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Putin’s People Part 2: How the Oligarchs Took Russia’s Wealth and then Silenced the Journalists

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Russian Newspapers by Ruslan Krivobok / Руслан Кривобок is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0

Most books on modern Russia tend to isolate Russia’s re-emergence as a significant power in Europe from the West. Its rise is often attributed to Putin’s bellicosity in dealing with the West, buffeted by the rising oil prices and Russia’s wealth of natural resources. However, Catherine Belton’s Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and then Took on the West is a deep dive into the corruption of the system behind Putin. It is a self-assured description of how the officers of the KGB implemented a system, beginning in the dying days of the Soviet Union, to ensure that the hold on power is never left to chance. But it is also a damning indictment of the West’s blindness to the risks of accepting what was obviously dirty money and the foolishness in suggesting that were the organisations peddling this cash exposed to Western ways of doing things, then they would see the error of their ways. The Western financial systems were not unwitting victims of disinformation and cleverly concocted schemes; rather, they were complicit actors in the fleecing of the Russian people and the consolidation of Putin’s power.

During Andropov’s premiership, the KGB realised that the Soviet Union was beginning to lag far behind the West in terms of economic prosperity and capacity and that the system in the Soviet Union could not compete with the West for much longer. The inefficiencies of a planned system and compulsory employment could not hope to compete with the efficiencies demanded and the innovation encouraged by the capitalist system in the West. The KGB had always had access to ‘black’ money to finance its operations in the West[1] and to ensure their networks were maintained. They began to funnel ever greater amounts out of the Soviet Union for slush funds and to ensure permanent access to the financial networks of the West.

It is no secret that many of the Russian billionaires who earned their wealth in the 1990s did so through shady, secretive schemes and that many have done so since through their connections with the people at the centre of Putin’s Kremlin. We also know that those who refused to play ball such as Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, Berezovsky to name just a few, were relieved of their possessions through the shameful use of the courts in barely masked power grabs by the Kremlin and its allies. While it may be hard to feel sorry for people whose own wealth was generated in what many view today as theft on a mass scale, it opens up questions about what other billionaires from Russia do in order to prevent that happening to them.

The research that went into this book is phenomenal. There are countless interviews listed over a number of years as well as reports and articles written by journalists and investigators during the Putin years. What I took most from this book and that I think others will too, is not the names of the Russian billionaires involved or the numerous schemes that the KGB have used to funnel money out of Russia, but the appalling lack of judgement and due diligence on the part of Western financiers who have allowed this flow of illicit finance into the stock markets and property markets.[2] The furore that has been caused by the publication of this book has also once again exposed the complicity of London’s courts in Russian score settling. Author Belton is facing numerous lawsuits from some of the oligarchs listed in the book – Roman Abramovich is not only suing the publishing house Harper Collins but also Belton herself; Mikhail Fridman, owner of Russia’s largest non-state bank, Pyotr Aven, Fridman’s business partner, and Shalva Chigirinsky are also suing. London-based lawyers are representing them. The UK Government continually promises to counter Russia’s disinformation campaigns as well as rid and clean the London markets of their corrupting financial influence. As these court cases show, the UK Government is failing miserably.

Investigative journalists are vital for upholding democracy but too many are being impeded in their work by SLAPPs – Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Those with money, and therefore power, are using the courts to harass the media and civil society, to silence journalists and activists who are drawing attention to the abuses of power that are happening on a huge scale across the world. Of course, there should be laws to protect innocent people from libel and from illegal intrusions. However, investigations that are in the public interest and which are carefully carried out so as to ensure that information is accurate and corroborated must be given the respect and protection that it deserves. SLAPPs are a cynical use of the legal system to protect the malign interests of the few whose money makes them believe they are untouchable. Our courts are renowned around the world for their long-standing dedication to fair trials for all, regardless of one’s background or finances. This reputation is being sullied and the UK Government are doing little to stop that happening.

In July of last year, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK Parliament released their ‘Russia Report’, an investigation into the security threat that Russia poses to the UK and the weaknesses of the UK in resisting this threat. It was noted that Russia views any loss for the West as a win for Russia – foreign policy as a zero-sum game.[3] One of the report’s recommendations was to develop a new statutory framework to tackle espionage, the illicit financial dealings of the Russian elite, and the ‘enablers’ who support this activity. It is there in black and white in a UK Government report. The financial dealings of the Russian elite are considered a threat to the security of the UK – Russian influence in the UK is ‘the new normal’. There are a lot of Russians with very close links to Putin who are well integrated into the UK business and social scene and accepted because of their wealth[4]

It is clear from this book that changes in the markets need to be made. Audits should be demanded for companies operating in the UK, and the company only accepted if they are transparent and show adherence to Western laws. UK courts must be above reproach and should be protected against being used as pawns in a cynical game to protect the wealth and interests of those corrupting our system. Putin believes that he can behave as he likes because the West can be bought. The West must demonstrate that this is wrong; that the West will forego the millions and billions that are stolen from the Russian people and used to prop up the Kremlin’s authoritarian regime. The West must demonstrate that they will stand by the principles of transparency so vital to maintaining our democracies.

[1] Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and then Took on the West, Harper Collins, 2020. p.15, 64

[2] Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and then Took on the West, Harper Collins, 2020. p., p.488

[3]Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Russia, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/20200721_HC632_CCS001_CCS1019402408-001_ISC_Russia_Report_Web_Accessible.pdf p.1

[4] Ibid, p.22

Russia’s battle with COVID: One Step Forwards, Three Steps Back

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Russia continues to struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic as cases and deaths increase each day (by focusonmore.com; licensed under CC BY 2.0)

Russia was the first country to approve a vaccine to treat the SARS-CoV-2 virus, its Sputnik V jab, which has since been complemented by the development of two other homegrown vaccines, CoviVac and EpiVacCorona. Moscow also directs a national vaccination program which is free and accessible to all Russian citizens who wish to receive a shot. Russia ought to be well on its way to achieving a high-level of immunity in its population, with the government repeatedly claiming ‘victory’ over the deadly coronavirus.

Yet any claims of victory are false. The country’s Covid defence is in a poor position relative to other large nations. As of July 21 Russia has a paltry 14.38% of its population fully vaccinated; 54.3% are fully vaccinated in the UK by contrast. Meanwhile, cases and deaths multiply at alarming rates each day, with 24,098 infections and 711 fatalities recorded on 20 July. Though democracies are also still struggling to defeat the virus, especially the highly transmissible Delta variant, responsibility for Russia’s poor performance in managing the pandemic largely falls at the feet of Vladimir Putin and his authoritarianism.

Rather than properly getting to grips with the pandemic, the severity of which the Kremlin has sought to downplay, the government has instead often prioritised its shady political objectives, carrying out a comprehensive crackdown against civil society following Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment and preparing for the upcoming elections to the State Duma, Russia’s parliament, scheduled to happen this year on 19 September. Meanwhile a combination of a historic lack of trust in the state among Russians, government disinformation about vaccines produced outside Russia, and lack of adherence to proper development standards in the production of Russia’s vaccines has seen the Russian population largely shun vaccination and remain vulnerable to the third wave of Covid. The authorities, when they do try to mitigate the virus’ effects, are increasingly being forced to impose restrictions which are widely unpopular with the public, including the enforcement of mandatory vaccinations and infringements on everyday life such as requiring proof of vaccination status to visit cafés and restaurants, which has led to a thriving black market in fake QR codes and vaccination certificates.

Putin has repeatedly expressed confidence about beating the virus but his government continues to lag behind in terms of its response (World Economic Forum; licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Russia’s continued covid-crisis has three main causes: vaccine hesitancy and mismanagement, disinformation, and an undemocratic political system. Firstly, vaccine hestitancy is widespread among the Russian population. While this is also an issue in many other countries, including democracies, it is a problem which is particularly pronounced in Russia. Data collected by a poll conducted by the Levada Centre, Russia’s largest polling agency, revealed that 54% of respondents were unwilling to be vaccinated, 25% were willing, and 19% reported that they had already received the vaccine; 69.4%, 68.6%, and 48.9% of the UK’s, the US’, and France’s populations respectively have accepted at least one shot of a  vaccine.

Second, Russians’ vaccine hesitancy is compounded and made more likely by the behaviour of the government. Not only was Russia’s flagship vaccine, Sputnik V, developed and administered before the completion of routine mass trials to assess its efficacy (it is considered safe by experts now), the government has mismanaged its promotion. President Vladimir Putin’s own vaccination was shrouded in secrecy as he refused to be pictured during it and initially he did not reveal which shot he had received (in the end it transpired to be Sputnik V), forfeiting a PR opportunity taken by many other world leaders to demonstrate to the public the safety of Covid vaccines. There have additionally been reports that Russians were given a different vaccine to the one they were informed they were receiving, while lockdowns have generally been ‘eschewed’ by the government. The Kremlin has also taken a highly nationalist approach to the utilisation of its vaccine. Sputnik V has become a tool in the Russian government’s foreign policy, offering it to African countries to boost Moscow’s standing. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has simultaneously promoted conspiracy theories regarding vaccines developed in other countries in order to lift the profile of its own. The combined effect has been to worsen public confidence in the best line of defence against the increasingly rampant virus.

Yet third, and most fundamental of all, is that the above factors are symptoms of the longer-term illness which undermines the effectiveness of Russia’s governance: the poor health of its democracy and civil society. It is not so much that Russians do not trust vaccine itself. Rather, they do not have faith in the government that provides the vaccine. The Russian state already interferes in the daily lives of citizens to sometimes intolerable degrees, which provokes cynicism towards any government scheme. Despite the vaccine’s necessity, it is seen as just another untrustworthy authoritarian measure that the state is trying to enforce on the population.

Russia’s Covid crisis is a lesson in the ills of autocracy. Having long lost the trust of millions of Russians, the state cannot not rely on voluntary uptake of the vaccine, meaning further unpopular mandatory measures may be necessary, regardless of the fact Putin said he hoped there would be no need for a new lockdown at 2021’s Direct Line session, a public relations event where the Russian President fields questions from ostensibly ‘typical’ Russians over videocall. The regime also plans to use the elections as an opportunity to ‘refresh its legitimacy’ and Covid will take careful management in order to avoid any upsets for the ruling but increasingly unpopular United Russia party. For now, though, the Russian government remains on the back foot.

The HMS Defender Incident: Russia, the Crimea and the Insecurity of an Illegal Annexation

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HMS DEFENDER transits through the Suez Canal. Picture: LA(Phot) Dan Rosenbaum. Licensed under Creative Commons.

On the 23rd of June, when it was reported that Russian ships fired warning shots at HMS Defender, a British Type-45 destroyer several miles of the Crimean coast, the world was reminded of the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine as well as the continuous Russian occupation of Crimea since 2014. The presence of British naval forces in the Black Sea is not a new phenomenon, as NATO conducts annual exercises in the region, often hosted by Romania. While the incident saw no casualties, it has generated  novel Russian paranoia regarding its position in the Black Sea. The Kremlin has accused NATO of unprovoked aggression in the Black Sea and has pledged a strong response – although it is not clear what long-term steps Russia can take. It is important to remember that the Russian annexation of Crimea receives limited international recognition and that the peninsula is almost entirely surrounded by Ukrainian territory. Crimea is therefore vulnerable to the probes and prods of NATO forces who wish to test the Russian military. Incidents such as this expose the fact that despite the annexation being in its seventh year, Russia’s position in the region remains weaker than it appears. But is this an issue that the Kremlin can resolve? They cannot suddenly turn their illegal annexation into a legal one and NATO shows no signs of backing down in its competition with Russia in the Black Sea.

Historically, the Black Sea region has been a crucial part of Russian grand strategy, throughout the imperial, soviet and republican eras. It represents the possibility of a year-round warm water port at Sevastopol, and the ability for Russian maritime commerce and military assets to move through the Straits of the Dardanelles, into the Mediterranean. Since the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia has used numerous conflicts and crises to expand its control in the Black Sea and when this was lost during the breakup of the Soviet Union it was not long before the new Russian state sought an opportunity to regain a foothold. This was achieved in 2014 with minimal difficulty as the Russian military occupied the Crimean Peninsula, while Russian backed separatists in eastern Ukraine began and still continue to wage a civil war. The illegality of Russia’s annexation is straightforward: no state has the right to change the borders or territorial integrity of another, by force. Simply put, the right of conquest has no legal standing in the 21st century. Western states may have condemned the annexation and leveed sanctions against Russia, but they have taken no military steps to force Russia out of Crimea. Now that Russia once again holds a position in the Black Sea, they will not surrender it easily.

The HMS Defender incident is not an isolated occurrence. In recent days, the Dutch vessel HNLMS Evertsen had a close run in with several Russian fighter jets, described as a ‘mock attack’. This has all come as NATO commences Operation Sea Breeze 21, a series of joint naval exercises with Ukraine across the Black Sea. This year’s Sea Breeze exercises will also be the largest in the program’s history. They will involve five thousand personnel and thirty-two ships, with more than thirty countries participating. Naval incidents between Russia, NATO and its allies are nothing new as in April it was reported that Royal Navy vessels were deployed in the English Channel to escort a group of Russian ships as they passed through the Dover Strait. Individual NATO states such as the UK have also signed new naval agreements with Ukraine, providing training support as well as new defensive equipment. Rather than leave Ukraine to an uncertain and likely unpleasant fate, NATO is clearly seeking to bolster the state as a crucial partner against Russian expansionism. The new war of words between Russia and NATO over the incident with HMS Defender will likely to do nothing to deter the western allies from maintaining their position in Ukraine and the Black Sea.

The problem that Russia faces is that as its annexation of Crimea was illegal, it cannot claim jurisdiction over the region’s territorial waters, so NATO vessels can continue to move through these waters provided they have permission from Ukraine. This was the primary justification for NATO to conduct the Sea Breeze exercises so close to Russian territory. Russia has also responded to the NATO exercises with its own live fire drills in the Black Sea, these following on from the land-based exercises they conducted in Crimea in April. While it is highly unlikely that NATO or any individual power will try to reverse the Crimean annexation by force, it presents an opportunity for Russia’s opponents to demonstrate their military reach and their continued opposition to the Russian presence in Ukraine.

For all its shows of strength in Ukraine, Russian policy is flailing . The separatists they back in eastern Ukraine may still hold territory, but they have not achieved a resounding victory. The government in Kiev continues to enjoy western backing, which shows no signs of declining and while NATO views Russian Black Sea presence as vulnerable, they will continue to conduct naval exercises. Essentially, this issue is unresolvable for the Kremlin: Russian strategic aims prevent scaling back their position in Crimea and western policy, alongside international law, hampers their attempts to solidify their hold on the region. Under international law, Crimea is Ukrainian, therefore the waters surrounding Crimea are Ukrainian. It does not matter how much military hardware Russia dispatches to the Crimea, it will not change this legal reality. Ultimately, it will be this fact that Russia will continue to be unable to escape.

A second Crimean War is not on the horizon. The five hundred will not charge again into the valley of death and the Thin Red Line will not have to hold. However, the ongoing disputes over Crimea will continue to simmer, with incidents similar to HMS Defender bound to happen again. This is something that the Russians will likely be forced to tolerate, while still displaying its military strength, both in response to NATO actions and their domestic audience. The impasse between the two sides shows no signs of being resolved. Neither Ukraine nor NATO will use force to expel Russia from Crimea, but they’re sure to make the annexation as uncomfortable for the Kremlin as possible.

Andrei Sakharov at 100: Nobel Laureate, Dissident, and Human Rights Champion

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Andrei Sakharov, born 21st May, 1921 in Moscow (Credit: Vladimir Fedorenko/License: CC BY-SA 3.0 license)

The 21st of May 2021 marked one hundred years since the birth of Andrei Sakharov. A Nobel Laureate, scientist, weapons designer, dissident, and human rights campaigner, the numerous labels one can use to describe him pay testament to the size of the legacy Sakharov left behind upon his death in 1989. Many events celebrating Sakharov have been held in his honour, with one hosted and recorded by the Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.

In Moscow, however, Sakharov’s place of birth, a planned exhibition celebrating the dissident’s life and achievements, organised by the Sakharov Centre, was disrupted by the state authorities. Though the official reasons cited were conflicts in the provision of necessary equipment with commemorations of the Second World War (usually referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) taking place at the same time, representatives of the Sakharov Centre say they were informed by officials that it was the content of the planned exhibition which meant it could not be permitted to go ahead.

The Russian state would naturally be anxious about allowing a dissident to be celebrated when it is still trying to side-line Alexei Navalny, a contemporary Russian dissident and one of the President Vladimir Putin’s fiercest critics. Though there are differences between their views, like Navalny, Sakharov was a perennial thorn in the side of the Kremlin and the Nobel Laureate’s message on the primacy of human rights is as equally resonant today as it was in the 1960s and 1970s, when Sakharov rose to prominence.

Sakharov’s path to becoming a dissident and human rights champion was in some senses an unlikely one. A member of the Soviet scientific elite and one of the chief architects of the hydrogen bomb, Sakharov could have enjoyed a life of privilege and comfort had he opted to remain uncritical of the Soviet government’s abuses, as did so many of his colleagues. This is the only aspect of Sakharov’s biography, that is his achievements in nuclear physics, that the Russian state is prepared to honour, with Putin issuing a statement celebrating the scientist’s contribution to ‘defence capability and national security’ through the hydrogen bomb’s creation. Not once, however, did the Russian President mention Sakharov’s human rights activism. Though it may be obliged to acknowledge Sakharov’s importance, the Russian state will not encourage celebrating dissidence.

Sakharov’s ideas are actively dangerous to the Putin regime, most famously articulated in a 1968 pamphlet Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom in which the dissident offered a compelling and original vision of global cooperation. Sakharov turned against the arms race his own work had helped accelerate and argued that respect for the individual’s views and rights by governments provided the sole basis for any chance of a peaceful and progressive future that averted the threat of war. Notably, Sakharov called for internationally binding laws that guaranteed freedom of speech, the protection of the environment, and the rationalisation of international relations through the introduction of scientific methods. Most of all, for Sakharov, respect for human rights had to form the basis of the social contract between the citizen and their government. His pamphlet sold millions and turned him into a figurehead of human rights and opposition to the Soviet state’s abuses.

The Soviet leadership, of course, took a dim view of Sakharov’s activities and gradually intensified their persecution of the scientist until 1980, at which point, following comments critical of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the increasingly reactionary Kremlin decided to place the dissident in internal exile in the closed Soviet city of Gorky. Deprived of all but the most modest means of communication, the Soviet state hoped that the dissident and his wife, Elena Bonner, could be isolated. Bonner was an equally key figure of Soviet dissent and campaigned for freedom in the Soviet Union and beyond. She passed away in 2011 and continues to be celebrated as a champion of human rights.

Despite his persecution, Sakharov’s ideas had a resonance which the Soviet state could not contain. Having already received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, Sakharov, even while in exile, continued to resist the Kremlin’s attempts to suppress freedom of speech, and the dissident served as a symbol of hope for those seeking reform in the USSR.

Sakharov’s ideas on freedom were in part taken up by Mikhail Gorbachev, who would attempt to reform the Soviet Union and turn it towards some measure of democracy. Gorbachev brought Sakharov out of exile in 1986 and the dissident became a crucial figure in the efforts towards democratic reform, taking up a seat in a new national legislative body. Gorbachev struggled to enact his reforms effectively and political chaos began to grip the USSR in the 1980s. There were few figures who could equal Gorbachev for stature and political standing, yet Sakharov might have been a stabilising figure for the USSR’s nascent democracy as Gorbachev’s reforms and the Soviet Union itself fell apart during 1990-91. Alas, Sakharov sadly died in 1989, having long suffered with poor health, and the Soviet Union lost one of its leading lights.

Mourners gather at Sakharov’s grave in 1990 (Credit: GeorgeLouis/License: CC BY-SA 3.0 license)

Though his argument on the importance of human rights may not seem as revolutionary as it did during the Cold War, it is partly the veracity of Sakharov, Bonner, and other campaigners that we have to thank for the wide circulation of these concepts today. His ideas also continue to have relevance. With wilting democracy across different parts of the world and growing threats to freedom of speech, Sakharov’s message on intellectual freedom ought to be remembered. Further, Sakharov rose concerns about climate change at a time when the issue was not on many politicians’ agendas. The academician called on governments to take action to reverse the effects of environmental destruction for the benefit of all humankind and his joint messages of respect for human rights, intellectual freedom, and the environment remain compelling to this day.

Sakharov’s legacy lives on the form of a prize in his name, presented by the European Union to cotemporary champions of human rights. In 2020, the prize was received by the democratic opposition in Belarus led by Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, whose ongoing struggle highlights the lingering presence of the type of authoritarianism which Sakharov himself resisted. Remembering him and his ideas this year draws attention to the need to defend those fundamental rights for which he fought, and many others fight for today.

The Old World of Arms Control is Dying

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By Bryce Farabaugh

Military.com, 2021

The future of nuclear arms control is uncertain. On February 3, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the 5-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the agreement between the United States and Russia that limits the number of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers each state may possess. The extension was a welcome relief for those concerned about the fate of the last remaining pillar of the global arms control regime, a system intended to reduce nuclear risks by improving insight, verification, and trust between the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. As the treaty’s survival was anything but certain under the previous administration, proponents of its extension are celebrating this victory, but such celebrations are bound to be short-lived as looming arms control challenges come into focus. U.S. policymakers are increasingly wary of China’s military capabilities, including its modernizing nuclear arsenal, and both supporters and skeptics of the New START extension concede future arms control agreements will likely need to include China in some capacity. Indeed, if meaningful arms control agreements are going to continue to serve the national security interests of the United States by reducing global nuclear risks in an evolving security environment, it’s helpful to interrogate arguments that were made against the New START extension to explore whether such arguments are likely to be obstacles in future arms control dialogues.

New START is largely a product of the post-Cold War thaw in relations between the United States and Russia. In the 1990’s, as the dust settled from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States came to terms with “the unipolar moment,” global nuclear stockpiles were reduced while cooperation on nuclear issues generally increased between the two states.  Cooperative arms control measures between the United States, the former Soviet Union, and others were achieved during this period: the Open Skies Treaty improved confidence and security in Europe, Soviet nuclear weapons were successfully removed from Ukraine, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) created an international network capable of monitoring nuclear detonations (among other successes) While there have undoubtedly been setbacks including the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001 and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the CTBT, for a while it appeared increasingly likely that intense nuclear competition between the US and its rivals was a thing of the past. 

Indeed, the crown jewel of the post-Cold War arms control agreements, New START, entered into force in 2011 and was viewed by many as a major achievement in US-Russian relations. Set to expire in February 2021, the United States and Russia appeared unable to come to an agreement on its extension. This fact was somewhat surprising, as New START was widely popular among US nuclear experts. Arms controllers praise its limits on deployed strategic warheads, while counterforce advocates value the verification and monitoring protocols that provide visibility into Russian military capabilities. Likewise, leaders at the highest levels of the Russian Government publicly stated their desire to extend the agreement without preconditions. The reticence by the US to extend New START had been attributed to a host of explanations, but one complaint from US negotiators surfaced repeatedly: the absence of China from the treaty.

The US’s insistence on including China in New START and related strategic dialogues is puzzling for several reasons. First, China is believed to have a much smaller arsenal than either the US or Russia, meaning its number of strategic warheads is already far below the limits of the agreement. Second, China was not party to the original negotiation and had few (if any) incentives to join. And third, Chinese security concerns are very different than the decades-long nuclear rivalry between the US and Russia, etc. This begs the question then that if the US possesses nuclear superiority over China, both quantitative and qualitative, why does it continue to behave as if China is a significant and growing nuclear threat that must be controlled at all costs?

One answer may lie in how humans process information. US policymakers are often students of history and thus rely on historical analogies for interpreting new events. Additionally, behavioral scientists have shown that humans, in general, often rely on information that they believe is relevant for a situation even when the circumstances, parties involved, stakes, and other conditions are quite different, resulting in cognitive biases that can impact decision-making.  In the context of US-China cooperation/competition over nuclear weapons issues, these two facts suggest policymakers may be heavily inclined to view the current situation as a replay of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. This could lead policymakers to mistakenly pursue policies that previously worked for the US despite the drastically different circumstances of the current situation.

This overreliance on the flawed Cold War analogy between the US and China can be seen in statements by senior US officials responsible for overseeing nuclear weapons policy. For example, in May 2020,  US Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, Marshall Billingslea, stated that the US is prepared to spend Russia and China “into oblivion” in order to win a new nuclear arms race. Billingslea had also reportedly called Chinese efforts to modernize its nuclear forces “a ‘highly alarming effort’ to gain parity with the far larger arsenals that Russia and the United States have kept for decades.” These concerns evoke memories of the infamous “missile gap” argument that plagued American political discourse beginning in the 1950’s , a myth that still echoes in comments like those of Billingslea and other former officials

In addition to these tired Cold War analogies, theoretical arguments about the structure of the international system may alternatively explain increasing nuclear competition between the United States and China. Under this framework, states are constantly competing with one another in order to achieve national goals, whether supremacy in the international system or narrower goals like regional security or relative gains vis-à-vis competitor states. Nuclear competition in this scenario is largely inevitable as states constantly strive to improve military capabilities. Recent scholars have argued why maintaining a robust nuclear arsenal is important to deter nuclear conflict with a rising power like China or, in the event of a crisis, possess the ability to terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the US. Matthew Kroenig argues maintaining “nuclear superiority” can provide significant utility for the US should such a crisis or conflict occur. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press similarly argue that states may be able to escape nuclear “stalemate,” which suggests that while the US currently maintains a significant nuclear advantage over China, technological advances may erode this advantage and thus some form of nuclear competition is inevitable. Additionally, some US Government intelligence agencies have contributed to this perceived “inevitability” by promulgating largely-unrealistic projections of the growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which further reinforces the US-China nuclear competition framing.

Policymakers’ overreliance on Cold War logic and deterministic structural forces may make the future of arms control look bleak, but students of history would be wise to remember that even during the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union were able to find common ground to reduce risks and avoid catastrophe. The unfolding competitive relationship between Washington and Beijing shouldn’t be viewed through a strictly zero-sum lens, and cooperation between the United States and China on security issues with global implications must be pursued when possible. With New START officially expiring on February 5, 2026, the clock is ticking; now is the time to get creative and imagine how a new world of arms control can deal with emerging nuclear risks that threaten to erase the progress previous generations worked so hard to achieve.  

 

Bryce Farabaugh is a master’s student at the University of Chicago’s Committee on International Relations and an external representative for Strife. You can follow him on Twitter @brycefarabaugh