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The buck passing stops here on European norms for drones

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By Delina Goxho

The nEUROn, an experimental drone currently developed under an international cooperation, led by the French company Dassault Aviation, and involving France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. (Credit Image: Dassault Aviation)

 

The most recent Trump administration changes to the policies regulating drone strikes are still secret, but what we do know sets a dangerous precedent on the use of armed drones and the use of force broadly, with strong implications to the USA as well as Europe. . The current U.S. policy reportedly removes the condition of immediacy of the targeted threat, among other things, challenging the limits of international standards regulating the use of force[1].  Most European states are not willing to regulate their acquisition and the use of armed drones in ways that would preserve compliance with both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), blaming lack of consensus internationally and at home. Indeed, the UK has so far admitted one civilian casualty in an air campaign (through both conventional and drones strikes) in Syria that started  four years ago and has no end in sight[2]. France is currently acquiring armed drones to be deployed in the G5 Sahel countries, but has no safeguards[3] in place to prevent the use of such weapons contravening international law. In addition, Italy, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands are all aiding the US drone war in the Middle East and Africa both with intelligence and infrastructure.

European states should challenge the US precedent of drone use and establish norms that are accountable, transparent and legal. This article will first clarify why armed drones can be considered to be a controversial weapon, it will then outline what is currently unfolding at the EU level in terms of defence budget and it will delve into the buck passing game that is occurring at the UN, EU and Member state levels and finally recommend that the EU finds a Common Position on the use of armed drones that is respectful of international norms.

 

A controversial tool

Despite allowing for potentially more precise strikes, presenting a strategic advantage and minimising risk to troops’ lives, armed drones are particularly controversial because they facilitate escalation of a conflict: by making war a less costly resort, armed drones are a powerful means for states to intervene where they would not have the political support, resources on the ground or a legal mandate to do so[4]. The proliferation of armed drones within and outside Europe, including their use to execute targeted killings and complicity in US strikes, as recently pointed out in Amnesty International report[5], presents a challenge to the international legal order. Drones are not only used in battlefield theatres, where IHL applies, but also outside of areas of armed conflict, where IHRL applies, which implies that strikes are paramount to extrajudicial executions[6][7]. In addition, from a more counterterrorism perspective, there has not been enough debate on whether drones may be “creating more terrorists than we’re killing”, as former Defence Secretary Rumsfeld famously put it[8]. Discussions around a Common European Position[9] regarding the acquisition and use of armed drones are of vital importance[10], especially after reports of targeted killings as a counter-terrorism technique[11] have become the norm. New European Union spending in the field of defence risks exacerbating these worrisome developments.

 

New European defence budget and Multilateral buck-passing

On 13 June 2018, the European Commission released its proposals for the Security and Defence heading under the next EU long-term budget. The new “militarised” EU Multi Annual Financial Framework foresees an increase of the Defence Fund by 2200%.[12] Additionally, the EU will allow companies developing the so-called ‘lethal autonomous weapons’ to apply for EU funding. The European Parliament had originally wanted to bar controversial new weapons, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones), cluster munitions, anti-personnel landmines and fully autonomous weapons from receiving EU subsidies, but without success. The proposed regulation simply stated that projects would not be eligible for funding if their end product was “prohibited by international law”. This is a matter of controversy becuase the UAV platform itself would not be prohibited, but its uses outside international law would be. In exchange, the Council of Ministers of the EU offered the European Parliament a formal rationale for the norm, in which “the eligibility of actions … should also be subject to developments in international law”[13]. In other words, controversial weapons could be banned from the European Defence Industrial Development Programme once agreement is found at the international level.

This presents two issues: first, that armed drones, despite their negative impacts on the battlefield, are not even mentioned in the document and secondly that State representatives at various UN fora are only willing to reach an agreement if there is the political desire to do so within their respective governments. The same happens within the EU, where state representatives are not willing to make decisions if there is no lead from their political leaders. European member states on the other hand play rebound, and suggest that consensus should be reached multilaterally before they can come to an agreement internally. This buck passing game is slowing down the decision making process, while drone technology rapidly improves and drones are used by more and more states and non-state armed groups globally, in ways that are often unlawful, as recently explained in a PAX report on new drone producers and users[14].

 

Trump’s Shadow War

All this buck-passing is operated against the backdrop of the new US Principles, Standards and Procedures (PSP), which further loosens policies around the use of armed drones in the US[15]. Fears that Trump would tear up Obama-era regulations governing the use of direct military action were justified[16]: Trump removed the condition  that a terrorist target has to pose an imminent threat to U.S. persons to be individually targeted, which lowered the ‘threat standard’[17] applied to people the United States can kill. The Trump administration is yet to provide information on the new threshold for action and whether this threshold is uniform. Additionally, proposed drone strikes and counterterrorism raids no longer undergo the same vetting they did under Obama. Instead, Trump will permit the delegation of decision-making to lower levels of seniority before conducting a strike[18].

 

Towards a European Common position?

Against this backdrop in the US, more UAV investment at the EU level is especially problematic: if the US modus operandi has been the most common policy for the use of armed drones in the West, why should the EU behave differently? It is thoroughly understandable that the EU would want to prioritise European industries and move away from US dependency as far as its own defence is concerned, given the security challenges within the Union and US disengagement. ‘With this agreement, we are building the EU’s strategic autonomy and boosting the competitiveness of the EU defence industry’ said industry Commissioner Bienkowska[19]. This however must be done without sacrificing what the Union is founded upon, i.e. a shared understanding of human rights principles. According to Catalan Research Institute Centre Delas, by 2027, the EU will have spent more on military research than on humanitarian aid[20]. If we look at US policy regarding the use of military drones, it is of vital importance to ask EU member states not to follow that path blindly but instead to distance themselves from a policy which is unlawful – as far as IHRL and IHL principles are concerned – and which sets a dangerous precedent.

 

A similar issue can be identified with regard to European arms exports: different Member states apply different principles when exporting weapons to third countries who violate international law, making the European Common Position on arms exports disharmonic. As stated in the Call to Action of the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD)[21] European states should articulate clear policies, prevent complicity, ensure transparency, establish accountability and finally control proliferation.

On armed drones Europe has only achieved a Parliamentary Resolution and does not have a Common Position yet. The EU was built on a set of values that would end up becoming empty words if Europe does not put in place safeguards and choose rules of engagement on the battlefield different from those of its transatlantic ally.

 

Delina is the consultant on armed drones and targeted killing at the Open Society Foundations office in Brussels. Prior to this, Delina worked for the European External Action Service in the Task Force Iran, focusing on Security and Humanitarian issues, the Defence and Security and the Economic and Social Committees at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, focusing on the Syrian civil conflict and CT operations against Daesh and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, doing research on the humanitarian intervention in Libya.

Delina holds a B.A. in French and English literature from the University of Verona and the University of Cambridge and an M.A. in International Security from the University of Bologna and the University of California, Berkeley. She speaks English, French, Italian, Albanian and is currently learning Arabic.

Notes: 

[1]https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson%20Action%20Plan%20on%20US%20Drone%20Policy.pdf

[2] http://appgdrones.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/INH_PG_Drones_AllInOne_v25.pdf

[3] The French government refuse to confirm or put policies in place to clarify that they will not be adopting practices/legal interpretations deployed in the use of drones that have been legally controversial and caused considerable civilian harm.

[4] Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, The New Press, New York, 2015 [“drones project power without projecting vulnerability”]

[5] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/04/european-assistance-to-deadly-us-drone-strikes/

[6] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ArmedDrones.aspx

[7] https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-us-military-came-to-embrace-extrajudicial-killings/

[8] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/killing-more-innocents-we-admit-23266

[9] Document can be found here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578032/EXPO_STU(2017)578032_EN.pdf

[10] The European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) represents an interesting tool to monitor and challenge current practices around the use of armed drones: https://www.efadrones.org

[11]Bruno Oliveira Martins, Global Affairs: The European Union and armed drones: framing the debate, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2015.1080930?scroll=top&needAccess=true

[12] The fund has two strands: Research (€90 million until the end of 2019 and €500 million per year after 2020) and Development & Acquisition (€500 million in total for 2019-20 then €1 billion per year after 2020); EU Observer https://euobserver.com/science/141885

[13] https://euobserver.com/science/141885

[14] https://www.paxforpeace.nl/stay-informed/news/global-military-drone-industry-expands-rapidly

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html

[16] A group of NGOs (Center for Civilians in Conflict, Airwars, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Amnesty International, American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch, Center for Constitutional Rights, Reprieve amongst others) have warned against the increased use of strikes and the loosening up of norms: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/trump-deadly-drone-policy-ngos-180307204617166.html

[17] https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/07/ngo-statement-reported-changes-us-policy-use-armed-drones-and-other-lethal-force

[18] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html

[19] http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-23-05-2018.htm

[20] http://www.centredelas.org/en/press/news/3641-the-european-defence-fund-will-merely-benefit-the-industry-and-trigger-arms-race-in-autonomous-weapons-says-enaat

[21] EFAD is a civil society network of organisations working to promote human rights, respect for the rule of law, disarmament and conflict prevention https://www.efadrones.org/call-to-action/

 

Image Source: https://euobserver.com/news/115283

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part V – The Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations

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By Felix Manig

UN Unmanned/Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is prepared for take-off (Credit Image: UN Dispatch)

The nature of conflict is changing and so must UN peace operations if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security. What then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated in 2014 echoes even louder today, given the ever more politically complex and high-risk environments UN peacekeepers operate in. While there is no one-size-fits-all peace operation, adopting a number of priorities can help all UN missions to move toward necessary reform. The future peacekeeping architecture should build on strategic and regional partnerships, strengthen conflict prevention capacities and harness emerging technologies to effectively sustain peace in the twenty-first century.

 

Strategic and Regional Partnerships

 A key challenge for UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) is to compel states with more advanced military capabilities and technical expertise to contribute more meaningfully to missions in the future. Perhaps the most promising path for this lies in building on the strategic partnership with the European Union (EU), which vowed to cooperate more closely with the UN on peacekeeping and crisis management. The EU is uniquely qualified to aid the UN in capacity building for the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in complex operations for which regular troop contributing countries are ill-equipped. In fact, EU member states collectively represent the largest financial contributor to UNPKOs and UN peace operations also address key EU foreign and security policy priorities in counterterrorism, the rule of law and promoting the role of women in peace and security. The initial results of increased policy coherence, joint training exercises and EU engagement in support of UN peacekeeping over the last years appear promising. In Mali, EU military and civilian support helped MINUSMA to strengthen local internal security forces. In the Central African Republic, the EU’s EUFOR RCA operation set the foundation for the later UN-led MINUSCA mission.

In Africa, where the UN currently conducts the majority of its peacekeeping missions, building on partnerships means strengthening collaboration with the African Union (AU) and other regional and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS or IGAD. While the UN already cooperates with the AU in conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping, simultaneous or complementary deployments by the UN and AU will likely feature more prominently in the future. These hybrid mandates can add important political capital to operations and prove valuable during peace negotiations, such as in the Central African Republic, where local and regional knowledge may be indispensable.

 

Strengthen Conflict Prevention

In his vision statement, Secretary-General António Guterres stressed his commitment to a “culture of prevention” to bring about peace, political solutions and sustainable development to crisis hotspots. One major strategy to promote stability and prevent conflict is to include more women in UN peacekeeping, both as security sector officials within operations and in critical decision-making bodies for conflict resolution. Passing UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was a historic and important step. However, the UN must act more decisively to build up women’s participation and turn the resolution’s pledges into a reality. Given that it is the responsibility of UN member states to commit peacekeeping personnel, the organisation should feature its gender mainstreaming strategy more prominently and boost the reach and responsibility of its Gender Advisers to encourage troop contributing countries to increase the share of female staff. Strong evidence shows that women’s participation in peace and security processes improves the safety of peacekeepers, leads to more successful radicalisation prevention programmes, and improves the economic recovery in conflict-affected regions. Perhaps most importantly, peace agreements in which women participated meaningfully are 35% more likely to last at least 15 years than agreements which were concluded by male-only signatories.

 

Harnessing Emerging Technologies 

The reform agenda introduced by the Secretary-General equally calls for scaling up the technological capabilities of UNPKOs to make peacekeepers more flexible and mobile. In 2015, an independent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation found that many UN field operations were lacking the technological tools considered necessary by militaries and law enforcement agencies to operate effectively. The report also drew a direct connection between these deficiencies and the reluctance of developed countries to meaningfully contribute troops to existing operations.

An improved understanding of operating environments as well as the presence or intent of adversaries are key components for risk reduction in conflict. Harnessing emerging technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is one way to move into this direction. Unarmed UAVs were first used by the UN MONUSCO operation in December 2013, helping peacekeepers to improve their situational awareness, monitor migration movements and track armed groups in the mountainous terrain of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Since then, camera and sensor-equipped UAVs have become increasingly common in other UNPKOs, including in Mali and the Central African Republic, and their use should be expanded to other operations as needed.

The UN should also push for more intelligence gathering and monitoring tools within UNPKOs of the future. From satellite reconnaissance to ground surveillance radars and acoustic or seismic sensors, the cost of such once exclusive technologies has now fallen so dramatically that even the small peacekeeping budget allows investment in them. The collection and analysis of data about movements, crime and conflict can then produce intelligence which in turn can be used to shorten warning and response times for peacekeepers on the ground. Systematic and data-driven monitoring and mapping of crises can also promote patterns and models to make the prevention of human rights abuses or cease-fire violations more efficient and cost-effective.

 

Looking Forward

 A meaningful implementation of the above recommendations depends, as always, on the necessary funding and political will of UN member states. Threats by the US administration to cut its share of the already meagre $6.8 billion peacekeeping budget, which is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures, sends a troubling sign to multilateral efforts at maintaining peace and security. For UNPKOs, gaining the necessary political will largely depends on the strategic interests of P5 members in conflict regions. In this sense, geopolitical competition and the current stalemate at the UN Security Council around humanitarian crises such as in Syria or Yemen represent major challenges to the UN peacekeeping architecture.

However, the UN is not in an existential crisis. Since taking office, the Secretary-General has made reform a priority for the UN and the organisation is responding to the justifiable criticisms. The UN realised the changing nature of conflict and is in the process of adapting its prevention and peacekeeping missions to this new threat landscape. Although the UN may sometimes seem like a relic of the 20th century, it has the ability and necessary vision under its current leadership to evolve and remain irreplaceable for promoting international peace and security.

 

Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig

Image Source:  https://www.undispatch.com/un-learning-love-drones/

India’s eye in the sky: combat drones in the Kashmiri equation

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By: Gen Kawasaki and Chu Kah Leong

A Predator C Avenger Unmanned Aircraft System (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor/Released)
A Predator-C Avenger Unmanned Aircraft System (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor/Released)

The use of drones as a sophisticated means of deterrence and tactical precision has constituted one of the most prominent features of counterinsurgency in the twenty-first century. Represented in this instance by India’s ongoing negotiations for a drone partnership with the U.S., this newfound interest sheds important light on the changing means and ends of counterinsurgency and political violence within the already tenuous cords of Kashmiri security.[1]

Historically, India has proven itself as a seasoned practitioner of conventional force to achieve strategic goals in Kashmir. Military responses to Kashmiri insurgent movements since the 1980s – culminating in tens of thousands of casualties thus far – testify to the readiness to absorb the attendant repercussions of unrestrained political violence.[2] Viewed in unison with the newly formulated Cold Start doctrine, with its emphasis on tactical flexibility, the time remains early for the introduction of an attack medium that is both ubiquitous and efficient.[3] The role of drones as a selective yet no less brutal means of violence thus gains fresh relevance particularly in the wake of the devastating Uri attacks.[4]

On a broad note, a considerably strengthened Indian drone fleet is likely to contribute to stronger Pakistani responses in future disputes. While a surveillance drone deal will likely shift the India-Pakistan balance of power, New Delhi’s endgame is to obtain the Predator-C Avenger armed with Hellfire missiles – which would enable India to conduct pre-emptive, cross-border strikes along its porous borders against potential terrorist threats.[5] Acquiring such a capability would fit within the strategic boundaries established in the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1990 . The act legally justifies any ‘use of armed forces’, including that of drones, in territories explicitly classified as ‘disturbed areas’, which is the case of Kashmir.[6]

It is therefore not a stretch to conceptualize the deployment of drones – both lethal and nonlethal – to enforce Kashmiri security, albeit without the regulatory oversight of courts and legislative committees that actively work to define the parameters of drone activity. Coupled with evidence of Pakistani complicity in the Kashmiri insurgency movement,[7] what transpires is a drone platform that may exacerbate the already tenuous strains of low-intensity conflict in the region. Denoted by periodic exchanges of armed violence and border clashes, it remains an unsettling yet imperative task to ponder the dire consequence of an ill-informed drone strike mission – say, a missile that was launched on a location populated both by the suspected target as well as large numbers of civilians. Indian policymakers attracted to the tactical precision of drones will eventually have to be prepared to absorb the attendant strategic perils in an already confrontational atmosphere.

This drone push comes as President Obama wishes to finalize a key facet of US-Indian military cooperation before his successor assumes office. A key challenge, however, is that drones in the Line of Control – the de facto military control line between India and Pakistan – merely adds fuel to the fire. Operator proficiency, which is far from guaranteed, could result in collateral damage or even in-flight crashes. Such incidents, which would likely spark an overreaction from Pakistan, would test the resilience of U.S.-Indian military cooperation but would also open up further discussions for other possible bilateral defense programs.

Concurrently, whilst India’s recent entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has broadened existing avenues of military technology transfers, it still finds itself in a slight predicament.[8] New Delhi has long been reluctant to sign the accordant foundation agreements, consisting of the LSA (Logistical Support Agreement – currently LEMOA, a diluted version has been ratified), CISMOA (Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement) and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). While they are not prerequisites for bilateral cooperation with the U.S., they nevertheless expedite rates of interoperability and technology transfers, speeding up drone acquisitions in the process.

There remain a number of additional concerns regarding merits of signing these agreements. Firstly, the LSA requires India to provide access to its bases for U.S. Military Transporters – meaning that it would be compelled to forgo neutrality and strategic autonomy completely in the geopolitical frictions between the U.S. and China. Secondly, BECA would afford the U.S. unrestricted access to Indian intelligence reports and battlefield satellite data imagery whilst CISMOA forbids all Indian personnel from utilizing U.S. military communication devices. In the wake of such crucial diplomatic talks, many Indians have been increasingly concerned over how willing their government is to accept such lopsided and intrusive agreements.

With recently escalating tensions, the Indo-Pakistani dilemma remains crucial for both regional and international hegemons. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, which occurred weeks after the U.S. presidential elections, had dragged the international community into fierce multilateral negotiations to de-escalate the situation. With this in mind, India and its allies must carefully tread their bilateral drone programs as it is sure to have serious implications in the geopolitical future of the region.

Gen Kawasaki is a third year undergraduate at King’s College London. He is the researcher and coordinator for the King’s College London Crisis Simulation that will replicate tensions in the India-Pakistan region this year. LinkedIn: Gen Kawasaki

Chu Kah Leong is a third year undergraduate in the King’s War Studies Department. He recently concluded a year long exchange program in Tokyo, Japan and aspires towards graduate studies in the near future.

Notes:

[1] Sanjeev Miglani. “Update 1-India in talks to buy US Predator drones, has eye on China, Pakistan” Reuters, April 8, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/india-usa-drones-idUSL3N17B3YU

[2] Kaz De Jong, Nathan Ford, Saskia van de Kam, Kamalini Lokuge, Silke From, Renate van Galen, Brigg Reilley and Rolf Kleber, “Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I: exposure to violence”, Conflict and Health 2:10 (2008), 2.

[3] Abishek Saksena, “Here’s Why the Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ‘Cold Start’ Is Giving Jitters to the World”, India Times (22 April 2015), accessed 6 October 2016. http://www.indiatimes.com/culture/who-we-are/heres-why-the-indian-army%E2%80%99s-new-war-doctrine- cold-start-is-giving-pakistan-the-jitters-232034.html

[4] Muhammad Daim Fazil, “Responding to Uri Attack: What Are India’s Options?”, The Diplomat (29 September 2016), accessed 8 October 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/responding-to-uri-attack-what-are-indias-options/

[5] Sanjeev Miglani. “India in talks to buy U.S. Predator drones, has eye on CHina, Pakistan” Reuters, April 11 2016. Accessed September 24, 2016. http://in.reuters.com/article/india-usa-predator-drones-china-pakistan-idINKCN0X51BW

[6] Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 (No. 21 of 1990), Sec. 3.

[7] PTI, “Pakistan Role Behind Violent Protests in Kashmir: MoS PMO”, The Times of India, 11 July 2016, accessed 6 October 2016. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-role-behind-violent-protests-in-Kashmir-MoS-PMO/articlesh ow/53157261.cms

[8] LDWO, Missile Technology Control Regime. “Report by the MTCR Chair: accession of India to the MTCR” MTCR, June 27, 2016. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://mtcr.info/report-by-the-mtcr-chair-accession-of-india-to-the-mtcr/

Image credit: Public domain photograph from defenseimagery.mil, available at http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imageRetrieve.action?guid=39eddc33aac4199784b181043137d0e6f2c9d301&t=2

PROXY Capabilities – Proliferation and Patronage: UAV Diffusion as a New Form of Proxy

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This is the third of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.

By: Rian Whitton

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Source: Russia Today

Though having existed for most of the twentieth century, the improved technological capabilities and increased reconnaissance and lethal capacities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) have raised concern about their proliferation. Through analysing developments in China, Iran and non-state actors like Hezbollah, it becomes clear that regulation is not working, and the diffusion of UAV is providing new avenues for proxy strategies.

China –Interstate proliferation a form of arms competition and proxy

Beijing has been researching unmanned aerial vehicles since the late 1950s.[1] More recently, China’s economic boom has fuelled a substantial programme of military modernisation, one of the fruits of which has been the procurement of some 50 designs.  These range from micro-drones to unmanned combat systems (UCAV’s) like the Wing Loong II (Pterodactyl), a platform whose similarities to the MQ-1 Predator led some to believe it was procured through espionage.[2]

While the Chinese rationale for UAV’s relates directly to the patrolling of Beijing’s interests in the contested maritime waters of the South China Sea and East pacific, the most striking development has been the exporting of platforms to other countries.[3] Nigeria, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have all purchased the Wing Loong I, with Jordan, a prominent US ally in the fight against IS, also rumoured to have negotiated a deal in May 2015.[4]

A number of factors explain Beijing’s success in selling UAV’s. A recent senate report noted that China was not hindered by the same export restrictions of the two premiere UAV producers; the USA and Israel. While the two countries are bound by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, China is not, and thus has been sheltered from competition with its more renowned competitors.[5]

Another driver is the relatively low cost of Chinese systems. The Wing Loong II is believed to cost $1 million in comparison to the $30 million Reaper.[6] Though it lacks the payload, maximum altitude and speed of its US counterpart, such deficiencies are redundant in a market strategy primarily pandering to developing countries in Africa and the Middle-East. At a 2012 air show in Zhuhai, a Chinese official explained that Asian and African countries were “quite interested in the intermediate and short-range UAVs because they are expendable and low-cost.”[7] China also attempted to capitalise on Pakistani frustration at not accessing US UAV technology by supplying Islamabad with the CH-3 Rainbow.[8] This was averted with the indigenous development of the Burraq UCAV.[9]

Worries about Beijing undercutting Washington in the sale of UAV’s led Republican rep. Duncan Hunter to urge the President to provide the Jordanian government with access to the Predator, in response to concerns that China was finalising a deal with America’s regional ally to supply a number of unmanned platforms.[10] That General Atomics (producer of the Predator) is Hunter’s largest campaign contributor should be noted, and in the face of stagnating domestic budgets, American companies are pushing for ever looser export-restrictions. Concomitantly US-aligned countries like Ukraine have begun requesting Reapers.[11] Washington’s current policy has been to help its allies by using UAV’s to provide lethal targeting information, like with French forces in Mali.[12]

With both internal and external pressure, America has eased its restrictions on exports as of mid-2015.[13]Though still abiding by the MTCR agreements, the development suggests an understanding in Washington that their stringent controls have done nothing to stall proliferation, as they risk losing market ground to China.

Iran- Middle Powers can develop significant UAV industries

The proliferation and control of UAV’s is increasingly out of the hands of great powers, with regional players like Iran developing significant capability.

The international embargoes on Tehran have so far limited it to domestic technology, but the programme; spearheaded by the Revolutionary Guard’s Aerospace division, has made considerable progress off the back of reverse-engineering US/Israeli systems.[14] An example of this is the Shahed-129 (based on the Israeli Hermes-450), which is purported to be capable of a missile payload for a non-stop 24-hour flight over 2000km.[15] Iran has also claimed to develop an air-to-air combat drone (Sarir H-110). The ability of Iran, a regional power under international embargo, to develop a thriving UAV industry primarily through the reverse engineering of Western models is impressive.

The effectiveness of regulation or embargos is unlikely to stall this development. The Iranian drone fleet is comprised mainly of small tactical platforms, and thus the majority of necessary components are accessible via the use of middlemen and front companies. In 2009, a US cable published by WikiLeaks warned about Iran trying to obtain German Limbach 550E engines and ship them to an Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Company with faked shipping labels.[16] Such accessibility to dual-use components and off-the-shelf materials makes UAV’s a difficult category to regulate compared to more expensive systems (vis-à-vis fighter aircraft). Alarmingly, Iran’s success in procuring modern UAV technology is facilitating the diffusion to non-state proxies.

Hezbollah- Non-state proxies have increased access to UAV’s

One of Iran’s key beneficiaries; Hezbollah, has had access to drone technology for a number of years, with a fleet of reportedly 200 platforms.[17] As early as 2004, Iran ferried an update of the Mohajer, the Mirsad, to Hezbollah.[18]

This has exacerbated security concerns for Israel. In2006, Hezbollah launched Ababil UCAV’s allegedly carrying explosives against Tel Aviv. They were promptly shot down by Israeli F-16s.[19] These medium-altitude UAV’s are virtually defenceless against sophisticated air defences, but the main concern for Tel Aviv is that Hezbollah will use large quantities of low-flying miniature drones that are harder to intercept. An example this came in 2014 when a low altitude reconnaissance drone was caught loitering over an Israeli nuclear reactor.[20]

UAV’s provide Hezbollah with a number of advantages; kamikaze-style strikes could have a similar casualty rate to suicide bombings. The unmanned systems could also supply the group with accurate reconnaissance of Israeli movements while potentially directing a 60,000 strong stockpile of projectiles.[21] The psychological impact is also substantive, with insurgents appearing to strike technological parity with the world’s fourth-strongest military. This constitutes a misappropriation of awe regarding the sophistication and strategic impact of UAV’s.

Iran’s patronage of Hezbollah represents the most striking case-study of UAV’s being used as a tool of proxy warfare by competing powers, and the technology is proliferating on multiple fronts. In the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, reports suggest the Donetsk People’s Republic has deployed the Russian-made Eleron 3SV for ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) campaigns.[22] In turn, Kiev has been using modified and hobbyist UAV’s for ISR support.[23]

Looking forward

The successes of China in undercutting America by exporting cheaper drones, and the ability of Iran, despite embargos, to develop an impressive apparatus and arm its proxies, points to the fact that the stringent US-export controls and wider international regulations are not going to prevent the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles.

While the mentioned examples relate to the diffusion of drone technology via state patronage, the economics and feasibility of drones are driving proliferation beyond arms sales.

As Woods notes, non-state actors are trying to build their own UAV’s. In 2013 alone, local law enforcement has uncovered ‘drone workshops’ in three nations.[24] In Iraq and Islamabad, ‘Drone-laboratories’ have been uncovered.[25] As Iran’s procurement through reverse engineering and off-the-shelf purchasing has shown, the acquisition of drone technology is becoming increasingly feasible, so much so that non-state actors may not have to act as a proxy and rely on a generous patron for accessing UAV’s. In 2012, the RAND Corporation study noted the possibility of insurgents and terrorists being armed with substantial fleets of small, rudimentary drones and employing swarm technology.[26] There is certainly no guarantee that even the tightest international regulation of states, or even a ban, would stop terrorist organisations incorporating unmanned systems within their wider arsenals.

Despite these concerns, three considerations should undercut hyperbole regarding the diffusion of UAV’s. Firstly, unmanned systems, though tactically convenient and incorporating multiple capabilities, have yet to prove beyond doubt their strategic war-winning ability.

Second, unmanned systems remain secondary to conventional airpower. During the 2011 intervention in Libya, NATO remote crews carried out 145 strikes, compared to the 7,455 weapons released by manned aircraft.[27] This provides some context of drone usage not as transformative but as a growing development alongside traditional airpower.

Third, the growth in unmanned systems has been mirrored by counter-measures employed by both non-state actors and states. In Mali, a document was discovered which provided practical solutions on how to foil drone strikes.[28] Militants and non-state actors are receiving the military kit, like Russian-made ‘Skygrabber’ transceivers, that can interfere with UAV signals and hack into drone feeds.[29] The Kremlin has also provided its separatist beneficiaries in the Donbass with signal jamming technology.[30] The proliferation of unmanned systems is feeding a simultaneous proliferation of ‘anti-UAV’ technology.

Technologists like Elon Musk have opened a debate on banning autonomous weapons.[31] But when it comes to regulating the systems on which the prophesied artificial intelligence might run, the ship has sailed.

Rian holds a bachelor’s degree in history & politics from the university of Sheffield. He is currently undertaking his MA in science & security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around technological innovation, unmanned systems, remote warfare and strategic culture.

Notes:

[1] O’Gorman, R.  & Abbott, C., ‘Remote control war Unmanned combat air vehicles in China, India, Israel, Iran, Russia and Turkey,’ Remote Control Project, Open Briefing, September 20th, 2013, p. 3 http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Remote-Control-War.pdf

[2]Baker, B. ‘Chinese Arms Companies Are Picking Up the Pace in Africa and the Middle East,’ The Diplomat, October 21st, 2015   http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/chinese-arms-companies-are-picking-up-the-pace-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/

[3] O’Gorman, R.  & Abbott, C., p. 5

[4] Tucker, P. & Weisgerber, M., ‘China May Be Selling Armed Drones to Jordan,’ Defense One, May 15th, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/05/china-may-be-selling-armed-drones-jordan/112876/

 [5] Hsu, K., ‘China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,‘ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 13, 2013, p. 15 http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China’s%20Military%20UAV%20Industry_14%20June%202013.pdf

[6] Baker, B., ‘Drone Wars: China and US Compete on the Global UAV Market,’ October 25, 2015 ‘http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/drone-wars-china-and-us-compete-on-the-global-uav-market/

[7] Standaert, M. ‘China unveils new drones aimed at buyers in developing countries,’ Global Post, November 15, 2012, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/121114/china-unveils-newdrones-developing-economies.

[8] Ali Ehsan, M., ‘Drone warfare in Balochistan,’ The Express Tribune, June 14th, 2015  http://tribune.com.pk/story/903100/drone-warfare-in-balochistan/

 [9] Baghwan, J., ‘Drone war: ‘Burraq’ turned the tide in Tirah battle, say officials,’ The Express Tribune, March 26, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/859152/drone-war-burraq-turned-the-tide-in-tirah-battle-say-officials/

 [10] Tucker, P. & Weisgerber, M.

[11] ‘‘Hostile Drones,’ p. 13

[12] Woods, C., ‘ Sudden Justice, America’s Secret Drone Wars,’ Hurst company, London, 2015, p. 280

[13] Tucker, P. & Weisgerber, M., ‘Obama To Sell Armed Drones To More Countries,’ Defense One, February 17th, 2015 http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/obama-sell-armed-drones-more-countries/105495/

[14] O’Gorman, R.  & Abbott, C., p. 9

[15] Rawnsley, A., ‘Like It or Not, Iran Is a Drone Power: Sanctions have not stopped Tehran’s robot development,’ War is Boring, September 5th, 2014  https://medium.com/war-is-boring/like-it-or-not-iran-is-a-drone-power-e9899c954a3f#.zcv6do9u5

[16] Rawnsley, A.

[17] ‘Hostile Drones,’ Remote Control project, Open briefing, January 2016, p. 12 http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Hostile-use-of-drones-report_open-briefing_16.pdf

 [18] Dreazen, Y., The Next Arab-Israeli War Will Be Fought with Drones,’ New Republic, March 27th, 2014 https://newrepublic.com/article/117087/next-arab-israeli-war-will-be-fought-drones

[19] ‘Hostile Drones,’ p. 12

[20] Hostile Drones,’ p. 12

[21] Dreazen, Y.

[22] Dreazen, Y.

[23] ‘Hostile Drones,’ p. 13

[24] Woods, C., p. 275

[25] Woods, C., p. 275

[26] Woods, C., p. 275

[27] Woods, C., p. 279

[28] Woods, C., p. 273

[29] Woods, C., p. 273

[30] Hostile Drones,’ p. 13

[31] Roberts, B. & Musgrave, Z., ‘Why Humans Need To Ban Artificially Intelligent Weapons,’ Defense One, August 14th, 2015 http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/08/why-humans-need-ban-artificially-intelligent-weapons/119130/

 

Is democratic peace theory undermined on the cyber battlefield?

by

By: Archie Jobson

https://c1.staticflickr.com/1/427/18729140824_4ae0fb0574_b.jpg
https://c1.staticflickr.com/1/427/18729140824_4ae0fb0574_b.jpg

Remote Control is a project hosted by the London-based think tank Oxford Research Group, set up to examine changes in military engagement, in particular the use of drones, special forces, private military companies and cyber warfare. They recently hosted an essay competition for participants in response to the question ‘Is remote control effective in solving security problems?’ Both Chad Tumelty and Archie Jobson of King’s College London achieved runner up. Strife is proud to feature them as your long read of the week over the coming two weeks.

Democratic peace is a historically proven and appealing solution to the violent and anarchic nature of international relations. However, much of the statistical proof for claims of a democratic peace rest on constrained and narrow definitions of war. Cyberwar introduces a new method of war that negates many of the principles and parameters of democratic peace theory, subsequently putting the validity of a democratic peace in doubt. In order to conclusively assess whether democratic peace is applicable to cyberspace, I shall, firstly, define cyberwar in reference to current debate and the Clausewitzian understanding of war. Secondly I will contrast the characteristics of cyber war to the framework of democratic peace theory. Ultimately democratic peace theory has little applicability to the realm of cyberspace, but, importantly, to date the democratic peace has held, as two democratic states are yet to engage in cyberwar.

“Cyber war will not happen” and “cyber war will happen!” are, two conflicting arguments posed by Thomas Rid and John Stone respectively. Although, as the titles suggest, both are seeking to establish the likelihood of cyber war, the essential disagreement can be seen as does cyberwar constitute war. Thomas Rid claims that, due to the lack violence in a cyber attack it cannot equate to conventional understandings of war, and thus is not. Rid refers to Clausewitz’s definition,  “war is an act of force to compel an enemy to do our will.” The crucial word for Rid is force, which he defines as violence and thus an action of war must pertain an element of lethality. However this seems to be a flawed understanding of war and, as John Stone points out, is historically unfounded. Stone highlights the 1943 bombings of the Bavarian town of Schweinfurt. The intended aim was to destroy German ball-bearing production capacity. Although over 400 civilians died in these raids, providing Rid’s lethality, it was seen as “incidental to the desired goal”. The proposition is that, these air raids had no aim of lethality but were clearly acts of war, and thus Rid’s requirement of lethal violence is restrictive, even by conventional understandings of war. It is possible to reinforce John Stone’s argument with the logic that, if an action of cyberwar results in the “compel(ling)” of an enemy to do the attackers “will” then it arguably constitutes war, at least by a Clausewitzian definition. Essentially, this means that if cyberwar achieves the same result as traditional warfare, it should be considered as war. This is reinforced by the idea that if “breaking and entering” in cyber space, the theft of personal or corporate information, is registered as an equal if not greater crime as physically breaking and entering, then cyberwar that achieves the submission of the opponents will, must equate to a conventional conflict that amounts to the same.

The cyber attacks on Estonia in April 2007 demonstrate this. As the result of the proposed removal of a Soviet war memorial from the centre of Tallinn, Estonia and its online infrastructure came under attack from computers of Russian origin. In context, Estonia was regularly called the “wired state of Europe”, with 90% of its domestic financial transactions taking place online. By May 19th Hansabank, Estonia’s largest bank, was forced offline. Ultimately to stop these attacks the Estonian government was forced to close down all external Internet traffic, essentially shutting itself off to the rest of the world. Although, clearly, this is not a cyberwar between two democracies, it demonstrates that a state can force another to act against its own will, by the use of a cyber attack. In this case Estonia closing itself off to the world, causing significant disruption and economic damage. Estonia’s cyber space was recognized by Russia as integral to the “wired state”, and was targeted for this reason. It is hard to deny, therefore, that cyberwar does not constitute war; if, as this example shows, it has the potential to achieve the same ends desired in a conventional conflict. The retort could be made that the memorial was still removed, demonstrating Estonia did not bow to Russian desires; but this seems naive to the nature of Russian intentions during this period. The attack on Estonia can be seen as a move by Russia to demonstrate its support of ethnic Russian communities in former soviet bloc states, this is highlighted by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war which also involved substantial cyber attacks. However, it should be noted that a cyber war such as this would not fall under the traditional definition of war utilized by democratic peace theory, the “correlates of war.” Thus the distinction should be established that either the correlates of war are outdated and cannot help in understanding the ever modernizing developments of war, or that cyber war does not constitute as a sufficient example of conflict; it seems on assessment of the above example the later is incorrect.

The logic of democratic peace theory prescribes that democracies do not engage one another in military conflict, due to the nature of democratic systems and the shared cultural norms that reject violence. Cyber warfare introduces several new elements that null these factors, and in so doing raise questions of the validity of democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory posits that the absence of war between democratic states is a result of “institutional constraints; the restraining effect of public opinion or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic structures.” In cyber warfare, however, the dynamics of conflict have fundamentally changed, negating these explanations. For example the battlefield of cyber war is not inhabited by soldiers but by servers. This subsequently removes the danger to life, and thus it must remove a strong element of public aversion to conflict. Secondly if the conventional elements of war are either removed entirely, or substantially reduced, it will be accompanied by a significant cost reduction. Thus if a nation will not loose “its treasure” (comparatively to conventional war), and there still remains the possibility of gain from a cyber conflict, in the form of prestige or a stronger global position; the assumption that democracies would be unwilling to commit to a conflict, lacks evidence. Ultimately, if “blood and treasure” were not applicable there would be little, if no, restraining effect. This is because these are two, fundamental, war retardants held by democratic peace theorists.

Christopher Layne points out that democratic peace theorist often argue “that the absence of war between democracies is more important than the absence of threats”. The validity of this argument, as a result of the weaknesses highlighted above, is now under much greater pressure. Democratic states can now threaten another international actor with cyberwar, without the restraints they were contained by before. The comparatively smaller cost of a cyber attack, in terms of “Blood” and “Treasure”, to a conventional one is demonstrated by “struxnet”. This was a virus, planted by the US, which infected the Iranian nuclear facilities’ computer network. This caused an internal explosion by disrupting the separation process of uranium-235. The conventional alternative, that could have caused the same level of damage, would have been an airstrike using special munitions, with estimate costs running into millions of dollars. Struxnet was cheap as it “capitalized on code expertise” that already existed. Furthermore no US personnel were put at risk to carry out the operation. Cyberwar thus challenges the assertion that substantial physical and economic loss prevents elected leaders from taking their countries to war with other democratic states. This is because the weight of public antipathy to these loses, is essentially non-applicable in cyberwar; rebuffing the claims that war will not happen between democratic states.

The transparency and legality of democratic states is also claimed by democratic peace theorist to demonstrate why democratic states are less likely to engage in conflict. As a result of this transparency and conformity to international legal norms it is argued that, democratic states have an innate level of trust amongst each other. However, in the cyber world such faith in another states intentions, especially those towards you, is challenged. This is due to the element of deniability that is possible with cyber attacks, that is not possible via conventional methods. For example, operation “Titan Rain”, as dubbed by the US, was a wide spread cyber attack on multiple US and UK government departments from 2003-07, that came from Chinese origin. The blame was put solely on PLA by British and American government officials; yet the Chinese government was able to plainly deny these claims due to the attacks untraceable nature. Although again this example is not a conflict between two democracies, it clearly shows that transparency and legality do not apply in cyber space. This is because a state could perpetrate an attack to disable a government’s infrastructure, an act that fulfils the parameters of war, but then deny any involvement. As Chinese government did by arguing they had no part in the attack. Crucially America and the UK were restricted in their response on these grounds, and could not pursue a legal course. Therefore, because the burden of proof in the cyber world is so much greater it could fog up the transparency of democratic states and thus trust in one another would dissipate. Cyberspace is therefore a domain in which, a state could attack another and not be held accountable to international legal norms. The situation has arisen where transparency and conformity to legal norms are no longer relevant, because states can act essentially anonymously. Ultimately, this will challenge democracies’ commitment to international law.

Maoz and Russet in “A Statistical Artifact?” state that democratic spirit of “peaceful competition, persuasion and compromise” explains why democracies behave in a “qualatively” different manner towards each other than they do towards non-democracies. As the cyber world continues to develop this idea of peaceful competition, on which democratic peace’s foundations lie, is increasingly challenged. As a result it is possible to conclude that the apparent stability of democratic peace is not foreseeable. This can be demonstrated by the comparison of the 1923 Ruhr crisis with the 2013 United States National Security Agency’s espionage on the state owned Brazilian oil giant Petrobras. Historically the idea that democracies behave towards one another with a mutual respect has been regularly challenged. Christopher Layne in “Kant or Can’t: The Myth of the Democratic Peace” challenged such arguments with the example of the 1923 Franco-German Ruhr Crisis. Essentially Layne claims that, the occupation of the Ruhr valley by France is an example where the inherent respect that democracies have for one another, was not present. The occupation of the Ruhr showed that France’s war objective of crippling Wilhelm Germany remained the same, despite the fact that Germany was now a democratic republic. Up to 1923 France had rejected the idea of a new democratic Germany, as they did not believe their security situation had fundamentally changed. “What mattered to France was Germany’s latent power”, France’s attitude toward Germany “displayed none of the mutual respect based on democratic norms and culture” on which democratic peace theory rests. As a consequence the French PM Poincare had no option, if he was to maintain his prime ministerial position, but to occupy the Ruhr as anti-German sentiment was so high in France. The Ruhr crisis provides two problematic situations for democratic peace theorists.  Firstly it demonstrates that, should it be politically expedient for one democracy to force itself upon another, as it was for Poincare, it will. Secondly, and more importantly for cyber war, when the situation arises that one democracy is inherently weaker than another (Germany 1923) then it becomes a viable target for other democracies. This is arguably the current situation in cyber space and consequently the cyber battlefield.

In September 2013 it emerged that the U.S had been spying on the Brazilian oil company Petrobras. This provides many parallels to 1923 and is essentially an act of corporate cyber espionage by the U.S, against a state owned oil producer. From this it is possible to conclude that the United States, in a similar fashion to France in 1923, does not conform to ideas of mutual respect; instead they sought to understand the “Latent” economic power of Petrobras, and thus the Brazilian government’s oil wealth. At this point it is important to acknowledge Moaz and Russet’s claim that democratic peace is generated by “peaceful competition, persuasion and compromise”, thus the stability of the so called democratic peace, if Moaz and Russet are correct, is on unstable ground, as a result of an increasing turn to the realm of cyber space. The Petrobras incident demonstrates that in cyber space two essential pillars of democratic peace have been removed. This is because the United States has shown that democratic states do not have the inherent respect required of democratic peace theory, when they are operating in the cyber world. Furthermore on the evidence presented it is possible to conclude, if not predict, that democracies such as the U.S would be willing to perform a cyber attack if it enabled some kind of economic benefit. Therefore the growth of the cyber world has simultaneously eliminated the idea of trust between democracies. As a result the likelihood of (cyber)war is much greater.

The counter argument could be made here that Petrobras, despite its majority state ownership, does not amount to a democratic state, hence this example does not undermine democratic peace theory’s requisite that democracies hold mutual respect and compete peacefully. However this is one example of many. If, for example, you examine 2013-14 revelations that the CIA and NSA were exercising a “Special Collections Service”(SCS) unit in Berlin monitoring not only Angela Merkel’s phone conversations, but also the committee rooms of the Reichstag, the future for democratic peace in the cyber realm is bleak. This example demonstrates that not only do democracies not inherently trust democratically elected leaders, but also the legislative bodies within democratic states. Moreover the SCS program has been in operation across Europe operating in other capitals such as Madrid. What this demonstrates, is that if a democratic state has the ability to do something, as the U.S cyber dominance has allowed in this case, it will do it. Furthermore it demonstrates that it will not be restrained by the articulated parameters of democratic peace theory.

Cyberwar presents a decisive challenge to democratic peace theory. The developing nature of warfare allows the logic of the democratic peace to be disputed. This is because cyberwar is not restricted by the confinements of public opinion, this in turn defeats ideas of transparency and trust between democracies. However, as stated, an example of cyberwar, that in itself, disproves the democratic peace cannot be provided; only examples that indicate the likelihood of future cyberwars between democracies. When two democratic states come into collision on an issue divisive enough for them to question the trust on which democratic peace is orientated, the inherent harmony of democracies will collapse. This is beginning to emerge as the U.S utilizes its cyber hegemony to infiltrate other democratic states, in order to understand their intentions, and true capabilities. What cyberwar reinforces, therefore, is that democracy is still in its founding moments and to conclude that it will create a perpetual peace, is to ignore the possibility of development in what we define as peace and war.

Archie is currently a third year undergraduate in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His dissertation focused on human rights and the war on terror. He is interested in the changing nature of warfare and how it is revealing our rigid definitions of conflict as inadequate and outdated. Archie is hoping to continue his studies within the War Studies Department with an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society.