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Passports and the New Cold War

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By the latter half of the Trump administration, punditry was firmly centred on the development of a new Cold War. While some focus on a revisionist Russia, others see the primary conflict of the 21st century as between China and the United States. Concerning the US-China conflict, most of the attention has been paid to the basic geopolitical struggle between an established hegemon and a rising power. More recently, there has been a focus on how each offer competing systems of governance to the world: authoritarianism and democracy. Against this backdrop, an assertive China, ever-conscious of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), is beginning to resemble the Soviet Union in one important facet: the movement of people.

Winston Churchill’s metaphorical “iron curtain” illustrated a clear demarcation between the Western and Soviet spheres of influence.  It also highlighted the near-impermeable border which separated Soviet citizens from the west. One of the hallmarks of the USSR was a system of internal and external passports. The former was a way for the government to control the internal movement of the population; changing residence for a period of “greater than one and one half months” was bureaucratically cumbersome and  purposefully reduced mobility. International passports were difficult to obtain and served as decidedly political tools to restrict the activity of so-called “untrustworthies,” particularly those who might attempt to flee the USSR for political reasons.  In a 1986 document, there were ten separate reasons for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused exit authorization for personal travel for citizens of the USSR. These included such vague and all-encompassing reasons as “knowledge of state secrets” and “ensuring the protection of public order.” While the Soviet Union was not alone in using visas for political purposes – it was a common practice in the United States – the focus on the domestic population was uniquely Soviet.

Contemporary China also uses a system of internal and external passports. The hukou is a household registration system which governs everything from an individual’s ability to purchase a house, receive government benefits, and register a child in public school. Changing one’s hukou status, for example when moving from a rural community to a large city, is very difficult if not outright impossible. It is a tool with which the government can control the movement of people and thus the development of different urban and rural areas throughout the country. The hukou system is being augmented with an equally powerful social credit score, which can be used as a pretext to restrict the movement of citizens. In general, passports for international travel have been readily obtainable for most Chinese citizens. Yet, there have long been exceptions to this standard. Since 2012, almost no new passports have been issued to residents of the Tibetan Autonomous region. Recently, China has issued blanket recalls of passports in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Authorities have demanded that Uighurs return to China to renew expired passports; those who do have disappeared. Both policies are racist attempts to suppress ethnic minorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and directly contravene the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which calls for unrestricted domestic and international mobility.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to further restrictions in China’s passport system, even affecting those who previously benefited from easy access. In response to the Delta variant in Summer 2021, China banned passport renewals for those engaged in non-essential travel. While the government had previously restricted the travel of government critics, last summer’s restrictions represented a new wholesale attempt to restrict external freedom of movment. While ostensibly meant to support China’s zero-COVID policy, some have argued that the policies are meant to shield China from outside influences. Extraordinarily long quarantine periods in China and Hong Kong likely have a muting effect on international travel, regardless of the underlying rationale for these policies.

Why then, does a government that is loath to repeat the mistakes of the USSR, maintain policies that echo many of those from the Soviet system, particularly when it comes to the free-movement of people? Both the USSR and PRC are authoritarian regimes that rely upon strict social controls to retain power. China, for its part, has become an increasingly assertive geopolitical power and its president – Xi Jinping – has made Chinese economic and political primacy his singular focus. As part of this, a policy of Sinicization is underway in majority-minority regions of China and there is little expectation that the CCP will yield to international pressure to allow emigration as occurred in the Soviet Union. These passport policies, then, represent an effective tool with which the CCP can continue to maintain control over an economically empowered populace, while also shielding the Chinese political-economic system from outside threats. We are indeed witnessing some of the hallmarks of the twentieth century Cold War, but not always in the most obvious manner.

Russian PMCs in Africa: How the Kremlin converts hard power into economic opportunity

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Soldier Holding Gun /Photo Credit: Jakson Martins, licensed under Creative Commons

The primary driver of Russian expansion in Africa are Private Military Contractors (PMC). Exerting hard power, while maintaining plausible deniability for the Russian state, PMCs are active across Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and more. Providing a cheaper alternative to Russian army deployments, PMCs, like the infamous Wagner Group, enable Russia to generate economic outcomes. The mechanisms by which they do so, however, remain murky. I will therefore interrogate these processes, arguing that Russia’s strategy revolves around exchanging PMC-derived hard power for economic concessions and partnerships.

Russian influence in Africa

Russia relies on Soviet legacies to maintain and build its influence in Africa. With enduring historical ties rooted in Cold War geopolitics, Russia is less affected by accusations of neo-colonialism. It never held colonies on the continent and thus carries less baggage in its dealing with regional governments. Putin has promoted Russian partnerships as “no strings attached”, differentiating their agreements from those with former colonial powers which often demand political or structural economic reforms.

Russia has acted opportunistically to offer military assistance to states affected by civil war, social unrest, and terrorism. Wagner Group was sent to CAR in 2018 following the end of French peacekeeping mission Opération Sangaris and the failure of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force to disarm rebel groups. In Sudan and Madagascar, Russia answered calls for security assistance amidst social and political unrest. In Libya, up to 1200 Wagner troops directly supported Haftar’s LNA (Libyan National Army) 2019 Tripoli Offensive. Finally, Mali’s recent contracting of Wagner Group follows the gradual end of France’s counterterrorism mission Opération Barkhane, which has not solved lingering issues of terrorism in the Sahel, while significantly heightening anti-French sentiment in the country.

A clear strategic trend is therefore apparent, Russia is identifying African security vacuums and offering PMC-led military aid. However, such Russian military aid is not free, PMC forces are often deployed in exchange for economic concessions.

Russia’s geopolitical strategy

Putin believes Russia is a great power and should retain this position, no matter the cost. While Russia’s military power is widely recognized, the same cannot be said for its economy.

The Russian president employs a foreign policy that exploits Russia’s hard power to expand its economic ties. In what are known as “packages”, Moscow offers foreign governments PMC support in exchange for natural resource concessions and the opening of national markets to Russian companies. That African governments request assistance is crucial, as it gives Russian interventions a degree of legitimacy within the international community.

In the short term, Russia focuses on exploiting natural resource concessions. Such concessions are granted as direct payments for the deployment of Wagner Group forces. On top of natural resources, the Kremlin’s economic interests in Africa revolve around arms exports to the continent. These bilateral security ties provide billions to the Kremlin, essential for keeping foreign interventions going and financing the defence industry.

In the long term, Putin is looking to position Russian export companies at the centre of CAR’s, Libya’s, and DRC’s economies. Although these countries’ populations possess little purchasing power, this will not always be the case. Their large young populations represent key emerging consumer groups, thus far untapped by the global market. By stoking new, massive export markets for Russian companies, Putin is looking to plan ahead, positioning Russia to benefit from long term shifts in the global economy.

Finally, the Russian president seeks to establish a strong base of geopolitical influence in Africa. This would give Russia a foothold on Europe’s southern border, notably in Libya, boosting Russia’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis the EU. The Kremlin will continue to offer package deals to African countries with geographically strategic locations and maturing markets.

Plausible deniability and controlling PMCs

PMCs give Putin plausible deniability. They are neither part of, nor officially affiliated with, the Russian state, therefore the Kremlin cannot be held accountable for their actions. Furthermore, PMCs technically do not exist in Russia, as they are banned by the law. Employing these companies allows Russia is to mitigate scrutiny into its overseas operations, reflected by continued uncertainty about the exact number of Wagner personnel in Libya, CAR and DRC. The PMC’s covertness acts as force multipliers to contracting armies and to hide casualties from the general public.

Putin exploits the lack of legal status to control the PMCs, who suffer consequences when they step out of line, such as the shakeup of Wagner’s command after the battle of Kasham. Wagner Group is heavily connected to Russia’s military intelligence (GRU), its founder, Utkin, was the commander of the GRU’s 700th Special Forces Unit of the 2nd Separate Special Forces Brigade. Wagner Group’s headquarters are a shared military base with the GRU’s 10th Separate Special Purpose Brigade, based in Molkino, Krasnodar. The contractors receive passports from the Central Migration Office Unit 770-001, which are only issued for GRU operatives. In 2016, Putin honoured Utkin at a reception for the “Hero of the Fatherland Day”.  When 33 Wagner Group operatives were arrested in Belarus during the 2020 presidential elections, Putin intervened personally to have them freed.

The lack of official connection between the contractors and the Russian state also makes their deployment far cheaper. A Wagner soldier’s monthly salary of $4,600 is almost four times that of a Russian soldier at $1,200. However, the mercenary’s salary, accommodation and equipment are paid by Wagner Group owner Prigozhin’s network, using income from the exploitation of natural resource concessions. Therefore, Russia deploys Wagner troops abroad with low financial drawbacks, only paying for transport and occasional medical treatment. By controlling Wagner’s operational capacity to deploy to conflict zones, the Kremlin’s exerts direct authority over the contractors.

Putin’s intercessions in favour of Wagner Group and the outfit’s very close ties to the GRU demonstrate a direct link between the mercenaries and the highest levels of the Russian state. These ties are further compounded by Putin’s inner circle often owning PMCs, natural resource companies and financial firms active in Africa.

PMC’s financial structure and economic interests

One man is at the centre of Putin’s private interests in Africa: Yuri Prigozhin. Kremlin insider and Wagner Group’s financier, Prigozhin was tasked to exploit African natural resources in exchange for Russian mercenary assistance. With Putin’s backing, the businessman set up contacts all over the continent, negotiating “package” agreements.

Prigozhin owns M Invest, an umbrella company that manages a mix of security and energy firms. Through this umbrella company, he secures natural resource concessions by negotiating “package” agreements in the Kremlin’s name. He then guards the natural resources with PMCs, exploits the resources with specialized energy companies, and distributes the profits amongst African partners, himself and likely the Kremlin. M Invest’s subsidiaries include Lobaye Invest, which extracts gold and diamonds in CAR, Meroe Gold, a gold mining operation in Sudan, and Sewa Security Services, which provides personal security for government officials.

Closely interlinked and with direct ties to the Kremlin, these companies further the interests of bigger Russian multinationals. For example, after a 9 month halt in operations that coincided with the Wagner-backed Tripoli offensive, Gazprom resumed operations in Libya in May 2021. The firm concurrently jumpstarted its pre-planned infrastructure expansion projects to boost gas production. This pattern of interlinked companies is repeated across the African countries where Russia has a significant presence.

Prigozhin is one of many oligarchs that control the system of highly interconnected security, energy and financial firms. Closely connected to these oligarchs, Putin, through his inner circle, stands to personally profit from Russia’s expansion into Africa. This operation is in line with the Russian President’s rule, defined by informal personal network connections and high military corruption.

Summary

In conclusion, Russian PMCs are a tool employed by the Kremlin to expand Russia’s economic, political and geopolitical influence in Africa. The contractors are at the heart of Russian strategy, which trades hard power assistance with natural resource concessions and long-term economic partnerships. Putin’s long-term strategy of gaining preferential market access to emerging African states furthers his Grand Strategy of maintaining Russia’s great power status. However, Putin’s private economic interests in the exploitation of natural resources points to an inability to separate personal gains from state governance. This blurring of the lines may hamper Russia’s long-term strategy on the continent. Nevertheless, in the short term, Russian PMCs are set to continue playing a defining role in Africa’s security sphere due to their efficiency and low operational costs.

Beyond Beijing: Russia in the Indo-Pacific

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Russian Missile Cruiser Varyag. Photo Credit: Phil King, licensed via Creative Commons.

Russia’s military power in the Indo-Pacific is often confined analytically to the Sino-Russian relationship vis-a-vis the U.S. While the extent of that relationship remains heavily debated, Russia’s larger role as a security actor in the Indo-Pacific is ignored, despite possessing military relationships with states in the region, particularly with India and Vietnam. These relationships are underpinned by arms deals, joint exercises, and cooperation on policy, indicating a more complex and fluid position for Russia in the Indo-Pacific than the Sino-Russian relationship alone explains. Russia is a multi-dimensional security actor in the Indo-Pacific region and policy to the end of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” should take this into account.

Russia has always had security interests in the East. The 19th century competition between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain for Afghanistan, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Soviet Union’s defeat of Japan’s Kwantung Army in World War II demonstrate a long history of Russian interest in the Indo-Pacific.[1] Russia has demonstrated interest in the Indo-Pacific when the region has been of geopolitical importance. Though Russia officially rejects the concept of the Indo-Pacific as an artificial American construct, its policy suggests a de facto recognition of the theater. As such, the focus on the region in international politics has influenced the Kremlin’s strategic calculus.

The contested southern Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan serve as one locus of Russian interest in the region.[2] Russia deployed Bal and Bastion anti-ship missile systems and drones to the southern Kuril Islands in 2016 and began plans to construct military facilities on the islands.[3] In August 2021, Defence Minister Shoigu announced that Russia would build “51 more pieces of military infrastructure”[4] on the Kuril Islands. Then, in early October 2021, the Russian and Chinese navies held their first-ever joint patrols in the Sea of Japan.[5] Four days later, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet’s Submarine Force Command, Rear Admiral Arkady Navarsky, told the Russian News Agency (TASS) that Russia’s Pacific Fleet would be receiving four new submarines.[6] Moscow’s increased investments in its Pacific assets are indicative of its desire to be a proactive and influential player in the region.

During his tenure as Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov laid the groundwork for Russia’s “pivot to Asia” in the mid-1990s by initiating stronger relations with China and India.[7] These two remain the only countries named as security partners in Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy. Russia seeks with China a “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction” (всеобъемлющее партнерство и стратегический взаимодействие) and with India, a “particularly privileged strategic partnership” (особо привилегированное стратегическое партнерство). Such specifications suggest Russia’s relationship with these two Asian countries are different in nature, though it remains ambiguous, which ultimately Russia favours.[8] In the Asia-Pacific, Russia aims to contribute to stability and security on a non-aligned basis (на внеблоковой основе).[9]

Russia and India have had a strong but imperfect relationship since the Cold War era, the foundation of which is arms sales.[10] In 2019 India purchased two Admiral Grigorovich class guided-missile frigates for the Indian Navy[11] and in early 2021 India agreed to spend $5.5 billion on the Russian S-400 air defence system, against U.S. wishes.[12] Between 2013-2017 35 percent of Russian arms exports went to India, with only 12 percent going to China.[13] Nor was the relationship limited to arms sales. In September 2021 India participated in the Russian-led ZAPAD 2021 military exercise,[14] a month after the 12th annual Indo-Russian joint military exercise Indra-21 was held in Volgograd.[15] Bala Venkatesh Varma, outgoing Ambassador to Russia, told TASS that the Joint Commission on Technology and Science, and agreements on military technical cooperation and reciprocal defence logistical support are anticipated to be announced later this year.[16]

Much like the Indo-Russian relationship, the Russo-Vietnamese defence relationship dates back to the Cold War and is grounded predominantly in arms sales. Vietnam alone is responsible for 61 percent of Russian arms sales to Southeast Asia over the past two decades.[17] However, like the Indian relationship, more is afoot than simple weapons deals. Indeed, the first ever joint Russian-Vietnamese military exercise was held in December 2019 in the port of Cam Ranh.[18] Prior to said exercise, in June 2021, Shoigu and his Vietnamese counterpart Colonel General Phan Van Giang held a video conference on deepening military and military-technical cooperation.[19] Later that month, Deputy Minister of National Defence Senior Lieutenant Le Huy Vinh hosted Anatoly Chuprynov, the resident representative of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation in Hanoi.[20]

Both India and Vietnam value their security relationships with Russia. The Russia-India bilateral summit in December 2021 is preceded by Russia and India’s first ministerial 2+2 dialogue, a format India previously only used with the U.S., Japan, and Australia. Moreover, India has opted to not only purchase Russian arms but invest in joint military technological development. The BrahMos cruise missile joint production venture[21] and the Joint Commission on Technology and Science are investments that suggest New Delhi views Russia as a serious contributor to India’s long-term defence capabilities. Much like India, Vietnam initiated the June 2021 Shoigu-Van Giang conference and has made its desire to purchase the BrahMos cruise missile well-known.[22] New Delhi and Hanoi are making efforts to sell cooperation with Russia to its domestic audiences, as well. Indian media outlets made note of China’s status as a mere observer to ZAPAD 2021, while India and Russia demonstrated joint operability.[23] Equally, the Vietnamese Communist Party’s party website described strategic cooperation with Russia as the “top priority”[24] of the party and state after Vietnamese Defence Minister Ngo Xuan Lich’s February 2020 Moscow trip.

The seriousness with which New Delhi and Hanoi address their relationships with Moscow is telling—Russia is considered as a possible restraint on growing Chinese military power in the region and as a “third-way” in the U.S.-China competition more generally. Vietnam explicitly pursues a multi-pronged foreign policy that does not give one external power too much influence over the country’s security and like Russia, India favours multipolarity.[25] Both view it as beneficial to keep Russia invested in the region.

The West’s efforts to estrange Moscow and Beijing may be futile if not counterproductive, but there are reasons why the former may choose to distance itself from the latter to the end of its own interests. Both Russian and Chinese authorities reject bipolarity as the present or coming world architecture, though China’s status may no longer be “for China to choose.”[26] An international structure in which China levels with or passes the U.S. in national power is unsatisfactory to Russia because Moscow aims for multipolarity and great power status. It is difficult to imagine China ceding influence to other states if this is achieved. Russia’s ambitions would then be frustrated by Beijing’s power, prompting antagonistic behavior towards China from Moscow.

The Sino-Russian relationship may otherwise weaken gradually as the economic relationship becomes more lopsided, with China eventually halting its purchase of Russian military hardware – in favour of domestically procured items -and climate change reducing the attractiveness of Russia’s fossil fuel reserves.[27] Such conditions incentivise Russia to keep China at arms-length. India and Vietnam are unlikely to cut security ties with Russia, despite pressure from the U.S. to do so, because they view Russia as a counterweight to both China and the U.S., a role it served for these states during the Cold War.[28] Moreover, Russia’s relationships with India and Vietnam do not threaten Russia’s great power ambitions, implying a certain level of durability.

When estimating the extent to which Russia may support China in competition or open conflict with the U.S., Russia’s assorted interests in the Indo-Pacific must be considered. The Sino-Russian relationship is worthy of attention, but there should be greater analytical curiosity regarding Russia’s other Indo-Pacific relationships and how they may affect Moscow’s decision-making, especially if China obfuscates Russia’s strategic end-goal of multipolarity. A scenario in which Russia restrains rather than emboldens China is a very real possibility. Stranger things have happened.

[1] “A Soviet Push Helped Force Japan to Surrender,” The Moscow Times (The Moscow Times, August 8, 2005), https://web.archive.org/web/20131212214325/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/a-soviet-push-helped-force-japan-to-surrender/210764.html.

[2] Tom Holcombe, “Ending a 60 Year Stalemate: Japan’s Push to Get a Peace Treaty with Russia,” The Interpreter (The Interpreter, January 16, 2018), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ending-60-year-stalemate-japans-push-get-peace-treaty-russia.

[3] “Russia to Beef up Military, Recession Be Damned,” CBS News (CBS Interactive, March 25, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-to-beef-up-military-recession-be-damned/.

[4] Olzhas Auyezov, “Russia Expands Military Construction Plans on Kuril Islands – Report,” Reuters (Reuters, August 9, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-expands-military-construction-plans-kuril-islands-report-2021-08-09/.

[5] Polina Devitt, “Russian, Chinese Warships Hold First Joint Patrols in the Pacific,” Reuters (Reuters, October 24, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-chinese-warships-hold-first-joint-patrols-pacific-2021-10-23/.

[6] “Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Receive Four Nuclear Subs in Coming Years, Says Rear Admiral,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, October 27, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1354851.

[7] Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Asia Strategy: Bolstering the Eagle’s Eastern Wing,” Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 94 (2016). https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/russias-asia-strategy-bolstering-eagles-eastern-wing. 17.

[8] It is important to note that Russia rejected the reframing of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean as one region, the Indo-Pacific, as a U.S.-made artificial construct. Nevertheless, its balancing act of its relationships to other actors suggests that it seeks to expand its power in the regional framework and not through separate campaigns.

[9] President of the Russian Federation, On the National Security of the Russian Federation, 2021, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001, 44.

[10] Sameer Lalwani et al., “The Influence of Arms: Explaining the Durability of India–Russia Alignment,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, January 15, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2473328/the-influence-of-arms-explaining-the-durability-of-indiarussia-alignment/#sdendnote169anc.

[11] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Kicks off Work on 2 Guided Missile Frigates for Indian Navy,” The Diplomat (The Diplomat, July 15, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/russia-kicks-off-work-on-2-guided-missile-frigates-for-indian-navy/.

[12] Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Russian Arms Sale Clouds U.S.-India Ties,” Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, March 19, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/19/russia-india-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-s-400-china-arms-sales/.

[13] Leon Aron, “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance?” Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance.

[14] “Indian Army to Participate in Multi-Nation Exercise ‘Zapad 2021’ in Russia,” Mint (Mint, September 1, 2021), https://www.livemint.com/news/india/indian-army-to-participate-in-multi-nation-military-exercise-zapad-2021-in-russia-11630511720499.html.

[15] Press Trust of India, “India, Russia to Hold 13-Day Mega Joint Military Exercise from August 1,” NDTV.com (NDTV, July 29, 2021), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indra-2021-india-russia-to-hold-13-day-mega-military-exercise-in-volgograd-from-august-1-2498159.

[16] “India’s Envoy to Russia Looks Forward to Inking Defense Deals at December Summit,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, November 1, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1356659.

[17] Ian Storey, “Russia’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: A Tenuous Lead in Arms Sales but Lagging in Other Areas,” ISEAS (Yusof Ishak Institute, April 8, 2021), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-33-russias-defence-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia-a-tenuous-lead-in-arms-sales-but-lagging-in-other-areas-by-ian-storey/.

[18] “The joint Russian-Vietnamese exercise to assist a submarine will be held in the port of Cam Ranh,” Press Service of the Eastern Military District (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, December 5, 2019), https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12265198@egNews.

[19] “Russia’s Defense Chief Vows to Strengthen Military Interaction with Vietnam,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, June 11, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1301681.

[20] “Vietnam, Russia Forge Stronger Military-Technical Ties,” Thông tấn xã Việt Nam (TTXVN) (Vietnam News Agency (VNA), June 23, 2021), https://vnanet.vn/en/anh/vna-photos-1027/vietnam-russia-forge-stronger-military-technical-ties-5514850.html.

[21] “Russian-Indian Joint Venture Brahmos,” NPO Mashinostroyenia, http://www.npomash.ru/cooperation/en/brahmos.htm.

[22] Snehesh Alex Philip, “Rajnath Singh Assures ‘Friend’ Vietnam of Help Modernising Its Armed Forces,” ThePrint (ThePrint, November 27, 2020), https://theprint.in/defence/rajnath-singh-assures-friend-vietnam-of-help-modernising-its-armed-forces/553405/.

[23] Divyanshu Jindal, “India at Zapad-2021: What It Means for Our Ties with Russia & China,” The Quint (The Quint, September 20, 2021), https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-russia-military-exercise-zapad-2021-geopolitical-implications#read-more.

[24] Ralph Jennings, “Vietnam Advancing Ties with Russia to Hedge against China, US,” VOA (Voice of America News, February 21, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_vietnam-advancing-ties-russia-hedge-against-china-us/6184625.html.

[25] Elizabeth Roche, “India Supports Multipolar World Order: Shringla,” Mint (Mint, June 23, 2021), https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-supports-multipolar-world-order-shringla-11624450754028.html.

[26] Zhao Huasheng and Andrey Kortunov, “The Coming Bipolarity and Its Implications: Views from China and Russia,” Russian International Affairs Council (Russian International Affairs Council, November 23, 2020), https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-coming-bipolarity-and-its-implications-views-from-china-and-russia/.

[27] Jonathan E. Hillman, “China and Russia: Economic Unequals,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (July 15, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-russia-economic-unequals; Interview with Paul Haenle, Dmitri Trenin, Eugene Rumer, Alexander Gabuev, Are China-Russia Relations Getting Too Close for Comfort?, podcast audio, Carnegie Endowment, October 30, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/30/are-china-russia-relations-getting-too-close-for-comfort-pub-80238.

[28] Embassy New Delhi to Department of State, Telegram 026315, October 28, 1985, “Gandhi’s Visit to Moscow,” Carter Presidential Library (accessed November 12, 2021), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18128-document-02-ambassador-dean-cable-subject-gandhi.; Stephen J. Morris, “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970s: The View from Moscow,” Working Paper No. 25, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (April 1999).

Russia’s 2021 State Duma Elections: A sham vote but with signs pointing to possible future change

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Russia’s recent elections were the most repressive of the past twenty-one years, marred by ballot stuffing (©Gwydion M. Williams, 2011; CC BY 2.0 license).

National elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the lower chamber of Russia’s bicameral parliamentary system, were recently held across a three-day voting period from the 17th to the 19th of September. The result was entirely predictable: an apparently resounding victory for Vladimir Putin’s party United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya).

The final count recorded that United Russia took 49.8% of the vote. The nearest rival was the Communist Party which attained a 19% share of the ballots. Following them were the confusingly named ultra-nationalist ‘Liberal Democratic Party of Russia’  (LDPR) on 7.5%, ‘A Just Russia’ on 7.4%, and ‘New People’ on 5.3%, a new party taking part in the elections for the first time.

The Communists, LDPR, and ‘A Just Russia’ are generally considered to be pro-Putin and part of the ‘systemic opposition’ in Russia that allows the simulation of pluralism in the country. New People, meanwhile, advocate the liberal reforms popular among supporters of the jailed opposition leader and Putin-critic Alexei Navalny but without directly attacking Putin, suggesting they are potentially a ‘synthetic party’ convened by Putin’s lackeys to take votes away from the genuine, ‘non-systemic’ opposition.

Such efforts to secure Putin’s dominance show how Russia’s elections have become increasingly uncompetitive over the 21st century, with allegations of vote-rigging and voter coercion always common. However, in 2021, measures to supress the opposition reached new heights both before and during the voting period.

In the build-up to the elections, civil society came under a renewed and vicious assault from the authorities. This included both targeted and mass arrests of protestors following Navalny’s imprisonment in January and many genuine opposition candidates being barred from standing. The rationale behind this new wave of oppression rested on the simple fact that United Russia has become increasingly unpopular in recent times, particularly following the government’s poor performance during the pandemic and allegations of corruption against key party figures, seeing it reach levels as low as 30% in opinion polls.

Opposition leader Alexei Navalny, pictured here in 2017, observed the elections from a prison cell following his arrest earlier this year by the security services upon his return to Russia. Navalny was flying home from Germany, where he had been receiving treatment for a near-fatal poisoning which the Russia state is highly suspected of having perpetrated (Evgeny Feldman, 2017; CC BY-SA 4.0 license).

The elections themselves, meanwhile, were marred by ballot stuffing and an absence of foreign observers. A new online voting system was introduced this year, partially in response to covid, which enabled the security services to monitor voting behaviour and intimidate reluctant state employees to cast their ballot for United Russia. Meanwhile, team Navalny’s tactical or ‘smart’-voting initiative, an app that recommended to voters the most viable non-United Russia candidate in their district to vote for, was blocked by the authorities; Apple and Google both removed the app from their online stores leading to criticism from Navalny’s allies. Yet despite Putin maintaining his two-thirds supermajority in the State Duma, which is required to make constitutional changes such as to limits on presidential terms, there are signs that we may see change in Russia one day.

Though United Russia won, the political capital expended by Putin to win the election, necessitated by the party’s sheer unpopularity, has cost the ruling regime in terms of legitimacy. Meanwhile, even with the use of exceptionally repressive measures, the political technologists of United Russia could not prevent a 4.4% drop in its share of the vote. Furthermore, while the path to extending Putin’s rule beyond 2024 has been secured, as senior RFE/RL correspondent Robert Coalson has said, it is difficult to see how the Kremlin can hold another similar vote, such as in the upcoming 2024 presidential election, having now so thoroughly discredited any remaining democratic credentials it had. While in the last presidential vote of 2018 selected Kremlin-approved liberal opposition candidates were allowed to run, in order to create the impression of a competitive election, no liberal opposition candidate will be willing to stand in such blatantly fraudulent elections. And without the ability to simulate democracy, Putin’s legitimacy and position is at the very least made slightly more uncertain.

There are also signs that the once pliant systemic opposition may be willing to challenge the regime. The Communists, who were long considered a fairly toothless pro-Putin party, have on the back of gaining fifteen seats and increasing their vote share by 6%, been emboldened. Their leader, Gennady Zyuganov has accused the Kremlin of perpetrating a litany of electoral violations, among them ballot stuffing. Some Communists have since come out onto the streets to protest the election results, claiming they were cheated of victory by state interference with the online voting system.

The Kremlin of course denies these allegations, calling the elections a ‘free and fair’ vote. The regime has even sought to deflect these accusations, with former president and Security Council deputy chief Dmitri Medvedev suggesting it may launch a ‘probe’ into supposed US interference in Russia’s political system.

Nevertheless, despite such bluster, the Kremlin must now be aware that through its actions during 2021’s vote it has limited its options via which to claim legitimacy, a development that further down the line could have serious consequences to Putin’s grip on power. Certainly, it cannot be denied that political apathy does remain high in Russia which suits the regime. However, if in 2024 Putin does try to remain in power, as many expect him to do, there are reasons to tentatively predict a political re-awakening in Russia. As Vladimir Kara-Murza says, the continued claim to legitimacy via rigged votes by the ever-present president may prove to be an insult too far to the dignity of Russian voters and 2024 has the potential to become another decisive moment of revolutionary political change in modern Russian history alongside 1917 and 1991.

Putin’s People Part 2: How the Oligarchs Took Russia’s Wealth and then Silenced the Journalists

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Russian Newspapers by Ruslan Krivobok / Руслан Кривобок is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0

Most books on modern Russia tend to isolate Russia’s re-emergence as a significant power in Europe from the West. Its rise is often attributed to Putin’s bellicosity in dealing with the West, buffeted by the rising oil prices and Russia’s wealth of natural resources. However, Catherine Belton’s Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and then Took on the West is a deep dive into the corruption of the system behind Putin. It is a self-assured description of how the officers of the KGB implemented a system, beginning in the dying days of the Soviet Union, to ensure that the hold on power is never left to chance. But it is also a damning indictment of the West’s blindness to the risks of accepting what was obviously dirty money and the foolishness in suggesting that were the organisations peddling this cash exposed to Western ways of doing things, then they would see the error of their ways. The Western financial systems were not unwitting victims of disinformation and cleverly concocted schemes; rather, they were complicit actors in the fleecing of the Russian people and the consolidation of Putin’s power.

During Andropov’s premiership, the KGB realised that the Soviet Union was beginning to lag far behind the West in terms of economic prosperity and capacity and that the system in the Soviet Union could not compete with the West for much longer. The inefficiencies of a planned system and compulsory employment could not hope to compete with the efficiencies demanded and the innovation encouraged by the capitalist system in the West. The KGB had always had access to ‘black’ money to finance its operations in the West[1] and to ensure their networks were maintained. They began to funnel ever greater amounts out of the Soviet Union for slush funds and to ensure permanent access to the financial networks of the West.

It is no secret that many of the Russian billionaires who earned their wealth in the 1990s did so through shady, secretive schemes and that many have done so since through their connections with the people at the centre of Putin’s Kremlin. We also know that those who refused to play ball such as Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, Berezovsky to name just a few, were relieved of their possessions through the shameful use of the courts in barely masked power grabs by the Kremlin and its allies. While it may be hard to feel sorry for people whose own wealth was generated in what many view today as theft on a mass scale, it opens up questions about what other billionaires from Russia do in order to prevent that happening to them.

The research that went into this book is phenomenal. There are countless interviews listed over a number of years as well as reports and articles written by journalists and investigators during the Putin years. What I took most from this book and that I think others will too, is not the names of the Russian billionaires involved or the numerous schemes that the KGB have used to funnel money out of Russia, but the appalling lack of judgement and due diligence on the part of Western financiers who have allowed this flow of illicit finance into the stock markets and property markets.[2] The furore that has been caused by the publication of this book has also once again exposed the complicity of London’s courts in Russian score settling. Author Belton is facing numerous lawsuits from some of the oligarchs listed in the book – Roman Abramovich is not only suing the publishing house Harper Collins but also Belton herself; Mikhail Fridman, owner of Russia’s largest non-state bank, Pyotr Aven, Fridman’s business partner, and Shalva Chigirinsky are also suing. London-based lawyers are representing them. The UK Government continually promises to counter Russia’s disinformation campaigns as well as rid and clean the London markets of their corrupting financial influence. As these court cases show, the UK Government is failing miserably.

Investigative journalists are vital for upholding democracy but too many are being impeded in their work by SLAPPs – Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Those with money, and therefore power, are using the courts to harass the media and civil society, to silence journalists and activists who are drawing attention to the abuses of power that are happening on a huge scale across the world. Of course, there should be laws to protect innocent people from libel and from illegal intrusions. However, investigations that are in the public interest and which are carefully carried out so as to ensure that information is accurate and corroborated must be given the respect and protection that it deserves. SLAPPs are a cynical use of the legal system to protect the malign interests of the few whose money makes them believe they are untouchable. Our courts are renowned around the world for their long-standing dedication to fair trials for all, regardless of one’s background or finances. This reputation is being sullied and the UK Government are doing little to stop that happening.

In July of last year, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK Parliament released their ‘Russia Report’, an investigation into the security threat that Russia poses to the UK and the weaknesses of the UK in resisting this threat. It was noted that Russia views any loss for the West as a win for Russia – foreign policy as a zero-sum game.[3] One of the report’s recommendations was to develop a new statutory framework to tackle espionage, the illicit financial dealings of the Russian elite, and the ‘enablers’ who support this activity. It is there in black and white in a UK Government report. The financial dealings of the Russian elite are considered a threat to the security of the UK – Russian influence in the UK is ‘the new normal’. There are a lot of Russians with very close links to Putin who are well integrated into the UK business and social scene and accepted because of their wealth[4]

It is clear from this book that changes in the markets need to be made. Audits should be demanded for companies operating in the UK, and the company only accepted if they are transparent and show adherence to Western laws. UK courts must be above reproach and should be protected against being used as pawns in a cynical game to protect the wealth and interests of those corrupting our system. Putin believes that he can behave as he likes because the West can be bought. The West must demonstrate that this is wrong; that the West will forego the millions and billions that are stolen from the Russian people and used to prop up the Kremlin’s authoritarian regime. The West must demonstrate that they will stand by the principles of transparency so vital to maintaining our democracies.

[1] Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and then Took on the West, Harper Collins, 2020. p.15, 64

[2] Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and then Took on the West, Harper Collins, 2020. p., p.488

[3]Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Russia, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/20200721_HC632_CCS001_CCS1019402408-001_ISC_Russia_Report_Web_Accessible.pdf p.1

[4] Ibid, p.22