Turkey

Conscription Reform and the Future of Military Manpower in Turkey

February 12, 2019 by Strife Staff

By Onur Kara

12 February 2019

A Turkish soldiers stands guard in Anıtkabir, Ankara.(Photo credit: Wojciech Olkusnik)

The military draft is making headlines again following several decades in decline. France seeks to re-introduce the national service and several gulf Arab states went ahead with implementing conscription despite their relatively small populations. Even Tunisia, known for maintaining a modest army, had a debate about making the military more attractive to its youth.

Turkish security bureaucracy, however, spent a good portion of 2018 working on a paid conscription exemption — a one-off payment of 15,000 Turkish Liras (roughly £2000 at the time of writing), for which people born before 1994 are eligible. This ‘exemption’ allows the reduction of military service to 21 days of mostly symbolic training instead of a 6-month minimum. The response was overwhelming; over 600,000 people applied by the time the government closed applications in November 2018. It also revealed that the Turkish military has a severe recruitment problem which remained under the radar, highlighting the strenuous interaction between politicians and the army.

Military service is a politically sensitive topic in Turkey. Military service exemptions were a talking point for many political figures before the July 2018 elections, while one analyst argued that the paid exemption supporters constituted the best organised lobby group in the country. They are very visible with their Twitter campaigns, supported by a dedicated association which attracts a wide following, constituting a large pool of voters with a very clear demand in mind.

Electoral politics, however, cover only one part of a larger story. Turkey’s defence and security establishment has been undergoing substantial change after the failed coup attempt in 2016, and the defence doctrine is not exempt from it. The manpower policy in particular is due to change, which feeds the second largest land army in NATO and one the strongest in its region. In a topic where available literature is a thin and anecdotal evidence is the norm, the issue of military service buyouts provides some insight.

Turkey’s conscription model is universal. It is not possible to opt for civilian service, or opt out due to religious or family reasons. Conscientious objection is not recognised, which often means a long legal struggle for objectors. The only practical way of total exemption is (apart from dropping the citizenship altogether) a medical discharge. All other methods result in deferrals, which does not remove the obligation and there is no cut-off point where the state stops tracking one’s military service status.

The key issue is that the manpower policy of the military no longer corresponds to the needs of the nation. Prime Minister Yıldırım announced that 5.5 million people still carried the military obligation in 2018, which denotes all men of the military age who still need to go through their military service. He also stated that the required force level of the army was 350,000. In a country of 80 million people with a large youth population, it means processing a very high amount of young men every year. The bureaucracy of enlistment and discharging previous cohorts alone causes several months’ gap between one’s application to enlist and the start of the actual service. So, 600,000 applications for the November 2018 exemption suddenly clogged the system, causing the government to announce a mobilisation-demobilisation schedule stretching to January 2020.

In June 2018, President Erdogan announced a commitment to a more professional and high-tech military as the paid exemption was being launched. The structure of the military has already changed considerably in the last years; the army no longer uses conscripts in most combat units, and the Gendarmerie declared that it will stop enlisting conscripted troops altogether after 2019. The Gendarmerie alone employs around 120,000 drafted personnel, which presents a substantial challenge on its own. Hence, a conscript today is unlikely to see combat, and the military experience remains limited to support roles.

How further professionalisation will be achieved, however, is still in question. The government is unlikely to abolish the military service altogether. Political cost of such a step is very high in an environment where nationalism is on the rise, and the armed forces itself could disagree. Stopgap measures in the past also proved themselves to be problematic: there were several cases in the 2000s where the army pushed for further professionalisation, especially for enlisted men ad NCOs. These were much less successful than anticipated and the armed forces usually could not recruit as many candidates as they wanted.

As a result, the military service became increasingly filled with variations and exceptions: differences between university graduates and non-diploma holders, special rules for dual-citizenship holders and Turks living abroad, and so on. The practice of paid exemptions contributes to this pattern while not finding a solution to the underlying structural issues. It also raises moral questions since those with the wherewithal end up not serving.

The armed forces themselves are aware of these problems. Hulusi Akar, the Minister of National Defence, recently made a statement declaring that the military service is to be reformed — which will unify the currently fractured system into a single training program where educational attainment and employment status will not make a difference. Such a reform would help alleviate the sense of injustice coming from the current system; however, it also requires the coordination of several government ministries.

Any concrete proposals for military service reform will become clearer after the local elections scheduled for March 2019. The manpower policy of the Turkish army is evolving as the society changes and the security policy evolves towards favouring a different kind of force structure. The end result is likely to be a form of compromise between the civilians and the military, which hopefully won’t be the worst of both worlds.

Onur Kara is a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow him on Twitter @on_kara.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turkish_soldier.jpg

Turkey’s Growing Military Influence

May 23, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Gorkem Dirik & Selcuk Aydin

Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 (Credit Image: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

Turkey views itself increasingly compelled to generate new strategies in foreign and security policy by combining both soft and hard power instruments because of the changing dynamics during the post-Arab Spring period. While Turkey was seen as a role model during the Arab Spring for neighboring countries that were in transition from autocratic to democratic forms of governance, this model lost its appeal due to violent toppling of democratically elected regimes as well as the escalation of conflicts in the wider Middle East. For instance, Turkey lost its political and economic ties in Egypt after the coup d’état in 2013. The Syrian civil war bears economic, social and security implications for Turkey. Hence, in order to preserve its political and economic power in the region in the wake of hostile developments around the country, Turkey began to search for other mechanisms to wield its influence. As a result, Turkey has found itself launching military bases in Qatar and Somalia and military intervention in Syria.

Military Journey of Turkey

Turkey was established by Kemalist military cadres who conducted top-down modernist reforms and threatened the civilian governments by coup d’états that encountered strong opposition from the social and political movements throughout Turkish political history.

Several events played a significant role in decreasing the power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in domestic politics during the Justice and Development Party era since 2002. Such factors include the EU negotiation process during the first decade of 2000, the Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer cases respectively in 2008 and 2010 as well as the failed coup attempt on 15^th July 2016 committed by the FETO (Gülenists). The consolidation of civilian politics against the TAF establishment during the Justice and Development Party era enabled the civilian government to use hard power as a diplomatic instrument. Consequently, there TAF were once identified as the determinant of Turkish Foreign Policy, however they have undergone a drastic transformation and they have now turned into the instrument of Turkey’s Foreign policy.

As Turkey entered a new era of foreign policy implementation, this reflected upon the country’s efforts to diversify its options in this matter. For instance, Turkey established new embassies in twelve countries across the African continent to bolster economic relations. Most significantly, this change in foreign policy has positively resulted in a spill-over effect from economic to political and then security fields of relations and impacts.

Historical experiences have also played a key role in empowering the defence industry in guaranteeing the security of the country. In 1974, for instance, when Turkey conducted military operations in Cyprus, the country faced an arms embargo by the US. Ankara was also prohibited from purchasing some specific arms from its NATO allies in its fight against the PKK in the 1990s.

Along with these historical experiences, the conflict in Syria and Iraq accelerated the urgency of empowering the defence industry. Having realized this, Turkey chose to nationalise its defence industry and proceeded with the diversification of its security alliance. As part of this process, Ankara has become cautious on its relations with NATO, whilst signing the S-400 missile agreement with Russia. Turkey also took a leading role in the Syrian peace process alongside Russia and Iran. These advancements in its defence industry allowed the country to undergo a transition from an absolute weapon-importer state to a weapon-exporter state. One illustration is this shift comes with an arms sell to Pakistan selling arms to Pakistan.

Turkey’s Military Expansion

By investing in its defence industry and expanding its network of military bases, Turkey aims to become a more active player in the Middle East, Africa, and Caucasus.

This is evident when looking at the Turkish incursion in Syria, which became a showcase for Ankara to evaluate its military capacity. President Tayyip Erdogan understood the necessity of using military power as a foreign policy instrument in the Syrian war, with the statement “We are not war-lovers, but we are not far from war either” in 2012. In this regard, the Turkish military deterrence has visibly altered the security dynamics in Syria against the ISIS and PKK affiliated groups since the beginning of Euphrates Shield Operation in 2016. As the efforts via soft power means to form a safe-zone in Northern Syria had proven fruitless, Turkey felt obligated to take the necessary steps to create a zone of influence. In addition to this, the recent Turkish-Russian-Iranian tripartite cooperation has indeed aimed to decrease conflict in Syria with agreeing on the four de-escalation zones. Thus, this underlined the prominence of Turkey’s military deterrence capabilities and its growth as a regional power.

As part of Turkey’s new strategy, Turkey has established military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Iraq, and it is expected that the number of Turkish soldiers serving in the oversea military bases will surpass 60,000 by 2022. Moreover, Turkish military activities are not only limited to military bases. Additionally, the TAF train and equip the armies of allied countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

In Somalia, Turkey has opened dockyards, built international airports and numerous hospitals, and established a military base on 30 September 2017. With more than 10,000 soldiers serving, Turkey`s main role is to train and equip the Somali forces in their fight against terrorist groups such as Al-Shaabab. Furthermore, the Turkish military presence has been improving Somalia`s ability to secure its coastline, particularly against pirates that threaten the maritime trade route.

The sharing of common interests, especially in the foreign policy arena, has brought Qatar and Turkey together. This led Ankara to establish another military base in Qatar at the request of the Qatari government in October 2015. With 3,000 troops deployed in the Tariq bin-Ziyad military base, Turkey has further strengthened its position in the Gulf and altered the regional status quo. For instance, during the Gulf crisis, Turkey has played a key role in dissuading the GCC’s (Gulf Cooperation Council) decision to isolate and castigate Qatar for its rapprochement with Turkey, thereby underlining how the latter has increasingly shifted regional power dynamics in its favor.

Furthermore, Turkey`s security cooperation with Azerbaijan has allowed both countries holding periodic joint military exercises to evaluate the Azerbaijani Army’s potential. Turkey also assists in the modernization of Azerbaijani military education by trying to bring it in line with NATO standards. As a result, Azerbaijani military officers participate with Turkey`s peacekeeping missions abroad, for instance, in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ultimately, Turkish military capability has been further solidified via an unofficial agreement between Turkish and Azerbaijani officials on `Casus Foederis`, which signifies that an attack against one country is an attack against both.

In conclusion, Turkey has accelerated its military activity in the Middle East in an attempt to alter the regional balance of power in its favor. Apart from Qatar and Somalia, Turkish military bases as well as its deterrence capabilities can be observed in Northern Cyprus and Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, Ankara provides military training as well as equipping to the military of key Central Asian countries, which also enables increased Turkish influence in this region. Moreover, Turkey`s recent incursion into northern Syria has also illustrated technological advances in its defense industry. Taking all of these developments into consideration, it can be said that Turkey has transformed itself into a crucial player whose influence impacts not only the Middle East but also farther afield, stretching from the Caucasus to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Gorkem Dirik

Gorkem is an Assistant Researcher at TRT World Research Centre. He previously worked at Turkish Embassies in Malta and Barcelona, Spain which enabled him to observe the inner dealings of diplomacy. Before he moved back to Turkey he carried out his studies in languages and diplomacy in Kaliningrad (Russia), Malta, Belgrade (Serbia), Barcelona (Spain), Buenos Aires (Argentina), London (United Kingdom), and Almaty (Kazakhstan). He holds a Master of Science in Conflict Studies and Nationalism from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Besides Turkish, he is fluent in English, Russian, Serbian, Croatian, Spanish and Portuguese for which he holds certificates from reputable universities that he can speak them all on a diplomatic level. His book on Turkish foreign policy, titled Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st century – A Comparative Study: Turkey between East and West was published in 2012 by the University of Malta. Moreover, his dissertation on the Ukrainian Crisis, “The Role of Nationalism in the De-Facto Dissolution of Ukraine” has been awarded as the best dissertation of the year by the LSE. His research and specialisation area is Russian and Turkish foreign policies and their implications on the Balkans and the Central Asia.

Selcuk Aydin

Selcuk is a Researcher at the TRT World Research Centre, and a PhD Candidate, Defence Studies, School of Security Studies, King’s College London. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey’s history, Turkish diaspora in the UK, Kurdish Studies and Middle East. His research interests are colonialism, Middle Eastern politics and history, Islamic and Kurdish movements, diaspora, institutional, and security studies. Selçuk holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, a Master’s Degree in Political Economy of the Middle East from King’s College London. His PhD thesis’ title is “Post-Ottoman States and Kurdish Movements: A Comparatively Analysis of Single Party Regime in Turkey (1923-1945), British Mandate Regime in Iraq (1920-1932) and French Mandate Regime in Syria (1923-1946).”

Image Source: https://qz.com/1093011/turkey-opens-its-largest-overseas-military-base-in-somalia-to-train-somali-soldiers/

Reforming the Republic of Turkey: Erdoğan’s Power Project

December 20, 2016 by Strife Staff

By Kyle R.Brady

After the military-led July 2016 coup attempt failed to overthrow Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2016, a counter-coup effort was initiated by Erdogan to remove any alleged co-conspirators from power. At the time, Erdoğan’s retaliation was expected but the initial response was still overblown, with structurally damaging and problematic consequences to both civil society and the international theatre. In the months following, Erdoğan has undertaken a massive effort that appears to target any enemies – real, perceived, or invented – who stand in opposition to his goals to reform the country. In a continued state of emergency, with expanded national security powers, and with more than 125,000 Turks already removed or suspended from their positions within the military or government, the counter-coup cleanup has clearly exceeded external expectations as the country moves toward autocracy.

Additionally, the formal restructuring of the Republic of Turkey and its government has begun, as the legislature has proposed substantial constitutional reforms that would empower the Presidency and, therefore, Erdoğan. As this is in line with the other Turkish power restructurings in the latter half of 2016, it seems abundantly clear that Erdoğan will not cease his Turkish reformation until fully empowered as its leader. Moreover, this threat-inspired reform will continue to exploit fear and shadowy enemies as the violent attacks on the civilian population – regularly attributed to the Kurds and ISIS — continue.

The consequences of this threat-inspired reform seem to be extraordinarily wide-ranging. The primary and most fundamental casualty derives from the attack on Turkey’s political structure, no longer democratic: the Republic now seems to be authoritarian, if not a burgeoning autocracy. As this reform and conversion process continues, Turkey’s hope for membership in the European Union declines in tandem. Further, the Turkish people will suffer politically, ideologically, and perhaps even theologically, as any autocracy does not tolerate dissent, opposing political views, or alternative belief systems — this intolerance was initiated with the purges.

In light of the birth of a New Cold War, of significant concern to the wider world may be the budding relationship between Turkey and Russia, as they grow closer in their ties, stronger in their coordination, streamlined in their interests, and more similar in their state behaviors [1]. As a NATO member state and a long-term ally of the United States, Turkey’s drift toward authoritarianism, autocracy, and anti-Western sensibilities present a substantial problem to Western leaders in terms of alliances, reliability, and trustworthiness. Moreover, the difficulties presented by the apparent failure of a non-Western, non-European democracy cannot be overstated, as it very clearly presents a counterargument for attempts to bring democracy to the region.

As these purges and authoritarian trends continue, the overall distance between Turkey’s democratic past and authoritarian present remains to be seen. Whether Turkey maintains its NATO membership, EU candidacy, and Western ally status, the country will remain an important regional power with an essential role in the dual interests of the present: a resurgent Russia and regional counter-terrorism efforts. In the meantime, however, Erdoğan will grow both his positioning and power, while freedom, liberty, and peace will continue to suffer within the borders of his state.

Kyle R. Brady (@KyleBradyOnline) is a security-oriented academic with a primary interest in contextualizing security concerns, which he currently explores as a postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies. He also holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University with foci on terrorism, public administration, and emergency management, and a Bachelors in Political Science from San Jose State University with interests in international relations and political theory. You can find Kyle’s work at http://docs.kyle-brady.com, http://blog.kyle-brady.com, or email him at kyle.brady@kcl.ac.uk.

Notes:

[1] Hennigan, W.J., and Brian Bennett. “Russia, Turkey Expand Military Operations in Syria during Trump’s Transition to Power.” Los Angeles Times, 17 November 2016, available at http://lat.ms/2h4hgW6. Also see MacFarquhar, Neil. “Warming Relations in Person, Putin and Erdogan Revive Pipeline Deal.” New York Times, 10 October 2016, available at http://nyti.ms/2h32NZb, and Fraser, Suzan, and Dominique Soguel. “UN Expert Says Torture Appeared Widespread after Turkey Coup.” Washington Post, 2 December 2016 available at http://wapo.st/2i7vXDU

Image credit: https://gercekbizde.com/Haber/Large/72084_biz-bu-tuzaga-dusmeyecegiz_WI2G55CTCKEH.jpg

NATO in the Crucible

October 5, 2016 by Strife Staff

By. Dr. Zachary Wolfraim

nato_parliamentary_assembly_london_2014 — NATO Parliamentary Assembly, held in London 2014. (Source: NATO Parliamentary Assembly Pre-Summit Conference)

Yet again, NATO is having a challenging year. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has demonstrated its repeated ability to pivot and adapt in order to retain some level of relevance in the face of continued international instability. That being said, the newest challenges are coming from within the Alliance and from three of its key member states: the US, the UK and Turkey. NATO is now fully immersed in one of its most difficult and uncertain periods yet, as all these countries potentially redefine their roles internationally and their relationship with the organisation.

The most immediate challenge for NATO is Turkey’s drift towards authoritarianism under President Recep Erdogan. The has given Erdogan the freedom to purge his enemies, both real and imagined, from government while also allowing him to consolidate power. This is troubling for many reasons; however, for NATO, it certainly compromises its ability to act as an alliance built on shared values. NATO has previously had questionable governments in its ranks such as Portugal under Antonio Salazar, the Greek military junta in the 1970s, and Turkey during its previous periods of military rule. That said, the current trend in Turkey seems to be an increasingly colder relationship with Europe and the NATO allies. This has been coupled with renewed overtures towards Moscow, thus presenting a serious difficulty for any future NATO role. An Erdogan-led government of an increasingly authoritarian nature presents a serious threat to NATO’s .

To respond, NATO must continue to gently remind Turkey of the benefits of the Alliance. NATO must also prod other nations, particularly European ones, to remember Turkey’s role in NATO as well the regional pressures that Turkey is facing and which many member states have done little to alleviate. While Turkey is unlikely to leave NATO, a closer relationship with Russia would complicate NATO’s consensus-based decision-making process. Backing Erdogan into a corner will only serve to deepen the Turkish dissatisfaction with NATO and promote closer ties between Ankara and Moscow.

The second clear threat came in the form of the message sent by the British public about their continued relationship with the European Union. With the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron, the desertion of leadership posts by the main pro-Leave campaign leaders and deep turmoil within the Labour party opposition, the British political system was shaken to its foundations. Brexit has fundamentally damaged the credibility of the UK’s ability to serve as the leading international actor in Europe. Though the UK remains a critical military actor in NATO for the time being, it has nonetheless called into question its ability to maintain this position in light of Brexit-related budget shortfalls. Additionally, the deep differences in attitudes towards Europe between Scotland and Northern Ireland and the rest of Britain point to potentially further instability within the UK. While it would be wrong to doubt the UK’s resolve to act in a crisis, the Brexit vote calls into question the scale and capabilities that it can bring to bear in the future.

For now, there has been little immediate effect from the referendum save for the self-inflicted economic damage. Prime Minister Theresa May has announced her intention to invoke Article 50 in early 2017 and formally begin the process of leaving the EU, meaning most, if not all, the instruments of British policymaking will be focused on disentangling and redefining the UK’s relationship with the EU . Beyond this, the future economic impact of Brexit will likely mean diminished revenues and, by extension, NATO can insulate itself somewhat from this by strengthening its relationship with the EU and European member states and offering a more cohesive and coherent partnership between the two organisations. Depending on the shape that Brexit takes, however, it may see one of its most stalwart members reduced significantly in stature.

The final and thankfully still hypothetical prospect, for policymakers in Brussels and for many of America’s allies more generally, is the election of Donald Trump. He recently declared his intention to what could be diplomatically called a more “ blatant disregard for the rules and norms that govern participation in NATO drew a strong response from the Secretary General; however, the reality is that the lack of American participation in the Alliance would effectively demolish its effectiveness. Even questioning the commitment to NATO’s collective security guarantee, Article V, would mean that European member states would find themselves under threat. While there has always been some unease in Washington D.C. about NATO allies pulling their weight, it is the first time that a Presidential contender has threatened to leave American allies undefended.

Thus far Mr. Trump’s foreign policy pronouncements have lacked coherence; however, he has made it clear that European states would not be able to count on the US to uphold the key tenets that underpin NATO’s security guarantee. Similarly, he has expressed his affinity for President Vladimir Putin and recognised Russian claims to Crimea while also (apparently sarcastically) encouraging Russian hackers to leak information about Hilary Clinton. There is little NATO can do should Mr. Trump win the election as his approach to foreign policy is erratic at best. It nonetheless falls on the Secretary General and senior officials to continue to articulate the importance of NATO to American interests overseas.

Any one of these issues would present a serious challenge for NATO yet the Alliance is now faced with all three. This reinforces the commentary from the Wales Summit about NATO’s ability to “walk and chew gum” as crises continue to crop up in parallel rather than sequentially. NATO has continually shown its capacity to repurpose itself, often despite its own worst impulses. It must demonstrate this ability yet again.

Dr. Zachary Wolfraim recently graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as the political risk sector in London.

Turkey’s President Erdoğan counter-coup cleanup

September 5, 2016 by Strife Staff

By: Kyle R. Brady

SAMSUNG CAMERA PICTURES — A night view of Istanbul, Turkey.

Is President Erdoğan ignoring the lessons of the Iraq War at his peril?

Following the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey[1] — wherein factions within the Turkish military and government allegedly conspired to depose President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan[2] — the government of Erdoğan now faces a serious and growing threat: a potential insurgency found within the thousands of Turkish citizens formerly employed by the government, military, or public sector.

In the post-coup period, Erdoğan has not only retained his position but has also undergone[3] a multi-step[4] process of substantially[5] consolidating his power[6] within the country[7]. After formally blaming Fethullah Gülen[8] — a Turkish man and moderate Muslim reformer in self-imposed exile in the United States[9] — for orchestrating the coup, Erdoğan has proceeded to purge the government and military of anyone accused of supporting or sympathizing with Gülen. This effort has resulted in the removal of thousands of bureaucrats, government officials, judges, teachers, and members of the military from their positions, simply as a result of the allegations of the government — a government that increasingly answers solely to Erdoğan.

In the process of undertaking this purge, Erdoğan has ensured a number of outcomes for the immediate future. The first, and most evident, outcome has been the transformation of Turkish democracy into a democracy in name only, as it is incrementally replaced with a loyalist and increasingly autocratic structure that answers more to its leader than the state’s underlying principles or the well-defined rule of law. Second, the civilian-controlled[10] and structurally weakened[11] Turkish military is no longer seen as the defender of the people and the democracy, despite their decades-long status as such[12]. Third, Turkey’s member status within NATO is likely to come into question[13], particularly as Erdoğan’s state increases formal ties with President Putin’s Russia[14]. Lastly, as a result of Erdoğan’s response to the coup, the Turkish government now has greater control over their own anti-terrorist efforts and, by nature of the newly loyalist government, freedom[15] to swiftly[16] pursue any individuals or groups they deem to be terrorists[17], including members of minority or separatist groups that have long troubled Erdoğan[18].

In addition to the clear outcomes of Erdoğan’s post-coup maneuvers — the subject of much discussion by journalists, academics, foreign policy professionals, and others within the field — there exists another distinct problem that has received scant, if any, attention: the group of well-trained, disaffected, and now-subjugated Turkish citizens who have had their lives upended.

One of the most widely acknowledged mistakes of the Iraq War was the swift disbanding of the state’s military and police forces[19]. With this simple act, the United States and its allies created an entire group of individuals who no longer had a source of income or personal pride, but were well-trained in their field, motivated to serve their fellow Iraqis, and fight for what they believed in. This substantially contributed to the extraordinarily difficult problem of insurgency within Iraq — and, eventually, helped to birth ISIS — as many of those who were trained in various aspects of fighting, training, and organizing applied their talents to a familiar purpose and in opposition to those who had deposed them.

This is, precisely, a problem that Erdoğan may soon face: thousands of Turkish citizens who are well-trained in the arts of war, education, and government but have been removed from their posts, stand accused of treason, and are disaffected at the hands of the state they formerly served. It seems unlikely that Erdoğan has yet to realize his potentially grave mistake, nor is he likely to ever do so, given the increasingly loyalist nature of his government. Instead, as he continues to remove citizens of all kinds from their positions, he may be creating the foundation for a widespread insurgency that is entirely unrelated to Turkey’s longstanding problems — both real and perceived — with terrorists, separatists, minorities, and nationalists. Moreover, should he continue down this path, Erdoğan may alienate himself from the general population and create the conditions for his own removal through a populist uprising, rather than a military coup.

It would, therefore, be advisable for Erdoğan to understand and apply the lessons of the Iraq War to his country, his interest in power, and his reforming of government: those who are relied upon to maintain order and function should not be disavowed or disbanded en masse, lest they band together to focus their talent and training on a newer, emerging threat found much closer to home.

Any opinions expressed are directly and expressly the author’s own; they do not represent — unless stated — his employers (past, present, or future) or associated/affiliated institutions.

Kyle R. Brady is an imminent postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies, holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University, and has primary interests in terrorism, law enforcement, and contextualizing security concerns. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. You can follow Kyle on Twitter: @KyleBradyOnline and his personal blog at http://blog.kyle-brady.com. He can be reached through email via: brady.k@gmail.com.

Notes:

[1] http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/world/turkey-military-coup-what-we-know/

[2] http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/what-caused-the-turkish-coup-attempt-214057

[3] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN0ZX07S

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/europe/turkey-prisoners-erdogan.html

[5] http://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-convenes-emergency-security-summit-over-coup-attempt-1469015066

[6] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/turkey-erdogan-coup-future/491696/

[7] http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/08/06/turkey-chooses-erdogan/

[8] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/11/politics/turkey-us-fethullah-gulen-ultimatum/

[9] ibid.

[10] https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/07/31/decree-tightens-civilian-control-over-turkish-military/qSdjjrhmpHRuCUKpwQLTwM/story.html

[11] http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/20/middleeast/turkey-military-failed-coup/