Yemen

Strife Feature – The Warrior Prince, Sectarian Strife and Countless Civilian Casualties

February 22, 2018

The Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s Blockade in Yemen: A gross miscalculation for political capital?

By Tasneem Ghazi

Illustration of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, as civilians present papers in order to receive food rations. (Credit Photo: Hani Mohammed / AP)

Abstract

It is perhaps ironic that in the very day and age when robots hold citizenship rights (such as the infamous Saudi ‘Sophia’), over seven million people remain starving, stranded, and bombarded daily in an arid, barren desert. Save the Children predicts that in Yemen, an estimated average of 130 children are dying daily from malnutrition alone. This humanitarian disaster is a direct result of the Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s decision to enforce a naval and aerial blockade on the 25th March 2015; a strategy aimed at crippling their opponents, the Houthi-led insurgents backed by Iran. The blockade has prevented all humanitarian aid and basic resources (such as food and water) from entering the afflicted Houthi-dominated areas. As it stands, Yemen is now the ‘largest humanitarian crisis in the modern world’ and yet, America, Russia, Great Britain and neighbouring countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have turned a blind eye. Regardless of whether the Saudi Arabian-led Military Coalition’s intervention into the Yemeni civil war may be morally justified, civilian plight has reached an unprecedented level and is only worsening. The blockade has also been unable to prevent the Houthis from arming themselves with long-range ballistic missiles and firing them at Riyadh (e.g., on 4 November 2017). These developments beg the question–is the blockade really an effective strategy or a gross miscalculation by the Coalition?

Humanitarian Crisis

The devastating causalities in Yemen have been caused by the ongoing strife that begun during the 2011 Arab Spring. As initially clarified, the extraordinary scale of this humanitarian crisis is because of the Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s decision to enforce a naval and aerial blockade. Publicly, the Coalition announced that this blockade would severely undermine their opponents, the Houthi-led insurgents, by preventing them from receiving weapons and ammunition from their ally and patron, Iran. Yet, it has done anything but this. Amnesty International, alongside most humanitarian and relief agencies, has declared that the blockade has prevented aid and resources from reaching the afflicted civilian and Houthi areas. Most recently, the blockade has closed the major entry ports of Hodeidah and Saleef, in addition to the airport in the capital Sana’a, blocking all access and entrapping the impoverished areas more than ever before. Matters have been exacerbated by the worst outbreak of cholera in modern history, which stands at 1 million cases and counting, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Save the Children predicts that because of this deadly epidemic, one child is being infected with cholera every 35 seconds. Even if we are to place the Coalition’s airstrikes aside, Amnesty International predicts that in Yemen, 18.8 million people, out of a total population of 28 million, are in need of basic supplies as well as medical and humanitarian aid. These figures are rising daily and this simply will not cease until the blockade ends.

After two years of ongoing fighting, the situation in Yemen remains at a stalemate. Houthi forces have managed to retain control of the majority of the Western coast, bordering the Red Sea, as well as the capital Sana’a. If the blockade were really as successful as the Coalition’s news outlets have claimed, it would have choked the Houthis and prevented them from receiving arms and ammunition, let alone missiles. The reality, from a strategic perspective, is that it has failed. As long as 32 months after the blockade’s primary enforcement, the Houthis fired a Scud-type missile with a range of more than 800km at Riyadh. If this is the case, why then, have the Coalition’s policymakers chosen to enforce such a costly and ineffective policy?

The ‘Warrior Prince’

The answer arguably lies in the objectives and stakes of a young Arab leader, who political commentators have identified as being responsible for the consolidation of the Saudi Military Coalition and the rigorous enforcement of this blockade. Namely: The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman. Publicly, Bin Salman has made quite clear that the Coalition is staunchly committed to prolonging the conflict until a victory is secured. After tightening the blockade in November 2017 , following the missile strike on Riyadh, Bin Salman received much praise as the ‘Protector of the Gulf’. Indeed, Bin Salman’s policy objectives merit inspection in light of his unexpected and dashing arrival into regional and national politics. It is no secret that he has used the war to consolidate his public image as the young ‘Warrior Prince’ and rightful heir to the Saudi Arabian throne. In March 2015, barely a month after forming and leading the Coalition for his conquest into Yemen, the unexperienced 30-year-old was made Deputy Crown Prince, instead of many of his older, more qualified relatives.

Since Bin Salman’s swift rise to power, political commentators have rushed to make sense of his extraordinary policies. These include imprisoning 150 of his relatives (even well-known philanthropists such as Al Walid Bin Talal), planning a completely robot-run city, and granting citizenship to the computerized Robot, ‘Sophia’. Famously, on 24 October 2017, he delivered a speech in which he vowed to return Saudi Arabia to an age of ‘moderate Islam’ .This speech is laden with dark irony, as ‘moderate Islam’, or mainstream Islam for that matter, would not endorse a blockade that is starving disease-stricken civilians, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. This is crystal clear in the Qur’anic verse: “Whoever slays (or is responsible for killing) a soul … it is as if he had slain mankind altogether (5:32)”.

Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia

Policy Objectives

It is clear that Bin Salman’s policies are not theologically founded, at least, not in the traditional Islamic sense. However, his recent momentous speech reenforces his desire to appear moderate in order to attract the West’s backing and investment. Leading the effort in Yemen, as well as imprisoning any contenders to his position and becoming the first to bestow citizenship rights upon a robot reveals a common thread in his policies–to steal the limelight and paint a striking public image. These actions have little to do with the good of the Saudi state. Indeed, philanthropists of the Al Saud dynasty who held the good of the Saudi state at heart are now in cuffs and the Saudi Arabian budget is being further depleted by the costs of this war. What may be commonly ascertained from Bin Salman’s policies is that his public image is his highest priority. He desires to be seen in the West as a young modernizing ruler and in the Middle East as a ‘Warrior Prince’. Some have even claimed that his policies in Yemen are painted with Machiavellian brushes. For in Chapter 8 of The Prince, Machiavelli contends that ‘conquests by criminal virtue’ may be justified to establish a Prince’s power.[1] Likewise, Bin Salman clearly boosted his popularity back home through this blockade and hopes of a smashing victory abroad.

From this angle, we might venture to say that Bin Salman’s policies in Yemen have been successful in securing his political credibility. Credibility here is not limited to Saudi Arabia, but neighboring states in region, such as the UAE, with which he has strengthened and secured ties. On a personal level, analysts say that his actions have commanded the respect of Arab leaders such as Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed and the King of Bahrain. This is also because he is achieving the long-standing political and ideologically-rooted objective of weakening Iran’s support in the region, by fighting their allies, the Houthis. The ideology subscribed to by most of the Al Saud dynasty is one that the rulers of the UAE and Bahrain publicly condone. This ideology is the neo-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi ‘takfiri’ school of thought that labels Shi’a and all non-Wahhabis or non-Salafis as ‘heretics’[2]. It is encapsulated and based upon Mohammed Ibn Abd Al Wahhabb’s Nullifiers of Islam (Nawaqid Al Islam) [3]. In Yemen, the Houthis (being Zaidis) are non-Wahhabis. According to this ideology, Zaidis (like all non-Wahhabis) are branded ‘heretics’ that ‘must be killed’ if they do not submit to Salafi-Wahhabism[4]. The Houthis represent 40% of the Yemeni population and they have been most affected by the causalities in areas such as Mocha. However, in Bin Salman’s eyes, Yemen is a ‘two birds with one stone’ opportunity. Not only has the blockade allowed him to embellish his public image and secure credibility, but his actions are additionally justified from an ideological, Wahhabi perspective.

Another Sunni-Shi’a Conflict?

Nevertheless, it would be far too simplistic to reduce the entire conflict to a mere extension of the sectarian Sunni-Shi’a strife that dominates the region. It is true that on one side, for the Saudis this is to some extent an ideological, and perhaps, a theologically-rooted crusade. However, for the rest of the Coalition (e.g., Egypt and Jordan) who are not Wahhabis and are traditional ‘usuli’ Sunnis, the war has no religious justification whatsoever. This is even more true for the Houthis themselves, who despite being supported by Iran, are not Shi’a per se[5]. In fact, from an Islamic, theological perspective, traditional Zaidism is far more similar to traditional Sunnism, and specifically Hanafi ‘usul’ (traditions) that are practiced across the majority of the Levant, as opposed to Twelver Shi’ism that is practiced by the majority of Iran. This is precisely why it is debatable whether the Zaidis are Shi’a at all[6], and why historically speaking, sectarianism has never been a problem in Yemen until this point.

Whilst bitter sectarian rhetoric remains at the heart of the conflict, notions of a religiously justified war have been augmented by the media. Yemen is certainly a manifestation of the Saudi-Iran power struggle for regional hegemony. Recent developments such as former President Saleh’s death and desertion of the Houthis have fueled the fire ignited by Sunni-Shi’a rhetoric even further. The vacancy left by Saleh’s death means that there is no significant, internationally known Yemeni figure supporting the Houthis. This, in turn, has reinforced the portrayal of the Houthis in the Arab press as no more than Iran’s ‘Anti-Sunni’ puppets. However, despite this, Yemen should not be confused with a religious war or large-scale sectarian strife, like the situation in post-2003 Iraq. More importantly, the civilian plight that exists can be alleviated in a manner that does not hinder both factions from fighting one another. Yemen is primarily a proxy war. For the Houthis, Iran is a strong, loyal, and convenient ally. As for the Saudis, the Houthis pose a threat at their borders, both ideologically and strategically speaking. But, as far as the majority of Yemeni civilians are concerned, nothing matters except being able to survive.

A more detailed understanding of theological nuances teaches that the situation in Yemen extends far beyond a ‘Sunni-Shi’a’ conflict. History corroborates this even further; despite Al Saud’s longstanding commitment to Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia has previously set aside its ideological differences in Yemen. In the early 1960’s, King Faisal intervened by supporting the Houthi Royalists against the Communist rebels backed by Pan-Arabist Jamal Abd Al Nasser. Furthermore, when this intervention failed, King Faisal went to great lengths to reestablish peace in Yemen through the Tai’f Conference in 1965. Thus, it would be foolish to presume that Bin Salman cannot emulate his truly moderate uncle in one way or another.

According to the Red Cross, three Yemeni cities lack of clear water due to a Saudi blockade

A Different Approach

An alternate strategy with regards to the blockade does not mean that the Saudis would abandon their military campaign, however morally dubious this may be. It simply entails the adoption of a different approach towards Yemeni civilians. This would consist of lifting or loosening the blockade in civilian-dominated areas such as Mocha and letting humanitarian agencies in with Saudi protection. This strategy would cost just as much as the blockade has cost. If well publicized, this could also boost the popularity of Bin Salman and the Coalition in Yemen. After all, tightening the blockade in November 2017 allowed Bin Salman to make yet another mark as the ‘Sunni Strongman’ of the Gulf. Realistically speaking then, even if the rest of the Coalition wanted to loosen the blockade, Bin Salman will not budge unless he is convinced that this new approach will benefit him personally.

Evaluation

If efforts were to be disguised as ‘concern’ for Yemeni civilians, this would allow Bin Salman to create a well-rounded public image in the Middle East as a figure who can do no wrong–merciful towards civilians and concerned for their livelihoods. In the long run, this would be instrumental for mustering the support of local Yemeni tribes. Particularly in light of the late President Saleh’s defection and death by the Houthis, a massive humanitarian campaign has the potential to encourage Saleh’s supporters and grateful civilians to switch sides. During the beginning of the conflict, many civilians were Houthi sympathizers merely because Houthi forces did not disrespect local tribes or wreak havoc in the rural areas that they captured. Local tribes appreciated this, in contrast to the ‘Scorched Earth Approach’ adopted by the Coalition and their de facto allies on the ground– the Colombian mercenaries hired by the UAE and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Ansar Al Sharia’a. In fact, this is why Houthi forces command much more support than many would like to admit. Their tactics, as far as civilians are concerned, are relatively speaking, not nearly as brutal.

In short, loosening the blockade and disguising humanitarian efforts as the Coalition’s ‘concern’ would be a much more effective strategy on many levels. By saving millions of lives, the Coalition would earn the gratitude and loyalty of the afflicted civilians: Sunni tribes and Zaidi’s alike. This move would undermine the core strength of the Houthi-led insurgency. Such a campaign would be taking advantage of the fact that the Zaidi’s have neither the means nor the infrastructure to cure cholera, diphtheria, and other epidemics, in addition to famine.

Regardless of whether the blockade stands, Iran will still supply the Houthis with weapons and ammunition as proved by the Houthi’s intermittent missile strikes. Partially lifting the blockade to allow aid in will not, therefore, be severely detrimental to the Coalition’s military position. In fact, this approach might even bolster the Coalition’s standing in Yemen and turn the tables in their favour by giving local tribes reason to shift allegiances, as Saleh notably did before his death. The starving, disease-stricken civilians are mainly Zaidi’s and traditional usuli Sunnis, both of which have no religious or ideological commitment to fight the Coalition or Wahhabis per se. Although a decent amount are Houthi sympathizers, the afflicted are not majorly concerned with regional politics. Indiscriminate airstrikes and letting these civilians starve and suffer is a grim, slow manner of securing a win for the Saudi-led Coalition.

A more effective strategy in the long run would entail saving millions of lives by Saudi Arabia allowing aid in and disguising this as ‘concern’ for Yemeni children. The ambitious ‘Warrior Prince’ could even use this to ameliorate his popularity and amass Yemeni allies and support for a new post-conflict government in the future. However, the reality is that it is, perhaps, easier for the Coalition to use the excuse of sectarian strife to prolong the conflict rather than save millions of Zaidis. After all, neither America nor Britain has entangled themselves in the conflict yet so why should the Coalition worry about aggravating the largest humanitarian crisis in the world?

Tasneem Ghazi reads Politics, Philosophy and Law at King’s College London. She is an editor at the King’s Student Law Review (KSLR) and is also one of the founding editors of the Politics, Philosophy and Law Journal (KSJPPL). Tasneem is a contributing writer to a number of academic journals and media outlets. Her areas of expertise and interest include the Arab Spring in the Levant, the dynamics of sectarianism in the MENA, the influence of religion and socio-economics on political systems in the MENA and countering violent- extremist thought in the MENA. She is also trilingual and works as a freelance translator.

Notes:

[1]Niccolò Machiavelli, ‘The Prince’ (London: Penguin Books, 1988), Chapter 8.

[2] Vincenzo Olivetti, Terror’s Source’, The House of Islam p.16

[3] Mohammed Ibn Abd Al Wahabb (‘The Nullifiers of Islam’) ‘Nawaqid Al Islam’

[4]Vincenzo Olivetti, ‘Terror’s Source’, The Salafi Ideology Doctrines and Tenet, p.33

[5] Ibid, p.15

[6] Ibid, p.16

Image sources

Banner (image 1): https://www.axios.com/famine-cholera-and-civilian-casualties-the-crisis-in-yemen-1513307014-02f92d70-8f7c-47f2-814d-dc913a1e8b79.html

Image 2: https://en.reseauinternational.net/a-warrior-prince-rises-in-arabia-as-the-monarch-of-all-he-surveys/

Image 3: http://www.yamanyoon.com/?p=91162&lang=en

Resource-Induced Conflicts, Part IV: Society, Resources, and Conflict in Yemen

September 21, 2016

By: Dr. Charles Schmitz

In Yemen, natural resources do not cause conflicts, people do. The relationship between natural resources and people is mediated by society such that a simple, causal relationship between resource abundance or scarcity and conflict does not exist. In Yemen, scarcity does not cause conflict; in fact, a better case might be made for the reverse, namely that conflict causes scarcity. Conflict drives investment and capital away from the country, destroys productive infrastructure, debilitates the state, and prevents the sustainable management of resources.

Talk of natural resource scarcity in Yemen focuses on oil and water. In the 2000s, Yemen’s economy and government depended heavily upon oil revenues. About a third of economic output and three quarters of government revenue came from oil.[1] But oil production peaked in 2002 and has declined steadily ever since.[2] What is more, Sana’a is often described as the first capital in the world to run out of water. Water levels in aquifers around the city and elsewhere in Yemen are dropping precipitously. Oil production is falling and water resources are dwindling and in 2015, Yemen collapsed into a devastating civil war. While natural resource scarcity appears to coincide with conflict, the causal relationship between scarcity and conflict is difficult to support.

Unnatural Scarcity

In Yemen, the political dynamics of the Saleh regime created scarcity by driving investment away from the country and failing to manage Yemen’s assets. Yemenis and foreign advisors alike were well aware of two fundamental realities. Firstly, Yemen’s oil and water resources were limited. Secondly, like some of the oil economies of the Gulf States – such as Bahrain, Oman, or even Saudi Arabia today – Yemen needed to invest its revenues from oil to harness the labour of Yemeni’s in economic activities that could produce wealth in a post hydrocarbon economy. Yet the Saleh regime used the economy not for enhancing Yemen’s productive capacities, but for bolstering its political position. It created informal political barriers to entry that allotted key positions atop the private economy to a select group of families; those not included invested their money elsewhere. The lack of private sector development outside of the hydrocarbon sector meant that when oil revenues declined, the economy was not equipped to offer alternative means of making a living. Additionally, the regime also exacerbated tribal and political conflicts preventing the sustainable management of water resources. Thus, the political strategy of the Saleh regime drove the economy into the ground, and created unnatural scarcity by failing to manage Yemen’s resource assets.

The Politics of Aridity

While it is true that water resources in Yemen are very limited, water is also a renewable resource. The majority of Yemen’s water comes from rain, which – given its geographic location astride the Indian Ocean and its mountainous terrain in the West – is plentiful. In addition to the rain, Yemenis exploited groundwater by digging wells. Beginning in the 1950s, but greatly expanding in the 1970s, bore wells enabled Yemenis to exploit groundwater at far greater depths. While traditional social institutions had been developed to regulate the water rights for farmers and herdsmen, they were ill-equipped to monitor and regulate the emerging bore wells that allowed much faster withdrawal rates. Thus, the country’s water problem is not the absence of water, but rather the inability to manage the available resources. In this case, scarcity is a matter of management and state capacity, not a lack of water.[3] When water is managed in a manner that takes into account the technological developments of the last half-century, Yemen’s water resources will consequently be restored.

Additionally, water is not a driver of conflict, at least not directly. Those that make Malthusian arguments about water in Yemen point to violent disputes over wells. While it is true that tribal groups do fight one another over the control of wells, water is not the sole focus of tribal conflict. Rather, the increase in tribal conflict was driven by the politics of the Saleh regime that exacerbated armed conflict in general in the northern highlands.

While tribes in Yemen are long standing traditional institutions that mediate conflict, the fractured nature of tribal society is also prone to conflict.[4] In the far north of Yemen, Saleh used tribal conflict to his advantage.[5] He ruled by the politics of chaos rather than direct control, supporting opposing groups in order to cause and nourish conflict, thereby preventing them from uniting in opposition to his regime.[6]- [7] Thus, conflict among tribes was not caused by resource scarcity, but by a conscious political strategy of the Saleh regime, particularly in the northern highlands. In a slightly different analysis, Lichtenthaeler shows how disputes over land and water in the northern governorate of Sa’adah were driven not only by population increase, but also by the attempts of the regime to alter the political composition of the region’s landowners by installing elements supportive of Saleh.[8]

Oil and Conflict

In our global economy, the relationship between people and the environment is mediated by markets. So while it is true that the quantity of oil produced in Yemen peaked in 2002 and declined every year since, government revenues rose dramatically in the post peak period. Average government revenue from exports of crude oil from 2003 to 2014 was 2.9 billion USD, whereas in 2002 revenues were 1.6 billion USD. Only in 2014 did government revenue from oil exports return to 2002 levels.[9]

The timing of the rise and fall of these oil revenues is important because those making Malthusian arguments for Yemen might point to the correspondence of the decline in oil production with the distinct episodes of conflict in Yemen’s recent history: a secession attempt in the south in 1994; an insurgency in the north from 2004 to 2010; a stubborn civil disobedience movement in the south from 2007; the overthrow of the regime of Ali Abdallah Saleh in 2011; a campaign against al-Qaeda in the south in 2012; and a civil war beginning in 2015 and still raging today. These episodes of violence, with the exception of the war of 1994, do correspond to declines in oil production, but they do not correspond to any scarcity of government resources or recession in the economy. In fact, oil revenues for the government and for the economy were highest in the period of the highest instability: 2004-2011. Thus, something other than resource scarcity was driving these violent outbreaks, namely political conflict over power and the nature of the state.

The war of 1994 is an important example because it is sometimes explained by arguing that the driver of the war was natural resources. However, the war of 1994 resulted from leadership disputes between the former rulers of the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and the northern Yemen Arab Republic. The two republics were Cold War enemies, but the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed their leaderships to negotiate an agreement for unification. The agreement created a transitional government with equal power sharing while a new constitution was drafted for the united Yemen. The understanding of the leadership of the (much smaller demographically) southern state was that the two former ruling parties would form a coalition government following elections. However, the northern ruling party decided instead to form a coalition government with a third Islamic party in the north that was hostile to the southern socialist leadership.

In the interim period between the unification of Yemen in 1990 and the elections of 1993, significant oil was discovered in the region of the former southern state. Thus, some argued that the driver of the war was northern fear that the south would secede with its newfound oil wealth — a classic resource war. While oil revenues may have enticed the former ruler of the south to attempt secession and thereby secure the survival of his state, the war was not between the north and the south; it was between those that supported unification and those that supported secession. In the south, support for secession was not strong, as many distrusted the old socialist leadership and preferred to live under the liberal state (at the time) of unified Yemen. Moreover, half of the Yemeni Socialist Party also rejected the attempt at secession. In January 1986, the ruling YSP had been rocked by an extremely violent internecine conflict. The losing faction of the YSP and its associated military units fled to the northern Yemen Arab Republic. In the war of 1994, these southern refugees in the north led the war against the secession attempt. Their motivation was revenge. Among the military commanders of the southern forces supporting unity was Hadi, a southerner from the Abyan Governorate and the current president of Yemen. Thus the war was not a case of northerners taking over the south, but northerners and southerners determining the nature of the state and its leadership.

Similarly, the uprising in the south that began in 2007 was not a result of resource scarcity, but a failure of the political strategies of the Saleh regime. Following the war of secession in 1994, Saleh tried to build support in the south. However, rather than rebuilding southern politics, northern supporters of Saleh treated the south as war booty to be plundered. Southerners, including those who rejected secession in 1994, were consequently marginalized; a fate that led them to overcome their many differences in 2007 and unite in opposition to Saleh.

Significantly, the protests in the south came at a time when the Saleh regime was wealthier than ever. In 2006, revenues from state export of crude oil reached four billion USD. In 2007, revenues slid to three billion, but in 2008, state revenues from oil exports reached a record 4.5 billion USD [see charts]. The Yemeni state had more resources than ever, yet irrepressible conflict flared. Saleh tried to use his resources to calm the south by reinstating many southern military officers that had been dismissed after 1994. But the grievances ran deeper than Saleh’s patronage could mollify. Thus, when the state coffers were overflowing, protests raged – scarcity or abundance did not cause conflict, the state’s behaviour did.

Current Conflict

In the current conflict in Yemen, it was the conflict itself that shut down oil exports and drove the economy into the ground. And while natural resources may have played some role (for example, the Houthi movement overran Sana’a with the promise to roll back cuts in government subsidies to oil products), the primary driver is the ambition of the former ruler of Yemen, Ali Abdallah Saleh, now allied with the leader of the Houthi movement, Abd al-Malek al-Houthi, to rule the country. Pitted against their ambitions is the hawkish regime of King Salman in Saudi Arabia who accuses them of facilitating Iran’s influence in Yemen. The Saudi air campaign and the naval blockade of the country crushed what remained of the oil economy and led to dramatic declines in the standard of living as well as a massive humanitarian crisis.

There is, however, one way through which scarcity drives the current conflict: poverty and desperation drives young men to enlist in the many different militias of the competing warlords. The Saudi regime (by proxy), Ali Abdallah Saleh, the Houthi controlled state, and al-Qaeda in the south all pay young men to join the fight. Were these young men not desperate to feed themselves and their families, Yemen’s warring leadership would have much greater difficulty filling the ranks of their militias, and a negotiated settlement would be much easier to accomplish.

The Yemen case shows that the relationship between natural resources and people is mediated by society, and that it is the people that drive conflict rather than resources. In some circumstances, conflicts occur along with resource scarcity, but in other circumstances, resource scarcity accompanies social harmony. People and their politics are the key variables, not the abundance or scarcity of natural resources.

Charles Schmitz is a professor of Geography and a specialist on Yemen at Towson University in Baltimore, MD, USA.

Notes:

[1] Central Statistical Organization (2012), “Annual Yearbook,” Sana’a: Republic of Yemen.

[2] Energy Information Agency (2016), “Yemen,” Washington DC: US Government http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=YEM

[3] Lichtenthaeler, Gerhard (2010) “Water Cooperation and Conflict in Yemen,” MERIP Vol 40, no. 254; Schmitz, Charles (2013), “Geography,” in Steve Caton (ed.), Yemen, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO

[4] Dresch, Paul (1990), “Imams and Tribes: The Writing and Acting of History in Yemen,” Khoury, Phillip, and Joseph Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 287

[5] Adel Sharjabi ed. (2009), The Castle and the Chamber: the political role of the tribe in Yemen. Sana`a: Yemeni Human Rights Observer (Arabic)

[6] Blumi, Isa (2011), Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism, New York: Routledge

[7] Phillips, Sarah (2011), Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, London: Adelphi Books

[8] Lichtenthaeler, Gerhard (2003) Political Ecology and the Role of Water: Environment, Economy, and Society in Northern Yemen, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company

[9] Central Bank of Yemen (2015), “Monetary & Banking Developments,” January 2015, http://www.centralbank.gov.ye/App_Upload/Jan2015.pdf

[10] Hill, Ginny and Peter Salisbury (2015) Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight, and Global Drivers of Conflict, Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press

[11] Alley, April (2010) “The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage in Yemen,” Middle East Journal Vol. 64, No. 3, Summer 2010.

Image Source: http://www.zamzamwater.org/yemen-details.php

Perim: the strategic island that never was

June 29, 2016

By: James A. Fargher

Despite lying in the middle of one of the world’s most critical choke points, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait between Djibouti and Yemen, the island of Perim is a remote and often forgotten outpost. Perim is located in the midst of the waterway which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden – the connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Throughout history, Perim has been fought over as a prize by great and regional powers alike in the belief that the island can be used as a gateway to the vital Suez shipping lane. Nevertheless, due in part to the island’s small size and its harsh climate, Perim has proven to be only marginally useful to the regional maritime powers. This article reviews Perim’s modern history, exploring the series of occasions in which powers have attempted unsuccessfully to turn the island into a ‘Gibraltar of the East.’

Perim is a fragment of an ancient volcano, part of a chain of long-dormant volcanos stretching across Africa and Arabia.[1] It lies in the middle of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, three kilometres from Arabia and twenty kilometres from Africa.[2] Perim has no source of fresh water, aside from occasional rainfalls, and it is located in one of the hottest and driest regions in the world.[3]

Perim was first scouted as a possible site for a castle by the Portuguese explorer and admiral Afonso de Albuquerque.[4] The Portuguese had launched a fleet into the Indian Ocean in an attempt to seize control of the lucrative Indian spice trade and in 1513 Afonso led his ships through Bab-el-Mandeb into the Red Sea. Failing to discover sources of fresh water on the island, the Portuguese abandoned their plans for building a fortress on Perim. By the end of the 16^th century the Red Sea had fallen under the control of the Ottoman Turks.[5]

The possibility of establishing a naval base on Perim was next explored by the British East India Company in 1799.[6] Lieutenant-Colonel John Murray, commander of the 84^th Regiment, was despatched by the Company from India to Perim with a force of three hundred men.[7] Following Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, the Company was anxious to control the line of communication between the Red Sea and India, and to forestall any French assault on the subcontinent. Like the Portuguese, Murray discovered that there were no sources of water to supply his troops.[8] Moreover, the artillery pieces at that time did not have the range needed to hit ships sailing through the western side of the Strait, so Perim could not be used to prevent a fleet exiting the Red Sea.[9] Six months after landing on Perim, Murray withdrew his force from the island to Aden.[10]

Following Murray’s failed expedition Perim was left unclaimed for nearly sixty years. Interest in the island was only revived when in 1854 the French engineer Fernand de Lesseps announced his plan to build a canal connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, a revolutionary project which when it was eventually completed in 1869 transformed the Red Sea into one of the world’s great oceanic highways. In response to rumoured French interest in the island and driven by the urgent need to construct a lighthouse, the British government despatched a warship to formally lay claim to Perim in 1857.[11] The legend goes that Perim was seized hours before the arrival of a French expedition, the morning after the British consul in Aden had deliberately gotten them drunk, an episode which one Victorian statesman described as a ‘bright ornament in the history of British naval enterprize [sic]’.[12] Indeed, Perim would remain a British possession for over a century until it was ceded to the People’s Republic of South Yemen in 1967.

Despite its timely capture and notwithstanding its location on the most important shipping and communication line in the British Empire, Perim did not prove to be a strategic asset for the British. Although a small detachment of Indian troops was garrisoned on the island and a lighthouse constructed, no fortifications were ever built on Perim. As the War Office concluded in a report in 1882, ‘no advantage would be gained by fortifying the island, although it is doubtless necessary to hold in order to prevent any other power taking it and converting it into a fortress.’[13] Moreover, even the latest artillery was unlikely to have the range necessary to stop ships from slipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.[14] For Britain, Perim was only valuable in so far as that owning the island ensured that it was denied to other rivals; only once was it assaulted when in 1916 a small Ottoman force unsuccessfully attempted to storm it.[15] Whilst a small coaling station did operate on the island between 1883 and the mid-1930s, this was purely a commercial enterprise and Royal Navy ships continued to refuel at the nearby imperial fortress of Aden.[16]

The only time in modern history that Perim has been used to blockade the southern entrance of the Red Sea came shortly after it was granted to South Yemen in the 1960s. After failing to secure a UN resolution guaranteeing free passage of Bab-el-Mandeb, Britain had left Perim in the hands of South Yemen, then under the control of the National Liberation Front (NLF).[17] A radical faction of the NLF occupied Perim in December 1967, and attempted to impose a blockade on Israeli tankers passing through the Strait.[18] Armed with only short-range artillery, however, NLF militants were unable to interdict Israeli shipping,[19] and an effective blockade was only implemented once Egypt joined in hostilities against Israeli during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In October that year, Egyptian troops armed with Soviet artillery pieces were deployed to the island, backed up with naval units.[20] These forces were able to briefly secure the Strait and block Israeli tankers from reaching Eilat, but the blockade was lifted shortly afterwards following a ceasefire.[21]

Since the October War, Perim has not been used as a strategic base. Despite its location in the middle of one of the world’s busiest shipping lines through which 3.4 million barrels of oil pass per day,[22] no state has truly been able to utilise the island’s supposed strategic potential. The lack of water and harsh climate has hampered efforts to establish large garrisons on Perim, as does the island’s small size. Moreover, only modern artillery has sufficient range to engage ships passing through the western strait, and attempting to sever such a vital artery of world trade would likely result in significant political repercussions. With Yemen currently embroiled in a bitter civil war and lacking in naval hardware, it also remains unlikely that Perim will be used as a base for power projection in the short to medium-term.

James A. Fargher is a Doctoral candidate in the Laughton Naval History Unit in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, specialising in British naval and Imperial history.

Notes:

[1] DIJ Mallick et. al., ‘Perim Island, a volcanic remnant in the southern entrance to the Red Sea,’ Geological Magazine 127:4 (1990): 309-318.

[2] Ibid.

[3] ftp://ftp.atdd.noaa.gov/pub/GCOS/WMO-Normals/TABLES/REG__I/D1/63125.TXT.

[4] RS Whiteway, The Rise of Portguese Power in India, 1497-1550 (London: Archibald Constable, 1899), 153-157.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kenneth Panton, Historical Dictionary of the British Empire (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 406.

[7] H. M. Chichester, ‘Murray, Sir John, eighth baronet (1768?–1827)’, rev. Roger T. Stearn, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19633, accessed 19 June 2016].

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Speech to the House of Commons, 10 March 1884, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 285 (1884).

[13] Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General of India, 18 March 1886, Letter. In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 55.

[14] Sir E. Hertslet, ‘Memorandum on French and Italian Designs in the Red Sea and its immediate Neighbourhood,’ Foreign Office, 6 March 1882. In Steven Smith, ed., The Red Sea Region: Sovereignty, Boundaries & Conflict, 1839-1967, vol. 1. Arabian Geopolitics 6 Regional Documentary Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 99.

[15] MD Fontenoy, ‘British Control of Red Sea is Due to Coup by Governor,’ The Washington Post, 22 July 1916.

[16] Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, ‘Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea, 1894, Orders.’ In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 586.

[17] Robert Aliboni, The Red Sea Region: Local Actors and the Superpowers (Routledge Library Editions: Politics of the Middle East).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Michael Binyon, ‘Egyptians say that Suez is cut off from Cairo and Observers are Blocked,’ Times, 26 October 1973.

[21] Drew Middleton, ‘Israel Sees Peril in Arab Decisions,’ The New York Times, 1 November 1974.

[22] Mohammed Mukhashaf, ‘Gulf Arabs wrest strategic Yemen island from Iran-allied group,’ Reuters, 5 October 2015.

The limits of US security cooperation in Jordan

April 22, 2016

By: Peter Kirechu

Barack_Obama_and_Abdullah_II — President Barack Obama Meets with King Abdullah II of Jordan in the Oval Office on 26 April, 2013. Source: Wikimedia.

The most notable feature of President Barack Obama’s partnership-based counterterrorism doctrine–roughly defined–is its central focus on training and arming local security services to independently deal with emerging terrorism threats. The President’s doctrine is unfortunately fraught with inconsistent performance of US-trained security services, especially among fragile states in the Middle East and beyond. Whether in Iraq, Yemen, or Afghanistan, singular focus on capacity building within the security sector has failed to remedy the governance failures that fuel instability within the region.

In Jordan, the United States (US) enjoys a long history of sustained political, economic and military cooperation which dates back to 1951. However, since the self-styled Islamic State established a cross-border presence in Syria, concerns with the contagion of trained militants across Jordan’s borders have led to substantial increases in US security assistance. In February 2015, the United States expanded its annual aid to Jordan from $660 million to $1 billion. The funds were directed towards core counterterrorism priorities (border protection, C4ISR, quick-reaction airlift capabilities) and also the immediate humanitarian demands incurred by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Though the US-Jordanian security relationship is less fraught with discord when compared with other states in the region, this assessment slightly deceives a growing angst within the Jordanian public. Since the brutal loss of Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasaesbeh, to the Islamic State in 2014, the public is increasingly apprehensive of its government’s support of US policy prerogatives. The pilot’s death stood as a stark reminder of the costs paid by the Jordanian military–and the public writ large–in small part due to the government’s role within the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition.

Despite this fomenting anxiety, the United States appears squarely focused on the more proximate security threats borne by the Syrian conflict. But as the Salafi-Jihadist landscape evolves throughout the region, Jordan will remain an attractive target due to the available reservoir of disenchanted locals eager for a brighter economic future and resentful of the government’s stunted reforms. Unless the United States adopts a more balanced security assistance approach, one that emphasizes comprehensive governance reforms, the current policy will remain inadequate to the underlying causes of domestic instability.

Jihadist entreaties on a vulnerable public

Since 2013, Jordan has served as the training and staging ground for Syrian rebels battling the Islamic State in Southern Syria. This training effort has slowly expanded and now includes the provision of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) to various US-supported rebel factions. This covert effort proceeded under limited public scrutiny until the Islamic State’s capture and subsequent beheadings of several western journalists and aid workers. These gruesome executions ultimately triggered the US-led aerial bombing campaign against the jihadist group in both Iraq and Syria.

The Jordanian government joined the US effort, viewing its participation as a necessary measure aimed at shoring up Jordan’s national security. At the outset, the public’s response was initially quite supportive but subsequent research polls conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Studies revealed that a majority of respondents viewed the campaign as more beneficial to the United States, Israel and Iran, rather than to Jordan’s security and stability. Though Jordanians expressed early support for their government’s role within the coalition, many did not consider the country’s security interests under direct threat.

But once Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was captured and gruesomely executed, his death elevated formerly muted discontent with Jordan’s role within the coalition. Those who not normally involve themselves with the ebbs and flows of foreign affairs found themselves participants in a growing conversation on the merits of their government’s continued involvement in the US-led coalition.

Nonetheless, the participation of roughly 2,200 Jordanian citizens in active battlefronts in Syria and Iraq underscores the government’s concerns with the return of trained militants who may seek to undermine the current governing order. As such, the government’s participation in the US-led coalition appears to be a reasonable response to the rising threat of both domestic and foreign militancy.

On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have banned cleric that are sympathetic to the Islamic State from delivering public sermons. Other measures include the release of some prominent Salafist clerics with the intent of enlisting their assistance in combatting jihadist rhetoric within the public domain. The government has also adopted a more repressive approach to public dissent, detaining Muslim Brotherhood members and introducing new amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law. These changes have criminalized the criticism of foreign countries and their leaders while permitting the prosecution of journalists and activists for speech-related crimes–as widely interpreted by the State Security Court.

The crackdown on public speech under the cover of combatting terrorism weighed heavily on Jordan’s decline from a ‘Partially Free’ to a ‘Not Free’ State according to the Freedom’s House Freedom in the World rankings. This ranking has endured since 2010 and is not likely to improve under current conditions. Unfortunately, the government’s embrace of these policy prerogatives harms the state’s long-term security by ignoring legitimate public grievances and broadening public apathy with stagnated reforms that were once viewed as a bulwark against domestic instability.

Crises of Socio-Economic Patronage

The Hashemite Kingdom’s most urgent economic ails are grounded in the patronage and subsidy system which secures the monarchy’s rule. Regime loyalty underscores the long-running history of generous welfare benefits accorded to East Banker tribes and the pervasive use of personal friendships and tribal relationships to secure professional positions throughout the government. The patronage system is particularly acute within some sectors of the security services, where political and personal relationships often supersede professional conduct and competency.

The unprecedented nine to ten percent increase of the overall Jordanian population as a result of Syrian refugees has pushed the import-heavy Jordanian government into further reliance on foreign financial aid. Through IMF, EU, and US financial support, the country’s budget deficits have narrowed though public debt remains at 90 percent and unemployment increased from 14 percent to 22 percent in 2014. Due to the government’s overdependence on a politically motivated patronage system, systemic reforms are anathema to those who have historically thrived under public benefits. Thus efforts to curb this reliance ultimately undermine the Monarchy’s ability to institute meaningful economic changes. Nonetheless, progress towards this difficult objective remains a worthwhile goal for Jordan’s overall security.

The international community’s traditional responses to Jordan’s precarious economic position often focus on broadening the country’s financial reserves through infusions of foreign aid. But as long as foreign direct investments serve as the preferred model of external financial support, the government should channel these funds towards economic activities that utilize the immense labor reserves offered by the refugee population and Jordan’s unemployed youth.

By adopting economic policies that target this readily available labor pool, the government can provide opportunities for a highly vulnerable population in the low-skill manufacturing, agriculture, and construction sectors. Due to the widespread destruction of Syria’s manufacturing output, and the slow disappearance of formerly productive commercial centers and trade routes, the Jordanian government has the opportunity to develop these lost capabilities within its borders. Such an approach similarly coopts the potential diversion of marginalized youths and refugees into criminality or radicalization.

This approach not only addresses the socio-economic grievances that threaten the government’s long-term stability, but also changes public perceptions of the government’s commitment to meaningful reforms.

Due to the inflamed crises that characterize the Jordan’s neighborhood, the opposition movement has so far restrained itself from overt agitation for regime change. This patient resolve is perhaps rooted in the hopes that meaningful change might emerge through cooperation with the monarchy, rather than the revolutionary violence that has resulted in widespread human suffering elsewhere in the region. Unlike other places in the region, the government has the unlikely benefit of a relatively subdued opposition movement. It should capitalize on this level of calm agitation for change and dedicate more of its foreign assistance toward addressing the full breadth of opposition grievances.

The Limits of Narrow Counterterrorism Approaches

It is likely that the more visible results of effective counterterrorism support occur on the operational theater. Local security services elevate their targeting, surveillance, and response capabilities and gain an operational edge against insurgents and terrorist networks through US training and equipment support. However, when partner states accept US assistance, these transactions are also de facto political decisions with immense implications on the governed.

Recipient governments that focus their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities on regime survival or personal enrichment, as seen in Iraq, are unlikely to survive in the long-term. For others, security assistance and cooperation becomes a publically poisonous symbol of US encroachment on state sovereignty as seen in Yemen and Pakistan. In these environments, security-centered assistance is commonly squandered and US national interests harmed in the long-term.

The United States must therefore balance its security-dominant engagement with the Jordanian government and dedicate more resources to the socio-political and economic factors addressed herein. Placing governance and economic reform conditions on US security assistance, is the first step towards changing the United States’ reception within the Jordanian public. These conditions also incentivize the Jordanian government to balance security-based expenditures with the socio-economic investments that target the governance roots of instability. Over time, it is these investments that build economic, political, and social resilience throughout the Jordanian public and prevent radicalization among the most vulnerable sectors of the general public.

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. Twitter: @PeterKirechu

International Women’s Day: The impact of conflict on parity

March 8, 2016

Author’s note: Much of the reference to Yemen was drawn from the recent publication: “Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges”[1] (2015).

By: Joana Cook

Today marks the 2016 International Women’s Day, where the year’s theme “Pledge for Parity” promotes areas extending from helping women and girls achieve their ambitions, calling for gender-balanced leadership, and encouraging respect and value of difference.

It is perhaps fitting then to highlight what was for many a key struggle to achieve parity. Five years have now passed since the 2011 Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The protests were largely driven by populations seeking an end to corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, who demanded dignity, equality and justice in their societies. Women and youth were foremost amidst these, participating in protests in Libya and Tunisia, occupying Tahrir Square in Egypt, and challenging the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (amongst others).

While countries such as Tunisia have been able to emerge from these protests with fragile, transitional democratic governments, others such as Syria and Libya have descended into states of chaos, destabilizing the surrounding region and creating vacuums currently filled by groups such as the so-called ‘Islamic State’. Yemen, perhaps the most overlooked of these Arab Spring participants, deserves special recognition for the roles that women were able to carve for themselves in the early days of the Arab Spring, and the gains they were able to advance. Yemen too, perhaps highlights what is most at stake for the parity of women with the failure to solidify these ambitions.

Yemen was always going to be a challenging country to advance parity. Yemen is currently ranked on the UN Human Development Index as 160 out of 188. It’s gender equality rating is the worst in the world – the World Economic Forum’s Gender Equality Index places Yemen 142 of 142 countries. Prior to 2011, Yemen only featured a single woman in parliament and three in the Shura council. Despite these long-standing poor rankings however, women such as Tawakal Karman and others from diverse backgrounds initiated and led protests across the country which eventually led to the transition of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Karman later won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts and brought attention to the significant efforts of many other brave and dedicated women across the country.

The subsequent National Dialogue Conference (NDC) contained nine working groups that addressed key transitional issues such as military and security, development and transitional justice. While an imperfect process, the NDC was deemed a success by many around the world, and significantly 27% of participants in the conference were women. The outcomes of the NDC were forwarded to the constitutional drafting committee and a draft constitution was completed in January 2015. This constitution, which had not yet been ratified, was extraordinary in the advances it guaranteed for women.

The draft constitution highlighted the representation and support of women in areas ranging from leadership and participation in political bodies, to supporting their roles in the security sector (police, military and intelligence) and ensured the State would “eliminate negative cultural and social norms that demean the dignity of women” (Article 57). Article 76 went so far as to state, “To give effect to the principle of equal citizenship, the State shall enact legislation and take measures, to achieve effective political participation for women to ensure access to at least 30% in various authorities and bodies.” While the substance of such articles needed to be further articulated, and the constitution was set to be debated prior to ratification, the leaps and bounds inherent to the protections and promotions of women in this document were incredible.

However, due to a number of avoidable factors and failures,[2] this transition was interrupted and the situation for women has never been more dire. The constitution in its current format also seems unlikely to move forward and the very status of the state is currently in question. In March 2015, Operation Decisive Storm began in an effort to stop Houthi rebels from seizing power in the country has in many respects shattered the country – the War in Yemen has now stretched almost a year and the country is on the brink of the abyss. 21 million of the countries 24 million now need some form of humanitarian aid and over 3,000 have been killed, many in coalition air strikes (though this figure is expected to be much higher). Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the so-called Islamic State continue to make advances in the country, and have historically installed harsh interpretations of sharia law over the populations they control, including severe restrictions on the rights of women.

Furthermore, displaced populations face significant challenges, and women in particular face an increased risk of sexual assault and abuse (even within their families, as public pressures grow and manifest themselves in the private sphere, increases in domestic violence often occur). There has also been a noticeable increase in the number of child brides amongst fleeing populations, with families unable to care for their children. Education, employment and other key activities to ensuring the advancement of women in the country is attainable have been interrupted or ceased all together. Perhaps most critically, negotiations to end the conflict have reflected a notable absence of women, particularly from the government side. In essence, it appears as though the significant opportunities that once appeared for women in Yemen have all but vanished.

As highlighted by the case of Yemen, it is clear that women in these societies have been integral to significant social, economic, cultural and political achievements before and during the Arab Spring. It is also clear that for many of them, advances to their rights and aspirations to parity have never been at such risk.

This International Women’s Day, it is perhaps worthwhile then to remember then that while parity in general is as worthy a focus as any, such considerations must be reflected in the very fabric of conflict mediation, resolution and reconstruction that will be required in places such as Yemen, Syria and Libya.

Joana Cook is a PhD Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her PhD analyzes the roles of women in counterterrorism practices post-9/11. Her broader academic interests revolve around extremism and terrorism, with a focus on Canada, the US, UK and Middle East. She is also a researcher for the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook.

Notes:

[1] Joana Cook, ed. “Our Main Concern Is Security”: Women’s Political Participation, Engagement in the Security Sector, and Public Safety in Yemen, Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges (Gerlach Publishing, 2015).

[2] For a good background on this, see: Adam Baron, “Civil War in Yemen: Imminent and Avoidable,” in Policy Memo, ed. European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) (23 March 2015).

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