Strife Feature

Strife Feature – The Incapable ‘Lone Ranger:’ Understanding Inequality and the Role of Interdependent Factors in the Onset of Violent Conflict

July 25, 2018 by Zach Beecher

By Zach Beecher

Residents of the besieged Palestinian camp of Yarmouk, queuing to receive food supplies, in Damascus, Syria, in 2014 (Credit Image: Uncredited/AP)

Central to understanding the outbreak of violent conflict is the question of what propels the first combatant to pull the trigger and propel the force of his or her voice through the barrel of a gun. Recent literature aims to understand the role of horizontal and vertical inequality in the initiation of war. Yet, despite strong correlations, there is seemingly no smoking gun from the start of conflict indicating a causal relationship with inequality. Ultimately, inequality, whether horizontal or vertical, cannot be said to be “the lone ranger” in triggering conflicts, it is dependent upon a host of interdependent variables that must act in symphony to create the cacophony of war.[1]

Vertical inequality is the measure of “how income or another attribute is distributed among individuals or households in a population.”[2] Typically measured within a particular country though sometimes globally, it ranks the population from top to bottom in terms of distribution of income or a similarly inordinate variable.[3] Examining vertical inequality and what it reflects about a population illuminates the gaps that must be surmounted to provide for improved “social mobility” in the population.[4]

Seeking to break the cycle of violence in a scramble to the top, the dawn of the 21^st century marked confidence and ambitious goals in eradicating vertical inequalities. Five years ahead of its own schedule, the World Bank reportedly halved the 1990 worldwide poverty rate of 36% to a mere 18%.[5] Despite this accomplishment, results are uneven throughout the world and the ultimate goal of eradicating “extreme poverty” by 2030 is likely futile.[6] Though these programs focus on sheer numbers rather than specific group dynamics, a more peaceful century should have been at hand.[7]

Figure 1: Millions of Impoverished People and Percentage of Global Poor Over Time[8]

However, Christopher Cramer identifies flaws in the empirical arguments for the causal relationship between vertical inequality and the onset of violence. First, he identifies the problematic definition of what is specified as the onset of violent conflict by evaluating the Gini coefficient.[9] He compares five countries: Brazil, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, and Panama. In Figure 2, one can see South Africa and Guatemala that faced considerable intrastate violence during the period of 1944 to 2000 as opposed to those on the right who did not face significant intrastate violence.[10] Yet, the inequality of the “no conflict” nations are more extreme. Brazil further complicates this when one considers the extraordinary violence in its borders not related to an attempted overthrow of the government.[11] Thus, Cramer holds that inequality may be the seeds of violence, but it may fester and manifest in different ways depending on context.[12]

Figure 2: Gini Coefficients of Nations Suffering Intrastate conflict vs. Nations Not Suffering Intrastate Conflict[13]

Further, Cramer notes the lack of a “linear” relationship between homicide and violence in society to varying degrees of economic inequality.[14] He points out that the more equal nations of Finland, South Korea, and Costa Rica show no significant differences in homicide rates when compared with a significantly less equal country like Venezuela[15] Amartya Sen echoes this argument by pointedly noting that Kolkata, India is simultaneously one of the poorest cities in the world as well as a one of the safest.[16] Clearly, measures of vertical inequality fail to fully illuminate a causal argument for the outbreak of violence.

The world spins madly on in the new millennium, “conflicts have increased sharply since 2010” with active conflicts jumping from 41 to 50 from 2014 to 2015 alone.[17] New conflicts are marked by an “increasing concentration of the impoverished in countries affected by violence” (see Figure 3).[18] The report also notes that the longer a country is involved in war, the deeper the depths of poverty become over time (see Figure 4).[19] At first glance, the correlation of the geography of the poor and conflict seemingly suggests a causal relationship. Yet, a “chicken and egg” problem emerges: are wars starting because nations are increasingly poor or are they poor because wars continue?

Figure 3: Percent Share of Global Power Plotted Against Fragile State Index [20]

Figure 4: Poverty Headcount (% of population under $1.25 a day) Over Time[21]

Horizontal inequality may provide the detail needed to better understand the relationship between onsets of conflict and inequality. Defined by Frances Stewart as the “multidimensional” measure of inequalities “between culturally defined groups,” divided into four categories: economic, social, political, and cultural status. [22] Economic horizontal inequality is “access and ownership of assets.”[23] Social horizontal inequalities are marked by the availability and access of social services.[24] Political horizontal inequalities are the “distribution of political opportunities and power among groups.”[25] Lastly, cultural status horizontal inequalities “include disparities in the recognition and standing of different groups’ languages, customs, norms and practices.”[26] Taken together, horizontal inequalities, or “categorical inequalities,” persist for generations as one group seizes an advantage initially and secures a “cumulative” advantage over time thereby solidifying their relative control of a particular resource.[27]

Empirical evidence emphasizes the centrality of horizontal inequalities in the outbreak of violent conflict. Stewart found “the probability of conflict increases threefold” when comparing counties with average economic and social horizontal inequalities with those in the 95^th percentile and this level maintains with consistency of higher horizontal inequalities in the political, economic, and social spheres.[28] Essentially, if a group is able to maintain some degree of control within one of those three spheres, the chance of conflict is less likely as the deprivation is less complete.[29] Ultimately, it is precisely this mass “socioeconomic deprivation” that drives the production of a “mass grievance” that can trigger organized opposition and possibly violence.[30]

Gudrun Østby finds further damning numbers for the combustible qualities of horizontal inequalities. Evaluating the averages across the global spectrum, Østby finds that probability for the trigger of a violent conflict rests around a 2.3% amongst nations average in horizontal inequality, but when adjusting the variables of horizontal asset inequality to the 95^th percentile, this jumps to 6.1%.[31] Interestingly, Østby finds there may be increased relevance in looking at interregional inequalities, as the addition of 95^th percentile of interregional rates of horizontal inequalities leaps the chance of conflict leaps from 3.8% to 9.5%.[32] Lastly, when these horizontal inequalities specifically look at asset allocation by regions, where one region is more benefitted than other, like oil in Western Angola, and there are severe political exclusionary policies in effect, the chance of conflict becomes dramatically high approaching 24%.[33] Horizontal inequalities are certainly kindling high with potential to spark violent conflict.[34]

Yet, the match of conflict is not always sparked; poverty can also translate into “passivity” powered by an overwhelming “sense of voicelessness and powerlessness.”[35] Amartya Sen notes, “many countries have experienced – and continue to experience – the simultaneous presence of economic destitution and political strife.”[36] Not all of these countries face open conflict in their streets as a result of this destitution, thus a causal relationship between inequality and violence remains dubious.

Morris Miller instead argues that the “siren song” of leaders draws people to war emphasizing the considerable barriers, both financial and organizational, that the impoverished face in initiating and ultimately waging war.[37] First, leaders are able to “[stir] up chauvinism and/or grievances by virtue of control of media.”[38] Second, leaders have “recourse to motivation” through a variety of means to incentivize or force participation in conflict.[39] Lastly, making and waging war is an “exceptionally costly process” in human and financial terms.[40] Leaders certainly matter, but the groundswell for action is foundationally related to the grievances of the people, typically rooted in poverty and inequality.

Therefore, rising inequality may instead be the “warning bells” to conflict.[41] Miller notes that this foundational base of poverty “may give rise to widespread and acute stress for individuals and society at large.”[42] This may then lead to conflict through what Ted Gurr calls, “relative deprivation.”[43] He defines this as: “…perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities.”[44] He argues that when society provides conditions that cause individuals to have rising expectations and these expectations fail to materialise, the depths of “discontent” deepen across society.[45] Gurr postulates that this intensification of dissatisfaction with the state and the status quo is the match point for sparking the outbreak of violence as particular groups mobilise to prevent a seeming deepening of horizontal inequalities.[46]

James Davies echoes Gurr arguing that those with the means and “dissatisfied [states] of mind” trigger the onset of violent conflict.[47] He predicts, “revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a period of sharp reversal.”[48] To visualize this “mood” in a population, Davies depicts the situation through a “J-curve” that illustrates where declining circumstances running headlong into rising expectations spark violence (see Figure 5).[49] Stewart lends her support to this concept, stating “perceived injustices rather than because of measured statistical inequalities…” often catalyse action.[50] Inequality is significant not in its depth in the intensity of which it is felt by the aggrieved.

Figure 5: Need Satisfaction and Revolution[51]

Consider the contemporary example of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Following the 2003 American invasion, Sunnis, previously the dominant political class of Iraq but the minority population comprising about 40% of Iraq’s 38 million people, suddenly found themselves on the outside looking in.[52] Mosul, a majority Sunni city of 1.6 million people, quickly became a nest for the nascent and later fierce Sunni insurgency against the “Sunniphobic” policies of a predominantly Shi’a government in Baghdad.[53] Beyond Sunni identity politics, many officers from the Saddam-era army who refused to serve in the new government migrated to Mosul. In this marriage of mayhem between Ba’athist and Sunni militants, Mosul became home to Al Qaeda in Iraq, under the brutal leadership of Zarqawi, which would ultimately grow into ISIS, and the Jaish Naqshbandi, a militant group led by a close aide to Saddam Hussein.[54] Deep and newfound horizontal inequalities deepened cleavages in Iraqi society, but it is impossible to imagine the conflict without understanding the role of the ideology and leadership of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and Abu Musab al Zarqaqi as well as the history of foreign intervention in the region. Certainly, the social terrain is an essential factor in the onset of civil war, but it does not occur in a vacuum.[55]

Ultimately, we find that inequality, whether delineated as horizontal or vertical, is an incapable “lone ranger.” Empirical data presented by Stewart and Østby clearly build on the case for the importance of understanding relative horizontal inequalities in the onset of conflict. Work by the World Bank and United Nations provide a macro view to the eradication of vertical inequality. Yet, as Sen and Cramer argue, a direct causal or smoking gun indicator tying inequality to the outbreak of conflict remains missing. To fully understand then, one must analyse the role of leaders, expectations, and market factors alongside and as a part of vertical and horizontal inequality, because, in the words of Amartya Sen, these interconnections that “work together” do so “often kill together.”[56]

Zach Beecher is an MA candidate in Conflict, Security & Development at King’s College London. He focuses on rule of law efforts, counterinsurgency, and post-conflict stabilisation. Previous to his time at King’s, Zach served with the United States Army; in 2017, he was the Lead Logistics Advise and Assist Coordinator for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division during combat operations in Northern Iraq. He is a graduate of Princeton University. You can reach him for questions at zachary.beecher@kcl.ac.uk.

Notes:

[1] Sen, A. (2008). Violence, Identity and Poverty. Journal of Peace Research, 45(1), p. 12. He uses this to describe the role of deprivation, but I specify its application to the general role of inequality.

[2] Currie – Alder, Bruce and Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora. International Development: Ideas Experiences, and Prospects. “Chapter 6: Inequality and Development.” Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (2015). Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty. Washington, D.C., p.1.

[6] World Bank. (2016). Poverty Overview. [online] The World Bank defines extreme poverty as those persons on an income of less than $1.25 (USD) a day. Poverty persists in sub-Saharan Africa continues with little reduction placing the recent reduction at only 4 million of a larger estimated 389 million.

[7] Stewart, F. (2002). Horizontal inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. P. 1.

[8] Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty, p. 1.

[9] United Nations Development Programme. (2013). Income Gini coefficient | Human Development Reports. [online] The World Bank and United Nations define the income Gini Coefficient as: “Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country from a perfect distribution, a 0 indicates perfect equality, while a 100 indicates absolute inequality.”

[10] Cramer, C. (2003). “Does Inequality Cause Conflict?” Journal of International Development, 15(5), pp. 401 – 402. Here, he is working with the inequality data from Deningerger and Squire (1996) and the conflict data from Sambanis (2000). It should be noted that Panama faced interstate war in 1990 and Guinea-Bissau experienced some violence in its local region during the late 1990s.

[11] Cramer, 401 – 402. At the time of writing for Cramer, he identified a murder rate of 20 per 100,000. Currently, as recently as 2016, Forbes reported that the number of murders or actions with lethal intent in Brazil eclipsed 58,000, greater than those killed in Syria, a nation currently engaged in a civil war. Reported by Kenneth Rapoza, “As Crime Wave Hits Brazil, Daily Death Toll Tops Syria.” Forbes. Online. Published 28 October 2016.

[12] Ibid., 403.

[13] Cramer., 403.

[14] Ibid.., 403.

[15] Ibid., 403. At the time of Cramer’s writing, Venezuela was in a vastly different civil situation.

[16] Sen, 9.

[17] Marc, A. (2015). Conflict and Violence in the 21st Century: Current Trends as Observed in Empirical Research and Statistics. Slide 2.

[18] Ibid., Slide 2. In this assessment, Alexandre Marc plots the geographic locations of the impoverished outlined in the “Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty” report by the Development Economics Group at the World Bank in 2014 and plots it against the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Fragile States Index.

[19] Marc., Slide 17. By Marc’s analysis, he argues that “a civil war costs a medium-sized developing country the equivalent of 30 years of GDP growth.”

[20] Ibid., Slide 16.

[21] Ibid., Slide 17.

[22] Stewart, UNU – WIDER, p. 2. and Stewart, Frances. Horizontal Inequalities as a cause of conflict. (2009). Bradford Development Lecture, p. 5.

[23] Ibid., 5.

[24] Ibid., 5.

[25] Ibid., 5.

[26] Ibid., 5.

[27] Currie- Alder, Bruce and Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone.

[28] Stewart, Bradford Development Lecture, p. 7.

[29] Ibid., p. 9.

[30] Stewart, Bradford Development Lecture, p. 9.

[31] Østby, G. (2007). Horizontal Inequalities, Political Environment, And Civil Conflict : Evidence From 55 Developing Countries, 1986-2003. Policy Research Working Papers. p, 20.

[32] Ibid., 20.

[33] Ibid., 23.

[34] Østby, 24 – 25. She identifies two major concerns with her analysis. First, the data is drawn from a limited pool of surveys conducted from only 1986 to 2003. Second, there may be errors in “operationalization” of specific variables.

[35] Ibid., 275.

[36] Sen, 7.

[37] Miller, 276.

[38] Miller, 276.

[39] Ibid. 276.

[40] Ibid., 276.

[41] Miller, 278.

[42] Ibid., 291.

[43] Gurr, T. (2016). Why men rebel. London: Routledge, p. 33.

[44] Gurr, 33. He defines value expectations as, “the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled” and value capabilities as, “the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.”

[45] Gurr, 33.

[46] Ibid., 33.

[47] Davies, J. (1962). Toward a Theory of Revolution. American Sociological Review, 27(1), p. 6.

[48] Ibid., 6. He defines revolution as: “violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support.”

[49] Ibid, 6.

[50] Stewart, UNU-WIDER, p. 15.

[51] Ibid., 6.

[52] Central Intelligence Agency. “Iraq.” The World Factbook. 21 June 2017. Online. and Hashim, Ahmed. (2006). Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq. New York: Cornell University Press. Page 237.

[53] Fishman, Brian H. (2016). The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory. New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 183.

[54] Parker, Ned and Raheem Salman. (14 June 2014). “Fall of Mosul aided by Iraq’s political distrust.” Reuters. Online.

[55] Gubler and Selway, 227.

[56] Sen, 11.

Image Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/syrias-war-80-in-poverty-life-expectancy-cut-by-20-years-200bn-lost#img-1

Bibliography:

Central Intelligence Agency. “Iraq.” The World Factbook. 21 June 2017. Online.

Corcoran, Mary (1995). “Rags to Rags: Poverty and Mobility in the United States,” Annual Review of Sociology, 21: pp. 237 – 267.

Cramer, C. (2003). “Does Inequality Cause Conflict?” Journal of International Development, 15(5), pp.397 – 412.

Currie- Alder, Bruce and Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora. International Development: Ideas Experiences, and Prospects. “Chapter 6: Inequality and Development.” Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014.

Davies, J. (1962). “Toward a Theory of Revolution.” American Sociological Review, 27(1), p.5.

Fishman, Brian H. (2016). The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gubler, J. and Selway, J. (2012). “Horizontal Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages, and Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(2), pp.206-232.

Gurr, T. (2016). Why men rebel. London: Routledge.

Hashim, Ahmed. (2006). Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq. New York: Cornell University Press.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (2015). Prosperity for All: Ending Extreme Poverty. Washington, D.C., p.1.

Marc, A. (2015). Conflict and Violence in the 21st Century: Current Trends as Observed in Empirical Research and Statistics.

Miller, M. (2000). “Poverty as a cause of wars?” Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25(4), pp.273-297.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014). Highlights: States of Fragility 2014 – Meeting Post 2014 Ambitions. The Development Assistance Committee.

Østby, G. (2007). “Horizontal Inequalities, Political Environment, And Civil Conflict : Evidence From 55 Developing Countries, 1986-2003.” Policy Research Working Papers.

Parker, Ned and Raheem Salman. (14 June 2014). “Fall of Mosul aided by Iraq’s political distrust.” Reuters. Online.

Paul, C., Clarke, C., Grill, B. and Dunigan, M. (2013). Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. RAND Corporation, Chapter: Angola (UNITA), 1975 2002 Case Outcome: COIN Win.

Rapoza, K. (2016). “As Crime Wave Hits Brazil, Daily Death Toll Tops Syria.” [online] Forbes. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/10/28/as-crime-wave-hits-brazil-daily-death-toll-tops-syria.

Sen, A. (2008). “Violence, Identity and Poverty.” Journal of Peace Research, 45(1), pp.5 – 15.

Stewart, F. (2002). Horizontal inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

Stewart, Frances. Horizontal Inequalities as a cause of conflict. (2009). Bradford Development Lecture.

United Nations (2000). Resolution 55/2: Millennium Declaration. New York: United Nations, p.1.

United Nations Development Programme. (2013). Income Gini coefficient | Human Development Reports. [online] Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient.

World Bank. (2016). Poverty Overview. [online] Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview.

Strife Feature – Cautious waters in an Asian Century: Militarization in the South China Sea in 2017

April 6, 2017 by Douglas Gray

By: Douglas Gray

The contesting claims of the South China Sea.

As stakeholders and policy makers work on predictions of the direction the Trump Administration’s foreign policy will take, uncertainty regarding Washington’s moves in the Asia-Pacific has mounted. Overtures from the new administration regarding a $54bn increase in the Pentagon’s military budget next year, a ten percent rise to ‘ensure America wins its future wars’, have made allies and adversaries alike uncertain of Washington’s next step. In relation to the South China Sea, signalling from the Trump Administration appears to be indicating a more hawkish and militaristic stance on the dispute, in line with chief strategist Steve Bannon’s public beliefs that war between the two powers is inevitable. However, a militaristic response is short sighted in such a complicated geopolitical contest. By placing the South China Sea disputes in the context of the wider China-US geopolitical contest, this article will identify the shortcomings of solving the disputes with a military-first response. Beijing’s strategy recognises that as China’s sphere of influence grows – enhanced by economic and diplomatic might in the region – it will be possible to recoup relations with regional states after a fundamental status quo change in the South China Sea has occurred. So if Washington hopes to combat Beijing’s adventurism it must effectively bolster and extend its own sphere of influence in turn.

Representing a crucial waypoint in the Indo-Pacific region, the South China Sea is bordered by Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. The seemingly marginal sea contains a rich and heavily exploited fishing ground as well as significant oil and gas reserves. And it is not just natural resources that make the South China Sea valuable; Japan, South Korea, and other non-littoral states rely heavily on maritime trade and energy flow through the disputed waters. It is the significance of this major shipping lane, the overlapping sovereignty claims to the Sea’s reefs and increasingly hard-line policies in enforcing such claims that have continuously brought the South China Sea to the fore in regional geopolitics. Maritime disputes in the region focus primarily on the major reefs and rocks scattered across the contested waters, including the Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Spratly Islands, and, perhaps most importantly, the Scarborough Shoal. Being subject to a series of overlapping claims by states, the different reefs and their surrounding waters are the centre of a persistent set of legal and territorial disputes, with the largest claim being China’s nine-dash line.

The contemporary disputes are rooted in these early stages of gradual status-quo change over successive decades, with the reinforcement of claims now exacerbating tensions. [1] Beijing’s tactics in the region have been described as the “slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change,” a tactic Robert Haddick coined ‘salami slicing.’ The gradual acquisition of reefs and features within the South China Sea enabled an increased presence, and a consolidation of territorial claims has been enabled by artificial reef extensions throughout the South China Sea. [2] Extensive infrastructure-building has allowed Beijing to move towards a fundamental shift in the status-quo of the region in their favour, allowing for dominance of the all-important sea lanes and the natural resources below them. The building of airbases and military infrastructure at an unprecedented pace, including reinforcement with surface-to-air missile sites, has changed the nature of the disputes, which have taken on a much more overtly strategic tone. The infrastructural investments, coupled with rapidly accelerating procurements by the Chinese Navy (18 new ships were commissioned in 2016), speaks to a militarisation of the region that is unprecedented in the post-WWII era.

Land reclamation by Beijing on Fiery Cross Reef. Top: August 14, 2014. Below: June 3, 2016.

Legally, the international laws governing the disputes are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), established as a framework to balance the interest of both coastal and seafaring states. [3] This legal framework drew significant attention on July 12th 2016 when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled overwhelmingly against Beijing in a legal contest brought on by Manila. In assessing whether or not Beijing had breached its obligations under UNCLOS, the court not only stated that China’s nine-dash line claim had no legal basis but also presented a damning indictment of Beijing’s behaviour throughout the proceedings. However, perhaps unsurprisingly to international law sceptics, the court’s ruling has seemingly had no effect on the current state of the disputes due to the lack of an accompanying enforcement mechanism.

While the United States is in a comparably weak position to challenge the lack of conformity to international laws and norms in Beijing’s island claims, given that it is the only major power not to have ratified UNCLOS, it has cited the violation of ‘customary international law’ in its efforts to counter what it views as Chinese expansionism. Since 2015 Washington has conducted four freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through the contested waters to challenge Chinese claims, along with diplomatic efforts. In October 2015, the USS Lassen exercised innocent passage by patrolling within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-controlled Subi Reef. Later on, in January and May 2016 respectively, the USS Curtis Wilbur and the USS William P. Lawrence conducted FONOPs near Triton Island and Fiery Cross Reef – both of which were heavily condemned by Beijing. Most recently, the USS Decatur undertook a FONOP near the Paracel Islands in October 2016, in what was declared to be the first iteration of a ‘more regular operations tempo’ to come.

And it would seem that the tempo has in fact increased. The arrival of a US carrier strike group to the South China Sea on February 18th, including the Nimitz-class USS Carl Vinson and an escorting destroyer, the USS Wayne E. Meyer, represents a significant step up in US military presence in the region. While the carrier has been en route since before Trump’s entry to the oval office, having previously been in Guam and the Philippine Sea, the illustration of power has concerned pundits amid rhetoric that has come from the new administration. Recent comments by US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis during his visit to Tokyo appeared to largely reassert the policy status quo toward the region set by the Obama Administration. Mattis’ public comments that the issue is ‘best solved by diplomats’ were welcomed by Beijing. In private, Mattis has reportedly stated that ‘America would no longer be that tolerant of China’s behaviour in the South China Sea,’ pledging to take a more aggressive stance and increase patrols. The comments reflect a US administration seeking to take a hard line on the issue, consistent with earlier remarks by now-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at his confirmation hearing, who implied that the US would attempt to blockade China’s access to islands – a contentious claim later moderated by clarifying that this would only apply ‘if a contingency occurs.’

The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transits the Philippine Sea. The Carl Vinson Strike Group is on a regularly scheduled western Pacific deployment as part of the U.S. Pacific Feet-led initiative to extend the command and control functions of U.S. 3rd Fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 3rd Class Kurtis A. Hatcher/Released)

It is based on comments such as these that a continuation down the path of militarisation of the region has been widely tipped as the Trump Administration now articulates its foreign policy. Proponents of a more hawkish stance on the issue are pushing for the Trump Administration to execute a military rebalance to Asia in a more steadfast way than the previous Obama Administration. They argue that the US should look to impose a strategic risk on Beijing’s belligerence in order to reassert dominance. However, while deterring expansionism is necessary, a focus on militarisation is informed by a short-sighted viewpoint of Beijing’s strategy in the region.

As South-east Asian states seek to hedge between the two major powers, cautiously attempting to push Beijing and Washington towards cooperation rather than confrontation, Washington’s hopes of alignment against excessive Chinese claims have been dashed. ASEAN’s continuous claims of unity and harmony are often fragile and hollow. It has adopted a muted line in the wake of the UNCLOS ruling last year, choosing not to speak up about the issue. In a region finding itself increasingly reliant on China’s economic power, individual states’ interests, as well as those of the community as a whole, are shifting. Beijing’s strategy is based on economic leverage and the belief that the region is naturally inclined to fall within its sphere of influence. While assertiveness in the South China Sea has exacerbated disputes with its neighbours, trade dependencies and carefully managed diplomacy have prevented the long-term costs frequently affiliated with such adventurism. The lacklustre reaction to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the territorial disputes is a direct result of Chinese influence and concerns from regional stakeholders regarding the economic and political repercussions of pursuing action on the ruling.

At present, Beijing’s extensive infrastructural investments have not been militarised beyond defensive measures. While the islands have the capacity to host fighter and bomber squadrons, missiles or PLAN vessels, no such militarized actions have yet been taken. Beijing’s stance remains that Xi Jinping’s 2015 promise not to militarise the region has been upheld – and while satellite imagery provides ample evidence to dispute this, the stall in further escalation from Beijing puts American responses on the back foot. The ultimate symbol of this strategy’s success perhaps came last year, during the last FONOP by Washington in October. Chinese state media was able to achieve a significant diplomatic coup by labelling the United States as the belligerents of the South China Sea, a move only made possible by effectively bringing Manila ‘into the fold’, with President Duterte having been in Beijing at the time for conciliatory talks. Former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once urged China to become a responsible stakeholder in the region – but perhaps Beijing being viewed as a responsible stakeholder and provider of economic wellbeing is the biggest threat to US interests.

So if the Trump Administration is to counter Beijing’s adventurism in the South China Sea, a strategy beyond simplistic militarisation of the dispute must be employed. As the American liberal world order is increasingly challenged on the global stage, including Moscow’s actions in Crimea and Beijing’s rejection of the PCA ruling, measures to strengthen it must likewise be maintained. The establishment of the post-WWII, US-centric alliance systems in Europe and Asia, along with the World Bank, IMF and GAT, placed policy makers in Washington in an unprecedented leadership position. While having the biggest economy and an unparalleled military are important for superiority on the world stage, the continuity of American primacy over the last three decades has been built upon a bastion of institutional leadership, both economic and political – something that should not be forgotten. While Washington has had to contribute a disproportionate amount to these institutions and alliances, it is not because policy makers were duped, but because they recognised that the benefits of leadership outweighed the costs. The Bretton Woods system and subsequent dominance of world trade were not fashioned out of altruism, but as a way of advancing the interests of the United States via systemic leadership.

After the Trump administration abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement – the economic centrepiece of Obama’s rebalance to Asia – without a replacement, doubts were been raised in Asia about the future credibility of US leadership in the region. While the TPP has been a contentious issue, the rationale underpinning the agreement represented an extension of the post-WWII American rules-based order strategy that has underpinned its pre-eminence for decades. Furthermore, Beijing is currently advancing its own institutions that challenge the US leadership – such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In this context, active retrenchment from international institutions carries enormous costs to Washington. Xi Jinping’s portrayal of Beijing as an alternative leader of globalisation at Davos in January has been widely touted as the seizing of an opportunity to place China in a position to adopt a mantle of leadership as the US recedes. And in Southeast Asia, the formation of the aforementioned Beijing-centred institutions provides the framework for the assumption of economic and trade leadership throughout the region. China is already an indispensable trading partner in most of the Asia-Pacific region and is rapidly placing itself at the heart of a new set of institutions to provide the foundation for extending a sphere of influence which is in parts already there.

So if the new administration in Washington hopes to combat Beijing’s adventurism in the South China Sea, it must recognise both Beijing’s wider strategy and the structural factors of America’s own pre-eminence before intensifying a militaristic response. The absence of war that has been sustained in the Western Pacific over the last four decades has been fundamental to the political stabilisation and economic development of the region – and it is in no state’s interests for this to end. A return to the competitive cat-and-mouse military confrontations of the Cold War era is fundamentally short-sighted and fails to recognise the wider geopolitical contest between Beijing and Washington. So as Beijing seeks to extend its sphere of influence and deter continued American pre-eminence in the region, the Trump administration must bolster its structural influence, otherwise, Washington will increasingly find itself disadvantaged.

So how can the Trump Administration undertake this task? Most importantly, it must be appreciated that the expansion of US access to Asian economies amid the much touted Asian-century was not only about economic leverage, but also about consolidating a US sphere of leadership and influence which has staggered as China grows. While the military must play an important part within a reinforcement of US interests in the region, it should be harnessed to further reinforce structural leadership. For instance, a return to discussions to establish an Indo-Pacific Quad, a hypothetical military alliance United States, India, Japan, and Australia, could both reinforce influence and establish a US-centric institution with the authority to weather Chinese claims of American belligerence. Likewise, active engagement with ASEAN states, both individually and collectively, must be maintained, in order to ensure the US presence in the region is continually recognised. In order to counter Beijing’s economic weight, an alternative to the TPP must be sought, otherwise Chinese will increasingly harness the ability to rewrite the US rules of trade in the region. Beijing’s strategy is based on an appreciation that its own sphere of influence is growing with time, so in order to counter this, the Trump Administration must reassure the region as a whole that they are there to stay.

Douglas Gray is a Masters student at Kings College London in the War Studies Department, studying Intelligence and International Security. Previously, he completed his honours degree at Victoria University Wellington in New Zealand, majoring in international relations and political science. His special research interests are information warfare, intelligence sharing and competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Endnotes

[1] The current round of tensions were sparked after a tense standoff between Beijing and Manila over the Scarborough Shoal in 2008; eventually leading to Beijing’s de facto control of the outcrop in 2012. Later, in 2014, another standoff occurred between Beijing and Hanoi over drilling operations by a Chinese state-owned oil company 17 nautical miles from Triton Island, eventually leading to the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam.

[2] While Beijing is notably not the only state reclaiming land in the South China Sea, with similar activities being undertaken by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, they have certainly done so further and faster than any others.

[3] Ratified by nearly all coastal states in the disputes, UNCLOS establishes an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within 200 nautical miles of coastal waters while also guaranteeing passage rights for naval vessels through these zones.

Image 1 source: https://qz.com/763161/it-is-time-to-rename-the-south-china-sea/

Image 2&3 source: https://amti.csis.org/fiery-cross-reef/

Image 5 source: https://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/BN-RO104_0109da_GR_20170109164947.jpg

Strife Feature – Small but Mighty: The critical importance of Singapore in contemporary geo-politics

January 31, 2017 by Cheng Lai Ki

By: Cheng Lai Ki

“I’m not interested in being loved. What’s the profit in it?”
– Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, The Father of Singapore.

The small city-state of Singapore is today known for its progressive economic development, diverse ethnic cohesiveness or national governance strategies. When it’s independence begun on 9th August 1965, Singapore was tiny and underdeveloped. Making matters worse, it possessed no natural resources, limited national sustainability and a highly diverse population of recent immigrants. Guided by Singapore’s first Prime Minister the late Lee Kuan Yew, the nation-state slowly gained rapport in international diplomacy and established a firm foothold in financial markets which allowed it to expand into the metropolitan marvel it is today. Singapore has accomplished much in the last 51-years through exploiting its strategic geographical location, welcoming foreign trade, encapsulating on technological empowerment and focusing on utilitarian civil-policies. Today, Singapore possesses a steadily growing GDP (Gross Domestic Product), technologically advanced military capabilities, is a key player within international trade and initiated a multitude of developments (i.e. the ‘Smart Nation’ vision) empowering several other sectors. In the coming years, Singapore will play an increasingly important role in global geopolitics – but how? The paper argues that Singapore’s strategic pragmatism has potentially made the nation-state indispensable in navigating an increasingly unpredictable landscape within international commerce, politics and security domains.

To illustrate this, the paper is broken down into two parts. First, I highlight areas of Singaporean focus since its independence in 1965. The objective here is to: a) provide a brief insight into how the country developed throughout the last 50-years and b) to identify Singapore’s fundamentally pragmatic approach to national and international development. In the following sections, I continue to outline Singapore’s importance in contemporary geopolitical, technological and international security domains. The objective here is to show how strategic pragmatism has made Singapore almost indispensable amidst fluctuating international status-quos.

Majura Singapura

Today, Singapore is often considered a model for sustainable national development and is respected for its capability to defy domestic odds and become the metropolitan marvel it is today. However, Singapore’s political power was not developed overnight, but was accumulated through a pragmatic and utilitarian approach to state governance, guided by the teachings of PM Lee Kuan Yew – otherwise known as Minister Mentor. After it was discarded by the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, Singapore not only survived, but thrived. Focusing on pragmatic strategies and not populist axioms over the last fifty years has turned Singapore into the metropolitan marvel it is today. At its core, Singapore focused its national development under three domains of Economics, Security, and Diplomacy.

Its first objective was to re-establish Singapore’s economy. Exploiting its strategic geography and understanding the value of foreign investment, Singapore’s highly developed market economy has a long history of entrepôt trade. Extensive international investment between 1965 to the present supported a high GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rate, which allowed the nation to invest in key technological innovations to advance its own national infrastructure, commercial sector and civil services. Today, Singapore is best known for its economic freedom, technological innovation, highly competitive and business-friendly financial environment. This makes it a very attractive investment choice for international corporations with significant economic influence on global geopolitics. With technology, oil and financial services driving commercial forces in global economics, Singapore subsequently emphasized developing STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) sectors to concurrently: a) maximize national capabilities in adapting to core economic drivers, and b) increase its awareness of global economic fluctuations for long-term national investment and financial stability.

The Port of Singapore, a key hub for international logistics and trade.

Its second objective was to protect itself from regional threats and thus provide security to citizens and foreign investors. The Singaporean military (Army, Navy, and Air-Force) is arguably the most technologically advanced fighting force in the region, and is well-armed and developed to respond to a broad range of conventional and unconventional warfare and crisis scenarios. The Singaporean military is today highly active in aspects such as counterterrorism measures, the provision of effective maritime security and providing humanitarian support to crisis scenarios around the world. Its various military branches possess a significant global presence, and they often train and operate with other national militaries around the world. Modern Singapore is described to adhere to a ‘porcupine strategy’ where it focuses on developing the reactive capabilities of the military and intelligence capabilities (i.e. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) to deter and inflict intolerable costs on potential aggressors. The country’s geographic restrictions have meant that Singapore’s military must be capable of repelling an attack swiftly and decisively, as there is literally no ground to retreat nor re-group. Heightened domestic security systems, strict security laws, sensory systems and secretive intelligence services arguably make Singapore an advanced surveillance state – understandable given its geographically incurred limitations. Despite being a nation of skilled reservist soldiers, Singapore continues to expand its national readiness through introducing the Singapore Armed Forces Volunteer Corps (SAFVC), a uniformed scheme designed to further expand the nation’s national defense. It is arguably a reinvigoration of its predecessor, the Singapore Volunteer Corps of the mid-1800s. The Singaporean Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) continues its focus on strengthening its multilateral military relationships and empowering old ties.

Its third objective was to establish functional diplomatic domestic infrastructure and international network. This was essential towards its economic internationalization and national security. Domestically, Singapore possesses a parliamentary political infrastructure, led by an elected Prime Minister and with democratically elected Members of Parliament (MPs) representing various districts in Singapore. While elections are democratic and clean, Singapore has been labelled as a ‘flawed democracy’ on page 34 in The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2016. Internationally, Singapore’s core foreign policy ideals emphasize regional security and a belief in multinational prosperity through security. Singapore’s strongest reflection of multilateralism was the formation of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967. ASEAN is multinational collective designed to promote better regional relationships between nations and highly reflected Singapore’s belief in multinationalism. At its core, ASEAN is an essential mechanism allowing for peaceful discussions between participatory states and the rest of the international community. Further, a reflection of Singapore’s extensive diplomatic abilities can be seen in its passport rankings. According to the Passport Index, the Singaporean passport has a VFS (Visa-Free Score) of 157 and is ranked second in the world alongside Sweden in 2017. Bilaterally, Singapore has developed and maintained close ties with the United States (US). The two countries possess significantly close economic and security relationships. In December 2015, Singapore’s Minister of Defense, Dr. Ng Eng Hen signed a ‘Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)’ which enhanced better bilateral collaboration in areas of ‘military, policy, strategic and technology spheres’. The close and renewed American-Singaporean relationship could be viewed as a geopolitical counterbalance rapid emergence of China as a hemispheric power.

The Pragmatic Approach

Through mapping Singapore’s economic, security and diplomatic developments, a governance trend revolving around strategic pragmatism can be easily traced. Under economic domains, the nation depended critically on foreign investment and importation of critical resources. Acknowledging the power of technological innovation, it focused on cultivating its STEM, financial and legal capabilities in future generations. This pragmatic approached paved the foundations for future generations to easily adapt to the rapidly evolving commercial industry, especially within Information Technology (IT) – a concept revisited later.

Singapore Technologies (ST) Kinetics’s Terrex-2

Within the security domains, Singapore’s global presence is often reflected by its technological innovation in aerospace, electronics, land systems and maritime disciplines. Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd (ST Engineering) is a publically traded, integrated engineering group headquartered in Singapore. Much alike other engineering corporations such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, ST Engineering has become a formidable player in the weapons industry. In March 2016, its subsidiary, ST Kinetics, was awarded a bid to provide the US Marine Corps the TERREX-2, an 8×8 multi-terrain amphibious armored troop transport. In earlier years, ST Kinetics also won the bid to provide the British military another armored platform called the BRONCO (or known as the WARTHOG) in the early 2000s. The pragmatic element here is how Singapore exploits its technological innovations to empower existing multilateral military relationships with commercial trade of weapon platforms.

In terms of diplomacy, pragmatism is more evident in domestic than in foreign policies. Domestically, Singaporean governance has been criticized, given the degree of state influence by the dominating People’s Action Party. However, this paper cautions the reader to not confuse pragmatism as a ‘flawed democracy’. A key lesson from PM Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore was that it avoided populist measures, while focusing on providing the welfare its people needed and not ‘‘handouts’ [which undoubtedly would have] undermined self-reliance and fostered a dependence on the state’. Singapore’s brand of democracy focuses on the collective. Welfare is granted through the provision of skills, opportunities and failsafe programs (i.e. Central Provident Fund) for its citizens. Although Singapore’s pragmatic approach to international diplomacy is visible through the establishment of ASEAN to promote a collective and collaborative regional development, it is however undermined from its closer ties to the West than the East. As such, it is plagued by a phenomenon this paper terms as The Janus Dilemma, where a nation displays varying ‘faces’ of allegiance to competing powers. It is evident that at the very core of Singaporean national strategies is the emphasis on practical and utilitarian approaches, designed to streamline development and focus on collective evolution.

Tiny Lion, Loud Roar: navigating global challenges

Over the last decade, the world has undergone significant shifts in geopolitics, technological and security.

US Withdrawal from the TPP

A major development has been the USA’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) by President Donald J. Trump within the first 100-days in office. The TPP is a 12-nation trade agreement liberalizing the flow of commercial goods between nations within the Pacific Rim and was a focal achievement of Former-President Barrack Obama. The agreement focused on issues such as unified trade tariffs and copyright laws to streamline and expedite commercial trade between member nations. However, China has been consistently unclear about joining the partnership and considered the TPP as an American ploy to resist China’s rampant expansion through controlling the international economic status-quo, as the TPP arguably would reduce its commercial influence and dominance. Should China join the TPP now, it could potentially hijack the agreement to assist its expansion and rejuvenation objectives under President Xi Jingping.

Amongst the remaining TPP states, Singapore currently possesses the highest GDP. According to a 2013 article for Inbound Logistics, it revealed Singapore as a ‘prime location for major logistics firms [and] possesses 200 shipping lanes to 600 ports in 123 countries’. This has also inspired ‘20 of the top 25 global logistics service providers [to] conduct operations there [alongside establishing] regional or global headquarters in Singapore’. Armed with decades of experience international trade and strong diplomatic relationships, the nation is well equipped to guide future discussions under the TPP.

Smart City Vision

International investment from multiple global industries allowed Singapore to exploit key technological innovations. Technologically, the increasing Internet-of-Things landscape has stimulated national projects towards building smart cities and increased focus on the IT sector. Most recently through the Smart City vision. Per a 2014/15 Annual Report of the Information Development Authority of Singapore, the objective of the vision was: ‘[t]o develop information technology and telecommunications within Singapore [through] working with leading global IT companies [to develop national] information technologies and telecommunications infrastructure, policies and capabilities’. While the project is still within its infancy, it is still closely coordinated by the state. However, this program has drawn the attention of other nations such as India aiming to test the smart city concept.

With a city-scape powering towards thriving in an Internet-of-Things era, Singapore’s need for effective cybersecurity that protects the state and its commercial relations is unquestionable. Per its 2016 Cybersecurity Strategy, it is underpinned by four pillars: a) strengthening Critical Information Infrastructures, b) institute a nation-wide cultural change, c) cultivate a new sector of economic and skills development exclusively for cybersecurity, and d) establish strong international partnerships to maintain sovereignty within cyberspace. While most other countries all possess their relevant cybersecurity strategies, what makes Singapore unique is that is strategy directly correlates with its smart city vision. Concurrent development of both programs is reflective of Singapore’s underlying security-centric characteristic.

Unease in South East Asia

Finally, a ubiquitous security development would undoubtedly be the tensions in the South China Sea between China and several ASEAN member states. China’s strategic expansions are two-fold. First is gaining military dominance through expanding strategic borders, reflected in their 2013 Science and Military Strategy publication. It also aims for greater control over regional trade routes, which sustains China’s growing maritime logistics sector that has established (and empower) ports in nations like Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Africa, that reflect its Maritime Silk Road initiative. Despite being situated on the outskirts of the region under tension and possessing no claim to the contested territories, China’s expansion has come to even worry Singapore – reflected in the Shangri-La Dialogues of 2016. Its initiatives have caused tensions between various ASEAN member nations and have guided political shifts within the region (e.g. Duterte and Chinese relationships). China’s expansion of its strategic domain significantly increases is deployment distance and regional dominance. The importance of Singapore here resides in its close security relationships. As revealed in the Snowden Files. Singapore possesses formidable military intelligence relationships. With increased strategic relationships between Singapore and several regional militaries (like Thailand) recently renewed, the nation-state is very capable of being the voice of reason to China’s military expansionism.

The emergence of extremism in the region is also a key concern. Amongst the various regional nations, Singapore has a consistently evolving counterterrorism program coupled with a highly effective de-radicalization program. Singapore’s counterterrorism model is a blend of both soft approaches (like the British CONTEST Strategy) focusing on community cohesion and hardline strategies that employ the use of decisive force. Singapore’s civil experiences have since made significant research leaps into understanding violent extremism and radicalization , making it a good model and information resource for policy-makers and academics.

Conclusion

Singapore maybe a small nation-state with a population of 5.61 million people, but it carries a mighty roar that rumbles throughout the Asian region. With the global status-quo in flux, the small nation continues to thrive. Long guided by the skilful geopolitical navigation of the late Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to focused on pragmatic approaches toward empowering Singapore’s Economy, Security and Diplomacy. While not necessarily gaining the most popular support for various policies and strategies, it reinvigorated the nation and modernized it. Emphasis on constructive welfare ultimately empowered the nation in multiple aspects, making it a leader under various domains alongside streamlining its national development and subsequent importance in a fluctuating geopolitical landscape.

I have illustrated Singapore’s deep involvement in multiple international developments and issues. Despite being geographically small, its progressive economy, pragmatic geopolitical decisions, and security-centric development grant Singapore a significant amount of political power – making it an essential ally for many states. Despite the recent withdrawal of the US from international arrangements such as the TPP, Singapore’s experience in economics and international trade gives it significant authority and influence within global commerce. Its emphasis on technological advances has stimulated a city-wide revolution and initiated the smart city vision. This development significantly increases national output and continues to improve the quality of life for many. Singapore has metamorphosed into a role-model nation state that other countries often look up to; this gives it leverage to deepen bilateral political ties. Finally, Singapore’s advanced military, multilateral relationships and unique experiences in counterterrorism heighten its status as a valuable mentor to other countries. The nation’s strategic position requires it to have a security-first sensibility and is something emerging weaker nation-states could learn from. At its core, Singapore is a city built on pragmatism, a guiding principle that might prove valuable in the current geopolitical climate of seemingly endless political noise. This paper ends the discussion with a video about the late Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew where he says, ‘I’m not interested in being loved. What’s the profit in it?’ – what do you think?

*The views and opinions represented within this piece does not represent that of the Singapore government or its Ministry of Defence but are only the intellectual analysis of the author.

Cheng Lai Ki is a reservist military officer with the Singapore Armed Forces. He possesses degrees in Criminology, Intelligence and International Security respectively from the University of Leicester and King’s College London. Formerly the Managing Editor for Strife Blog and Journal, his work has also been featured by IHSJane’s Intelligence Review and Cyber World.

Image sources:

Image 1: http://bit.ly/2jR3ZgU

Image 2: http://bit.ly/2kn8naT

Image 3: http://bit.ly/2jqG5gm

Image 4: http://bit.ly/2kQ3e8i

Strife Feature – Trudeau’s First Year: The Fundamental Shifts in Canadian Foreign Policy

November 24, 2016 by Marc-Olivier Cantin

By: Marc-Olivier Cantin

President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau review the troops. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy); Source: https://medium.com/@WhiteHouse/in-photos-the-official-canadian-state-visit-94db196bedc8#.7kqrem8j9; 10 March 2016 — President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau review the troops. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)

‘We’re back!’ It was with this unequivocal assertion that, in his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reclaimed Canada’s seat at the international table, hinting at the fundamental foreign policy overhauls he intended to implement. Indeed, a year has passed since Trudeau settled in Ottawa and it appears that the lines of fracture are manifold between the genuinely Westphalian conception of the world of former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau’s uninhibited internationalism. Over the last twelve months, under the leadership of the new prodigy of world politics, the legacy of the Conservatives’ intergovernmental and hard-power oriented foreign policy has dramatically withered in favour of a truly transnational approach. In this context, this article endeavours to underscore the chief manifestations of these foreign policy shifts and to shed a light on their implications for the international landscape.

The revamping of Canada’s international agenda has been ubiquitously observable in the country’s most recent global endeavours. The shift that is perhaps the most evident is the reaffirmation of Canada’s commitment to multilateralism. Stephen Harper, in his decade-long reign at 24 Sussex Drive, fostered a sincere repugnance for international rostrums, favouring bilateral channels over what he perceived as ineffective and corrupted platforms. By contrast, Trudeau appears to lean closer to the promise of transnational organisations and has repeatedly reasserted Canada’s adherence to the core values of such organisations, particularly the United Nations and NATO.

This reengagement was evident in Trudeau’s first NATO summit where he pledged that Canada would assemble and lead the organisation’s new battalions. These will be stationed in the Baltic countries and in eastern Poland to deter the exponential boldness of Russian interventionism in the region. This renewed commitment to multilateralism is equally apparent in Canada’s utilisation of the UN as the paramount catalyst for its international aspirations. Concurrently, Trudeau’s administration has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts over the past year to acquire one of the rotating seat on the Security Council in 2020, a bet that could improve the clout of the country’s international voice and that would simultaneously provide a potent source of political leverage for this middle power that can struggle in translating its wishes into deeds.

Irrefutably, the Liberals aim to foster a truly pivotal role for Canada within these organisations. This trend reflects a sharp contrast to the traditional scepticism towards the prospects of multilateralism from the former Conservative-led government. With this aim in mind, Ottawa has been overhauling the hierarchy of its international priorities while simultaneously rethinking its strategic approaches. Indeed, Trudeau has been prioritising “low politics” and “soft power” in attempting to realign the country’s actions to its actual political, economic and military capabilities. Canada has, for example, renewed focus on its traditional areas of expertise including increased emphases on human rights, environment, promotion of equality, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid. Such issues are more compatible, in Trudeau’s mind, to the inherent identity of Canada’s progressivism.

Comparatively, Stephen Harper adhered significantly more to the potentialities of “hard power” and increasingly turned his back on Canada’s traditional prudent on the world stage to bet on a more muscular foreign policy posture. After a year in office, Trudeau appears to be opting for persuasion rather than for coercion and has abandoned Harper’s “boots on the ground” strategy to embrace an approach focusing on peace keeping. This fundamental shift was evident in the recent launch of the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOS), in which Canada pledged $450 million CAD and more than 600 soldiers to promote peace building and stability worldwide. This new programme is a clear manifestation of Trudeau’s desire to “address the causes and the effects of conflicts, to prevent their escalation or recurrence and to work on early warnings, prevention, dialogue and mediation (Government of Canada, 2016)” rather than to rely on mere military deterrence. Hence, by committing to train, assist and advise their allies around the world instead of fighting alongside them on the battlefield, Trudeau and his Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion are betting on Canada’s operational expertise and are capitalising on its reputation as a Blue Helmets pioneer to enhance the international visibility of Canada as a whole.

US Secretary Kerry and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau toasting to the US-Canada relationship on March 10th, 2016. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Secretary_Kerry_and_Canadian_Prime_Minister_Trudeau_Raise_a_Toast_to_the_U.S.-Canada_Relationship_at_a_State_Luncheon_(25680800665).jpg; (Accessed 15 November 2016) — US Secretary Kerry and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau toasting to the US-Canada relationship on March 10th, 2016.

Canada’s Emerging Security Role

This new perspective on Canada’s role in global security is also manifest in the way Trudeau grounded its planes in Iraq to prioritize the training and equipping of regional forces. It is also found in peacekeeping training programs implemented in key West African states such as Senegal, Ghana and Mali. Additionally, the central role Canada plays in the actual refugee crisis similarly highlights Trudeau’s reliance on alternative means of influence enhancement in his attempt to bolster the country’s international credentials.

Indeed, by pledging to welcome more than 25,000 refugees in the first few months of his mandate, Trudeau aimed at positioning Canada in the foreground of the world’s most critical issues. Thus, Justin Trudeau seems to be disavowing the compartmentalized approach of his predecessor by opting instead for an integrated approach that combines foreign policy, defence, development and national security in one converging international direction. Moreover, in terms of a commitment to humanitarian assistance, the Trudeau administration appears to be diametrically opposed to its Conservative forerunners as Harper was known to be rather parsimonious in his approach to foreign aid while the current government is indubitably untying the purse’s strings. Ottawa will be spending $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance over the next three years, supporting programs such as emergency relief, health and sanitary operations, educational programs and infrastructure schemes. In this instance as well, this renewed commitment to humanitarian principles underscores Trudeau’s soft power-oriented foreign policy and his quest to seduce to world rather than to compel it. Thereby, restoration of Canada’s reputation as a principled and compassionate actor in world politics is undoubtedly a key priority of the Canadian PM.

Furthermore, the new Liberal government appears to be utilising commerce as a power leverage to further the country’s credibility and to revamp its international “brand”. However, in comparison to the former administration, the difference is one of kind not of degree since the reliance on international trade isn’t significantly different in quantitative terms between both eras of Canadian foreign policy. Yet, while Stephen Harper largely favoured bilateral channels and intergovernmental agreements, Justin Trudeau is undeniably privileging larger multinational covenants. Particularly exemplified by his commitment towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Trudeau’s new trade policy appears to be an attempt to fortify relationships with key partners around the world and to showcase Canadian leadership in negotiations of vital importance.

As a patent manifestation of the fraternal relationship and the ideological overlaps that have developed between Justin Trudeau and U.S. President Barack Obama, the Canadian PM also seems to be mirroring the United States’ “pivot to Asia” initiated by his American counterpart. Indeed, since the November 2015 elections, the commercial focus of Ottawa has largely shifted towards Asia-Pacific, a region that will be incrementally interested in Canadian natural-resources. This reorientation is particularly conspicuous in regards to China since, after just a few days in office, Trudeau sought to put Canada’s relationship with the country on sounder footing. In comparison, the Conservatives were relying substantially more on European states and on its North American partners inside NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement) when it came to doing business outside Canada’s borders. Therefore, it is the nature and the regional focus of their international trade policy that differentiate Trudeau and Harper.

Finally, another fundamental shift in regards to the way Justin Trudeau conducts his foreign policy is the considerable thawing of Canada’s relationships with both Russia and Iran. Indeed, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ties between the two countries were severely damaged and tensions reached a critical apex. Similarly, the nuclear uncertainty surrounding Iran in Harper’s years in office dramatically impaired the diplomatic channels between both nations. Reflected through the closure of Canada’s Teheran embassy in the fall of 2012. Conversely, Trudeau capitalized on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, i.e. Iran Nuclear Deal) that reinstated Iran as an acceptable interlocutor, and on the growing influence of Russia in global issues such as the Syrian War, to normalise the relations with both countries.

If one can criticize the moral malleability of these partnership choices, the Trudeau administration appears to be thawing these relationships though a rational mind frame, being conscious of the inescapable necessity of cooperating with these exponentially influential actors and of the potential to further Canada’s national interests through them. Regarding Iran, this reconciliation was embodied by Ottawa’s decision to entirely lift the economic sanctions and trade embargo that, for many years, poisoned the bilateral relations between the two countries. Additionally, this decision might also pave the way towards an eventual improvement of their political, diplomatic and military cooperation. As for Russia, Trudeau’s appeasement policy towards the Kremlin appears to be propelled by more pragmatic incentives since both countries are compelled to cooperate in a vast array of issues including the fight against Daesh and the management of the Arctic. Hence, the thawing of the Russo-Canadian relationship is significantly more attributable to a rationalized understanding of their shared interests than a genuinely symbiotic perception of world affairs.

President-Elect Donald J. Trump during his election campaign in Arizona.

THE ‘TRUMP’ EFFECT

Certainly, the arrival of the White House’s new tenant in January 2017 will have meaningful implications for the implementation of these new foreign policy commitments. The international agenda which President-elect Donald J. Trump seemingly intends to institute is, in many regards, an antithesis of the one favoured by Trudeau. Under such circumstances, should Trump advance with his electoral promises of isolationism, the prospects of multilateralism will likely become increasingly appealing to the Canadian administration. America’s potential negligence towards the issue generates incentive for the Canadian administration to collaborate with alternative partners from the European Union, forming multilateral relationships to compensate for a weakening privilege originally shared with its southern neighbour. Hence, by engaging on the path to political seclusion, the Trump administration would inadvertently promote Canadian commitment to multilateralism and to establish more international anchorages to substitute its faltering American support.

This tendency might also materialize in terms of security if the United States develops an autarkic strategy and treat NATO with contemptuousness. In this scenario, Canada could benefit from an eventual leadership vacuum within the military alliance and becoming an indispensable pole of strategic influence on the American continent. Trudeau might be obliged to rely, politically as well as militarily, on alternative partners and allies to respond to the waning of the American support – further solidifying the need for broader Canadian-International partnerships.

As for the economic landscape, the professed isolationism and protectionism of the Trump administration might also benefit Canada insofar as the country might become a landing strip for eventual investors eager to have a foothold in North America. This consideration will be particularly true for the European Union, which has just signed a free trade agreement (Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement; CETA) with Canada. Within this context, Trudeau’s commercial shift towards the EU and the Asia-Pacific region will most likely be amplified since Donald Trump has been rather vocal about his disdain for the NAFTA agreement and about his intention to refocus on American domestic economy rather than on international commerce. These trends will undeniably consolidate Trudeau’s reliance on commerce and on alternative sources of influence to counteract the potentiality of an increasingly unreliable America. It thus seems evident that the Trump presidency will present both opportunities and challenges for Canada in the upcoming years, despite the numerous uncertainties it implies.

The Long Road Ahead

Ultimately, the fundamental shifts in Canadian foreign policy are tangible and are showcasing the evolving international trajectory that Justin Trudeau has set out for the country. Certainly, this new approach will have genuine implications for the world in the next few years, as Canada might become a vital ally in the safeguarding the values that are under threat by the current proliferation of far-right movements, religious fundamentalism and populist politics. Essentially, as Trudeau prophesied in his inaugural speech, these changes mean that Canada is back, back to its historical roots as a principled and progressive actor in international politics, back as a pacifist and moderate player in global issues, and back as a nation opened to the world.

About the Author:

Marc-Olivier Cantin is a postgraduate student in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on Canadian foreign policy, Middle Eastern affairs and security matters.

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GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. (2015). “The Peace and Stabilization Operations Program”. Government of Canada. 2015. URL: http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/world_issues-enjeux-mondiaux/psop.aspx?lang=eng. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. (2016). “Canada to Support Peace Operations”. Government of Canada. 2016. URL: http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1117209. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

LEBLANC, D., ZILIO, M. and STONE L. (2016). “Canada’s Changing Role in the Fights Against the Islamic State”. The Globe and Mail. July 20^th 2016. URL: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/canadas-changing-role-in-the-fight-against-islamicstate/article28659664/. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

STANDISH, R. (2016). “Can Justin Trudeau Use the U.N. to Rebrand Canadian Foreign Policy?”. Foreign Policy. September 2016. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/20/can-justin-trudeau-use-the-u-n-to-rebrand-canadian-foreign-policy-unga-obama/. Consulted on October 16^th 2016.

THE GUARDIAN. (2016). “Canada meets target to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees”. The Guardian. March 1^st 2016. URL : https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/01/canada-target-resettle-25000-syrian-refugees. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

THE GUARDIAN. (2016). “EU and Canada sign CETA free trade deal”. The Guardian. October 30^th 2016. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/30/eu-canada-sign-ceta-free-trade-deal-trudeau-juncker. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

Image 1 Source: https://medium.com/@WhiteHouse/in-photos-the-official-canadian-state-visit-94db196bedc8#.7kqrem8j9; (Accessed: 10 March 2016)

Image 2 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Secretary_Kerry_and_Canadian_Prime_Minister_Trudeau_Raise_a_Toast_to_the_U.S.-Canada_Relationship_at_a_State_Luncheon_(25680800665).jpg; (Accessed 15 November 2016)

Image 3 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump_presidential_campaign,_2016#/media/File:Donald_Trump_(27150683144).jpg; (Accessed 12 August 2016)

*An earlier variant of Marc’s article can be found on Global Policy Journal: http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/19/10/2016/year-under-trudeau-fundamental-shifts-canadian-foreign-policy

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