Yemen

Yemen: A Failure of Human Security

July 22, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Philip Mayne

The enduring conflict in Yemen has driven many into refugee camps (Image credit: UNICEF/Alessio Romenzi)

Since its reunification in 1990, Yemen has been ravaged by economic failure and internal conflict. In 2015, a civil war erupted between the government and the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia Muslim minority. In 2018, when the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) began fighting the government for control of the southern city of Aden, the STC announced self-rule on 26 April 2020 for the areas under its control. At the time of writing the Yemeni government continues to be embroiled in a civil war against the Houthis in the North, the STC in the South, and other rebel groups elsewhere in the country. Yemen is witnessing some of the worst human security failings in recent years.

What is Human Security?

Following the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts became prominent across the globe. Traditional international relations theories, blinkered at the state level of analysis, failed to examine these sub-state conflicts. Human security was introduced in 1994 with the publication of the United Nations Development (UNDP) report. Human security makes the individual the referent object of security. Human security focuses on establishing ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ for every individual. However, threats to human security remain numerous. The 1994 report lists seven main categories of threat, including food security, health security and personal security. Yemen is one example of a state failing to meet human security in these aspects.

Food (In)security

As a result of the conflict, poverty is rife within Yemen. Almost half of the population is living on less than US$3.10 a day, and over five million people live on less than $1.90 a day. Even more people are at risk of falling into poverty. Without income, buying necessities becomes almost impossible. The economic situation in Yemen, in terms of wages, employment, and the Yemeni currency itself, is worsening, yet food prices continue rising.

However, there is more to food security than the ability to buy food. Food security is also the ability to always have physical, social, and economic access to safe and nutrient-rich food. In Yemen, even for those who can afford it, access to food and water is minimal at best. Much of the basic infrastructure has been decimated by the war. It is estimated that 3.5 million people have lost access to piped water, due to conflict. Access to food is also limited.

Yemen is heavily dependent on imports to satisfy domestic consumption. Yet successive governments failed to establish an effective infrastructure to allow the feeding of the nation. Moreover, the conflict has restricted the ability to access this imported food. At least 5.1 million people in seventy-five districts have been cut off from access to imports and humanitarian assistance due to restrictions imposed by authorities during the conflict. The situation has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic; as supply routes were closed due to international lockdowns, thereby slowing down trade. In addition to Yemen’s woes, a locust swarm sweeping over the country has begun to affect agricultural production. The results of food insecurity in the country could be devastating.

The multifaceted issues that have caused food insecurity in Yemen have resulted in a situation that is beyond dire. Yemen now faces the worst food security crisis in decades. Over twenty million Yemenis are food insecure, and ten million are at the brink of famine and starvation. 65,000 people are already in the advanced stages of hunger and extreme food deprivation. Over two million children, under the age of five, are also suffering from chronic malnutrition. In 2019, it was reported that extreme hunger and disease had directly killed up to 85,000 children. It is clear that Yemen is clearly failing in terms of food security, and keeping the people of Yemen fed poses one of the greatest international challenges on the world stage.

Health (In)security

In addition to inadequate economic and food insecurity, Yemen faces a severe health crisis. Health facilities have been depleted due to the conflict, as shelling and airstrikes have damaged hospitals, healthcare workers have been assaulted and medical facilities have been occupied. The lack of access to clean water and sanitation resulted in a major cholera outbreak in 2016. Since 2018, there have been nearly one million suspected cholera cases. As it stands, cholera, dengue, malaria, and poor sanitation are still prevalent, and the health services are already overstretched.

Unfortunately, COVID-19 has exacerbated Yemen’s struggles. As of 14 July, the number of cases in Yemen is 1502, with 425 deaths. This figure, is likely lower than the reality, as they are from government reports, and insurgent groups have been accused of concealing the outbreak. Nonetheless, the virus is rapidly spreading in Yemen; and the fatality rate is four times the global average.

The focus on COVID-19 has resulted in other services being reduced, resulting in other negative implications for health security. Yemen currently has a maternal mortality rate that is 47 times that of the UK. However, The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has been forced to suspend reproductive health care in 140 out of 180 health facilities. Only 40 facilities now provide these facilities across the entire country. This reduction in funding risks the lives of 2 million women and girls of childbearing age. The UNFPA states “Some 320,000 pregnant women will be cut off from lifesaving reproductive health services, while 48,000 women could die from complications of pregnancy and childbirth”. Prior to COVID-19, Yemen failed to provide sufficient health services and provide care for the population. In the current crisis, the future looks even bleaker.

Personal (In)security

In the last five years, over 112,000 people have died as a direct result of the conflict in Yemen. 25,000 of these casualties were in 2019 alone. In February of this year the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), confirmed that since March 2015, 7,734 civilians have been killed directly because of the war, including 2,103 children. In the first quarter of 2020, 270 civilians were killed as a result of the conflict.

Intrastate conflicts often include high levels of civilian casualties as local populations get caught up in the conflict. However, in Yemen, there is evidence that points to the deliberate targeting of civilians. In June 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reported that between January and December 2019, there were thirty-five targeted attacks against schools and hospitals. These attacks were carried out by all sides of the conflict. One report states that in 2019, the conflict was responsible for killing one child younger than 5 every twelve minutes. It is clear that personal security is not being met in Yemen, with indiscriminate force being used by the Saudi-led coalition, and indiscriminate weapons, such as banned mines, by rebels.

Indirectly, the conflict has created another personal security issue, as the number of displaced people in the country stands at over 3.6 million. Displaced people are at higher risk of exploitation, harassment, and violence. Women and girls, who make up half of all displaced people, are particularly at risk. Some girls have been forced into child marriages, and other women have been subjected to domestic abuse, yet there has been a reluctance to report such crimes.

In addition to women, displaced children are at risk of threats to their personal security. Currently, it is estimated that there are two million displaced children in Yemen; many without their families. These children are especially vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse, exploitation, and recruitment into armed groups. Again, as with other human security issues, personal security is far from being realised in Yemen.

What Solution?

Efforts by the United Nations and several international NGOs have alleviated some of the suffering through providing humanitarian aid and assistance in Yemen. But with the combination of continued conflict and a global pandemic, the outlook for Yemen continues to be a human security disaster, unless one of these issues can be alleviated.

Conflict has been central to the human security crisis in Yemen. If there is any chance of alleviating the suffering in Yemen, then the first and most important step is to bring an end to the on-going conflict. After five years of conflict and with no end in sight, outright military victory seems highly unlikely. Therefore, international actors need to continue to convince all parties to open discussions and negotiate an end to the conflict.

Negotiations between the parties are not unprecedented. Regional actors have had some success in bringing the parties to the table. In November 2019 the, albeit short-lived, power-sharing Riyadh Agreement was signed after negotiations between the Yemeni government and STC were brokered by Saudi Arabia. International organisations too have had some success. In December 2018 the UN-brokered the Stockholm Agreement, which implemented a ceasefire in the city of Hudaydah, allowing aid to enter the city and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. Therefore, the UN, and other actors, must continue their efforts calling all parties to seek a negotiated peace. Without peace, there is little hope that the suffering in Yemen can be alleviated, and Yemen will continue to be one of the greatest human security failures of recent times.

Philip Mayne is a final year PhD candidate at the University of Hull. He has a special interest in strategy, counterinsurgency, military ethics, military history, international security and relations. His thesis examines the relationship between military ethics and military effectiveness. Specifically, his work focuses on adherence to the Just War Tradition, and success in counterinsurgencies; through analysing the case studies of the Malayan Emergency, the Kenyan Emergency, the Algerian War and the Vietnam War. Philip has contributed to the Huffington Post and is an active member of the Hull University War Studies Research Group. Find him on Twitter @phil_mayne.

Cash Crops, Conflict, and Climate Change

July 8, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Eve Gleeson

Mexico’s Avocado police on patrol (Image credit: Katy Watson/BBC)

The cultivation of crops is a steady and promising source of economic gain for developing states, both through internal markets and international trade. However, these powerhouses of economic success may well serve as a double-edged sword. Lacking robust and well-enforced laws and regulations, the economies and populations of many states have become dependent on, or in some cases addicted to, the success of these crops for their livelihoods and security. This success has precipitated destructive practices in subservience to the crop’s lucrative economic benefits, such as informal governance by militias and the decimation of environmental resources such as land and water.

Circumstances in Yemen and Mexico, in particular, point to these hostile relationships surrounding cash crops. In Mexico, militias are operating through kidnappings and killings, forests and ecosystems are being destroyed for land clearings, and local populations are facing health hazards from excessive pesticide use. In Yemen, the market monopolisation of a non-food crop is exacerbating a famine originally created by war and natural resource scarcity. In both of these cases, environmental pressures have preceded or followed from the urgency exerted by a stressed food system, depicting the inseparable relationship between unsustainable agriculture and compromised social, economic, and political stability.

Yemen’s cash crop drug: conflict, famine, and natural resource depletion

The War in Yemen, a conflict between the Houthi rebel movement, government forces, and a coalition of Arabian states, has resulted in a famine that harbours a much darker backstory than blockades stopping the import of food and water to the country. In addition, the famine has been worsened by the growth of khat (or qat), a stimulant drug that features as Yemen’s superstar crop. It has brought such financial gain to its growers that it has taken priority in farming country over other crops, such as wheat or fruits, that could provide sustenance to its people. Khat is so ubiquitous in the country’s political economy that it has become entwined with the interests of warring factions, further spurring conflict, water depletion, and famine on the peninsula.

The crop is the source of a violent dispute between farmers, a currency for bribe-seeking soldiers, and a dominant figure in the country’s markets, detrimentally crowding out crops that could help soften the blow of Yemen’s famine. It provides a source of funding for both the Houthi rebels and the pro-government forces in the war, as ‘qat traders pay a tax on their qat to whichever side controls their region‘. The crop also consumes close to forty per cent of Yemen’s clean water reserves, thereby further overtaxing water resources already weaponised by warring factions that destroy infrastructure, obstruct roadways, and blockade imports.

To make matters worse, the stimulant drug is also challenging Yemen’s dependence on groundwater reserves that are dwindling under drought, heat, and other climatic irregularities. The government lacks the capacity to enforce modern water rights, which have been rejected by wealthy farmers who regularly exploit their poor counterparts by drilling on their land. Now, farmers freely drill wells without government regulation. As a result, they continue to use highly unsustainable groundwater reserves to feed khat production, with no plan for developing renewable water sources for human or agricultural use as droughts persist and temperatures rise.

‘Blood Avocados’ in Mexico’s Michoacán state

Avocados, known to many in the growing industry as ‘green gold’, account for conflict between rival farmers and traders in Mexico. Cartels, violence, and extortion are just some of the troubling factors behind this cash crop; one that has drained resources– land, water, and capital– from the regions in which they are grown. Major importers such as the United States, the EU, and Japan have driven a $2 billion industry rooted thousands of miles away with little conception of the havoc the efforts have inflicted on the region of Michoacán, where production is concentrated.

In the Michoacán state, four principal narcotics cartels extorting avocado farmers have transformed the region into what Mexican online magazine Clarín Mundo has called Mexico’s ‘Capital of Violence’. Failure to pay ‘monthly protection’ fees to the cartels has resulted in kidnappings, killings, and seizures of farmland. In response, state-funded self-defence militias have sprouted from the local community to combat these gangs, whose narcoterrorism is partially financed by the extortion of farmers. Consequently, the region’s capital of Tacitaro has become militarised: ‘The new force is equipped with armored patrol trucks, and each officer wears full combat gear, including bulletproof vests, helmets, and high-power rifles — all provided for by the state police’.

This industry is also guilty of precipitating deforestation and water depletion (avocados require nearly 320 litres of water per unit) as well as stimulating competition for land that has provoked the intentional burning of wildlife ecosystems. This deforestation, performed illegally, points to gaps in environmental governance. Climatic irregularities, such as droughts and floods, have further troubled soil and land health, compromising the fertility of existing farmland. Given that growing a crop at an industrial scale often requires the heavy use of pesticides, these chemicals have contaminated the water supply in avocado-growing regions and sickened local populations.

The bigger picture: the disparate effects of climate change on developing states

This unmistakable relationship between food and conflict is an increasingly global issue that threatens and is likewise threatened by, the pressures of resource and environmental degradation. Though vastly different in nature, the cases of Yemen and Mexico illustrate how unsustainable agricultural practices, themselves propagated by gaps in governance and commodity demands from rich, developed states, can manifest in a conflict where effective protection of farmers and land is absent, particularly in an era when climatic changes are an increasing threat to security. Similar situations are unfolding in places like Iraq, where desertification and salination of water tables resulting from climatic irregularities are intensifying grievances in an already fragile state.

For this reason, the looming threat of climate change is not a ‘first world problem’. Although developed countries have the technological and financial resources (even if they lack the willpower) to transition to renewable energy, sustainable agricultural practices, and lower carbon emissions, the threat is a less immediate one for many. Wealthier developed countries have the resources for more expensive projects, like desalination of saltwater, if groundwater reserves become exhausted or contaminated. For communities that strive day-to-day for economic, political, and social stability and predictability, climate change can mean compromises to essential crop yields, irreplaceable loss of natural resources, increased conflict, and even displacement.

How can the global community ensure that more vulnerable populations stop suffering from food and nutrition insecurity, domestic tensions and war, contaminated and insufficient water resources, or displacement at the hand of climate change? Addressing climate change is at the forefront of this matter: lowering greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the carbon sequestration capacity of land by repairing broken systems. In the short term, we must consider how the demands and interventions of more developed and often opportunistic states impact the ability for less stable states to ensure food, water, and other basic livelihoods. Grassroots organisations like Soil, Food and Healthy Communities in Malawi and Sustainable Harvest International in Central America are making major headway in creating more sustainable and regenerative practices in communities that struggle with food insecurity. But movements in the West must acknowledge the disparate effects of climate change on vulnerable communities and their impact on international security.

Eve Gleeson holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. After briefly working in threat intelligence, she is shifting her focus toward sustainable agriculture and food policy. She can be found on LinkedIn or on Twitter at @evegleeson_.

Strife Feature – The Warrior Prince, Sectarian Strife and Countless Civilian Casualties

February 22, 2018 by Strife Staff

The Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s Blockade in Yemen: A gross miscalculation for political capital?

By Tasneem Ghazi

Illustration of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, as civilians present papers in order to receive food rations. (Credit Photo: Hani Mohammed / AP)

Abstract

It is perhaps ironic that in the very day and age when robots hold citizenship rights (such as the infamous Saudi ‘Sophia’), over seven million people remain starving, stranded, and bombarded daily in an arid, barren desert. Save the Children predicts that in Yemen, an estimated average of 130 children are dying daily from malnutrition alone. This humanitarian disaster is a direct result of the Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s decision to enforce a naval and aerial blockade on the 25th March 2015; a strategy aimed at crippling their opponents, the Houthi-led insurgents backed by Iran. The blockade has prevented all humanitarian aid and basic resources (such as food and water) from entering the afflicted Houthi-dominated areas. As it stands, Yemen is now the ‘largest humanitarian crisis in the modern world’ and yet, America, Russia, Great Britain and neighbouring countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have turned a blind eye. Regardless of whether the Saudi Arabian-led Military Coalition’s intervention into the Yemeni civil war may be morally justified, civilian plight has reached an unprecedented level and is only worsening. The blockade has also been unable to prevent the Houthis from arming themselves with long-range ballistic missiles and firing them at Riyadh (e.g., on 4 November 2017). These developments beg the question–is the blockade really an effective strategy or a gross miscalculation by the Coalition?

Humanitarian Crisis

The devastating causalities in Yemen have been caused by the ongoing strife that begun during the 2011 Arab Spring. As initially clarified, the extraordinary scale of this humanitarian crisis is because of the Saudi Arabian Military Coalition’s decision to enforce a naval and aerial blockade. Publicly, the Coalition announced that this blockade would severely undermine their opponents, the Houthi-led insurgents, by preventing them from receiving weapons and ammunition from their ally and patron, Iran. Yet, it has done anything but this. Amnesty International, alongside most humanitarian and relief agencies, has declared that the blockade has prevented aid and resources from reaching the afflicted civilian and Houthi areas. Most recently, the blockade has closed the major entry ports of Hodeidah and Saleef, in addition to the airport in the capital Sana’a, blocking all access and entrapping the impoverished areas more than ever before. Matters have been exacerbated by the worst outbreak of cholera in modern history, which stands at 1 million cases and counting, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Save the Children predicts that because of this deadly epidemic, one child is being infected with cholera every 35 seconds. Even if we are to place the Coalition’s airstrikes aside, Amnesty International predicts that in Yemen, 18.8 million people, out of a total population of 28 million, are in need of basic supplies as well as medical and humanitarian aid. These figures are rising daily and this simply will not cease until the blockade ends.

After two years of ongoing fighting, the situation in Yemen remains at a stalemate. Houthi forces have managed to retain control of the majority of the Western coast, bordering the Red Sea, as well as the capital Sana’a. If the blockade were really as successful as the Coalition’s news outlets have claimed, it would have choked the Houthis and prevented them from receiving arms and ammunition, let alone missiles. The reality, from a strategic perspective, is that it has failed. As long as 32 months after the blockade’s primary enforcement, the Houthis fired a Scud-type missile with a range of more than 800km at Riyadh. If this is the case, why then, have the Coalition’s policymakers chosen to enforce such a costly and ineffective policy?

The ‘Warrior Prince’

The answer arguably lies in the objectives and stakes of a young Arab leader, who political commentators have identified as being responsible for the consolidation of the Saudi Military Coalition and the rigorous enforcement of this blockade. Namely: The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman. Publicly, Bin Salman has made quite clear that the Coalition is staunchly committed to prolonging the conflict until a victory is secured. After tightening the blockade in November 2017 , following the missile strike on Riyadh, Bin Salman received much praise as the ‘Protector of the Gulf’. Indeed, Bin Salman’s policy objectives merit inspection in light of his unexpected and dashing arrival into regional and national politics. It is no secret that he has used the war to consolidate his public image as the young ‘Warrior Prince’ and rightful heir to the Saudi Arabian throne. In March 2015, barely a month after forming and leading the Coalition for his conquest into Yemen, the unexperienced 30-year-old was made Deputy Crown Prince, instead of many of his older, more qualified relatives.

Since Bin Salman’s swift rise to power, political commentators have rushed to make sense of his extraordinary policies. These include imprisoning 150 of his relatives (even well-known philanthropists such as Al Walid Bin Talal), planning a completely robot-run city, and granting citizenship to the computerized Robot, ‘Sophia’. Famously, on 24 October 2017, he delivered a speech in which he vowed to return Saudi Arabia to an age of ‘moderate Islam’ .This speech is laden with dark irony, as ‘moderate Islam’, or mainstream Islam for that matter, would not endorse a blockade that is starving disease-stricken civilians, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. This is crystal clear in the Qur’anic verse: “Whoever slays (or is responsible for killing) a soul … it is as if he had slain mankind altogether (5:32)”.

Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia

Policy Objectives

It is clear that Bin Salman’s policies are not theologically founded, at least, not in the traditional Islamic sense. However, his recent momentous speech reenforces his desire to appear moderate in order to attract the West’s backing and investment. Leading the effort in Yemen, as well as imprisoning any contenders to his position and becoming the first to bestow citizenship rights upon a robot reveals a common thread in his policies–to steal the limelight and paint a striking public image. These actions have little to do with the good of the Saudi state. Indeed, philanthropists of the Al Saud dynasty who held the good of the Saudi state at heart are now in cuffs and the Saudi Arabian budget is being further depleted by the costs of this war. What may be commonly ascertained from Bin Salman’s policies is that his public image is his highest priority. He desires to be seen in the West as a young modernizing ruler and in the Middle East as a ‘Warrior Prince’. Some have even claimed that his policies in Yemen are painted with Machiavellian brushes. For in Chapter 8 of The Prince, Machiavelli contends that ‘conquests by criminal virtue’ may be justified to establish a Prince’s power.[1] Likewise, Bin Salman clearly boosted his popularity back home through this blockade and hopes of a smashing victory abroad.

From this angle, we might venture to say that Bin Salman’s policies in Yemen have been successful in securing his political credibility. Credibility here is not limited to Saudi Arabia, but neighboring states in region, such as the UAE, with which he has strengthened and secured ties. On a personal level, analysts say that his actions have commanded the respect of Arab leaders such as Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed and the King of Bahrain. This is also because he is achieving the long-standing political and ideologically-rooted objective of weakening Iran’s support in the region, by fighting their allies, the Houthis. The ideology subscribed to by most of the Al Saud dynasty is one that the rulers of the UAE and Bahrain publicly condone. This ideology is the neo-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi ‘takfiri’ school of thought that labels Shi’a and all non-Wahhabis or non-Salafis as ‘heretics’[2]. It is encapsulated and based upon Mohammed Ibn Abd Al Wahhabb’s Nullifiers of Islam (Nawaqid Al Islam) [3]. In Yemen, the Houthis (being Zaidis) are non-Wahhabis. According to this ideology, Zaidis (like all non-Wahhabis) are branded ‘heretics’ that ‘must be killed’ if they do not submit to Salafi-Wahhabism[4]. The Houthis represent 40% of the Yemeni population and they have been most affected by the causalities in areas such as Mocha. However, in Bin Salman’s eyes, Yemen is a ‘two birds with one stone’ opportunity. Not only has the blockade allowed him to embellish his public image and secure credibility, but his actions are additionally justified from an ideological, Wahhabi perspective.

Another Sunni-Shi’a Conflict?

Nevertheless, it would be far too simplistic to reduce the entire conflict to a mere extension of the sectarian Sunni-Shi’a strife that dominates the region. It is true that on one side, for the Saudis this is to some extent an ideological, and perhaps, a theologically-rooted crusade. However, for the rest of the Coalition (e.g., Egypt and Jordan) who are not Wahhabis and are traditional ‘usuli’ Sunnis, the war has no religious justification whatsoever. This is even more true for the Houthis themselves, who despite being supported by Iran, are not Shi’a per se[5]. In fact, from an Islamic, theological perspective, traditional Zaidism is far more similar to traditional Sunnism, and specifically Hanafi ‘usul’ (traditions) that are practiced across the majority of the Levant, as opposed to Twelver Shi’ism that is practiced by the majority of Iran. This is precisely why it is debatable whether the Zaidis are Shi’a at all[6], and why historically speaking, sectarianism has never been a problem in Yemen until this point.

Whilst bitter sectarian rhetoric remains at the heart of the conflict, notions of a religiously justified war have been augmented by the media. Yemen is certainly a manifestation of the Saudi-Iran power struggle for regional hegemony. Recent developments such as former President Saleh’s death and desertion of the Houthis have fueled the fire ignited by Sunni-Shi’a rhetoric even further. The vacancy left by Saleh’s death means that there is no significant, internationally known Yemeni figure supporting the Houthis. This, in turn, has reinforced the portrayal of the Houthis in the Arab press as no more than Iran’s ‘Anti-Sunni’ puppets. However, despite this, Yemen should not be confused with a religious war or large-scale sectarian strife, like the situation in post-2003 Iraq. More importantly, the civilian plight that exists can be alleviated in a manner that does not hinder both factions from fighting one another. Yemen is primarily a proxy war. For the Houthis, Iran is a strong, loyal, and convenient ally. As for the Saudis, the Houthis pose a threat at their borders, both ideologically and strategically speaking. But, as far as the majority of Yemeni civilians are concerned, nothing matters except being able to survive.

A more detailed understanding of theological nuances teaches that the situation in Yemen extends far beyond a ‘Sunni-Shi’a’ conflict. History corroborates this even further; despite Al Saud’s longstanding commitment to Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia has previously set aside its ideological differences in Yemen. In the early 1960’s, King Faisal intervened by supporting the Houthi Royalists against the Communist rebels backed by Pan-Arabist Jamal Abd Al Nasser. Furthermore, when this intervention failed, King Faisal went to great lengths to reestablish peace in Yemen through the Tai’f Conference in 1965. Thus, it would be foolish to presume that Bin Salman cannot emulate his truly moderate uncle in one way or another.

According to the Red Cross, three Yemeni cities lack of clear water due to a Saudi blockade

A Different Approach

An alternate strategy with regards to the blockade does not mean that the Saudis would abandon their military campaign, however morally dubious this may be. It simply entails the adoption of a different approach towards Yemeni civilians. This would consist of lifting or loosening the blockade in civilian-dominated areas such as Mocha and letting humanitarian agencies in with Saudi protection. This strategy would cost just as much as the blockade has cost. If well publicized, this could also boost the popularity of Bin Salman and the Coalition in Yemen. After all, tightening the blockade in November 2017 allowed Bin Salman to make yet another mark as the ‘Sunni Strongman’ of the Gulf. Realistically speaking then, even if the rest of the Coalition wanted to loosen the blockade, Bin Salman will not budge unless he is convinced that this new approach will benefit him personally.

Evaluation

If efforts were to be disguised as ‘concern’ for Yemeni civilians, this would allow Bin Salman to create a well-rounded public image in the Middle East as a figure who can do no wrong–merciful towards civilians and concerned for their livelihoods. In the long run, this would be instrumental for mustering the support of local Yemeni tribes. Particularly in light of the late President Saleh’s defection and death by the Houthis, a massive humanitarian campaign has the potential to encourage Saleh’s supporters and grateful civilians to switch sides. During the beginning of the conflict, many civilians were Houthi sympathizers merely because Houthi forces did not disrespect local tribes or wreak havoc in the rural areas that they captured. Local tribes appreciated this, in contrast to the ‘Scorched Earth Approach’ adopted by the Coalition and their de facto allies on the ground– the Colombian mercenaries hired by the UAE and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Ansar Al Sharia’a. In fact, this is why Houthi forces command much more support than many would like to admit. Their tactics, as far as civilians are concerned, are relatively speaking, not nearly as brutal.

In short, loosening the blockade and disguising humanitarian efforts as the Coalition’s ‘concern’ would be a much more effective strategy on many levels. By saving millions of lives, the Coalition would earn the gratitude and loyalty of the afflicted civilians: Sunni tribes and Zaidi’s alike. This move would undermine the core strength of the Houthi-led insurgency. Such a campaign would be taking advantage of the fact that the Zaidi’s have neither the means nor the infrastructure to cure cholera, diphtheria, and other epidemics, in addition to famine.

Regardless of whether the blockade stands, Iran will still supply the Houthis with weapons and ammunition as proved by the Houthi’s intermittent missile strikes. Partially lifting the blockade to allow aid in will not, therefore, be severely detrimental to the Coalition’s military position. In fact, this approach might even bolster the Coalition’s standing in Yemen and turn the tables in their favour by giving local tribes reason to shift allegiances, as Saleh notably did before his death. The starving, disease-stricken civilians are mainly Zaidi’s and traditional usuli Sunnis, both of which have no religious or ideological commitment to fight the Coalition or Wahhabis per se. Although a decent amount are Houthi sympathizers, the afflicted are not majorly concerned with regional politics. Indiscriminate airstrikes and letting these civilians starve and suffer is a grim, slow manner of securing a win for the Saudi-led Coalition.

A more effective strategy in the long run would entail saving millions of lives by Saudi Arabia allowing aid in and disguising this as ‘concern’ for Yemeni children. The ambitious ‘Warrior Prince’ could even use this to ameliorate his popularity and amass Yemeni allies and support for a new post-conflict government in the future. However, the reality is that it is, perhaps, easier for the Coalition to use the excuse of sectarian strife to prolong the conflict rather than save millions of Zaidis. After all, neither America nor Britain has entangled themselves in the conflict yet so why should the Coalition worry about aggravating the largest humanitarian crisis in the world?

Tasneem Ghazi reads Politics, Philosophy and Law at King’s College London. She is an editor at the King’s Student Law Review (KSLR) and is also one of the founding editors of the Politics, Philosophy and Law Journal (KSJPPL). Tasneem is a contributing writer to a number of academic journals and media outlets. Her areas of expertise and interest include the Arab Spring in the Levant, the dynamics of sectarianism in the MENA, the influence of religion and socio-economics on political systems in the MENA and countering violent- extremist thought in the MENA. She is also trilingual and works as a freelance translator.

Notes:

[1]Niccolò Machiavelli, ‘The Prince’ (London: Penguin Books, 1988), Chapter 8.

[2] Vincenzo Olivetti, Terror’s Source’, The House of Islam p.16

[3] Mohammed Ibn Abd Al Wahabb (‘The Nullifiers of Islam’) ‘Nawaqid Al Islam’

[4]Vincenzo Olivetti, ‘Terror’s Source’, The Salafi Ideology Doctrines and Tenet, p.33

[5] Ibid, p.15

[6] Ibid, p.16

Image sources

Banner (image 1): https://www.axios.com/famine-cholera-and-civilian-casualties-the-crisis-in-yemen-1513307014-02f92d70-8f7c-47f2-814d-dc913a1e8b79.html

Image 2: https://en.reseauinternational.net/a-warrior-prince-rises-in-arabia-as-the-monarch-of-all-he-surveys/

Image 3: http://www.yamanyoon.com/?p=91162&lang=en

Resource-Induced Conflicts, Part IV: Society, Resources, and Conflict in Yemen

September 21, 2016 by Strife Staff

By: Dr. Charles Schmitz

In Yemen, natural resources do not cause conflicts, people do. The relationship between natural resources and people is mediated by society such that a simple, causal relationship between resource abundance or scarcity and conflict does not exist. In Yemen, scarcity does not cause conflict; in fact, a better case might be made for the reverse, namely that conflict causes scarcity. Conflict drives investment and capital away from the country, destroys productive infrastructure, debilitates the state, and prevents the sustainable management of resources.

Talk of natural resource scarcity in Yemen focuses on oil and water. In the 2000s, Yemen’s economy and government depended heavily upon oil revenues. About a third of economic output and three quarters of government revenue came from oil.[1] But oil production peaked in 2002 and has declined steadily ever since.[2] What is more, Sana’a is often described as the first capital in the world to run out of water. Water levels in aquifers around the city and elsewhere in Yemen are dropping precipitously. Oil production is falling and water resources are dwindling and in 2015, Yemen collapsed into a devastating civil war. While natural resource scarcity appears to coincide with conflict, the causal relationship between scarcity and conflict is difficult to support.

Unnatural Scarcity

In Yemen, the political dynamics of the Saleh regime created scarcity by driving investment away from the country and failing to manage Yemen’s assets. Yemenis and foreign advisors alike were well aware of two fundamental realities. Firstly, Yemen’s oil and water resources were limited. Secondly, like some of the oil economies of the Gulf States – such as Bahrain, Oman, or even Saudi Arabia today – Yemen needed to invest its revenues from oil to harness the labour of Yemeni’s in economic activities that could produce wealth in a post hydrocarbon economy. Yet the Saleh regime used the economy not for enhancing Yemen’s productive capacities, but for bolstering its political position. It created informal political barriers to entry that allotted key positions atop the private economy to a select group of families; those not included invested their money elsewhere. The lack of private sector development outside of the hydrocarbon sector meant that when oil revenues declined, the economy was not equipped to offer alternative means of making a living. Additionally, the regime also exacerbated tribal and political conflicts preventing the sustainable management of water resources. Thus, the political strategy of the Saleh regime drove the economy into the ground, and created unnatural scarcity by failing to manage Yemen’s resource assets.

The Politics of Aridity

While it is true that water resources in Yemen are very limited, water is also a renewable resource. The majority of Yemen’s water comes from rain, which – given its geographic location astride the Indian Ocean and its mountainous terrain in the West – is plentiful. In addition to the rain, Yemenis exploited groundwater by digging wells. Beginning in the 1950s, but greatly expanding in the 1970s, bore wells enabled Yemenis to exploit groundwater at far greater depths. While traditional social institutions had been developed to regulate the water rights for farmers and herdsmen, they were ill-equipped to monitor and regulate the emerging bore wells that allowed much faster withdrawal rates. Thus, the country’s water problem is not the absence of water, but rather the inability to manage the available resources. In this case, scarcity is a matter of management and state capacity, not a lack of water.[3] When water is managed in a manner that takes into account the technological developments of the last half-century, Yemen’s water resources will consequently be restored.

Additionally, water is not a driver of conflict, at least not directly. Those that make Malthusian arguments about water in Yemen point to violent disputes over wells. While it is true that tribal groups do fight one another over the control of wells, water is not the sole focus of tribal conflict. Rather, the increase in tribal conflict was driven by the politics of the Saleh regime that exacerbated armed conflict in general in the northern highlands.

While tribes in Yemen are long standing traditional institutions that mediate conflict, the fractured nature of tribal society is also prone to conflict.[4] In the far north of Yemen, Saleh used tribal conflict to his advantage.[5] He ruled by the politics of chaos rather than direct control, supporting opposing groups in order to cause and nourish conflict, thereby preventing them from uniting in opposition to his regime.[6]- [7] Thus, conflict among tribes was not caused by resource scarcity, but by a conscious political strategy of the Saleh regime, particularly in the northern highlands. In a slightly different analysis, Lichtenthaeler shows how disputes over land and water in the northern governorate of Sa’adah were driven not only by population increase, but also by the attempts of the regime to alter the political composition of the region’s landowners by installing elements supportive of Saleh.[8]

Oil and Conflict

In our global economy, the relationship between people and the environment is mediated by markets. So while it is true that the quantity of oil produced in Yemen peaked in 2002 and declined every year since, government revenues rose dramatically in the post peak period. Average government revenue from exports of crude oil from 2003 to 2014 was 2.9 billion USD, whereas in 2002 revenues were 1.6 billion USD. Only in 2014 did government revenue from oil exports return to 2002 levels.[9]

The timing of the rise and fall of these oil revenues is important because those making Malthusian arguments for Yemen might point to the correspondence of the decline in oil production with the distinct episodes of conflict in Yemen’s recent history: a secession attempt in the south in 1994; an insurgency in the north from 2004 to 2010; a stubborn civil disobedience movement in the south from 2007; the overthrow of the regime of Ali Abdallah Saleh in 2011; a campaign against al-Qaeda in the south in 2012; and a civil war beginning in 2015 and still raging today. These episodes of violence, with the exception of the war of 1994, do correspond to declines in oil production, but they do not correspond to any scarcity of government resources or recession in the economy. In fact, oil revenues for the government and for the economy were highest in the period of the highest instability: 2004-2011. Thus, something other than resource scarcity was driving these violent outbreaks, namely political conflict over power and the nature of the state.

The war of 1994 is an important example because it is sometimes explained by arguing that the driver of the war was natural resources. However, the war of 1994 resulted from leadership disputes between the former rulers of the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and the northern Yemen Arab Republic. The two republics were Cold War enemies, but the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed their leaderships to negotiate an agreement for unification. The agreement created a transitional government with equal power sharing while a new constitution was drafted for the united Yemen. The understanding of the leadership of the (much smaller demographically) southern state was that the two former ruling parties would form a coalition government following elections. However, the northern ruling party decided instead to form a coalition government with a third Islamic party in the north that was hostile to the southern socialist leadership.

In the interim period between the unification of Yemen in 1990 and the elections of 1993, significant oil was discovered in the region of the former southern state. Thus, some argued that the driver of the war was northern fear that the south would secede with its newfound oil wealth — a classic resource war. While oil revenues may have enticed the former ruler of the south to attempt secession and thereby secure the survival of his state, the war was not between the north and the south; it was between those that supported unification and those that supported secession. In the south, support for secession was not strong, as many distrusted the old socialist leadership and preferred to live under the liberal state (at the time) of unified Yemen. Moreover, half of the Yemeni Socialist Party also rejected the attempt at secession. In January 1986, the ruling YSP had been rocked by an extremely violent internecine conflict. The losing faction of the YSP and its associated military units fled to the northern Yemen Arab Republic. In the war of 1994, these southern refugees in the north led the war against the secession attempt. Their motivation was revenge. Among the military commanders of the southern forces supporting unity was Hadi, a southerner from the Abyan Governorate and the current president of Yemen. Thus the war was not a case of northerners taking over the south, but northerners and southerners determining the nature of the state and its leadership.

Similarly, the uprising in the south that began in 2007 was not a result of resource scarcity, but a failure of the political strategies of the Saleh regime. Following the war of secession in 1994, Saleh tried to build support in the south. However, rather than rebuilding southern politics, northern supporters of Saleh treated the south as war booty to be plundered. Southerners, including those who rejected secession in 1994, were consequently marginalized; a fate that led them to overcome their many differences in 2007 and unite in opposition to Saleh.

Significantly, the protests in the south came at a time when the Saleh regime was wealthier than ever. In 2006, revenues from state export of crude oil reached four billion USD. In 2007, revenues slid to three billion, but in 2008, state revenues from oil exports reached a record 4.5 billion USD [see charts]. The Yemeni state had more resources than ever, yet irrepressible conflict flared. Saleh tried to use his resources to calm the south by reinstating many southern military officers that had been dismissed after 1994. But the grievances ran deeper than Saleh’s patronage could mollify. Thus, when the state coffers were overflowing, protests raged – scarcity or abundance did not cause conflict, the state’s behaviour did.

Current Conflict

In the current conflict in Yemen, it was the conflict itself that shut down oil exports and drove the economy into the ground. And while natural resources may have played some role (for example, the Houthi movement overran Sana’a with the promise to roll back cuts in government subsidies to oil products), the primary driver is the ambition of the former ruler of Yemen, Ali Abdallah Saleh, now allied with the leader of the Houthi movement, Abd al-Malek al-Houthi, to rule the country. Pitted against their ambitions is the hawkish regime of King Salman in Saudi Arabia who accuses them of facilitating Iran’s influence in Yemen. The Saudi air campaign and the naval blockade of the country crushed what remained of the oil economy and led to dramatic declines in the standard of living as well as a massive humanitarian crisis.

There is, however, one way through which scarcity drives the current conflict: poverty and desperation drives young men to enlist in the many different militias of the competing warlords. The Saudi regime (by proxy), Ali Abdallah Saleh, the Houthi controlled state, and al-Qaeda in the south all pay young men to join the fight. Were these young men not desperate to feed themselves and their families, Yemen’s warring leadership would have much greater difficulty filling the ranks of their militias, and a negotiated settlement would be much easier to accomplish.

The Yemen case shows that the relationship between natural resources and people is mediated by society, and that it is the people that drive conflict rather than resources. In some circumstances, conflicts occur along with resource scarcity, but in other circumstances, resource scarcity accompanies social harmony. People and their politics are the key variables, not the abundance or scarcity of natural resources.

Charles Schmitz is a professor of Geography and a specialist on Yemen at Towson University in Baltimore, MD, USA.

Notes:

[1] Central Statistical Organization (2012), “Annual Yearbook,” Sana’a: Republic of Yemen.

[2] Energy Information Agency (2016), “Yemen,” Washington DC: US Government http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=YEM

[3] Lichtenthaeler, Gerhard (2010) “Water Cooperation and Conflict in Yemen,” MERIP Vol 40, no. 254; Schmitz, Charles (2013), “Geography,” in Steve Caton (ed.), Yemen, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO

[4] Dresch, Paul (1990), “Imams and Tribes: The Writing and Acting of History in Yemen,” Khoury, Phillip, and Joseph Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 287

[5] Adel Sharjabi ed. (2009), The Castle and the Chamber: the political role of the tribe in Yemen. Sana`a: Yemeni Human Rights Observer (Arabic)

[6] Blumi, Isa (2011), Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism, New York: Routledge

[7] Phillips, Sarah (2011), Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, London: Adelphi Books

[8] Lichtenthaeler, Gerhard (2003) Political Ecology and the Role of Water: Environment, Economy, and Society in Northern Yemen, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company

[9] Central Bank of Yemen (2015), “Monetary & Banking Developments,” January 2015, http://www.centralbank.gov.ye/App_Upload/Jan2015.pdf

[10] Hill, Ginny and Peter Salisbury (2015) Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight, and Global Drivers of Conflict, Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press

[11] Alley, April (2010) “The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage in Yemen,” Middle East Journal Vol. 64, No. 3, Summer 2010.

Image Source: http://www.zamzamwater.org/yemen-details.php

Perim: the strategic island that never was

June 29, 2016 by Strife Staff

By: James A. Fargher

Despite lying in the middle of one of the world’s most critical choke points, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait between Djibouti and Yemen, the island of Perim is a remote and often forgotten outpost. Perim is located in the midst of the waterway which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden – the connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Throughout history, Perim has been fought over as a prize by great and regional powers alike in the belief that the island can be used as a gateway to the vital Suez shipping lane. Nevertheless, due in part to the island’s small size and its harsh climate, Perim has proven to be only marginally useful to the regional maritime powers. This article reviews Perim’s modern history, exploring the series of occasions in which powers have attempted unsuccessfully to turn the island into a ‘Gibraltar of the East.’

Perim is a fragment of an ancient volcano, part of a chain of long-dormant volcanos stretching across Africa and Arabia.[1] It lies in the middle of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, three kilometres from Arabia and twenty kilometres from Africa.[2] Perim has no source of fresh water, aside from occasional rainfalls, and it is located in one of the hottest and driest regions in the world.[3]

Perim was first scouted as a possible site for a castle by the Portuguese explorer and admiral Afonso de Albuquerque.[4] The Portuguese had launched a fleet into the Indian Ocean in an attempt to seize control of the lucrative Indian spice trade and in 1513 Afonso led his ships through Bab-el-Mandeb into the Red Sea. Failing to discover sources of fresh water on the island, the Portuguese abandoned their plans for building a fortress on Perim. By the end of the 16^th century the Red Sea had fallen under the control of the Ottoman Turks.[5]

The possibility of establishing a naval base on Perim was next explored by the British East India Company in 1799.[6] Lieutenant-Colonel John Murray, commander of the 84^th Regiment, was despatched by the Company from India to Perim with a force of three hundred men.[7] Following Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, the Company was anxious to control the line of communication between the Red Sea and India, and to forestall any French assault on the subcontinent. Like the Portuguese, Murray discovered that there were no sources of water to supply his troops.[8] Moreover, the artillery pieces at that time did not have the range needed to hit ships sailing through the western side of the Strait, so Perim could not be used to prevent a fleet exiting the Red Sea.[9] Six months after landing on Perim, Murray withdrew his force from the island to Aden.[10]

Following Murray’s failed expedition Perim was left unclaimed for nearly sixty years. Interest in the island was only revived when in 1854 the French engineer Fernand de Lesseps announced his plan to build a canal connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, a revolutionary project which when it was eventually completed in 1869 transformed the Red Sea into one of the world’s great oceanic highways. In response to rumoured French interest in the island and driven by the urgent need to construct a lighthouse, the British government despatched a warship to formally lay claim to Perim in 1857.[11] The legend goes that Perim was seized hours before the arrival of a French expedition, the morning after the British consul in Aden had deliberately gotten them drunk, an episode which one Victorian statesman described as a ‘bright ornament in the history of British naval enterprize [sic]’.[12] Indeed, Perim would remain a British possession for over a century until it was ceded to the People’s Republic of South Yemen in 1967.

Despite its timely capture and notwithstanding its location on the most important shipping and communication line in the British Empire, Perim did not prove to be a strategic asset for the British. Although a small detachment of Indian troops was garrisoned on the island and a lighthouse constructed, no fortifications were ever built on Perim. As the War Office concluded in a report in 1882, ‘no advantage would be gained by fortifying the island, although it is doubtless necessary to hold in order to prevent any other power taking it and converting it into a fortress.’[13] Moreover, even the latest artillery was unlikely to have the range necessary to stop ships from slipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.[14] For Britain, Perim was only valuable in so far as that owning the island ensured that it was denied to other rivals; only once was it assaulted when in 1916 a small Ottoman force unsuccessfully attempted to storm it.[15] Whilst a small coaling station did operate on the island between 1883 and the mid-1930s, this was purely a commercial enterprise and Royal Navy ships continued to refuel at the nearby imperial fortress of Aden.[16]

The only time in modern history that Perim has been used to blockade the southern entrance of the Red Sea came shortly after it was granted to South Yemen in the 1960s. After failing to secure a UN resolution guaranteeing free passage of Bab-el-Mandeb, Britain had left Perim in the hands of South Yemen, then under the control of the National Liberation Front (NLF).[17] A radical faction of the NLF occupied Perim in December 1967, and attempted to impose a blockade on Israeli tankers passing through the Strait.[18] Armed with only short-range artillery, however, NLF militants were unable to interdict Israeli shipping,[19] and an effective blockade was only implemented once Egypt joined in hostilities against Israeli during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In October that year, Egyptian troops armed with Soviet artillery pieces were deployed to the island, backed up with naval units.[20] These forces were able to briefly secure the Strait and block Israeli tankers from reaching Eilat, but the blockade was lifted shortly afterwards following a ceasefire.[21]

Since the October War, Perim has not been used as a strategic base. Despite its location in the middle of one of the world’s busiest shipping lines through which 3.4 million barrels of oil pass per day,[22] no state has truly been able to utilise the island’s supposed strategic potential. The lack of water and harsh climate has hampered efforts to establish large garrisons on Perim, as does the island’s small size. Moreover, only modern artillery has sufficient range to engage ships passing through the western strait, and attempting to sever such a vital artery of world trade would likely result in significant political repercussions. With Yemen currently embroiled in a bitter civil war and lacking in naval hardware, it also remains unlikely that Perim will be used as a base for power projection in the short to medium-term.

James A. Fargher is a Doctoral candidate in the Laughton Naval History Unit in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, specialising in British naval and Imperial history.

Notes:

[1] DIJ Mallick et. al., ‘Perim Island, a volcanic remnant in the southern entrance to the Red Sea,’ Geological Magazine 127:4 (1990): 309-318.

[2] Ibid.

[3] ftp://ftp.atdd.noaa.gov/pub/GCOS/WMO-Normals/TABLES/REG__I/D1/63125.TXT.

[4] RS Whiteway, The Rise of Portguese Power in India, 1497-1550 (London: Archibald Constable, 1899), 153-157.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kenneth Panton, Historical Dictionary of the British Empire (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 406.

[7] H. M. Chichester, ‘Murray, Sir John, eighth baronet (1768?–1827)’, rev. Roger T. Stearn, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19633, accessed 19 June 2016].

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Speech to the House of Commons, 10 March 1884, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 285 (1884).

[13] Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General of India, 18 March 1886, Letter. In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 55.

[14] Sir E. Hertslet, ‘Memorandum on French and Italian Designs in the Red Sea and its immediate Neighbourhood,’ Foreign Office, 6 March 1882. In Steven Smith, ed., The Red Sea Region: Sovereignty, Boundaries & Conflict, 1839-1967, vol. 1. Arabian Geopolitics 6 Regional Documentary Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 99.

[15] MD Fontenoy, ‘British Control of Red Sea is Due to Coup by Governor,’ The Washington Post, 22 July 1916.

[16] Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, ‘Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea, 1894, Orders.’ In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 586.

[17] Robert Aliboni, The Red Sea Region: Local Actors and the Superpowers (Routledge Library Editions: Politics of the Middle East).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Michael Binyon, ‘Egyptians say that Suez is cut off from Cairo and Observers are Blocked,’ Times, 26 October 1973.

[21] Drew Middleton, ‘Israel Sees Peril in Arab Decisions,’ The New York Times, 1 November 1974.

[22] Mohammed Mukhashaf, ‘Gulf Arabs wrest strategic Yemen island from Iran-allied group,’ Reuters, 5 October 2015.