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Strife Feature – The Incapable ‘Lone Ranger:’ Understanding Inequality and the Role of Interdependent Factors in the Onset of Violent Conflict

by

By Zach Beecher

Residents of the besieged Palestinian camp of Yarmouk, queuing to receive food supplies, in Damascus, Syria, in 2014 (Credit Image: Uncredited/AP)

 

Central to understanding the outbreak of violent conflict is the question of what propels the first combatant to pull the trigger and propel the force of his or her voice through the barrel of a gun. Recent literature aims to understand the role of horizontal and vertical inequality in the initiation of war. Yet, despite strong correlations, there is seemingly no smoking gun from the start of conflict indicating a causal relationship with inequality. Ultimately, inequality, whether horizontal or vertical, cannot be said to be “the lone ranger” in triggering conflicts, it is dependent upon a host of interdependent variables that must act in symphony to create the cacophony of war.[1]

Vertical inequality is the measure of “how income or another attribute is distributed among individuals or households in a population.”[2] Typically measured within a particular country though sometimes globally, it ranks the population from top to bottom in terms of distribution of income or a similarly inordinate variable.[3] Examining vertical inequality and what it reflects about a population illuminates the gaps that must be surmounted to provide for improved “social mobility” in the population.[4]

Seeking to break the cycle of violence in a scramble to the top, the dawn of the 21st century marked confidence and ambitious goals in eradicating vertical inequalities. Five years ahead of its own schedule, the World Bank reportedly halved the 1990 worldwide poverty rate of 36% to a mere 18%.[5] Despite this accomplishment, results are uneven throughout the world and the ultimate goal of eradicating “extreme poverty” by 2030 is likely futile.[6] Though these programs focus on sheer numbers rather than specific group dynamics, a more peaceful century should have been at hand.[7]

 

Figure 1: Millions of Impoverished People and Percentage of Global Poor Over Time[8]

 

However, Christopher Cramer identifies flaws in the empirical arguments for the causal relationship between vertical inequality and the onset of violence. First, he identifies the problematic definition of what is specified as the onset of violent conflict by evaluating the Gini coefficient.[9] He compares five countries: Brazil, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, and Panama. In Figure 2, one can see South Africa and Guatemala that faced considerable intrastate violence during the period of 1944 to 2000 as opposed to those on the right who did not face significant intrastate violence.[10] Yet, the inequality of the “no conflict” nations are more extreme. Brazil further complicates this when one considers the extraordinary violence in its borders not related to an attempted overthrow of the government.[11] Thus, Cramer holds that inequality may be the seeds of violence, but it may fester and manifest in different ways depending on context.[12]

Figure 2: Gini Coefficients of Nations Suffering Intrastate conflict vs. Nations Not Suffering Intrastate Conflict[13]

Further, Cramer notes the lack of a “linear” relationship between homicide and violence in society to varying degrees of economic inequality.[14] He points out that the more equal nations of Finland, South Korea, and Costa Rica show no significant differences in homicide rates when compared with a significantly less equal country like Venezuela[15] Amartya Sen echoes this argument by pointedly noting that Kolkata, India is simultaneously one of the poorest cities in the world as well as a one of the safest.[16] Clearly, measures of vertical inequality fail to fully illuminate a causal argument for the outbreak of violence.

The world spins madly on in the new millennium, “conflicts have increased sharply since 2010” with active conflicts jumping from 41 to 50 from 2014 to 2015 alone.[17] New conflicts are marked by an “increasing concentration of the impoverished in countries affected by violence” (see Figure 3).[18] The report also notes that the longer a country is involved in war, the deeper the depths of poverty become over time (see Figure 4).[19] At first glance, the correlation of the geography of the poor and conflict seemingly suggests a causal relationship. Yet, a “chicken and egg” problem emerges: are wars starting because nations are increasingly poor or are they poor because wars continue?

 

Figure 3: Percent Share of Global Power Plotted Against Fragile State Index [20]

 

 

Figure 4: Poverty Headcount (% of population under $1.25 a day) Over Time[21]

 

Horizontal inequality may provide the detail needed to better understand the relationship between onsets of conflict and inequality. Defined by Frances Stewart as the “multidimensional” measure of inequalities “between culturally defined groups,” divided into four categories: economic, social, political, and cultural status. [22] Economic horizontal inequality is “access and ownership of assets.”[23] Social horizontal inequalities are marked by the availability and access of social services.[24] Political horizontal inequalities are the “distribution of political opportunities and power among groups.”[25] Lastly, cultural status horizontal inequalities “include disparities in the recognition and standing of different groups’ languages, customs, norms and practices.”[26] Taken together, horizontal inequalities, or “categorical inequalities,” persist for generations as one group seizes an advantage initially and secures a “cumulative” advantage over time thereby solidifying their relative control of a particular resource.[27]

Empirical evidence emphasizes the centrality of horizontal inequalities in the outbreak of violent conflict. Stewart found “the probability of conflict increases threefold” when comparing counties with average economic and social horizontal inequalities with those in the 95th percentile and this level maintains with consistency of higher horizontal inequalities in the political, economic, and social spheres.[28] Essentially, if a group is able to maintain some degree of control within one of those three spheres, the chance of conflict is less likely as the deprivation is less complete.[29] Ultimately, it is precisely this mass “socioeconomic deprivation” that drives the production of a “mass grievance” that can trigger organized opposition and possibly violence.[30]

Gudrun Østby finds further damning numbers for the combustible qualities of horizontal inequalities. Evaluating the averages across the global spectrum, Østby finds that probability for the trigger of a violent conflict rests around a 2.3% amongst nations average in horizontal inequality, but when adjusting the variables of horizontal asset inequality to the 95th percentile, this jumps to 6.1%.[31] Interestingly, Østby finds there may be increased relevance in looking at interregional inequalities, as the addition of 95th percentile of interregional rates of horizontal inequalities leaps the chance of conflict leaps from 3.8% to 9.5%.[32] Lastly, when these horizontal inequalities specifically look at asset allocation by regions, where one region is more benefitted than other, like oil in Western Angola, and there are severe political exclusionary policies in effect, the chance of conflict becomes dramatically high approaching 24%.[33] Horizontal inequalities are certainly kindling high with potential to spark violent conflict.[34]

Yet, the match of conflict is not always sparked; poverty can also translate into “passivity” powered by an overwhelming “sense of voicelessness and powerlessness.”[35] Amartya Sen notes, “many countries have experienced – and continue to experience – the simultaneous presence of economic destitution and political strife.”[36] Not all of these countries face open conflict in their streets as a result of this destitution, thus a causal relationship between inequality and violence remains dubious.

Morris Miller instead argues that the “siren song” of leaders draws people to war emphasizing the considerable barriers, both financial and organizational, that the impoverished face in initiating and ultimately waging war.[37] First, leaders are able to “[stir] up chauvinism and/or grievances by virtue of control of media.”[38] Second, leaders have “recourse to motivation” through a variety of means to incentivize or force participation in conflict.[39] Lastly, making and waging war is an “exceptionally costly process” in human and financial terms.[40] Leaders certainly matter, but the groundswell for action is foundationally related to the grievances of the people, typically rooted in poverty and inequality.

Therefore, rising inequality may instead be the “warning bells” to conflict.[41] Miller notes that this foundational base of poverty “may give rise to widespread and acute stress for individuals and society at large.”[42] This may then lead to conflict through what Ted Gurr calls, “relative deprivation.”[43] He defines this as: “…perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities.”[44] He argues that when society provides conditions that cause individuals to have rising expectations and these expectations fail to materialise, the depths of “discontent” deepen across society.[45] Gurr postulates that this intensification of dissatisfaction with the state and the status quo is the match point for sparking the outbreak of violence as particular groups mobilise to prevent a seeming deepening of horizontal inequalities.[46]

James Davies echoes Gurr arguing that those with the means and “dissatisfied [states] of mind” trigger the onset of violent conflict.[47] He predicts, “revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a period of sharp reversal.”[48] To visualize this “mood” in a population, Davies depicts the situation through a “J-curve” that illustrates where declining circumstances running headlong into rising expectations spark violence (see Figure 5).[49] Stewart lends her support to this concept, stating “perceived injustices rather than because of measured statistical inequalities…” often catalyse action.[50] Inequality is significant not in its depth in the intensity of which it is felt by the aggrieved.

 

Figure 5: Need Satisfaction and Revolution[51]

 

 

Consider the contemporary example of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Following the 2003 American invasion, Sunnis, previously the dominant political class of Iraq but the minority population comprising about 40% of Iraq’s 38 million people, suddenly found themselves on the outside looking in.[52] Mosul, a majority Sunni city of 1.6 million people, quickly became a nest for the nascent and later fierce Sunni insurgency against the “Sunniphobic” policies of a predominantly Shi’a government in Baghdad.[53] Beyond Sunni identity politics, many officers from the Saddam-era army who refused to serve in the new government migrated to Mosul. In this marriage of mayhem between Ba’athist and Sunni militants, Mosul became home to Al Qaeda in Iraq, under the brutal leadership of Zarqawi, which would ultimately grow into ISIS, and the Jaish Naqshbandi, a militant group led by a close aide to Saddam Hussein.[54] Deep and newfound horizontal inequalities deepened cleavages in Iraqi society, but it is impossible to imagine the conflict without understanding the role of the ideology and leadership of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and Abu Musab al Zarqaqi as well as the history of foreign intervention in the region. Certainly, the social terrain is an essential factor in the onset of civil war, but it does not occur in a vacuum.[55]

Ultimately, we find that inequality, whether delineated as horizontal or vertical, is an incapable “lone ranger.” Empirical data presented by Stewart and Østby clearly build on the case for the importance of understanding relative horizontal inequalities in the onset of conflict. Work by the World Bank and United Nations provide a macro view to the eradication of vertical inequality. Yet, as Sen and Cramer argue, a direct causal or smoking gun indicator tying inequality to the outbreak of conflict remains missing. To fully understand then, one must analyse the role of leaders, expectations, and market factors alongside and as a part of vertical and horizontal inequality, because, in the words of Amartya Sen, these interconnections that “work together” do so “often kill together.”[56]

 

Zach Beecher is an MA candidate in Conflict, Security & Development at King’s College London. He focuses on rule of law efforts, counterinsurgency, and post-conflict stabilisation. Previous to his time at King’s, Zach served with the United States Army; in 2017, he was the Lead Logistics Advise and Assist Coordinator for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division during combat operations in Northern Iraq. He is a graduate of Princeton University. You can reach him for questions at [email protected].

 

Notes:

 

[1] Sen, A. (2008). Violence, Identity and Poverty. Journal of Peace Research, 45(1), p. 12. He uses this to describe the role of deprivation, but I specify its application to the general role of inequality.

[2] Currie - Alder, Bruce and Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora. International Development: Ideas Experiences, and Prospects. “Chapter 6: Inequality and Development.” Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (2015). Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty. Washington, D.C., p.1.

[6] World Bank. (2016). Poverty Overview. [online] The World Bank defines extreme poverty as those persons on an income of less than $1.25 (USD) a day. Poverty persists in sub-Saharan Africa continues with little reduction placing the recent reduction at only 4 million of a larger estimated 389 million.

[7] Stewart, F. (2002). Horizontal inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. P. 1.

[8] Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty, p. 1.

[9] United Nations Development Programme. (2013). Income Gini coefficient | Human Development Reports. [online] The World Bank and United Nations define the income Gini Coefficient as: “Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country from a perfect distribution, a 0 indicates perfect equality, while a 100 indicates absolute inequality.”

[10] Cramer, C. (2003). “Does Inequality Cause Conflict?” Journal of International Development, 15(5), pp. 401 - 402. Here, he is working with the inequality data from Deningerger and Squire (1996) and the conflict data from Sambanis (2000). It should be noted that Panama faced interstate war in 1990 and Guinea-Bissau experienced some violence in its local region during the late 1990s.

[11] Cramer, 401 - 402. At the time of writing for Cramer, he identified a murder rate of 20 per 100,000. Currently, as recently as 2016, Forbes reported that the number of murders or actions with lethal intent in Brazil eclipsed 58,000, greater than those killed in Syria, a nation currently engaged in a civil war. Reported by Kenneth Rapoza, “As Crime Wave Hits Brazil, Daily Death Toll Tops Syria.” Forbes. Online. Published 28 October 2016.

[12] Ibid., 403.

[13] Cramer., 403.

[14] Ibid.., 403.

[15] Ibid., 403. At the time of Cramer’s writing, Venezuela was in a vastly different civil situation.

[16] Sen, 9.

[17] Marc, A. (2015). Conflict and Violence in the 21st Century: Current Trends as Observed in Empirical Research and Statistics. Slide 2.

[18] Ibid., Slide 2. In this assessment, Alexandre Marc plots the geographic locations of the impoverished outlined in the “Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty” report by the Development Economics Group at the World Bank in 2014 and plots it against the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Fragile States Index.

[19] Marc., Slide 17. By Marc’s analysis, he argues that “a civil war costs a medium-sized developing country the equivalent of 30 years of GDP growth.”

[20] Ibid., Slide 16.

[21] Ibid., Slide 17.

[22] Stewart, UNU - WIDER, p. 2. and Stewart, Frances. Horizontal Inequalities as a cause of conflict. (2009). Bradford Development Lecture, p. 5.

[23] Ibid., 5.

[24] Ibid., 5.

[25] Ibid., 5.

[26] Ibid., 5.

[27] Currie- Alder, Bruce and Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone.

[28] Stewart, Bradford Development Lecture, p. 7.

[29] Ibid., p. 9.

[30] Stewart, Bradford Development Lecture, p. 9.

[31] Østby, G. (2007). Horizontal Inequalities, Political Environment, And Civil Conflict : Evidence From 55 Developing Countries, 1986-2003. Policy Research Working Papers. p, 20.

[32] Ibid., 20.

[33] Ibid., 23.

[34] Østby, 24 – 25. She identifies two major concerns with her analysis. First, the data is drawn from a limited pool of surveys conducted from only 1986 to 2003. Second, there may be errors in “operationalization” of specific variables.

[35] Ibid., 275.

[36] Sen, 7.

[37] Miller, 276.

[38] Miller, 276.

[39] Ibid. 276.

[40] Ibid., 276.

[41] Miller, 278.

[42] Ibid., 291.

[43] Gurr, T. (2016). Why men rebel. London: Routledge, p. 33.

[44] Gurr, 33. He defines value expectations as, “the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled” and value capabilities as, “the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.”

[45] Gurr, 33.

[46] Ibid., 33.

[47] Davies, J. (1962). Toward a Theory of Revolution. American Sociological Review, 27(1), p. 6.

[48] Ibid., 6. He defines revolution as: “violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support.”

[49] Ibid, 6.

[50] Stewart, UNU-WIDER, p. 15.

[51] Ibid., 6.

[52] Central Intelligence Agency. “Iraq.” The World Factbook. 21 June 2017. Online. and Hashim, Ahmed. (2006). Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq. New York: Cornell University Press. Page 237.

[53] Fishman, Brian H. (2016). The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory. New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 183.

[54] Parker, Ned and Raheem Salman. (14 June 2014). “Fall of Mosul aided by Iraq’s political distrust.” Reuters. Online.

[55] Gubler and Selway, 227.

[56] Sen, 11.

 

Image Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/syrias-war-80-in-poverty-life-expectancy-cut-by-20-years-200bn-lost#img-1

 

Bibliography:

Central Intelligence Agency. “Iraq.” The World Factbook. 21 June 2017. Online.

Corcoran, Mary (1995). “Rags to Rags: Poverty and Mobility in the United States,” Annual Review of Sociology, 21: pp. 237 – 267.

Cramer, C. (2003). “Does Inequality Cause Conflict?” Journal of International Development, 15(5), pp.397 - 412.

Currie- Alder, Bruce and Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora. International Development: Ideas Experiences, and Prospects. “Chapter 6: Inequality and Development.” Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014.

Davies, J. (1962). “Toward a Theory of Revolution.” American Sociological Review, 27(1), p.5.

Fishman, Brian H. (2016). The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gubler, J. and Selway, J. (2012). “Horizontal Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages, and Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(2), pp.206-232.

Gurr, T. (2016). Why men rebel. London: Routledge.

Hashim, Ahmed. (2006). Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq. New York: Cornell University Press.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (2015). Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty. Washington, D.C., p.1.

Marc, A. (2015). Conflict and Violence in the 21st Century: Current Trends as Observed in Empirical Research and Statistics.

Miller, M. (2000). “Poverty as a cause of wars?” Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25(4), pp.273-297.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014). Highlights: States of Fragility 2014 - Meeting Post 2014 Ambitions. The Development Assistance Committee.

Østby, G. (2007). “Horizontal Inequalities, Political Environment, And Civil Conflict : Evidence From 55 Developing Countries, 1986-2003.” Policy Research Working Papers.

Parker, Ned and Raheem Salman. (14 June 2014). “Fall of Mosul aided by Iraq’s political distrust.” Reuters. Online.

Paul, C., Clarke, C., Grill, B. and Dunigan, M. (2013). Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. RAND Corporation, Chapter: Angola (UNITA), 1975 2002 Case Outcome: COIN Win.

Rapoza, K. (2016). “As Crime Wave Hits Brazil, Daily Death Toll Tops Syria.” [online] Forbes. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/10/28/as-crime-wave-hits-brazil-daily-death-toll-tops-syria.

Sen, A. (2008). “Violence, Identity and Poverty.” Journal of Peace Research, 45(1), pp.5 - 15.

Stewart, F. (2002). Horizontal inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

Stewart, Frances. Horizontal Inequalities as a cause of conflict. (2009). Bradford Development Lecture.

United Nations (2000). Resolution 55/2: Millennium Declaration. New York: United Nations, p.1.

United Nations Development Programme. (2013). Income Gini coefficient | Human Development Reports. [online] Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient.

World Bank. (2016). Poverty Overview. [online] Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview.

 

Crossing Borders: Technology and Migration in an Interconnected World - Conference Tickets on Sale

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By: Johan Lammers

In times of travel bans and Brexit, as a foreign student from The Netherlands where the polls are led by a party whose official stance on immigration is literally ‘zero asylum seekers extra and no more immigrants from Islamic countries; border closed’, migration is never far from my thoughts and conversations. In this blogpost, I would like to give an idea of why migration is worthy of our growing concern in the interconnected, digitalized ‘Age of Information’. In doing so, I also set the scene for the upcoming annual Conflict, Security and Development Conference happening on the 3rd of March 2017 on this issue with the title ‘Crossing Borders: Technology and Migration in an Interconnected World’.

The UN documents over 243 million migrants around the world, or 3.3% of world population. Between 2014-2016, EuroStat recorded over 3 million first-time asylum requests to the EU; in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Lebanon, refugees make up 43%, 36% and 27% of the population. While the concept of a smartphone did not exist at the end of the Cold War, 37% of the world population is expected to own one in 2020; a 2015 survey found that close to 86% of the Syrian youth in a refugee camp in Jordan did. Unsurprisingly, both strongly upward trends have an influence on each other. Migrant and host communities are increasingly interconnected through constant and abundant live information. This increasingly blurs the lines that divide consumers and producers of generated news and public opinion about ongoing conflicts. The emergence of physical and virtual information and communication networks have an endogenous reinforcing effect and facilitate an unprecedented flow of people and ideas.

However, these flows are far from uncontrollable as numerous stakeholders with varying if not directly opposing interests seek to manage, coordinate or exploit this modern phenomenon of (forced) migration in an interconnected world. Whereas the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees seeks to manage global databases in camps based on biometric registrations, border police are using drones for monitoring. Separated families can remain in touch or even reunite across vast distances. Expectation management for aspiring migrants, educational information and preparing for integration greatly benefit from a wealth of online data, programs and apps. Meanwhile, migrants risk entire livelihoods based on the best practices, rumours and accounts of strangers via Facebook groups.

In addition to these parallel mechanisms that make up the interaction between technology and migration, single mechanisms do not have a uniformly beneficial or harmful effect. Does technology hamper the capacity of human traffickers through increased transparency in their practices, or does it provide them with unchecked informal advertising platforms and viral mouth-to-mouth networks? How does the constant feed of real-time available media material influence both mutual perceptions of migrant and host communities and the political climates that result for their political representatives?

Hence, a proper understanding of migration and technology cannot come from merely a single perspective but requires multiple lenses. Yet neither is it merely a ‘problem’ that should be ‘solved’, without also discussing the opportunities to be seized.

During the Conflict, Security and Development Conference on the 3rd of March 2017, we will address several of these issues by bringing together academics, NGOs, policymakers, journalists, entrepreneurs and migrants for discussion. Through this forum, we seek to compare and contrast how these combined perspectives provide an idea of what the current challenges and opportunities are, and how these integrated trends are likely to develop in the years to come.

In our first panel, we bring together migrants-turned-activists and entrepreneurs to identify how modern technologies have a personal impact on a migrant’s experiences, but also how businesses emerge to employ migrants and cater towards particular needs of these emerging target audiences. Our second panel discusses how NGOs and other migration managers seek to employ technologies to coordinate these flows of peoples. Our third panel considers what policy implications modern, digitalized migrants might have, and how technologies can be instrumentalized towards advancing these aims.

More information on how to buy tickets, our speakers’ profiles, and the schedule for the day can be found on our website. Payment: The conference welcomes all audiences, though students from the University of London can attend at a reduced fee.

Notes:

Beheshti-Kashi, Samaneh, Makki, Baharak (2013), ‘Social Media News: Motivation, Purpose and Usage’, International Journal of Computer Science & Information Technology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.97-105

The author is pursuing his MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. This piece was submitted by the 2017 Conflict, Security and Development Conference organisers as an advertisement for the annual student-led CSD Conference. You can buy tickets here.

Image source: http://www.wnyc.org/story/a-harrowing-journey-into-europe-aided-by-apps-and-internet-access/

Book Review: ‘A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence’

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Reviewed By: Kate Dinnison

D. Davis, D. Kilcullen, G. Mills and D. Spencer, A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence, (London, UK: Hurst&Co. Publishing), 2016; ISBN-13: 978-1849046282

Colombia Book

Since its liberation from Spain by Simon Bolivar in 1819, la Republica de Colombia has been perpetually at war, almost 150 of its 195 years. Colombia, for a long time, was synonymous with weak institutions, crime, terrorism, and, above all, the cocaine that perpetuated the conflict. This country, however, is now one of the greatest success stories of countering insurgency in the 21st century, and A Great Perhaps sets out to investigate both the efforts made by the Colombian government and the international community, as well as analyse the adaptive nature of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s left-wing guerrillas.

The authors, Dickie Davis, David Kilcullen Greg Mills and David Spencer, have crafted a comprehensive and holistic account of the long effort by the government to beat back the guerrillas, reduce the dependency on the illicit economy, and improve perennial issues like social exclusion. More than this, A Great Perhaps is a book that asks one of the most fundamental and puzzling questions in the study of conflict and counterinsurgency (COIN): What, in effect, is victory?

The historical background in Chapter 1 divides the conflict into six phases, from La Violencia in 1949 to the official establishment of FARC, then following the ebbs and flows of insurgency through the latter half of the 20th century, up to the groundwork for today’s bilateral ceasefire. Each author then delves into different components of Colombia’s protracted struggle – guerrilla warfare, the security-economy nexus, FARC’s transformation, concluding by putting the conflict up against other modern day insurgencies and outlining Colombia’s ‘prospects for peace.’[1] While there are small noticeable differences in writing style between the four authors, there is a consistent organisation throughout that allows for readers to take away a laundry list of issues as well as remedies.

The efforts in previous and ongoing COIN operations such as Malaya and Afghanistan, while helpful in contrasting to the more civil situation in Colombia, provide limited insight into defining victory for the Colombian government and for their people. As the authors establish, the interplay of narcotics and insurgency, international and domestic actors, and civilians and the military are entirely unique to Colombia but can be useful for drawing parallels to those African nations undergoing similar security challenges, which they address in the final chapter.[2]

This incredibly detailed account of Colombia’s ‘long war’ goes far beyond much of journalism about the conflict, providing insight into the grievances that gave birth to the insurgency, the influence of ‘conflict entrepreneurs,’ the complex role of narcotics in the economy, and how war serves as a means for a higher end – credible peace.[3] Even without any background knowledge on this often side-lined current affairs topic, any reader will come out with a clear understanding of the military campaign on the wider political and strategic levels, down to the tactical and operational details from both the government and guerrilla perspectives.

Since the publication of this book, Colombia is one step closer to a peace agreement with FARC with the signing of a ‘A Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire, Cessation of Hostilities, and Laying Aside of Weapons.’ This is an important step defined as victory, toward ending the violence and criminality that has plagued Colombia for decades. Like any country enduring civil conflict, Colombia is skating on thin ice - the successes made since the turn of the century could easily be derailed by a round of failed peace talks, lack of popular support, a crippling economic recession, or budget cuts in defense, as the authors remind us.[4] Davis, Kilcullen, Mills and Spencer dissect the roots of Colombia’s protracted war in order to celebrate the successes of the campaign since 2002.

 

Kate Dinnison is an American undergraduate student of International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter: @katedinns

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Davis, Dickie, David Kilcullen, Greg Mills, and David E. Spencer. A Great Perhaps?: Colombia: Conflict and Convergence. London: Hurst, 2016. pp. 179.

[2] Ibid., pp. 68.

[3] Ibid., pp. 2.

[4] Ibid., pp. 80

Image Credit: https://www.amazon.com/Great-Perhaps-Colombia-Conflict-Divergence/dp/184904628X

Image Credit: http://doralnewsonline.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ejercito-colombiano.jpg

The World's Forgotten Migrants

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By Isobel Petersen:

A displaced woman sits on a bed next to the remnants of her burnt house in Khor Abeche, South Darfur. April, 2014. Photo: Albert Gonzalez Farran, UNAMID (CC 2.0)
A displaced woman sits on a bed next to the remnants of her burnt house in Khor Abeche, South Darfur. April, 2014. Photo: Albert Gonzalez Farran, UNAMID (CC 2.0)

Human migration exists on a large scale across the globe, but in a variety of forms and for a variety of reasons. Conflict is one of the key causes of displacement, which is unsurprising considering the devastating effects of living in a conflict zone: poor health; economic instability; familial tragedy and lack of education opportunities, amongst others.

Today’s conflicts are increasingly asymmetric with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) taking the lead in waging wars, resulting in a multitude of competing factions and loyalties heightening the threat to citizens of a state in conflict. Furthermore, the lines are blurred between combatant and civilian all too easily, normalising both the intentional targeting of civilians as well as their destruction as ‘collateral damage’. During the past 50 years, wars of independence evolved into civil wars, which splintered into NSAGs pursuing their own gains, the targeting of minorities, battles for resources, and border disputes. Today across Iraq and Syria there is a new supra-state crisis with the rise of Islamic State (IS).

In Europe the issue of displaced persons is most visible as thousands cross the Mediterranean into Italy and Greece or by land into the Balkan states. The rate at which they have arrived has doubled in the past year, although Europe is still home to less than 10% of the world’s displaced persons. This is a life-threatening journey with the risk of injury, separation from family, poverty and arrest along the way to a hopefully better life. We are all aware of the tragedies along the southern coastlines of the Med’s beaches, but with the rising political popularity of the European Right there has been a tendency to overlook the more disastrous bigger picture.

The significance of a European Right is that it has become a prominent mouthpiece for anti-immigration, nationalist voices. On the international scale, this has consequently presented the issue of immigration as a concern for the destination countries for immigrants rather than the reasons behind migration. This problem has been exacerbated by the lack of global responsibility to tackle the issue, and focuses instead on the socio-political climate of the countries that have the capacity to assist.

Migrants are displaced peoples, admittedly not always by force, but with sufficient reason to dare to start somewhere unfamiliar and potentially hostile. Displaced peoples can also be refugees, political exiles, stateless peoples and unwelcome minorities. Migration is considered as a last resort, whether to escape persecution, natural disaster, and extreme poverty or conflict zones, and it is not a new phenomenon.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) by the end of 2014 there were 59.5 million people forcibly displaced – that is, involuntarily displaced people. That is only a few million shy of the total UK population. This figure is too large to ignore and states must recognise that they are increasingly going to have to accommodate non-nationals as part of the wider solution to solve the problem. This is arguably precisely why the understanding of migration has narrowed, so much so that the vast majority of those displaced by conflict have been forgotten. These forgotten migrants are internally displaced peoples (IDPs); those who - predominantly as a result of conflict – have had to move within their own countries leaving them economically unstable and at risk from persecution. The issue of cross-border migration is so headline-grabbing that the vast number of IDPs have been pushed to one side, although they are in need of humanitarian assistance too.

A little over a month ago the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) released their latest annual report for the global trends and figures of IDPs. The report makes for powerful and shocking reading, as one realises just how many people are in transitory and volatile living situations within their own country. Across the 60 countries that the IDMC included in the study, there was an equivalent of 30,000 new IDPs every day between January and December 2014, bringing the global total to a staggering 38 million people; a 15% rise from 2013. When one then considers that this is about 65% of all displaced people, it becomes hard to ignore that this is a matter for academics, practitioners and policy-makers alike.

Photo: UNHCR
Photo: UNHCR

Earlier this month the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Lise Grande, made an urgent plea for £316m in assistance for Iraqis affected by the IS campaign, this includes over 3 million Iraqi IDPs. The financial contribution of international organisations and states is an essential part of the immediate and life-saving relief that people affected by conflict need. However, displacement cannot quickly be reversed or solved simply with funding; it must be a long-term policy movement to help not just the state structure but also the individuals. States impacted by intense conflict are likely to struggle through economic instability and weak state governance, thus making it difficult to provide for their own citizens and migrants.

In a 2009 report published by the International Committee of the Red Cross about IDPs, a key suggestion the organisation made was to assist in providing economic security in areas which are both likely to face the repercussions of conflict and those areas which receive IDPs in order to prevent future destabilisation. Post-conflict peacebuilding is accepted as a role for the UN and its member states; this must include acknowledging IDPs and assisting post-conflict governments in adjusting to the new social, economic and political demands of internal displacement.

The African Union’s (AU) 2009 Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, (informally known as the Kampala Convention), was the first legally binding instrument specifically catering to IDPs. By December 2014 22 AU member states had ratified it, with a further 20 member states signing it. This is an example of positive action taken by states affected directly, or as regional actors, by IDPs. It particularly reaffirms the obligation of governments to address the needs of those in their own states.

Implementation of concrete change is still, however, a challenge because states hosting displaced persons tend to be fragile, without the economic means to sufficiently address the issue. The Kampala Convention is an example of a decision that needs international support for it to be effectively implemented.

The numbers of IDPs in Colombia are the second worst in the world after Syria with 6 million counted in 2014, although UNHCR has said that may be an underestimate. This is as a result of a 50-year civil war between government forces and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), alongside other paramilitary groups and bandit gangs.

The poor of Colombia are becoming poorer and the ethnic minorities are suffering the most, as they live in the rural areas where most armed conflict takes place. There are legal frameworks in place to respond to internal displacement; however, this is hampered by poor enforcement on the part of the Colombian government, administrative errors, and most importantly a reactive rather than a proactive attitude. The weaknesses in the Colombian strategy of dealing with IDPs demonstrates the all-too-easy potential to provide reactive, short-term responses instead of prioritising a collaborative, long-lasting effort.

Once a ceasefire agreement has been signed, this does not mean that those IDPs who have fled the violence are once again able to continue with their lives. It should not be accepted that forcible displacement is an inevitable result of conflict; a new norm must take hold. Leaving the economic and physical security of one’s home as a result of conflict has long-term consequences for the future stability of a country, jeopardizing sustainable peace. This is the most important reason for why governments of countries with large numbers of IDPs must take the issue seriously and prioritise legal, financial and social assurances in the post-conflict environment. This requires the help of the international community who must continue to contribute to the essential humanitarian needs of those affected by conflict, including IDPs.

Most importantly, however, is the long-term recognition that migrants are not always cross-border refugees who are visible and demand a political response; a political response is needed for the ‘invisible’ migrants who have been displaced within their own countries too. Both issues must be tackled, but the issues are also separate, and demand separate responses.

Finally, it is essential that in countries such as the UK there is an attitude transformation regarding migration, as increasingly our domestic policy and attitude towards foreign relations is becoming narrow-minded and selfish. If this public attitude continues to prevail then there is no hope for a positive British contribution by policy-makers to the international tragedy of forcible internal displacement.

Isobel Petersen studied International Relations at the University of Exeter and is currently reading for an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Her particular interest is post-conflict resolution with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli crisis. Isobel is an Editor at Strife.

Aid and Conflict: Britain's approach

by

By Isobel Petersen:

UK aid bound for the Philipines after Typhoon Haiyan, November 2013. Photo: MoD, Sgt Ralph Merry (CC 2.0)
UK aid bound for the Philipines after Typhoon Haiyan, November 2013.
Photo: MoD, Sgt Ralph Merry (CC 2.0)

There is a trend across Western governments, and the UK is no exception, to consider the value of aid and conflict prevention as intertwined. The UK government has been a staunch supporter of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) framework since the 1990s (see Strife’s interview with Dylan Hendrickson). This concept advocates a holistic approach to human security that ties together the security and development sectors.

Prioritising reform and stabilising the security sector in a post-conflict situation to reduce the chances of repeated cycles is essential. But a country’s development is just as important when it comes to strengthening a government’s ability to provide for its people. Ultimately, SSR prioritises the individual’s sense of security in order to reduce the likelihood of future conflict. This framework is a good illustration of the wider plan for British overseas aid assistance and how it should be regarded.

It is normal for aid assistance, whether from states or Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), to be considered by governments and the authorities as interrelated with, and an underpinning motivation for, conflict prevention. However, in the public sphere aid assistance is usually understood to mean ‘poverty reduction’. This is a convenient portrayal, but there is more to aid commitments than the Robin Hood intentions of Western governments. Does it matter if the authorities and the public have different conceptions of the meaning of ‘aid’?

At the beginning of March parliament passed a bill committing 0.7% of Britain’s Gross National Income to international aid spending. This makes the UK one of the leading nations in global development assistance. As well as bolstering the UK’s international reputation, it also ensures that the UK as a donor country is involved in the domestic affairs of the recipient country. This is a particularly powerful side-effect when it comes to post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention. The consequences of the actions taken by the World Bank in developing nations’ affairs are infamously divisive; nonetheless, their explicit declaration of a positive correlation between poverty and recurrent conflict is a persuasive one.

Contributing to effective conflict prevention by improving human security requires resources, time, expertise and financing, and it is worth this investment. Combating conflict recurrence should be considered a key objective of the UK government’s foreign policy, if only because security threats are far more likely than ever to arise as a result of overseas conflicts and fragile states.

The UK government has a commitment to spending 30% of UK aid in fragile states, which means that a large proportion of the new aid budget will be going directly to states in the midst of conflict and instability. This does not take into account countries at the focus of democratisation efforts after conflict or countries with counter-terrorism operations, which are usually afflicted by conflict to some extent.

Giving aid in an ethical, cost-effective and sustainable fashion consistently throws up challenges, particularly when aid is so often required in conflict-affected areas; but this is not a good enough reason to suspend aid programmes and commitments.

There is a mainstream approach within Western policy-making views a conflict as consisting of two opposing sides who are either ‘allies’ or ‘spoilers’. International involvement typically follows the same path: first the military presence, then the post-conflict reconstruction phase, where an influx of aid will be directed at the ‘allied’ forces.[i] The choice recipient is based upon a certain interpretation of the conflict by the donor country or organisation that is difficult to avoid. This is one serious difficulty when faced with the task of giving aid in a conflict environment.

Another challenge is counter-terrorism. This issue can confuse the conventional association of aid with poverty-alleviation. Pakistan was the highest recipient of UK aid in 2014, and yet between 2009-2013 they were rated the 47th poorest nation by GDP. Pakistan clearly faces numerous challenges worthy of assistance, but this comparison demonstrates what happens when UK national interest takes precedence over genuine human need. It has even been argued that giving aid to states which are the focus of counter-terrorism operations can alienate the population because it is likely to be diverted away from the people.[ii]

In the same vein, aid coming into a conflict area can alter the power balance and distribution of resources within a divided society. This may lead to a worsening of inter-group tensions, the proliferation in arms acquisition, and a reinforcement of inequalities. It therefore runs the risk of worsening the existing conflict rather than succeeding with conflict prevention.

Sri Lanka is a good example of this. After the tsunami there was such vast pressure to give large amounts of aid to the country as quickly as possible that time was not spent considering facts other than the tsunami. The aid was undoubtedly life-saving but it did not take into account the concurrent conflict; there was a failure to ensure even distribution between government-controlled areas and those of the opposition Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebel movement. This only exacerbated political tensions and the ongoing conflict.

It is not just the practical hurdles that the UK faces when giving aid assistance, it also faces the criticism from the public and media at home. This is just as damaging to aid assistance as errors on the ground. Conservative MP Philip Davies declared the recent legislation as pandering to do-gooders with a “mis-guided guilt complex”. This is shockingly patronising and selfish. It is all too easy to argue that our lives in the UK would be simpler and better by keeping all we have for ourselves, but that is willfully ignorant of the difficult reality for so many beyond our borders. Furthermore, is it not contrary to the universal value of sharing with and caring for others that is taught to us all as children growing up?

There are a few key flaws in the criticism of the bill protecting the size of the UK aid budget. First, the announcement in early March simply enshrined in law a commitment that every UN member state made in 1970, so really this should have happened years ago. Second, the target was reached for the first time in 2013 with 0.72% of national income given,[iii] meaning that no extra spending would be required and it is compatible with the continued functioning of the UK. Finally, for those concerned that the wellbeing of British citizens would be excessively jeopardised, welfare spending was at 23.8% of GDP in 2013, leagues ahead of other EU member states, and vastly overshadows the aid commitment. The urgency of financial assistance and conflict prevention is higher than ever and as Justine Greening, the UK International Development Secretary, said last year to the World Bank spring meetings in Washington, “the humanitarian system is already stretched to breaking point”.

The MP who introduced the legislation, Michael Moore, argued that “the problems of other parts of the world do not stay local for long”.[iv] This has never been truer; conflict prevention and post-conflict assistance deserves attention, and one way of achieving this is through financial assistance. One aspect of financial assistance is the Government and Civil Society sector, which in 2013 received £835 million, 12.4% of the overall UK Bilateral aid spend. This sector includes activities carried out by the Conflict Pool, which is a cross-departmental UK team seeking to reduce the impact of conflict by holding rule of law projects and training peacekeepers for example.[v] The UK are in the luxurious position of being politically, socially and economically stable enough to contribute financially on a significant scale; it would be shameful not to do so.

Perhaps then, ‘aid’ is a term that can easily be misrepresented. It does not matter that UK aid is directed to conflict prevention as well as poverty assistance; but it does matter if their relationship is not widely understood by the British taxpayer. If the motivation for aid is to deliver reform, to protect national security, and to reduce the chances of recurrent conflict, then presenting the figures as solely to combat international poverty is misleading. The public perceive security and aid as separate entities, which means that those with the power of decision-making and implementation need to consider it their responsibility not to politicise an issue of international human security and well-being, but to express clearly how the aid commitment is relevant to both security and development, and furthermore how the two are related.

State failure and human insecurity as a result of conflict are both unacceptable. Responsible aid assistance is a start to building a country’s capacity to prevent future conflict. Providing funding and expertise to train the security forces in how to separate the roles of the police forces and military of a post-conflict state to increase their trustworthiness and efficiency is one example of how aid can increase capacity to prevent future conflict.

Conflict prevention and aid assistance are inextricably linked and the UK government legislation guaranteeing the nation’s role in this is a positive decision. However, there must be an awareness of the complexity of blindly trusting an aid package to solve everything. Monitoring, training, direct application to civilians, and accountability measures are all ways that such an aid commitment can reach its full potential. Importantly, raising awareness about the specificities about what UK aid assistance really means gives the British public the opportunity to ensure that whichever government comes next continues to live up these standards.

Isobel Petersen studied International Relations at the University of Exeter and is currently reading for an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Her particular interest is post-conflict resolution with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli crisis.

References

[i] D.Keen with L.Attree Dilemmas of Counter-terror, Stabilisation and Statebuilding in Saferworld (January 2015)

[ii] ibid

[iii] L. Booth “The 0.7% aid target” House of Commons Library (28 July 2014)

[iv] R. Mason “MPs back law committing 0.7% of national income to foreign aid” in Guardian foreign policy (12 September 2014)

[v] Statistics on International Development by DFID (October 2014)