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U.S. Energy, Placing Strategy ahead of Policy

January 22, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Benjamin Flosi

Conceptual photo of energy sources. Source: LovetoKnow

U.S. Energy Production – Politics vs. Strategy

U.S. energy policy is U.S. energy politics. The fight for energy-producing states this election season demonstrated this feature. President Trump made a calculated all-out blitz for these politically essential states in 2016 and 2020 by targeting his messaging of unrestricted energy production policies to critical constituents. [i] The Democrat Party, always in a more precarious political position due to a broader base, attempted to thread the needle, moving between abruptly ending the fossil fuel industry and gently progressing away. Finally, deciding on $2T in spending as a middle ground between its constituents.

This phenomenon deviates from U.S. energy policy’s historical role, where political leadership from both parties would equate energy policy with national security. President Nixon declared an emergency after the oil embargo and increased domestic production programmes. President Carter looked to secure supplies by removing pricing controls, establishing a strategic reserve, and initiated the U.S. military’s force increase in the Gulf region.[ii] The first war in Iraq was partially justified as preventing Saddam Hussein from controlling an even greater share of the global oil supply. Similarly, the reactivation of the fifth fleet and regional basing and partnerships stem from these strategic calculations. Even as recently as President Obama, achieving energy independence from international vagaries was a central talking point of his clean and renewable energy policies. Despite different political bases and inherent beliefs, each approached energy policy from the point of strategic national benefit.

Overton Window

When tackling climate change, America would be wise not to put policy goals before a strategic approach, as demonstrated in the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussain. Here, a rush to achieve a “safer world” through removing several threats and the spread of democracy, all in one swift policy, demonstrates that having a policy goal of global change without a feasible and sustainable strategy to reach that goal can invite catastrophe.

Fortunately, the U.S. energy-producing states’ current importance to any presidential bid, the 50/50 divided in domestic politics, and a split congress offer the opportunity to implement an energy strategy over an energy policy. This is due to the current political conditions preventing either side from implementing a strictly partisan policy. Furthermore, the diverse options under any multifaceted and long-term strategy allow political actors from all sides to claim a moral victory and deliver results to their constituents.

Strategic Dilemma

Climate change is real. Unfortunately, so is Chinese and Russian aggression. The kernel of this strategic dilemma is that most U.S. steps to reduce carbon use also reduces U.S. and global security. While climate change will continue to impose itself on the word with strategic repercussions, so will Russia and China. China’s ability to use threats about trade to compel the E.U. in times of stress was successful, as the E.U. backed down in its reporting on China’s response to COVID. China also produced similar threats to cut off medical and pharmaceutical supplies to the U.S. Furthermore, their use of salami tactics to control trade routes, energy sources, and commercial fishing in national territory and control pieces of Europe will continue independent of climate change.

Decarbonization will be costly to the U.S. Every effort to impose restrictions will decrease the strategic risk of climate change but will increase the strategic risk imposed by China and Russia due to reduced U.S. economic capacity, global economic influence, energy independence, and reduce the energy independence of its allies and partners. There is also no guarantee that enduring these costs will achieve the objectives of ending or significantly reducing global warming due to China’s continual expansion of coal power plants and occupation of oil and gas fields in the South China Sea for potential exploitation. Furthermore, projected growth across India and Asia could additionally counter any feasible reductions in the U.S.

Strategic Opportunities

Advantages of the Status Quo: In 2019, the U.S. attained a greater degree of energy independence as it transitioned from being a net importer to a net exporter of crude and refined petroleum products. This accomplishment provides an economic advantage in revenue derived through market share, integration of world-class U.S. corporations into economies around the world, sustains a robust and dynamic economy that absorbs millions of immigrants and develops everything from the P.C. to one of the first the COVID-19 vaccine, and fuels a military that maintains global security. It also provides a hedge in the event of a great power or sustained conflict. Similarly, U.S. production capacity secures European economies and militaries as it allows for an alternative to global supply chains and dependence on Russia’s energy exports.[iii] Since oil and gas trade in USD, current arrangements help solidify the USD’s strategic advantage as the reserve currency and global finance provider. This latter fact is beneficial for countering an economically ambitious China attempting to ensnare smaller countries, as revealed in Sri Lanka’s loss of Hambantota Port, by creating new trade routes and an alternate reserve currency and financing opportunities.

Advantages of Opportunity: While the U.S. does maintain a current strategic advantage in the extraction-based world, this does not mean that a future of transition is devoid of similar strategic opportunities. The U.S. possesses several inherent strategic advantages, which it can lever in the quest to develop an answer to these problems. These include its capacity for research and development through its universities, defence and federal government initiatives, and iconic inventors in their garages. It also includes its business culture, cutting edge firm practices, entrepreneurship, and its flexible and dynamic investing ecosystem. Therefore, any path towards decarbonization can maintain some of the current advantages if it applies these strengths.

Strategic Pillars

Treat Decarbonization like Disarmament: To prevent a strategic nadir, the U.S. can treat decarbonization like disarmament. Agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords, on their own, will only hurt compliers while increasing relative gains of countries savvy or cynical enough to join and evade or ignore commitments. While Xi Jinping was producing statement after statement about reducing greenhouse emissions, his party brought more new coal plants into existence, nationally and internationally, than the accords can potentially overcome. Alternately, as U.S. efforts to decarbonize increase consumers’ and exporters’ costs, reduce U.S. multinational firms’ capacity, and reduce core industrial capability and small businesses vitality, America’s rivals continue to decrease energy production and consumption costs.

Therefore, as the Biden administration starts to adjust the Trump trade war, realigns relations with China, and builds U.S. manufacturing and the post-COVID economy, an opportunity exists to create agreements that can balance these concerns and embed reciprocal actions over blanket U.S. reductions.

Secure Supply Lines: Long-term movement away from carbon dependence requires a move towards reliance on rare earth elements. While the federal government has taken steps to increase its reserves of these elements, no efforts exist to secure continued supply, especially in a national emergency or sustained conflict. The fact that Russia and China together can possess or control up to 90% of global supply, depending on the specific element, adds another security challenge that requires a solution before relying on renewables.

Fortunately, the potential for new exploration exists in the U.S., Australia, Africa, and Latin America. Similarly, other Asian countries besides China can provide a low-cost option in making these materials usable. Malaysia being one, where China’s attempt to dominate its port facilities and transportation infrastructure demonstrates the need to secure these chains. Ambitious exploration and exploitation can reduce the costs of extraction and open new supplies. Part of securing this access, against China’s attempts, could include setting up ventures between U.S. and host nation companies to address the exploration, mining, extraction, and transportation required to bring these items to market while keeping the process partly in U.S. hands. As any return on investment would be long-term and risky, the U.S. Government would need to play a role in funding, guaranteeing profits, and technology exchange. This model could also deliver structured and spill-over entrepreneurial, technology, and educational benefits to local businesses and populations through additional loans, infrastructure development, educational opportunities, and access to both global and U.S. markets and companies. It could provide a local and grassroots development model and an alternate approach to China’s state-centered and state empowering One Belt One Road initiative. [iv]

Develop Comparative Advantages at Home: Within the U.S., opportunities exist that play to America’s strength and ensure that decarbonization supports U.S. economic advancement. As renewables and batteries depend on a significant amount of rare earth elements and minerals, the government can use U.S. universities to start programs that will create technology that can extract minerals with cheaper methods. The government can also promote STEM education in these fields through subsiding education. The importance of the production of these components to national security provides an opportunity to bring advanced manufacturing back to the U.S. Although, achieving this remains complicated as production in the U.S. is more expensive than in Asia. Still, the government should examine expenses, including the cost of not controlling production, including diplomatic and military, associated with securing overseas supplies and use them in a calculation on onshoring.[v]

Conclusion

In the U.S., the election cycle, which seemingly is an almost continuous street brawl these days, limits politicians’ ability to implement longer-term and incremental solutions. Instead, they must execute the immediate option to meet their short-term political demands. Although, as the President and Congress wade through a divided government and country, the opportunity exists to trade short-term paralysis for a long-term strategy and implement a far-sighted approach to battling climate change.

[i] Guliyev, Farid. “Trump’s ‘America first’ energy policy, contingency and the reconfiguration of the global energy order.” Energy Policy, vol. 140, May 2020.

[ii] Painter, David. “Oil and Geopolitics: The Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the Cold War.” Historical and Social Research, vol. 39, no. 4, 2014.

[iii] Henderson J., Mitrova T. (2020) Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia. In: Hafner M., Tagliapietra S. (eds) The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition. Lecture Notes in Energy, vol 73. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39066-2_5.

[iv] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/) from September-November 2020.

[v] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/)from September-November 2020.

Benjamin Flosi is a first year Ph.D. student at King’s College London and a Copy Editor at Strife.

Why Biden Will Not Get Soft with China

December 21, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Martina Bernardini

President-Elect Joe Biden, then in his capacity of Vice President, walks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, shortly after his arrival at Andrews Air Force Base during a 2015 visit to the United States (Image credit: AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster)

The election of Joe Biden as President of the United States is meaningful for several reasons, but foreign policy stands out as one of the most important. While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent crisis in Transatlantic relations challenged the resilience of U.S. hegemony, the widespread enthusiasm to Biden’s election demonstrates that the U.S. historic allies still want – and require – an engaged United States on their side. Taking the reins of U.S. foreign policy in this particular moment in the history of the international system, however, is not an easy task. The biggest challenge lies in re-affirming the U.S. position in world affairs, a grand strategy that will contribute to building a strict balance between Washington and Beijing, to show that the absolute decline of U.S. power has not occurred.

During his presidential campaign, outgoing U.S. President Donald J. Trump argued that Biden allowed China to become a threat to the United States by supporting China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Such assumption indicated that for Trump, if Biden became President of the United States, he would get soft with China. The recent history of U.S. foreign policy, however, dismisses this thesis. In 2000, in fact, together with eighty-two U.S. Senators and 237 members of the House of Representatives, Joe Biden did vote in favour of the China Trade Bill, which authorised ‘the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to the People’s Republic of China, and to establish a framework for relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.’

The approval of such a bill by the U.S. Congress accompanied U.S. support for China’s accession to the WTO. At the dawn of the 21^st century, this move represented – at least to U.S. policymakers – China’s official embrace of a world order based on the American-led ideals of free trade and democracy, a trend that was set in motion by President Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush. China’s entry into the WTO was indeed positively welcomed both by Democrats and Republicans – by Presidents Clinton as well as George W. Bush – because it was seen as the coronation of a grand strategy aimed at bringing China into a pan-American trade regime. Consequently, Biden’s vote in favour of the China Trade Bill does not mean that, as President of the United States, he will adopt a concessionary China policy. Incidentally, the exact reasons for his support of China’s integration into the global trade system increase the probability that Biden’s foreign policy towards China will not be accommodating.

Biden’s vision of the United States in the world reflects the American exceptionalism that drove the United States towards superpower status by spreading the American soft power and democratic ideals abroad from the Spanish-American war (1898) to Obama’s presidency (2008-2016). For Biden, this means that the U.S. has the duty to lead and inspire the other powers of the international system. In this framework, his administration’s foreign policy plan is to lead the United States to re-establish such a relationship with the international community after four years of isolationism under Trump.

This foreign policy approach will consequently bring Sino-American relations back to the Obama years, when Washington recognised that China represented a challenge for U.S. power that had to be addressed firmly, without undermining the bilateral relationship nor the stability of the international system, of which the United States intends to be the guarantor. In the last phase of his presidential campaign, Biden anticipated how he is likely to approach Beijing. For example, he criticized Trump for not having acted on the issue of human rights in the Xinjiang region, but at the same time, he talked about working with China on climate-related matters and the COVID-19 pandemic. That is to say, that open hostilities are unlikely to break out, but Biden will want the U.S. to take a firm stance against China in the key fields where the U.S. leadership among its allies and its great power status are at stake.

The most delicate grounds for Sino-American relations in the near future are two: trade and technology. Biden will inherit the trade war that Trump launched during his years in office as an attempt to reverse the course of the growing U.S. trade deficit with China. When he was Vice President from 2009 to 2017 under Obama, the United States pursued a multilateral economic strategy to reach the goal of re-balancing the U.S. balance of payments with China. Today, this approach is no longer an option, mainly because Biden will face a bipartisan consensus for toughening the U.S. China policy.

As David Shambaugh explained, the Democrats might not have fully agreed on the utility of tariffs for U.S. national security, but they were not against Trump’s tough China policy overall. A cross-party general indisposition and the willingness to take effective action towards China have risen in U.S. Congress because China challenges the U.S. power on many fronts, and exactly because Biden recognised the need of rebalancing the economic relations with China already during his Vice-Presidency, he is expected to be determined to reach such goal. For now, Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the U.S. and China that was signed this year remains in place, and Biden declared that he is not intentioned to cancel such agreement, at least not immediately. The first step for the Biden administration’s China policy will thus be to get a sense of where the historical U.S. foreign policy partners stand vis-à-vis their commercial relations with China.

Alliances are likely to be the starting point for a firm stance on the technology front as well. ‘The United States does need to get tough with China. If China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies of their technology and intellectual property,’ Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs last spring, adding that the best way to confront the Chinese technological challenge is to build a ‘united front’ with allies. Much has been said about the U.S. semiconductor sector as at risk of being exploited by China, which led the U.S. Department of Defense to finally add Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) – the largest chipmaker in China – to the U.S. Entity List on December 18, 2020.

The list in question, which is run by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, contains the names of foreign persons, governmental organisations, and companies that are subject to specific license requirements for the import of items from American suppliers. Consequently, any operation held with one of the subjects present in the Entity List is considered at risk by the U.S. government, and will therefore be closely monitored. The move comes as the final act of the most vigorous measures that the outgoing Trump administration implemented towards Beijing before Biden takes office on January 20, 2021, fearful that the incoming administration would soften the line.

This, however, is not likely to happen, because Biden’s vision of the U.S. in the world will merge with the clear bipartisan support of a hard line with China coming from Congress. The incoming Biden administration will thus aim to bring the tensions on the commercial and technological fronts to a higher strategic level especially by working on reinvigorating Transatlantic relations. Biden’s overall approach to foreign policy will be guided by his vision of the U.S. in the world, which, on the one hand, is strictly related to the historical conception of American exceptionalism, but, on the other hand, must resiliently adapt to the shape of the 21^st Century’s international system, which demands a cooperative approach on climate change, migration, and global health. This means that the world will not enter a ‘new Cold War’ – a misleading term that is very often overused to describe Sino-American relations – but that Biden’s foreign policy towards Beijing will contribute to a redefinition of the terms of great power competition in a globalised world, which is not necessarily an easier scenario.

Martina is a PhD Candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has been awarded the Leverhulme Scholarship ‘Interrogating Visions of a Post-Western World: Interdisciplinary and Interregional Perspectives on the Future in a Changing International Order.’ Her research focuses on the history of U.S. foreign policy towards China, particularly on the role of China in U.S. President George H.W. Bush’s Grand Strategy for a post-Cold War World Order. She is an alumna of the School of Politics founded by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, and she holds a first-class honors Master’s degree in International Studies from Roma Tre University, where she also completed her BA in Political Science and International Relations.

After the US Elections: Chances for a European Strategy on China

December 9, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Gesine Weber

EU: the referee in the great-power competition that is the US-China relationship? (Image credit: ImagineChina)

Over the past four years, the EU’s inability to balance its position between the US and China proved to be extremely challenging. Its member states can neither afford to loosen their ties with their long-standing ally across the Atlantic, nor risk a large-scale decoupling from the giant in the East. The alliance with the US is an essential security guarantee for Europe and perceived as vital, especially by countries in Eastern Europe. Putting this relationship at risk would leave Europe’s eastern flank exposed to the unpredictable aggression from Russia.

At the same time, China holds crucial political weight in international affairs: besides its status as a major trading partner for Europe, Beijing is now heading four out of fifteen UN organisations. Turning completely away from China could therefore be seen as a rejection of global cooperation with an increasingly global player. As such, the EU finds itself in a delicate balancing act. Decision-makers across Europe urgently need to prevent the EU from falling as the first victim of the Thucydides trap between the two powers.

Keeping China on the political agenda

The necessity for the EU to find a common strategy for China is not new. Since the election of American President Donald J. Trump in 2016, the challenge of mitigating US-China competition grew to become an important issue for policy-makers in Europe. Despite transatlantic relations at their lowest point during this time, Trump’s China policy spurred on a European awakening towards China. This shift happened in two ways. Firstly, it put active policy-making vis-à-vis China and the Indo-Pacific high on the political agenda, counter to the region’s relative neglect in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) before.

Secondly, however, European reluctance to endorse the US’s maximum pressure strategy towards China underlined the diverging opinions and thereby unveiled the lack of a comprehensive EU strategy on China. Despite the release of documents such as the strategic outlook on China or the 2020 Agenda for Strategic Cooperation, there has, so far, not been a comprehensive guideline or strategy on the EU’s current and future action towards China in the different realms of foreign affairs, ranging from trade to security, to technology, so on and so forth.

Presently, should President-Elect Joe Biden wants to credibly translate his value-based foreign policy discourse into practice, there is a need to cooperate with the Europeans. In this context, finding a common approach towards China might be possible at least in some policy areas. Although President Biden will most likely seek closer cooperation with the US’ European partners, there will be little patience in Washington for intra-EU or EU-NATO power struggles or debates on the wording. This is especially the case for France and Germany: the two most influential EU member states are currently getting lost in semantic quarrels on European strategic autonomy – a term that is highly contested in Germany and a concept strong advocated for by Macron -, although both actually want the same things, to advance European security and defence.

US elections as a potential driving force for EU strategy-making

Over the history of European integration, the functionalist approach of ‘form follows function’ often demonstrated the EU’s ability to overcome challenges. New policies and approaches were first and foremost designed to serve a certain objective, and institutional adaptation could follow at a later stage of this process once the output matched the expectations. In this sense, the US elections could catalyse European strategy-making.

As EU leaders have already declared their willingness to cooperate with Biden on China, it is now important for the latter to define their priorities and identify areas of cooperation. Such a development ought to happen first among the member states and then between the EU and the US. Despite the EU member states’ diverging opinions on some issues, especially on the 17+1 format, there is a growing consensus that the EU requires a common approach to China.

Accordingly, a window of opportunity is opening here for European strategy-making. Such a China strategy, however, is not to be solely focused on the identification of threats. No, this exercise should also concentrate on drafting a positive agenda on China. The potential of global cooperation, with a broad regional and multilateral approach, is to be pursued. If the EU and its member states achieve this objective and manage to present a comprehensive approach on China – ranging from foreign investment to security in the Indo-Pacific to regulation of new technologies and environmental challenges – strategy-making will succeed thanks to geopolitical drivers — and without getting lost in technical debates. Instead of wedged in between China and the US, the EU could emerge as the balancer of both.

Gesine Weber is a first-year PhD Candidate at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, and works as a Program Assistant for the Paris Office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. She holds a master’s degree in European Affairs (cum laude) from SciencesPo Paris and a master’s in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin. Her research interests include European defence cooperation, which she focuses on in her PhD thesis, the CSDP, geopolitics and questions of global order.

Parsing the Safe Passage

October 21, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Matthew Ader

“They can’t fight!” by Frederick Burr Opper, January 1896, originally published in Puck. (Image credit: National Archives)

Scholars and policymakers around the world are turning to history to understand how to navigate the onrushing collision between the ailing United States of America and an increasingly assertive China. The most famous example, expounded upon at length in Graham Allison’s Destined for War, is the clash between Sparta and Athens as documented by Thucydides. However, the most recent hegemonic transition, that of Britain to the United States, deserves significant attention – it is well-sourced, exhaustively documented, and involves national actors still relevant today. That makes it a valuable case study.

However, little work has yet been done to model this period in a way, which would allow the clean transfer of lessons learnt to the modern context. Even Kori Schake’s Safe Passage, written explicitly with the intent of informing Sino-American competition, is an excellent history before it is a work of political science. The relative paucity of overarching models means that policymakers must either fall back on heuristics or delve into intricate historical details.

This article attempts to split the difference by deriving a broader model of hegemonic transition from the circumstances of the Anglo-American case, with the hope that it will ease comparative work between the historical and contemporary situations.

I argue that the transition can be broken down into five distinct phases:

Potential for competition (1756 – 1823) – the United States begins to grow in capability, but Britain is not yet aware of the potential threat.
Recognition (1823) – Britain recognises the United States as a potential threat.
The window of opportunity (1823 – 1914) – Britain conducts policy to (in most cases) conciliate the United States as the two nations move towards parity.
Moment of transition (1916) – the United States surpasses Britain, as a result of British losses and American industrial growth during the First World War.
Settling into a new order (1917 onwards) – the United States becomes the new global rule-setter, and Britain adjusts its position accordingly.

The United States’ growth in power began before the American Revolution, with the Seven Years War and American independence, but a combination of internal weakness and British distraction with eastern conquests and ambitious Corsicans – not to mention America’s poor performance in the War of 1812 – meant that it took until the 1820s for senior British officials to directly recognise the future potential of the United States as a major disruptive influence. Notably, and seemingly uniquely in terms of hegemonic transitions, this was recognised long before the United States even began to approach military parity with Britain. This may be due to traditional British lack of confidence in its own power, and also the naval character of said power – as Lord Palmerston observed in 1858, the simple reality of American geography rendered it invulnerable to British domination even in the absence of a major US force.

Given that Britain recognised the potential for competition relatively early, they had a large window of opportunity to apply policy. Instead of launching a preventive war, which would have been ineffective given the fact that Britain could not achieve lasting dominance over the United States, they pursued a consistent policy of conciliation. During the Oregon boundary dispute (1846), the Trent Affair (1861), and the Venezuelan Debt Crisis (1895), among other crises, Britain de-escalated even when it held the upper hand in coercive force. British bankers and merchants were encouraged to invest in the United States, even as propaganda about a joint Anglo-American destiny, linked by shared Anglo-Saxon heritage, percolated into American culture.

This was sagacious policy and was enabled in large part by the early recognition of the potential threat the United States posed and subsequently extensive window of opportunity. Given 80 years, most diplomatic relationships can be transformed in major ways – this is much less viable over shorter time frames. The result was that at the moment of transition, towards the end of the First World War – as British policymakers acknowledged that American industrial power so outmatched their own that America held the upper hand in any interaction, as was evidenced by the Paris Peace Conference and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the United States looked on Britain not as a weakened rival, but as a culturally, economically, and at least somewhat strategically aligned partner. Debate persists, however, on the specifics of the Anglo-American transition of power, with many scholars placing it in 1945. However, I would argue that the passage happened in 1916 and was already visible at Versailles. Nevertheless, Britain continued to play a global role arguably disproportionate to its means. The USA, in turn, did not emerge as a hegemon until after the Second World War.

Why A Model?

Given that the historical record exists, why would a model of that transition be helpful? Principally because it allows clearer comparative analysis and the codification of lessons learnt.

First, in terms of comparative analysis, we can transfer this model to Sino-American relations relatively clearly. The potential for competition existed throughout the 1990s and 2000s as China grew in power, but the distracted United States only recognised the threat in 2009 with the Pivot/Rebalance to Asia. Others would argue that this recognition came even later, with the American declaration of China as a near-peer competitor. The United States is now in the window of opportunity vis a vis China, as the relative gap between the powers narrows, and must implement policy to forestall or cushion its decline. If current trends continue unabated, there will be a moment of transition, either when China peacefully surpasses American power; or when its aggressive moves run into a mutual red line.

Rather than attempting to draw difficult comparisons based on historical events in the Anglo-American relationship, the existence of the model allows references to history without getting lost in the details. Similarly, the model allows a clearer discussion of lessons learnt. British success stemmed in large part, I would argue, from early recognition of the American potential as a competitor. Others might suggest it was the result of effective policy within the window of opportunity. A model equips us with a common vocabulary to discuss a difficult topic.

This is not, of course, perfect. The model itself is applicable to Anglo-American hegemonic transition, and I believe Sino-American too, but it carries with it the weight of hindsight – assuming as it does that China will at some point fight the United States or move past it in some peaceful yet vital way. Equally plausible is the idea that China may fall short of hegemony, not due to American action within the window of opportunity, but internal socioeconomic weakness. Another possibility not fully incorporated in this model is that the United States and China may reach parity and remain there for a long period, with neither able to act as a hegemon. And, of course, in the general sense, having an avowedly simplifying model often makes things more complex, not less.

Despite that, given the growing importance of hegemonic transition, it is important to ensure rigour and clear communication in debates around it. This model, or something like it, may go some way towards helping in that effort.

Matthew Ader is an undergraduate student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London with an interest in climate change and grand strategy. He tweets occasionally from @AderMatthew.

COVID-19 and China-US Relations: An Interview with Jia Qingguo

September 29, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Lin Li

Professor Jia Qingguo, former Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’s National Committee (Image credit: SCMP)

The global economy, politics, as well as daily life, ground to a halt after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Worldwide, infection rates rose to staggering heights; leaving a striking amount of casualties in its wake. Despite this situation, the chronic rivalry between the US and China continued, with further pessimism on the rise and little hope of cooperation anytime soon. As is now usual, Lin Li virtually met with Professor Jia Qingguo for an interview on US-China relations during and after the pandemic. Originally conducted in Chinese, the interview, and its subsequent translation are made by the interviewer.

The failure to cooperate against COVID-19

At the outbreak of the pandemic, the world expected China and the United States to work together in stemming its spread. However, the opposite is true. Instead, the mutual suspicion between the two countries escalated further from an initial trade war to become a war on all but the kinetic front; with little hope of such rivalry diminishing in the near future. The reasons for this situation, Jia Qingguo believes, is because the political environment in the United States sustains a highly emotional consensus on the government’s tough stance towards China. Such sentiment led to the ideological and political differences between these nations to become more pronounced. As a result, the population of each country tends to see the one as the polar opposite of the other.

‘After the outbreak of COVID-19, the US government poorly implemented measures against its spread. Out of domestic political considerations, it tried to pass the buck to China, which led to more negative interactions between the two countries. Moreover, in the heat of the U.S. presidential election, both sides of the campaign intend to play tough on all matters related to China. This situation is not beneficial for the bilateral relationship. Of course, that does not mean there is no room for improvement. Domestically, consensus on China is based on very particular perceptions of the country,’ Professor Jia argued. ‘These perceptions may not be entirely in line with reality. If China does a good job in explaining itself and adjusts some policies, I think it is still possible to change the American public’s position on China.’

Jia Qingguo believes that, globally, the response to the pandemic has been lacking in leadership. With the US finding itself bogged down in the fight against the pandemic, the virus further exacerbated previously existing suspicions against China. In such a situation, it is difficult to find any grounds for effective cooperation. ‘The Chinese government has been expressing its willingness to cooperate and has made great efforts, actively helping other countries to fight the virus. As President Xi Jinping said recently at the Extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit, China believes that the best way to fight the global pandemic is through international cooperation.’

China and the US: more alike than one would think

‘I do not think that China and the United States are that different in nature,’ Professor Jia argued. ‘Although the two countries have different ideologies and political systems; both do advocate democracy and freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy. In fact, these three elements are all listed as China’s official core values, although there is still a big difference in how these values are put in practice. Both China and the United States are also beneficiaries of the existing international order. Both countries hope for stability, peace, and international prosperity. They also advocate free trade and the need to jointly address global challenges such as climate change, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and international crime. In fact, one could argue that the two countries are more similar than many may believe. If we can emphasise these common values and interests, without focusing on the ideological and institutional differences, the bilateral relationship could well be stabilised again.’

Professor Jia contends that the United States and many Americans remain doubtful about Chinese intentions, indeed in part because of their perceptions about the country. For example, realists assume that when a great power rises, it will expand and challenge the existing power. This so-called Thucydides Trap assumes that, as China rises, the country will challenge the US; thereby provoking a confrontation. Others believe that the United States is able to change China to its liking. This latter group is very disappointed that China has not made the changes they expected it to make.

The effects of COVID-19 on China-US relations

According to Jia Qingguo, the pandemic has both positive and negative effects on China-US relations. Its negative impact is taken by extremists on both sides as an opportunity to vent their discontent and to speculate on the other side’s culpability. Riddled with undertones of a conspiracy, such assessments feature accusations of intentionally creating or spreading the virus, thereby even advocating war.

At the same time, the virus has become the common enemy of the two countries, the fundamental interests of which require cooperation to fight against this enemy together. This mutual fight requires both China and the US to strengthen their information-sharing processes, to enhance bilateral cooperation in the development of medication, to provide anti-epidemic supplies to each other through donation and trade, and finally, to coordinate international cooperation.

Nevertheless, Jia Qingguo believes that the chance for cooperation has been diminishing as a result of negative interactions between the two sides. In the post-pandemic era, both countries should reflect on what the main reasons and factors are for the deterioration of the relations, as a basis upon which to formulate more reasonable policies.

Obstacles for China-US cooperation in fighting the pandemic

‘The two biggest obstacles in China-US Cooperation in fighting the pandemic are psychological and political. Psychologically speaking, both countries are faced with the problem of how to perceive the other properly. In recent years, the mainstream of American foreign policy has taken an increasingly extreme view of China, always interpreting China’s words and deeds from the worst possible angle. China also has some speculations about the intentions of the United States from the perspective of the ideologues and offensive realists. Such mindsets make it difficult for cooperation to be sustained. Politically, and based on the different interests and value orientations, there are people on both sides who deliberately exaggerate the other side’s negative rhetoric and actions; even inciting confrontation as inevitable. In so doing, the level of distrust between the two countries is growing. It is likely that Chinese people have similar views on the United States.’

Under such circumstances, Jia Qingguo continues, people on both sides should objectively and pragmatically assess the China-US relationship and take positive measures to stabilise and promote cooperation. Both countries are stakeholders in the international order and hope for world stability and prosperity. Peaceful coexistence and cooperation are in their best interests and feature as the foundation of this bilateral relationship. China and the US could strengthen their cooperation, for example, by exchanging anti-pandemic experience, collaborate in developing medication, and coordinate economic policies in order to stabilise the global economy. Only through cooperation can the two sides effectively overcome the pandemic and improve the relationship.

The lowest point in the past four decades?

‘Whether it is the lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties forty years ago depends on how you measure it.’ Jia Qingguo argues, ‘I think politically and security-wise it certainly is. But when it comes to the economy and other aspects, I think we still made much progress. Nevertheless, a further deterioration of the relationship is in the books. The Trump administration seems determined to stir up some kind of crisis in the relationship in order to improve the President’s chances for a second term. China also has domestic public opinions, so when the United States closed the Houston Consulate, China felt that it had to close the Chengdu Consulate in response. Indeed, if the United States decides to take certain measures, the Chinese government may find it necessary to respond in kind. As a result, the relationship may end up in a disastrous spiral of escalation. I hope that both sides can calm down and handle bilateral relations in a more pragmatic way. It is complicated, but I think both sides should at least make some efforts.’

‘Recently, many people are talking about the possibility of war between China and the US. I think that is still very unlikely. First, the cost of war between China and the US is too high for both countries to bear. It has become an unwritten law that nuclear powers do not fight wars, since there is no winner in such a conflict. As long as leaders of the two countries are rational, they will try their best to avoid war. It is also very hard to persuade their people to fight such a kind of war. The American political system with its checks and balances means that only when most people say yes, could the government go to war with foreign countries, especially with nuclear states.’

If not nuclear, what kind of war?

‘The war on the scientific and technological fronts has begun and will continue. However, there will also be limits. The blocking of Huawei or other Chinese high-tech companies hurts not only China but also the US, because these Chinese companies are important customers of American companies in the high-tech industry as well. If uncontrolled, the war in science and technology will break the existing ecology of the research and development as well as production chains, with a devastating impact on all countries in the world.’

China and the United States are facing a crisis of trust. America’s distrust of China is particularly prominent in its approach to China’s development of high technology like 5G. Because of the high degree of penetration of technology into people’s life and work, trust is needed more than ever. With this in mind, Huawei has offered to release the source code of some of its software, in an attempt to soften concerns on the safety of personal information and its storage. Jia Qingguo argues: ‘In terms of technology, we should have more communication and take necessary measures to reassure each other. The Americans also have a responsibility to reassure China that Microsoft and Google will not harm China’s national security. Both sides must make a lot of effort to rebuild some trust for the future of our relationship. However, I do not believe the Trump Administration will do so. I hope the next government can.’

‘The possibility of a financial war cannot be ruled out either. But this will bring even more harm to the US. Unless the two countries become extremely confrontational, it will be difficult for the United States to make such a decision.’ Trump’s views on the international economy remain those of the 19th century. For example, the American President thinks that the United States has suffered a great loss in trade with China because it runs a large deficit with the country. In fact, many products exported from China to the United States include parts, services, or patented technologies from other countries, including the US. Trump assumes the goods exported from one country to another are 100 per cent made in this country. It is simply not true.

‘Some people are wondering what happens if the United States refuses to honor the U.S. Treasury bonds purchased by China. I think the chance for that to happen is very low, because such action may trash the credibility of the US. Some people say that the United States will forcibly terminate its financial exchanges with China, which is even less likely, for the same reason that this will cause great harm to the US, and other countries will not agree either.’

Therefore, whether it is to fight a war of science or technology or finance or trade, the costs are likely to be prohibitive. The Trump administration may not rational but in the end, people in the United States may stop it.

In conclusion, Jia Qingguo argues that in the long run, China and the US have to find a way to coexist peacefully and cooperate when needed because their interests and survival demand it. ‘As stakeholders in peace and prosperity, China and the US have many things in common, and that hasn’t changed despite the recent round of conflicts.’

Lin Li is a doctoral researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. Lin completed her BA in Law at the School of International Studies, Peking University in Beijing; her MA in Geopolitics, Territory and Security at Department of Geography, KCL; and her MA in History of War, War Studies, also KCL. Lin previously worked as Teaching Assistant for the School of International Studies and a Research Assistant for the Institute of International and Strategic Studies of Peking University, as well as Program Manager for Peking University’s Office of International Affairs. Lin is an Observer of the PKU Youth Think Tank since 2018. A Chinese Zheng musician, Lin has published concerto CDs with the Chinese Film Symphony Orchestra and held a series of concerts internationally.

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