Climate Change

Climate-Change and Conflict Prevention: Integrating Climate and Conflict Early Warning Systems

July 2, 2022 by Langdon Ogburn

Dakar Senegal – Looking North / Photo Credit: Jeff Attaway, licensed under Creative Commons

Hundreds of blue buildings in Djougop, Senegal, are increasingly being filled by families from the nearby coastal city of St. Louis. Most did not choose to make this move—rather, their displacement has been driven by the destruction of neighborhoods from increased sea levels. St. Louis’ low sea level and placement along the Senegal River have made its population one of the first to be heavily impacted by climate change, but it will not be the last.

In West Africa, low-lying coastal cities most susceptible to sea-level rise generate 56% of the region’s GDP and have a population growth double the global average. Further, decreased rainfall and desertification increasingly impact the livelihoods of millions living in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions. At the same time, extreme weather events like heatwaves, flooding, droughts, rainstorms, and cyclones are increasing in number and intensity. On whole, the unique impact of climate change on ecological systems in Africa could force as many as 86 million Africans to become internally displaced.

The link between climate change and security has been recognized by global leaders and international institutions the world over. Climate-change stresses existing causes of political instability, which, if unaddressed, can result in increasing instances of conflict and fuel existing conflicts. The vulnerabilities created by climate change increase various populations’ chances of predation by criminal organizations, militias, and extremist groups. Further, competition for diminishing resources—including access to water and arable land—can cause an upsurge in violence.

Climate-related security threats can already be seen in the southern Sahel, where desertification has been linked to an upsurge in violent altercations between farmers and pastoralists, predominately along ethnic group lines.

While climate-related security threats can be found globally, Africa’s robust conflict early warning systems make African regional institutions uniquely capable of taking preventative action against climate-driven conflict.

What are conflict Early Warning Systems (EWS)?

Conflict EWS expert Madhawa Palihapitiya stated, ‘most community-based violence can be prevented if the right information is delivered to the right stakeholders, at the right time, in the right format, enabling the stakeholders to take the right actions.’

Conflict EWS are grounded in this idea. They collect and analyze information, identify conflict risks, warn decision-makers, and provide proposals for addressing potential conflict.

These systems frequently differ in methods and structure. However, general best practices and characteristics include:

The transparent sharing of validated and reliable information between all parts of the system.
Use various quantitative and qualitative methods to collect information, including technology, field networks, and open-source resources.
Track a broad range of potential drives of conflict attuned to local contexts.
Are directly linked to decision-makers and response mechanisms.

Existing African EWS

Today, Africa has one of the most extensive and multi-dimensional EWS structures in the world.

In 2005, the African Union (AU) started developing its Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) as a core part of its Peace and Security Council.

The CEWS consists of two parts. The first is an observation monitoring unit (labelled “the Situation Room”) that oversees data collection and analysis, which has made great improvements since its construction. The second are regional observation monitoring teams. These are located within Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and are directly linked with the AU’s observation monitoring unit.

Each REC’s EWS uses different methods attuned to local contexts. Examples include:

The South African Development Community (SADC)’s Regional Early Warning System (REWS)
The Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS)’s Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN)
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

These regional EWCs are linked either officially with state governments or with monitors located in various communal areas across the region. This continental, regional, national, and communal organizational structure allows the CEWs to be linked to information gathering at the local level.

The Necessity of Climate EWS

Climate specialists have consistently advocated for the necessity of developing climate early warning systems—notably, EWS were incorporated into one of the four goals created by COP26.

Climate EWS use technological tools– most notably Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping—to identify extreme weather events like flooding, fires, drought, and heatwaves and long-term negative environmental trends like desertification or sea-level rise. Analysts can use this information to make recommendations to policymakers on limiting climate-related threats to vulnerable populations.

Yet, the larger goals of climate EWS are not much different than how conflict EWS have traditionally been conceived. They use information gathering and analysis to advise leaders on appropriately responding to early threats, promoting long-term stability and sustainability among civil society.

Integrating Climate EWS into Existing Conflict EWS Structures

The nexus between conflict and climate change between climate change and the dynamics of conflict provides a clear opportunity for existing EWS.

By integrating climate early warning into existing conflict EWS infrastructure, African political entities can minimize the resources needed to monitor potential impacts of climate on human security effectively. Already, EWS monitor economic, political, and governance indicators that may undermine security—through the use of geospatial data and analysis, it is possible to add a set of indicators that monitors environments and climate change. This analysis can measure how climate change impacts environments and the economic, political, and cultural impacts this may have on local populations.

Although I argue for the merit of integrating climate EWS into current conflict EWS, debates can and should be held about viewing climate-change indicators purely through the lens of human security. Even if securitization of climate change is not the answer, current structures of conflict EWS found throughout Africa can act as a good model for how effective climate EWS can be constructed. Further, if climate EWS are constructed independently of conflict EWS, it will be essential that analysts in both systems communicate and share information with one another to ensure the relationship between conflict and climate is accounted for in providing policy suggestions.

A Lesson Beyond Africa

Although climate change impacts Africa’s geography and geopolitical context in a unique way, it is far from the only geopolitical area that will have its security impacted by climate change. The continent’s robust conflict EWS provides political actors in Africa an opportunity to prepare for the impending impacts that climate change will have on human security—an opportunity that policymakers throughout the globe should consider constructing within their own political organizations.

Strife Series: Arctic Maritime Security – Climate and the Securitisation of the Arctic

June 1, 2022 by Lauren Chin and Andro Mathewson

A Russian icebreaker in the Arctic. Source: NASA, Public Domain.

The intersection of drastic climate change and the increasing securitisation of the Arctic is an issue policymakers and scientists cannot afford to ignore. With rising tensions between Russia and the West and prolonged disputes between the various eight Arctic States, Arctic conflict is increasingly a possibility despite the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—the broad legal framework governing our oceans, including the Arctic, the work of the Arctic Council—and a general history of cooperation in the region. An increased likelihood of conflict is a direct result of increased securitisation of the rapidly changing, warming region that has historically remained excluded from global conflicts. Resolving this securitisation will require concerted cooperation between many states with competing interests across several issues, including territorial claims, climate change, and natural resource extraction.

Much of the geopolitical tension across the Arctic plays out in the maritime domain and is exacerbated by climate change. Because the region is easier to access due to melting sea ice and technological developments, arctic states are deploying more naval vessels for exploration, scientific studies, and defence posturing. Melting sea ice and increased accessibility can rekindle dormant territorial claims, or spark new ones, as new islands are uncovered and borders shift.

Future maritime skirmishes are likely to be limited to security incidents over local territorial claims, which could be initiated by climate change and technological advancements, which may lead to larger conflicts in the region. Despite the currently peaceful and passive nature of the contested territorial claims in the region, the combination of increased securitisation interwoven and climate change might collapse this fragile Arctic peace.

The Changing Arctic

The Arctic has been disproportionately affected by climate change and the region continues to warm over twice as fast as the rest of the world. From a maritime perspective, the most influential changes lie in the rapid decline of sea ice thickness, area covered, and age over the last few decades–determining factors. Recent studies suggest that there is a 60% probability that the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free by the 2030s, which are only reinforced after disappointment in the lacklustre commitments and outcomes at the UN COP26 climate conference in Glasgow. Less sea ice and more open water not only impacts the Arctic’s important function in regulating global climate patterns but also redefines the boundaries of geopolitics: especially transportation.

It is now easier than ever to access the Arctic shipping routes like the Northwest Passage through Canada and the Northern Sea Route, sometimes called the Northeast Passage, along the Russian coast, leading to an increased economic interest in the region. The effects of anthropogenic global warming and the ramifications of an ice-free summer in the Arctic are evident: In 2017, a Russian tanker carrying liquified natural gas from Norway to Korea traversed the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic without an ice breaker escort for the first time ever. As shipping companies increasingly look to the Arctic instead of traditional maritime routes, the increase of marine traffic may increase both tensions between Arctic states due to maritime border disputes and the propensity for maritime incidents between vessels.

The geophysical transformation of the Arctic represents an opportunity for a departure from the traditional state-centric view of international security. As the ice melts, the map of the Arctic is literally redrawn. With access to new natural resources caches and shipping routes, Arctic states are prioritising their sovereignty and territorial integrity across the region, securitising the region.

Maritime Securitisation of the Arctic

The liminal nature of ice complicates the permanence that underpins modern concepts of sovereignty. Not only can borders within the Arctic change between decades due to the ice melt, but it also complicates subsea mapping, which is central to UNCLOS determinations. New islands are continuously found in the Arctic, previously covered by ice. This has given rise to cartopolitics to expand sovereignty claims. Some attempts have led to disputes between several Arctic states, such as the Danish claim over the Lomonosov Ridge, over which Russia and Canada also claim sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite the non-ratification of the treaty by the U.S., UNCLOS has provided the Arctic states with a successful framework from which to peacefully resolve disputes. Besides UNCLOS, the remaining portion of Arctic governance is routed primarily through bilateral agreements and the Arctic Council. However, the council focuses primarily on developmental and environmental issues. It has also been criticized due to its “weak institutional structure, soft law status and ad hoc funding system.” Fundamentally, the Arctic lacks a comprehensive legal regime analogous to that of the Antarctic Treaty.

Before melting ice began changing the geography of the Arctic, there were already tensions between many nations present in the region. Canada and the U.S. have prolonged disputes over both the status of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Canada, Denmark, and Russia have clashing continental shelf claims over the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain chain intersection in the Arctic basin. These prolonged disputes are reemerging as heightened security issues due to the rapidly changing Arctic.

Despite the cold nature of Arctic competition, its warming is exacerbating tensions, which could eventually lead to open conflict over conflicting territorial claims. The increased uncertainty has led to the securitisation of both climate change and the region. U.S. President Biden has stated that “climate considerations shall be an essential element of United States foreign policy and national security.” His administration also recently appointed a slew of regional experts to “advance U.S. national security and economic security interests in the Arctic to keep the region secure and stable.” Despite its status as a non-Arctic state, China’s Arctic Policy directly links maritime navigational security and climate change together as key security concerns in Arctic affairs. Russia has also expanded its military footprint in the region to protect its northern reaches, despite general (public-facing) indifference from its leaders to the dangers of climate change.

Increased military presence in the region is following the rhetorical securitization, led by the maritime assets of Arctic and non-Arctic states alike: The U.S. Coast Guard is taking steps to address key challenges in the region, and expanding its fleet of icebreakers. Russia has upgraded the administrative status of its Northern Fleet for the second time in less than a decade. China is building a new heavy icebreaker and lift vessel for the Arctic, and the Canadian Coast Guard and British Royal Navy have signed a new agreement with Arctic cooperation. The increased number of naval vessels, in an area twelve times smaller than the Pacific Ocean, with at least as many competing interests, could easily lead to maritime incidents between naval forces.

Moving Forward

Climate change-induced transformation of the Arctic has increasingly led to its securitisation by numerous Arctic and non-Arctic states. The result is the increased presence of maritime assets in the region, which raises the propensity for Arctic conflict, and require concerted cooperation between states to manage. The rising tensions in the Arctic highlight the increasingly prominent intersection of climate change and geopolitics. While there is a need for global cooperation and continued information sharing between states, their militaries, and international organisations to reduce the likelihood of conflict in the region, the extensive problem of climate change and its contributory role in conflict remains unsolved. Comprehensive national security strategy should not only prepare for a ‘world on fire’, but also proactively work to reduce anthropogenic climate contributions to avoid conflict in the Arctic and beyond.

The Sahel’s Scream for Help: A Warning of the Security Impact of Climate Change

April 16, 2021 by Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell

By Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell

Refugee boy fetching water (Image Credit: UNICEF)
Source: https://weshare.unicef.org/Package/2AM408W045LE

Climate change is an ever-present issue on most state agendas and in the mission statements of most multinational corporations. However, measures taken in the fight against climate change are not yet sufficient to revert, stop, or minimise its devastating consequences, despite it being considered a critical matter for international security, and especially for human security. Furthermore, its destructive effects are already a reality in many corners of the world, ranging from melting icebergs in the Artic, to torrential rains and floods in Asia, hurricanes in Central America and severe droughts in the Sahel. So, it is up to this generation of civilians and politicians, companies, and international organisations, to decide whether to unite against climate change or to continue struggling with uncoordinated, vain attempts. It is this choice which will define the future of billions in this generation and those following; a decision that cannot be postponed any longer. Climate change is here, it has arrived, and it is not going anywhere. The Sahel Crisis is a confirmation of this.

The Sahel’s rapid social, political, economic and environmental deteriorations have dramatically worsened human security. As a consequence, calls for humanitarian aid across the region have sharply increased, reaching unparalleled levels. For instance, increasing violence in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in 2020 led to more than 1,000 violent incidents, while claiming more than 8, 000 lives and forcing millions to flee their homes. Although the Sahel has historically been plagued with severe humanitarian crises, the reality is that climate change is now aggravating matters further. According to the UN, 80% of the Sahel’s land is currently degraded, a by-product of the climate change-borne droughts and heavy rainfalls that have been assailing the region in recent years. This is exacerbating current social problems, as shortage of natural resources is preventing farmers from sowing and cultivating their crops, leading to confrontations between them and pastoralists as both are fighting for the scarce livelihoods and fertile land left in the area. Moreover, the rise in terrorism is further complicating the situation. Terrorists are seeking to extend their influence, exploiting the social and political vulnerabilities of a crumbling, porous and unguarded region. This is consequently creating no-go zones, preventing Sahelians from migrating to search for more fertile land. Therefore, it is clear that the adverse effects of climate change are acting as a threat multiplier, compounding current tensions and threats. This is preventing the stabilisation of the Sahel and thus, the delivery of a more adequate response to the humanitarian emergency that is currently unfolding in the region.

An additional challenge is the COVID-19 pandemic which has spread amongst the Sahel populous. As of 26th of March 2021, 449,540 cases and more than 6,000 deaths have already been recorded, although the numbers are probably higher due to the limited resources for documentation. COVID-19 has further hampered communities by forcing the closure of schools and health centres and reducing the movement of the economy. Travel restrictions have also impeded the arrival of much-needed humanitarian assistance, aggravating the already profound, multi-faceted crisis. Thus, 2020 saw more than 24 million Sahelians requiring life-saving aid to be able to confront such perilous circumstances. Despite the UNHCR scaling up its resources in the area, greater international aid and awareness remains necessary as the Sahel does not appears to be a matter of critical urgency on today’s world affairs agenda.

The Sahel’s current societal collapse is revealing a link between climate change, peace, and security. For instance, with droughts destabilizing the economic and political landscape of the region through the loss of commercial livelihoods, weak national governments have been exposed. These institutions have historically struggled to maintain a fair distribution of resources among the population. As a consequence, if better measures are not implemented, governments will likely find it ever-more difficult to manage them, due to global warming depleting such resources. Governmental mismanagement, coupled with recent climate shocks, are concurrently leading to an increase in hunger, extremism, and social unrest . Thus, climate change is significantly harming the human welfare of Sahelians owing to the increase in food insecurity, physical violence and psychological damage, as well as the destruction of essential infrastructure and the environment.

Although this may appear as a distant problem for those located outside the region, in reality, the Sahel Crisis is not confined to a distant land. It has transnational consequences which should be taken seriously. Climate change mitigation and environmental protection measures ought to be implemented as structural preconditions to confront the root causes of the insecurity in the Sahel and the rise of violence. If no action is taken, violence and insecurity will, sooner rather than later, spill-over into other regions of the world. Indeed, one of the most prominent effects of climate change is the mass migration of civilians to areas of greater safety. This phenomenon has been unfolding intra-regionally in the Sahel for years, but is one that worsened in 2020, eventually placing further pressure on countries within the Sahel itself.

Countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are now at the epicentre of one of the world’s fastest growing displacement crises. Nearly 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 365,000 refugees are temporarily living in those countries, which themselves are suffering from the combination of drought, lack of resources and regional conflict, particularly jihadist terrorism. Burkina Faso is experiencing the greatest toll, as the number of IDPs doubled to over one million over the past year. This has occurred whilst Burkina Faso is among the poorest countries in the world and one of the most vulnerable to climate risks. The UN World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization have even warned that Burkina Faso is one of four “hotspot” countries where a deadly amalgamation of climate risks, conflict, economic decay, and the COVID-19 pandemic have increased the risk of famine among its citizens. Furthermore, the problem has not remained within the enclaves of the Sahel. Many Sahelians have embarked on arduous journeys towards safety, making this crisis an ever-more transnational phenomenon, as reflected by the increased arrival of migrants from North Africa into Europe in recent years. Migrants are escaping not only conflicts, but also the lack of resources owing to the impact of climate change, which has left them without basic necessities such as fertile land, drinkable water or safe infrastructures.

Thus, this crisis threatens to put further strain on the international community. The Sahel crisis is just a foretaste of the social destruction that climate change can have on our current social and world order. And this is not an isolated phenomenon, as experts foresee a similar prognosis for other nations and regions susceptible to climate change, such as Central America. Moreover, the ecologist Norman Myers has predicted that by the mid-to late century, there may be around 200 million environmental refugees around the globe.

Hence, concerted action to prevent these devastating predictions from materialising is necessary. Unfortunately, the convergence of the global pandemic and the growth of nationalism stymieing collective security and cooperation are hampering the prevention and mitigation of climate risks. These issues have contributed to the increased vulnerability of society, creating the perfect storm for further climate change-borne calamities to become part of the world’s day-to-day life, heightening human insecurity for all. Therefore, situations like the Sahel Crisis must be addressed because it is morally and ethically correct, as defended by Hugo Slim in his masterful book Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disasters. But, also because it is strategically beneficial and can be used as a learning experience to comprehend how to confront such situations and prepare for similar occurrences in the future.

This is vital since climate change is unfolding quicker than previously imagined, and thus nations and societies must become better prepared to confront it. Yet, despite the clear evidence of climate change and the supportive findings of numerous subject-matter experts, the measures taken by international organisations, states and citizens are still insufficient. This is reflected by the increased climate-induced events that have been assailing the world recently. In fact, the sentiment towards climate change seems to be an emulation of the attitude taken towards the outbreak of COVID-19: one mostly ruled by individualistic action instead of a collective one. Although, the COVAX scheme led by the WHO, CEPI and Gavi is proof of concerted action against this biological global threat, it is still finding itself in competition with individual countries who are sealing their own deals with pharmaceuticals, hampering the equitable worldwide rollout of vaccines. This has once again demonstrated the weakness of modern multilateralism and cooperation. Thus, a change of nations´ priorities towards less individualistic goals is needed to even have a chance at successfully confronting this transnational problem, and also the more long-lasting global threat of climate change.

Countries cannot solve climate change unilaterally; hence international cooperation is required. However, nations and corporations have their own interests, and many are short-sighted, giving priority to their short-term gains instead of the long-term well-being of the world. Climate change is an epitome of the Tragedy of the Commons, and thus, for cooperation to be somewhat successful, this nationalistic outlook needs to stop. Therefore, greater united action together with more long-term, climate-focused policies and environment-friendly commitments such as the European Green Deal are necessary. These changes will allow for a more successful fight against the effects of climate change, together with the prevention of future mass humanitarian catastrophes such as the one currently unfolding in the Sahel.

Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell is a part-time MA International Relations student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interests are around the topics of Migration, Climate Change, Gender and Human Rights. She is currently a Spanish Red Cross volunteer in the Canary Islands helping with the management of the latest influx of migrants to the islands.

Bridging the Gap: Getting Climate Academics and Security Practitioners Round the Table

April 5, 2021 by Matthew Ader

Pixabay/TRASMO, 2017 – A Sahelian village.

It is a truism in British and American government circles that climate change does and will continue to lead to conflict, both between and within states. Yet, a yawning divide exists between this group and their academic counterparts. Environmental security academics in the Anglophone scholarly community are far more dubious of its impact, an empirical evidence remaining highly contested – for example, conflict in the Sahel is often linked strongly to climate change driven resource competition, even though the area of arable land is increasing in the region. This has led to intellectual analysis of policy truisms regarding climate change to remain missing in action. The lack of such a critical factor does not bode well for our ability to effectively navigate the onrushing threat of climate change. Action must be taken to understand and address this disconnect.

What is the divide?

In his first address to the United Nations in 2009, President Obama directly linked climate and conflict, saying “More frequent droughts and crop failures breed hunger and conflict.” In 2010, the Pentagon followed suit, naming climate change as a major threat to US security – a theme it has continued with in varying intensity over the last decade. The UK’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre concurs, as do many other nations and leaders around the world.

Given the seeming consensus of policymakers, one would be forgiven in assuming similar agreement among academics. In fact, the notion that climate change and conflict are linked is the subject of serious debate. Scholars like Marshall Burke and David Lobell have argued that higher temperatures are tied directly to increased incidence of conflict. But sceptics like Nils Petter Gleditsch argue this is unfounded in the literature; while Halvard Buhaug directly challenged Burke and Lobell’s thesis as based off inaccurate modelling. Tor Benjaminsen found that comparing conflict data and weather records in Mali, “offers little support for the notion that climate variability drives intercommunal conflicts.” The closest thing to a recognisable consensus position was articulated by a 2019 roundtable of eleven leading environmental scientists, which concluded that, “climate has already increased the risk of armed conflict, but the effect is small relative to other factors.”

This academic position and debates surrounding it are clearly a far cry from the arguments made by policymakers and politicians. It is true that academics can afford caution, while governments must prepare for the worst. Nonetheless, the certainty of governments, compared to the uncertainty of academia, speaks to a worrying divide. It suggests that policymaking is perhaps not based on the best available academic evidence. This is made more concerning still by the mounting challenge of climate change. As its impacts worsen, does the infrastructure which would allow climate academics to inform policymaking exist? The current state of affairs suggests that it does not, and in turn that security practitioners may make decisions without a full grasp of the environmental facts on the ground.

How did this divide occur?

A key factor explaining why environmental security scholars do not seem to interact with defence is that they often view securitisation of environmental issues with deep concern. Environmental security is a sub-set of social science and geography, both of which tend to analyse governments from a highly critical perspective. Some also believe – not without cause – that securitising climate change will not help those directly impacted by it. These tendencies are exacerbated by their ‘outsider’ status. Defence think tanks like RUSI, IISS, and CSIS have the ear of policymakers. And, while said organisations do increasingly consider climate change as part of their portfolio, there are no dedicated equivalents which centre their research and policy recommendations on environmental security. Moreover, in the US in particular, defence academics often rotate through policy jobs – environmental security scholars tend not to have the same exposure to government. Given this scepticism and isolation, it is unsurprising that their work does not cross into the policy world.

The defence community is not blameless in this. Strategic studies academics generally do not publish on climate change. Leading national security websites like War on the Rocks, Strategy Bridge, and Strife have relatively few pieces on the subject. Those that do tend to engage more with the development and human security implications of climate change, rather than operational and strategic impact. As one academic told me in 2019, “strategy and climate change live in different universes.”

This state of affairs is difficult to change. Given the underrepresentation of climate change in defence literature, writing on it is more time consuming and less likely to pay-off in career rewards than a more conventional topic. Creating modules and supervising PhDs in the field is similarly complex. While this issue is particularly acute for career academics, think-tankers are also subject to it. Audiences in government are often more interested in great power competition or than climate change.

One last factor is folk International Relations knowledge. This is the habit of ingrained assumptions about international politics seem sensible but may not survive scrutiny. For example, resource scarcity is generally assumed to drive conflict. In fact, that is highly contested. Some work, dating back to Paul and Anne Ehrlich’s 1968 book The Population Bomb, argues that it does. But more recent scholarship tends to disagree, noting that conflict is generally more prevalent in times of relative plenty, as armies require a minimum level of resources to field and sustain. These assumptions are generally unconscious, yet they do influence how institutions look at problems – potentially making them less receptive to academic work which goes against the grain.

How can we solve the problem?

Much more work is required to fully understand the nature of the split, but the above analysis suggests that building trust between policymakers and academics, and increasing access to the field, would pay dividends.

First, the UK or US governments could make a concerted effort to reach out to environmental security scholars. For example, an annual conference examining climate and conflict would provide academics with a consistent platform to speak to defence policymakers and soldiers, in the vein of RUSI’s Land Warfare Conference. This could help drive research by making it clear that the defence establishment is listening. On a similar note, authorities should invest more money in grants to help direct work on particular areas of interest within the climate change field. Given the impact of COVID-19 on the academic job market, this might be especially effective now.

Second, defence academics could assist in increasing accessibility to the field, for both authors and readers. Environmental security scholars, on the whole, write on either personal blogs or in journals. This limits the audience for their work. It also makes it harder for interested students and early career researchers to break into the field. The defence community in particular has an extensive network of websites and blogs with high circulation which could deliver scholarship to relevant stakeholders. Finding ways to collaborate with academics to highlight research on these popular sites could drive engagement and debate on the subject, including bringing it to public attention in ways which may lead to productive advocacy – or at least greater scrutiny of policy on climate and conflict by the public.

Climate change is and will continue to reshape the world in dramatic and unforeseen ways. There is a significant divide between governmental positions and academic consensus on its security impact. This is not due to failure on either side, but rather interlocking structural pressures and perception gaps. Modest interventions in partnership and publishing could start to bridge the gap, creating better policy and more effective scholarship.

Matthew is a third-year student doing War Studies. He has worked as an intern in a number of security consultancy firms. His academic interests gravitate loosely towards understanding challenges and opportunities for Anglo-American strategy in the 21^st century (and also being snide about Captain America’s command ability). He is an editor at Wavell Room, among other publications. You can follow him on Twitter: @AderMatthew.

Why the fight against climate change is also a battle against slavery

February 16, 2021 by Rebecca Brown

By Rebecca Brown

*Note: modern slavery here is used as an umbrella term that encompasses exploitation, human trafficking and forced labour.

As a child growing up in Devon, there was never any shortage of leafy woodland walks filled with snuffling hedgehogs and deer. I grew up with a genuine curiosity and appreciation of nature, spending my summers picking strawberries on farms as a treat, and my evenings watching animal documentaries with my father, or reading about strange birds and fish in distant lands. In school, I learned in horror about deforestation in a far away place called the Amazon, and how harmful farming chemicals were bringing animals like the Peregrine Falcon to extinction in the UK. Such facts affected me profoundly, but the ‘damage chain’ of climate destruction and my place within it were never really explained to me.

As a young adult, I discovered and fell in love with fashion. I was a typical teenager, spending hours in High Street stores browsing for whatever would make me look more like Shirley Manson or Siouxsie Sioux. There’s a distant memory of the term ‘sweatshop’ being on the news at some point in the late 90s. For those too young to remember, the scandal involved the discovery of factories in Indonesia manufacturing clothes for Adidas, with children and adults barely paid and suffering from regular physical and sexual abuse. I don’t think I particularly understood the controversy or my role in its being enough to pay it heed.

Then in 2010, I discovered ‘new abolitionist’ Kevin Bales, and learned a life-altering new term: modern slavery. Suddenly, the world brought new curiosity: were the foundations of London architecture made by children working over kilns in Pakistan? Were women dying in cramped, unsafe Bangladeshi factories so that I could look like the rock stars I so idolised? There are an estimated 40.3 million men, women, and children survivors of modern slavery. Was not slavery abolished in the 19th century? In Bales’ latest book, ‘Blood and Earth’, he reveals the horrific nexus between modern slavery and climate change, both inextricably linked, increased and exacerbated by our overconsumption and exploitation of human and natural resources. For the first time, my place in that ‘damage chain’ became clear, and as recently pointed out by KCL PhD student, Elias Yassin, it is communities of black, indigenous, and other people of colour (BIPOC), who are largely paying the price – again.

Deforestation is a high-risk driver of modern slavery, and enslaved people are not only regularly used to deforest for timber, but also for the construction of new farms and natural resource extraction operations. NGO Repórter Brasil, estimates that from 1995-2019, over 54,000 people in the Amazon were rescued from farms dealing in animal produce, vegetables and cotton. In 2017, following a 48-hour journey through the rainforest, a police raid managed to rescue seven enslaved men who had been enslaved into farming work under highly unsafe and unsanitary conditions, and who testified to having been beaten and threatened with murder. Slavery is common practice amongst ranchers in the area and raids of this kind are not unheard of, but rarely result in punitive measures. The rescued men were all illiterate and, whilst the report does not mention their current condition, it is likely that without prospects and an adequate support network, that they remain in a precarious situation. In March 2020, another investigation by Repórter Brasil linked the world’s biggest meat companies, JBS and Marfrig, to a farm where nine men were found dead in the Amazon, in what was described as one of the most brutal Amazonian massacres in recent history – their bodies showing signs of torture and of having been stabbed or shot.

These same Ranchers forgo traditional indigenous forest-burning tactics for an August burning season, where the dry weather is used to haphazardly prepare land for crops and pasture, resulting in major fires which devastate indigenous homes and natural habitats. Indigenous activists have been fighting back, with leaders such as Nemonte Nenquimo recently honoured with the 2020 Goldman Environmental Prize for her success in protecting 500,000 acres of rainforest from oil extraction. But the fight for climate preservation against exploitative organisations has come at a huge cost of life, with a record number of environmental activists murdered in the Amazon in 2019 alone by illegal logging gangs, which Human Rights Watch has described as “only getting worse under President Bolsonaro.”

In 2015, following decades of discussions, the UK finally enacted the Modern Slavery Act in an effort to prevent, prosecute and protect individuals caught up in serious exploitation and the associated abuses. There are many issues with the Act, in particular an overreliance and focus on law enforcement, immigration and deportation, but it has nevertheless been hailed as ground-breaking, and last year alone led to the referral of 10,627 potential survivors. There is still a long way to go before it is survivor-focused, but the UK Modern Slavery Act is not all-talk: It is being implemented. 26% of the individuals referred claimed they had been exploited overseas, with the majority of cases in both adults and children covering labour trafficking. In an ideal world, every country would have a well-implemented modern slavery act, and the UK ‘s influence cannot be denied. The Act has achieved international influence, imprinting itself in legislation such as that of the 2017 “Corporate duty of vigilance law” in France and the Modern Slavery Act (2018) in Australia, with Canada now looking to follow suit. But there is still much to be done.

The nexus between modern slavery and climate change is still barely discussed or explored, particularly in terms of gaining policy-related acknowledgement. There have been high-level discussions on climate change and disaster displacement, and in early 2020 a United Nations human rights committee ruled it unlawful for governments to return ‘climate refugees’ to countries where their lives might be threatened by the climate crisis. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Filippo Grandi recently shared that the world needs to prepare for millions of people being driven from their homes by climate change. But without adequate legislature and a sufficiently financed support-infrastructure, who or what will ensure these individuals do not fall prey to climate slavery and into exploitative practices which compound climate change itself?

Modern slavery and climate change are transnational issues which desperately require improved cross-border cooperation. The issues have for too long been addressed separately, but if individuals and governments are serious about preventing either, it is time we acknowledged and fixed the fragmented dialogue surrounding them.

Rebecca is the Events Officer at Policy Institute and Global Institute for Women’s Leadership at King’s College London. Prior to this, she worked in PhD Registry Services at King’s whilst also undertaking events management consultancy work. Previously, she worked for various think tanks, organising events in Europe, North America and Africa, mainly focusing on human rights, security and defence, international development and healthcare policy. She is a self-confessed “modern-slavery geek” and is setting up an educational not-for-profit, the “Universities Against Modern Slavery Alliance (UAMSA)’, which focuses on education and movement building within our Universities to prevent modern slavery and human trafficking. Rebecca has a Master’s degree in International Relations and the European Union (with Mandarin Chinese) from Aston University, and a BA in Spanish and Italian from the University of Bangor, Wales. Rebecca dreams of one day undertaking a PhD and getting a job as a researcher specialising in human trafficking and modern slavery.