Feature

Climate-Change and Conflict Prevention: Integrating Climate and Conflict Early Warning Systems

July 2, 2022 by Langdon Ogburn

Dakar Senegal – Looking North / Photo Credit: Jeff Attaway, licensed under Creative Commons

Hundreds of blue buildings in Djougop, Senegal, are increasingly being filled by families from the nearby coastal city of St. Louis. Most did not choose to make this move—rather, their displacement has been driven by the destruction of neighborhoods from increased sea levels. St. Louis’ low sea level and placement along the Senegal River have made its population one of the first to be heavily impacted by climate change, but it will not be the last.

In West Africa, low-lying coastal cities most susceptible to sea-level rise generate 56% of the region’s GDP and have a population growth double the global average. Further, decreased rainfall and desertification increasingly impact the livelihoods of millions living in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions. At the same time, extreme weather events like heatwaves, flooding, droughts, rainstorms, and cyclones are increasing in number and intensity. On whole, the unique impact of climate change on ecological systems in Africa could force as many as 86 million Africans to become internally displaced.

The link between climate change and security has been recognized by global leaders and international institutions the world over. Climate-change stresses existing causes of political instability, which, if unaddressed, can result in increasing instances of conflict and fuel existing conflicts. The vulnerabilities created by climate change increase various populations’ chances of predation by criminal organizations, militias, and extremist groups. Further, competition for diminishing resources—including access to water and arable land—can cause an upsurge in violence.

Climate-related security threats can already be seen in the southern Sahel, where desertification has been linked to an upsurge in violent altercations between farmers and pastoralists, predominately along ethnic group lines.

While climate-related security threats can be found globally, Africa’s robust conflict early warning systems make African regional institutions uniquely capable of taking preventative action against climate-driven conflict.

What are conflict Early Warning Systems (EWS)?

Conflict EWS expert Madhawa Palihapitiya stated, ‘most community-based violence can be prevented if the right information is delivered to the right stakeholders, at the right time, in the right format, enabling the stakeholders to take the right actions.’

Conflict EWS are grounded in this idea. They collect and analyze information, identify conflict risks, warn decision-makers, and provide proposals for addressing potential conflict.

These systems frequently differ in methods and structure. However, general best practices and characteristics include:

The transparent sharing of validated and reliable information between all parts of the system.
Use various quantitative and qualitative methods to collect information, including technology, field networks, and open-source resources.
Track a broad range of potential drives of conflict attuned to local contexts.
Are directly linked to decision-makers and response mechanisms.

Existing African EWS

Today, Africa has one of the most extensive and multi-dimensional EWS structures in the world.

In 2005, the African Union (AU) started developing its Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) as a core part of its Peace and Security Council.

The CEWS consists of two parts. The first is an observation monitoring unit (labelled “the Situation Room”) that oversees data collection and analysis, which has made great improvements since its construction. The second are regional observation monitoring teams. These are located within Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and are directly linked with the AU’s observation monitoring unit.

Each REC’s EWS uses different methods attuned to local contexts. Examples include:

The South African Development Community (SADC)’s Regional Early Warning System (REWS)
The Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS)’s Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN)
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

These regional EWCs are linked either officially with state governments or with monitors located in various communal areas across the region. This continental, regional, national, and communal organizational structure allows the CEWs to be linked to information gathering at the local level.

The Necessity of Climate EWS

Climate specialists have consistently advocated for the necessity of developing climate early warning systems—notably, EWS were incorporated into one of the four goals created by COP26.

Climate EWS use technological tools– most notably Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping—to identify extreme weather events like flooding, fires, drought, and heatwaves and long-term negative environmental trends like desertification or sea-level rise. Analysts can use this information to make recommendations to policymakers on limiting climate-related threats to vulnerable populations.

Yet, the larger goals of climate EWS are not much different than how conflict EWS have traditionally been conceived. They use information gathering and analysis to advise leaders on appropriately responding to early threats, promoting long-term stability and sustainability among civil society.

Integrating Climate EWS into Existing Conflict EWS Structures

The nexus between conflict and climate change between climate change and the dynamics of conflict provides a clear opportunity for existing EWS.

By integrating climate early warning into existing conflict EWS infrastructure, African political entities can minimize the resources needed to monitor potential impacts of climate on human security effectively. Already, EWS monitor economic, political, and governance indicators that may undermine security—through the use of geospatial data and analysis, it is possible to add a set of indicators that monitors environments and climate change. This analysis can measure how climate change impacts environments and the economic, political, and cultural impacts this may have on local populations.

Although I argue for the merit of integrating climate EWS into current conflict EWS, debates can and should be held about viewing climate-change indicators purely through the lens of human security. Even if securitization of climate change is not the answer, current structures of conflict EWS found throughout Africa can act as a good model for how effective climate EWS can be constructed. Further, if climate EWS are constructed independently of conflict EWS, it will be essential that analysts in both systems communicate and share information with one another to ensure the relationship between conflict and climate is accounted for in providing policy suggestions.

A Lesson Beyond Africa

Although climate change impacts Africa’s geography and geopolitical context in a unique way, it is far from the only geopolitical area that will have its security impacted by climate change. The continent’s robust conflict EWS provides political actors in Africa an opportunity to prepare for the impending impacts that climate change will have on human security—an opportunity that policymakers throughout the globe should consider constructing within their own political organizations.

Preventing Coup d’Étas: Lessons on Coup-Proofing from Gabon

July 1, 2022 by Ryan Johnson

Members of the Armed Forces of Gabon stand in formation. Photo Credit: U.S. Army Africa photo by Brian Kimball, used under Creative Commons.

The COVID-19 pandemic is significantly endangering Sub-Saharan countries by increasing the rate of coup d’états in already fragile regimes. Within the past two years alone, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso all experienced military takeovers after growing disapproval of their government’s mishandled virus response. This worrying trend reinvigorates attention toward the causes of military coups, domestic and international events that enable them, and more importantly, how they can be prevented. This article addresses these questions by introducing institutional coup-proofing—a set of measures that undermine a military’s predisposition to conduct a coup by establishing competing factions within the armed force. This article concludes with a case study of the unsuccessful coup attempt in Gabon in 2019 and describes lessons other Sub-Saharan countries can apply to potentially reduce instability and conflict in the region.

What is Institutional Coup Proofing?

Militaries serve an essential role in society by providing for the common defense, securing state monopoly on violence, and deterring foreign actors. In maintaining these armed servants, rulers encounter the delicate tradeoff when strengthening the military establishment; it must be strong enough to win wars but not strong enough to overthrow the government it serves. As the Greek philosopher Plato famously asked, “who shall guard the guardians?”

To lessen the likelihood of coups, governments can implement a set of deliberate, institutionalized measures that disincentivize military elites from attempting to betray their government. This can be done by distributing resources to key stakeholders and making the status quo preferable to a coup. One such method is counterbalancing the armed forces and creating additional players, such as paramilitary units and presidential guards. Acting outside the national armed forces, these organizations form independent interests distinct from the traditional military and serve as internal deterrence mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of any organization’s attempts to stage a coup. The more actors present, the less likely one actor will dissent and stage a coup.

A less preferred method is rulers weakening the armed forces by creating internal coordination challenges within their militaries. Purging senior military officers, reducing personnel in the armed forces, and decreasing the quality of training for recruits all hamper the military’s overall speed and effectiveness. These efforts dramatically limit the military’s prospects of successfully overthrowing the regime since soldiers are less capable of mobilizing. Rather than creating multiple organizations that compete, regime leaders can weaken the military at the expense of being vulnerable to external national security threats.

In some cases, however, counterbalancing measures can increase the likelihood of military coups, but not necessarily their success. This is what happened in the failed Gabon coup in 2019. There is a U-shaped relationship between coup-proofing techniques and coup probability. Initial actions of counterbalancing the military force reduce the risks of a military coup for the reasons discussed above. But too many organizations eventually strain resources and weaken their ability to deter each other since they compete for scarce resources. Similar missions also mean units will free-ride off each other, believing the other organizations are doing their job already. To safeguard against this, leaders must ensure they deploy ample monitoring techniques to ensure these units are doing their job.

The Failed 2019 Coup in Gabon

Counterbalancing military organizations against each other is a legitimate tactic to reduce the likelihood of coup occurrences and success. Gabon’s failed coup attempt in 2019 helps illustrate the various mechanisms that make coup-proofing effective, namely how it creates internal coordination challenges among competing organizations.

At the time of the attempted coup in 2019, Gabon maintained three military organizations: The Armed Forces of Gabon, the National Gendarmerie (national police), and a Republican Guard, which was directly under presidential control and served as his security detail. The presidential military guard, created in the 1960s, was explicitly designed to counter the national armed forces and, up until 2019, was largely successful. Before this coup attempt, Gabon was one of only a few post-colonial nations in the region to safeguard its democratic government successfully.

On January 7, 2019, a small group of soldiers from the Armed Forces of Gabon, led by Lieutenant Kelly Ondo Obiang, seized control of a radio station announcing a coup d’état, citing grievances with the current regime as their motivation. The soldiers argued President Ali Bongo, who was absent for two months and recovering from a stroke in nearby Morocco, failed to defend the nation’s interests and was an illegitimate leader. On the broadcast, Obiang issued calls for citizens to safeguard their country, announcing the creation of a “National Council for the Restoration of Democracy.” But due to the small number of soldiers participating, Obiang’s movement was quickly suppressed by competing military forces. The Gendarmerie (national police) swiftly ended the coup attempt by breaching the radio station, killing two and arresting the four other members.

The inability of Obiang and his supporters to launch a coordinated movement highlights the value of counterbalancing as a deterrent for coups. Subsequent reporting on the incident indicates the attempt was poorly planned and did not contain the critical mass required to succeed. Less than a dozen soldiers participated, and the highest-ranking member was a junior officer. These challenges stemmed from Obiang and his supporters being unable to mobilize the sufficient strength necessary to co-opt military elites from other organizations, meaning they had to act independently. This is mainly due to the division of military units intended to counterbalance each other. After capturing the local radio station and calling for the coup, the National police force arrested Obiang and his conspirators. From this isolated case, the case can be made that the internal structure and dividing of armed forces prevented a mass mobilization needed to topple the regime.

Conclusion and Prospects for Neighboring Countries

In the years following the Gabon coup, neighboring Sub-Saharan nations face higher military coups probabilities. Earlier this year, a group of soldiers ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in Burkina Faso, citing governance-related grievances as their primary motive. This West African country joins Mali, Chad, and Guinea, who all experienced military coups in 2021 alone.

As Gabon’s case highlights, creating additional costs for the military by creating counterbalancing organizations may be a way to prevent this seemingly uncontrolled phenomenon in the region. By pitting various military units against each other, political leaders disincentivize one unit from deviating from the status quo and attempting to overthrow the regime. Additionally, multiple competing organizations inevitably compete for resources, decreasing their motivation to further instability. This is precisely what happened in Gabon since the two other organizations were uncertain a coup attempt would improve the situation. For other Sub-Saharan nations, institutional coup proofing should be considered a way to avert the seemingly inevitable coup-trap many countries are experiencing.

The Struggle for National Memory in Contemporary Nigeria

June 30, 2022 by Christopher Hebert

Biafran independence demonstration. Photo Credit: Sigfrid Lundberg, used under Creative Commons.

In early 2021, the Eastern Security Network, an armed group linked to Igbo separatism, clashed with government security forces resulting in the deaths of more than 20 police officers. The federal government replied with excessive force, killing at least 115 people, some of whom were likely civilians. These tensions, however, are nothing new. Animosity between separatist and governmental groups in Nigeria trace back to ethnic divisions cemented by colonial policy and conflicting public narratives on the post-independence Nigeria-Biafran war.

Ethnic divisions in Nigeria today have deep historical roots, extending back to the Berlin Conference of 1884 and British colonization. The British invented the country of Nigeria by imposing borders that ignored pre-existing boundaries between peoples, creating a place that contained three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba, along with hundreds of micro-minorities.

Britain capitalized on these divisions through indirect colonial rule, using competing interests and existing rivalries between the three dominant groups as negotiating tools. The colonial administration was able to “divide-and-rule” in this manner until Nigerian independence in 1960. However, the enflamed rivalries between different groups in Nigeria did not disappear after independence. In many ways, British colonialism set the stage for the next major event in Nigerian history—the Nigeria-Biafran War lasting from 1967-1970.

Two military coups in the same year (1966) aggravated ethnic tensions and led to the targeted killings of Igbos in Northern Nigeria. Following these events, the Southeast region and parts of Eastern Nigeria, with a majority Igbo population, attempted to secede and called their breakaway region Biafra. The fact that the East/Biafra had the majority of Nigeria’s oil reserves meant both that the breakaway region was economically viable, and that the federal government would undoubtedly resist Biafra’s secession.

While some scholars believe that ethnic divisions were the leading cause of the war, others argue that oil played the most important role in Biafra’s attempt to secede. The oil hypothesis is useful because it reinforces Britain’s role in the conflict—they supported a “One Nigeria” solution primarily to protect British oil interests. Indeed, oil is often referred to in the Nigerian context as a “resource curse” because multinational companies like Shell play an outsized role in Nigeria’s politics and environmental degradation. Yet, irrespective of whether ethnic divisions or oil resources played a larger causal role, the attempt to create an independent Biafra has a direct link to Igbo separatist goals today.

After a protracted and bloody conflict that led to a highly-publicized humanitarian crisis in Biafra, the federal government curbed the region’s attempt to secede. After the war there was a proliferation of narratives about the war, dominated by the federal government’s hegemonic narrative.

The official state narrative is that the war was one of national unity, but Igbo people perceive the conflict as a war of Igbo national liberation. It is crucial to note that even today, the federal government’s notion of “nation” and the Igbo people’s notion of “nation” is not yet congruent. Furthermore, non-Igbo minority groups within Biafra experienced atrocities committed by both federal and Biafran troops during the conflict. Their narratives have not yet been incorporated into official discourses on the war.

There are also problems with how the memory of the war has been institutionalized or ignored in schools and universities across the country. An emblematic example of the discursive competition primarily between Igbo people and the federal government is how the war is named. School textbooks usually call it the Nigerian Civil War or the War of National Unity, while groups sympathetic to the Biafran side refer to the war as the Nigeria-Biafra War or simply the Biafran War. The word “Biafra” has also been purged from state documents and discourse, and the Bight of Biafra, the southern part of Nigeria’s Atlantic coast, was renamed the Bight of Bonny.

Despite the federal government’s attempts to erase or obscure public memory of the war, Igbo separatism has survived until today. The main separatist group currently is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) headed by Nnamdi Kanu, which is an offshoot of The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). IPOB has its own security force called the Eastern Security Network (ESN) which ostensibly exists to protect the Igbo people from Fulani herders.

IPOB believes that the federal government supports Muslim Fulani herders against the primarily Christian Igbo people in an attempt to Islamize the country. Even though there is no evidence for the federal government’s support of Islamization, the fact remains that IPOB does not trust the federal government to provide security for Igbo people in the East and opts to provide security for themselves.

Recent conflicts between IPOB and the federal government indicates that genuine reconciliation between the Igbo people and the federal government never happened after the Nigeria-Biafran War. However, they do not explain the attitudes of other groups within Nigeria. The Yoruba, for example, were on the federal government’s side during the Nigeria-Biafran War, but there are still calls for the establishment of the Yoruba Oduduwa Republic. Additionally, there are calls in the north for an Arewa Republic made up of Hausa-Fulani. Even in the Niger Delta there are demands for a Niger Delta Republic. The proliferation of separatist attitudes in the present speaks to a constant need to assess the lasting effects of colonialism in modern Nigeria and the inability of the federal government to provide security for Nigerian people or create any sense of national unity.

It is difficult to make value judgements on the separatist aspirations of Igbo groups given the historical persecution of Igbo people. Still, in conflicts between the federal government and separatists, it is often the micro-minorities outside of the dominating Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba that suffer the most. During the Nigeria-Biafran War, it was these groups of people—including Ijaw, Edo, and Ogoni—who were caught in-between federal and Biafran forces and endured atrocities at the hands of both. The solution to separatism in Nigeria cannot be the redrawing of borders, as this would likely lead to bloody, protracted conflict. Instead, the Nigerian state needs to actively reckon with its past, particularly the events of the Nigeria-Biafran War, and most importantly center the accounts of micro-minority groups. The federal government’s sanitization and censorship of the war cannot be the answer, but neither can unbridled Igbo nostalgia for Biafra. Both ideologies harm the people in the middle, which is why any serious attempt at reconciliation should begin with their stories.

How UN Support for Insider Mediation Could Be a Breakthrough in the Kivu Conflict

June 29, 2022 by Ishmael Maxwell

Map of Nord-Kivu (North Kivu) and Sud-Kivu (South Kivu) and the surrounding region. Photo Credit: The Advocacy Project, used under Creative Commons.

For over twenty years, the North and South Kivu Regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been embroiled in violence. The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has been active in North and South Kivu since early in the conflict. Still, the mission has failed to fulfil its mandate of bringing stability to the region. MONUSCO facilitated numerous ceasefire and peace agreements, which were all quickly violated, allowing conflict to resume. While the UN security council unanimously voted to extend MONUSCO’s mandate through 2022, there is mounting pressure to draw down the mission and shift towards supporting local peacebuilding efforts, including insider mediation. Prioritising insider mediation and local ownership over the peace process is critical to building sustainable peace in North and South Kivu. The UN mission can best contribute to peacemaking by shifting from its role as chief-facilitator to serving as an interlocutor between local mediators and elites, linking local and national tracks of engagement.

MONUSCO’s Involvement in North and South Kivu

The strategic priorities of MONUSCO’s mandate are to protect civilians and support stabilisation by strengthening state institutions. Towards these ends, the UN has acted as a mediator and negotiator in various peace agreements throughout the conflict. In 1999, the UN mediated the Lusaka Agreement, which sought to end the Second Congo War. In 2008, a new rebellion led by the National Council for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in North Kivu shifted MONUSCO’s attention to the east of the DRC, where it helped facilitate peace agreements at the 2009 Goma Conference. In 2012, a second rebellion in the region, carried out by M23, almost entirely shifted MONUSCO’s focus to the North Kivu region and led to further ceasefire agreements. However, each of these agreements quickly failed, in part, because of several crucial strategic mistakes by MONUSCO.

First, MONUSCO’s political efforts have generally been secondary to its military operations in North and South Kivu. The mission is the largest in the world, comprised of over 16,000 soldiers and police and costing over $1 billion a year. Despite the original strategic objectives of the mission remaining in place, its primary directive since 2013 has been to “neutralise armed groups.” Instead of protecting citizens, these efforts have further displaced Hutu populations, creating an even more perilous environment for locals.

Second, MONUSCO has acted firmly on behalf of the Congolese government, undermining its legitimacy as a neutral mediator. Impartiality is seen as a core strength of outside mediators and a traditional principle of peacekeeping, but MONUSCO has undertaken offensives against militant groups in cooperation with the government. The Congolese government has a notorious track record of human rights abuses and, by acting jointly with its military, MONUSCO has made itself complicit in these activities.

Finally, the peace agreements and political activities which MONUSCO has facilitated have been top-down and elite-driven, without attention to building sustainable peace or consulting local populations. Instead of addressing the concerns of local populations, the UN has sought to diagnose the roots of the conflict itself, primarily viewing the elimination of militant groups as the key to peace. Consequently, polls in North Kivu reveal that, according to local sentiment, MONUSCO “generally fails to protect civilians” and “peacekeepers are distant from and disrespectful towards local civilians.” Therefore, the mission has not obtained the consent of all parties, which is another core peacekeeping principle. Militant groups, in contrast, have embedded themselves in local communities, taking advantage of communal conflict and continued instability to win support.

Insider Mediation in the Kivu conflict

While MONUSCO has undermined its mediation efforts through partisanship, elitism, and the use of force, inside mediators have made significant contributions to facilitating dialogue, building social cohesion, and establishing the environment for formal peace talks. Insider mediation is defined by cultural and experiential closeness between the groups in conflict and the mediator. Essentially, inside mediators have close relationships to conflict parties and deep knowledge of the conflict dynamics, crucial elements of conflict transformation.

Inside mediators are especially effective in the DRC, which is a weak state. Without the presence of a functioning state apparatus inside, mediators have gained trust through personal relationships, not “official” titles, which are often seen as indicators of corruption. CIDDHOPE, a local mediation organisation, is seen as a trusted alternative to corrupt courts in resolving land disputes. MONUSCO’s focus on militant groups has caused it to overlook local disputes as a source of violence. CIDDHOPE and other organisations rooted in communities possess a deeper understanding of which local disagreements can balloon into larger conflicts.

Furthermore, inside mediators in the Eastern Congo maintain communities’ sense of ownership over conflicts while also viewing their work as part of a long-term process. The RHA, a mediation organisation in the Ituri region, does not propose solutions to local conflicts. Instead, they clarify each party’s interests and ensure they are operating under the same premises. Furthermore, unlike MONUSCO and other outside mediators who seek to make specific mediation interventions, RHA remains involved in disputes over a long period of time. This method seeks to not only reduce violence but fundamentally change relationships and behaviours in communities with the goal of sustained peace.

Outlook for MONUSCO in North and South Kivu

While the UN’s years of engagement in North and South Kivu have not brought an end to violence, MONUSCO can still play a crucial role in the region as a supporter of grassroots efforts and as an interlocutor between local and national tracks of engagement. In Resolution 2612, which extended MONUSCO’s mandate in the region, the UN indicated a shift towards this kind of engagement. However, each of its commitments fall short of what is required for sustainable peace.

First, while the resolution lowered MONUSCO’s troop ceiling, the act was largely symbolic as the maximum number of authorised troops was only lowered from 14,000 to 13,500. In cases of UN peacekeeping successes – such as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala – the role of the UN was sometimes minimal, but UN actions were always directed towards the goal of reaching a mediated settlement. MONUSCO’s use of force detracts from achieving that goal.

Second, the resolution recognized the importance of local-level mediation and committed MONUSCO to engaging and facilitating such efforts. However, supporting inside mediators through funding and research may be more effective than directly facilitating negotiations. International actors are already assuming these supportive roles in the Kivu conflict. The Netherlands’ primary development agency, GIZ, is funding an insider mediation project in North Kivu and Rwanda’s Bugesera District, supporting 90 inside mediators in the two regions. MONUSCO would be more effective in this indirect role, providing predictable long-term support for grassroots mediation projects.

Finally, the resolution stated that MONUSCO will play a role in national and local dialogues. However, MONUSCO must not only be involved in both levels of dialogue, but play the role of interlocutor between these tracks of engagement. While inside mediators can build social cohesion in local communities, they do not have the capacity or influence to generalise their work to make a systemic impact in the region as a whole. Inside mediation must be part of an interconnected, multi-pronged approach to peacekeeping in the DRC that also includes national, Track 1 negotiations. By acting as an interlocutor between these dialogues, MONUSCO can provide local mediators influence with elites that would otherwise be beyond their reach and elites with effective strategies produced by local mediators to inform the broader peace process.

Summary

Ultimately, MONUSCO’s mission in Kivu – and the DRC more broadly – has been impeded by an overemphasis on top-down peace agreements, joint action with the Congolese government, and offensives against militant groups. In contrast, inside mediation efforts have successfully built sustainable peace in local communities. By reducing its military presence, supporting insider mediation initiatives, and acting as an interlocutor between local and national tracks of engagement, MONUSCO can reorient towards its original goals of protecting civilizations and supporting stabilisation.

Strife Series: Modern Conflict & Atrocity Prevention in Africa – Introduction

June 28, 2022 by Langdon Ogburn

United Nations Peacekeepers Assist with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in DRC / Photo Credit: United Nations Photo, licensed under Creative Commons

Over the past year, the humanitarian consequences of conflict and atrocities have been consistently visible. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Western-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, millions of Afghans are experiencing acute hunger and starvation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been riddled with evidence of war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, sexual-based violence, torture, and looting. Evidence of ethnic cleansing is being reported in Ethiopia’s Tigray region—a consequence of the recent civil war in the country. Further, any near-term solutions to these humanitarian crises seem almost wholly out of grasp.

These events support a belief commonly espoused by advocates of conflict and atrocity prevention—that the best way to minimize the human suffering experienced during conflict and atrocities is to ensure that they never happen in the first place.

Conflict and atrocities are far from exclusive to the African continent. They have been historically prevalent and continue to occur in every geographic region in the world. However, the emphasis on conflict and atrocity prevention that has taken place over the past few decades on the African continent is unparalleled in any other region.

Conflict resolution and peace have been key objectives of the African Union since its conception, leading to heavy investment in conflict early warning systems and peacebuilding activities. Globally, half of the twelve active UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa, and 57 have been previously completed within the continent.

This emphasis entails that there is much to be learned about conflict and atrocity prevention from the efforts that have been taken in Africa. This series aims to analyze these efforts to understand their success, failures, and how they can be improved. By doing so, we hope to add to the discussion on how conflict and atrocity can be prevented throughout the world.

The Series

Part 1: Ishmael Maxwell contrasts the actions of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with insider mediation efforts, and outlines the opportunity for MUNUSCO to support these initiatives.

Part 2: Christopher Heber examines the consequences that national memory and narrative play in continuing separatists’ efforts in Nigeria and how these narratives can be transformed to promote national unity.

Part 3: In the wake of several recent coups in Western Africa, Ryan Johnson reflects on the concept of “coup-proofing” and how the structure of Gabon’s security sector has aided the country in avoiding successful coup attempts.

Part 4: I will discuss the extensive existing conflict early warning system infrastructure on the African continent and how it can be leveraged to prevent climate-change driven conflict.