Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for Climate Change

Climate Change

The Sahel’s Scream for Help: A Warning of the Security Impact of Climate Change

by

By Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell

 

Refugee boy fetching water (Image Credit: UNICEF)
Source: https://weshare.unicef.org/Package/2AM408W045LE

Climate change is an ever-present issue on most state agendas and in the mission statements of most multinational corporations. However, measures taken in the fight against climate change are not yet sufficient to revert, stop, or minimise its devastating consequences, despite it being considered a critical matter for international security, and especially for human security. Furthermore, its destructive effects are already a reality in many corners of the world, ranging from melting icebergs in the Artic, to torrential rains and floods in Asia, hurricanes in Central America and severe droughts in the Sahel. So, it is up to this generation of civilians and politicians, companies, and international organisations, to decide whether to unite against climate change or to continue struggling with uncoordinated, vain attempts. It is this choice which will define the future of billions in this generation and those following; a decision that cannot be postponed any longer. Climate change is here, it has arrived, and it is not going anywhere. The Sahel Crisis is a confirmation of this. 

The Sahel’s rapid social, political, economic and environmental deteriorations have dramatically worsened human security. As a consequence, calls for humanitarian aid across the region have sharply increased, reaching unparalleled levels. For instance, increasing violence in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in 2020 led to more than 1,000 violent incidents, while claiming more than 8, 000 lives and forcing millions to flee their homes. Although the Sahel has historically been plagued with severe humanitarian crises, the reality is that climate change is now aggravating matters further. According to the UN,  80% of the Sahel’s land is currently degraded, a by-product of the climate change-borne droughts and heavy rainfalls that have been assailing the region  in recent years. This is exacerbating current social problems, as shortage of natural resources is preventing farmers from sowing and cultivating their crops, leading to confrontations between them and pastoralists as both are fighting for the scarce livelihoods and fertile land left in the area. Moreover,  the rise in terrorism is further complicating the situation. Terrorists are seeking to extend their influence, exploiting the social and political vulnerabilities of a crumbling, porous and unguarded region. This is consequently creating no-go zones, preventing Sahelians from migrating to search for more fertile land. Therefore, it is clear that the adverse effects of climate change are acting as a threat multiplier, compounding current tensions and threats. This is preventing the stabilisation of the Sahel and thus, the delivery of a more adequate response to the humanitarian emergency that is currently unfolding in the region.

An additional challenge is the COVID-19 pandemic which has spread amongst the Sahel populous. As of 26th of March 2021, 449,540 cases and more than 6,000 deaths have already been recorded, although the numbers are probably higher due to the limited resources for documentation. COVID-19 has further hampered communities by forcing the closure of schools and health centres and reducing the movement of the economy. Travel restrictions have also impeded the arrival of much-needed humanitarian assistance, aggravating the already profound, multi-faceted crisis. Thus, 2020 saw more than 24 million Sahelians requiring life-saving aid to be able to confront such perilous circumstances. Despite the UNHCR scaling up its resources in the area, greater international aid and awareness remains necessary as the Sahel does not appears to be a matter of critical urgency on today’s world affairs agenda. 

The Sahel’s current societal collapse is revealing a link between climate change, peace, and security. For instance, with droughts destabilizing the economic and political landscape of the region through the loss of commercial livelihoods, weak national governments have been exposed. These institutions have historically struggled to maintain a fair distribution of resources among the population. As a consequence, if better measures are not implemented, governments will likely find it ever-more difficult to manage them, due to global warming depleting such resources. Governmental mismanagement, coupled with recent climate shocks, are concurrently leading to an increase in hunger, extremism, and social unrest . Thus, climate change is significantly harming the human welfare of Sahelians owing to the increase in food insecurity, physical violence and psychological damage, as well as the destruction of essential infrastructure and the environment. 

Although this may appear as a distant problem for those located outside the region, in reality, the Sahel Crisis is not confined to a distant land. It has transnational consequences which should be taken seriously. Climate change mitigation and environmental protection measures ought to be implemented as structural preconditions to confront the root causes of the insecurity in the Sahel and the rise of violence.  If no action is taken, violence and insecurity will, sooner rather than later, spill-over into other regions of the world. Indeed, one of the most prominent effects of climate change is the mass migration of civilians to areas of greater safety. This phenomenon has been unfolding intra-regionally in the Sahel for years, but is one that worsened in 2020, eventually placing further pressure on countries within the Sahel itself. 

Countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are now at the epicentre of one of the world’s fastest growing displacement crises.  Nearly 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 365,000 refugees are temporarily living in those countries, which themselves are suffering from the combination of drought, lack of resources and regional conflict, particularly jihadist terrorism. Burkina Faso is experiencing the greatest toll, as the number of IDPs doubled to over one million over the past year. This has occurred whilst Burkina Faso is among the poorest countries in the world and one of the most vulnerable to climate risks. The UN World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization have even warned that Burkina Faso is one of four “hotspot” countries where a deadly amalgamation of climate risks, conflict, economic decay, and the COVID-19 pandemic have increased the risk of famine among its citizens. Furthermore, the problem has not remained within the enclaves of the Sahel. Many Sahelians have embarked on arduous journeys towards safety, making this crisis an ever-more transnational phenomenon, as reflected by the increased arrival of migrants from North Africa into Europe in recent years. Migrants are escaping not only conflicts, but also the lack of resources owing to the impact of climate change, which has left them without basic necessities such as fertile land, drinkable water or safe infrastructures. 

Thus, this crisis threatens to put further strain on the international community. The Sahel crisis is just a foretaste of the social destruction that climate change can have on our current social and world order.  And this is not an isolated phenomenon, as experts foresee a similar prognosis for other nations and regions susceptible to climate change, such as Central America. Moreover, the ecologist Norman Myers has predicted that by the mid-to late century, there may be around 200 million environmental refugees around the globe. 

Hence, concerted action to prevent these devastating predictions from materialising is necessary. Unfortunately, the convergence of the global pandemic and the growth of nationalism stymieing collective security and cooperation are hampering the prevention and mitigation of climate risks. These issues have contributed to the increased vulnerability of society, creating the perfect storm for further climate change-borne calamities to become part of the world’s day-to-day life, heightening human insecurity for all. Therefore, situations like the Sahel Crisis must be addressed because it is morally and ethically correct, as defended by Hugo Slim in his masterful book Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disasters. But, also because it is strategically beneficial and can be used as a learning experience to comprehend how to confront such situations and prepare for similar occurrences in the future. 

This is vital since climate change is unfolding quicker than previously imagined, and thus nations and societies must become better prepared to confront it.  Yet, despite the clear evidence of climate change and the supportive findings of numerous subject-matter experts, the measures taken by international organisations, states and citizens are still insufficient. This is reflected by the increased climate-induced events that have been assailing the world recently. In fact, the sentiment towards climate change seems to be an emulation of the attitude taken towards the outbreak of COVID-19: one mostly ruled by individualistic action instead of a collective one. Although, the COVAX scheme led by the WHO, CEPI and Gavi is proof of concerted action against this biological global threat, it is still finding itself in competition with individual countries who are sealing their own deals with pharmaceuticals, hampering the equitable worldwide rollout of vaccines. This has once again demonstrated the weakness of modern multilateralism and cooperation. Thus, a change of nations´ priorities towards less individualistic goals is needed to even have a chance at successfully confronting this transnational problem, and also the more long-lasting global threat of climate change.  

Countries cannot solve climate change unilaterally; hence international cooperation is required. However, nations and corporations have their own interests, and many are short-sighted, giving priority to their short-term gains instead of the long-term well-being of the world. Climate change is an epitome of the Tragedy of the Commons, and thus, for cooperation to be somewhat successful, this nationalistic outlook needs to stop.  Therefore, greater united action together with more long-term, climate-focused policies and environment-friendly commitments such as the European Green Deal are necessary. These changes will allow for a more successful fight against the effects of climate change, together with the prevention of future mass humanitarian catastrophes such as the one currently unfolding in the Sahel. 

 

Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell is a part-time MA International Relations student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interests are around the topics of Migration, Climate Change, Gender and Human Rights. She is currently a Spanish Red Cross volunteer in the Canary Islands helping with the management of the latest influx of migrants to the islands.

Bridging the Gap: Getting Climate Academics and Security Practitioners Round the Table

by

Pixabay/TRASMO, 2017 – A Sahelian village.

It is a truism in British and American government circles that climate change does and will continue to lead to conflict, both between and within states. Yet, a yawning divide exists between this group and their academic counterparts. Environmental security academics in the Anglophone scholarly community are far more dubious of its impact, an empirical evidence remaining highly contested – for example, conflict in the Sahel is often linked strongly to climate change driven resource competition, even though the area of arable land is increasing in the region. This has led to intellectual analysis of policy truisms regarding climate change to remain missing in action. The lack of such a critical factor does not bode well for our ability to effectively navigate the onrushing threat of climate change. Action must be taken to understand and address this disconnect. 

What is the divide? 

In his first address to the United Nations in 2009, President Obama directly linked climate and conflict, saying “More frequent droughts and crop failures breed hunger and conflict.” In 2010, the Pentagon followed suit, naming climate change as a major threat to US security – a theme it has continued with in varying intensity over the last decade. The UK’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre concurs, as do many other nations and leaders around the world.  

Given the seeming consensus of policymakers, one would be forgiven in assuming similar agreement among academics. In fact, the notion that climate change and conflict are linked is the subject of serious debate. Scholars like Marshall Burke and David Lobell have argued that higher temperatures are tied directly to increased incidence of conflict. But sceptics like Nils Petter Gleditsch argue this is unfounded in the literature; while Halvard Buhaug directly challenged Burke and Lobell’s thesis as based off inaccurate modelling. Tor Benjaminsen found that comparing conflict data and weather records in Mali, “offers little support for the notion that climate variability drives intercommunal conflicts.” The closest thing to a recognisable consensus position was articulated by a 2019 roundtable of eleven leading environmental scientists, which concluded that, “climate has already increased the risk of armed conflict, but the effect is small relative to other factors.” 

This academic position and debates surrounding it are clearly a far cry from the arguments made by policymakers and politicians. It is true that academics can afford caution, while governments must prepare for the worst. Nonetheless, the certainty of governments, compared to the uncertainty of academia, speaks to a worrying divide. It suggests that policymaking is perhaps not based on the best available academic evidence. This is made more concerning still by the mounting challenge of climate change. As its impacts worsen, does the infrastructure which would allow climate academics to inform policymaking exist? The current state of affairs suggests that it does not, and in turn that security practitioners may make decisions without a full grasp of the environmental facts on the ground.   

How did this divide occur? 

A key factor explaining why environmental security scholars do not seem to interact with defence is that they often view securitisation of environmental issues with deep concern. Environmental security is a sub-set of social science and geography, both of which tend to analyse governments from a highly critical perspective. Some also believe – not without cause – that securitising climate change will not help those directly impacted by it. These tendencies are exacerbated by their ‘outsider’ status. Defence think tanks like RUSI, IISS, and CSIS have the ear of policymakers. And, while said organisations do increasingly consider climate change as part of their portfolio, there are no dedicated equivalents which centre their research and policy recommendations on environmental security. Moreover, in the US in particular, defence academics often rotate through policy jobs – environmental security scholars tend not to have the same exposure to government.  Given this scepticism and isolation, it is unsurprising that their work does not cross into the policy world. 

The defence community is not blameless in this. Strategic studies academics generally do not publish on climate change. Leading national security websites like War on the Rocks, Strategy Bridge, and Strife have relatively few pieces on the subject. Those that do tend to engage more with the development and human security implications of climate change, rather than operational and strategic impact. As one academic told me in 2019, “strategy and climate change live in different universes.” 

This state of affairs is difficult to change. Given the underrepresentation of climate change in defence literature, writing on it is more time consuming and less likely to pay-off in career rewards than a more conventional topic. Creating modules and supervising PhDs in the field is similarly complex. While this issue is particularly acute for career academics, think-tankers are also subject to it. Audiences in government are often more interested in great power competition or than climate change. 

One last factor is folk International Relations knowledge. This is the habit of ingrained assumptions about international politics seem sensible but may not survive scrutiny. For example, resource scarcity is generally assumed to drive conflict. In fact, that is highly contested. Some work, dating back to Paul and Anne Ehrlich’s 1968 book The Population Bomb, argues that it does. But more recent scholarship tends to disagree, noting that conflict is generally more prevalent in times of relative plenty, as armies require a minimum level of resources to field and sustain. These assumptions are generally unconscious, yet they do influence how institutions look at problems – potentially making them less receptive to academic work which goes against the grain. 

How can we solve the problem? 

Much more work is required to fully understand the nature of the split, but the above analysis suggests that building trust between policymakers and academics, and increasing access to the field, would pay dividends.  

First, the UK or US governments could make a concerted effort to reach out to environmental security scholars. For example, an annual conference examining climate and conflict would provide academics with a consistent platform to speak to defence policymakers and soldiers, in the vein of RUSI’s Land Warfare Conference. This could help drive research by making it clear that the defence establishment is listening. On a similar note, authorities should invest more money in grants to help direct work on particular areas of interest within the climate change field. Given the impact of COVID-19 on the academic job market, this might be especially effective now. 

Second, defence academics could assist in increasing accessibility to the field, for both authors and readers. Environmental security scholars, on the whole, write on either personal blogs or in journals. This limits the audience for their work. It also makes it harder for interested students and early career researchers to break into the field. The defence community in particular has an extensive network of websites and blogs with high circulation which could deliver scholarship to relevant stakeholders. Finding ways to collaborate with academics to highlight research on these popular sites could drive engagement and debate on the subject, including bringing it to public attention in ways which may lead to productive advocacy – or at least greater scrutiny of policy on climate and conflict by the public. 

Climate change is and will continue to reshape the world in dramatic and unforeseen ways. There is a significant divide between governmental positions and academic consensus on its security impact. This is not due to failure on either side, but rather interlocking structural pressures and perception gaps. Modest interventions in partnership and publishing could start to bridge the gap, creating better policy and more effective scholarship. 

 

Matthew is a third-year student doing War Studies. He has worked as an intern in a number of security consultancy firms. His academic interests gravitate loosely towards understanding challenges and opportunities for Anglo-American strategy in the 21st century (and also being snide about Captain America’s command ability). He is an editor at Wavell Room, among other publications. You can follow him on Twitter: @AderMatthew.

Why the fight against climate change is also a battle against slavery

by

By Rebecca Brown

 

Image: Thompson Reuters

*Note: modern slavery here is used as an umbrella term that encompasses exploitation, human trafficking and forced labour.

As a child growing up in Devon, there was never any shortage of leafy woodland walks filled with snuffling hedgehogs and deer. I grew up with a genuine curiosity and appreciation of nature, spending my summers picking strawberries on farms as a treat, and my evenings watching animal documentaries with my father, or reading about strange birds and fish in distant lands. In school, I learned in horror about deforestation in a far away place called the Amazon, and how harmful farming chemicals were bringing animals like the Peregrine Falcon to extinction in the UK. Such facts affected me profoundly, but the ‘damage chain’ of climate destruction and my place within it were never really explained to me. 

As a young adult, I discovered and fell in love with fashion. I was a typical teenager, spending hours in High Street stores browsing for whatever would make me look more like Shirley Manson or Siouxsie Sioux. There’s a distant memory of the term ‘sweatshop’ being on the news at some point in the late 90s. For those too young to remember, the scandal involved the discovery of factories in Indonesia manufacturing clothes for Adidas, with children and adults barely paid and suffering from regular physical and sexual abuse. I don’t think I particularly understood the controversy or my role in its being enough to pay it heed. 

Then in 2010, I discovered ‘new abolitionist’ Kevin Bales, and learned a life-altering new term: modern slavery. Suddenly, the world brought new curiosity: were the foundations of London architecture made by children working over kilns in Pakistan? Were women dying in cramped, unsafe Bangladeshi factories so that I could look like the rock stars I so idolised? There are an estimated 40.3 million men, women, and children survivors of modern slavery. Was not slavery abolished in the 19th century? In Bales’ latest book, ‘Blood and Earth’, he reveals the horrific nexus between modern slavery and climate change, both inextricably linked, increased and exacerbated by our overconsumption and exploitation of human and natural resources. For the first time, my place in that ‘damage chain’ became clear, and as recently pointed out by KCL PhD student, Elias Yassin, it is communities of black, indigenous, and other people of colour (BIPOC), who are largely paying the price – again.

Deforestation is a high-risk driver of modern slavery, and enslaved people are not only regularly used to deforest for timber, but also for the construction of new farms and natural resource extraction operations. NGO Repórter Brasil, estimates that from 1995-2019, over 54,000 people in the Amazon were rescued from farms dealing in animal produce, vegetables and cotton. In 2017, following a 48-hour journey through the rainforest, a police raid managed to rescue seven enslaved men who had been enslaved into farming work under highly unsafe and unsanitary conditions, and who testified to having been beaten and threatened with murder. Slavery is common practice amongst ranchers in the area and raids of this kind are not unheard of, but rarely result in punitive measures. The rescued men were all illiterate and, whilst the report does not mention their current condition, it is likely that without prospects and an adequate support network, that they remain in a precarious situation. In March 2020, another investigation by Repórter Brasil linked the world’s biggest meat companies, JBS and Marfrig, to a farm where nine men were found dead in the Amazon, in what was described as one of the most brutal Amazonian massacres in recent history – their bodies showing signs of torture and of having been stabbed or shot.

These same Ranchers forgo traditional indigenous forest-burning tactics for an August burning season, where the dry weather is used to haphazardly prepare land for crops and pasture, resulting in major fires which devastate indigenous homes and natural habitats. Indigenous activists have been fighting back, with leaders such as Nemonte Nenquimo recently honoured with the 2020 Goldman Environmental Prize for her success in protecting 500,000 acres of rainforest from oil extraction. But the fight for climate preservation against exploitative organisations has come at a huge cost of life, with a record number of environmental activists murdered in the Amazon in 2019 alone by illegal logging gangs, which Human Rights Watch has described as “only getting worse under President Bolsonaro.” 

In 2015, following decades of discussions, the UK finally enacted the Modern Slavery Act in an effort to prevent, prosecute and protect individuals caught up in serious exploitation and the associated abuses. There are many issues with the Act, in particular an overreliance and focus on law enforcement, immigration and deportation, but it has nevertheless been hailed as ground-breaking, and last year alone led to the referral of 10,627 potential survivors. There is still a long way to go before it is survivor-focused, but the UK Modern Slavery Act is not all-talk: It is being implemented. 26% of the individuals referred claimed they had been exploited overseas, with the majority of cases in both adults and children covering labour trafficking. In an ideal world, every country would have a well-implemented modern slavery act, and the UK ‘s influence cannot be denied. The Act has achieved international influence, imprinting itself in legislation such as that of the 2017 “Corporate duty of vigilance law” in France and the Modern Slavery Act (2018) in Australia, with Canada now looking to follow suit. But there is still much to be done.

The nexus between modern slavery and climate change is still barely discussed or explored, particularly in terms of gaining policy-related acknowledgement. There have been high-level discussions on climate change and disaster displacement, and in early 2020 a United Nations human rights committee ruled it unlawful for governments to return ‘climate refugees’ to countries where their lives might be threatened by the climate crisis. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Filippo Grandi recently shared that the world needs to prepare for millions of people being driven from their homes by climate change. But without adequate legislature and a sufficiently financed support-infrastructure, who or what will ensure these individuals do not fall prey to climate slavery and into exploitative practices which compound climate change itself? 

Modern slavery and climate change are transnational issues which desperately require improved cross-border cooperation. The issues have for too long been addressed separately, but if individuals and governments are serious about preventing either, it is time we acknowledged and fixed the fragmented dialogue surrounding them. 

 

Rebecca is the Events Officer at Policy Institute and Global Institute for Women’s Leadership at King’s College London. Prior to this, she worked in PhD Registry Services at King’s whilst also undertaking events management consultancy work. Previously, she worked for various think tanks, organising events in Europe, North America and Africa, mainly focusing on human rights, security and defence, international development and healthcare policy. She is a self-confessed “modern-slavery geek” and is setting up an educational not-for-profit, the “Universities Against Modern Slavery Alliance (UAMSA)’, which focuses on education and movement building within our Universities to prevent modern slavery and human trafficking. Rebecca has a Master’s degree in International Relations and the European Union (with Mandarin Chinese) from Aston University, and a BA in Spanish and Italian from the University of Bangor, Wales. Rebecca dreams of one day undertaking a PhD and getting a job as a researcher specialising in human trafficking and modern slavery.

Feature – Climate Change, Conflict, and Children’s Rights Abuses: Syrian Refugees in Turkey

by

by Chiara Scissa

In limbo in Lesbos: Doctors without Borders labelled the Mória Refugee Camp as the ‘worst refugee camp on earth’ (Image credit: Getty Images/AFP/F. Perrier)

Introduction

The world is becoming increasingly aware of the interconnections between climate change, human rights, and its implications on affected populations and countries. It is now widely recognised that climate change adversely impacts the right to life, property, and an adequate standard of living by hampering access to hygiene, water, and food but also adequate healthcare, among many basic necessities. This fact has been most visible during the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011.

According to the data of the Syrian Ministry of State for Environment Affairs and the World Bank, the annual temperature in Syria has increased at a rate of 0.8°C per century since the 1950s. This change is reflected in an increased frequency, length, and intensity of droughts and heatwaves. Decades of unsustainable agricultural policies, the consequent overexploitation of water and soil resources, coupled with the effects of climate change resulted in desertification, higher temperatures, and reduced precipitations. These developments dramatically impacted the agricultural industry, at that time representing twenty-five per cent of Syrian GDP.

Although in-depth research studies have so far not confirmed a causal link between climate change and conflicts, other scholars, such as Ingrid Boas, nevertheless stress that drought and water scarcity may be included among the complex and interlinked pressures that characterise the unrest in Syria. To make matters worse, water infrastructure there was consistently under attack. In a country already hit by drought, attacks on water networks cut services for weeks during the armed conflict, with millions of people suffering from long and deliberate interruptions to a water supply.

According to UNICEF, disruptions in Aleppo encompassed a deliberate forty-eight-day shutdown of a water treatment plant that served two million people. Indeed, the organisation  straightforwardly claimed ‘attacks on water and sanitation are attacks on children.’ Without safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), children’s health, nutrition, safety, and education are at risk. They are exposed to preventable diseases including diarrhoea, typhoid, cholera and polio which may potentially disrupt their early development if not treated on time. Children are also at risk of undernutrition and malnutrition, vulnerable to sexual violence and injury as they collect water.

The report continues by noting that children under fifteen are, on average, nearly three times more likely to die than adults from vector-borne diseases, such as diarrhoeal disease, related to unsafe water and sanitation than violence directly linked to conflict. As a matter of fact, seventy per cent of annual children’s death are attributable to diarrhoea, malaria, neonatal infection, pneumonia, preterm delivery, and the lack of oxygen at birth. For children under five, this probability increases more than twenty times.

With millions of refugees streaming into Europe since the onset of the war, Turkey, as Syria’s closest and ‘safest’ neighbour has been the focal point of this population movement. However, Turkey’s response to the refugees has been a human rights abomination, particularly when it comes to children and minors. This article will describe the steps Turkey has taken to undermine the human rights of Syrian children and why it should not be considered a safe third country.

Children’s rights abuses in Turkey

It has been estimated that due to the Syrian civil war, as of March 2019, one million Syrian children became orphans, 4.7 million children are in need of humanitarian assistance, and another 490,000 of said children are in hard-to-reach areas. Overall, six million Syrians are internally displaced, while another 5.6 million people have left their home country. Most of them fled to Turkey. In response, Turkey passed two foundational pieces of legislation in 2013. First, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection no. 6458, which entered into force in April 2014, and second, the Temporary Protection Regulation – TPR, in 2014. Given that Turkey is one among very few countries which still has the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Syrians and non-European asylum seekers may only be entitled to the weaker standards provided under the TPR.

As pointed out by several authors, temporary protection has a more limited scope than the refugee protection and, in non-compliance with its provisions, health and education services as well as access to social assistance and employment to Syrians are often not delivered. For instance, UNICEF stressed that the situation for refugee children in Turkey remains particularly challenging, given that around 400,000 Syrian children are still out of school and are therefore at likely risk of isolation, discrimination and exploitation. Of 4 million registered Syrians in Turkey, 3.6 million were awarded the TPR, including around 1.5 million children under 18, of which 532,000 are under 5 years of age.

To date, Ankara is yet established a comprehensive human rights framework. Nor does it provide for a specific law addressing (un)accompanied minors. However, under Article 3 of the TPR, (un)accompanied minors are persons with special needs, thus entitled to additional safeguards and priority access to rights and services, such as healthcare, psychosocial support, and rehabilitation. Pursuant to the Turkish Civil Code, unaccompanied minors shall be appointed with a legal guardian, a provision that the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) claims is not respected most of the time.

In this respect, it has been noted that lawyers in Ankara have witnessed difficulties, while in some cases appointed guardians had no qualification for that role. AIDA also noted the persistent coexistence of different procedures applying to the reception and guardianship of unaccompanied minors in Turkey, which gives rise to different standards of treatment. AIDA considers, for instance, that in 2019 the legal assessments of new guardians in Antakya have not been conducted carefully.

Additionally, although Turkey has ratified both the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Exploitation and Abuses, Amnesty International claims that, between 2014 and 2018, Turkey has unlawfully deported Syrians to their home country, violating the principle of non-refoulement. According to such peremptory norm, States are not allowed to remove, deport or expel a person to a country where their life and liberty would be threatened, or where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

This allegation has been also confirmed by Human Rights Watch and questions have been raised by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on migration and refugees of the Council of Europe, on the observance of its international obligations. Amnesty showed that episodes of deportation persisted respectively in July 2019 and May 2020. The victims are mostly men, but there is evidence of children and families deported. Moreover, Syrians at risk of deportation are often left without legal recourse or remedy to prevent their illegal removal, and the UNHCR does not have access to immigration removal centres, as also noted by the European Parliament.

Furthermore, Amnesty International, Save the Children, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, and the Council of Europe accuse Turkey of unlawfully detaining Syrian asylum seekers. In 2017, there were 21 temporary accommodation centres for temporary protection beneficiaries. Some of these have turned into de facto detention centres for Syrians with insufficient food and dire conditions, especially for children. In practice, unaccompanied minors are kept in removal centres in border cities and a number of children begging or selling small objects in the street are detained in police stations, where they often receive documents cancelling their right to stay.

Children with their families are generally detained in removal centres where they are not granted education. For all these reasons, recently, the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey violating Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture), Article 5.4 ECHR (right to remedy), Article 5.1 ECHR (freedom of movement), and Article 13 ECHR (fair trial) in the case of detention pending expulsion of a mother and her 3 children, all Russian nationals, arrested for attempting to cross the Syrian border after entering Turkey.

Finally, another severe breach of children’s rights in Turkey concerns the employment of children under the age of 15, which remains a considerable problem in Turkey. The influx of refugees has led to a quickly growing number of Syrian children working especially in textile factories and agriculture. A 2020 Save the Children report finds that often families only pay smugglers for their children’s trip to Turkey. From there the children need to find jobs to continue their journey to Western Europe.

This particular pattern of emigration exposes them to exploitation, abuses, kidnapping, and detention by smugglers as well as by Turkish authorities. According to Save the Children, ‘out of 254 children interviewed in March 2019, almost thirty per cent worked in one of the transit countries before reaching Belgrade. Almost all of these children (97%) worked in Turkey. Based on the testimonies of those willing to provide this information, the prices of transferring migrants from the country of origin to the desired destination ranged from EUR 6,000 to over EUR 10,000’.

Conclusion

In light of the persistent violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights of Syrians and other non-European persons in need of international protection in general and of (un)accompanied minors in particular, the unfilled lack of a comprehensive human rights framework, and the increasing limitation to basic civil and political rights by the central Turkish government, it comes clear that Turkey cannot be considered anymore, if ever, as a safe third country, where international protection applicants may find guarantees of adequate protection standards.

Similarly, the heads of government and state of the EU Member States that in 2016 signed together with Turkey the so-called EU-Turkey Statement cannot shy away anymore from their international obligations and responsibilities. Neither Turkish President Erdoğan’s autocratic regime, nor the absence of a national human rights framework persuaded the EU to consider Turkey as an unsafe country for refugees and asylum seekers. On this behalf, President Erdoğan repeatedly threatened the EU to open the border with Greece as a way to convince the Union to financially support Turkey’s intervention in Syria. In March 2020, the EU refused to increase its financial aid to Ankara, claiming that EU Member States would not bow to President Erdoğan’s threats. A few days later, the Turkish President opened the gate and thousands of migrants stuck at the Turkish-Greek border to exit the country.

Ankara used migration to put pressure on a weak EU, unwilling to take on its responsibilities towards migratory challenges. The externalisation of actions to curb migration through informal agreements with unsafe non-EU countries, which unlawfully impedes people to leave their soil in exchange for financial and economic benefits, leads to human rights abuses, to breaches of international and EU law, and to extremely serious damages against the victims involved. Many scholars have also pointed out the high risk for the parties involved to violate the principle of non-refoulement, since the removal of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey as the first country of asylum seems not to fulfil the requirement of sufficient and effective protection.

Such a human rights-breaching deal – that trapped over twelve thousand asylum seekers in the Moria refugee camp, which has a capacity to house two thousand – should end immediately. As long as EU Member States will continue to limit the access to international protection in their national territories and to add external barriers to stem migration flows, the Common European Asylum System cannot be more than empty words on the EU Official Journal.

Chiara Scissa is a PhD student in Law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies (Pisa, Italy) and Human Rights and Migrant Protection Focal Point at the United Nations Major Group for Children and Youth (UNMGCY). Her main research interests in migration and refugee studies include the impact of climate change on human rights and environmental migration. Email: chiara.scissa@santannapisa.it

Strife Series on Climate Change and Conflict (Part IV) – Water Conflicts: Climate Change as Threat Multiplier in Sub-Saharan Africa

by

by Musab Alnour Ibrahim

The Greater Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the giant hydropower project on the Nile, and the control of the waters flow that comes with it, remains a point of contention in the region (Image credit: Reuters)

On 11 April 2019, a popular revolution removed Omar Hassan al-Bashir from power. Since the ruler’s departure after more than thirty years, the Transitional Government of Sudan, led by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, has been tasked with alleviating the economic hardship resulting from decades of mismanagement and corruption, addressing the lack of civil and human rights, as well as preparing the country for its first democratic elections in 2022. A major persisting issue facing the country is the devastating conflicts occurring in multiple regions. It is a crisis further exacerbated by the fact that Sudan is one of the countries most affected by climate change. In 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense classified climate change in its report as a ‘threat multiplier,’ highlighting the seriousness of the issue and asserting the role of climate change in creating the conditions for violent extremism and terrorism.

While there is scientific consensus on the causal links between human activities and rising temperatures, disagreement persists over the impact climate change has on the likeliness of a conflict to occur. However, it is widely agreed among academic circles that higher temperatures lead to severe droughts, desertification, flash floods in the rainy season, and other climate-linked disasters. These are all factors that increase the likelihood of conflicts. A recent study has concluded that more conflicts will occur as the environmental effects of climate change become more severe.

Threat multiplier: Climate change in Darfur

An often-cited example in the climate-conflict literature is the conflict in Darfur, which is considered by scholars like Jeffrey Mazo, as the world’s first modern-day climate change conflict. Since 2003, the western-most region of Sudan was at the centre stage of violent conflict between the al-Bashir government and allied militias, against the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, which accused the government of ethnic cleansing of black Africans in favour of Arabised indigenous Africans. According to International observers and scholars, the seeds of the Darfur conflict, which killed more than 300,000 people and displaced about 3 million, began with a famine in the mid-1980s.

As temperatures rose, water scarcity led to severe droughts and a shortage of grazing lands, impacting the adaptive capacity of Darfur. Consequently, as the Sahara Desert expanded southward overtaking once green areas, water points, and fertile pasture lands became focal points of the conflict between the semi-nomadic livestock herders and sedentary farmers, undermining the social fabric and peaceful coexistence in the region. The adverse environmental conditions caused by rising temperatures also negatively impacted economic prosperity in this volatile region, as freshwater sources become increasingly scarce, food production declined, and subsequently, people began to migrate in search of better opportunities.

The competition was complicated by the former regime’s policies that have led to the socioeconomic marginalisation of many Darfuris. For hundreds of years, tribal groups settled their differences through mechanisms built on past traditions. The main traditional mediation method in Darfur, called Judiya, allows for disputes to be resolved by setting up a reconciliation committee, which consists of a group of tribal elders as impartial facilitators, guiding the parties of the conflict towards a peacefully negotiated settlement. Under the government of al-Bashir, these mechanisms have been either weakened or abolished, further exacerbating the conflict.

The Darfur Conflict continues, despite the presence of one of the world’s largest peacekeeping missions. While the transitional government was able to agree with rebel groups in Darfur on the cessation of hostilities, the climate factors that exacerbated the conflict still remain. To maintain a lasting peace in the region, initiatives like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission should be championed to rectify the wrongs of the past and mitigate disputes in the future.

Geopolitical implications of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

The case of the Darfur conflict illustrated the consequences of severe climate conditions within a country. However, in recent years Sudan found itself in another water conflict, one which also involved its East African neighbours of Egypt and Ethiopia. At the heart of the dispute is the construction and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River, the latest development in one of the world’s oldest geopolitical rivalry. All three countries share the Blue Nile River, which provides 85% of the Nile River water and originates in the Ethiopian highlands. The $4.6bn hydroelectric dam is seen by Ethiopia as a legacy project that could lift millions out of poverty, as half of the population has no access to electricity. Once operational, the GERD will be Africa’s biggest hydroelectric power plant to date and the seventh-largest in the world, producing 6,500 megawatts of electricity for the country’s poorest regions. With power generation starting from 2021, the massive hydropower project is also intended to spur Ethiopia’s economic growth and turn the country into Africa’s biggest power exporter.

Ethiopia began working on the mega-dam project in 2011, while Egypt was mired in a political turmoil in the wake of the Arab Spring, not able to confront Ethiopia over the project at the time. Since then, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan held multiple talks to reach an agreement on the operation and filling of the dam, the most contentious elements of any future agreement. While Ethiopia’s intention is to fill the dam’s reservoir over four to seven years, Egypt proposed an extension to over 15 years. With a fast-growing population of about 100 million people, Egypt heavily depends on the river for over 90% of its freshwater needs. For thousands of years, Egypt relied on the river to flood and help grow its crops in inland farms, providing sustenance for the poor and agricultural products to export. However, years of water mismanagement and pollution led to severe water scarcity, estimated in 2019 at around 570 cubic meters of water per person annually, well below the 1,000 cubic meters of water considered by hydrologists to be the threshold. Moreover, the dam’s location near the Ethiopian-Sudanese border suggests that once the dam is operational, Ethiopia could threaten downstream nations by controlling the flow of the river, without any serious consequences to its own territories.

Hence, despite the reassurances of Addis Ababa, Cairo fears the short-term drop in freshwater supply could pose an existential threat to Egypt, a threat they are prepared to answer militarily. While Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has asserted, that negotiations are the way to resolve the dispute, he has warned that his country will go forward with its plans to fill the dam in the rainy season of July, even if that would lead to war. The challenge to reach a deal is complicated by nationalism and domestic considerations in both nations. For instance, much of the GERD’s cost was financed through public contributions from ordinary Ethiopians. The dispute is further complicated by colonial-era arrangements that are in favour of Egypt. For decades, affairs pertaining to the Nile River’s use were managed within the framework of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, signed between Egypt and Great Britain, which governed and negotiated at the time on behalf of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika (modern-day Tanzania), and Sudan.

The agreement gave Egypt a veto right over future water projects that could potentially affect its water supply. Subsequently, the 1959 Treaty further strengthened Egypt’s position, by allocating 55.5 billion cubic meters (66%) a year of the Nile water to the country, 18.5 BCM (22%) to Sudan, and the remaining 12% was left for evaporation. Neither of the treaties made any reference towards the rights of Ethiopia or the other Nile River basin nations. Fearing the loss of its current share of water supply, Egypt insists that any resolution respects the decades-long colonial treaties, while Ethiopia does not recognise the treaties. Downstream nations argue that under the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), a permanent resolution can be achieved. Meanwhile, Khartoum had to strike a balance between the interests of Cairo and Addis Ababa, while protecting its own interests. Despite the fact that Sudan initially opposed the GERD, due to safety concerns regarding the dam and its impact on its own dams, Khartoum was persuaded to support the project, as it will provide cheap electricity, decrease flooding downstream and increase crop rotations.

Negotiations between the three Nile River basin nations have yet to produce a conclusive agreement. Although a Declaration of Principles on the GERD, signed in 2015, was a significant step towards a resolution and affirmed the “equitable and reasonable” use of the Nile, the tripartite talks have failed to reach an agreement over the technical details of the dam’s filling and operations. The Crisis Group has studied the issues at hand and in its report, which suggested a two-step resolution to overcome the impasse. Firstly, the parties have to agree to a timetable for filling the reservoir, as well as a study of GERD’s impact on water flow. Secondly, once an agreement has been reached, Egypt has to work through the Nile Basin Initiative, which is an intergovernmental partnership of ten countries through which the Nile flows, to establish a working framework that would set the rights and obligations of each nation. Another suggestion came from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, which proposed a mixture of technical and financial assistance from the European Union. Under this proposal, the EU would help create a compensation mechanism to ascertain the estimated cost for not filling the reservoir in the proposed time, and aid Cairo in compensating for the concessions made by Ethiopia.

As temperatures rise, wind and rainfall patterns will become more unpredictable. This is a particular vulnerability to the agricultural sector that still dominates many economies around the world. While this conflict is still ongoing, it is evident from the case study that as the effects of climate change become more severe, we are likely to see more water conflicts emerge in the future. Without a global treaty on the use and sharing of rivers suggested by experts, I argue that we will be bound to see more unilateral actions, that could destabilise volatile regions that already experience extreme political instability and economic hardship.

Musab Alnour Ibrahim holds an MA in Intelligence and International Security from King’s College London.