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EU Migration Mismanagement: Canary Islands the new Lesbos?

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by Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell

Hundreds of migrants crammed in unseaworthy boats.
Source: Council of Europe

Migrants embarking in unseaworthy boats from Northern and Western African shores or making arduous overland journeys on foot from Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria or Afghanistan, to reach Europe demonstrate the harsh reality of irregular migration. These movements are normally prompted by the perilous circumstances such as wars, ethnical violence or scarcity of essential resources affecting their home countries.

In addition to their tough past and uncertain future, many migrants find themselves alone and vulnerable in foreign lands, often enduring dangerous, inhumane, and degrading circumstances caused by governmental policies where they arrive. For its part, the EU continues to turn a blind eye to the humanitarian issues underlying such migratory movements, focusing mainly on the associated security and logistical matters. This failure to give help where it is most needed is causing extreme suffering at its borders, proving the lack of empathy and solidarity of EU migration laws and regulations towards the arrivals.

The EU aims to show on occasions, the apparent importance it places on safeguarding migrants, leading the European population to believe its actions are sufficient. Germany´s decision in 2019 to take in vulnerable refugees through the European Resettlement Programme, and the provision of EU aid to Turkey to support refugees escaping from Syria, are just some examples. Both overtures initially appear altruistic; yet closer examination reveals they are, by all accounts, insufficient. In March 2020, when the unsustainable situation in Turkey led it to threaten to allow migrants to cross the border into Greece, the EU acted swiftly by providing aid to Greece to seal its Turkish borders.  This response was not born from a spirit of goodwill and solidarity; as expected, the EU was simply trying to secure its borders to prevent a reignition of the 2015 crisis. Likewise, the response from other powerful European actors, such as the UK and France, to the plight of migrants has been begrudging at best, and shameful at worst, as exemplified by the recent drownings in the English Channel.

Such a lacklustre response is a deeply controversial issue as the EU aims to protect the interests of all Europeans by ensuring their safety and economic growth; but it fails to do enough for the displaced, asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants. The EU is, in effect, preventing genuine refugees from seeking asylum through laws that disregard outsiders by complicating and slowing down such processes, as dictated, for instance, by the Dublin Regulation. Such law, only permits refugees to seek asylum in the country where they arrive, leaving many without protection since the receiving countries, such as Greece, Italy, Malta or Spain, are overwhelmed. Furthermore, through such laws, refugees are being denied their right to freely choose where to live. Denying such protection and freedom is in breach of the human rights upheld by international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, and the 1990 Migrant Workers Convention. This insular and nationalistic approach is dehumanising the lives of those escaping from wars, genocides, terrorist regimes, and the effects of climate change in order to find a place where they can live, instead of remaining in one where they are simply trying to survive.

To confront African migration, the EU is seeking to establish Migration Agreements with third countries in Northern Africa, the ultimate territorial border before the Mediterranean and, hence, European waters. The strong relationship established with Morocco attests to this. Since the 1990s, a series of bilateral re-admission agreements have been signed between Morocco and Spain to cooperate in the control of irregular migration. This cooperation was later complemented by FRONTEX, the EU External Border Agency. In 2013, a new tool was put forward to North African countries as part of the EU Global Approach to Migration. This ‘Mobility Partnerships Facility’, a “long-term framework based on political dialogue and operational cooperation” for collaboration on migration, was accepted by Morocco and Tunisia. Although certain aspects have not yet been finalised, including the controversial readmission issue of third-country nationals (TCN), its implications are visible: higher securitization, and stricter border controls.

West African Maritime Route.
Source: International Organization for Migration

What sounds like a great step forward in helping Morocco to manage the large influx of migrants is, in reality, just shifting part of the migratory issue from the north of Morocco to the south and west, and to southern Sub-Saharan countries such as Senegal, Gambia, and Mauritania, where less control exists. Thus, migrants seeking a better life in Europe now view the more dangerous West African Maritime route, crossing to Spain’s Canary Islands from Africa’s Western Coast, as their only viable option. This is a route that has witnessed over five hundred deaths in 2020, a figure which is likely much higher as not all shipwrecks are reported. Despite the patrols between the archipelago and the African coast, the abundancy of boats has overwhelmed the islands’ rescue and humanitarian services.

As a result, the Canary Islands are currently suffering a  humanitarian emergency and Europe is once again ignoring  another migratory issue affecting its southern border. Migrant arrivals in Spain’s Canary Islands are at their highest level in over a decade. Although the number of migrants arriving in Spain via the Mediterranean Sea has decreased by fifty per cent versus 2019, arrivals in the Canaries have increased by more than a thousand per cent. These are shocking numbers, but they fail to reflect the reality of the harsh journey as one in every sixteen migrants who embarks upon this gruelling journey dies along the way. For example, on 24 October 2020, a boat caught fire off the coast of Senegal and almost all of its 140 occupants drowned.

Problems do not end upon reaching land as Canary Island authorities lack the capacity to manage the enormous influx of migrants. Gran Canaria is the island feeling the heaviest toll, with its reception centres full and over two-thousand people at a time forced to camp on the dockside in the port of Arguineguin. Concurrently, this humanitarian crisis is impeding the maintenance of coronavirus prevention measures, putting at risk the lives of migrants and those involved in their rescue and care. Moreover, due to tedious bureaucratic and legal procedures, further hampered by COVID-19, these migrants are facing another deadlock as the Spanish government has hindered their transfer to other Spanish regions to prevent the establishment of a new migratory route into Europe. This, together with the closure of African countries’ borders due to the pandemic, is effectively converting the islands into an open-air prison for the 18,000 freedom-seekers currently being held on them, mirroring the appalling situation on the Greek island of Lesbos.

The Spanish Government and the EU both believe that protection should only be provided to those who have the right to it and those who comply with the Dublin Regulation. A study on arrivals in the Canary Islands completed by the UN Refugee Agency in 2020 revealed that over sixty-two per cent were escaping from generalised, gender-based, ethnic, religious or political violence, hence having the right to seek asylum; therefore, Spain and the EU are duty-bound to come to their aid. Nevertheless, there are also, the so-called economic migrants, escaping from the hardship exacerbated by COVID-19 in their home countries. This group is not entitled to international protection and such migrants are liable for deportation to their countries of origin.

To some extent, the caution shown by the Spanish authorities and the EU when handling the irregular arrivals is understandable. Whilst some are genuine refugees, striving to reach a destination where their life is not in danger, this does not assuage the fears of the Spanish government and the EU that some may be members of criminal groups, thereby endangering the security of Europe. For this reason, two measures are required: procedures that ensure protection is provided to all those entitled to it under international law; and, in parallel, the creation of safe deportation routes. Without these improvements to guarantee a dignified response, Gran Canaria risks suffering a similar humanitarian catastrophe to the one befalling Lesbos.

Although logistical processes have commenced, with migrants finally being transferred to tourist complexes unoccupied due to COVID-19, and receiving more dignified shelter, the problem remains unresolved as very few migrants are being transferred to other parts of Spain or Europe, or extradited, due to European and Spanish bureaucracy and the pandemic. Unsurprisingly, some experts suggest that a “Call Effect” has been created, as migrants encourage others to make the dangerous journey, putting further strain on the Spanish system, and placing more lives at risk. Consequently, collaboration between the EU, Spain, and African countries to address the underlying factors spurring migration in the countries of origin is the only way forward. It will not be easy, but the push factors driving migrants from Northern Africa to make the perilous voyage to Europe must be addressed to enable a more long-term solution than the piecemeal efforts undertaken to date. Until such a time, the EU’s moral duty must be to offer help and support to all of those who reach its shores.

Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell is a part-time MA International Relations student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interests are around the topics of Migration, especially African migration into Europe, Gender and Human Rights. She is currently a Spanish Red Cross volunteer in the Canary Islands helping with the management of the latest influx of migrants to the islands.

Cristina is a part of the Strife Women in Writing Programme.

The Bataan Death March: The Effects and Limits of Military Socialization

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by Sam Erkiletian

American and Filipino prisoners carrying comrades during the Bataan Death –  March, 1942.
Source: United States National Archives and Records Administration

On 9 April 1942, approximately 60,000 Filipino and 15,000 beleaguered American soldiers surrendered to the Imperial Japanese 14th Army under the command of General Masaharu Homma after three months of heavy fighting across the Philippines and on the Bataan Peninsula. What followed was one of the greatest atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second World War, which was aptly named the Bataan Death March. Exhausted and malnourished Filipino and American POWs were forced to make the roughly 70-mile journey from Bataan to the American military base Camp O’Donnell without adequate medical or food supplies, all while being subjected to routine beatings, torture, and executions from their Japanese captors.[i] Approximately 7,000 to 10,000 Allied soldiers (2,330 Americans) died on the march.[ii]

The early atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers across China and in the Philippines, coupled with the perfidious nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor, solidified Allied enmity towards the Japanese and the stereotype that they were a “robotic, ferociously brainwashed people” willing to carry out any order no matter how brutal.[iii] However, a comprehensive account of the Bataan Death March reveals something puzzling—a significant number of Allied POWs received relatively humane treatment from some of their Japanese wardens. While some Allied prisoners were beaten, murdered, and even forced to bury their own officers alive during the march, others were allowed to ride in trucks and given adequate supplies and humane treatment.[iv] [v]

What explains this variation and inconsistency in the treatment towards Allied POWs by Japanese soldiers during the Bataan Death March? Why did some Japanese guards unflinchingly follow orders to beat and murder their charges while others resisted them? In order to answer these questions and to understand what factors led to the Bataan Death March, it is necessary to first discuss the military socialization process for Japanese soldiers during the Second World War and to then engage with the growing literature on resistance to socialization within armed groups.

Captured American and Filipino soldiers march past Japanese guards.
Source: Cleveland Plain-Dealer

Military Socialization in Imperial Japan

Japanese treatment towards POWs and the atrocities committed during the Bataan Death March were a direct result of the military socialization processes within the Imperial Japanese Army. Military socialization is the process within armed groups that “strip away [the] pre-military norms and identities” of recruits and replace them with the expected values and behaviors of the armed group.[vi][vii][viii] Armed groups employ a combination of ideological and social pressures through formal training, indoctrination, hazing, and initiation rituals to reform the identity of recruits.[ix][x]

Japanese soldiers experienced one of the most intensive military socialization processes during the Second World War. Even before active duty, young Japanese men had already been inculcated with ultranationalist propaganda that glorified the military and death in service of the emperor through media, the national school system, and during preparatory military training which began as early as secondary school.[xi] Japanese adolescents were raised in a society that had been “geared for war for fifteen years” and extolled patriotism which was “ultimately expressed through devotion to the emperor” and military service.[xii] A central theme of the propaganda promulgated throughout 1930s Japan was not only service to the emperor, but also obedience to all other authority figures.

Once inside the Imperial Japanese Army, recruits endured brutal physical and psychological training that further emphasized blind obedience and fostered extreme group cohesion. The Army was built on a “structure of authoritarian coercion that transferred oppression downwards [and] superior officers commonly commanded fear rather than respect”.[xiii] Physically hitting recruits in the face, a practice known as binta, was a regular occurrence meted out seemingly at random. Insubordination was also unacceptable. If a single member of a unit suffered an infraction or hesitated to carry out an order, the rest of his squad-mates often suffered savage beatings by officers with baseball bats, some inscribed with the words “Military Spirit Instilling Bat”.[xiv] This normalized brutality accompanied severe physical training in the form of long marches and drills that pushed recruits to the limits of their endurance.

Ideologically, Japanese recruits were inculcated through formal and informal indoctrination that emphasized devotion to the nation and the emperor, as well as a strict policy of no surrender. The doctrine of no surrender was reinforced at every level and stage of the military socialization process and was codified in the official Field Service Code for the Japanese Army (Senjinkun). For instance, one of the codes stated the following:  “never live to experience shame as a prisoner…always think of preserving the honor of your community and be a credit to yourself and your family…by dying you will avoid leaving behind the crime of a stain on your honor”.[xv] The concept of  “death before dishonor” was so enshrined in Japanese military culture, that the Japanese government refused to ratify the Geneva Convention of 1929 on the grounds that the treaty was unfair as “Japan would have to feed and house POWs, while other countries would be spared the onus of caring for Japanese prisoners because there would be none”.[xvi]

This policy had an incredible impact on the conduct of Japanese soldiers throughout the Second World War. Out of the 5,000 Japanese defenders on Tarawa, only 17 surrendered. On Iwo Jima, only 216 out of 14,000 soldiers surrendered, and on Okinawa, only around 10,000 of the 170,000-man garrison were captured alive.[xvii] In comparison, approximately 235,000 Axis soldiers surrendered at Stalingrad in February 1943 and over 260,000 German and Italian soldiers were captured in Tunisia later that year.[xviii]

Given the norms and behaviors emphasized during the military socialization process in the Imperial Japanese Army—blind obedience, discipline, extreme physical endurance, and no surrender—it is unsurprising that many Japanese soldiers treated prisoners viciously and that entire units committed atrocities against them. To many of the Japanese soldiers overseeing the procession of Allied prisoners from Bataan to Camp O’Donnell in April 1942, POWs represented the antithesis of their military culture and training; they were disgraced soldiers “seen as legitimate objects of their captor’s scorn, contempt, and much worse”.[xix][xx] However, even within this system of extreme military socialization, there were a number of Japanese soldiers that did not conform to these norms and in some instances even directly resisted them.

Limits to Military Socialization

The fact that “cruelty was not systematic” during the Bataan Death March and that some Japanese guards and officers defied orders to execute their charges suggests the potential limits of and resistance to military socialization.[xxi] Mounting evidence finds that individuals within armed groups are capable of resisting socialization and, in turn, the prescribed norms and behaviors of their group.[xxii][xxiii] Individual combatants “retain a measure of agency even under pervasive social control” which can lead to conflicting behaviors and insubordination. [xxiv]

At Bataan, many officers disobeyed a direct order from Colonel Tsuji, a radical officer even by the standards of the Imperial Japanese Army, to execute all POWs in their possession. For example, upon receiving the order to execute his prisoners, Colonel Imai not only disobeyed Colonel Tsuji, but freed his roughly one thousand prisoners and allowed them to escape into the jungle, citing that the order would have violated his own personal interpretation of Bushidō, the ancient Japanese warrior code.[xxv] At the ground level, a multitude of Japanese guards also went against the norms of their military culture to beat and belittle prisoners and instead provided adequate food, water, and breaks during the march. In one instance, an American tank commander was hugged and supported by a Japanese officer who had been his classmate at the University of California, Los Angeles.[xxvi]

The Bataan Death March demonstrates the effects of military socialization as well as its limitations. While the few Japanese soldiers and officers who resisted the draconian norms of their military culture were unable to change the horrific outcome of the Bataan Death March and the widespread atrocities committed by their brothers-in-arms, their actions illustrate that resistance to socialization and expected behaviors can occur even within rigidly controlled armed groups like the Japanese Imperial Army. Colonel Imai refused an order because it conflicted with his own personal code, while another Japanese officer disregarded expected behavior and embraced an old classmate because they were friends before the war. These experiences demonstrate that soldiers are not “blank slates” but have enduring prewar civilian identities “formed through prior arenas of socialization, such as families and schools” that can conflict with or even override aspects of military socialization processes.[xxvii]

The unexpected behavior of these Japanese soldiers during this brutal event in history illustrates that there are complex and often overlooked dynamics of identity and resistance within armed groups. Further research is needed to better understand what factors lead certain combatants like Colonel Imai and other Japanese soldiers to go directly against the expected norms of their armed group. Investigating what leads to behavioral differences will provide a more nuanced understanding as to how armed groups function, and such exploration will help to better contextualize the motivation and behavior of combatants.

[i] Kevin Murphy. Inside the Bataan Death March: Defeat, Travail and Memory (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2014).

[ii] John Toland. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 301.

[iii] John Dower. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: Norton, 2012), 122.

[iv] John Toland. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 294-301.

[v] Michael Norman and Elizabeth Norman. Tears in the Darkness: The Story of the Bataan Death March and Its Aftermath (New York: Picador, 2009).

[vi]Amelia Hoover Green. “The commander’s dilemma: Creating and controlling armed group violence,” Journal of Peace Research 53, 5 (2016): 619-632, 621.

[vii] Devorah Manekin. “The limits of socialization and the underproduction of military violence: Eviidence form the IDF,” Journal of Peace Research 54,5 (2017): p. 606-619.

[viii] Gary Wamsley. “Contrasting institutions of Air Force socialization,” American Journal of Sociology 78, 2 (1972): 399-417.

[ix] Anthony Kellett. Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (New York: Springer, 1982)

[x] Jefferey Checkel. “Socialization and violence: Introduction and framework,” Journal of Peace Research 54, 5 (2017): 801-826.

[xi] Ulrich Straus. The Anguish of Surrender: Japanese POWs of World War II (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005).

[xii]John Dower. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: Norton, 2012), 58,193.

[xiii] Ibid, 58.

[xiv] Ulrich Straus. The Anguish of Surrender: Japanese POWs of World War II (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 37.

[xv] Ibid, 39.

[xvi] Ibid, 21.

[xvii] John Toland. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: Modern Library, 2003)

[xviii] Antony Beevor. The Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2014)

[xix] Ulrich Straus. The Anguish of Surrender: Japanese POWs of World War II (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 3.

[xx] Michael Norman and Elizabeth Norman. Tears in the Darkness: The Story of the Bataan Death March and Its Aftermath (New York: Picador, 2009).

[xxi] John Toland. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 301.

[xxii] Jefferey Checkel. “Socialization and violence: Introduction and framework,” Journal of Peace Research 54, 5 (2017): 801-826.

[xxiii] Theodore McLaughlin. “Desertion and collective action in civil wars,” International Studies Quarterly 59 (2015): 669-679.

[xxiv] Devorah Manekin. “The limits of socialization and the underproduction of military violence: Evidence from the IDF.” Journal of Peace Research 54,5 (2017): 607.

[xxv] John Toland. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 295.

[xxvi]Ibid, 295.

[xxvii] Devorah Manekin. “The limits of socialization and the underproduction of military violence: Eviidence form the IDF,” Journal of Peace Research 54,5 (2017), 610.

Sam Erkiletian is a PhD candidate at University College London’s Department of Political Science. His research focuses on the changing identities of combatants during conflicts and in postwar environments. In particular, he is interested in how the military socialization processes of armed groups affect the behavior and postwar identity of former combatants. Sam employs comparative case studies and utilizes primary sources from conflict archives in his research designs.

Sam is a Senior Editor at Strife. Find him on Twitter @SErkiletian

U.S. Energy, Placing Strategy ahead of Policy

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by Benjamin Flosi

Conceptual photo of energy sources. Source: LovetoKnow

U.S. Energy Production – Politics vs. Strategy

U.S. energy policy is U.S. energy politics. The fight for energy-producing states this election season demonstrated this feature. President Trump made a calculated all-out blitz for these politically essential states in 2016 and 2020 by targeting his messaging of unrestricted energy production policies to critical constituents. [i] The Democrat Party, always in a more precarious political position due to a broader base, attempted to thread the needle, moving between abruptly ending the fossil fuel industry and gently progressing away. Finally, deciding on $2T in spending as a middle ground between its constituents.

This phenomenon deviates from U.S. energy policy’s historical role, where political leadership from both parties would equate energy policy with national security. President Nixon declared an emergency after the oil embargo and increased domestic production programmes. President Carter looked to secure supplies by removing pricing controls, establishing a strategic reserve, and initiated the U.S. military’s force increase in the Gulf region.[ii] The first war in Iraq was partially justified as preventing Saddam Hussein from controlling an even greater share of the global oil supply. Similarly, the reactivation of the fifth fleet and regional basing and partnerships stem from these strategic calculations. Even as recently as President Obama, achieving energy independence from international vagaries was a central talking point of his clean and renewable energy policies. Despite different political bases and inherent beliefs, each approached energy policy from the point of strategic national benefit.

Overton Window

When tackling climate change, America would be wise not to put policy goals before a strategic approach, as demonstrated in the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussain. Here, a rush to achieve a “safer world” through removing several threats and the spread of democracy, all in one swift policy, demonstrates that having a policy goal of global change without a feasible and sustainable strategy to reach that goal can invite catastrophe.

Fortunately, the U.S. energy-producing states’ current importance to any presidential bid, the 50/50 divided in domestic politics, and a split congress offer the opportunity to implement an energy strategy over an energy policy. This is due to the current political conditions preventing either side from implementing a strictly partisan policy. Furthermore, the diverse options under any multifaceted and long-term strategy allow political actors from all sides to claim a moral victory and deliver results to their constituents.

Strategic Dilemma

 Climate change is real. Unfortunately, so is Chinese and Russian aggression. The kernel of this strategic dilemma is that most U.S. steps to reduce carbon use also reduces U.S. and global security. While climate change will continue to impose itself on the word with strategic repercussions, so will Russia and China. China’s ability to use threats about trade to compel the E.U. in times of stress was successful, as the E.U. backed down in its reporting on China’s response to COVID. China also produced similar threats to cut off medical and pharmaceutical supplies to the U.S. Furthermore, their use of salami tactics to control trade routes, energy sources, and commercial fishing in national territory and control pieces of Europe will continue independent of climate change.

Decarbonization will be costly to the U.S. Every effort to impose restrictions will decrease the strategic risk of climate change but will increase the strategic risk imposed by China and Russia due to reduced U.S. economic capacity, global economic influence, energy independence, and reduce the energy independence of its allies and partners. There is also no guarantee that enduring these costs will achieve the objectives of ending or significantly reducing global warming due to China’s continual expansion of coal power plants and occupation of oil and gas fields in the South China Sea for potential exploitation. Furthermore, projected growth across India and Asia could additionally counter any feasible reductions in the U.S.

Strategic Opportunities

Advantages of the Status Quo: In 2019, the U.S. attained a greater degree of energy independence as it transitioned from being a net importer to a net exporter of crude and refined petroleum products. This accomplishment provides an economic advantage in revenue derived through market share, integration of world-class U.S. corporations into economies around the world, sustains a robust and dynamic economy that absorbs millions of immigrants and develops everything from the P.C. to one of the first the COVID-19 vaccine, and fuels a military that maintains global security. It also provides a hedge in the event of a great power or sustained conflict. Similarly, U.S. production capacity secures European economies and militaries as it allows for an alternative to global supply chains and dependence on Russia’s energy exports.[iii] Since oil and gas trade in USD, current arrangements help solidify the USD’s strategic advantage as the reserve currency and global finance provider. This latter fact is beneficial for countering an economically ambitious China attempting to ensnare smaller countries, as revealed in Sri Lanka’s loss of Hambantota Port, by creating new trade routes and an alternate reserve currency and financing opportunities.

Advantages of Opportunity: While the U.S. does maintain a current strategic advantage in the extraction-based world, this does not mean that a future of transition is devoid of similar strategic opportunities. The U.S. possesses several inherent strategic advantages, which it can lever in the quest to develop an answer to these problems. These include its capacity for research and development through its universities, defence and federal government initiatives, and iconic inventors in their garages. It also includes its business culture, cutting edge firm practices, entrepreneurship, and its flexible and dynamic investing ecosystem. Therefore, any path towards decarbonization can maintain some of the current advantages if it applies these strengths.

Strategic Pillars

Treat Decarbonization like Disarmament: To prevent a strategic nadir, the U.S. can treat decarbonization like disarmament. Agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords, on their own, will only hurt compliers while increasing relative gains of countries savvy or cynical enough to join and evade or ignore commitments. While Xi Jinping was producing statement after statement about reducing greenhouse emissions, his party brought more new coal plants into existence, nationally and internationally, than the accords can potentially overcome. Alternately, as U.S. efforts to decarbonize increase consumers’ and exporters’ costs, reduce U.S. multinational firms’ capacity, and reduce core industrial capability and small businesses vitality, America’s rivals continue to decrease energy production and consumption costs.

Therefore, as the Biden administration starts to adjust the Trump trade war, realigns relations with China, and builds U.S. manufacturing and the post-COVID economy, an opportunity exists to create agreements that can balance these concerns and embed reciprocal actions over blanket U.S. reductions.

Secure Supply Lines: Long-term movement away from carbon dependence requires a move towards reliance on rare earth elements. While the federal government has taken steps to increase its reserves of these elements, no efforts exist to secure continued supply, especially in a national emergency or sustained conflict. The fact that Russia and China together can possess or control up to 90% of global supply, depending on the specific element, adds another security challenge that requires a solution before relying on renewables.

Fortunately, the potential for new exploration exists in the U.S., Australia, Africa, and Latin America. Similarly, other Asian countries besides China can provide a low-cost option in making these materials usable. Malaysia being one, where China’s attempt to dominate its port facilities and transportation infrastructure demonstrates the need to secure these chains. Ambitious exploration and exploitation can reduce the costs of extraction and open new supplies. Part of securing this access, against China’s attempts, could include setting up ventures between U.S. and host nation companies to address the exploration, mining, extraction, and transportation required to bring these items to market while keeping the process partly in U.S. hands. As any return on investment would be long-term and risky, the U.S. Government would need to play a role in funding, guaranteeing profits, and technology exchange. This model could also deliver structured and spill-over entrepreneurial, technology, and educational benefits to local businesses and populations through additional loans, infrastructure development, educational opportunities, and access to both global and U.S. markets and companies. It could provide a local and grassroots development model and an alternate approach to China’s state-centered and state empowering One Belt One Road initiative. [iv]

Develop Comparative Advantages at Home: Within the U.S., opportunities exist that play to America’s strength and ensure that decarbonization supports U.S. economic advancement. As renewables and batteries depend on a significant amount of rare earth elements and minerals, the government can use U.S. universities to start programs that will create technology that can extract minerals with cheaper methods. The government can also promote STEM education in these fields through subsiding education. The importance of the production of these components to national security provides an opportunity to bring advanced manufacturing back to the U.S. Although, achieving this remains complicated as production in the U.S. is more expensive than in Asia. Still, the government should examine expenses, including the cost of not controlling production, including diplomatic and military, associated with securing overseas supplies and use them in a calculation on onshoring.[v]

Conclusion

In the U.S., the election cycle, which seemingly is an almost continuous street brawl these days, limits politicians’ ability to implement longer-term and incremental solutions. Instead, they must execute the immediate option to meet their short-term political demands. Although, as the President and Congress wade through a divided government and country, the opportunity exists to trade short-term paralysis for a long-term strategy and implement a far-sighted approach to battling climate change.

[i] Guliyev, Farid. “Trump’s ‘America first’ energy policy, contingency and the reconfiguration of the global energy order.” Energy Policy, vol. 140, May 2020.

[ii] Painter, David. “Oil and Geopolitics: The Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the Cold War.” Historical and Social Research, vol. 39, no. 4, 2014.

[iii] Henderson J., Mitrova T. (2020) Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia. In: Hafner M., Tagliapietra S. (eds) The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition. Lecture Notes in Energy, vol 73. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39066-2_5.

[iv] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/) from September-November 2020.

[v] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/)from September-November 2020.

Benjamin Flosi is a first year Ph.D. student at King’s College London and a Copy Editor at Strife.

 

President Trump’s gift to Al Shabaab

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by Marie Blessing Gilbert

US Troops in Somalia. Source: Commondreams

On the 4th of December last, the withdrawal of approximately 700 US troops and assets from Somalia was announced by the Pentagon. Some of these numbers will be deployed outside of East Africa whilst the rest will be repositioned in countries neighbouring Somalia. For decades Somalia has been devasted as a result of wars and famines. The burden carried by its people has been huge. Assistance from the US forces in Somalia in attempting to stabilise the country is vital if any hope of a better tomorrow is ever to be achieved.

Al Shabaab is an Al Qaeda linked militant group in Somalia whose aim is to establish a caliphate in Somalia that would in turn spread to neighbouring countries in the ‘Horn of Africa’ and beyond. They are not the only extremist group in Somalia, ISIS too has a footing there, however they are the primary source of terrorist offences in the Horn of Africa.

US troops have been present in Somalia since the early 1990s when at its height, there were approximately 25,000 troops assisting UN aid workers in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. This number was critically cut soon after by President Bill Clinton, and has dwindled since, to the 700 that were removed from Somalia in the last days of the Trump Administration.

The timing of the decision couldn’t be worse. Somalia has already missed the deadline of its general election which was due this month. Presidential elections are due to take place in February 2021. Tensions always run high in East Africa on the run up to and in the aftermath of elections. Anxiety in Somalia, which has been decimated for years at the hands of warlords and terrorist groups like Al Shabaab will hit a pinnacle soon. Pre- and post-election violence is expected no matter what the result of either election is due to the power struggle between elected officials, opponents, jihadist groups and clan elders. It is widely believed that the Somali security forces and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are not prepared to deal with a further escalation of violence within the country. Al Shabaab, as the most powerful jihadi extremist group in Somalia, is set to capitalise in the strife that will ensue.

Further to this, Somalia’s current fragile governmental system has long been aided by troops from neighbouring Ethiopia as part of AMISOM. Ethiopia has approximately 4000 troops currently in Somalia. However published reports have shown hundreds of Tigrayans troops forming part of this number have had their weapons seized by Ethiopian troops loyal to the government in Addis Ababa as a result of the current conflict between Tigrayan and Ethiopian forces in Ethiopia. Should AMISOM forces get distracted in any way from their peacekeeping mission in Somalia a vacuum will be created where militants can thrive even further than they do already. Somalia and Ethiopia have a long, porous border and traditionally strong ties. If the conflict in Ethiopia continues or escalates Somalia will undoubtedly suffer as a consequence.

To add to the problems of this highly vulnerable state the announcement that the US will remove their troops from within Somalia’s borders in weeks will further weaken the security forces in Somalia. The brunt of the American withdrawal is expected to be felt by the Somali commando force, Danab that was set up in 2014 as an elite force of combatants. Danab was established largely with US financial help, training and equipment. Its primary aim was that of a counter terrorist force in the country. Accompanied on many missions by US forces, Danab will surely be left to fend for itself when its US counterparts leave Somalia. Given they have worked together closely for 6 years it will, without doubt be a devastating blow to the Somali counter-terrorism efforts.

Al Shabaab members in Somalia. Source: Independent.ie

Leading politicians in Somalia and neighbouring countries have been left alarmed by the Pentagon’s announcement with Somalia’s President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed expressing deep concern that the efforts to counter terrorism in the region were aided hugely by the existing US-Somali partnership. In Neighbouring Kenya, Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary, Kamau Macharia, has opined that the situation will worsen in Somalia after the US withdrawal. It had already been announced that AMISOM troops were to work towards a full withdrawal of their troops from Somalia by the end of 2021, with graduated withdrawal already underway. Should this take place on top of US withdrawal the future looks very bleak for this extremely fragile and volatile state.

It seems that everything is happening at once to hinder any hopes that Somalia has to rise from the ashes of decades-long conflict. Somalia’s loss will be Al Shabaab’s gain and undoubtedly Trump’s final actions as he leaves the White House to withdraw his forces from Somalia will have devastating effects. The final withdrawal of troops was completed just two days before the inauguration of Joe Biden as President. The hope would be that President Biden will reverse this decision. However, with the troops already out of Somalia and even the uncertainly surrounding Trump’s decision will unquestioningly strengthen Al Shabaab’s resolve and can be seen as Trump’s parting gift to these jihadi extremists.

Marie Blessing Gilbert is currently studying full time for a Masters degree in Terrorism, Security and Society in King’s College London with an interest in the terrorism threat in Ireland and East Africa.

Marie is a part of the Strife Women in Writing Programme.

The Iraqi government is hamstrung by the very causes that are driving Iraqis to the streets

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by Gareth Jonas and Tom Webster

Tahrir Square (Liberation Square) with the Freedom Monument in the background – Baghdad, Iraq.
Source: Next Century Foundation

On October 25, thousands of Iraqi protesters mobilised throughout the country to commemorate the October 2019 “Tishreen Revolution,” with huge demonstrations in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the protest movement. Their latest demands? Much the same as the original grievances that first drew Iraqis to the streets last year: economic reform, and tackling corruption and constitutional change—albeit now with the additional call for justice for the 600 protesters killed by pro-Iran militia groups and security forces since the initial protests. Despite these waves of mass protest, progress continues to be extremely limited with the Iraqi state remaining constrained by pro-Iranian parties, economic crises, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The perpetuation of demonstrations since October 2019 highlights the limited progress made by the Iraqi state to address protester demands. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that further progress will be made anytime soon.

While the original grievances in October 2019 centred around corruption and a lack of economic opportunities, the extensive use of violence against protesters has since made security sector reform the core demand of protests. Yet, justice for the deaths of protesters continues to be absent, magnifying the glaring lack of accountability within the Iraqi security sector. The July raid in which 14 Kataib Hezbollah members were arrested, only to be released days later after threats from the group, underscores the difficulty Prime Minister Mustafa  Al-Kadhimi has in enforcing that accountability. Therefore, though Kadhimi has repeatedly emphasised his support for the protesters and dedication to serving justice for the ‘martyrs’ of the protests, his actions (or lack thereof) suggest that these are empty promises. Protesters’ concerns will be little allayed by the reinstatement of Abdel-Wahab al-Saadi to the head of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service. That was a victory for protesters, but a pyrrhic victory when one considers the death toll of the protests and the much more far-ranging demands to improve public safety. Today, protesters continue to place improved security and justice for the 600 or so killed protesters at the top of their agenda. That this remains the case six months after taking office, combined with the continued assassinations of high-profile activists and intellectuals across the summer, shows the evident lack of progress Kadhimi has been able to make in this area.

On the economy—the original core issue of protesters demands—the picture looks even bleaker. Mass rallies began in October 2019 in Tahrir Square calling for more job opportunities and improved services. One year on, it is hard to point at anything resembling progress as Iraq’s struggle with COVID-19 has only exacerbated its pre-existing economic woes and deprived the government of the resources to combat them. This, combined with the overinflated public sector, has led to a new strain of protests, in which medical workers and employees of the Ministry of Electricity across the country are demanding the disbursement of unpaid wages. It is thus apparent that Kadhimi has even more to contend with economically now than when he entered office.

The government’s greatest success in this area could be said to be the white paper published in October 2020 containing a historical diagnosis of Iraq’s financial woes and a prescription for a way out of it—by diversifying Iraq’s economy away from its dependence on oil whilst providing economic opportunities for Iraqis. It aims to achieve this by following International Monetary Fund guidelines which require spending cuts on basic needs such as health and education, alongside the devaluation of the currency to increase exports. However, the estimated 450 articles of legislation needed to be approved for the implementation of these recommendations are highly unlikely to pass due to opposition from various political parties who were not consulted, and little political will exists to pass them anyhow. As the country continues to teeter on the edge of an economic implosion, most protesters now seem resigned to simply wait out the pandemic until Iraq sees an increase in oil revenues.

There has also been very little progress towards domestic political reform. Calls for early elections and electoral reform to tackle corruption have increased throughout 2020 as protesters seek to do away with sectarian politics. Yet, the Iraqi Parliament is beset with factional infighting along sectarian lines as members of parliament continue to advance their individual and party interests at the cost of political reform. Whilst the recently passed electoral law goes some way towards weakening the dominance of traditional parliamentary blocs by dissolving provincial constituencies into electoral districts, protesters have accused it of dividing constituencies along ethnic and sectarian lines. This has effectively worked to buttress the reviled Muhasasa system; that is, the ethno-sectarian quotas by which cabinet positions are awarded amongst Iraq’s demographics. In addition, whilst early parliamentary elections have been scheduled for June 2021, the continued understaffing of the Independent High Electoral Commission and Federal Supreme Court—necessary to manage the elections and ratify the results—calls into question the current timeline for next year’s elections.

It is thus apparent that the majority of protesters’ demands have yet to be fulfilled, and the opportunity for progress in the short-term appears bleak. However, in considering the evolution of the protest movement’s response to the changing security and economic conditions that Iraq faces, we must acknowledge the limitations which the government faces in trying to meet many of the protesters’ demands. As a caretaker prime minister predominantly intended to navigate Iraq to new elections next year, whilst facing staunch opposition from pro-Iran parties and blocs in Parliament, there is little hard progress which Kadhimi can achieve. Nevertheless, the frustrations behind the protests are deep-set and not going away anytime soon. The antipathy voiced against Kadhimi at Tahrir Square in October was a significant moment in a movement which had hitherto been hesitant to criticise a leader who wants to clamp down on the militias and make progress on security and economy. The patience of protesters is quickly running out, so it seems as though Kadhimi will have to make a better effort in co-opting the energy of the streets if he is to bolster Iraq’s security and drive meaningful change in the lives of millions of Iraqis.

Gareth Jonas is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International. He can be found tweeting about identity, ethnic conflict, and international security at @jonas_gareth.  He is a Senior Editor at Strife.

Tom Webster is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International who has conducted extensive research on the Popular Mobilization Units and their place in Iraqi state-building.