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The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: a distorted reality

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2000 years ago, two great civilizations dominated each ends of the ancient Silk Road.

At its most Eastern point was China’s Han dynasty, which knew very little of the other mysterious empire that controlled the Silk Road’s Western tip. Chinese people referred to this empire as “Da Qin,” and they thought of it as a sort of “counter-China” which sat at the other end of the world. Today we know that what the Chinese people called “Da Qin” was in fact nothing but the mighty Roman Empire. The story goes that in the year 97 A.D., Chinese ambassador Kan Ying embarked on a journey through the arid steppes of Central Asia to pay a visit to Rome, carrying lavish gifts for its Roman rulers.

Today, that ancient Silk Road has been revived under the name of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his intention to build a modern-day adaptation of these trade routes, giving life to a network of railways, ports, pipelines, power grids and highways that will once again carry goods and ideas between East and West. In this vision, China and Italy could once again become the two powers sitting at the opposite ends of the Silk Road.

In March 2019, President Xi embarked on a three-day state visit to Italy, which today is less a Mediterranean spanning empire and more of a fatigued country saddled with massive debt. In addition, unlike Chinese ambassador Kan Ying, this time President Xi Jinping did not carry lavish gifts for the Roman rulers, but a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Italy to join the Belt and Road Initiative. This was officially signed on March 23.

Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons

That Italy, a member of the G7 and a founding member of both the EU and NATO, embraced China’s Belt and Road Initiative was perceived as a major blow to its traditional Western allies. At a time when the US and China were locked in a bitter trade war which saw Washington and Beijing imposing tit-for-tat tariffs and EU leaders emphasizing the need for a common strategy towards China, Rome’s formal endorsement for the BRI raised concerns that Italy could become the entry point for Chinese influence in Europe.

Various media outlets claimed that Italy “was playing with fire”, and the US depicted the country as “the European weak link in the power struggle with China”. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also warned that Beijing would take advantage of Rome, recalling the common assumption that the BRI only plays in China’s favor, and that countries that will be unable to repay generous Chinese loans will eventually fall into the so-called “debt trap”. And, because the MoU would grant a Chinese state-owned company access to various Italian ports, including Genova and Trieste, in 2019 many claimed that Italy would eventually cede its national assets to Beijing.

An article from The New York Times quickly inflated this narrative and painted a stark picture of Trieste being “invaded” by an army of deep-pocketed Chinese people: “To walk through Trieste is to witness how the city has already opened to China” – the article reads in a prophetic tone – “Chinese tourists shop for the city’s trademark Illy coffee and take pictures with their Huawei phones of the elegant Caffé Degli Specchi”. As the article continues, “most significant, construction workers in scuba gear have been laying foundations near the site where a new pier is expected to become China’s home in the industrial port.” In the imaginary of the Times, the idea that China could soon control major Italian national assets loomed large. Yet, two years since the controversial signing of the MoU, the obvious question is: have these prophecies come about? The answer is no.

First, it should be noted that most of the agreements signed by Italy and China were largely expressions of intention, which never really came to reality.

After March 2019 Beijing had to learn a hard lesson: dealing with Italy’s schizophrenic, unpredictable, and unreliable political system is no easy task. When the MoU for the BRI was first signed, Italy was governed by the Five-Star Movement (5SM) and the far-right League, a dysfunctional and populist coalition that favored a new partnership with Beijing. This coalition also rejected Italy’s traditional Western alliances and was largely anti-EU and anti-establishment. However, this government was quickly replaced by a new coalition that re-positioned Italy back into its traditional alliance system. This approach was then reinforced by yet another change of government in 2021, when Prime Minister Mario Draghi emphasized that his new administration was “strongly pro-European and Atlanticist.” This political roller coaster essentially proved that Rome’s position towards the BRI can virtually change at any time.

In addition, the continuing US-China trade war and the growing tension around Italy’s endorsement for the BRI in 2019 might have eventually influenced Italy’s decision-makers, prompting them to choose different partners. In Trieste, where, according to the New York Times, to walk through the city is “to witness how the city has already opened to China,” the port infrastructure project was eventually contracted not by China Communication Construction Company (CCCC), but by Germany’s Hafen and Logistik.

It is also important to highlight that many concerns on Italy falling into a “debt trap” had little supporting evidence. Both Italian and European legal frameworks limit the ability of foreign companies to acquire assets in country’s vital sectors. In particular, the Italian government can also appeal to the so-called “Golden Power” regulation, a special rule introduced in 2012 and reviewed in 2020 by which the Italian government can decide to stop foreign direct investment when it goes against the national interest. This means that there was virtually no possibility to cede control of Italian ports to a Chinese organisation.

Finally, what is often ignored is that Chinese investment would have been limited to very specific projects: China’s collaboration would not be focused directly on the entire ports of Genova and Trieste – rather, in Genova, CCCC would have invested in the construction of a new breakwater dam, while in Trieste the company would have been involved in the construction of railway stations and rail connections. These considerations seem to suggest that fears over Chinese investments in Italian infrastructure have often been exaggerated by media outlets and political figures. Also, they stemmed from a general mistrust towards China’s BRI, rather than from any thorough analysis. Stating that “to walk through Trieste is to witness how the city has already opened to China” is a form of sensationalism that actively distorts reality.

Russia’s 2021 State Duma Elections: A sham vote but with signs pointing to possible future change

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Russia’s recent elections were the most repressive of the past twenty-one years, marred by ballot stuffing (©Gwydion M. Williams, 2011; CC BY 2.0 license).

National elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the lower chamber of Russia’s bicameral parliamentary system, were recently held across a three-day voting period from the 17th to the 19th of September. The result was entirely predictable: an apparently resounding victory for Vladimir Putin’s party United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya).

The final count recorded that United Russia took 49.8% of the vote. The nearest rival was the Communist Party which attained a 19% share of the ballots. Following them were the confusingly named ultra-nationalist ‘Liberal Democratic Party of Russia’  (LDPR) on 7.5%, ‘A Just Russia’ on 7.4%, and ‘New People’ on 5.3%, a new party taking part in the elections for the first time.

The Communists, LDPR, and ‘A Just Russia’ are generally considered to be pro-Putin and part of the ‘systemic opposition’ in Russia that allows the simulation of pluralism in the country. New People, meanwhile, advocate the liberal reforms popular among supporters of the jailed opposition leader and Putin-critic Alexei Navalny but without directly attacking Putin, suggesting they are potentially a ‘synthetic party’ convened by Putin’s lackeys to take votes away from the genuine, ‘non-systemic’ opposition.

Such efforts to secure Putin’s dominance show how Russia’s elections have become increasingly uncompetitive over the 21st century, with allegations of vote-rigging and voter coercion always common. However, in 2021, measures to supress the opposition reached new heights both before and during the voting period.

In the build-up to the elections, civil society came under a renewed and vicious assault from the authorities. This included both targeted and mass arrests of protestors following Navalny’s imprisonment in January and many genuine opposition candidates being barred from standing. The rationale behind this new wave of oppression rested on the simple fact that United Russia has become increasingly unpopular in recent times, particularly following the government’s poor performance during the pandemic and allegations of corruption against key party figures, seeing it reach levels as low as 30% in opinion polls.

Opposition leader Alexei Navalny, pictured here in 2017, observed the elections from a prison cell following his arrest earlier this year by the security services upon his return to Russia. Navalny was flying home from Germany, where he had been receiving treatment for a near-fatal poisoning which the Russia state is highly suspected of having perpetrated (Evgeny Feldman, 2017; CC BY-SA 4.0 license).

The elections themselves, meanwhile, were marred by ballot stuffing and an absence of foreign observers. A new online voting system was introduced this year, partially in response to covid, which enabled the security services to monitor voting behaviour and intimidate reluctant state employees to cast their ballot for United Russia. Meanwhile, team Navalny’s tactical or ‘smart’-voting initiative, an app that recommended to voters the most viable non-United Russia candidate in their district to vote for, was blocked by the authorities; Apple and Google both removed the app from their online stores leading to criticism from Navalny’s allies. Yet despite Putin maintaining his two-thirds supermajority in the State Duma, which is required to make constitutional changes such as to limits on presidential terms, there are signs that we may see change in Russia one day.

Though United Russia won, the political capital expended by Putin to win the election, necessitated by the party’s sheer unpopularity, has cost the ruling regime in terms of legitimacy. Meanwhile, even with the use of exceptionally repressive measures, the political technologists of United Russia could not prevent a 4.4% drop in its share of the vote. Furthermore, while the path to extending Putin’s rule beyond 2024 has been secured, as senior RFE/RL correspondent Robert Coalson has said, it is difficult to see how the Kremlin can hold another similar vote, such as in the upcoming 2024 presidential election, having now so thoroughly discredited any remaining democratic credentials it had. While in the last presidential vote of 2018 selected Kremlin-approved liberal opposition candidates were allowed to run, in order to create the impression of a competitive election, no liberal opposition candidate will be willing to stand in such blatantly fraudulent elections. And without the ability to simulate democracy, Putin’s legitimacy and position is at the very least made slightly more uncertain.

There are also signs that the once pliant systemic opposition may be willing to challenge the regime. The Communists, who were long considered a fairly toothless pro-Putin party, have on the back of gaining fifteen seats and increasing their vote share by 6%, been emboldened. Their leader, Gennady Zyuganov has accused the Kremlin of perpetrating a litany of electoral violations, among them ballot stuffing. Some Communists have since come out onto the streets to protest the election results, claiming they were cheated of victory by state interference with the online voting system.

The Kremlin of course denies these allegations, calling the elections a ‘free and fair’ vote. The regime has even sought to deflect these accusations, with former president and Security Council deputy chief Dmitri Medvedev suggesting it may launch a ‘probe’ into supposed US interference in Russia’s political system.

Nevertheless, despite such bluster, the Kremlin must now be aware that through its actions during 2021’s vote it has limited its options via which to claim legitimacy, a development that further down the line could have serious consequences to Putin’s grip on power. Certainly, it cannot be denied that political apathy does remain high in Russia which suits the regime. However, if in 2024 Putin does try to remain in power, as many expect him to do, there are reasons to tentatively predict a political re-awakening in Russia. As Vladimir Kara-Murza says, the continued claim to legitimacy via rigged votes by the ever-present president may prove to be an insult too far to the dignity of Russian voters and 2024 has the potential to become another decisive moment of revolutionary political change in modern Russian history alongside 1917 and 1991.

Feminist Foreign Policy and South Asia: A scuffle between values and change

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Nepalese Battalion received UN Medal.
Photo Credit: United Nations, licensed under Creative Commons.

‘The personal is political.’

The above sentence, coined by Carol Hanisch, encapsulates a simple yet pervasive truth about women and their struggles. Women’s lives in the public domain have for a long time been affected directly by gendered power hierarchies and beliefs. Their participation and inclusion in the public domain are determined by the norms and beliefs laid out in the society. However, this politics of domination and subjugation do not exist only in the public domain but also affect the personal lives of people. Personal spaces and family lives are governed by gendered notions that put men in a higher pedestal than women. The personal and political are intrinsically linked, for one, the values imbibed in the personal also influence the political behaviour of women.

South Asian women, have been historically marginalised and excluded from active participation in the political sphere. In recent times, multiple developmental programs have attempted to decrease the regional gender gap in education, employment and political participation by focusing on women centric development, however, the Global Gender Gap Report 2020, highlights that South Asia has the second largest gender gap among the eight other regions of the world.

The gender gap, visible in the education, social and employment sector, is also reflected in the foreign policy and diplomatic decisions of the countries in the region. Female representation remains scarce in important positions in the international arena. Diplomacy as such is a gender-neutral term that does not differentiate between male and female participants, however, the hierarchies established in these societies makes it a male-dominant field. Without proper representation of female voices remain unheard and neglected in internal and international spaces. Female political agency in most South Asian countries is scarce. Female parliamentarians make up only 13% of parliamentarians in India, 21 % in Bangladesh, and Nepal tops the list with women comprising 33.5 % of the federal parliament. Though these statistics show a considerable improvement from previous years , they are not proportional to the female population living in these countries.

Despite improvement in terms of the political representation of women in various South Asian countries, ground level problems remain which need to be addressed to ensure feminist outlooks are taken into context when making international decisions. Complex patriarchal power structures in these countries limit the participation of women. In Nepal, for example, the 2015 constitution prevents women from providing their child with the right to citizenship. The only parent able to confer Nepalese citizenship is a ‘male’ member of society. This prejudicial notion limits women’s participation in society. Their participation becomes directly linked to a male member of society and they their roles are confined as just daughters and wives This limitation in role also manifests in the political decision-making process in times of war and conflict where a similar binary between the genders is adopted, labelling men as the protectors while women are the objects that are need of protection.

In a similar vein, in India, through protests like that of Shaheen Bagh, political representation and inclusivity has improved , with more women asserting themselves in the public sphere. However, international and diplomatic decision-making persists in excluding women from senior positions. As Khullar highlights, a false hard-soft diplomatic dichotomy has been created where defence, military, power and security are reserved as male domains and diplomatic decision-making surrounding topics of international trafficking, migration, women empowerment and human rights are labelled as soft-domains. An outlook that women rely on emotions and focus on soft-issues is still prevalent in many countries in the region and women ministers are often assigned positions based on the same assumption while diplomatic decision-making remain dominated by male leaders. Therefore, the diplomatic and foreign policy structure that has been monopolised by men does not allow space for feminist voices.

Allowing women more representation not just in internal but also international politics will open up new avenues for countries to make way for a more inclusive society. A feminist foreign policy will ensure that women who are confined to the domestic spheres are also represented in the decision-making process. A feminist foreign policy (FFP) agenda can act as a fresh perspective and opportunity to view war and peace from a different lens. FFP emphasises that gender is not an accidental but an intrinsic part of military, economic and diplomatic relations between nations. It allows countries to develop a holistic outlook towards decision-making in the international security arena by incorporating the voices of women and other marginalised communities.

Women’s issues in many societies are viewed through a cultural lens of culture while issues surrounding men are considered political. These traditional notions bar women from being active participants in the political arena. The responsibility to protect and various international agendas are also used patriarchal tools to advance strategic interests in interventionist wars across the world where men are responsible for the protection of women. In the light of this underrepresentation and exclusion from the mainstream international agenda, the inclusion of women in negotiation tables and their decisions should be taken into consideration. Hearing the voices of people from traditionally underrepresented groups in society will shed light upon the intersectional impact of any decision-making process.

The war-peace dichotomy, a fixture of traditional foreign policy, can be overcome by addressing issues surrounding migration, border policing and increased securitisation through a feminist lens. South Asia has an admirable history in terms of women residing in positions of power with Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal electing female leaders. However, despite such headline progress women in parts of South Asia are still subjected to discriminatory practices and are excluded from social and political participation. Adopting a feminist foreign policy in such a situation will allow countries in South Asia to assert their commitment to gender equality by addressing intersectional issues in both internal and international arena. Commitment towards a feminist foreign policy can also impact the global standing of countries and can help strengthen diplomatic ties.

Belarus: Rogue State

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A squadron of heavily equipped riot police face an anti-government protestor holding the red-and-white flag of the opposition in the Belarusian capital Minsk (©Jana Shnipelson, 2020, used with permission).

In recent times, the Republic of Belarus has captured the world’s attention for its transformation, into what many now describe as a fully-fledged ‘rogue state’. In the last two years Belarus has morphed from a once largely stable, albeit authoritarian, state, to one of the most pressing threats to peace and order in Europe. The Belarusian government, led since 1994 by the dictatorial Aleksandr Lukashenka, has become increasingly violent and repressive in response to the opposition protest movement that emerged following Lukashenka’s victory in rigged-elections in August 2020 –  which many consider to have truly been won by the exiled leader of the Belarusian opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

Since August 2020, the Belarusian security services have exacted a brutal crackdown on protestors and freedom of expression; 35,000 are thought to have been arrested while 150,000 have fled to neighbouring Ukraine, as the Lukashenka government tries to cling to power. In 2021, Belarus’ piratical behaviour has escalated to new heights. Lukashenka’s government has run up the score in disturbingly reckless and vicious offences against its own citizens, targeting them both at home and, increasingly, abroad. Already accused of torturing imprisoned protestors, the security services of Belarus, still ominously known as the KGB, stunned the world when in May they redirected and grounded a Ryanair flight flying from Greece to Lithuania in order to arrest the opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich, who was travelling on-board with his girlfriend, Sofia Sapega; she was also detained. Then, at the start of August, a litany of fresh acts of brutality transpired.

The Belarusian Olympic sprinter, Krystsina Tsimanouskaya, after making non-political criticisms of the Belarusian team’s coaching staff at the 2020 Tokyo games, was ordered home by Belarusian team officials. Fearing for her safety in her home country, Tsimanouskaya sought refuge at the Tokyo Polish Embassy and fled via Vienna to Warsaw. The sprinter’s grandmother had warned her that she would not be safe upon returning to Belarus and the Olympian has since been joined in Poland by her husband. Yet even being abroad does not seem to promise guaranteed sanctuary to at-risk Belarusians.

Vitaly Shyshov, who led Belarusian House, an organisation assisting Belarusians who have fled to Ukraine, was found dead hanging from a tree with a broken nose in a Kiev park on August 3rd. While a Ukrainian police investigation is ongoing, many of Shyshov’s colleagues at Belarusian House and fellow dissidents strongly suspect the involvement of the Belarusian security services. Shyshov had previously reported being followed by strangers and Belarusian House released a statement, saying: ‘There is no doubt that this was a planned operation by security operatives to liquidate a Belarusian dangerous for the regime.’ Responding to Shyshov’s death, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who herself was forced to leave her home country, called it ‘worrying that those who flee Belarus still can’t be safe.’

Belarus’ authoritarian president Aleksandr Lukashenka who has been in power since 1994 (©Okras, 2014: under CC BY-SA 4.0 license).

Meanwhile, the Belarusian government has been involved with arranging clandestine flights from Iraq, smuggling refugees over and directing them across its borders into Poland and Lithuania in order to create a local migration crisis; Warsaw accuses Minsk of weaponizing migration like this in retaliation to Poland’s granting of asylum to the sprinter Tsimanouskaya. Such brazen acts, committed with complete disregard for human life, to achieve cynical political goals leave analysts at a loss as to how to understand the Belarusian government. Belarus expert Andrew Wilson has put forward the ‘madman theory’ of foreign policy, ‘according to which unpredictability and rash behaviour are actually an asset, unsettling opponents and even allies’,  to rationalise the strategies employed by Aleksandr Lukashenka.

By making Belarus impossible to predict, Lukashenka intends to catch his opponents off-guard. The package of economic sanctions brought against Belarus by the EU in June were designed to force Lukashenka to relax his aggression. Yet Belarus has only escalated its maniacal behaviours, suddenly exiting the Eastern Partnership with the EU which had been in place since 2009 in June.

Belarus’ spiralling behaviour poses a serious challenge to the West. Sanctions have as yet failed to achieve the desired results. Wilson posits that Belarus’ leaders may in the future resort to aggressive economic takeovers of national financial assets in order to bankroll the regime. Meanwhile, the City of London must come under greater scrutiny, with the Belarusian opposition calling for investigations as to whether the Belarusian state is already benefitting from bonds and money raised in UK markets.

The picture remains unclear as to how long Lukashenka’s regime can last. However, so far it has succeeded in hanging on to power by whatever means it deems necessary, and so long as Russia’s problems with civil unrest persist, Moscow will look to back its ally in Minsk. The threat that Belarus might escalate its behaviour further needs to be taken seriously by Western leaders, from whom Tsikhanouskaya is currently seeking support, and they must take further coordinated actions to end Lukashenka’s increasingly international reign of terror.

Military Mayhem in Myanmar: the end of a democratic experiment

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A group of monks walk in the streets of Yangoon, Myanmar’s largest city. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons.

On February 1st 2021 a coup d’état ended Myanmar’s decade-long experiment with democracy, ushering back in the ruthless military rule of the Tatmadaw. Since then, the “lady of Myanmar,” Aung San Suu Kyi, who became an icon for democracy after spending 15 years under house arrest, has been detained in an unknown location. She now faces various charges, including the possession of illegal walkie-talkies – an obvious pretext intended to keep her away from Myanmar’s political scene. Meanwhile, under the blazing sun of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw has re-established its reign of terror. Security forces have killed hundreds of opponents and injured thousands more. Authorities have also suspended most television programs and blocked access to Facebook and other social media sites.

Myanmar’s coup d’état has significant domestic and regional implications. Internally, historical ethnic divisions have seemingly softened, and formerly divided actors are now uniting against a common foe – the Tatmadaw. Regionally, the coup is sowing uncertainty throughout Myanmar’s neighboring countries, with serious consequences in two particular domains: first, the ASEAN bloc; second, China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Ethnic minorities and the Bamar majority

 Squeezed between India and China, Myanmar is a melting pot of cultures that counts more than 135 ethnic groups within its territory, with Buddhism being the dominant religion.
Since 1962, Myanmar’s ethnic division was cleverly exploited by Tatmadaw military forces as a tool to legitimize their rule. According to their distorted narrative, a military regime is necessary to defend Myanmar from the enemies of the nation, which consist of a cabal of ethnic minorities claiming autonomy and undermining national unity. Thus, in the Tatmadaw’s words, the military forces are the real guardians of the Buddhist nation of Myanmar.

The reality is quite different. The military rule has merely instrumentalized Myanmar’s ethnic diversity in order to cling to power. The mastermind of the February coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is widely known for commanding the extermination of entire villages belonging to various ethnic minority groups such as the Shan and the Kokang, and for authorizing the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims. In such a fragmented reality, the Tatmadaw has always feared an alliance between the Bamar majority, which mainly inhabits the country’s heartlands, and ethnic minority groups, who largely inhabit border areas. Such an alliance could in fact lead the civilian population to unite against the military, undermining their rule.

Today, in the mountainous periphery of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw’s worst nightmare is coming true.

In the frontier regions, groups of armed ethnic minorities have been fighting for autonomy for decades, for them, the military brutality that Bamar anti-coup protesters have experienced since February is nothing but a continuation of the same oppression they have been enduring for decades. In this sense, ethnic minorities provide important insights on the best tactics to fight against the Tatmadaw. Thus, since February, anti-coup protesters, namely members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), have fled to the mountainous periphery of Myanmar to collaborate with ethnic armed groups. Thousands of activists are now learning from these resistance groups how to load a rifle, throw hand grenades, and assemble firebombs, de facto transforming into a guerrilla force.

People like Nerdah Bo Mya, a member of the Karen National Union (KNU) – the oldest rebel group which protects the Karen ethnic minority – are showing their solidarity to Bamar anti-coup protesters. “We have heart for these kind of people, because we have gone through this ourselves and we know what kind of pain, what kind of suffering… what kind of atrocities they’re going through, so we can put ourselves in their shoes”, said Nerdah. Similarly, many among the Bamar population are now apologizing on social media for not acknowledging the minorities’ experience of repression over the past years. The military coup has now clearly revealed to the Bamar population the real extent of Tatmadaw’s brutality, leading Myanmar’s majority to soul-search and change their perspective towards ethnic minorities.

Thus, for now, the Bamar population and ethnic minorities are united against the military regime, with both parties applying the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” leaving aside old tensions to fight against a common foe. However, looking to the future, doubts arise. Although this newly-emerged unity represents a great leap forward in Myanmar’s fractured social reality, the Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities seemingly have different plans for Myanmar’s future. Anti-coup protestors want democracy under Suu Kyi, while minorities want self-determination and autonomy, thereby leaving many questions unanswered.

A Kayan woman, a sub-group of the Karen people. Women are known for wearing neck rings as part of their cultural identity. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons.

The ASEAN bloc

At a regional level, the reaction to the military coup appears slow and limited. Like never before, Myanmar’s crisis has exposed an uncomfortable truth about ASEAN: the bloc is unable to reach a cohesive response to any common problem.

On one side, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have criticized the use of violence against Myanmar’s civil society. On the other side, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam have remained largely silent, which does not come as a surprise, considering that Thailand’s prime minister himself gained power after a coup in 2014. Even worse, ASEAN recently invited the mastermind of the coup itself, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, to their official summit in Jakarta. Thus, not only did ASEAN not show any effective response, such as suspending Myanmar’s membership, but it also indirectly legitimized Myanmar’s brutal generals. In addition, after Western states applied several sanctions on trade to punish the military regime, ASEAN members undermined these efforts by continuing to trade with Myanmar. Injecting billions of dollars of investment into Tatmadaw’s business empire, they are helping to cement a de facto military-oligarchic ruling class. Paralyzed in a permanent state of indecision, ASEAN is now facing the prospect of a civil war in one of its member countries, with the potential of a disastrous regional spillover effect. And on top of this, its coordinating power is inevitably losing credibility in front of the international community.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative

The military coup has also posed serious threats to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Before, Beijing had closely collaborated with Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic parliament, signing various contracts for future projects in Myanmar. In 2017, the two governments agreed to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor agreement (CMED), which included various infrastructure projects that were intended to revitalize Myanmar’s economy, while providing China with a land route to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. This would diminish Beijing’s over-reliance on the Strait of Malacca for oil and gas imports. Now, some analysts believe that these projects will be delayed due to Myanmar’s instability.

Conclusion

Only time will tell what the future holds for Myanmar. But there is no doubt that the military coup has unleashed a sequence of effects that will have impacts not only inside the country but also across the region. On one side, the coup offers opportunities for domestic social cohesion. On the other side, it represents a testing time for the ASEAN bloc and significant instability for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.