Yemen

The United States, Saudi Arabia and Yemen: Same Crisis, Different Administrations

March 22, 2021 by Philip Mayne

By Philip Mayne

The outcome of the civil war in Yemen matters to the United States. Geographically, the country sits on the Maghreb Straits, a major trade route. Instability within the region has economic implications for the United States. The outcome of the conflict affects other key interests of the US, such as influence within the region and the containment of Iran.

The United States has been, and continues to be, concerned with an increase in Iranian influence and power within the region. The US and Iran have had a tense relationship for decades. In 2015, tensions were lifted slightly following a nuclear deal between the US and Iran, however President Trump abandoned this deal in 2018 and reinstated sanctions. Relations worsened following the assassination of General Soleimi in 2020 and Iran has vowed that it will seek revenge. The US sees Iran as potentially destabilising the region, which could affect US trade. US policy in Yemen has been guided by its wider interest of containing Iran.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched an intervention into Yemen to restore the Government. Since then, Saudi Arabia has been at the heart of US policy towards Yemen. Saudi Arabia provides an important Middle Eastern ally to the United States, as both seek to contain the influence of Iran within the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been in competition for dominance within the region for decades. Aggravated by religious tensions, the Saudi Arabia and Iran relationship can be perceived as a regional Cold War. The Yemen crisis can be perceived as part of the wider Iran-Saudi Proxy war. Saudi Arabia has backed the Yemeni government and Iran has supported the Houthi rebels, also known as Ansar Allah. Therefore, US-Yemen policy has revolved around one of its key Middle Eastern allies, Saudi Arabia.

What has US-Yemen Policy Looked like?

In 2015 the Obama administration, which had a tense and difficult relationship with Saudi Arabia, supported its intervention in Yemen. At the heart of this support has been trade. In 2010, Obama authorised a significant trade deal with the country. By the time he left office $115 billion worth of arms had been sold to Saudi Arabia.

The trade with Saudi Arabia increased under the Trump Administration. A major arms trade deal was secured with the Saudis in 2018, worth up to $380 billion across 10 years. By 2019, guided missiles and bombs made up the majority of the Saudi purchases. US officials have insisted that selling American weapons, such as precision air-to-ground Paveway Missiles, to the Saudis would help to avoid civilian casualties. However, the World Peace Foundation reported that Saudi Arabia has been deliberately targeting civilians with these ‘smart’ weapons. According to Security Assistance Monitor, continued weapons sales from the US has “enabled the Saudi regime to wage a brutal and indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen”. Infrastructure, such as fishing and farming, has also been targeted by the Saudis in an effort to starve the population into compliance.

Following reports of war crimes early in the war, the decision to continue to trade with Saudi Arabia, essentially enabling the Saudis to fight in Yemen, has become a controversial issue. The United Nations, in September 2019, urged all states to refrain from “providing arms that could be used in the conflict”. Despite this, Trump continued to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.

In 2019, Trump vetoed a resolution, which would have forced an end to US support of the War, on the grounds that the US must show commitment to its allies. He continued to make the weapons trade deals and integral part of US foreign policy, to counter Iran, boost US jobs and the US economy. Trump’s foreign policy ultimately elevated economics over other concerns. Trump’s reluctance to cut ties, or halt the arms trade with Saudi Arabia, has been perceived as giving the country the ‘green light’ for more atrocities, and the US has been criticised for looking the other way as one of its staunch allies has committed war crimes; such as the deliberate bombing of civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, the Saudi-led coalition have bombed hospitals, markets, mosques, detention centres, school buses and fishermen.

Biden’s Policy

The Biden administration has set out to transform US foreign policy. Biden has set out to rebuild US relations and rebuild “moral leadership”. Last week, the new administration has announced changes to its policy on the war in Yemen, and its relationship with Saudi Arabia. On 4 February 2021, Biden made his first speech on US foreign policy. Within the statement he said that he will be stepping up diplomacy efforts, to bring a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels and begin peace talks. Biden reiterated that the US would continue to support Saudi Arabia to defend its territory and sovereignty. But, importantly he said “to underscore our commitment, we are ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales”.

The following day, Biden announced that his administration would revoke the terrorist designation of the Houthis. During his last few weeks in office, Trump designated the Houthis a terrorist organisation, in a move to “further malign activity by the Iranian regime”. However, the move was met with widespread condemnation. The move was opposed because designating the group as a terrorist organisation makes it harder to broker a resolution. The Financial Times expected that the designation would likely push the Houthi movement closer to Tehran, hardening the stances of both sides. Trump’s decision was met with condemnation by the UN, who argued that this would worsen the already dire humanitarian crisis. Since the start of the War, it is expected that more than 230,000 Yemenis have died due to war, mostly due to a lack of food, health services and infrastructure. The UN shared its concerns that the situation would worsen, as links to food and medical supplies could be interrupted. David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, warned that the designation could “be a death sentence to hundreds and thousands if not millions”.

The state department has said that Biden’s announcement does not mean that the US supports the Houthis, and nor does it support the conduct of the Houthis; who have used child soldiers and committed war crimes as well. Instead, it has been decided based on the humanitarian affects that the designation may have had. The UN has welcomed the change in policy calling it a “positive development” towards negotiations.

How important is this transition in policy?

Biden’s policy is a significant change from the last two administrations. He is reversing the policies of the Obama administration and he is trying to distance Washington from Riyadh, overturning the direction of Trump’s foreign policy. No longer will the US position be solely on supporting Saudi Arabia to keep Iran in check, instead it is to focus on human rights abuses on both sides of the war.

However, this policy change has come early in his administration and the effects are not yet clear. The freezing of the flow of US arms to Saudi will put the country under pressure. However, there are no immediate details on what the freeze means. It is not clear what “relevant” arms sales are. William Hartung, the director of the arms and security programme at the Centre for International Policy, said “To be effective, the new policy should stop all arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both proposed and in the pipeline, including maintenance and logistical support”. Therefore, if Biden does want to put pressure on Saudis to come to the negotiating table, the “relevant” arms sales freezes must be significant and wide ranging.

However, the US decision to freeze arms not only puts Saudi Arabia under pressure, but it also ramps up the pressure for other countries, such as Canada, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, selling arms and providing technical support to Saudi Arabia. The UK may be reluctant to do this, as the UK has a trade deal, which includes Typhoons and missiles, worth up to £5.4 billion.

However, if the UK and other allies continue to supply the Saudis, they appear to be out of line with the US. Even more so, due to Biden’s emphasis on the humanitarian issues of the war. Time will tell the impact of Biden’s change in policy.

However, early into his administration Biden has not hesitated to show his commitment to ending the war. In early February, he announced Timothy Lenderking as the US special envoy to Yemen, to open up diplomatic channels. On 7 February, Lenderking was sent to Iran to try to broker a cease-fire between then Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels. On 22 February, Lenderking began another humanitarian trip to several countries in the Gulf with the intention of bringing about a lasting political solution, and humanitarian relief to the people of Yemen.

The Biden Administration has taken a different approach to the Yemen crisis. The President appears to be committed to bringing peace to the country. Although the change in policy is welcome, it is premature to celebrate. It will take a continued commitment to stopping the war and applying pressure to its allies. There is still a long and uncertain road ahead for the people of Yemen, who have already suffered years of war, crisis, and hunger.

Philip Mayne is a final year PhD candidate at the University of Hull. He has a special interest in strategy, counterinsurgency, military ethics, military history, international security and relations. His thesis examines the relationship between military ethics and military effectiveness. Specifically, his work focuses on adherence to the Just War Tradition, and success in counterinsurgencies; through analysing the case studies of the Malayan Emergency, the Kenyan Emergency, the Algerian War and the Vietnam War. Philip has contributed to the Huffington Post and is an active member of the Hull University War Studies Research Group. Find him on Twitter @phil_mayne.

Peace in the time of Pandemic

January 6, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Constance Wilhelm

While the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected professional and personal travel plans across the world, what happens when these plans can have a direct impact on cessation of hostilities in a conflict zone? What happens when a state or group may have an interest in allowing – or denying – individual travel in order to further their political aims?

Taking into consideration the current Afghan Peace Talks[1], as well as the ongoing political negotiations in Yemen, this article outlines how the pandemic has a potentially far-reaching impact on humanitarian assistance operations in conflict zones, and more broadly on peace.

Operational Environment

The pandemic has severely impacted the ability of aid actors to deliver assistance, including in countries facing enormous need. Beyond peace negotiations, humanitarian and development operations are also critical to providing security and opportunity to citizens in conflict zones. In Yemen, COVID-19 is yet another health challenge to a population already battling hunger, medicine and vaccine shortages, and diseases that have been long eliminated in other countries[2], all within a struggling medical system.

Afghanistan faces similar issues, where health clinics are already inaccessible for many citizens, especially women, and where scepticism concerning the virus further complicates limited medical capacity to treat it. At the same time, COVID-19 has not forced a break in fighting in the lead-up to the peace negotiations discussed below, with clear Taliban resistance to ceasefire attempts or a UN call for a humanitarian pause.

How does this affect peace and stability? While aid agencies struggle with their own operational limitations, they also operate in countries where they may not be popular with both governments and armed groups due to perceived ties with Western powers, and where securing access may already be a challenge. The pandemic is being wielded as an excuse to further deny access, travel, and movement to aid workers in areas where assistance is greatly needed. As such, this pandemic could deepen humanitarian crises, and threaten greater instability. This has been seen in Yemen and Afghanistan, but also in parts of Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and elsewhere. In Yemen in particular, Houthis have used the pandemic to not only restrict access to the country, but also to exert greater control on needs assessments, aid distributions, and any potential involvement of international actors in political process[3], all by holding a firm grip on permitted operations. These limitations can threaten the fair distribution of aid to the most vulnerable.

Beyond access under COVID-19, aid agencies also face a great challenge to their duty of care and best use of their resources. They must determine how much risk they are willing to take in sending their staff to field sites potentially exposed to conflict as well as severe health issues, possibly requiring medical evacuation. While organisations improve their understanding of the degree of risk posed by the pandemic to staff health and movements, many UN agencies and other NGOs[4] have responded with variations on a reduced footprint. Some are keeping staff in compounds (creating its own risk for staff due to the impossibility of social distancing) rather than sending them to more remote field sites. As familiarity with pandemic realities have increased and additional medical resources have been mobilized to treat sick staff, operational capacity has also increased – but humanitarians can still be denied access to their areas of intervention, with the perfect justification: it is for their own safety.

Pandemic Peace talks – Strategy and Logistics

This unique opportunity for affecting operational contexts neatly extends to peace talks, as the challenging logistics of bringing together warring sides to negotiate settlements in a third host country are intensified under pandemic conditions. In September 2020, discussions between Houthis and the Yemeni government over the release of Houthi prisoners moved forward in Switzerland. The Houthi and Yemeni delegations utilized UN Special Envoy planes departing from Saudi-controlled airspace to reach Switzerland and secured exceptions for diplomatic travel when no other movement was permitted, even as the Houthis themselves closed airports in Yemen and restricted movement for aid actors – including UN agencies. The Swiss government worked around national pandemic restrictions to allow representatives to speak directly to one another and to maintain their negotiations schedule.

The ongoing Afghan Peace Talks in Doha have been similarly impacted by logistical issues, with strategic implications. Under normal conditions, countries compete to host peace negotiations to protect their interests, ensure they are part of the conversation, and bolster their reputations as key geopolitical players. This confluence of actors and interests can pressure a negotiation and complicate participants’ calculations. However, during the pandemic, countries that might typically host peace negotiations become more focused on their urgent domestic needs and give less attention and resources to peace delegates. Where many great powers and actors may have competed to hold the Afghan talks prior to the pandemic, fewer countries are currently willing to assume the risk of hosting such an event. As such, the pandemic favours wealthy, autocratic systems such as Qatar’s that do not have to justify their decisions and risk-taking to their public. Also, a second round of talks is unlikely due to these logistical concerns[5], so Qatar’s willingness to host prolonged talks amid few alternative options creates pressure to conclude discussions during this round.

Qatar’s hosting has additional advantages: a strong Qatari national health authority able to handle testing and tracing, combined with the ability to indefinitely block off a 5-star hotel for talks, to mobilize private jets for transport, and to offer luxury accommodations for Taliban representatives and their families, all as representatives arrive from high-risk countries and are granted entrance health waivers for indefinite stays. This pandemic then serves Doha’s goals: they are at the centre of peace talks, ensuring international – including American – support despite being in a hostile neighbourhood. Senior diplomats leverage personal relationships with Qatari officials to get clearance to enter, while others less favoured find that their travel has ‘accidentally’ not been cleared. While externally entrenching their centrality to the negotiations, internally Qatari actors are also using their roles to leveraging power against one another. At the same time, Doha is a relatively less experienced host[6], which has opened the way for interested third parties to establish strong support groups and facilitate consultative, collaborative assistance to the talks to protect their interests.

Actors at the margins also lose; with COVID-19 travel restrictions in place, meetings on the margins – for example, side events on gender, minority rights and protections – are less likely to happen. Participation of civil society in peace talks becomes more tenuous, and inclusive representation at peace negotiations, which are already often seen as elite-driven or elite-bargaining processes, also suffer. When citizens do not have the opportunity to directly challenge leadership, it becomes more difficult to ensure that a range of views are accounted for in a potential settlement. In Doha, conference organizers fought to secure access for 30 Afghan journalists to attend the opening ceremony of the talks, allowing for some interaction between national press and the Taliban. This benefits the overall objective of the talks – with fewer sideline attractions, attention can be focused on the single outcome of reaching agreement – but inclusivity can suffer.

Another key difference in the current climate is that peace negotiations are commonly preceded by (secret) pre-negotiation discussions where key agenda items, red lines, and starting positions can be clarified on both sides. These have the advantage of accelerating formal talks once they begin but can also create tension should personalities or political positions combust from the start. Partly due to the pandemic, parties have arrived at the Afghan talks without pre-existing personal relationships, resulting in increased caution on both sides when interacting with one another, but also creating an opportunity to focus discussions free from personal distractions.

While it is too early to make comprehensive conclusions, the COVID-19 pandemic directly affects peace. It is being used as a justification to exert greater control over humanitarian activities in fractious contexts, further complicating operations in already difficult environments. The direction and execution of peace talks are being similarly constrained, resulting both in more concentrated but also less inclusive events. Whether these factors will increase chances for resolution remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that lessons drawn from this unique time can offer insights to practitioners once the post-pandemic chapter begins.

[1] Formally, the Intra-Afghan Peace Talks.

[2] Such diseases include measles, cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and polio.

[3] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, Yemen, 11 November 2020.

[4] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, 11 November 2020.

Interview with NGO worker, Afghanistan, 15 November 2020.

[5] Six months ago, at least 4 rounds of talks in Qatar, Germany, Norway, and Uzbekistan were envisioned, with all but Doha ultimately being scrapped.

[6] Capacity to properly address protocol and logistics are also a concern, for example with Doha releasing press statements concerning the talks without first clearing them on both sides, or releasing invitations and agendas to participants that are only available in Arabic (Dari and Pashto being the official languages of Afghanistan).

Constance Wilhelm is a Senior Editor for the Strife Journal, and a doctoral researcher with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she focuses on approaches to the return and prosecution of the European women that have joined Daesh. She is also an experienced researcher and Public and Humanitarian Policy consultant, specialising in conflict-affected areas and fragile states. She has worked with think tanks at Princeton University and New York University, with the Afghan Mission to the UN in New York, the OECD in Paris, humanitarian and international development organisations and consulting firms in Lebanon (leading teams in Syria), in Jordan (leading teams in Yemen), in Afghanistan, in Libya, as well as across both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel-Lake Chad region. Constance has an MA in Conflict Management and International Economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a BA from McGill University.

Yemen: A Failure of Human Security

July 22, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Philip Mayne

The enduring conflict in Yemen has driven many into refugee camps (Image credit: UNICEF/Alessio Romenzi)

Since its reunification in 1990, Yemen has been ravaged by economic failure and internal conflict. In 2015, a civil war erupted between the government and the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia Muslim minority. In 2018, when the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) began fighting the government for control of the southern city of Aden, the STC announced self-rule on 26 April 2020 for the areas under its control. At the time of writing the Yemeni government continues to be embroiled in a civil war against the Houthis in the North, the STC in the South, and other rebel groups elsewhere in the country. Yemen is witnessing some of the worst human security failings in recent years.

What is Human Security?

Following the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts became prominent across the globe. Traditional international relations theories, blinkered at the state level of analysis, failed to examine these sub-state conflicts. Human security was introduced in 1994 with the publication of the United Nations Development (UNDP) report. Human security makes the individual the referent object of security. Human security focuses on establishing ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ for every individual. However, threats to human security remain numerous. The 1994 report lists seven main categories of threat, including food security, health security and personal security. Yemen is one example of a state failing to meet human security in these aspects.

Food (In)security

As a result of the conflict, poverty is rife within Yemen. Almost half of the population is living on less than US$3.10 a day, and over five million people live on less than $1.90 a day. Even more people are at risk of falling into poverty. Without income, buying necessities becomes almost impossible. The economic situation in Yemen, in terms of wages, employment, and the Yemeni currency itself, is worsening, yet food prices continue rising.

However, there is more to food security than the ability to buy food. Food security is also the ability to always have physical, social, and economic access to safe and nutrient-rich food. In Yemen, even for those who can afford it, access to food and water is minimal at best. Much of the basic infrastructure has been decimated by the war. It is estimated that 3.5 million people have lost access to piped water, due to conflict. Access to food is also limited.

Yemen is heavily dependent on imports to satisfy domestic consumption. Yet successive governments failed to establish an effective infrastructure to allow the feeding of the nation. Moreover, the conflict has restricted the ability to access this imported food. At least 5.1 million people in seventy-five districts have been cut off from access to imports and humanitarian assistance due to restrictions imposed by authorities during the conflict. The situation has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic; as supply routes were closed due to international lockdowns, thereby slowing down trade. In addition to Yemen’s woes, a locust swarm sweeping over the country has begun to affect agricultural production. The results of food insecurity in the country could be devastating.

The multifaceted issues that have caused food insecurity in Yemen have resulted in a situation that is beyond dire. Yemen now faces the worst food security crisis in decades. Over twenty million Yemenis are food insecure, and ten million are at the brink of famine and starvation. 65,000 people are already in the advanced stages of hunger and extreme food deprivation. Over two million children, under the age of five, are also suffering from chronic malnutrition. In 2019, it was reported that extreme hunger and disease had directly killed up to 85,000 children. It is clear that Yemen is clearly failing in terms of food security, and keeping the people of Yemen fed poses one of the greatest international challenges on the world stage.

Health (In)security

In addition to inadequate economic and food insecurity, Yemen faces a severe health crisis. Health facilities have been depleted due to the conflict, as shelling and airstrikes have damaged hospitals, healthcare workers have been assaulted and medical facilities have been occupied. The lack of access to clean water and sanitation resulted in a major cholera outbreak in 2016. Since 2018, there have been nearly one million suspected cholera cases. As it stands, cholera, dengue, malaria, and poor sanitation are still prevalent, and the health services are already overstretched.

Unfortunately, COVID-19 has exacerbated Yemen’s struggles. As of 14 July, the number of cases in Yemen is 1502, with 425 deaths. This figure, is likely lower than the reality, as they are from government reports, and insurgent groups have been accused of concealing the outbreak. Nonetheless, the virus is rapidly spreading in Yemen; and the fatality rate is four times the global average.

The focus on COVID-19 has resulted in other services being reduced, resulting in other negative implications for health security. Yemen currently has a maternal mortality rate that is 47 times that of the UK. However, The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has been forced to suspend reproductive health care in 140 out of 180 health facilities. Only 40 facilities now provide these facilities across the entire country. This reduction in funding risks the lives of 2 million women and girls of childbearing age. The UNFPA states “Some 320,000 pregnant women will be cut off from lifesaving reproductive health services, while 48,000 women could die from complications of pregnancy and childbirth”. Prior to COVID-19, Yemen failed to provide sufficient health services and provide care for the population. In the current crisis, the future looks even bleaker.

Personal (In)security

In the last five years, over 112,000 people have died as a direct result of the conflict in Yemen. 25,000 of these casualties were in 2019 alone. In February of this year the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), confirmed that since March 2015, 7,734 civilians have been killed directly because of the war, including 2,103 children. In the first quarter of 2020, 270 civilians were killed as a result of the conflict.

Intrastate conflicts often include high levels of civilian casualties as local populations get caught up in the conflict. However, in Yemen, there is evidence that points to the deliberate targeting of civilians. In June 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reported that between January and December 2019, there were thirty-five targeted attacks against schools and hospitals. These attacks were carried out by all sides of the conflict. One report states that in 2019, the conflict was responsible for killing one child younger than 5 every twelve minutes. It is clear that personal security is not being met in Yemen, with indiscriminate force being used by the Saudi-led coalition, and indiscriminate weapons, such as banned mines, by rebels.

Indirectly, the conflict has created another personal security issue, as the number of displaced people in the country stands at over 3.6 million. Displaced people are at higher risk of exploitation, harassment, and violence. Women and girls, who make up half of all displaced people, are particularly at risk. Some girls have been forced into child marriages, and other women have been subjected to domestic abuse, yet there has been a reluctance to report such crimes.

In addition to women, displaced children are at risk of threats to their personal security. Currently, it is estimated that there are two million displaced children in Yemen; many without their families. These children are especially vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse, exploitation, and recruitment into armed groups. Again, as with other human security issues, personal security is far from being realised in Yemen.

What Solution?

Efforts by the United Nations and several international NGOs have alleviated some of the suffering through providing humanitarian aid and assistance in Yemen. But with the combination of continued conflict and a global pandemic, the outlook for Yemen continues to be a human security disaster, unless one of these issues can be alleviated.

Conflict has been central to the human security crisis in Yemen. If there is any chance of alleviating the suffering in Yemen, then the first and most important step is to bring an end to the on-going conflict. After five years of conflict and with no end in sight, outright military victory seems highly unlikely. Therefore, international actors need to continue to convince all parties to open discussions and negotiate an end to the conflict.

Negotiations between the parties are not unprecedented. Regional actors have had some success in bringing the parties to the table. In November 2019 the, albeit short-lived, power-sharing Riyadh Agreement was signed after negotiations between the Yemeni government and STC were brokered by Saudi Arabia. International organisations too have had some success. In December 2018 the UN-brokered the Stockholm Agreement, which implemented a ceasefire in the city of Hudaydah, allowing aid to enter the city and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. Therefore, the UN, and other actors, must continue their efforts calling all parties to seek a negotiated peace. Without peace, there is little hope that the suffering in Yemen can be alleviated, and Yemen will continue to be one of the greatest human security failures of recent times.

Cash Crops, Conflict, and Climate Change

July 8, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Eve Gleeson

Mexico’s Avocado police on patrol (Image credit: Katy Watson/BBC)

The cultivation of crops is a steady and promising source of economic gain for developing states, both through internal markets and international trade. However, these powerhouses of economic success may well serve as a double-edged sword. Lacking robust and well-enforced laws and regulations, the economies and populations of many states have become dependent on, or in some cases addicted to, the success of these crops for their livelihoods and security. This success has precipitated destructive practices in subservience to the crop’s lucrative economic benefits, such as informal governance by militias and the decimation of environmental resources such as land and water.

Circumstances in Yemen and Mexico, in particular, point to these hostile relationships surrounding cash crops. In Mexico, militias are operating through kidnappings and killings, forests and ecosystems are being destroyed for land clearings, and local populations are facing health hazards from excessive pesticide use. In Yemen, the market monopolisation of a non-food crop is exacerbating a famine originally created by war and natural resource scarcity. In both of these cases, environmental pressures have preceded or followed from the urgency exerted by a stressed food system, depicting the inseparable relationship between unsustainable agriculture and compromised social, economic, and political stability.

Yemen’s cash crop drug: conflict, famine, and natural resource depletion

The War in Yemen, a conflict between the Houthi rebel movement, government forces, and a coalition of Arabian states, has resulted in a famine that harbours a much darker backstory than blockades stopping the import of food and water to the country. In addition, the famine has been worsened by the growth of khat (or qat), a stimulant drug that features as Yemen’s superstar crop. It has brought such financial gain to its growers that it has taken priority in farming country over other crops, such as wheat or fruits, that could provide sustenance to its people. Khat is so ubiquitous in the country’s political economy that it has become entwined with the interests of warring factions, further spurring conflict, water depletion, and famine on the peninsula.

The crop is the source of a violent dispute between farmers, a currency for bribe-seeking soldiers, and a dominant figure in the country’s markets, detrimentally crowding out crops that could help soften the blow of Yemen’s famine. It provides a source of funding for both the Houthi rebels and the pro-government forces in the war, as ‘qat traders pay a tax on their qat to whichever side controls their region‘. The crop also consumes close to forty per cent of Yemen’s clean water reserves, thereby further overtaxing water resources already weaponised by warring factions that destroy infrastructure, obstruct roadways, and blockade imports.

To make matters worse, the stimulant drug is also challenging Yemen’s dependence on groundwater reserves that are dwindling under drought, heat, and other climatic irregularities. The government lacks the capacity to enforce modern water rights, which have been rejected by wealthy farmers who regularly exploit their poor counterparts by drilling on their land. Now, farmers freely drill wells without government regulation. As a result, they continue to use highly unsustainable groundwater reserves to feed khat production, with no plan for developing renewable water sources for human or agricultural use as droughts persist and temperatures rise.

‘Blood Avocados’ in Mexico’s Michoacán state

Avocados, known to many in the growing industry as ‘green gold’, account for conflict between rival farmers and traders in Mexico. Cartels, violence, and extortion are just some of the troubling factors behind this cash crop; one that has drained resources– land, water, and capital– from the regions in which they are grown. Major importers such as the United States, the EU, and Japan have driven a $2 billion industry rooted thousands of miles away with little conception of the havoc the efforts have inflicted on the region of Michoacán, where production is concentrated.

In the Michoacán state, four principal narcotics cartels extorting avocado farmers have transformed the region into what Mexican online magazine Clarín Mundo has called Mexico’s ‘Capital of Violence’. Failure to pay ‘monthly protection’ fees to the cartels has resulted in kidnappings, killings, and seizures of farmland. In response, state-funded self-defence militias have sprouted from the local community to combat these gangs, whose narcoterrorism is partially financed by the extortion of farmers. Consequently, the region’s capital of Tacitaro has become militarised: ‘The new force is equipped with armored patrol trucks, and each officer wears full combat gear, including bulletproof vests, helmets, and high-power rifles — all provided for by the state police’.

This industry is also guilty of precipitating deforestation and water depletion (avocados require nearly 320 litres of water per unit) as well as stimulating competition for land that has provoked the intentional burning of wildlife ecosystems. This deforestation, performed illegally, points to gaps in environmental governance. Climatic irregularities, such as droughts and floods, have further troubled soil and land health, compromising the fertility of existing farmland. Given that growing a crop at an industrial scale often requires the heavy use of pesticides, these chemicals have contaminated the water supply in avocado-growing regions and sickened local populations.

The bigger picture: the disparate effects of climate change on developing states

This unmistakable relationship between food and conflict is an increasingly global issue that threatens and is likewise threatened by, the pressures of resource and environmental degradation. Though vastly different in nature, the cases of Yemen and Mexico illustrate how unsustainable agricultural practices, themselves propagated by gaps in governance and commodity demands from rich, developed states, can manifest in a conflict where effective protection of farmers and land is absent, particularly in an era when climatic changes are an increasing threat to security. Similar situations are unfolding in places like Iraq, where desertification and salination of water tables resulting from climatic irregularities are intensifying grievances in an already fragile state.

For this reason, the looming threat of climate change is not a ‘first world problem’. Although developed countries have the technological and financial resources (even if they lack the willpower) to transition to renewable energy, sustainable agricultural practices, and lower carbon emissions, the threat is a less immediate one for many. Wealthier developed countries have the resources for more expensive projects, like desalination of saltwater, if groundwater reserves become exhausted or contaminated. For communities that strive day-to-day for economic, political, and social stability and predictability, climate change can mean compromises to essential crop yields, irreplaceable loss of natural resources, increased conflict, and even displacement.

How can the global community ensure that more vulnerable populations stop suffering from food and nutrition insecurity, domestic tensions and war, contaminated and insufficient water resources, or displacement at the hand of climate change? Addressing climate change is at the forefront of this matter: lowering greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the carbon sequestration capacity of land by repairing broken systems. In the short term, we must consider how the demands and interventions of more developed and often opportunistic states impact the ability for less stable states to ensure food, water, and other basic livelihoods. Grassroots organisations like Soil, Food and Healthy Communities in Malawi and Sustainable Harvest International in Central America are making major headway in creating more sustainable and regenerative practices in communities that struggle with food insecurity. But movements in the West must acknowledge the disparate effects of climate change on vulnerable communities and their impact on international security.

Eve Gleeson holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. After briefly working in threat intelligence, she is shifting her focus toward sustainable agriculture and food policy. She can be found on LinkedIn or on Twitter at @evegleeson_.

Strife Feature – The Warrior Prince, Sectarian Strife and Countless Civilian Casualties

February 22, 2018 by Strife Staff

The Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s Blockade in Yemen: A gross miscalculation for political capital?

By Tasneem Ghazi

Illustration of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, as civilians present papers in order to receive food rations. (Credit Photo: Hani Mohammed / AP)

Abstract

It is perhaps ironic that in the very day and age when robots hold citizenship rights (such as the infamous Saudi ‘Sophia’), over seven million people remain starving, stranded, and bombarded daily in an arid, barren desert. Save the Children predicts that in Yemen, an estimated average of 130 children are dying daily from malnutrition alone. This humanitarian disaster is a direct result of the Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s decision to enforce a naval and aerial blockade on the 25th March 2015; a strategy aimed at crippling their opponents, the Houthi-led insurgents backed by Iran. The blockade has prevented all humanitarian aid and basic resources (such as food and water) from entering the afflicted Houthi-dominated areas. As it stands, Yemen is now the ‘largest humanitarian crisis in the modern world’ and yet, America, Russia, Great Britain and neighbouring countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have turned a blind eye. Regardless of whether the Saudi Arabian-led Military Coalition’s intervention into the Yemeni civil war may be morally justified, civilian plight has reached an unprecedented level and is only worsening. The blockade has also been unable to prevent the Houthis from arming themselves with long-range ballistic missiles and firing them at Riyadh (e.g., on 4 November 2017). These developments beg the question–is the blockade really an effective strategy or a gross miscalculation by the Coalition?

Humanitarian Crisis

The devastating causalities in Yemen have been caused by the ongoing strife that begun during the 2011 Arab Spring. As initially clarified, the extraordinary scale of this humanitarian crisis is because of the Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s decision to enforce a naval and aerial blockade. Publicly, the Coalition announced that this blockade would severely undermine their opponents, the Houthi-led insurgents, by preventing them from receiving weapons and ammunition from their ally and patron, Iran. Yet, it has done anything but this. Amnesty International, alongside most humanitarian and relief agencies, has declared that the blockade has prevented aid and resources from reaching the afflicted civilian and Houthi areas. Most recently, the blockade has closed the major entry ports of Hodeidah and Saleef, in addition to the airport in the capital Sana’a, blocking all access and entrapping the impoverished areas more than ever before. Matters have been exacerbated by the worst outbreak of cholera in modern history, which stands at 1 million cases and counting, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Save the Children predicts that because of this deadly epidemic, one child is being infected with cholera every 35 seconds. Even if we are to place the Coalition’s airstrikes aside, Amnesty International predicts that in Yemen, 18.8 million people, out of a total population of 28 million, are in need of basic supplies as well as medical and humanitarian aid. These figures are rising daily and this simply will not cease until the blockade ends.

After two years of ongoing fighting, the situation in Yemen remains at a stalemate. Houthi forces have managed to retain control of the majority of the Western coast, bordering the Red Sea, as well as the capital Sana’a. If the blockade were really as successful as the Coalition’s news outlets have claimed, it would have choked the Houthis and prevented them from receiving arms and ammunition, let alone missiles. The reality, from a strategic perspective, is that it has failed. As long as 32 months after the blockade’s primary enforcement, the Houthis fired a Scud-type missile with a range of more than 800km at Riyadh. If this is the case, why then, have the Coalition’s policymakers chosen to enforce such a costly and ineffective policy?

The ‘Warrior Prince’

The answer arguably lies in the objectives and stakes of a young Arab leader, who political commentators have identified as being responsible for the consolidation of the Saudi Military Coalition and the rigorous enforcement of this blockade. Namely: The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman. Publicly, Bin Salman has made quite clear that the Coalition is staunchly committed to prolonging the conflict until a victory is secured. After tightening the blockade in November 2017 , following the missile strike on Riyadh, Bin Salman received much praise as the ‘Protector of the Gulf’. Indeed, Bin Salman’s policy objectives merit inspection in light of his unexpected and dashing arrival into regional and national politics. It is no secret that he has used the war to consolidate his public image as the young ‘Warrior Prince’ and rightful heir to the Saudi Arabian throne. In March 2015, barely a month after forming and leading the Coalition for his conquest into Yemen, the unexperienced 30-year-old was made Deputy Crown Prince, instead of many of his older, more qualified relatives.

Since Bin Salman’s swift rise to power, political commentators have rushed to make sense of his extraordinary policies. These include imprisoning 150 of his relatives (even well-known philanthropists such as Al Walid Bin Talal), planning a completely robot-run city, and granting citizenship to the computerized Robot, ‘Sophia’. Famously, on 24 October 2017, he delivered a speech in which he vowed to return Saudi Arabia to an age of ‘moderate Islam’ .This speech is laden with dark irony, as ‘moderate Islam’, or mainstream Islam for that matter, would not endorse a blockade that is starving disease-stricken civilians, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. This is crystal clear in the Qur’anic verse: “Whoever slays (or is responsible for killing) a soul … it is as if he had slain mankind altogether (5:32)”.

Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia

Policy Objectives

It is clear that Bin Salman’s policies are not theologically founded, at least, not in the traditional Islamic sense. However, his recent momentous speech reenforces his desire to appear moderate in order to attract the West’s backing and investment. Leading the effort in Yemen, as well as imprisoning any contenders to his position and becoming the first to bestow citizenship rights upon a robot reveals a common thread in his policies–to steal the limelight and paint a striking public image. These actions have little to do with the good of the Saudi state. Indeed, philanthropists of the Al Saud dynasty who held the good of the Saudi state at heart are now in cuffs and the Saudi Arabian budget is being further depleted by the costs of this war. What may be commonly ascertained from Bin Salman’s policies is that his public image is his highest priority. He desires to be seen in the West as a young modernizing ruler and in the Middle East as a ‘Warrior Prince’. Some have even claimed that his policies in Yemen are painted with Machiavellian brushes. For in Chapter 8 of The Prince, Machiavelli contends that ‘conquests by criminal virtue’ may be justified to establish a Prince’s power.[1] Likewise, Bin Salman clearly boosted his popularity back home through this blockade and hopes of a smashing victory abroad.

From this angle, we might venture to say that Bin Salman’s policies in Yemen have been successful in securing his political credibility. Credibility here is not limited to Saudi Arabia, but neighboring states in region, such as the UAE, with which he has strengthened and secured ties. On a personal level, analysts say that his actions have commanded the respect of Arab leaders such as Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed and the King of Bahrain. This is also because he is achieving the long-standing political and ideologically-rooted objective of weakening Iran’s support in the region, by fighting their allies, the Houthis. The ideology subscribed to by most of the Al Saud dynasty is one that the rulers of the UAE and Bahrain publicly condone. This ideology is the neo-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi ‘takfiri’ school of thought that labels Shi’a and all non-Wahhabis or non-Salafis as ‘heretics’[2]. It is encapsulated and based upon Mohammed Ibn Abd Al Wahhabb’s Nullifiers of Islam (Nawaqid Al Islam) [3]. In Yemen, the Houthis (being Zaidis) are non-Wahhabis. According to this ideology, Zaidis (like all non-Wahhabis) are branded ‘heretics’ that ‘must be killed’ if they do not submit to Salafi-Wahhabism[4]. The Houthis represent 40% of the Yemeni population and they have been most affected by the causalities in areas such as Mocha. However, in Bin Salman’s eyes, Yemen is a ‘two birds with one stone’ opportunity. Not only has the blockade allowed him to embellish his public image and secure credibility, but his actions are additionally justified from an ideological, Wahhabi perspective.

Another Sunni-Shi’a Conflict?

Nevertheless, it would be far too simplistic to reduce the entire conflict to a mere extension of the sectarian Sunni-Shi’a strife that dominates the region. It is true that on one side, for the Saudis this is to some extent an ideological, and perhaps, a theologically-rooted crusade. However, for the rest of the Coalition (e.g., Egypt and Jordan) who are not Wahhabis and are traditional ‘usuli’ Sunnis, the war has no religious justification whatsoever. This is even more true for the Houthis themselves, who despite being supported by Iran, are not Shi’a per se[5]. In fact, from an Islamic, theological perspective, traditional Zaidism is far more similar to traditional Sunnism, and specifically Hanafi ‘usul’ (traditions) that are practiced across the majority of the Levant, as opposed to Twelver Shi’ism that is practiced by the majority of Iran. This is precisely why it is debatable whether the Zaidis are Shi’a at all[6], and why historically speaking, sectarianism has never been a problem in Yemen until this point.

Whilst bitter sectarian rhetoric remains at the heart of the conflict, notions of a religiously justified war have been augmented by the media. Yemen is certainly a manifestation of the Saudi-Iran power struggle for regional hegemony. Recent developments such as former President Saleh’s death and desertion of the Houthis have fueled the fire ignited by Sunni-Shi’a rhetoric even further. The vacancy left by Saleh’s death means that there is no significant, internationally known Yemeni figure supporting the Houthis. This, in turn, has reinforced the portrayal of the Houthis in the Arab press as no more than Iran’s ‘Anti-Sunni’ puppets. However, despite this, Yemen should not be confused with a religious war or large-scale sectarian strife, like the situation in post-2003 Iraq. More importantly, the civilian plight that exists can be alleviated in a manner that does not hinder both factions from fighting one another. Yemen is primarily a proxy war. For the Houthis, Iran is a strong, loyal, and convenient ally. As for the Saudis, the Houthis pose a threat at their borders, both ideologically and strategically speaking. But, as far as the majority of Yemeni civilians are concerned, nothing matters except being able to survive.

A more detailed understanding of theological nuances teaches that the situation in Yemen extends far beyond a ‘Sunni-Shi’a’ conflict. History corroborates this even further; despite Al Saud’s longstanding commitment to Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia has previously set aside its ideological differences in Yemen. In the early 1960’s, King Faisal intervened by supporting the Houthi Royalists against the Communist rebels backed by Pan-Arabist Jamal Abd Al Nasser. Furthermore, when this intervention failed, King Faisal went to great lengths to reestablish peace in Yemen through the Tai’f Conference in 1965. Thus, it would be foolish to presume that Bin Salman cannot emulate his truly moderate uncle in one way or another.

According to the Red Cross, three Yemeni cities lack of clear water due to a Saudi blockade

A Different Approach

An alternate strategy with regards to the blockade does not mean that the Saudis would abandon their military campaign, however morally dubious this may be. It simply entails the adoption of a different approach towards Yemeni civilians. This would consist of lifting or loosening the blockade in civilian-dominated areas such as Mocha and letting humanitarian agencies in with Saudi protection. This strategy would cost just as much as the blockade has cost. If well publicized, this could also boost the popularity of Bin Salman and the Coalition in Yemen. After all, tightening the blockade in November 2017 allowed Bin Salman to make yet another mark as the ‘Sunni Strongman’ of the Gulf. Realistically speaking then, even if the rest of the Coalition wanted to loosen the blockade, Bin Salman will not budge unless he is convinced that this new approach will benefit him personally.

Evaluation

If efforts were to be disguised as ‘concern’ for Yemeni civilians, this would allow Bin Salman to create a well-rounded public image in the Middle East as a figure who can do no wrong–merciful towards civilians and concerned for their livelihoods. In the long run, this would be instrumental for mustering the support of local Yemeni tribes. Particularly in light of the late President Saleh’s defection and death by the Houthis, a massive humanitarian campaign has the potential to encourage Saleh’s supporters and grateful civilians to switch sides. During the beginning of the conflict, many civilians were Houthi sympathizers merely because Houthi forces did not disrespect local tribes or wreak havoc in the rural areas that they captured. Local tribes appreciated this, in contrast to the ‘Scorched Earth Approach’ adopted by the Coalition and their de facto allies on the ground– the Colombian mercenaries hired by the UAE and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Ansar Al Sharia’a. In fact, this is why Houthi forces command much more support than many would like to admit. Their tactics, as far as civilians are concerned, are relatively speaking, not nearly as brutal.

In short, loosening the blockade and disguising humanitarian efforts as the Coalition’s ‘concern’ would be a much more effective strategy on many levels. By saving millions of lives, the Coalition would earn the gratitude and loyalty of the afflicted civilians: Sunni tribes and Zaidi’s alike. This move would undermine the core strength of the Houthi-led insurgency. Such a campaign would be taking advantage of the fact that the Zaidi’s have neither the means nor the infrastructure to cure cholera, diphtheria, and other epidemics, in addition to famine.

Regardless of whether the blockade stands, Iran will still supply the Houthis with weapons and ammunition as proved by the Houthi’s intermittent missile strikes. Partially lifting the blockade to allow aid in will not, therefore, be severely detrimental to the Coalition’s military position. In fact, this approach might even bolster the Coalition’s standing in Yemen and turn the tables in their favour by giving local tribes reason to shift allegiances, as Saleh notably did before his death. The starving, disease-stricken civilians are mainly Zaidi’s and traditional usuli Sunnis, both of which have no religious or ideological commitment to fight the Coalition or Wahhabis per se. Although a decent amount are Houthi sympathizers, the afflicted are not majorly concerned with regional politics. Indiscriminate airstrikes and letting these civilians starve and suffer is a grim, slow manner of securing a win for the Saudi-led Coalition.

A more effective strategy in the long run would entail saving millions of lives by Saudi Arabia allowing aid in and disguising this as ‘concern’ for Yemeni children. The ambitious ‘Warrior Prince’ could even use this to ameliorate his popularity and amass Yemeni allies and support for a new post-conflict government in the future. However, the reality is that it is, perhaps, easier for the Coalition to use the excuse of sectarian strife to prolong the conflict rather than save millions of Zaidis. After all, neither America nor Britain has entangled themselves in the conflict yet so why should the Coalition worry about aggravating the largest humanitarian crisis in the world?

Tasneem Ghazi reads Politics, Philosophy and Law at King’s College London. She is an editor at the King’s Student Law Review (KSLR) and is also one of the founding editors of the Politics, Philosophy and Law Journal (KSJPPL). Tasneem is a contributing writer to a number of academic journals and media outlets. Her areas of expertise and interest include the Arab Spring in the Levant, the dynamics of sectarianism in the MENA, the influence of religion and socio-economics on political systems in the MENA and countering violent- extremist thought in the MENA. She is also trilingual and works as a freelance translator.

Notes:

[1]Niccolò Machiavelli, ‘The Prince’ (London: Penguin Books, 1988), Chapter 8.

[2] Vincenzo Olivetti, Terror’s Source’, The House of Islam p.16

[3] Mohammed Ibn Abd Al Wahabb (‘The Nullifiers of Islam’) ‘Nawaqid Al Islam’

[4]Vincenzo Olivetti, ‘Terror’s Source’, The Salafi Ideology Doctrines and Tenet, p.33

[5] Ibid, p.15

[6] Ibid, p.16

Image sources

Banner (image 1): https://www.axios.com/famine-cholera-and-civilian-casualties-the-crisis-in-yemen-1513307014-02f92d70-8f7c-47f2-814d-dc913a1e8b79.html

Image 2: https://en.reseauinternational.net/a-warrior-prince-rises-in-arabia-as-the-monarch-of-all-he-surveys/

Image 3: http://www.yamanyoon.com/?p=91162&lang=en