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Risking New York for Paris? The Illusion of the US Nuclear Umbrella

by Orion Noda

President Donald J. Trump reinstates sanctions on Iran after the US withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal in May 2018 (Image credit: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)

 

Deterrence theory is almost as old as the nuclear age. Consequently, the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and the use of nuclear weapons as a retaliatory deterrent has dominated the field of nuclear weapons and politics from the 1950s onwards.[1] However, like any field, a series of biases infect it. This blind trust and belief in the postulations of Deterrence Theory has established what Nick Ritchie called the “regime of nuclear truth” and denominated “nuclear absolutism.”[2] The effects of this unquestionable belief in Deterrence Theory sharply increases States’ reliance on and valuing of nuclear weapons. Consequentially, it poses an existential threat to disarmament processes and severely undermines nuclear weapon States’ Article VI obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is long past time these ‘truths’ were punctured.

Deterrence Theory, derived from a Realist school of thought, postulates that the possession of nuclear weapons – the ultimate deterrent – will thwart and deter attacks against the possessor. The sheer destructive power inherent in a single nuclear weapon, let alone thousands detonating in quick succession, make their use (almost) unthinkable. As a means to solidifying a unified front against the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Western European States along with the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to deter the Soviet Union’s massive conventional forces, as well as its ever-increasing nuclear arsenal after its first test a few months later. With NATO, the United States became the guarantor of the defence of Western Europe, and the so-called US nuclear umbrella was born.

As stated in Article V of the NATO treaty, an attack on one member was an attack on all of them. The US nuclear umbrella is, therefore, a security assurance agreement that the US deterrent intended primarily to defend itself, also extends over the territory of its NATO partners.[3] In other words, the United States would defend NATO members against aggressors, even resorting to nuclear weapons, should the situation require these capabilities to be deployed. In theory, the US nuclear umbrella would soothe NATO members’ anxieties and serve as an alternative to the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons.[4] However, given its Realist roots, the crucial question arises: when push comes to shove, would the United States be willing to risk its own security to defend its allies in Europe? What are the costs of sustaining the illusion of the US nuclear umbrella? While these questions retained an academic quality for some time, in the Age of Trump, they urgently require revisiting.

Alliances under Anarchy: a Realist Take

Realism puts significant emphasis on self-help given the anarchical setting of the International System. Cooperation is scarce and limited, and only possible if states see it in their primal interest of survival and quest for power. Nevertheless, military alliances do happen and are circumscribed in the theoretical postulations of Realism—they last for as long as the states involved see it as comparatively advantageous. In particular, alliances are formed to counter a third, more powerful, state.[5]

The US nuclear umbrella, one of the crown jewels of NATO, relies heavily on the existence and credibility of military alliances. If the alliance fails, so do the security assurances. In that sense, even though military alliances do exist, it seems almost incredible that, under Deterrence and, therefore, Realist logic, military alliances would include credible nuclear security assurances. In other words, following the Realist rationale of self-help and its ultimate goal of survival, it seems highly unlikely that a state would risk its own security and survival to come to the defence of another state, ally or not, that is threatened by a third.

Historically, military alliances based on mutual assistance and defence have proven to be nothing but empty promises. In 1924, Czechoslovakia and France signed the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, which stated that the two States would come to the other’s aid in times of peril.[6] In 1938, given the rise of tensions just before the Second World War in Europe, Czechoslovakia also had a gentleman’s agreement with the United Kingdom regarding the latter’s aid in case of a military invasion of the former by Germany.[7] However, when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, neither agreement was fulfilled, following several of the bedrock assumptions of the Realist school of thought.

Alliances, therefore, are susceptible to failure. As hard as it is for military alliances to succeed, the nuclear age amplifies the obstacles for their endurance. Even at the height of the Cold War, inside the war planning rooms of the Pentagon and the Strategic Air Command, the nuclear security assurances seemed to tremble. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, top US officials were reconsidering whether the United States should employ nuclear weapons to defend an eventual military incursion of the USSR in West Germany.[8] Since the development of nuclear weapons and the dominating logic of nuclear deterrence, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that security assurances in the nuclear age are quasi-empty words. In 2020, revisiting the bases of the US nuclear umbrella—particularly in Europe—does it still hold any value as a credible security assurance?

New York for Paris? The US Nuclear Umbrella Revisited

The strength of the US nuclear umbrella guarantee raised questions from the very start, most notably from France. In the 1960s, General Charles de Gaulle was highly sceptical of US nuclear security assurances, particularly after the USSR developed intercontinental ballistic missiles with enough range to reach the United States. This scepticism led de Gaulle to pose the question whether US President John F. Kennedy would be willing to risk New York for Paris. Eventually, this very lack of confidence fomented the development of France’s force de frappe—the French nuclear arsenal – allowing France to be able to protect itself and avoid a strict dependency on NATO.[9]

The question posed by de Gaulle summarises the central issues with the credibility of US – or any – nuclear security assurances and umbrellas. In 1970, given the USSR’s massive conventional forces and its nuclear parity with the US, President Richard M. Nixon believed the nuclear umbrella was no longer sustainable.[10] Despite his beliefs, Nixon could not publicly admit the frailty of the US nuclear umbrella lest it create anxieties in its European allies and tampers with the Cold War balance.[11]

Fast forward to the present day, Donald Trump was elected President in 2016 with the slogan ‘America First.’ Ever since tensions have risen in the nuclear sphere in multiple fronts. President Trump, echoing President Harry S. Truman’s words from 1945, famously threatened “fire and fury” against North Korea and withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal. Moreover, relations with Russia have also deteriorated after the mutual withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the seemingly unwillingness to extend New START—the only treaty remaining treaty limiting US and Russia’s nuclear arsenals—despite Russian President Putin’s positive signalling towards extension.

Similarly, President Trump has repeatedly shown his contempt for NATO, after moving to cut US contributions to the organisation. Despite Trump’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons and desire of a larger arsenal, it seems unlikely Trump and his ‘America First’ mentality would risk New York – or any other US city, for that matter—for Paris. The illusion of the US nuclear umbrella seems to be surfacing at last. On the other side of the Atlantic, a recent poll conducted by the Körber Foundation showed that the German population would rather either rely on France and the United Kingdom for nuclear assurances or even forgo them than to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Notwithstanding, high-ranking military officers seem to hold on to the current regime of nuclear truth.

Sustaining the illusion of the US nuclear umbrella incurs other costs whose effects have a global reach. By perpetuating the current regime of nuclear truth, the US is selling its nuclear umbrella, using it as a rock-solid alibi to keep the United States from abiding by its disarmament commitments. Under Article VI of the NPT, each State “[…] undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.[12] One key-argument against US nuclear disarmament for decades has been the anxieties it would create amongst its allies under the US nuclear umbrella.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is already strained as it is. Arms control seems to be failing and non-nuclear weapons States are frustrated with the slow pace of disarmament efforts. The so-called ‘grand bargain’ of the NPT – non-proliferation in exchange for nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the promise of disarmament – is in jeopardy. The maintenance and belief in the US nuclear umbrella and the growing frustration from the non-nuclear weapon States with its nuclear peers coalesce in existential threats to the cornerstone treaty keeping nuclear proliferation at bay. Were the illusion of the umbrella finally exposed, it would eliminate a key hindrance to nuclear disarmament.

The US nuclear umbrella seems to have lost its credibility. President Trump, in practicing his ‘America First’ policy has opened the blinds showing the illusion of its nuclear security assurances, particularly in the post-Cold War world. The dismantlement of the US nuclear umbrella – being replaced by a European nuclear umbrella, led by France and the United Kingdom, or eliminated completely – would likely have no de facto changes in European security. Rather, it would cripple to anti-disarmament movement in the United States. The United States is unlikely to risk New York for Paris, and its European allies seem to already know it. Waking up from this illusion would create a more inviting environment for nuclear disarmament.

[1] Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels, eds. (2019), The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

[2] Nick Ritchie (2013), Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons, Contemporary Security Policy, 34(1):152.

[3] Today, the US nuclear umbrella extends also to Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

[4] France and the United Kingdom, both NATO members, are nuclear weapons States, despite being under the US nuclear umbrella. France’s development of nuclear weapons was fomented, in part, by General Charles de Gaulle’s lack of confidence in the US nuclear umbrella. See Fred Kaplan (2020), The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[5] See, e.g., Hans Morgenthau (1948), Politics Among Nations. New York: A. A. Knopf; John Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.

[6] Treaty of Alliance and Friendship (1924), 23 U.N.T.C., pp. 163-169.

[7] See, e.g., Gerhard Weinberg (1995), A World at Arms: a Global History of World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[8] Kaplan (2020).

[9] Ibid.

[10] James Cameron (2018), The Double Game: The Demise of America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[11] Melvyn Leffler and Odd Westad, eds. (2010). The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume II: Crises and Détente. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[12] The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 U.N.T.S., 173.

Orion is a doctoral researcher currently at the Department of War Studies – King’s College London. He joined the Department of War Studies in 2019, as part of the Joint PhD-programme between King’s College London and the University of São Paulo, his home institution. He holds an MA (Hons) in International Security from the University of Groningen and a BA in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais, with a period at the Sorbonne University – Paris XIII. His doctoral research focuses on nuclear weapons and politics, particularly the symbolism behind nuclear weapons. He analyses the overarching relationship between symbolism, identity, and behaviour within the nuclear arena, focusing on the history of US nuclear strategy post-Hiroshima.

The Maoist Way of Guerilla Warfare and the Broader Challenge Presented by China

by Tom Harper

Long Live Chairman Mao! Long, Long Live! (Image credit: Chineseposter.net)

In the eyes of the modern world, Maoism is a relic of a more ideologically divided world and of a China that no longer exists.  Nevertheless, the ideas and strategies of Mao continue to have a direct and indirect influence upon a diverse array of actors, ranging from the insurgent movements of the post-colonial world to post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy strategies. Here, followers of the strategies devised by Mao and his German-educated strategist, Zhu De, are inspired by their combination of Marxist ideology and the maxims from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.  They applied these strategies to a China described by Mao as ‘half colonial, half feudal’[1], far removed from Marx’s original prognosis.

Prior to Mao’s leadership, China’s communist movement followed a strategy more in keeping with those of the Russian Bolsheviks, with cadres going to the Soviet Union for study.  The most prominent of these were known as the ‘Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks’, who were guided by advisors from the Soviet Comintern.  As a result of several strategic blunders in their rebellion against the nationalist KMT under Chiang Kai shek, which concluded in the Long March to Yan’an, Mao and Zhu were in a position to apply these strategies.

Mao and Zhu’s strategies were characterised by three main phases.  The first phase involved sending party cadres to the rural, isolated areas of China, which were often ignored by the KMT, which drew its support from the smaller urban class.  Unlike the Bolsheviks’ focus on the industrial proletariat, Mao saw the Chinese peasantry, which made up around eighty per cent of China’s population, as the driving force of communism in China.  To do so, these cadres sought to mobilise popular support through measures such as land reforms. These proved to be succesfull with a Chinese peasantry that had long been exploited by the feudal land-owning classes[2]. Over time, the communists were increasingly viewed as more capable administrators than the KMT, with the Chinese peasantry seeing the latter as corrupt and inefficient[3].

Through these measures, the Chinese communists had effectively created a parallel government in China’s agrarian provinces, in a manner similar to the earlier Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan[4].  This made the KMT increasingly irrelevant to the lives of the Chinese peasantry which undermined Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.

The military aspects of Mao and Zhu’s strategies came in the second and third phases of these strategies.  The former involved utilising guerrilla tactics against stronger opponents, such as the KMT and the Japanese, to build support, and to acquire resources while the latter came in defeating the KMT through conventional warfare.  In doing so, the CPC was able to preserve their forces while the KMT bore the brunt of the Japanese invasion.  As a result, the CPC was better placed for the continuation of the Chinese Civil War after Japan’s surrender. In returning to Sun Tzu, Mao and Zhu used the maxim that ‘supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’ to defeat a conventionally stronger opponent.  It was this maxim that had wider consequences as the new communist government sought to export its vision to the post-colonial world.

To China’s communist rulers, the largely agrarian post-colonial nations resembled pre-revolutionary China, which made it ripe for their efforts to replicate their earlier successes[5].  This came through assistance to the numerous anti-colonial movements battling the European colonial powers that had been damaged by the Second World War.  China’s bid to become the vanguard of communism in the developing world clashed with those of the Soviet Union, which also sought to promote its own vision of communism.  This became more pronounced with the Sino-Soviet Split of 1963 and there were often clashes between rival communist movements supported by Beijing and Moscow, such as the Angolan Civil War, where the Maoist UNITA battled the Soviet-backed MPLA.

It was the conflicts of the post-colonial world that drew attention to Maoist strategies from those who sought to combat it.  The earliest example of this was the French officer, David Galula, who witnessed the first phase of these strategies as a prisoner of the Chinese communists. After his release, Galula attempted to deploy these strategies against the anti-colonial movements throughout France’s overseas territories in a bid to deprive these movements of their local support.

While France failed to retain its colonies, Galula’s Maoist-inspired strategies caught the attention of American counter-insurgency planners who found themselves in the midst of the Vietnam War.  Like the Chinese communists before them, the National Liberation Front built support by mobilising the Vietnamese peasantry dissatisfied with the corrupt rule of the American-backed South Vietnamese government.  This influence was particularly notable in the Strategic Hamlets programme which replicated Galula’s earlier efforts in Algeria.

The Vietnam War was a case of where Maoist strategies influenced both insurgent movements and those who sought to combat them.  Ultimately, the Vietnamese communists were able to prevail over their stronger American foe by destroying its will to fight, as demonstrated by the fallout from the Tet Offensive in 1968.  Nevertheless, it was this pattern that would continue even after the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, Maoist strategies continued to maintain a degree of influence, the most visible of this being the groups within the developing world that still identified themselves with Mao’s ideas.  The most successful implementation of this was the overthrow of Nepal’s feudal monarchy by the Nepalese Communist Party in a manner eerily reminiscent of China’s own revolution, which once again came through the mobilisation of the Nepalese peasantry.

Maoist strategies also found a new audience in the midst of the War on Terror.  Just as these strategies had influenced Galula’s theories on counter-insurgency, American strategists, such as David Petraeus, invoked Mao and Zhu’s theories to justify the study of the non-military dimensions of warfare with the irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This continued the influence of these strategies on both insurgent movements and their opponents.

The most unexpected manifestation of Maoist strategies has been in Chinese foreign policy itself.  During the Cold War observers, such as John Cooley, warned that China’s strategies in Africa were aimed at expelling the United States from the continent.  In so doing, these attempts would turn Africa into a ‘major revolutionary outpost’ in a Sino-centric world where the US was largely irrelevant[6].  Cooley’s warnings are eerily reminiscent of later fears of Chinese influence in Africa and echoed the first phase of Mao’s strategies applied on a greater scale.

Ironically, this would come to pass, not through Chinese moves, but rather through the disinterest in Africa in the post-Cold War era[7].  As a result, China exploited this development to capture hearts and minds in the developing world, which had often been ignored by the major powers.  As a result, China has become an integral feature of the economic landscape of these nations, which has made it more relevant to the governance of these nations.  It is this template which China has deployed to the wider world.

In addition, China has also built a parallel international order, through institutions such as the BRI, SCO and AIIB.  These institutions shadow more established American led bodies, such as the IMF and NATO, which has seen the emergence of two competing forms of global governance just as China had been fought over by two rival governments.  From this, one can infer that Chinese strategies do not seek to overthrow American hegemony, as it has often been accused of doing, but rather seeks to render it irrelevant to global governance[8].

Whether it be the low-intensity guerrilla conflicts throughout the developing world or the globe-spanning machinations of Great Powers, Mao and Zhu’s strategies retain a significant influence.  This has become especially notable with China’s wider challenge, since it follows a strategic culture that is very different to those of the Great Powers that came before it.  Therefore, an understanding of this is an imperative in crafting a more effective response to Chinese strategies.

[1] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Dover Publications Inc, 2005), p. 68

[2] Erik Durschmied, Beware the Dragon: China: 1,000 Years of Bloodshed ( London: Andre Deutsch, 2008) p. 223

[3] Rana Mitter, The War Years, 1937-1949 in The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 175

[4] Jonathan D. Spence God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (London: WW Norton and Company, 1996) p. 173

[5] Julia Lovell Maoism: A Global History (London, Bodley Head, 2019) p. 138

[6] Lovell, 2019, p. 186

[7] Joshua Eisenmann, Eisenman, Joshua (2012) China-Africa Trade Patterns: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Contemporary China, 21:77, p.45

[8] Tom Harper, China’s Eurasia: The Belt and the Road Initiative and the Creation of a New Eurasian Power, Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 5.2, October 2019, p. 103

Tom Harper is a doctoral researcher in politics and international relations from the University of Surrey. His research interest is Chinese foreign policy in the developing world and has been published in the Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies as well as in the Conversation, the Asia Times and the Independent and has been interviewed by the China Daily and the Gazeta Do Povo. His articles have been translated into Arabic, French, Japanese, and Spanish. He can also speak Mandarin Chinese and Japanese

Tactical Instability on the South China Sea and Sino-American Decoupling

By Axel Dessein
30 October 2018

The USS Decatur finds itself seconds from disaster during an unsafe encounter with a Chinese destroyer in September 2018. (Image Credit: US Navy)

In late September 2018, a Chinese Luyang-class destroyer nearly collided with the American destroyer U.S.S. Decatur during a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea. These operations are essentially aimed at signalling a commitment to keeping the sea lanes open, the near-collision demonstrates that such commitments are to be upheld. Following the unsafe encounter at sea, several commentators pointed out that this atypical event may be a reflection of the broader deterioration in relations between the two countries. Indeed, we may now be witnessing the effects of the trade war spilling over into the military and security domain. This shift in behaviour is a crucial development, as the Trump Administration seems to have declared a new Cold War on China.

Winning Control

At the strategic level, China’s acquisitions in the South China Sea are its answer to the First and Second Island Chains, which caused the country’s claustrophobic vision of its surrounding seascape. Indeed, while the American interpretation of these island chains was aimed at keeping the country in, China itself views this enduring element of the region’s geostrategic outlook as benchmarks for its naval ambitions, as Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow demonstrate.

In the 1970s, China took control of the Paracel Islands and their surrounding waters after a military standoff with the Vietnamese Navy. It is on those islands that China eventually established Sansha City, the administrative basis for control over the “Three Sands:” the Paracels (or Xisha, West Sand), the Spratlys (or Nansha, South Sand), and the Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (commonly grouped under the name Zhongsha, Central Sand).

Undoubtedly, heaps of sand abound. Satellite imagery reveals that since 2014, China has engaged in massive land reclamation and construction activities on many of the islands and submerged features. This island-building enterprise is a clear expression of the intent to establish a military foothold in the region, thereby securing relative control of the sea. If for instance, one draws a line between the different island groups, a triangle becomes visible within the Nine-Dash Line, a series of dashes that trace China’s maritime demarcation line.

The Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlüe xue), an informative study released by the Chinese Academy of Military Science is especially enlightening as to what these advancements mean for China. According to the study, China’s strategic thinking is increasingly looking towards the South China Sea to attain a form of effective control (youxiao kongzhi) over the area to establish a forward-deployed position (qianyan fangwei) away from the mainland. However, it remains unclear what exactly China is claiming: the sea itself or the many features within the Nine-Dash Line.

This ambiguity fits perfectly within the nature of the country’s approach towards asserting its claims. In fact, China seems to be moving within the so-called grey zone, a form of strategy “at the low end of the conflict spectrum in which […] military coercion is occurring to alter the status quo,” according to James J. Wirtz. Whether conflict in the grey zone is an entirely new domain is of course an interesting debate, as Toshi Yoshihara demonstrated an earlier variation of such behaviour in his appraisal of the Paracel Sea Battle between China and Vietnam. Whatever the answer may be, such short-of-war behaviour has clearly demonstrated its effectiveness time and again.

Manning the Great Wall at Sea

Ambiguity and non-military coercion appear to be essential elements in China’s toolbox for the South China Sea. Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson have written extensively on this topic. Most importantly, one has to recognise that there are essentially three Chinese sea forces: the grey-hulled navy, the white-hulled coast guard and its fishermen. Aptly called a maritime militia, these fishing boats are the vanguard involved in promoting and defending China’s sovereignty at sea. That is not to say, however, that China has come up with a recipe for success.

The 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff demonstrates the fallibility of Chinese strategy. Special attention can be drawn to the Philippines which in 2013 filed a case against China’s territorial claims at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. After a ruling in favour of the Philippines that thereby denied the Chinese claims, China rejected the validity of the PCA and insisted on resolving the disputes bilaterally. In this instance, China failed to win control, and the shoal remains a major source of tension between the two countries.

The South China Sea is sometimes referred to as “Asia’s powder keg” because of its precarious position between China and several ASEAN states. (Image Credit: Global Security, CSIS, DW)

Other attempts have been made to quell China’s expansionist activities in the South China Sea. After sixteen years of negotiations China and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recently made some progress on drafting the framework of a proposed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which is a slow albeit necessary process. However, the conflict is not limited to Asia. Because of the growing economic and political relationship between China and countries like Greece, the European Union has come short of wording a clear statement on the issue. Here, we see attempts at preserving international law in a key trading region like the South China Sea increasingly being trumped by other economic interests.

One commentator suggests that the Scarborough Shoal standoff reveals much about China’s intent. The country demonstrated non-military assertiveness with the aim of becoming a great power at sea (haiyang qiangguo). Another commentator sees an analogy between China’s sea power endeavours and those of the German navy under Admiral Tirpitz. Broader historical parallels are also drawn with the Anglo-German conflict of the nineteenth century. However, while the clash between the world’s most powerful states is primarily about their desire for great-power status, diverging ideologies are shaping how this conflict plays out. Here, Alfred W. McCoy writes: “Treat the South China Sea as central, not peripheral, and the Cold War not as bounded by a specific ideological conflict but as the midpoint in a century-long clash of empires.” Today, the empires in question are of course, China and the U.S.

A Relationship Adrift

Amid growing trade tensions, the countries put a halt to their Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (D&SD). The U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis also skipped China during his October 2018 trip to Asia, but did meet with his Chinese counterpart in Singapore. In light of such events, it is but a small surprise that Chinese academics and political groups are discussing a “decoupling” (tuogou), a process which describes a potential rupture in the economic and security relationships between China and the U.S. The risks associated with such an unravelling of the ties between China and the U.S. are manifold, with increased tactical instability demonstrated by the recent near-collision as an example.

Strategic competition with China is back on the American agenda. As a result, the two giants are increasingly stepping on each other’s toes. In this scenario, the destroyer’s sortie could indeed be a display of greater confidence and boldness on the Chinese part, showcasing a broader shift in the relationship. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that an article by a think tank affiliated with China’s State Council still urges restraint in face of “long-term strategic competition” with the United States. While it is unclear how long such moderation will last, our understanding of the Chinese decision-making process clearly suffers from large information gaps. Simply talking about a new Cold War will not be the answer, learning from Chinese words and actions will be.

Axel Dessein is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. His research focuses on the implications of China’s rise on the current world order. Axel completed his BA and MA in Oriental Languages and Cultures at Ghent University. You can follow him on Twitter @AxelDessein.

Banner image source: https://www.stripes.com/news/photos-show-how-close-chinese-warship-came-to-colliding-with-us-navy-destroyer-1.550153

Strife Series on Cyberwarfare and State Perspectives, Part I – Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Medium Powers: Two Case Studies

By Andreas Haggman

Credit Image: luzitanija (123RF)

 

Introduction

In recent years, traditional military capabilities have been supplemented by the development of offensive cyber capabilities. Examples of cyber capabilities have proved that effects can be achieved in both the kinetic (e.g. Stuxnet, Black Energy) and information spheres (e.g. Crimea, TV5 Monde). However, discussions in this area are often predictable in the actors that are considered. When commentators, both in the media and academia, talk about offensive cyber capabilities it is usually in reference to a list of usual suspects: the US, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are the primary state antagonists, with the UK, Israel, and sometimes France being cast in supporting roles. Anonymous and amorphous organised crime groups are often referenced as non-state actors, though the role of Anonymous seems to have subsided in the past couple of years.

This article seeks to highlight how offensive cyber capabilities augment the traditional capabilities of two lesser-mentioned state actors: Australia and Sweden. Although geographically distinct, both these countries can be classified as ‘medium powers’ who, in the words of Richard Hill, are ‘likely to have few resources to spare for the exercise of power beyond what is necessary to safeguard and, where possible, further its vital interest of territorial integrity, political independence and betterment.’ Importantly, in the context of cyber capabilities, both countries have declared either operational deployment of such capabilities or intent to develop them. This article discusses how cyber capabilities form part of both countries’ official policies and how these might be deployed for operational effect in their geopolitical contexts.

 

Australia

Australia published its first Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which formally acknowledged the existence of Australian offensive cyber capabilities. In November 2016, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that the country had been conducting offensive cyber operations against ISIS targets. Australia therefore has a pedigree in the offensive cyber capability space and it also has a formulated policy on how these capabilities should be used: despite misplaced notions of deterrence expressed in the Cyber Security Strategy, later policy documents have stated that offensive cyber capabilities would be used to target cyber criminals.

Australia’s geopolitical situation means this approach of deprioritising state-based threats to instead focus on non-state actors (even if some these may have state-backing) is likely the best use of its offensive cyber capabilities. Geographically, politically, and economically, Australia’s most pressing concern is China: it’s attempted dominance of south east Asian sea routes, it’s influence in Australian politics, and its large investments in Australian industry, particularly the mining sector. However, deployment of offensive cyber capabilities against Chinese targets would not address any of these issues and they must instead be tackled with diplomatic, legal, and economic means.

A better use of offensive cyber capabilities is therefore to target non-state actors and criminal groups. For these targets, capabilities which cause disruption or enable better information gathering by law enforcement are more appropriate than capabilities which cause physical destruction. As an example, an extension of the Australian patrol boat scheme can be envisaged where Australia provides support to anti-piracy and anti-people smuggling operations in the south Pacific and Indian oceans. Capabilities that stain dark web traffic, allowing it to be tracked, can help identify the criminal actors which perpetrate these activities. Such capabilities may not be at the behest of the island nations which inhabit the south Pacific and Australia is well-placed to meaningfully contribute with its own capabilities.

 

Sweden

Sweden published a national cyber security strategy in 2016 which contains provisions for ‘a robust capability to conduct active operations in the cyber environment.’ However, as early as 2013 a report on long-term strategic planning had advocated for Sweden to develop offensive cyber capabilities. This view was backed by several people in the Government, who assessed that Sweden had to keep pace with technological developments – if everyone else were acquiring offensive cyber capabilities, so should Sweden.

Similar to Australia, Sweden has an obvious adversary in its immediate geographical locale: Russia. In this case, contemporary concerns about Russian behaviour (military manoeuvres, disinformation campaigns) are backed by a history of conflict between the countries – Russia is very much the old enemy. But since the 20th century Sweden has also positioned itself as a paragon of neutrality and all operational military activity has been strictly limited to UN peacekeeping missions. The utility of offensive cyber capabilities is less obvious in these missions because the critical component is a physical presence on the ground which serves a securing and deterring effect. This presence cannot be achieved with cyber capabilities.

Instead, Sweden may find a peacetime outlet for its offensive cyber capabilities if used as signalling devices. Russia regularly runs military flights provocatively close to, sometimes within, Swedish airspace. It could be envisaged that targeting one of these flights in a non-lethal capacity (for example by displaying a message on the pilot’s heads-up display) would send a message about the maturity of Swedish offensive cyber capabilities and their intent to use them. A key caveat here, however, is that the benefits of the operation must be carefully weighed against the cost, particularly if zero-day vulnerabilities need to be burned to achieve the desired effect.

 

Conclusion

Offensive cyber capabilities are not just the remit of great powers and rogue actors. Some states, such as Australia and Sweden discussed above, are technologically sophisticated yet perhaps do not have the remit to deploy cyber capabilities in the sort of arenas that make headlines. However, as suggested in the postulated deployment scenarios, these capabilities should not be discounted as means for achieving tactical and strategic effects in a limited context. The geopolitical situation of each country shapes these deployments and it is important to establish the desired effects before cyber capabilities are considered – they are not necessarily the most appropriate solution for every problem. Therefore, with careful deliberation, offensive cyber capabilities can be made to fit the imperatives of medium powers.

 

Andreas Haggman is a PhD researcher in the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security at Royal Holloway University of London. His thesis is a practical exploration of wargaming for cyber security education and awareness training. Andreas’ additional research interests span a wide spectrum of non-technical cyber security topics. He can be followed on Twitter @Andreas_Haggman.

Image Source: https://www.123rf.com/photo_49099172_puzzle-with-the-national-flag-of-sweden-and-australia-concept.html

 

NATO is wounded, this Summit could break it

By Dr Zachary Wolfraim

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Summit (Credit Image: NATO HQ)

In light of the recent chaos consuming British politics and the looming NATO summit, I revisited an article I wrote on the eve of the US election in 2016 hoping it would outline a worst-case scenario, rather than reality. At that time, NATO was heading into uncertainty with the reality of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s significantly reduced majority in Parliament just starting to sink in. Turkey was moving steadily towards autocracy and Donald Trump was a long-shot, but nonetheless threatening Presidential candidate. This scenario has since come to pass and with the critical ongoing summit  (on the 11th and 12th July 2018), NATO has again been pushed into a corner and forced to defend its existence. This is a frequent occurrence for the alliance, particularly since the end of the Cold War.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than disbanding, the alliance found new purpose both as a vehicle for promoting US interests in Europe but also as a security organisation capable of undertaking coordinated multilateral interventions. In occupying this role, NATO has reinvented itself from collective defence organisation established to prevent Soviet expansionism into one able to execute complex, coordinated multilateral military interventions. In doing so it has responded to crises in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and has now reoriented back towards countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The threat it faces now is not from an external crisis, however, but internal within the alliance and the effect of radical realignments in policy both in the US and the UK.

As a backdrop to current events, suspected Russian interference into both countries have undermined mechanisms of political campaigning and cast doubt on democratic outcomes while delivering policies that dramatically upend decades of Western international security policy. President Donald Trump and specifically his transactional view of international alliances and a complete lack of consistency in policymaking present an existential threat to the organisation and consequently, creates another way of undermining US influence in Europe. Concurrently, Britain has been rendered politically unstable, consumed with Brexit which adds to years of austerity that have diminished much of its defence capability. Both countries play a central role in providing military support and a diplomatic vision to NATO and are struggling to define their respective relationships within the broader international order.

In the UK specifically, both major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, are completely riven by Brexit with the Conservative party engaging in open conflict over the UK’s future relationship with the EU, most recently losing its Foreign Secretary and its Brexit minister. This has not yet spilled into the UK-NATO sphere but nonetheless has planted seeds of doubt in the minds of allies over the type of reliable member the UK will continue to be. Despite the country’s position as a framework nation contributing to vital capabilities and forces alongside meeting its 2% budgetary commitment, it has continued to under invest in maintaining its military capabilities and by extension limiting its ability to act as a capable partner in NATO operations. This is now reaching  a point where its future effectiveness could be called into question. Stagnant economic realities mean that future defence investment decisions are likely to be pushed down the road until there is a clearer UK-EU relationship. As a result, one of Europe’s critical NATO members is effectively in a holding pattern for the next few years.

The US, on the other hand, presents an even more fundamental question. President Trump has made it relatively clear that he does not believe the values that underpin NATO are sufficient to justify its existence. Trump’s sole emphasis has been on the disparity between US defence spending and the continuing 2% spending target, disregarding the agenda setting influence this spending has bought. While this has often been a point of contention in NATO, the President’s willful misunderstanding of how this spending target works has only compounded his sense of grievance with NATO allies. Fundamentally, the President seems willing to dismantle the security architecture that has underpinned the safety and security of Europe, the North Atlantic and the West more broadly since the end of the Second World War over the issue of spending and budgets. Despite reassurances from the US Permanent Representative to NATO and US Defence Secretary, James Mattis, about the alliance’s central role to US defence priorities, no one actually knows what President Trump will say as he has no defined priorities or identifiable value structure when it comes to international relations.

Regardless of what happens in this summit, NATO remains in serious trouble during the tenure of the Trump presidency and until Britain has decided its future relationship with the EU. For the time being NATO member states must remain defensive about their continued increases in spending, proactive in their policymaking and vocal about what NATO’s value added is to international security. The 2% spending goal, while admirable, should be adapted to place emphasis on effectiveness and thus increase coordination between Allies to enhance the capability of NATO as a whole. Though the UK has made its commitments to NATO clear, its ability to follow through on them is variable and thus the ability to coordinate with similarly effective NATO forces creates a way of preserving influence and capability. Ultimately, despite the UK’s diminished international presence, NATO can potentially continue to limp along with US disengagement until the next presidential election. However, there is no doubt that this is one of the lowest points for the transatlantic relationship since the beginning of the Iraq War. At that time, major NATO members both publicly rebuked the US invasion of Iraq and refused to support US efforts in mobilising NATO to defend Turkey. This previous rift in the alliance seems minor in hindsight, however, it nonetheless demonstrated that the organisation can endure difficult diplomatic relations and carve out a relevant international role.

During this summit and beyond, Canada and European NATO Allies will need to prioritise the relevance of NATO, invest in maintaining the organisation and prepare to speak up in its defence. There remains considerable support for NATO in the US and Allies should make every effort to maintain links with aligned US Senators and Representatives to continue making the case for NATO. In terms of operations, NATO must continue its presence in Eastern Europe and continue to be a proactive force in international affairs, driven by the initiative of Canada and European members, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming a discussion forum rather than an active force for stability and progress. More generally, NATO member states will need proactive strategies to deal with Russian disinformation and spend time on reaffirming and rebuilding trust with voters. With time and perhaps a different administration, the alliance will recover somewhat, however, the damage that has already occurred will take time and dedication, particularly on the part of the US, to recover.

 

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Dr. Zachary Wolfraim graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as political risk and intelligence sectors in London.

Image source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156597.htm