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Modern Conflict Favours Autocracies

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Photo by Mathias P.R. Reding on Unsplash

According to Freedom House, 2020 marked the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. Russia continues to interfere with foreign politics and brashly intimidate Ukraine, China leveraged the COVID-19 pandemic to tighten control of its population, and Iran has indicated intentions to increase nuclear activities. Meanwhile, the United States (U.S.) has left a broken Afghanistan after twenty years, Great Britain is reeling from the consequences of Brexit, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is struggling to maintain relevancy and address growing threats at its borders.

Amidst these changing politics and growing murmurs of great power competition is a shift in the nature of modern conflicts. Some experts argue that the conventional total wars of the 20th century will never occur again. Advances in artificial intelligence, space technologies, and cyber capabilities are digitising the battlefield and encouraging the adoption of unconventional and hybrid warfare. Modern conflict is extending beyond set-piece battles to encompass ever broader means of attaining political aims. Rapid advancements in technology mean that cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and proxy militias are replacing conventional troops while being leveraged more cheaply, effectively, and discreetly than ever before. This technology-driven battlefield favours autocracies as it blurs the line between combatants and civilians and confuses the traditional laws of war. Authoritarian regimes are better positioned for this 21st century conflict than democratic states for three key reasons – their suppression of domestic dissent, centralisation of government, and close relationships with industry.

First, a defining characteristic of autocracies is their elimination of opposition and control of information. Authoritarian regimes of the 20th century relied on extensive networks of informants and secret police – 1 in every 6 East Germans provided information to the Stasi after the Second World War. Today’s technology eliminates such cumbersome systems while simultaneously improving a state’s ability to surveil and control its population. Freedom House’s 15-year decline in democracy corresponds closely with the rise of the internet age, while research has found that today’s ‘digital autocracies’ are more durable than both their historic predecessors and their less technologically adept peers. Led by China, the use of digital tools enables autocracies in previously impossible ways. Massive amounts of data are generated on every citizen and used to control the population through social credit scores and arrest. Autocracies leverage technology by using deep fakes, disinformation, and internet outages to discredit political opponents, tamp down protests, or suppress unfavourable news coverage. And technological advancements only promise increasingly sophisticated ways for autocracies to monitor and manipulate their populations.

Digital autocracies are thus advantaged over democratic states in modern conflict because they effectively reduce public pressure on government actions. A 2020 RAND report found that the influence of public opinion restricted the options and tools available to democracies as compared to autocracies in conflicts. While democracies experience immense public pressure that often limits foreign policy decisions, authoritarian regimes enabled by technology face fewer constraints. Democratic leaders must spend nontrivial amounts of time and money during war to reduce civilian casualties, maintain public support, and win re-election. By contrast, authoritarian regimes are less accountable to their populations, making it easier for them to break international law without consequence, such as Russia’s enforced silence regarding soldiers killed in Ukraine. In suppressing domestic dissent more successfully than ever, autocracies are at an asymmetric advantage in modern conflict because of their flexibility of action unchecked by public opinion.

A second common, although not universal, attribute of autocracies is government centralisation. By concentrating power, authoritarian leaders ensure more control over their state’s budget, long-term planning, national security, legal infrastructure, popular culture, and foreign policy. The U.S. and China demonstrate the stark difference between decentralised and centralised government. The U.S. government quarrels annually over a budget and sometimes shuts down, whereas the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) articulates long-term plans spanning decades. Although the legitimacy of these long-term plans are contested, their mere existence demonstrates a governmental unity that democratic states like the U.S. will likely never achieve. Autocratic governments also tend to be more consolidated than democratic ones, with few independent bodies, limited organic growth, and highly integrated systems. China even has surveillance mechanisms in place to ensure CCP employees are dedicated to the party’s vision and motivated to perform.

Such centralisation can be advantageous to authoritarian states in modern conflict, particularly with the rise of hybrid and unconventional warfare. The commonly espoused antidote for Western democracies in the face of hybrid warfare is a ‘whole of government’ response. Because hybrid warfare is so diffuse, targeting everything from power grids to congressional emails, an enormous number of entities outside of the military may be involved. Democracies often scramble to unite disparate entities for a cohesive defence and response to unconventional warfare, such as the U.S. during the recent SolarWinds hack. Conversely, centralised autocracies are inherently well-positioned because they enact ‘whole of government’ responses to conflict by default. Moreover, centralised autocracies may have fewer cyber and human vulnerabilities to exploit. Aggressive control of communications infrastructure and security practices, such as the CCP’s monitoring of all internet traffic, can improve cybersecurity nationwide. Centralised autocracies use methods to control employees and citizens’ loyalty and technology usage, further limiting susceptibilities to information operations and social engineering. Government centralisation thus benefits autocracies in modern conflict by reducing vulnerabilities and structurally ensuring holistic responses to threats.

Finally, autocracies tend to be much more closely integrated with national industry than democracies. China and Russia typify two differing ways these relationships manifest. China’s president Xi Jinping has taken steps to integrate the CCP into all private companies, pushing for CCP board appointees, eliminating powerful or disloyal business leaders, and coercing foreign companies to support the CCP’s ‘United Front’. Furthermore, China’s 2017 national intelligence law requires organisations within China to ‘support, assist, and cooperate with the state intelligence work’. This law effectively mandates all businesses operating in China to provide any or all of their information and services to the government if asked. While the law technically only applies to intelligence, it is an easy stepping stone to more malign uses – and Chinese companies touch everything from Apple to General Electric, from Hollywood to Wall Street. As China has aggressively legislated its control over industry, Russia has embraced opportunities of partnership. Russia is increasingly using private military companies as proxy militias while encouraging or hiring civilians to undertake cyberattacks and information operations. Usage of civilians in these roles provides Russia with plausible deniability and increased capability. It also complicates any response from NATO and the West because of the complexities of international law and combatant designations.

Despite differences in approach, Russia and China’s leverage of national industry in a way unique to autocracies advantages them in modern conflict. Democracies, built on ideas of freedom of expression and freedom of action, cannot force industry to partner with defence.

Burgeoning technology companies, the quickening pace of research, and the evolving role of dual-use technology are forcing western defence departments to rely more heavily on private innovation. Budgetary constraints and public resistance, such as with Project Maven, are antagonising Western democracies’ defence contracts even as peer autocracies forge ahead with industry relationships unfettered by morals or law. Such easy relationships with industry cheapen and quicken defence acquisitions for autocracies. Conversely, democracies are obligated to pursue contracts within a framework heavily restricted by democratic principles, public opinion, and law. Autocracies are thus vastly advantaged in modern conflict by relationships with industry that democracies cannot match.

Rapid technological development is shaping the 21st century, changing the nature of warfare, and cementing the power of autocracies. Modern conflict, defined by hybrid and unconventional warfare, favours some of the unique characteristics of autocracies – suppression of domestic dissent, government centralisation, and close relationships with industry. Autocracies are of course not infallible though, and democracies are not doomed. Democracies are advantaged with a creativity, diversity, and passion rarely found within authoritarian regimes. While quashing of dissent and extreme centralisation can be beneficial, it is also dangerous. There are few mechanisms in place to guide autocratic leaders away from missteps – any one of which may be disastrous given the often deeply integrated nature of the government. And even as technology enables better surveillance, it enables better evasion, too. Populations under repressive rule are rarely silent, and an autocracy’s power is fragile. Western democracies would be prudent to consider the chinks in autocracies’ armour, even as they reckon with the large chinks in their own. Modern conflict favours autocracies, and the democratic West must prepare to face this new reality.

Disclaimer: The opinions and assertions contained herein are the private opinions of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the United States Department of Defense or the United States Air Force.

How China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy fuels China’s ambitious military aims

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by Orlanda Gill

Flag of China. Source: Pixabay

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is a Chinese state-directed strategy which seeks to modernise the Chinese military by creating a distinct Chinese military-industrial complex. The MCF strategy effectively seeks to eliminate the barriers between the civilian and military sectors, which consist of legal, political, communicative, and bureaucratic divisions. Once eradicated, the result is a fused civil-military sector which allows for simultaneous military and economic growth. Whilst similarities can be found in the Civil-Military Integration (CMI) of the United States in that it shares the same goals of the civilian and military industry working closely together, CMI demands co-operation either within the military industry, or with a civilian company, rather than a complete removal of barriers between the civilian and military industry. The goal of the MCF is to have a ‘world-class military’ by 2050. Whilst the exact meaning is unclear, it can be interpreted to mean China desires to be amongst the world’s greatest military powers. How this would be realised can be understood by analysing China’s strategic guidelines which can be most closely translated to operational doctrine in the West. Realisation of this aim can also be examined through China’s attitude towards the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which for China has placed and will place technological and scientific innovation at the center of war. The MCF therefore must be understood with regards to China’s strategic guidelines and the RMA. Overall, it can be demonstrated that the MCF is about having a modernised military which can fight and dominate in wars that demand technological and scientific superiority.

The MCF is not a new concept. The idea that economic growth cannot be without military is found in Deng Xiaoping, in the early 1980s, who focused on economic development before military equipment modernisation. It was, however, not until the ascension of President Jiang Zemin in 1993 when focus started to shift back more towards defence than solely economic growth. Jiang emphasised dual-use technologies, combining military facilities and civilian infrastructure to streamline military and econoomic spending. These core components, which are at the heart of the MCF, have endured from Jiang until the present, under Xi Jinping. The MCF, however, shares the most similarities to the policies of Xi’s predecessor  Hu Jintao whose Civil-Military Integration (CMI) in 2009 sought to integrate the civilian and military sectors.

Whilst this brief historical overview demonstrates the evolution of a concept, the MCF is best understood at the implementation level. The strategy can be seen at work at many different levels: institutional, provincial, and local. At an institutional level, there is a growing number of the former and current senior defence industrial cadre serving in prominent party and state posts, while President Xi Jinping leads the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development to monitor Military-Civil Fusion policies. Outside of government, the MCF also extends to universities for research. Currently, Tsinghua University is pursuing human-machine interaction with funding from the CMC Science and Technology Commission, which will likely contribute to China’s modernised military and concept of intelligentised warfare. At the provincial level, among production facilities, beginning in 2019, ten provincial-level governments are investing money into research and overseas acquisitions through guidance funds. At the local level, looking towards Tianjin, an AI Military-Civil Fusion Innovation Center was set up next to the National Supercomputer Center. This was coordinated with the Academy of Military Science.  The MCF, therefore, should be understood as a guiding principle enforced and supervised by the state to guide the civilian sector to military usages, whilst retaining the civilian economic benefits from technologically innovating and supplying dual-use technology.

President Xi Jinping has remarked that the MCF strategy is instrumental, and this view is supported by China’s prioritisation of technology in contemporary warfare. The Gulf War (1990-1991) and Kosovo War (1998-1999) for China indicated a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and therefore a new standard and future trend which puts information superiority and thus the quality of technology as a key factor in military victory and for what constitutes a powerful military.  This understanding continues in the PLA’s strategic guideline in ‘winning informatised local wars’ in July 2014. An important (although not the only) aspect of this strategic guideline is the role of information. Informatisation ‘refers to the collection, processing, and utilization of information in all aspects of warfighting in order to seamlessly link individual platforms in real time from across the services to gain leverage and advantage on the battlefield.’ The demand for information superiority therefore  places importance on the ‘cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains’. The importance of advanced information technologies is thus heightened and the MCF is made a crucial process for the PLA to advance technological innovation at a rapid pace in comparison to its adversaries to gain information superiority.  Additionally, the MCF allows China to capitalise from the tech-dominated global RMA and to become a  ‘world-class military’ by 2050.

The MCF is also important in what appears to a new and emerging concept known as intelligentised warfare. This may be understood as a ‘uniquely Chinese concept of applying AI’s machine speed and processing power to military planning, operational command, and decision support’. In President Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, intelligentisation was elevated to a guiding principle for China’s military modernisation. This  conceptualisation of future warfare marks an evolution from informatised warfare. Differences can be analysed in that intelligentised warfare involves an ‘algorithm confrontation’ rather than ‘systems confrontation’ that characterises informatised war. Winning would therefore come from having an ‘algorithm advantage’. Furthermore, whilst informatised warfare recognises the importance of the space and cyber domain, intelligentised warfare would expand the domain of warfare into the cognitive domain which concerns ‘the field of decision-making through reasoning’. Superiority in this domain would be achieved through enhanced cognitive capacity of human combatants via integrated human-machine intelligence. The expansion of warfare into new domains and the potential Revolution in Military Affairs through AI would certainly help produce a ‘world-class military’. The connection of intelligentised warfare and MCF is made explicit when we observe that the PLA’s Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative book on the PLA compiled by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), states the intention to ‘Promote deeper military-civil fusion, and leverage societal resources for the development of military intelligentisation’. The MCF is thus integral to China’s capacity to leverage science and technology to bolster their combat capabilities as well as to lead in what China envisions as future wars.

Overall, the Military-Civil Fusion is an ambitious concept and strategy that seeks to modernise the military to great heights by fusing the civilian and economic sectors. The question of its success perhaps depends on whether the PLA is a world-class military by 2050. Nevertheless, the strategy has further implications; it promises China a technological edge, the strengthening of economic security and domestic and international prestige. Therefore, rather than becoming overly attached to what may be perceived as an end goal, it is important to remain open so as to see where the fusion is leading China.

 

Orlanda Gill is a MA National Security Studies student at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. Her interest is in East Asian security with a key focus on China’s foreign and domestic policy. She is also currently exploring the technology-security nexus especially with regards to China.

Orlanda is a part of Strife’s Women in Writing programme.

You can find her on Twitter at @orlanda_gill.

 

Internet Sovereignty as a Gateway to Global Norms: The Battle over Global Internet Governance

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by Eve Gleeson

18 July 2019

A borderless world, or not really? (Image credit: Pxhere)

Introduction

The Internet’s essence as “open, global, [and] borderless” has complicated attempts toward international cooperation on Internet governance. Many authoritarian states with comprehensive cybersecurity policies and strategies regard the Internet as a tool to monitor and quell internal dissent that may threaten regime stability, while liberal democracies, especially those belonging to Western multilateral organisations such as the EU and NATO, have tended to conceive of it rather as a borderless space free from excessive regulation.

Authoritarian states, such as Russia, China and the states with whom they maintain rather informal ties, such as Iran and Southeastern Asian states like Malaysia and Indonesia, clash with the proponents of liberal democracy whose values traditionally prevail in international institutions. As leaders of the Internet Sovereignty (IS) movement, China and Russia hope to use their growing diplomatic influence to manipulate global Internet governance standards in favour of state sovereignty. This article will discuss how the values of IS may impact the global power balance and a transnational Internet governance agreement, stressing the position of Russia and China in global diplomatic bodies.

Transnational cybersecurity governance

Bodies like the UN and its agency the International Telecommunications Union have created and reviewed numerous initiatives concerning transnational Internet protocols. However, these initiatives have proved to be vague and incomplete strategies victim to gridlock and technical limitations. IS leaders Russia and China and their increasingly potent force of global Internet allies remain challenged by Western actors, such as the United States, who benefit from institutionalised power and market-dominating private technology companies.

Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this area has been prolific as powerful states seek to gain Internet allies who may represent their interests at the global negotiating table. This includes the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an alliance originally designed to combat terrorism but has since ushered its eight members, hailing from South and Central Asia, toward strategies and norms that speak to the threat that information poses to national security and stability. Other occurrences of inter-group cooperation are reflected through signatures on UN resolutions by band-wagoning states, including by developing states in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well as collaborations on global Internet conferences.

China and Russia: Messiahs of Internet Sovereignty

These states serve as beacons of hope for national jurisdiction over the digital space, serving up bold cybersecurity policies and strategies. With landmark policies like the Golden Shield and the Great Firewall, and technology giants like Huawei and Alibaba, China has become a leader of technological prosperity. Russia has created similarly robust Internet policies in addition to several market-dominating technology companies including Yandex and Kaspersky Lab. This has given the Russian state the capacity to expel Western technology companies, bolster the national economy, and monopolise national identity creation through social media censorship.

Chinese policies of filtering and censoring content reflect the ideals of state control over national identity, information access, dissent and mobilisation, and emerging technologies. China’s investment in the telecommunications sectors of East African states (linked with their adoption of Chinese-inspired censorious cybersecurity policies) and policy leadership in the SCO and BRICS partnerships reflect the state’s efforts to “promote [their views] as the basic principles for structuring international relations and regimes on a global level.”

In 2015, China and Russia formalised their bilateral cybersecurity relations with the Agreement on International Information Security Cooperation. Russia has also forged formal cybersecurity ties with less advanced emerging economies, such as Southeast Asia through an emerging agreement with ASEAN and existing cybersecurity collaboration with the Philippines. In addition, Russia has used the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, an alliance comprised of former Soviet satellite states, as a tool to consolidate a collective cybersecurity strategy. By combatting Western technological dominance, both materially and normatively, Russia and China can expand their own industries, retain control over their population, and spread non-Western ideals among states who may, in turn, provide support to them in international fora.

Implications and Conclusion

A global Internet governance regime ruled by IS ideals, whether it be a codified UN agreement or more informal norms and practices, would not mirror the hierarchical structure of traditional governance bodies: instead, it would create no order of power at all, with each individual state executing autonomy over Internet activity within its borders. This sort of agreement may also impact how cybersecurity development programs are funded, with resistance from China and Russia for developing states to receive development aid from the West.

Such a collaborative agreement may also struggle to set human rights and transparency norms. By granting states autonomy in this arena, it would relinquish authority over domestic consequences of Internet policies. This would leave states with a pre-modern degree of sovereignty, allowing them to steer the Internet toward or away from state-based information and knowledge control, political mobilisation, and national identity creation. Russia and China’s efforts toward Internet sovereignty norms will persist as they advance their interests of building a strong anti-West alliance. As they grow as economic powers, their efforts to integrate Westphalian values of sovereignty into international institutions will grow in tandem, threatening liberal ideals of globalisation.

So far, the transnational agreements that have been proposed, amended, and rejected have encountered fragmentation, ambiguity, and logistically-weak imperatives. The economic and infrastructural disparities between states, the struggle for policy to outpace technological advances, the role of private stakeholders that uphold the industry, and the logistical impracticalities of enforcing Internet policies have all stifled ventures toward global cooperation. In addition to resolving these issues, states must realistically engage in compromise to construct a functional regime.

Eve Gleeson is a master’s student in International Relations at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Communications Manager of Strife and a security analyst at AMC Solutions. Her research focuses on technology governance, cybersecurity of critical systems, and socio-technical theory. Eve holds a BA in International Studies with a focus on conflict and security from Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. You can find her on LinkedIn and on Twitter @evegleeson_.

Impact of New Technologies on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

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By Felix Manig

The UAVs used by the UN are unarmed and used by the UN peacekeeping force MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo to track movements of hostile actors and bolster humanitarian responses. Image credit: Felix Manig, 2014, Goma, DRC

Rapid technological advancements are changing the nature of warfare and military operations, with serious implications for peace and security. At present, states are investing immense sums into the research and development of emerging technologies for their national security. This phenomenon is led by the U.S. government which approves nearly $3 billion annually for its defense research agency DARPA. As technology becomes ever more essential in an evolving and complex world, how can less affluent security projects like multilateral United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) benefit from new technologies and integrate the positive effects into their mission? Introducing advanced technology into peacekeeping missions yields significant opportunities but must go hand in hand with strengthening the existing capabilities of UN diplomats and agencies that address the socio-economic, development and political issues related to the conflict.

UNPKOs have a poor technology track record

UNPKOs have been slow to adapt to technological change. In part, this is because the private sector is most often better situated than governments or bureaucratic organisations to harness and promote innovation. Secondly, the UN peacekeeping infrastructure is chronically underfunded and currently faces threats of further financial cuts. In February 2015, an independent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation appointed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support found that many UN field operations were lacking the technological capabilities considered necessary by militaries and law enforcement to operate effectively. It also cited these deficits as a direct reason for tech-enabled militaries of developed member states to refuse to participate in the field. With missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan or Syria representing some of the world’s most complex conflict environments, can new technologies soften the critical voices that attest these PKOs a failure to execute their Security Council mandate?

How can UNPKOs benefit from new technologies?

As the United Nations system is set to undergo significant reforms introduced by the new Secretary-General António Guterres, some changes and amendments include scaling up the technological capabilities of peacekeeping operations. The positive effects of new technologies are most likely to be useful for the prevention and response to conflicts, intelligence gathering, and communications system of missions.

In his vision statement, the Secretary-General stressed his commitment to a “culture of prevention” to bring about peace, political solutions and sustainable development to crisis hotspots. Technology can play a central role in supporting the UN’s endeavor to prevent conflict. Most importantly, the collection and analysis of data about crime and conflict could result in indicators which in turn can be used to shorten warning and response times for peacekeepers on the ground. Systematic monitoring and mapping of crises can promote patterns and models to make the prevention of human rights abuses or cease-fire violations more efficient and cost-effective. For example, when the UN tested the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the DR Congo and Central African Republic (CAR), significant advancements were made in the protection of civilians from ambushes by armed groups. UAVs also allowed peacekeepers to maintain improved situational awareness by tracking migration movements or performing aerial reconnaissance of hostile actors, thereby helping them to operate in difficult asymmetric threat environments.

Another important step in ramping up the prevention of conflict and violence would be a concerted effort among UN member states to develop an intelligence agency within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. While UNPKOs have established intelligence-gathering units, they are largely based on an ad-hoc approach and member states have expressed confusion around this concept. The UN doesn’t like to see itself as an intelligence-gathering unit; however, intelligence capabilities are required if peacekeeping operations want to effectively address threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century. Several issues currently impede the development of an intelligence oversight body, including the reluctance of member states to share information and equipment, questions of accountability, and the lumbering communications infrastructure of many peacekeeping operations, making it difficult to bring together the civilian, police and military components of a mission.

The communication network of UNPKOs is the third pillar that could benefit enormously from improved technology by incorporating local populations into missions – dubbed along the lines of “participatory peacekeeping”. Some recent ideas include letting locals send their information, observations or alerts directly to the peacekeeping force as a confidence-building measure and as a means to engage local communities in the process of conflict resolution. Modern communications equipment and better coordination between peace operations would also help improve the safety and security of UN personnel and assets.

A holistic approach to peacekeeping

At the same time, it is essential to understand that while new technologies can offer great assistance to UNPKOs, they are not a panacea to prevent all forms of conflict and violence. The heads of UNPKOs should be careful not to overstate the opportunities of big data analytics and simply replace their understanding of local politics and context-sensitive approaches with statistical models. It would be extremely foolish to discard the value of personal relationships that diplomats and conflict mediators have formed with actors on the ground over time or the important work of other UN agencies in the field.

Danger also lies in the adverse effects modern communication and technology can have within conflict settings. Concerns over internet privacy, censorship, and surveillance, or the opportunities technologies offer to extremist groups for recruitment and propaganda tools should all be considered. Furthermore, as armed drones or offensive cyber attacks become more frequent in today’s conflicts, international laws and norms are yet to materialise to contain their irresponsible use.

Missing the opportunities new technologies provide means missing chances for peace. The fact that the UN has adopted a strategy for technology and innovation for its PKOs is a promising step. At the same time, current operations must also address the technological capabilities of adversaries and civilians in conflict zones. In the end, PKOs need a holistic approach by effectively combining the opportunities of modern equipment and innovation, political solutions, and paths to economic development to secure peace.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany.

 

Crossing Borders: Technology and Migration in an Interconnected World – Conference Tickets on Sale

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By: Johan Lammers

In times of travel bans and Brexit, as a foreign student from The Netherlands where the polls are led by a party whose official stance on immigration is literally ‘zero asylum seekers extra and no more immigrants from Islamic countries; border closed’, migration is never far from my thoughts and conversations. In this blogpost, I would like to give an idea of why migration is worthy of our growing concern in the interconnected, digitalized ‘Age of Information’. In doing so, I also set the scene for the upcoming annual Conflict, Security and Development Conference happening on the 3rd of March 2017 on this issue with the title ‘Crossing Borders: Technology and Migration in an Interconnected World’.

The UN documents over 243 million migrants around the world, or 3.3% of world population. Between 2014-2016, EuroStat recorded over 3 million first-time asylum requests to the EU; in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Lebanon, refugees make up 43%, 36% and 27% of the population. While the concept of a smartphone did not exist at the end of the Cold War, 37% of the world population is expected to own one in 2020; a 2015 survey found that close to 86% of the Syrian youth in a refugee camp in Jordan did. Unsurprisingly, both strongly upward trends have an influence on each other. Migrant and host communities are increasingly interconnected through constant and abundant live information. This increasingly blurs the lines that divide consumers and producers of generated news and public opinion about ongoing conflicts. The emergence of physical and virtual information and communication networks have an endogenous reinforcing effect and facilitate an unprecedented flow of people and ideas.

However, these flows are far from uncontrollable as numerous stakeholders with varying if not directly opposing interests seek to manage, coordinate or exploit this modern phenomenon of (forced) migration in an interconnected world. Whereas the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees seeks to manage global databases in camps based on biometric registrations, border police are using drones for monitoring. Separated families can remain in touch or even reunite across vast distances. Expectation management for aspiring migrants, educational information and preparing for integration greatly benefit from a wealth of online data, programs and apps. Meanwhile, migrants risk entire livelihoods based on the best practices, rumours and accounts of strangers via Facebook groups.

In addition to these parallel mechanisms that make up the interaction between technology and migration, single mechanisms do not have a uniformly beneficial or harmful effect. Does technology hamper the capacity of human traffickers through increased transparency in their practices, or does it provide them with unchecked informal advertising platforms and viral mouth-to-mouth networks? How does the constant feed of real-time available media material influence both mutual perceptions of migrant and host communities and the political climates that result for their political representatives?

Hence, a proper understanding of migration and technology cannot come from merely a single perspective but requires multiple lenses. Yet neither is it merely a ‘problem’ that should be ‘solved’, without also discussing the opportunities to be seized.

During the Conflict, Security and Development Conference on the 3rd of March 2017, we will address several of these issues by bringing together academics, NGOs, policymakers, journalists, entrepreneurs and migrants for discussion. Through this forum, we seek to compare and contrast how these combined perspectives provide an idea of what the current challenges and opportunities are, and how these integrated trends are likely to develop in the years to come.

In our first panel, we bring together migrants-turned-activists and entrepreneurs to identify how modern technologies have a personal impact on a migrant’s experiences, but also how businesses emerge to employ migrants and cater towards particular needs of these emerging target audiences. Our second panel discusses how NGOs and other migration managers seek to employ technologies to coordinate these flows of peoples. Our third panel considers what policy implications modern, digitalized migrants might have, and how technologies can be instrumentalized towards advancing these aims.

More information on how to buy tickets, our speakers’ profiles, and the schedule for the day can be found on our website. Payment: The conference welcomes all audiences, though students from the University of London can attend at a reduced fee.  

Notes:

Beheshti-Kashi, Samaneh, Makki, Baharak (2013), ‘Social Media News: Motivation, Purpose and Usage’, International Journal of Computer Science & Information Technology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.97-105

The author is pursuing his MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. This piece was submitted by the 2017 Conflict, Security and Development Conference organisers as an advertisement for the annual student-led CSD Conference. You can buy tickets here.

Image source: http://www.wnyc.org/story/a-harrowing-journey-into-europe-aided-by-apps-and-internet-access/