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You are here: Home / Archives for Elections

Elections

Israel’s Electoral Standoff: Challenges in Securing Centre-Left Governance

April 24, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Kevin Nolan

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, here pictured with Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz, while meeting with President Reuven Rivlin in Jerusalem, September 2019 (Image Credit: Haim Zach/GPO)

The State of Israel, even prior to the Coronavirus outbreak, was a nation in crisis. Since April 2019, the political deadlock between Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent Prime Minister’s centre-right Likud party and Benny Gantz’s centre-left Blue and White alliance has subjugated its citizens to three national elections. The ensuing breakdown of Gantz’s opposition alliance during unity government negotiations in March 2020 enabled short-term electoral gains for leftist politics at the potential expense of its long-term prosperity. However, irrespective of the eventual tenure of the new unity administration, struggles with policy differentiation, fragmented political structures, and growing sectarian politics linked with changing demographics ultimately pose the greatest threat to a revival of leftist governance within Israel for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, until these barriers can be overcome a power-sharing agreement offers the most realistic opportunities for nationwide policy influence and implementation.

Lack of Differentiation

Despite the international perception that Israel’s leftist movement was experiencing a revival under the Blue and White alliance before its implosion, its leadership had aligned many of its policies, barring minor caveats, with the incumbent administration. For instance, despite its controversial coverage over the status of Jerusalem and annexation of large sections of the West Bank, both Netanyahu and Gantz have endorsed the 2020 Trump Peace plan. Even Gantz’s only major point of contention, the inclusion of Palestinian leadership into discussions, has been weakened through subsequent dialogue.

Indeed, whilst it does espouse several leftist policies, since its founding as the de facto anti-Bibi alliance, Blue and White’s core policies were almost entirely focused on ousting the Netanyahu administration from power either through the ballot box or via retrospectively binding legislation.[1] Such initiatives would involve enforcing term limits and preventing indicted politicians from serving as premier, thus disqualifying Netanyahu who currently awaits trial over allegations of corruption. Thus, despite overall having a more leftist platform than Likud, Netanyahu’s removal from office would be one of the only significant measures of differentiation imposed by a Gantz administration. As such, the emphasis on a political rather than ideological platform will likely struggle to attain broader support outside of a single-issue voter base in future elections.

A Fragmented Opposition

Fragmentation among oppositional factions threatens to impede their capability to govern as a genuine alternative to Likud in future electoral contests. Despite the limitations of a single-issue platform, Gantz was capable of attaining a broad array of support from multiple political factions, including the first endorsement of a Jewish politician from an Arab dominated party since 1992 via the Joint List. However, despite possessing a larger backing then Netanyahu to become the newest premier following the latest election, the misinterpreted strength of Gantz’s position made him incapable of translating this into a viable coalition government due to alliance factionalism.

Although the Joint List lent Blue and White their support for the preferred Premier, their anti-Zionist platform and fragile political formation prevents them from participating within any formal coalition government propagating Zionist ideals. Similarly, cultural apprehension among the Jewish factions against coalitions with Arab parties has permeated since the foundation of the state in 1948.[2] Irrespective of the accuracy of their assumptions, questions involving the ultimate loyalty of Arab parties and their lack of support of Zionism has resulted in the leaders of most Jewish factions, including Gantz, from opposing such an arrangement ever occurring. While Arab politicians have never served in any Israeli government, if the Joint List continues to remain the third-largest party in the Knesset, leftist parties will increasingly need to identify methods for overcoming these barriers in order to successfully challenge perpetual right-wing governance.

Additionally, regardless of their intentions behind doing so, the divisions generated among rival Blue and White factions following the initiation of unity government negotiations with Likud have damaged the cohesion of the opposition for the foreseeable future. National unity governments are not unprecedented within Israel, particularly during periods of national crisis. However, given that Blue and White’s platform was primarily based on ousting Netanyahu from power, the initiation of dialogue over any form of power-sharing agreement was enough to result in the formal exit of the Yesh Atid and Telem factions. Whilst Gantz has continued to keep the Blue and White name for his sole remaining political faction, Israel Resilience, the capitulation of the broader alliance may make it increasingly difficult for the opposition to reunify once the tenure of the unity government lapses.

Long-term Demographic Struggles

In addition to these immediate obstacles to securing governance, long-term demographic changes are likely to increasingly marginalise the capability of centre-left parties from beating right-wing blocs in elections within the next half-century. Historically,  the vast majority of citizenry have voted for parties which represent their religious or cultural beliefs, irrespective of the benefits, economic or otherwise, which may be better offered by rival factions.[3] For instance, the nation’s fastest-growing Jewish demographic, the religiously hard-line ultra-orthodox sect, are predicted to nearly double from thirteen to twenty-seven percent of the total population by 2059. Within this constituency voting patterns overwhelmingly align with their particular ethnicity, with those of Sephardic origin generally endorsing the Shah party, whilst those of Ashkenazi descent tending to favour United Torah Judaism. These allegiances transcend basis cost-benefit analyses since centre-left policies generally offer better subsidy packages for the ultra-orthodox, among whom nearly forty percent continue to live below the poverty line.

Similarly, nearly ninety percent of Arab-Israeli’s votes go to the Joint-List, despite its four factions, Hadash, Ta’al, United Arab List and Balad representing a large cross-section of differing ideologies, from socialism to Pan-Arabism. Yet while its population is also set to markedly increase from fifteen to twenty percent of the total population, unless the aforementioned tensions between Jewish and Arab political parties can be resolved they will remain outside the corridors of power indefinitely. Consequently, given the sectarian nature of a large part of Israel’s electorate, the rapid growth of the predominately right-wing Haredi threatens to increasingly undermine the long-term prospects of leftist parties securing governance throughout the next half-century, regardless of the policies which they propose.

Silver Lining

The centre-left has a long way to go before they will be able to reconcile the variety of challenges standing in its way of wresting control from Likud. Nonetheless, the current unity administration presently offers the greatest opportunity for leftist ideals to influence national policies. Despite the division of influence varying widely in prior scenarios, Gantz has successfully attained control over the influential Defence and Justice ministries, while temporarily delaying annexation plans within the West Bank. Consequently, despite the challenges which the centre-left will face in future elections, so long as the current unity arrangement is maintained in a fair and proportionate manner, leftist politics will remain capable of exercising some form of influence on federal policies within the current Likud administration.


[1] Kaḥol Lavan. 2019. “Blue And White 2019 Platform”. https://en.idi.org.il/media/12312/%D7%9B%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%91%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A2.pdf.

[2] Tessler, Mark. 2019. “Israel’S Arabs And The Palestinian Problem (1977)”. Religious Minorities In Non-Secular Middle Eastern And North African States, 325-344. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19843-5_12.

[3] Mathie, Nicola. 2016. “‘Jewish Sectarianism’ And The State Of Israel”. Global Discourse 6 (4): 601-629. doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1259284.


Kevin is a MA student in Conflict, Security and Development within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. A Series Editor for Strife, his research interests are primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific region, State building within post-conflict zones, and combating technological challenges to regional security concerns. Additionally, serving as King’s mature student officer, he is a strong advocate for exploring the correlation between the psychological impact of mental health degradation on academic well-being. Readers who identify as mature students and experience difficulties relating to any aspect of university life are encouraged to contact him at kevin.nolan@kcl.ac.uk

 

 

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: corona, Covid, COVID-19, Elections, Israel, Kevin Nolan, Politics

Taiwan Elections: Continuity, Change, and the Cross-Strait Conundrum

March 10, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Evita Liagka

DPP Demonstrators outside of the DPP Headquarters in Taipei (Image Credit: RFA)

The outcome of the January 2020 Taiwanese elections surprised no one. With participation climbing to an unprecedented seventy-seven per cent of the electorate and results strongly affirmative of the polling data, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by Tsai Ing-wen was hailed as the winner of the procedures, with the Beijing-backed party Kuomintang (KMT) ranking second and the People First Party (PFP) third. Six months prior to the general elections, the DPP had managed to turn the tables on its political opponents, gaining momentum from the outburst of the Hong Kong protests, the Sino-US frictions, and the outstanding performance of the Taiwanese economy.

Through its most recent re-election, the DDP secured its hold on power for another four years, thereby signaling, according to several analysts, a period of continuity for the island’s politics. Arguably, fewer have commented on the subtle and unsubtle changes that Taiwanese politics are undergoing, that reveal a much more complex picture within the broader context of East-Asian politics and regional security.

On the one hand, the DPP’s second-time victory could promulgate stability on many levels. At a micro- level, stability appears to ensue from the consolidation of power within the party itself. With calls for sovereignty, democracy, social reforms, and economic growth placed at the heart of its campaign, the DPP projected the powerful image and drive of a unified party that has previously proven that it can stick to its promises. At a macro-level however, any drastic changes concerning its sovereignty and independence triggered by Taipei are unlikely to transpire in cross-strait relations. After winning the elections one possibility is that the DPP will hereafter adopt a more moderate stance in comparison with the one its electoral campaign emanated, since that extra rhetoric push that helped it gain votes is no longer needed. Another possibility, which could be seen as complementary rather than necessarily mutually exclusive to the first, is that since it has already secured its position for the time being the DPP is not under pressure to either ameliorate or deteriorate Taiwan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Alternatively, it may choose to adopt a harder line towards Beijing. This could be the case if, in the years to come, younger and more radical politicians striving for Taiwanese independence (臺獨) take hold in the decision-making of the party, narrowing the room left for Tsai’s manipulations, pressuring for de jure independence of the island state. This new wave of politicians includes numerous activists linked to the 2014 Sunflower Movement (a mass student protest against KMT’s passing of a cross-strait service trade agreement between Taiwan and China), such as Lin Fei-fan, the current Deputy Secretary-General of DPP. Either way, it is unlikely that Taipei will adopt an extremely radical approach and declare de jure independence in the years to come, since the majority of Taiwanese have expressed their unwillingness to back-up policies that would lead to imminent, direct confrontation with the People’s Republic and their preference to support the maintenance of the status quo “in a broader sense”.

From China’s perspective dramatic policy alterations are also unlikely. Going through an extremely challenging period, the Beijing acknowledges that unifying with Taiwan by employing force is not the optimum scenario, despite Xi’s pledges to use “all necessary means”. Within the US-Taiwan-scope, China would be discouraged to use raw military force against Taiwan, unless its regime security suffered serious threats. Even in the most remote scenario of coercive, forceful reunification and non-interference from the U.S., the maintenance of power would come at such preventive cost that would suffice to render this option improbable. It is, thus, more probable that Taiwan will remain a part of the US-Taiwan-China triangle and a forceful reunification or even a rapprochement with China will not materialise any time soon.

It is worth noting that, even though the Hong Kong issue is indeed weighing down as a factor that ought to be taken into account when assessing the dynamics between the US, Taiwan, and China, any further comparisons between Hong Kong and Taiwan would be simplistic and pointless. Hong Kong comprises part of China’s sovereign territory while Taiwan does not. Still, it is undeniable that the way Beijing has handled the Hong Kong tensions so far has influenced Taiwanese politics by putting a big question mark over the robustness of the “one country, two systems” model, something that has not escaped the Taiwanese public opinion. Under that light, all aforementioned scenarios envision the status quo of Taiwanese politics mostly unperturbed.

On the other hand, such continuities should not be overplayed. Firstly, continuity does not necessarily mean stability. Rapidly losing allies to Beijing, communications with which are on a standstill since the DPP was first elected in 2016, and facing delays regarding recently US-approved arms’ deliveries, Taipei may need to partly reconsider its strategies to ensure its security in the near future. Yet in this respect, the prospect of diplomatic isolation remains dubious, if the powerful unofficial relations with the US and Japan are taken into the equation. Secondly, albeit the focus may currently be on continuities, changes in the island’s politics are not negligible – they are, in fact, quite substantial.

With regards to inner politics, the KMT has been grappling with organisational problems, as well as a mentality-orientation dilemma that became apparent during its campaigning and which may prove pivotal both for the party as well as Taiwanese politics. This dilemma boils down to the question of whether the KMT should continue to be a populist party or go back to be an elitist one. Currently undergoing a metamorphosis that seemingly points towards the first direction, the main opposition party very recently elected Johnny Chiang as its new chair, who promised to recuperate KMT’s image within a year’s time. In his campaign for party leadership Chiang mentioned that the “1992 consensus” on “one China” is no longer working, implying that the KMT might opt to sway away from its overtly pro-China stance which left it bereft of votes in this year’s elections.

With regard to cross-strait relations, it is rather doubtful that any changes occurring are going to be major ones. However, some developments may unfold on China’s part under the growing pressure stemming from its pursuit of the 2021 and 2049 centennial goals earmarking the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 and the commemoration of the PRC’s hundredth year of existence in 2049. Furthermore, whether he is to remain in power or not, Xi Jinping should be able to provide an irreproachable record by 2023 to seal the ending second term of his presidency. This includes, among other promised deliverables, to address the Taiwanese issue “efficiently” in order to achieve “great power” status, as stipulated by the second centennial goal. Alongside these, Beijing is currently presented with multifaceted challenges – the Coronavirus outbreak, the Hong Kong tensions and US-China trade wars seemingly being the most urgent of them. Such stress tests will probably counterbalance the reunification efforts, putting them on hold, at least temporarily, by monopolising the mainland’s attention.

On Taiwan’s part, some developments in cross-strait relations have already begun to take place after the pre-election passage of the Anti-infiltration Act, which aims at administering the influence of external hostile forces in internal affairs, obviously targeting China. During the Taiwanese elections the mainland consistently attempted to infiltrate the island’s politics, by affecting public opinion both via mass media, such as the China Group Television channels, and social media, such as Facebook, reasonably arising security concerns. After the elections, insofar as the DPP further promotes the Act, Sino-Taiwanese relations are about to grow more tense, since Beijing will be left with fewer soft-line options.

Entering another term, the DPP continues to lead Taipei’s policies in a period that finds China considerably distracted by the various other challenges it needs to confront, following the recent Coronavirus outbreak. Taiwan’s new challenge is to maintain DPP’s legitimacy with the new competition faced by KMT’s reformist policies. With time bought from a distracted China, Taiwan’s political trajectory in the near future should be one that could continue to maintain its national sovereignty and democratic integrity.


Evita Liagka completed her undergraduate degree in International, European and Area studies at the Panteion University of Athens, where she specialised in International Relations and Political Economy. She is currently a postgraduate at King’s College London, studying China & Globalisation at the Lau China Institute. Her research interests include urban and spatial politics, and the respective roles of civil society and environmental micro-governance, with a focus on China.

 

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: China, Elections, Evita Liagka, Taiwan

The Rise of Digital Propaganda – An ‘Alt-Right’ Phenomenon?

January 22, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Tom Ascott

Co-founder of Breitbart News Steve Bannon described the news website as a platform for the alt-right (Image Credit: Wikimedia)

Without social media, the alt-right would not exist, Donald Trump would not be president, and the UK would not be leaving the European Union. As the American Sociological Association put it ‘the rise of the alt-right would not be possible without the infrastructure built by the tech industry’. Social media is becoming the most important way for political campaigns to reach out to potential voters, and online misinformation campaigns use coordinated inauthentic activity to subtly manipulate citizens. It is the fastest and can also be the cheapest way of targeting an audience, much more so than door to door campaigning or flyering.

The alt-right isn’t simply more popular online than the left. In fact, there are far more left-wing political blogs, and blog readers often skew left-wing. Right-wingers tend to engage less with political discourse online and, when they do, they are more likely to be bi-partisan. Despite that, the alt-right is far more successful online when they do engage.

The Success of Alt-Right Activity

Right-wing political groups have had a significant impact on international affairs through their online activity. By successfully using data harvesting, micro-targeting and meme warfare, they have sent out tailored, political messages to individuals or small groups, which are never seen by others. The messages leverage the data they have mined to be as effective as possible. It may appear unusual that there has been no left-wing equivalent of the Cambridge Analytica scandal – and it could be quite a while before we see the emergence of such – but it will be crucial to understand how the left might channel such activities.

The closest we have seen to a left-wing version of Cambridge Analytica is Project Narwhal, the database that the Obama team built in 2012. Project Narwhal started by slowly and manually joining discrete databases, each with a few data points on a single voter, to build their profile. Years later those profiles had grown, and the project had 4,000– 5,000 data points on each American voter. Looking back at the ways the media fawned over Obama’s data strategy, it is not a surprise that the right took the ball and ran with it.

It is an anomaly that the alt-right thrives online. Identification can be risky for the alt-right. Those who are seen and identified attending rallies can lose their jobs or face other repercussions. Extreme-right opinions that are clearly racist, sexist or xenophobic can lead to users being blocked on mainstream platforms, so these users begin to ‘join smaller, more focused platforms’. Alt-right figures Alex Jones and Milo Yiannopoulos were banned from Facebook because they ‘promote or engage in violence and hate’. Laura Loomer, an alt-right activist, was banned from Twitter for tweeting at Ilhan Omar that Islam is a religion where “homosexuals are oppressed… women are abused and… forced to wear the hijab.”   As a result, the alt-right has become more digitally agile, using tools to exploit larger platforms and reshare their views. Platforms like Gab have a much higher rate of hate speech than Twitter. Discord has also been used to radicalise and ‘red pill’ users towards extreme-rightist beliefs.

The tools of the alt-right represent tools for disruption. It is only by disrupting the status-quo that Breitbart founder Steve Bannon believes that the alt-right can break into the political spectrum. These tools can be used to persuade or dissuade; Pro-Publica found that adds targeting liberals often urged them to vote for candidates or parties that did not exist.

The Left’s Slow Response

One reason why left-wing political parties have not used similar tools is exactly that conflation of such activities with the alt-right. Though there is plenty of dissent in left-wing politics over how centered or left-leaning it should continue to be, groups from the left simply do not identify as alt-left. Cambridge Analytica has offered the alt-right a chance to disrupt the right-wing, but there is much less desire to disrupt on the left. Instead of a true alt-left there is only ‘an anti-Alt-Right‘. Bannon believes that Cambridge Analytica, and the chaos it created, was a tool that the right-wing needed in order to survive. The ability to harvest data and use it to target specific individuals with political messaging appears to be a content-neutral process.

Any organisation could have done it, but the first to do so was Cambridge Analytica. It was an act of ‘evil genius’ to find individuals who weren’t motivated enough to engage in politics, target them with personalised messages and convert them to their specific brand of right-wing thinking, or to urge left-wing voters to disengage. It is hard to assess how prevalent online misinformation campaigns are. Groups will use neutral-sounding names, mask the political nature of their ads, or identify as partisan. Their only aim, however, is to confuse or dissuade voters.

Consequences for Social Media Platforms

The first-comer has it the easiest and copying the process will be extremely difficult. Following the scandal, the infrastructure for data harvesting has started to be regulated. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) was granted new powers in the Data Protection Act 2018 and the European Union introduced its General Data Protection Regulation in response to the scandal. Facebook has been forced to refine its policies on data sharing and, as a result, new data from the platform is less available now than previously.

After the scandal broke, the platform started to audit data that apps could collect and began blocking apps that continued to take users’ data. As Mark Zuckerberg’s continued appearances in front of Congress show, if Facebook will not regulate itself, then perhaps it will be broken up. Where anti-trust laws may seek to punish companies for harming the consumer, it will be hard to penalise Facebook. Users continue to opt-in, voluntarily hand over data, and enjoy time browsing their personalised, if pyrrhic, feeds.


Tom Ascott is the Digital Communications Manager at the Royal United Services Institute. You can find more of his articles here.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: activity, alt-right, analytica, bannon, cambridge, Elections, Facebook, influence, left-wing, memes, online, Politics, Tom Ascott, Voting

The Winners and Losers of the 2018 Italian General Election

March 12, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Giulia Monteleone

The land of political uncertainty – once again. The 2018 Italian general election confirms the failure of traditional parties to address voters’ concerns (Credit Image: Camera dei deputati)

On the 4th of March, Italians made their way to the polling stations to choose their next government, knowing that the results would most likely confirm the polls’ predictions of a hung parliament.

A turnout of 73.66% is surprising, as the election took place in times of high disillusionment with the political establishment and slight economic growth.  The runners of this general election were the following: the centre-left coalition led by Renzi’s Democratic Party; the centre-right coalition formed by Berlusconi’ s Forza Italia, Matteo Salvini’s League and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; and single runners such as Five Stars Movement (M5S) and Free and Equals. This article will analyse the winners and losers of the election.

 

The new electoral law

A new electoral law was passed last September – the so-called ‘Rosatellum” (after the MP Ettore Rosato who drafted it) – to replace its predecessor, the “Porcellum”, declared unconstitutional by the Italian Highest Court in early 2014.  The new law consists of a parallel voting system, whereby 61% of the seats are allocated through a proportional method, and the remaining ones are assigned on a first-past-the-post basis. According to Professor Stefano Vassallo, the Rosatellum requires parties to win at least 38-39% of total votes in order to ensure a working majority. However, due to the fragmented nature of the Italian party system, the likelihood of any party achieving that result appeared quite dim. As such, parties running in coalitions appeared to be favoured over single runners. It is no coincidence, in fact, that the Rosatellum is also the product of a political agreement between the Democratic Party and its right-wing counterparts to offset the M5S. One of the Movement’s pillars, in fact, consists in the refusal to align with any other party.  This is in line with their utter disdain toward political elites and their will to fundamentally break away from those ‘corrupt politicians who value the financial benefits entailed with their roles over the public good’.

 

The results

The election results confirmed fears of a hung parliament. In the Lower House, 32.68% of votes went to the M5S, making it Italy’s first party. Yet the centre-right coalition obtained an overall share of 37%. Neither one won the 314 seats necessary to rule. The outcome was similar in the Senate. The centre-right (37.49%) did slightly better than the M5S (32.22%), yet neither reached the 161 seats threshold required to obtain a vote of confidence.

Amidst political uncertainty – so well-rooted in Italian politics – Italians will need to rely on the neutral figure of the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, to facilitate talks amongst political forces so to give the country a government.

(Credit Image: ANSA)

 

 

(Credit Image: ANSA)

 

A split country

The elections have proven that Italy has fallen victim to populism and anti-immigrant feelings, like several other Western democracies. The results have also confirmed a country deeply divided between a developed North – the industrial powerhouse of the nation – and a traditionally underdeveloped South – victim of parochialism, cronyism and high unemployment rates. For decades, many Italians voted on the basis of the “lesser evil”. The prevailing impression being that of a lack of real political alternatives, with the same old faces filling sofas on television’s talk shows. De facto, a report by the research institute Demos & Pi showed how, in 2017, only 5% of the Italian population said to trust political parties.

Long deaf to grievances affecting a vast portion of the population, the mainstream political establishment – left a vacuum that the M5S and the far-right parties – such as “The League” (the former secessionist Northern League), and Brothers of Italy – could fill. An analysis of the Financial Times shows how Sunday’s vote appears to have been primarily driven by socio-economic factors, with provinces with “lower income per capita and higher unemployment rates” voting in block for the “grillini” (a popular moniker for M5S members).

(Credit Image: Financial Times and La Repubblica)

 

The winners

The first exit polls prefigured the bashing success of the M5S, outdoing predictions. Now, strong of this success, its leader, Luigi Di Maio, aims to be the next Prime Minister. On Monday, he stated the Movement’s intention to start negotiations to form a coalition and he declared the beginning of a new political era, the “Third Republic”.

By overcoming Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, the League managed to achieve an unforeseen result. This is even more considerable given that, in the last election, the League had merely obtained 4% of the votes. Salvini’s success – largely due to his anti-immigration stance and a rhetoric highly critical of Eurozone policies – has been hailed positively by Marine Le Pen, one of Salvini’s inspirational figures.

For the European Union, the victory of two highly euro-sceptic forces in a founding member is very worrisome, further holding back any prospect of a further political integration. A coalition government formed by these two parties cannot be ruled out. However, this option appears unlikely as of now, as both leaders desire to become the next head of government. Thus, they would hardly co-exist under the same government, also considering their diverging views on the economy and taxation (see flat tax and national citizenship income).

 

The losers

If anything, this election has confirmed the end of “Berlusconismo” in Italy. Berlusconi’s political career had already seen an end in 2011, when he was forced to resign in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, leaving the country on the edge of bankruptcy.
It now sees its final death knell. From signing a new “contract with the Italians” on television (famously signed in 2001), to the mantra of cutting taxes and introducing a universal flat tax at 23% (effectively only cutting taxes for the richest), Berlusconi seemed like that persistent ex who wants to take a walk down memory lane.

Dulcis in fundo, the greatest single example of political suicide in Italian modern politics: the Democratic Party, and its soon-to-be former, leader Matteo Renzi. In the last European elections of May 2014, his party received a stunning victory, with 40% of the votes. At that time, Renzi was at the peak of his political career. Elected party leader in December 2013, in early 2014 he had managed to become Prime Minister. The Italian centre-left seemed to have finally found a leader which could counter its many centrifugal forces that seemed prone to infinite splits. However, Renzi’s 1000 days in power ended in resignation following a 60% “No” vote in the December 2016 constitutional referendum. Since then, Renzi – who had previously affirmed that he would take time off politics had he lost – remained victim of the same curse which cost him the victory in the referendum: the personalization of his party. After calling new party elections – and winning them again in May 2017 – the party underwent an internal split, which alienated many electors and eventually led to the formation of Free and Equals. After the mild 19% result, Renzi submitted a letter of resignation as party leader, however postponing it until a new government has been installed. In so doing, it appears evident that Renzi aims to monitor this period of intensified talks, to ensure that the Democratic Party will not join forces with either Di Maio or Salvini. With him immediately out of the picture, in fact, both options could have been possible.

 

Conclusion

Italy, once again, embarks upon a frictious period of political instability. The next crucial date will be March 23rd, when both Houses are supposed to convey for the first time and their presidents be elected (respectively, the second and third highest institutional roles in the country). On such day, perhaps an agreement will have been reached. Shouldn’t this be the case, other options may include a tentative minority government led by the M5S, an – unlikely – grand-coalition government or, as a measure of last resort, a new election.

 


Giulia is Editor and MA Representative with Strife. She is pursuing an MA in Conflict, Security and Development in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she completed her BA in International Relations in 2017. She works as Graduate Research Assistant in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at KCL, researching on the Egyptian uprising and the Egyptian diaspora in the UK. She previously gained work experience in foreign affairs at governmental level and broadcasting at community media level.
Her academic interests focus on social movements and popular politics, Arab Uprisings, diaspora & migration studies. You can follow her on Twitter: @GiuliaMonteleon.


Images Sources:

Banner: http://www.camera.it/leg17/1?active_tab_27537=27548&active_slide_27561=1&active_tab_32120=32134

Images 1 & 2:   http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/politica.shtml

Image 3: https://www.ft.com/content/d11902f6-2062-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11 and http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2017/03/10/news/istat_occupazione_quarto_trimestre_2016-160200545/

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Elections, EU, feature, Italy, populism

Generation Terrorists: The Politics of Youth and the Gangs of Freetown

March 5, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Dr Kieran Mitton 

A poster in Susan’s Bay calls on Sierra Leone’s youth to be peaceful during elections (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

Youth at Risk – Youth as Risk

On the evening of the 15th February, six leading presidential candidates for the Sierra Leone presidential elections took to the stage. Over three hours of a live broadcasted debate, each answered questions about their plans for the country. Seen by some as a milestone in Sierra Leone’s post-war political development, the following morning the capital Freetown was abuzz with talk about who had acquitted themselves, who had failed to impress, and what – if anything – this might mean for the election result on the 7thMarch. In the offices of a youth development organisation, staff enthusiastically discussed the event.

In an adjoining room, I met with their colleague Mohamed*, a man with decades of experience working in the city’s poorest informal communities. What did you think of the debate? I asked. Was it a sign that Sierra Leone’s political scene is moving towards serious discussion of policies, or as one report put it, ‘growing up’?

Mohamed smiled. Pointing to his colleagues next door, he replied: ‘Each person there is arguing about why their preferred candidate won the debate. What the candidate actually said, how they performed – it doesn’t matter.’ He went on to make a familiar point; voters put party, tribe and personal loyalties ahead of policies. Whilst certainly not new or unique to Sierra Leone, this he contended, meant such debates had little bearing on the electoral outcome. The promise of some candidates to provide free education, surely a positive development for the country’s youth, was just rhetoric, he concluded. In fact, ‘politicians keep the youth uninformed and uneducated so they can use them to their own advantage.’

In Sierra Leone’s post-conflict era, great stress has been placed on engaging young people, providing solutions to severe unemployment and lack of educational opportunities to ensure the country never again experiences civil war. The idea that it was a ‘youth crisis’ that precipitated conflict dominates academic analysis and was a key conclusion of the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This emphasis has entrenched a peacebuilding discourse that presents youth as both an at risk population – vulnerable to chronic poverty and exploitation of their grievances – as well as a risk – a potential source of violence, instability, or even renewed conflict. In its crudest form, this latter discourse is found in frequent characterisations of ‘idle’ and criminal youth in local media, where their economic hardship and violence is explained not so much by their circumstances as by their ‘bad’ character. Election campaigns, through rhetoric aimed at youth and through violence involving youth, have reinforced both. Mohamed’s scepticism towards political promises, and belief that politicians seek to exploit young people, is born of experience.

Recycled Rhetoric and Remobilisation

Successive elections since 2002 have promised much but delivered little tangible change for many young people.  Initial optimism that a new administration might bring transformation, or that political patrons’ offers of jobs in exchange for support would be honoured, has invariably given way to disillusionment and deepened cynicism. A bitter sense of betrayal pervades the stories of those who describe their past enlistment by ‘big men’. The ability to register this frustration at the ballot box is certainly valued – an important and too often overlooked contrast to pre-war Sierra Leone – but it underlines a fundamental problem of the country’s political landscape. Both major parties – the ruling All People’s Congress (APC) and the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) – are seen as offering little deviation from politics as usual. The same old familiar faces of the establishment continue to dominate political life. And so, many of Sierra Leone’s youth believe they can change governments, but they cannot make governments change.

Violent clashes of past elections have done much to reinforce the ‘youth as risk’ discourse, reinvigorating tired tropes of idle youth and dangerous ex-combatants.  During 2007 elections, fighting between supporters of rival parties took place across the country, leading then SLPP President Tejan Kabbah to declare a state of emergency. Yet these incidents were not simply the boiling-over of pent-up frustration nor the wanton criminality of unemployed youth. In another sign of negative political continuity, parties and political patrons had actively courted – and importantly, been courted by – groups of youth and ex-combatants to act as security ‘taskforces.’ Incentives ranged from gifts of drink and cash to promises of jobs and education. Providing ‘security’ often equated to intimidating political opponents and interrupting rival rallies. In the years following, a small number of senior ex-combatants on the winning APC side had reaped the rewards of this bargain, but most others missed out.

In 2012, the situation was markedly different. In the run up, grave concerns were expressed as incidents of violence between rival party taskforces and youth groups continued to occur across the country. Much analysis warned of turmoil on a par with 2007, if not worse. Yet in the end the re-election of the APC’s President Ernest Bai Koroma was largely peaceful. Of encouragement was the role of civil society, including youth organisations, in actively campaigning against electoral violence. My interviews with ex-combatants also found a pronounced determination among some not to be ‘fooled’ again and drawn to violence on the back of false promises. That said, opportunities for their recruitment were comparatively scarce. The SLPP was wracked by splits and Koroma enjoyed strong support, winning over the 55 percent mark required to avoid a run-off vote. It is that second round that is associated with heightened violence, with the contest close and votes of minor parties up-for-grabs.

An APC poster in central Freetown thanks departing President Koroma on behalf of the young (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

2018 Elections and the Gangs of Freetown

In the years since 2012, the same challenges blighting youth mobility in Sierra Leone have not diminished. Official UN figures put youth unemployment and underemployment at 70%. A sense of weariness is detectable among many who held great optimism during Koroma’s first term. Whilst there has been visible infrastructural development, the poorest have felt little benefit. Hopes that mining profits might lead to economic transformation for the benefit of all have dissipated, and the response to the Ebola outbreak of 2014, no small challenge for any government, highlighted endemic problems of corruption and fraud against which Koroma had vowed to fight in 2007.

The vote on March 7th will see Koroma stand-down after serving the maximum two terms. For this reason alone, it will be significantly different to the 2012 ballot. But in a welcome shake-up, two new political parties have entered the fray. Former Vice-President Samuel Sam-Sumana leads the Coalition for Change (C4C). Sumana made international headlinesin March 2015 after seeking asylum in the US embassy following a fall-out with Koroma and the APC. He was subsequently sacked, a move which in November 2017 was ruled illegal by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Sumana’s support-base is in Kono, a key swing district that could prove decisive.

Another new player is the National Grand Coalition (NDC) led by Kandeh Yumkella, a former UN Under-Secretary General. Having split from the SLPP, he remains firmly opposed to the APC and could also take votes from both major parties. The entry of these parties raises the prospect of a much closer contest than the last, and the common view among Sierra Leonean and international observers is that the election will go to a second round.

With the expectation of a run-off vote, fears arise of a repeat of past election violence. But here there is also an important change from previous campaigns. In the immediate post-war years, attention was firmly fixed on ex-combatants and the potentially devastating consequences of their mobilisation. As that generation has grown older, and judging from the last election, moved away from direct engagement in violence, a new generation of young marginal Sierra Leoneans has taken their place in the discourse of dangerous youth: gangs.

Referred to as cliques, gangs and youth street associations have a long history in Sierra Leone. However, police, youth activists, researchers, local communities and gangs themselves agree that they have grown in size and significance in recent years, and are becoming institutionalised.** As mention of ex-combatants and party taskforces wanes in media reporting, discussion of the ‘clique problem’ has increased.  In 2015, news of fatal gang-related stabbings and public discussion of crime and violence led the Attorney General and Minister of Justice to describe gang activity in Freetown as ‘domestic terrorism’ , demanding immediate attention by the security sector. That attention saw police offer rewards for information on gang leaders, and in 2017, the Minister of Defence took to the airwaves to advocate his personal view that the solution to rising gang violence was to implement the death penalty. As the elections have drawn closer, general fears over gangs have narrowed to one specific concern: that they may be used by politicians to attack opponents and intimidate voters.

A ‘Member of Blood’ gangster proudly displays his tattoo (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

To what extent are the gangs truly a threat in upcoming elections? My research has sought to better understand Sierra Leone’s cliques and their violence, focussing on Freetown though gangs are to be found across much of country. There is not space here for in-depth detail of gang organisation and activity, or the responses to it. Here I wish to briefly explore the specific issue of election violence drawing on recent interviews and time spent with three factions: the red-wearing Bloods or M.O.B. (Members of Blood); the blue-wearing Cent Coast Crips (CCC); and the black-wearing So-So Black. In Freetown, Bloods dominate the west, Crips the centre, and Black the east, though boundaries are fluid and sub-cliques diffuse. Based primarily (but not exclusively) in informal settlements or slums, members are identified by bandanas – locally ‘mufflers’ – in their respective colours. They hang-out in ghettos and street-corners, listening to music, drinking, smoking and dealing marijuana. They range from young teens to those in their mid-thirties. Contrary to some portrayals, they are not significantly connected to ex-combatant networks, and in many neighbourhoods there are no ex-combatants among them. This is unsurprising considering some were born after the war.

When it comes to violence, a main driver is inter-gang disputes – ‘beefs’ over colour. One gang-member I interviewed had recently been released from a year-long prison sentence for stabbing a rival who had ‘provoked’ him by walking into his territory wearing a red muffler. Other larger-scale incidents have taken place during music concerts and football matches where rival groups come face-to-face. Running ‘rampages’ of vandalism and scuffles have accompanied the movement of east side gangs through enemy territory in the west and centre.

A sign outside a popular gang hangout in Susan’s Bay prohibits wearing gang colours (Credit Image: Kieran Mitton)

Personal disputes, often over women, also lead to vendettas and cycles of revenge. Opportunistic robbery, particularly at night, is a source of income alongside dealing marijuana. The latter is a subsistence game and there does not appear to be substantial conflict over the trade or dealing spots. But the elections, perhaps, offer new opportunities.

In the last couple of years, gang members have described one faction or another as siding with a political party. They recount stories of large payments being paid to gangs by intermediaries of parties, with the implicit (and sometimes explicit) expectation they would in turn give their support and cause ‘trouble’ for their opponents. Individual political patrons are alleged to have used gifts of alcohol, cash and job opportunities – the old familiar promises offered to ex-combatants in the past – to bring them to their side. Substantiating these claims remains difficult, but they are stories repeated across Freetown and regularly hinted at in news articles. They came to the fore on 26th January in the middle of the city, during a rally linked to the nomination ceremony of the ruling APC party. Fights broke out between youth wielding machetes and knives, and at least one individual was fatally stabbed. Pro-SLPP and APC outlets accused each other of being behind the violence, before police announced that the perpetrators were in fact gang members.

Fifty-five gangsters were subsequently arrested, including an individual who had previously been described in interviews as an intermediary between the government and cliques. In discussing the incident, members of various factions told a similar story, though again it could not be substantiated. The intermediary, they claimed, acted as a go-between with the government to tackle gang violence, often dispersing large amounts of money to gang leaders from the safety of a central police station. Several gangsters expressed the view that in reality, these were political payments to secure support, rather than investments in peace. On the specific occasion of the rally, they claimed, one clique suspected this individual of withholding funds for himself and began remonstrating. The dispute escalated to violence when another gang came to his defence, leading to the killing. Following the arrests, a Freetown judge sentenced the fifty-five to either three months imprisonment or payment of a Le1000,000 fine (roughly $130USD). Rumours quickly circulated that the fine was paid, and according to one confidential informant, that the money came from the ruling party.

The details of the above incident remain disputed and unverified. Beyond the usual challenge of rumour substantiating for fact, in the charged political environment of the election campaign there are clear reasons for parties to implicate each other in abuses. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that some gang members are seeking to profit as hired muscle, and political patrons have likewise courted them to this end. These stories mirror the mobilisation of ex-combatants and youth in past elections. Now, it seems, a new generation is becoming part of this old problem. Solo, a gang captain in his early twenties, commented:

‘At this election time we see them [the politicians]. After this time, we won’t see them. When they need us, they are our friends. They come with rum, cider, they offer small money. They want us to vote for them, go to the rally, to fight their rivals. All the parties come to us.’

This returns us to the opening concern. Has Sierra Leone’s political system, and specifically its relationship with marginalised youth, changed significantly? From the perspective of gang members, it has not. Elections still represent to some a brief window of opportunity for personal advancement, but at the risk of committing violence that only deepens fears of dangerous youth and perpetuates a political relationship built on mutual exploitation and distrust. Sierra Leone’s past shows that violence in such a context may become not simply a mercenary act, but expressive rebellion and defiance against those who seek to prosper from it. Whilst so much focus has been given by peacebuilders to the DDR generation and the supposed dangers of unemployed ex-combatants, a younger generation born after the war faces the same hardships of chronic poverty, limited educational opportunities, and a destructive relationship with political leaders. The feared growing ‘gang problem’ in Freetown and across Sierra Leone cannot be understood or addressed in isolation from these hardships.

To end on a positive note, anti-violence campaigning from civil society groups and the determination of Sierra Leoneans to maintain peace remains unwavering. Despite popular concerns, to date gangs do not appear to have been mobilised to the same extent as taskforces and youth groups in the past. This offers hope that elections will pass peacefully, though few will be surprised if they do not. Whoever emerges victorious, they will have an opportunity to inject renewed energy into tackling the root causes of youth marginalisation. This is an endeavour that by definition must be sustained long after the campaign posters have been taken down. It is a matter first and foremost not of a youth crisis, nor even a gang problem. It is about changing the very practice of politics and governing itself. A major but critical challenge that begins at the very top.

*Some names have been changed to preserve anonymity.

** For this observation and insights into the nationwide activity of gangs I am grateful to Professor Ibrahim Abdullah.

 

This article has been republished on Strife Blog with the author’s permission. It was originally published on Mats Utas Blog http://bit.ly/2FfefyA

 


Dr. Kieran Mitton is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Research Director of the Conflict, Security & Development Research Group, and co-Chair of the Africa Research Group, at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is developing a comparative research project – Youth at Risk/Youth as Risk: Global Responses to Urban Violence – that examines gang dynamics and interventions in Cape Town, Freetown, London, and Rio de Janeiro. He is the author of Rebels in a Rotten State: Understanding Atrocity in the Sierra Leonean Civil War . You can follow him on Twitter @kieranmitton


Images Source: all photos were taken by the author

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Africa, Elections, feature, Sierra Leone, Violence, youth

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