Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for foreign policy

foreign policy

Sri Lanka between China and the West: Balancing on a Foreign Policy Tightrope

by

by Shakthi De Silva

Hambantota port, victim of China’s debt-trap diplomacy? (Image credit: AFP)

After purportedly falling victim to China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, the island of Sri Lanka took the international limelight in July 2017. Many observers referred to the Sri Lankan Government’s decision to hand over the strategically located Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease as indicative of a malicious plan to indebt countries to China. Scholarship discussed the case as depicting the seemingly nefarious nature of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and in many narratives, the island was portrayed as having no agency – a small power which ‘suffers what they must’ in Thucydides’ words.

The 2015 ousting of Pro-China President Mahinda Rajapakse by a former minister of his own party – Maithripala Sirisena – ostensibly signalled a shift in the country’s foreign policy. The optimism of such a ‘foreign policy reset’ was overshadowed by the outcome of the 2019 Presidential election which resulted in Gotabhaya Rajapakse’s victory. Western scholars ruefully reasoned that Sri Lanka would shift overtly towards China under Gotabaya Rajapakse, having witnessed a Pro-China foreign policy during the tenure of his elder brother – Mahinda Rajapakse (2005-2015).

This conjecture has not been borne out by facts. A few days after the election, Gotabaya welcomed Dr. S. Jaishankar, India’s External Affairs Minister – the first Foreign Minister to meet and personally congratulate him on his victory. Rajapakse also chose India as the first country to visit as head of state and after meeting Prime Minister Modi received a $400 million line of credit to fund several development projects on the island. Since then, he met with Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as welcomed the U.S Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Alice G. Wells in the same week.

Complying with the much-iterated policy of ‘Non-alignment and Mutual Friendship and Trust among Nations’ was a core tenet of Gotabaya’s election manifesto. In several public pronouncements after the election, President Gotabaya expressed his desire to adopt a balanced approach in his foreign policy; welcoming investments from and striving “to maintain friendly relations” with all parties. As China and the United States expand their presence in the Indian Ocean, what must they keep in mind when they engage with the new Sri Lankan administration?

Rationalising the Sino-Sri Lankan relationship

Western powers should take note of the fact that Sri Lanka has been in dire need of investments to kick start its economy since the end of its internal armed conflict in 2009. Foreign direct investments (including foreign loans received by companies registered with the country’s Board of Investment) during the first half of 2019 amounted to $501 million – significantly lower than most neighboring Asian countries.

A World Bank report detailing the projected GDP growth of South Asian countries ranked Sri Lanka just above the bottom, with a real GDP growth rate of less than 3% for 2019.  Since the island reached upper-middle-income status, it has had to borrow on commercial terms; thereby intensifying its debt crisis. In such circumstances, policymakers are attuned to attract as much investment as possible to spur an economy that has consistently lagged behind other regional powers. In so doing, China emerges as an attractive partner and, thus, increased its investment in Sri Lanka from $ 178.5 million in 2012 to $ 579 million by 2017. Although the United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment in the Indo-Pacific, its cumulative foreign direct investment inflows to Sri Lanka between 2013 and 2018 amounted to only $134 million. The economic rationale behind the close Sino-Sri Lankan relationship is clear to see.

Secondly, Western narratives portraying Sri Lanka’s predicament as a manifestation of Chinese ‘predatory lending’, ‘checkbook diplomacy’, or ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ hardly resonates with the local public. Numerous studies by Sri Lankan economists have uncovered how Sri Lanka’s debt crisis is not ‘wholly’ or even ‘largely’ caused by China. In fact, a much larger percentage of Sri Lanka’s external debt are loans raised through external sovereign bonds and foreign currency financial facilities. Locals are also prone to blame Sri Lankan politicians, particularly members of the United National Party, for finalizing the 99-year lease agreement of the Hambantota port.

Moreover, the West must also understand that Sri Lankans do not generally perceive China’s presence in the Indian Ocean as pernicious to the island’s security. Despite establishing a base in Djibouti, China’s engagement in the Indian Ocean has been relatively limited and benign, owing to the fact that Beijing’s primary security interests reside in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. In consequence, the island welcomes China’s presence in the region and has sought ways in which the two economies can closely integrate so that the island can benefit from China’s rise. Furthermore, the substantial quantities of medical supplies delivered by China after the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus exhibit Beijing’s desire to cultivate an image as a friendly benefactor.

Beijing’s support during the final phases of the internal armed conflict in Sri Lanka is another major factor driving the local public’s relative lack of apprehension towards Chinese activities in the region. Political engagement between the two countries has been robust. As of 2018, Sri Lanka had nine ‘sister-city agreements’ with China and 2013 saw the inking of a comprehensive cooperative partnership between the two countries. One report also suggested that between 2000 and 2017 there were 130 political visits between Sri Lankan and Chinese governmental leaders. This year also marks the 63rd anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations with China.

Intensified allegations from the West against the state armed forces have also pushed President Gotabhaya to declare his intention of withdrawing from international institutions if they continue to press for transitional justice or demand for impartial investigations into the last stages of the war. For example, in his speech at the 2020 National Ranaviru Day commemorations, he emphatically stated: ‘In a small country like ours where our war heroes have sacrificed so much, I will not allow anyone to exert undue pressure on them or harass them.’ Therefore, continued pressure from the West on the human rights front will only push Rajapakse towards China – an outcome which the West nor Rajapakse are necessarily inclined to welcome.

However, this does not imply that Rajapakse will be beholden to Beijing. A pro-China policy stance is not an indelible position for most countries. Beijing would be wise to understand that a pro-China foreign policy can change if the leader is replaced by an alternative candidate in a democratic election or when the local ‘pro-China’ elite has a change of heart. To continue its robust relationship with Sri Lanka, it would be advisable for Beijing to enhance investments while also promoting people-to-people ties, particularly in the sectors of professional training and higher education

A pawn on the chessboard of great power politics?

Sri Lanka’s location has often been lauded as its most important asset but policymakers cannot solely avail on ‘strategic location’ if they wish to position the island as the hub of the Indian Ocean. In this complex and fluid environment, strategic astuteness has become a necessity for policymakers. Sri Lanka’s favorable location needs to be matched by a stable and coherent foreign policy as well as structural reforms to promote the island’s investment and business climate.

As great power presence in the Indian Ocean is unlikely to dissipate in the near future, misreading the landscape can prove costly for Sri Lanka. The island will witness increased presence and engagement with regional and extra-regional powers, which may create a situation where the island’s leadership might have to choose between one party over another. Local policymakers need to have hard-headed assessments of contemporary geopolitics, conduct unsentimental audits of the benefits and negative implications of diverse forms of engagement with regional and extra-regional powers, and resist a situation where Sri Lanka’s policy choices are constrained by external powers.

As China’s economy has entered a phase of gradual slowing down, Rajapakse would do best to remember that there are limits to what China can offer economically in the long run and therefore, diversifying ties with other regional and extra-regional powers would be in the island’s best interest.

 Mr. Shakthi De Silva currently serves as an Assistant Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Colombo. His previous work has appeared on the South Asian Survey (SAGE), Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (Taylor & Francis), and the Diplomat Magazine. 

Nationalism in Foreign Policy: Anachronism or Necessity?

by

by Alexandru Nica

Hungary’s Orbán and the EU, a troubled relationship (Image Credit: Wikimedia)

Let us take the following statement by way of introduction. ‘A nation […] is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors’. In this article, I will demonstrate how this statement is false, since nations and nationalism are, after all, expressions of identity. As such, nationalism will continue to shape foreign policy as long as nations continue to be the main actors on the international stage. Before discussing about nations, nationalism or foreign policy as their bond, however, one ought to first define these concepts.

Nationalism, nation, what is the difference?

The concept of nationalism has at its core the idea of a nation. This large group of people lives on a common territory and has a common cultural inheritance, a history, a language, a shared religion, and ultimately, interests. It can thus be argued that the concept of a ‘nation’ also develops a feeling of moral affectivity and solidarity among its members. It is not so much about political institutions, structures, or ideologies but rather more about cultural ties and ethnic legacies.

In a nutshell, nationalism can be defined as a current of thought or a doctrine which puts nations and their interests above any other individual or collective interest. In this sense, nationalism implies that nations should be entitled to govern themselves and their territory independently, without any foreign or other external interference. At the same time, nations should be the only legitimate foundation of states. In so doing, states should reflect the national identities and national unity.

However, some historians “have attributed to nationalism a variety of harmful consequences, ranging from absurd social and cultural policies to totalitarian terror and global destabilization”. This fact has often led to misinterpretations when the matter was politicised. Because of some political or diplomatic contexts or to support some extreme ideologies, nationalism can sometimes take exacerbated forms. Xenophobia or chauvinism are but two examples. Nonetheless, in order to understand nationalism’s true nature and purposes, a clear difference must be made between nationalism and these derived concepts.

According to the same Anthony Smith, some definitions consider nationalism to be an artificial doctrine, with almost nothing to do with the organic concept of a ‘nation’. However, there are also perspectives connecting nationalism with a national state of mind, reflected in feelings of national identity and belonging. Therefore, it is not only about people’s desiderata to have their own states and to be masters of their own destiny but also about the sense of belonging, of connection, of ancestry and continuity. It is an indispensable element of one’s core identity, because it implies integrating oneself in your past, present, and future. An existential perpetuity, if you will.

One might be tempted to think that nationalism, as it is perceived today, belongs to modernity. Indeed, nationalism appeared in the German space, as a reaction to the French Revolution of 1789. As such, it might indeed be considered ‘modern’, chronologically speaking. However, the fundamental element that nationalism operates with is the ‘nation’, an organic entity rooted in the pre-modern era (with the 100 Years War or the Spanish Reconquista as examples). In so doing, we can consider that nationalism precedes modernity, semantically speaking. Nonetheless, this argument can be developed separately, as the debate is too wide and complex to be covered here. For now, let us return to foreign policy.

Nationalism in foreign policy

It can be affirmed that foreign policy belongs to modernity, even if certain elements of diplomatic interaction can be identified even back to the era of Ancient Greece or the Roman Empire. At present, upon analysing the contemporary international environment, it can also be stated that nationalism has an important role in shaping world politics and no doubt that foreign policy reflects national interests of many states, even if the world is facing an ever-increasing process of globalisation.

For many states, the role of nationalism in the construction of their foreign policy has to do with a certain need for legitimising foreign affairs. As an analogy, this need for legitimacy can be traced back to the Roman Empire (which had an active and intense propaganda meant to express the civilising role of Rome and the relations with the ‘barbarians’). Historiography, which arose back then, is nowadays still an important factor of legitimacy, especially for countries with expanding tendencies.

When it comes to how national interest can be reflected into foreign policy, Russia is another great example. Even if the U.S.S.R. collapsed in 1991, Russia’s great power aspirations never ceased to be. For this reason, after a decade of internal difficulties and a faulty foreign policy (under Primakov’s policy), Russia adopted a new realism under Putin. This strategy was influenced by the national interests of the state and we can clearly notice a reflection of nationalism in Russia’s foreign policy even more now, in the last decade.

Although Putin’s Russia is not isolationist, his foreign policy made one fact clear: Russia wants to join the Western community. It wants to be integrated among the other great powers, but on its own terms. Simultaneously, it can be observed how Russia is slowly re-emerging as an important power on the international stage, by fully using its resource-rich advantages to pursue its national interests in its relation to the EU.

Speaking about the EU, one can argue that the Old Continent has over the last few years been confronted with a rise of nationalism, a development which is also reflected in foreign policy. This situation was possible also due to the perception that EU members are beginning to face a two-speed Union, where sometimes double standards are applied. Accordingly, Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary) were not satisfied with their position, as the power of each one’s voice wasn’t able to make their national interests heard towards the Western part of the Union. To put it frankly, this is how the “Visegrad Group” took shape.

These countries still accept the EU status-quo and common Aquis. However, in some cases, they take actions according to their own interest, even when this comes in contradiction with Brussels’ policy. Hungary, for instance, went even farther, adopting a sort of dualist foreign policy towards the EU and Russia. Orban’s rhetoric has been focused on opposing globalisation, migration, sexual ideologies, contesting decisions of the European Union, accusing foreign corporations of spoliation, calling for a return to Christian and national values, and so on.

In so doing, Orban presented “illiberal democracy” as a better solution, thereby rendering the term “illiberal” in a positive light – a necessary alternative to liberal internationalism and to an emerging “liberal empire” which is the EU. Moreover, as a constant critic of the EU, Orban rallied behind Polish premier Morawiecki and his similar political program.

In this context, one can argue that the Hungarian premier has come with an approach that functions as a ‘defensive shield’ in front of an outer peril which can dilute the Hungarian essence. The reason why his solution was embraced by a majority of Hungarians might be that it resonates with their inner psychological reaction to what they perceive as threatening for their core identity.

In the end, it’s all about identity

Today, when humanity finds itself in an era of digitalisation and globalisation, it might seem at a first glance that national identities are obsolete and anachronistic. However, national identity is one of the main components of psychological identity, broadly defined. In the case of large groups – nations, countries, this aspect is likely to be reflected in relation to other large groups.

By summarising the post-Cold War international context, Samuel Huntington offers an interesting approach on the need for identity. According to him, people are different mainly because they share different cultures. When facing existential questions, they try to find an answer by looking at their core identity, which is undoubtedly and inevitably shaped by their culture and community. By their traits and groups. People know who they are only when they find out who they are not.

Therefore, dimensionally, the group is going all the way up to the nation, starting from family, friends, and the surrounding environment. Nations determine people to adjust not only their self-confidence, but also their principles and values, by sticking to some of them and rejecting others. A human being needs to identify with something and to belong somewhere, as a “zoon politikon” – social animal – and “zoon logikon” – logical animal, as Aristotle stated in his Politics.

Apart from money or power, the need for identity can lead one to fight wars that are not his, on distant continents, thousands of miles away, as large-group affiliation is a very strong element in determining one’s identity. In other words, religion, ethnicity, national identity, culture, they all are at the core of the individual’s psyche.

Trying to survive and belong comes out of an inferiority complex. Trying to subdue and belong comes out of a superiority complex. Still, both are about identity. To quote Huntington: ‘People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies’. After all, people are both rational and emotional beings. And for such beings, the need for identity is permanent. That’s why nationalism – as an expression of national identity – is undoubtedly present in both foreign and internal policy and it seems it will probably remain like this as long as states will be the main actors on the international stage.

Alexandru is currently pursuing an MA in Political Psychology at Bournemouth University. He holds a BA in History and is interested in how politics, media, psychology, and technology are interconnected and shape our fast-paced contemporary society.

Donald Trump: A Unique Figure in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy?

by

by Nicole Brodie

31 July 2019

President Donald Trump at a Make America Great Again rally in Mesa, Arizona, on Oct. 19, 2018. (Image credit: Charlotte Cuthbertson/The Epoch Times)

“Our plan will put America First. Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo. As long as we are led by politicians who will not put America First, then we can be assured that other nations will not treat America with respect.”

This quote, from the 2016 Republican National Convention, is a fantastic summation of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy stance. American foreign policy for the past 70 years has been one of interventionism and globalism. Trump is the only post-Second World War American president to explicitly endorse an ‘America First’ position – a phrase with significant nationalist and isolationist history. The phrase was originally used during the First World War by Woodrow Wilson and other government figures, to represent American neutrality. It was then co-opted in the lead up to America’s involvement in World War II by the America First party, whose anti-Semitic, pro-fascist rhetoric led to it being disbanded in 1941 after Pearl Harbor. This group infamously included far-right, pro-Nazi figures such as Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford. It is difficult to believe Trump and his speech-writing team do not know the historical implications of using such a phrase when referring to his foreign policy, especially when there is a demonstrated understanding of the historical background of his other major slogan, ‘Make America Great ‘, having referenced its prior use by Ronald Reagan several times.

Trump is not the first isolationist president in American history – the Monroe Doctrine, declaring that the United States would not get involved in any European affairs,  was a cornerstone of American foreign policy for nearly a century, and Woodrow Wilson was re-elected due to his isolationist policies. It is important to consider the nature of American isolationism at the time, though, as America was not yet a superpower, and at the time had little prior involvement with European politics. However, with the rise of a liberal international order led by the United States in the aftermath of World War II such political views fell to the wayside. World War II made America a superpower, and as the only Western power left relatively unharmed, it began to not only get involved in, but lead global politics. Since then, America’s involvement and influence in international relations has only grown.

Trump is the first president in the past 70 years to express such isolationist opinions openly. His reasoning for having such a nationalist viewpoint is perhaps what makes him a truly unique figure in the history of American foreign policy. Past isolationist presidents have acted largely on the current state of the world and what was best for America in the present– but Trump’s brand of foreign policy has mostly been reactionary, stemming from his own ideas of how America has been treated, not from its current situation. While it could be argued that both Monroe and Wilson were also acting on their own perceptions, both their policies reflected the status of America at the time, as a nation already fairly removed from the rest of the world’s affairs. President Trump, however, is contradicting America’s existing role and wanting to take an entirely different direction. Trump’s vision of America is of a nation which does not bow to the demands of other nations if those demands are not to America’s direct benefit

 “Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories any more. We used to have victories but [now] we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody saw us beating, let’s say, China, in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time.”

This unwillingness to compromise is dangerous, as America’s influence throughout the past 70 years has been so strong specifically due to its relationships with allies and its reputation as a champion of liberal democracy – though this has been damaged in recent years, especially in the Middle East where backing down from its existing commitments can only harm America’s international standing, as well as the strength of its alliances – one only needs to look at the opinions recently expressed by various world leaders to see this. Trump has also demonstrated a highly revisionist view of American history. Foreign policy moves hailed as triumphs by previous administrations are derided by him and his supporters as examples of America getting taken advantage of – NAFTA, NATO, and the Paris Accords, for example. Every American president from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Barack Obama has supported the strengthening of America’s international ties and the expansion of liberal democracy – all except Donald Trump.

“We want to take our country back. Our country is disappearing. You look at the kind of deals we make. You look at what’s happening, our country is going in the wrong direction, and so wrong, and it’s got to be stopped and it’s got to be stopped fast.”

Trump’s following makes him a unique figure when considering his foreign policy. A significant proportion of his supporter base is intensely focused on identity and culture, and specifically on how theirs is being attacked. This in itself is not particularly unusual, but the way in which his supporters eschew the existing political system in favour of something, and someone, entirely different certainly is. They believe their identity as the ‘average’ middle-class Christian American, and by extension, ‘America’ itself, is being erased by an increasingly multicultural and globalist United States. Many fervently believe Trump and his ‘Make America Great Again’ stance will reverse that process. Even without focusing on the number of far right attacks that have occurred since he took office, Trump’s policies of nationalism and Americanism have allowed a resurgence in such sentiments among the public (and not just in America). Trump himself has decried the far-right and their ethno-nationalism, but his foreign policy stances have had a bolstering effect on them, and have allowed them to interpret his words as supporting their politics. It is unusual for any president to have such an intense following, especially ones who twist his every word to legitimize their views.

Trump’s best-known slogans may not be unique (both ‘America First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ have been used in past campaigns by Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan, respectively), but his views on foreign policy certainly are, as are his actions and words. He is the only president since before the Second World War (a significant amount of time for a nation only 243 years old) to renounce America’s globalist policies, and the only one in the history of the nation to buck the established tradition quite so thoroughly (and gleefully) based, seemingly, on largely his own opinions. This return to isolationist sentiment has already hurt America’s relationships with its allies, and can only further harm both its relationships and its influence. Trump himself summed up his worldview quite clearly:

“You know they have a word, it sort of became old-fashioned, it’s called a nationalist, and I say ‘really, we’re not supposed to use that word?’ Do you know what I am? I’m a nationalist.”

Nicole Brodie is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London. Her interests are American foreign policy and 20th century European history. You can find her on Twitter @nicoleebrodie. This article is the second of two winning essays of a writing competition jointly organised by the convenors of the module “Contemporary Issues in International History” and the Strife Blog.

Bibliography

Dunn, Susan. “Trump’s ‘America First’ Carries Ugly Echo.” CNN. April 28, 2016. Accessed March 19, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/27/opinions/trump-america-first-ugly-echoes-dunn/index.html.

Trump, Donald J. Speech, Republican National Convention, 21 July 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974

Trump, Donald J. Announcement of Presidental Bid. Speech, Trump Tower, 16 June 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.12b716055c01

Trump, Donald J. Foreign Policy Speech. Speech, Washington D.C., 27 April 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html

Trump, Donald J. Address at Liberty University. Speech, Liberty University (Lynchburg, Virginia), 18 January 2016. https://www.c-span.org/video/?403331-1/donald-trump-remarks-liberty-university

Trump, Donald J. Campaign Rally of Senator Ted Cruz. Speech, Houston, Texas, 22 October 2018. https://www.businessinsider.in/trump-declares-himself-a-nationalist-while-stumping-for-ted-cruz/articleshow/66327534.cms

 

Bolsonaro Leads Brazil Into A Turbulent Future

by

By Felipe Leal Albuquerque 

13 November 2018 

President-Elect Jair Bolsonaro promises to bring grand changes to Brazil. (Image credit: Janine Moraes)

 

Nearly two weeks after winning more than 55 percent of the vote, Jair Bolsonaro, the first extreme-right politician elected to the presidency in Brazil, vows to promote sweeping changes. Supported by around 57 million voters, the histrionic former Army captain showcased himself as an outsider while combining virulent and nationalistic discourses. Even before taking office, he manoeuvred with the current Michel Temer’s administration (2016-2018) to advance economic reforms and to promote conservative views in the name of ‘family values.’ His path will necessarily be turbulent.

Driving factors

How did an ultra-conservative, unnoticed congressman who defended the dictatorship come to be president of South America’s largest country? His election is a by-product of five main factors.

First, Brazil’s economy is painfully recovering from its worst recession, which is directly related to the economic errors made during the presidency of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and her centre-left Worker’s Party (PT). Brazil’s GDP fell 3.5 percent in 2015 and 3.6 percent in 2016, creating social unrest and damaging PT’s image, later ending in Rousseff’s impeachment. The next year saw a sluggish economic recovery of one percent, which was not able to compensate for the 12.5 million unemployed, many of them now falling back under the poverty line.

Second, violence is endemic. The daily death toll tops Syria, with nearly 64 thousand murders and 60 thousand cases of rape recorded in 2017. In the same period, Brazil’s police killed around 14 people every day, and 385 policemen died. As far as Brazil promotes itself as a “cordial” country, it is plagued by rampant violence, especially against poor, young, black men and minorities, not to mention gender-motivated violence.

Third, the country is engulfed in spiralling corruption, which led to the imprisonment of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), government officials, leaders of political parties and businessmen alike. Temer and congressmen in power might come next.

Fourth, progressive agendas related to LBGT+ rights, reproductive rights and affirmative action in higher education were associated with left and centre-left parties. These advancements encountered fierce opposition, namely amongst religious groups. In 2010, around 64 percent of the country’s population was declared Catholic and 27 percent evangelical. Currently, being elected in Brazil is impossible without the support of the highly engaged evangelical communities, which now control parliamentarian seats and media outlets. In the recent election, two other candidates besides Bolsonaro declared support for evangelical beliefs.

Fifth, traditional political parties such as the PT and the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSDB), which disputed Brazil’s presidency since 1994, could not reinvent campaigning strategies, compose competitive campaigns and properly make use of social media. The PT did not reckon past mistakes and was over reliant on Lula’s ability to transfer votes to Fernando Haddad, Bolsonaro’s main adversary. Plagued by internal rivalries and boycotting a possible centre-left coalition, the party ended up second, but still maintained prevalence over Brazil’s Northeast region and elected the largest number of seats in the lower house of the National Congress. The PSDB was also tainted by corruption scandals and disputes between older and younger party members, not being able to cultivate its position as the ‘anti-PT’ and achieving only 4.7 percent of the votes.

Together, economic recession, corruption scandals, mounting violence, the so-called ‘threats’ to family values, and the crisis of traditional parties formed the conditions explaining the Bolsonaro phenomenon. Adding to that, he was critically injured after being stabbed, which led him to avoid televised debates, thereby preventing other candidates from challenging his views directly. Rightly interpreting and fuelling popular dissatisfaction against the PT, and what he and his supporters classified as an array of ‘communists’ ranging from musician Roger Waters to political scientist Francis Fukuyama and the Pope, Bolsonaro capitalised upon the feelings of an impatient and angry population. Portraying himself as an anti-establishment candidate, he upheld patriotic slogans tempered with violent discourses, promising to jail or exile rivals.

‘Strongman diplomacy’

Bolsonaro’s election comes in a moment when strongmen are concentrating power. Together with that, multilateralism and the landmarks of the ‘liberal’ global order are treated as a scapegoat, much for their distributional costs, rising inequality and ‘decaying’ values. It is not by accident that his government pledges to emphasise bilateral relations, to move away from the Paris Agreement and to by-pass the rules and norms stemming from the United Nations, which he called a gathering of communists.

Much of that reasoning has to do with reverting PT’s foreign policy, which, Bolsonaro argues, gave undesired attention to South-South cooperation and used public funds to finance countries like Venezuela and Cuba. Indeed, in the first speech after being elected he promised to ‘liberate’ the ministry of External Affairs from an ‘ideological’ orientation. Achieving so, in his views, involves prioritising relations with countries such as the United States, Italy, and Israel, to which he promised relocating Brazil’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and to review the status of a Palestinian diplomatic legacy in Brasília. His Trump-like move is short-sighted and has already caused the suspension, by the Egyptian government, of an official visit of Brazil’s current minister of external relations. It is also expected to spark criticism from poultry importing Arab markets with which Brazil has trade surpluses.

Regarding Brazil’s immediate region, Paulo Guedes affirmed that Mercosur and Argentina ‘will not be a priority.’ In his view, the economic bloc is too restrictive, harming Brazil’s chances of expanding extra-regional trade ties. Moreover, moribund Unasur is seen as a forum under the influence of Venezuela, with whom relations are already unstable. In contrary, Bolsonaro expects to promote relations with Chile.

Dialogue with China, Brazil’s biggest trading partner, is messy. In March, Bolsonaro visited Taiwan. During the campaign, he declared that the Chinese are “buying Brazil”, which led two Chinese newspapers, China Daily and Global Times, to harshly question Bolsonaro’s intentions and to affirm that his actions can cost Brazil a ‘great deal.’ Later on, he met with Chinese representatives to say that bilateral trade should increase during his government.

Not even in power, president-elect Bolsonaro is already harming Brazil’s democracy and the country’s image abroad. The question now is how much change he will be able to imprint.

Can he govern?

Bolsonaro is expected to face a paralysing fiscal scenario, a divided but vocal opposition, and one of the most fragmented lower houses in the world. Of a total of 35 political parties, 30 have at least one chair at the lower house and 21 at the senate, greatly complicating governability. His until then insignificant Social Liberal Party (PSL), however, grew from eight seats to 52, ranking second. It is expected to surpass the PT, as a ‘performance clause’ to control fragmentation was established, allowing shifts in party membership without punishment. Furthermore, Brazil’s political compass moved towards the right, which made moderate political parties – namely the PSDB and Temer’s Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) – lose influence. Bolsonaro is expected to receive support from the BBB (bullets, beef, bible) caucus. That configuration can grant him enough backing even to approve constitutional amendments.

Up to now, his administration will be based on four axes, embodied by key appointees: (i) the military, represented by Vice-President General Hamilton Mourão and minister of Defence General Augusto Heleno; (ii) the Congress, guided by his future chief of staff, Congressman Onyx Lorenzoni, who is expected to accommodate demands from the BBB caucus; (iii) free market enthusiasts directed by his “super minister” and top financial advisor Paulo Guedes; and (iv) the judiciary and his second minister with unbridled powers, Judge Sergio Moro who helped to jail Lula and who is expected to tackle any wrongdoings in Bolsonaro’s political base.

In the best but unlikely scenario, Bolsonaro would be able to adjust the preferences of these different groupings, combining market reforms and anti-corruption rhetoric with a conservative, religious-like, family agenda. The crusade against some media outlets would continue and criticisms would be labelled fake news. Adding to that, he would relax gun laws, lower age of criminal responsibility and approve measures against indigenous territories and the environmental sector. He would proceed with reforms in the educational sector, favouring distance learning, and push changes in the pension system. In this situation, Bolsonaro would face street protests from the opposition. If deadlock exists and measures are postponed, he would infuriate some of his own voters and instability would mount.

A second and more likely scenario occurs with Bolsonaro not being able to handle his support base. His coalition is fragile and composed by groups with clashing interests. Two consequences can derive from that. First, congressmen counter Bolsonaro, impeding his ability to govern, as happened with Rousseff. Second, Bolsonaro attempts to circumvent Congress by heavily relying on his presidential decree authority and focusing on a minimalistic agenda that might appease his supporters.

In either case, he is likely to continue upholding radical, authoritarian-like discourses, calling voters to show public support and pressuring the media, the judiciary, and the political system. In a highly polarised political landscape with continued fears surrounding a sluggish economy, these discourses could spur increased violence, perhaps so much so that the military would be required to act.

Felipe Leal Albuquerque is a Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon. You can follow him on Twitter @leal and on Academia.edu. 

Image source: https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficheiro:Jair_Bolsonaro_na_c%C3%A2mara_sobre_a_comiss%C3%A3o_da_verdade.jpg

Strife Feature | Contemporary Russian foreign policy – Examining the Ukraine crisis

by

By William Moray

The 2014 Ukrainian Revolution – or Revolution of Dignity – and the subsequent Donbass War (Donbas, in Ukrainian) severely impacted the relations Russia held not only with Ukraine but also the international community. Moscow’s involvement in this conflict holds few secrets. Russian annexation of Crimea and its support provided to secessionist rebels in Donbas provinces has led the USA and its allies to impose a series of sanctions against Russia, in March 2014. Furthermore, the Western press often labels this as an ‘invasion’, which suggests the Kremlin is solely motivated by territorial expansionism. This article will argue that such limited views reflect a lack of understanding Russian politics. This article uses the Ukrainian crisis as a case-study – to examine key factors that arguably drive contemporary Russia’s foreign policy.

The role of ideology

Putin justified Russia’s annexation of or ‘reunification with’ Crimea on 18th of March 2014. Source: Creative Commons BY 4.0 license

According to mainstream Western media and politicians, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine allegedly serve a renewed Russian nationalism. Such a claim is as easy as convenient. A referendum took place in Crimea on 16th March 2014, during which 96% of the participants voted in favour of a ‘reunification’ with Russia.[1] Subsequently, President Vladimir Putin gave a speech two days later, and the language used has been qualified as ‘legal rhetoric’[2] as it provides a perfect illustration of the multiple Russian national identity narratives. Vera Tolz argues that there are five definitions of the Russian nation: the Union identity, the Eastern Slav identity, the Russian language identity, the racial identity, and the civic identity.[3] Several of these key concepts can be found in Putin’s speech.

For instance, given that Crimea shares a lot with Russia, Putin emphasised the vote’s result as logical. Religious Orthodoxy allegedly provides a basis for ‘culture, civilisation and human values’ which are shared by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This claim alludes to the Eastern Slav identity concept, the ‘community of Eastern Slavs’,[4] that people from these three countries allegedly have in common. Putin also qualifies ‘Kiev [as] the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other’.

Secondly, he describes Crimea as ‘blend of different peoples’ in the same way as Russia itself. This fits in well with the ’Union identity’ which emphasizes the multinational and multi-ethnic dimension of the country.[5] Richard Sakwa also suggests that the word ‘Rossiyanin’, one possible label of a Russian, designates a community of all nationalities living in the ‘Russian Federation and beyond’,[6] a reference to former Soviet states.

Another argument put forward relates to the threats faced by Russian minorities. Putin insists that the Russian community in Crimea became endangered following the Euromaidan Revolution, perpetrated by ‘nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites’. Consequently, it was the duty of Russia to defend this community, in accordance to the ‘Community of Russian speakers’.[7] The Russian diaspora constitutes ‘an inseparable part of the Russian nation’[8] and defending them is a moral obligation. Russians abroad can be designed as either ‘Russian-speakers’ (‘Russkoyazychnye’) or ‘compatriots’ (‘sootechestvenniki’).[9] Putin also uses this argument to threaten Ukraine, as he underlines that ‘Russia will always defend their interests [Russians living in Ukraine] using political, diplomatic and legal means.’ Therefore, Moscow’s support for the pro-Russian rebels was a matter of protecting fellow Russians.

Another element of Russian nationalism is present in Putin’s speech. He blamed the 1954 unification of Crimea with Ukraine as a ‘personal initiative’ made by the then head of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev. This gesture was made at the time to consolidate the union between Russia and Ukraine, on the 300th anniversary of their union. Although Sakwa adds another element, arguing that the Soviet Union’s ‘inside borders’ were administrative and thus held no political or ethnic logic.[10] Nonetheless, even at the time, ceding Crimea to Ukraine had been a source of controversy.[11]

These national identity narratives offer an explanation to Moscow’s policy in Crimea and subsequently, Eastern Ukraine. Based on these claims, Russia did not ‘annex’ any foreign territory. Rather, it merely allowed the ‘reunification’ of a region that historically has been part of the Russian empire since the late 1700s. However, this nationalistic rhetoric is insufficient to properly grasp the motives behind Russia’s foreign policy on this matter.

 The limits of the nationalist agenda

Providing support to the Rebels allows Russia to control any resolution of this ‘frozen conflict’ and prevents Ukraine from joining NATO. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Marlene Laruelle argues that the protection of Russian minorities argument is taken from a nationalistic concept – the ‘divided nation’.[12] However, the true influence of the nationalist ideology in shaping Russia’s foreign policy is profoundly debatable. For instance, Laruelle is adamant that far-right organisations ‘have never directly participated in decision-making processes on foreign policy’.[13] Consequently, the nationalist ideas were ‘a tool of Russia’s foreign policy, not its engine’.[14] Luke March similarly argues the Kremlin’s objective ‘is not the expression of nationalism per se, but its control and utilisation for regime goals’.[15] About Ukraine, Laruelle argues that the Kremlin’s actions were not ideology-motivated. Had ideology been an overarching factor, according to her, Russia would have annexed the secessionist provinces.[16] Instead, the rebels established the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). These self-proclaimed entities, in the likes of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Transnistria, can be qualified as ‘de facto states’, as they possess all the classic attributes of a state whilst lacking international recognition. This process results in a given conflict either to remain frozen, as with the Abkhazian-Georgian example;[17] or to fester, such as in Ukraine. Russia is able to use this situation as a lever to maintain pressure against Kyiv. Therefore, the ‘Divided Nation’ narrative remains a justification used by Putin and will not be applied on all countries which include Russian minorities. For instance, Laruelle is adamant that Moscow will not intervene if states such as Kazakhstan, agree to its rules, i.e. stay under its influence.[18]

In other words, the Russian expansionism witnessed in Eastern Ukraine serves a very different purpose. The next part will demonstrate it is their will to be recognized as an equal partner by the West.

Equality as the ultimate objective

From Moscow’s perspective, NATO and EU enlargement, as well as the ‘Color Revolutions’, are tools used by Western powers to expand their interests in Russia’s sphere of influence, namely the Former Soviet Union (FSU), also known as the ‘Near Abroad’. Yevgeny Primakov – the then Minister of Foreign Affairs – qualified in 1997 the first post-Cold War wave of NATO expansion as ‘the biggest mistake in Europe since the end of World War II’.[19] Similarly, Margot Light states that NATO expansion is viewed after 2000 as ‘a fundamental threat’ to Russia.[20] Regarding Euromaidan, Putin was similarly convinced that it ‘was the result of a US-led operation’. This line of thinking was reinforced by the support provided to demonstrators in December 2013, by US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Senator John McCain during a visit to Kiev.[21] The rhetoric used by Russian officials serves the same purpose, to portray NATO as an aggressive alliance against which Russia legitimately needs to defend itself. For instance, Colonel General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance between Russia and five other FSU states, recently accused NATO of wanting to transform the former Soviet space into ‘another Syria’.

The point here is that one could argue Russia genuinely believed it was ‘the victim, not the aggressor’, in regard to the Ukraine crisis, and that its intervention was an act of self-defence.[22] Laruelle takes a slightly different approach in suggesting that Putin’s objective was to punish Ukraine for two reasons. First, she argues that the new post-Revolution government in Kiev attempted to ally with the West and move away from Russia. Secondly, she claims that during the 2014 Revolution, Ukraine demonstrated poor governance and instability, as proven by the ‘Maidan’, which is defined here as demonstrations resulting in regime changes.[23] Laruelle’s theory is more convincing than the ‘victim, not aggressor’ stance as it also takes into consideration the fact that Russia views Ukraine as a part of the Near Abroad. Therefore, Russia is not just a victim, it also defends its status of great power. These two elements are not in opposition but need to be understood as two pieces of a larger picture – the actions Russia feels it must take in order to prevent a perceived Western infringement in the FSU, its traditional sphere of influence [24].

Russia sees this matter as a question of survival, which requires preserving – or rather re-establishing – its status of great power. Indeed, from Moscow’s perspective, the NATO/EU enlargement does not just pose a threat. It also proves the hypocrisy of the international order the West has been imposing since the end of the Cold War. Russia wishes to be considered as an equal, thus it defends an alternative international order. This disconnect between Western and Russian views of international order was underlined on 28 September 2015, when both the then American President Barack Obama and Putin gave speeches before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Obama insisted that ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’ concepts should be the new pillars of international order.[25] Whereas Putin defended a rather conservative approach, as he insisted on the value of ‘equality’; he also criticised that ‘after the end of the Cold War […] a single centre of domination emerged in the world’.[26] Indeed, Putin has constantly accused the West of imperialist views. This reproach was evident after the wars in Kosovo, Iraq [27] and more recently Libya. The defence of ‘liberty’, according to this view, is merely an excuse to justify aggressive expansionism. By contrast, Russia’s alternative international order seeks to respect sovereignty, promote equality and consequently, to preserve international law.  Ironically, this approach to international order does not apply to Russia’s Near Abroad. Hence Ukraine is in Russia’s view as FSU states are its sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Based upon a nationalist-like rhetoric, Russia’s actions were however not necessarily ideologically-motivated, nor based on a desire to acquire territory. Instead, fear of NATO’s enlargement constituted a more important driving factor, and relatedly, the need to stop Ukraine from moving closer to the West, in order to protect its historical sphere of influence. Russia’s also hoped its Ukraine intervention would serve a greater strategic objective: to restore an equal status vis-a-vis the West.

William Moray is the BA representative for Strife Blog and he has just graduated in War Studies BA from King’s College London. He will read the Intelligence and International Security MA at King’s next September onwards. His research interests include intelligence and the history of intelligence, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the relations between Russia and the West. You can follow him @WilliamMoray

Notes

[1] Putin, Vladimir, Speech on the annexation of Crimea (18 March 2014) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 This speech is referred to several times in the first part of this essay

[2] Roy Allison ‘Russian “Deniable” Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules’, International Affairs, 90:6 (2014), pp. 1258

[3] Vera Tolz, ‘Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Sep. 1998), p. 995

[4] Ibid, p. 999

[5] Tolz, Forging the Nation, op. cit., p. 996

[6] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, op. cit., p. 218

[7] Tolz, Forging the Nation, op. cit., p. 1000

[8] Ibid, p. 1001

[9] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, op. cit., p.219

[10] Ibid, p.230

[11] Stephen White, Understanding Russian Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.297

[12] Marlene Laruelle (2015) ‘Russia as a “Divided Nation,” from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy’, Problems of Post-Communism, 62:2, p. 88

[13] Ibid, p.89

[14] Ibid, p.90

[15] Luke March (2012) ‘Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’ ‘, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:3, 402

[16] Laruelle, Russia as a “Divided Nation”, op. cit., p.95

[17] Dov Lynch, ‘Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No.4 (Oct. 2002), p. 834

[18] Laruelle, p.95

[19] White, Understanding Russian Politics, p. 284

[20] Margot Light, ‘In search of an identity: Russian foreign policy and the end of ideology’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19:3, p.50

[21] Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, (NY: Public Affairs, 2016), p. 263

[22] Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, p. 292

[23] Laruelle, Russia as a “Divided Nation”, op. cit., p.94

[24] Ruth Deyermond, ‘What are Russia’s real motivations in Ukraine? We need to understand them’ The Guardian, 27 April 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/27/russia-motivations-ukraine-crisis

[25] Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General Assembly (28 September 2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly

[26] ‘Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly Speech’, The Washington Post, (28 September 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/?utm_term=.e3f0817a207a

[27] White, Understanding Russian Politics, p. 281