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You are here: Home / Archives for Turkey

Turkey

Lebanon’s case in the Turkish quest for regional leadership

March 19, 2021 by Strife Staff

By Pierre-Axel Thüring

Photo source: CNN Arabic, 2020

There is little debate about Turkish president Recep Tayiip Erdogan’s ambition to become a key regional player. In partnership with Qatar, Turkey has entered a number of unstable areas in a difficult search for regional leadership. If Turkish foreign policy in Syria and Libya is frequently discussed, what about Lebanon? Lebanon has always been the prey of former controlling powers (Turkey and France), invaders (Israel and Syria) and regional rivalries (Saudi Arabia and Iran). The point of this article is to state that, although still moderate, several factors illustrate the growing interest of Turkey in the Land of Cedars, notably in the North.  

Different resentments and biases make it difficult to form a clear and honest assessment of the degree of the Turkish influence today. According to Vice President Fuat Oktay, Ankara has no secret agenda in Lebanon: neither interest in natural resources, nor colonial legacy. The Turks are officially leading a win-win policy in order to promote peace and stability in the region. This policy is based on a ‘common ground’ inherited from the Ottoman Empire, while being quite ironically opposed by Fuat Oktay to a “mindset of colonialism” pursued by certain countries such as France. A contrary discourse can be found in several Western or anti-Erdogan media, accusing the Turkish leader of seeking more weight at the grassroots level. President Erdogan is criticized for trying to galvanize crowds in conservative Muslim areas, especially in the North in Tripoli and in the Akkar. Moreover, several rumours are circulating. Turkey is said to be supplying arms to loyalists in northern Lebanon and bringing cash to finance mobilisations. Faced with these two discourses, what about the facts? 

Turkish action in Lebanon is first of all community based. On one hand, it calls for Sunni Muslim solidarity. Investments are mainly in Sunni Muslim areas and Ankara largely publicises its support for Palestinian refugees, notably those in Lebanese camps.  On the other, it relies on groups of Turkmen and Turkish origin. In 2010, Erdogan came to visit Turkmen communities in the Akkar. The authorities even claimed to offer Turkish nationality to any Lebanese with Turkish or Turkmen roots, with a number of naturalizations estimated at 9600 until 2019.

Ankara and Beirut have also developed cooperation in several fields. Turkey is economically active to the point that it is one of Lebanon main trading partners. Several contracts make it a privileged interlocutor concerning energies such as electricity. Lebanon thus offers outlets for national production. It represents a major strategic interest in the context of economic crisis and regional rivalry in gas exploitation. Turkish presence is also a military one through its participation since 2006 in the UN mission on the border with Israel.  Nevertheless, the Turks are better known in Lebanon for their humanitarian and cultural support. Indeed, since 2014, a whole development program has been developed through the state-run Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). The agency has distinguished itself by the creation of a hospital in Sidon and more recently by the assistance provided following the explosion in the Port of Beirut. Through the creation of schools and cultural centres, through financing the restoration of Ottoman monuments in Tripoli and through series and films, Turkey is gradually developing its cultural influence in Lebanon. 

Finally, the Turkish political clout is relatively moderate and works primarily on personal relationships. Although the government is said to have relations with the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood party, there is no real proof of this. On the contrary, Ankara seems to be more open to dialogue with the widest possible political spectrum, though focusing mostly on Sunni politicians. This includes Faisal Karami, Najib Mikati and Ashraf Rifi. Ties are particularly notable between the families of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and President Erdogan, as well as between the head of the Turkish intelligence agency Hakan Fidan and the head of the Lebanese ‘General Security Directorate’ Abbas Ibrahim. 

This multi-faceted influence, growing although limited, generates many national and regional reactions. 

The most virulent is surely that of the Armenian community. In June 2020, an ethnic Armenian host called Erdogan on TV ‘an obnoxious Ottoman’, causing a demonstration in front of the TV station’s offices as well as many insults on the social networks, mainly from Arabs with Turkish origins. If the Ottoman legacy necessarily affects the vision of Syriacs and Armenian Christians on Turkey, it also has an impact on those remembering the massacres of Arab nationalists by the Ottomans in Beirut and Damascus in 1915 and 1916. 

European reactions to Turkish foreign policy in Lebanon are to be seen in the context of great rivalry in Eastern Mediterranean. The explosion at the Port of Beirut has led to a verbal joust between France and Turkey. Visiting Beirut, French President Emmanuel Macron insisted on avoiding Lebanon ending up ‘in the hands of the vileness of the regional powers’. It is surely no coincidence that, in early December, the French, German and American ambassadors jointly organized a visit to Tripoli. Nevertheless, for internal reasons, the Turkish president lately seems more open to burying the hatchet with France and the European Union. It remains to be seen how long this posture will last, and its consequences for Lebanon. 

The Sunnite position is enshrined in the competition for leadership in the region. With the flow of Palestinian and then Syrian migrants, the Sunnis have seen their political weight increase in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries initially presented themselves as the great patrons of this community. However, due to the economic and social quagmire and the growing Iranian hold, the Saudis have slightly disengaged. The fear of the Lebanese Sunni political elite for a disinterest could lead them to turn more to Ankara. Interestingly, this might not be seen in a bad light by Riyad and Abu Dhabi, since the latest moves on the international scene have shown a rapprochement between the Gulf countries and Qatar, and therefore Turkey. 

Last but not least, the perception of Hezbollah is unsure. If some criticisms emerge in Lebanon towards Hezbollah as responsible for the sanitary and economic crisis, but also for the explosion of the Port, the ‘Party of God’ remains a central player in Lebanese political life. It leaves little room for a political vacuum. What’s more, after clashes between the Turks and Hezbollah in Syria, Ankara lost the support it previously earned among Hezbollah supporters by having harsh words about Israel. According to Fadi Assaf, founder of Middle East Strategic Perspectives, the Shia group sees the rise of Turkish clout from a good eye only if it competes and even breaks the Saudi/Egypt/UAE power in Lebanon. On the contrary, a smart cooperation of influence between them could try to compete Hezbollah.  

To conclude, without fantasizing about it, the Turkish weight in Lebanon is growing in very diverse spheres, in particular in Northern Lebanon. Due to the instability of the country, this policy may represent a risk if it becomes more pronounced. Nevertheless, the redefinition of the Turkish role in Lebanon relies both on the Lebanese national context (Lebanon is not Syria or Libya) and on international developments, in particular the new US foreign policy.

 

Pierre-Axel Thüring is a MA student in International Peace & Security at the War Studies Department. Having studied in Lebanon and Jordan, his research interests are particularly focused on the MENA region.  He is currently writing his dissertation on the Turkish intervention in the Syrian Civil War. 

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: Lebanon, Turkey

Power Game in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Implications for the U.S.

February 18, 2021 by Strife Staff

By Sena Namlu

The John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group and Abraham Lincoln Strike group conduct operations at sea
(The Abraham Lincoln and John C. Stennis carrier strike groups are conducting carrier strike force operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeremiah Bartelt/U.S.)

“Each of the carriers operating in the Mediterranean as this time represent 100,000 tons of international diplomacy,” – Jon Huntsman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia

Sitting at the junction of three continents and main international trade routes, the Mediterranean Sea has been of capital importance for both littoral states and international powers. The name of Mediterranean itself, originating from the Latin term (mediues terra) and meaning “the sea in the middle of the earth,” illustrates its significant place in international affairs. While for regional powers, such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea determines their national security and prosperity, it equally has strategic implications for states outside of the basin with regards to furthering influence over different regions and connection with other parts of the world.

The United States has been engaged in the region since the 19th century. America’s involvement reached its apogee during the Cold War; a time when two superpowers vied for control over the Mediterranean region, encompassing an immense maritime zone between the Straits of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. The Mediterranean Sea has witnessed many examples of coercive naval diplomacy, historically known as Gunboat Diplomacy, which involves the application of naval forces to compel or deter a state. By the end of the Cold War, the United States had achieved unity in the Mediterranean, for the first time since ancient Rome, through bilateral and multilateral political arrangements; transforming the Sea into an almost a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lake or a Mare Nostrum for the Alliance. 

The emerging threats and complex regional challenges of the post-Cold War era brought renewed attention to the Mediterranean and forced states to engage in the region, notwithstanding the United States’ gradual retreatment. The American policy of withdrawal was initiated with the Obama Administration, but was taken further in the Trump era. Rising regional and international powers are eager to fill this expanding void left in America’s wake, seeking to gain as much control as they can in such a promising maritime area. 

Russia, which has historically had strong incentives to access the warm watersof the Mediterranean, has successfully exploited the long-lasting conflicts in the Mediterranean as well as the current power gap, leading to the establishment of a permanent presence through heavy investments in the Syrian Port of Tarsus, where now it has both an air base and naval facility. 

China has adopted a relatively peaceful method of further its influence in the Mediterranean through weaponization of its global supply chain. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the Mediterranean is a crucial part, led to the country investing in the high-tech industries of Europe such as aerospace and artificial intelligence, and connecting said ventures through an immense supply chain comprised of many Mediterranean ports in which Chinese state-owned companies have significant holdings. Following the acquisitions of ports in several coastal states such as Italy, Malta and Greece, Chinese state firms now have significant influence in one-tenth of all European port capacity. Beijing is orchestrating every instrument at its disposal, including political, economic, and security creating a symphony in the words of Chinese Foreign Minister, in order to expand Chinese influence and presence around the world. One of the major concerns is of the possibility that China may not hesitate to use its civilian port facilities to the military end as it has done so in the past. Furthermore, Beijing’s previous experience of dispatching one of its most impressive-looking warships, the 689-foot-long amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan to Syria” to participate in Russian coercive diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, makes the menace even greater for Europe and the United States.

Turkish claims based on the Blue Homeland doctrine and enforced through the dispatch of the seismic research vessel Oruç Reis raised the unresolved issues in the Mediterranean relating to maritime delimitation and jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the country with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Turkey regards drilling activities on the continental shelf as its fundamental right and disregards any solution that “confines Turkey to the shores.” Turkish foreign policy objectives relate the region directly to national security, rights, and interests. Additionally, Turkey’s perception of being left out in the Eastern Mediterranean based on the regional cooperation efforts excluding Turkey such as EastMed Gas Forum aggravates the tension and induces Ankara to resort more to coercive naval diplomacy. The successful outcome of natural gas reserve exploration in the Black Sea also strengthened Turkey’s commitment towards drilling operations in the Mediterranean. 

Countries opposed to Turkey’s actions in the region gathered around France, whose expectations for further political and military supports towards the European Union and NATO remain unmet, have agreed on seeking regional cooperation. France that has been the most vocal European power in opposing Turkey’s regional claims so far, backed by Greece and Cyprus with joint military drilling operations and deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Eastern Mediterranean. France’s President, Emmanuel Macron seems quite determined to resist resurgent Turkish moves in the Mediterranean and has closed the ranks with its regional partners at all costs as being lacked of concrete support from the European Union and NATO members in its battling with Turkey. 

Meanwhile, Turkey similarly seeks to strengthen its hand through bilateral arrangements with another regional actor. Ankara signed two memoranda of understanding with Libya’s United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), one of which regulates maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea in line with the Turkish claims and the other envisaging further security and military cooperation. These agreements are followed by a similar deal between Greece and Egypt. 

In pursuit of the Greece-Egypt deal, Prime Minister of Greece Mitsotakis and the President of Egypt Sisi reflected their expectation of more decisive U.S. involvement in the region under a Biden Administration. Nevertheless, given the other prominent challenges facing America such as extreme domestic polarization and the rising Chinese threat in the Pacific region, it is hard to predict whether the election of “Joe Bidenopoulos”, as he introduced himself to a group of Greek Americans will result in a rotation of American attention towards the region and to what extent this shift will change the course in the Mediterranean. Biden will likely give more weight to international organizations, beginning with enhancement of the EU and NATO’s downsized role in the region. However, geopolitical challenges require further engagements. Besides Russia’s permanent return to the area, China’s rapprochement with America’s most important strategic partner in the region, Israel puts American regional and international interests at higher risk. Similarly, Huawei’s expansion based on the Digital Silk Road Initiative accordingly to ports-buying strategy raise the caveat of filching data from NATO allies and friends in the region. 

There is little doubt that the President-elect Biden will find himself in the middle of various complex and entrenched issues related to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea once he takes the oval office. It is clear that defusing tensions, restoring once-existing U.S. and NATO’s influence, and countering the rise of Russia and China as the alternative strategic partners for the region will occupy the top of the lists of American policies in the area. Any help and support provided by the regional partners will be beneficial for the United States. Although the hard task of gathering regional NATO allies France, Greece and Turkey, around a table has become more challenging than it has been before, Biden Administration can bring a breath of fresh air in relations and create incentives for each party to bolster dialogue. Depending on the new American leader’s ability to manage sensitive and tangled regional relations and find a common ground among highly divided and determined actors, it will soon be seen whether this glimmer of hope may blaze out or rapidly fade away.

 

Sena Namlu is a youth and women’s right activist. She has actively partaken in social profit organizations working on particularly girls and youth empowerment — their inclusion in policy-making, conflict resolution, and peace-building processes, and initiated social projects. She is a board member of YCDC, the representative institution of Youth 20 in Turkey, and attended the Y20 Summit in Argentina and G(irls)20 Summit in Japan as Turkey’s delegate. She is also a fellow of the Women in Conflict 1325 Fellowship Programme. After graduation, she worked within Doctors of World Turkey Office as a Grant Officer. Sena is currently a graduate student in the Intelligence and International Security MA Program at the War Studies Department of KCL. Her research interests include processes of foreign policy-making, providing and analyzing information for decision-makers, as well as the role of women and non-governmental actors in conflict resolution and peace-building.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: aircraft carriers, greece, maritime, mediterranean, strategy, Turkey, United States

The Libyan Puzzle Piece in Turkey’s Grand Strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean

December 31, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Jack Cross

Joint press conference between President Erdogan and Fayez Al Sarraj, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord, 4th June, 2020

Despite dominating international headlines during the Arab Spring, events in Libya at the time and their consequences today appear to be forgotten. This does not mean, however, that events on the North African coast should be ignored. Indeed, in the context of a civil war, now entering its sixth year since beginning in 2014 , renewed attempts at peace are underway. Alongside the two warring factions are many interested external parties, including Turkey, whose government provides arms and support to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli. The GNA’s opponent is the Benghazi-based, House of Representatives and Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the LNA. But what exactly does Turkey hope to gain in this fragile, embattled and scarred state? I will argue, it is part of a wider narrative of Turkish expansionism across the Eastern Mediterranean and a drive to become the dominant political and economic force in the region.

A recent history of Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Civil War goes back to mid-2019, although their relationship stretches further to the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire under which Libya was a province until 1911-12. This imperial connection places Libya within Turkey’s historical sphere of influence. The current intervention began with Turkey and the GNA agreeing two memorandums of understanding: a military agreement and a maritime deal, signed in November 2019. These guaranteed Ankara’s support, in exchange for revisions of their shared maritime border in the Mediterranean Sea. This was followed up by a vote by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in January of this year, to approve the deployment of military personnel and resources to Libya. The assistance provided by Ankara came in the form of arms, supplies and technical support worth roughly $350 million. Moreover, foreign mercenaries have also been employed and deployed.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya has contributed to a war of words with some of its NATO allies, particularly France, who had been backing the rival Benghazi based government. This has continued despite the fact that the Haftar-led side has little international recognition. However, there have been attempts to reduce foreign influence in the Libyan conflict, including an EU arms embargo, agreed in 2016. This was used to add greater weight to the UN embargo established in 2011. So, what is to be gained here, particularly when the stakes are high enough to spark tensions with major powers? For Turkey, Libya is a key piece of the jigsaw in their ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. In recent years, Turkey as well as Greece and Cyprus, have been increasingly interested in explorative drilling in the Mediterranean, with the potential for huge benefits in exploiting the natural gas deposits beneath the seabed. The Turkish-GNA maritime agreement establishes exclusive economic zones for both Libya and Turkey in the Mediterranean, at the expense of the competing claims made by Greece, Cyprus and others. Already the world has seen mounting tension over this issue, with recent standoffs between the Turkish and Greek navies.

Now, Turkey’s fortunes in the Mediterranean are very clearly tied to those of the GNA in Libya. If the GNA fail to come out as the dominant party in any peace accord, this could put the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement in jeopardy, and President Erdogan’s ambitions along with it. The official line from Ankara makes it clear that they have no intention of abandoning their allies in Libya and there have been widespread suspicions that Turkey has been seeking to breach the arms embargo. In recent days, several Turkish vessels have been boarded by naval personnel, on behalf of the military mission policing the UN and EU embargos. While the Turkish government has denied that there have been attempts to breach any arms embargo, they have stated that their mercenaries are to remain in Libya. This is despite the fact that the initial ceasefire agreement did explicitly call for the removal of foreign military personnel. The danger here is that if Turkey continues these provocative acts, as part of its wider strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, peace talks in Libya may well break down.

So, what consequences do Turkish successes in Libya pose for the wider region? The problem for France, and others opposed to the Turkish policy, is that the Ankara backed side is in a stronger position. At the time of the ceasefire, the GNA had already successfully defended Tripoli from assaults by Haftar and the LNA and retains control of key air bases in the western part of the country. It increasingly appears as if the momentum is behind the GNA, after these recent victories. The current Haftar backers, particularly Russia, have no direct involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean disputes, and are also increasingly friendly with the Erdogan government.  In fact key parts of Turkey’s maritime aims regarding Libya are already accomplished, as the agreement made with the GNA has been registered by the UN as an arrangement made between two legitimate governments. But Ankara must maintain its involvement throughout the peace talks. Turkey has sought to strengthen its position within the peace negotiations, offering $120 billion (USD) worth of reconstruction contracts, on condition that the GNA becomes the dominant force in the post-war government. With this backdrop, it looks likely that Turkey will be heading for further collisions with other actors in the region as talks continue to reach a lasting settlement.

It is unclear yet if Erdogan’s gamble in supporting the GNA has paid off, or what exactly a victory in Libya would mean more broadly for Turkish foreign policy. The threat of sanctions over Turkey’s continued involvement in Libya and provocations in the Mediterranean have appeared to have little effect in deterring the Turkish government. The future remains uncertain and dangerous. The fragile truce in Libya could easily collapse and at that point, Turkish involvement could become greater and even more entrenched. The Libyan piece of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean puzzle has not quite fallen into place yet, it still hangs in the balance. With all the uncertainty and instability there is no telling what the direct consequences will be for the wider region, should Turkey prevail here.


Jack Cross is currently pursuing his MA in the History of War in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His main research interests are on diplomatic history, modern Turkey the Middle East more broadly.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Erdogan, GNA, Libya, LNA, neo-ottomanism, Turkey

Feature – Climate Change, Conflict, and Children’s Rights Abuses: Syrian Refugees in Turkey

December 18, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Chiara Scissa

In limbo in Lesbos: Doctors without Borders labelled the Mória Refugee Camp as the ‘worst refugee camp on earth’ (Image credit: Getty Images/AFP/F. Perrier)

Introduction

The world is becoming increasingly aware of the interconnections between climate change, human rights, and its implications on affected populations and countries. It is now widely recognised that climate change adversely impacts the right to life, property, and an adequate standard of living by hampering access to hygiene, water, and food but also adequate healthcare, among many basic necessities. This fact has been most visible during the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011.

According to the data of the Syrian Ministry of State for Environment Affairs and the World Bank, the annual temperature in Syria has increased at a rate of 0.8°C per century since the 1950s. This change is reflected in an increased frequency, length, and intensity of droughts and heatwaves. Decades of unsustainable agricultural policies, the consequent overexploitation of water and soil resources, coupled with the effects of climate change resulted in desertification, higher temperatures, and reduced precipitations. These developments dramatically impacted the agricultural industry, at that time representing twenty-five per cent of Syrian GDP.

Although in-depth research studies have so far not confirmed a causal link between climate change and conflicts, other scholars, such as Ingrid Boas, nevertheless stress that drought and water scarcity may be included among the complex and interlinked pressures that characterise the unrest in Syria. To make matters worse, water infrastructure there was consistently under attack. In a country already hit by drought, attacks on water networks cut services for weeks during the armed conflict, with millions of people suffering from long and deliberate interruptions to a water supply.

According to UNICEF, disruptions in Aleppo encompassed a deliberate forty-eight-day shutdown of a water treatment plant that served two million people. Indeed, the organisation  straightforwardly claimed ‘attacks on water and sanitation are attacks on children.’ Without safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), children’s health, nutrition, safety, and education are at risk. They are exposed to preventable diseases including diarrhoea, typhoid, cholera and polio which may potentially disrupt their early development if not treated on time. Children are also at risk of undernutrition and malnutrition, vulnerable to sexual violence and injury as they collect water.

The report continues by noting that children under fifteen are, on average, nearly three times more likely to die than adults from vector-borne diseases, such as diarrhoeal disease, related to unsafe water and sanitation than violence directly linked to conflict. As a matter of fact, seventy per cent of annual children’s death are attributable to diarrhoea, malaria, neonatal infection, pneumonia, preterm delivery, and the lack of oxygen at birth. For children under five, this probability increases more than twenty times.

With millions of refugees streaming into Europe since the onset of the war, Turkey, as Syria’s closest and ‘safest’ neighbour has been the focal point of this population movement. However, Turkey’s response to the refugees has been a human rights abomination, particularly when it comes to children and minors. This article will describe the steps Turkey has taken to undermine the human rights of Syrian children and why it should not be considered a safe third country.

Children’s rights abuses in Turkey

It has been estimated that due to the Syrian civil war, as of March 2019, one million Syrian children became orphans, 4.7 million children are in need of humanitarian assistance, and another 490,000 of said children are in hard-to-reach areas. Overall, six million Syrians are internally displaced, while another 5.6 million people have left their home country. Most of them fled to Turkey. In response, Turkey passed two foundational pieces of legislation in 2013. First, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection no. 6458, which entered into force in April 2014, and second, the Temporary Protection Regulation – TPR, in 2014. Given that Turkey is one among very few countries which still has the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Syrians and non-European asylum seekers may only be entitled to the weaker standards provided under the TPR.

As pointed out by several authors, temporary protection has a more limited scope than the refugee protection and, in non-compliance with its provisions, health and education services as well as access to social assistance and employment to Syrians are often not delivered. For instance, UNICEF stressed that the situation for refugee children in Turkey remains particularly challenging, given that around 400,000 Syrian children are still out of school and are therefore at likely risk of isolation, discrimination and exploitation. Of 4 million registered Syrians in Turkey, 3.6 million were awarded the TPR, including around 1.5 million children under 18, of which 532,000 are under 5 years of age.

To date, Ankara is yet established a comprehensive human rights framework. Nor does it provide for a specific law addressing (un)accompanied minors. However, under Article 3 of the TPR, (un)accompanied minors are persons with special needs, thus entitled to additional safeguards and priority access to rights and services, such as healthcare, psychosocial support, and rehabilitation. Pursuant to the Turkish Civil Code, unaccompanied minors shall be appointed with a legal guardian, a provision that the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) claims is not respected most of the time.

In this respect, it has been noted that lawyers in Ankara have witnessed difficulties, while in some cases appointed guardians had no qualification for that role. AIDA also noted the persistent coexistence of different procedures applying to the reception and guardianship of unaccompanied minors in Turkey, which gives rise to different standards of treatment. AIDA considers, for instance, that in 2019 the legal assessments of new guardians in Antakya have not been conducted carefully.

Additionally, although Turkey has ratified both the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Exploitation and Abuses, Amnesty International claims that, between 2014 and 2018, Turkey has unlawfully deported Syrians to their home country, violating the principle of non-refoulement. According to such peremptory norm, States are not allowed to remove, deport or expel a person to a country where their life and liberty would be threatened, or where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

This allegation has been also confirmed by Human Rights Watch and questions have been raised by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on migration and refugees of the Council of Europe, on the observance of its international obligations. Amnesty showed that episodes of deportation persisted respectively in July 2019 and May 2020. The victims are mostly men, but there is evidence of children and families deported. Moreover, Syrians at risk of deportation are often left without legal recourse or remedy to prevent their illegal removal, and the UNHCR does not have access to immigration removal centres, as also noted by the European Parliament.

Furthermore, Amnesty International, Save the Children, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, and the Council of Europe accuse Turkey of unlawfully detaining Syrian asylum seekers. In 2017, there were 21 temporary accommodation centres for temporary protection beneficiaries. Some of these have turned into de facto detention centres for Syrians with insufficient food and dire conditions, especially for children. In practice, unaccompanied minors are kept in removal centres in border cities and a number of children begging or selling small objects in the street are detained in police stations, where they often receive documents cancelling their right to stay.

Children with their families are generally detained in removal centres where they are not granted education. For all these reasons, recently, the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey violating Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture), Article 5.4 ECHR (right to remedy), Article 5.1 ECHR (freedom of movement), and Article 13 ECHR (fair trial) in the case of detention pending expulsion of a mother and her 3 children, all Russian nationals, arrested for attempting to cross the Syrian border after entering Turkey.

Finally, another severe breach of children’s rights in Turkey concerns the employment of children under the age of 15, which remains a considerable problem in Turkey. The influx of refugees has led to a quickly growing number of Syrian children working especially in textile factories and agriculture. A 2020 Save the Children report finds that often families only pay smugglers for their children’s trip to Turkey. From there the children need to find jobs to continue their journey to Western Europe.

This particular pattern of emigration exposes them to exploitation, abuses, kidnapping, and detention by smugglers as well as by Turkish authorities. According to Save the Children, ‘out of 254 children interviewed in March 2019, almost thirty per cent worked in one of the transit countries before reaching Belgrade. Almost all of these children (97%) worked in Turkey. Based on the testimonies of those willing to provide this information, the prices of transferring migrants from the country of origin to the desired destination ranged from EUR 6,000 to over EUR 10,000’.

Conclusion

In light of the persistent violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights of Syrians and other non-European persons in need of international protection in general and of (un)accompanied minors in particular, the unfilled lack of a comprehensive human rights framework, and the increasing limitation to basic civil and political rights by the central Turkish government, it comes clear that Turkey cannot be considered anymore, if ever, as a safe third country, where international protection applicants may find guarantees of adequate protection standards.

Similarly, the heads of government and state of the EU Member States that in 2016 signed together with Turkey the so-called EU-Turkey Statement cannot shy away anymore from their international obligations and responsibilities. Neither Turkish President Erdoğan’s autocratic regime, nor the absence of a national human rights framework persuaded the EU to consider Turkey as an unsafe country for refugees and asylum seekers. On this behalf, President Erdoğan repeatedly threatened the EU to open the border with Greece as a way to convince the Union to financially support Turkey’s intervention in Syria. In March 2020, the EU refused to increase its financial aid to Ankara, claiming that EU Member States would not bow to President Erdoğan’s threats. A few days later, the Turkish President opened the gate and thousands of migrants stuck at the Turkish-Greek border to exit the country.

Ankara used migration to put pressure on a weak EU, unwilling to take on its responsibilities towards migratory challenges. The externalisation of actions to curb migration through informal agreements with unsafe non-EU countries, which unlawfully impedes people to leave their soil in exchange for financial and economic benefits, leads to human rights abuses, to breaches of international and EU law, and to extremely serious damages against the victims involved. Many scholars have also pointed out the high risk for the parties involved to violate the principle of non-refoulement, since the removal of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey as the first country of asylum seems not to fulfil the requirement of sufficient and effective protection.

Such a human rights-breaching deal – that trapped over twelve thousand asylum seekers in the Moria refugee camp, which has a capacity to house two thousand – should end immediately. As long as EU Member States will continue to limit the access to international protection in their national territories and to add external barriers to stem migration flows, the Common European Asylum System cannot be more than empty words on the EU Official Journal.


Chiara Scissa is a PhD student in Law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies (Pisa, Italy) and Human Rights and Migrant Protection Focal Point at the United Nations Major Group for Children and Youth (UNMGCY). Her main research interests in migration and refugee studies include the impact of climate change on human rights and environmental migration. Email: chiara.scissa@santannapisa.it

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: children’s rights, Climate Change, conflict, displacement, Syria, Turkey

Turkish Claims and the Oil Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean

December 7, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Rafaella Piyioti

The RV MTA Oruç Reis, named after the Admiral in the Ottoman Navy and chief governor in the Western Mediterranean, near the coast of Antalya, Turkey (Image credit: AP)

Over the past decade, discoveries of large amounts of natural gas in the Levant Basin as well as in the territorial waters of Israel and Cyprus show that the area is rich in resources. Their successful exploitation potentially holds enormous economic benefits. For this reason, a strong alliance between Cyprus, Israel, Greece, and Egypt led to the signing of maritime boundary agreements, establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for each country. The presence of these resources, however, also presents a challenge for regional stability. Turkey, for example, is left excluded from this initiative. As a result, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are growing. The roots of this dispute over energy resources, nevertheless, is part of the conflictual histories of the actors involved, thus holding wider implications for the international community. 

In January 2020, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan formed the EastMed Gas Forum to establish the basis for cooperation and exploration of the natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. France made an official membership request while the US asked to become a permanent observer of the forum. At the same time, Turkey officially criticised the forum as an organised attempt to exclude Ankara. Part of the reason why, however, is that Turkey did not sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the UNCLOS, the territorial waters of a nation extend up to 12 nautical miles from its shore and up to 200 nautical miles from the shore of its EEZ. Natural resources found within this territory belong exclusively to that country. Contrary to UNCLOS, Turkey formed its own continental shelf theory, which excludes islands, and states that a country’s EEZ extends underwater only to the very edge of its continental shelf. The absence of formal agreements between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus on their maritime borders, leads to competing claims on the extension of their territorial rights at sea made by Cyprus and Greece, and Turkey and Northern Cyprus.

(Image credit: FT)

With Northern Cyprus under Turkish control since the 1974 invasion, Turkey officially does not recognise the Cypriot Republic to the South. As such, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejects any Cypriot drilling activities in the region and refuses to recognise Cyprus’ agreements with Israel, Greece, and Egypt over the exploitation of natural resources found in the Eastern Mediterranean. Instead, Turkey considers the maritime territory of Northern Cyprus to be part of its EEZ and following its own continental shelf theory the exploitation of hydrocarbons found in the region is a Turkish legal right. Northern Cyprus, however, is not recognised by any country other than Turkey itself and Erdoğan’s actions are deemed illegal by the international community.

More recently, tensions over the ownership of the natural resources under the seabed of the Mediterranean between Turkey and Cyprus escalated, with Turkey holding military exercises in the Mediterranean. In May 2019, Turkey sent its first drilling ship to conduct exploratory drillings off the north coast of Cyprus. The European Union (EU), in response, imposed economic sanctions on Turkey. Erdoğan refused to de-escalate tensions stating that European sanctions will not affect Turkey’s determination to continue exercising what it sees as its legal rights in Cypriot waters. At present, two Turkish ships, Yavuz and Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, are in territorial waters around Cyprus searching for natural resources.

Tensions between Greece and Turkey are more complicated. The two countries find themselves in an ongoing dispute over Kastellorizo, a Greek island located to the east of the Aegean Sea close to Turkey’s Anatolian coast. Greece insists that, according to UNCLOS, the island enjoys a full EEZ of 200 miles leaving Turkey with a very small EEZ relative to its coastline. Turkey rejects Athens’ claims and has continued to conduct drilling south of the island. In response, Greece has attempted to push for additional sanctions against Turkey but there is little appetite for such a response at the European level. German attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey called for official negotiations, which failed to reach a mutual agreement over the EEZ of Kastellorizo. A maritime-boundary agreement between Greece and Egypt, viewed by Turkey as a move of aggression violating its maritime territory, thereby ending the negotiation process.

Renewed illegal drillings by Turkey in August 2020, this time with the presence of Turkish Navy warships in the area. Greek warships often shadow them creating a tense and potentially escalating situation. As Erdoğan renews his aggressive rhetoric, the Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, introduced a new defence plan, increasing the country’s military capabilities. But as Turkey and Greece are NATO allies a push towards a new phase of negotiations seems more appealing than a military confrontation. France condemns Erdoğan’s violations of Greek and Cypriot maritime rights offering military assistance to Greece. Germany attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey and the rest of the EU is still indecisive.

(Image credit: FT)

Turkey’s behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of Erdoğan’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy, which aims at renewing Turkish influence in neighbouring countries, formerly part of the Ottoman empire. With the Turkish lira facing one of its lowest recorded values, the President is attempting to turn people’s attention away from the economic problems, by emphasising Turkish influence in the region. Turkey’s isolation from its NATO allies over their conflicting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean also pushed Erdoğan towards adopting a rather more Islamist tone, promoting himself domestically as the protector of all Muslims. After his long-lasting military presence in Syria since 2011, Erdoğan turned his attention to Libya. Turkey and Libya signed a maritime accord in November 2019 violating the Greek EEZ. To escalate things further Erdoğan sent military aid to the UN-recognised government (GNA) in Tripoli to help Fayez al-Sarraj defeat General Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya could lead to further destabilisation in the region and draw the involvement of additional international actors. France, Greece, Egypt, Israel, and the UAE publicly backed Haftar, with the latter two signing a historic peace deal. Paradoxically, the U.S. did not take a clear position on Libyan tensions despite its’ close ties with General Haftar who holds U.S. citizenship. Turkey’s recent involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is another example of Erdoğan’s assertive foreign policy. Amid recent increases of violence in the region Erdoğan pledged his nation’s support for Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani forces are using Turkish-made drones in their fight against Armenians. Turkey is growing into a major drone player but the use of Turkish drones in Nagorno-Karabakh received international scrutiny.

Erdoğan envisions Turkey as a regional power and pursues an assertive foreign policy to extend its regional influence. Turkish claims at a sea, as well as its pursuits on land, fall within the scope of its neo-Ottoman vision, which sees Turkey advancing its influence in the region. The EU remains indecisive on how to approach Turkey; Germany acts as the mediator whilst France takes a tougher stance, pledging military support to Greece. Without the U.S. in its traditional, since the 1974 Turkish Invasion in Cyprus, mediating and stabilising role in the region, it is time for the EU to decide on a new approach to handle this crisis. The U.S. under President Donald Trump reduced its foreign involvement and distanced itself from its NATO allies. Under the future President Joe Biden, the USA might wish to think anew of taking up its traditional role in NATO and its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is a strategic partner of the EU but if Erdoğan continues his aggressive behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions could escalate further jeopardising the future of EU-Turkey cooperation.


Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy and is a Staff Writer for Strife Blog, Shield, and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. Rafaella also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys travelling and learning about new cultures in her free time.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Disputes, Eastern Med, greece, Med, mediterranean, Oil, Territorial disputes, Turkey

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