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The Sahel’s Scream for Help: A Warning of the Security Impact of Climate Change

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By Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell

 

Refugee boy fetching water (Image Credit: UNICEF)
Source: https://weshare.unicef.org/Package/2AM408W045LE

Climate change is an ever-present issue on most state agendas and in the mission statements of most multinational corporations. However, measures taken in the fight against climate change are not yet sufficient to revert, stop, or minimise its devastating consequences, despite it being considered a critical matter for international security, and especially for human security. Furthermore, its destructive effects are already a reality in many corners of the world, ranging from melting icebergs in the Artic, to torrential rains and floods in Asia, hurricanes in Central America and severe droughts in the Sahel. So, it is up to this generation of civilians and politicians, companies, and international organisations, to decide whether to unite against climate change or to continue struggling with uncoordinated, vain attempts. It is this choice which will define the future of billions in this generation and those following; a decision that cannot be postponed any longer. Climate change is here, it has arrived, and it is not going anywhere. The Sahel Crisis is a confirmation of this. 

The Sahel’s rapid social, political, economic and environmental deteriorations have dramatically worsened human security. As a consequence, calls for humanitarian aid across the region have sharply increased, reaching unparalleled levels. For instance, increasing violence in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in 2020 led to more than 1,000 violent incidents, while claiming more than 8, 000 lives and forcing millions to flee their homes. Although the Sahel has historically been plagued with severe humanitarian crises, the reality is that climate change is now aggravating matters further. According to the UN,  80% of the Sahel’s land is currently degraded, a by-product of the climate change-borne droughts and heavy rainfalls that have been assailing the region  in recent years. This is exacerbating current social problems, as shortage of natural resources is preventing farmers from sowing and cultivating their crops, leading to confrontations between them and pastoralists as both are fighting for the scarce livelihoods and fertile land left in the area. Moreover,  the rise in terrorism is further complicating the situation. Terrorists are seeking to extend their influence, exploiting the social and political vulnerabilities of a crumbling, porous and unguarded region. This is consequently creating no-go zones, preventing Sahelians from migrating to search for more fertile land. Therefore, it is clear that the adverse effects of climate change are acting as a threat multiplier, compounding current tensions and threats. This is preventing the stabilisation of the Sahel and thus, the delivery of a more adequate response to the humanitarian emergency that is currently unfolding in the region.

An additional challenge is the COVID-19 pandemic which has spread amongst the Sahel populous. As of 26th of March 2021, 449,540 cases and more than 6,000 deaths have already been recorded, although the numbers are probably higher due to the limited resources for documentation. COVID-19 has further hampered communities by forcing the closure of schools and health centres and reducing the movement of the economy. Travel restrictions have also impeded the arrival of much-needed humanitarian assistance, aggravating the already profound, multi-faceted crisis. Thus, 2020 saw more than 24 million Sahelians requiring life-saving aid to be able to confront such perilous circumstances. Despite the UNHCR scaling up its resources in the area, greater international aid and awareness remains necessary as the Sahel does not appears to be a matter of critical urgency on today’s world affairs agenda. 

The Sahel’s current societal collapse is revealing a link between climate change, peace, and security. For instance, with droughts destabilizing the economic and political landscape of the region through the loss of commercial livelihoods, weak national governments have been exposed. These institutions have historically struggled to maintain a fair distribution of resources among the population. As a consequence, if better measures are not implemented, governments will likely find it ever-more difficult to manage them, due to global warming depleting such resources. Governmental mismanagement, coupled with recent climate shocks, are concurrently leading to an increase in hunger, extremism, and social unrest . Thus, climate change is significantly harming the human welfare of Sahelians owing to the increase in food insecurity, physical violence and psychological damage, as well as the destruction of essential infrastructure and the environment. 

Although this may appear as a distant problem for those located outside the region, in reality, the Sahel Crisis is not confined to a distant land. It has transnational consequences which should be taken seriously. Climate change mitigation and environmental protection measures ought to be implemented as structural preconditions to confront the root causes of the insecurity in the Sahel and the rise of violence.  If no action is taken, violence and insecurity will, sooner rather than later, spill-over into other regions of the world. Indeed, one of the most prominent effects of climate change is the mass migration of civilians to areas of greater safety. This phenomenon has been unfolding intra-regionally in the Sahel for years, but is one that worsened in 2020, eventually placing further pressure on countries within the Sahel itself. 

Countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are now at the epicentre of one of the world’s fastest growing displacement crises.  Nearly 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 365,000 refugees are temporarily living in those countries, which themselves are suffering from the combination of drought, lack of resources and regional conflict, particularly jihadist terrorism. Burkina Faso is experiencing the greatest toll, as the number of IDPs doubled to over one million over the past year. This has occurred whilst Burkina Faso is among the poorest countries in the world and one of the most vulnerable to climate risks. The UN World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization have even warned that Burkina Faso is one of four “hotspot” countries where a deadly amalgamation of climate risks, conflict, economic decay, and the COVID-19 pandemic have increased the risk of famine among its citizens. Furthermore, the problem has not remained within the enclaves of the Sahel. Many Sahelians have embarked on arduous journeys towards safety, making this crisis an ever-more transnational phenomenon, as reflected by the increased arrival of migrants from North Africa into Europe in recent years. Migrants are escaping not only conflicts, but also the lack of resources owing to the impact of climate change, which has left them without basic necessities such as fertile land, drinkable water or safe infrastructures. 

Thus, this crisis threatens to put further strain on the international community. The Sahel crisis is just a foretaste of the social destruction that climate change can have on our current social and world order.  And this is not an isolated phenomenon, as experts foresee a similar prognosis for other nations and regions susceptible to climate change, such as Central America. Moreover, the ecologist Norman Myers has predicted that by the mid-to late century, there may be around 200 million environmental refugees around the globe. 

Hence, concerted action to prevent these devastating predictions from materialising is necessary. Unfortunately, the convergence of the global pandemic and the growth of nationalism stymieing collective security and cooperation are hampering the prevention and mitigation of climate risks. These issues have contributed to the increased vulnerability of society, creating the perfect storm for further climate change-borne calamities to become part of the world’s day-to-day life, heightening human insecurity for all. Therefore, situations like the Sahel Crisis must be addressed because it is morally and ethically correct, as defended by Hugo Slim in his masterful book Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disasters. But, also because it is strategically beneficial and can be used as a learning experience to comprehend how to confront such situations and prepare for similar occurrences in the future. 

This is vital since climate change is unfolding quicker than previously imagined, and thus nations and societies must become better prepared to confront it.  Yet, despite the clear evidence of climate change and the supportive findings of numerous subject-matter experts, the measures taken by international organisations, states and citizens are still insufficient. This is reflected by the increased climate-induced events that have been assailing the world recently. In fact, the sentiment towards climate change seems to be an emulation of the attitude taken towards the outbreak of COVID-19: one mostly ruled by individualistic action instead of a collective one. Although, the COVAX scheme led by the WHO, CEPI and Gavi is proof of concerted action against this biological global threat, it is still finding itself in competition with individual countries who are sealing their own deals with pharmaceuticals, hampering the equitable worldwide rollout of vaccines. This has once again demonstrated the weakness of modern multilateralism and cooperation. Thus, a change of nations´ priorities towards less individualistic goals is needed to even have a chance at successfully confronting this transnational problem, and also the more long-lasting global threat of climate change.  

Countries cannot solve climate change unilaterally; hence international cooperation is required. However, nations and corporations have their own interests, and many are short-sighted, giving priority to their short-term gains instead of the long-term well-being of the world. Climate change is an epitome of the Tragedy of the Commons, and thus, for cooperation to be somewhat successful, this nationalistic outlook needs to stop.  Therefore, greater united action together with more long-term, climate-focused policies and environment-friendly commitments such as the European Green Deal are necessary. These changes will allow for a more successful fight against the effects of climate change, together with the prevention of future mass humanitarian catastrophes such as the one currently unfolding in the Sahel. 

 

Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell is a part-time MA International Relations student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interests are around the topics of Migration, Climate Change, Gender and Human Rights. She is currently a Spanish Red Cross volunteer in the Canary Islands helping with the management of the latest influx of migrants to the islands.

The Iraqi government is hamstrung by the very causes that are driving Iraqis to the streets

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by Gareth Jonas and Tom Webster

Tahrir Square (Liberation Square) with the Freedom Monument in the background – Baghdad, Iraq.
Source: Next Century Foundation

On October 25, thousands of Iraqi protesters mobilised throughout the country to commemorate the October 2019 “Tishreen Revolution,” with huge demonstrations in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the protest movement. Their latest demands? Much the same as the original grievances that first drew Iraqis to the streets last year: economic reform, and tackling corruption and constitutional change—albeit now with the additional call for justice for the 600 protesters killed by pro-Iran militia groups and security forces since the initial protests. Despite these waves of mass protest, progress continues to be extremely limited with the Iraqi state remaining constrained by pro-Iranian parties, economic crises, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The perpetuation of demonstrations since October 2019 highlights the limited progress made by the Iraqi state to address protester demands. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that further progress will be made anytime soon.

While the original grievances in October 2019 centred around corruption and a lack of economic opportunities, the extensive use of violence against protesters has since made security sector reform the core demand of protests. Yet, justice for the deaths of protesters continues to be absent, magnifying the glaring lack of accountability within the Iraqi security sector. The July raid in which 14 Kataib Hezbollah members were arrested, only to be released days later after threats from the group, underscores the difficulty Prime Minister Mustafa  Al-Kadhimi has in enforcing that accountability. Therefore, though Kadhimi has repeatedly emphasised his support for the protesters and dedication to serving justice for the ‘martyrs’ of the protests, his actions (or lack thereof) suggest that these are empty promises. Protesters’ concerns will be little allayed by the reinstatement of Abdel-Wahab al-Saadi to the head of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service. That was a victory for protesters, but a pyrrhic victory when one considers the death toll of the protests and the much more far-ranging demands to improve public safety. Today, protesters continue to place improved security and justice for the 600 or so killed protesters at the top of their agenda. That this remains the case six months after taking office, combined with the continued assassinations of high-profile activists and intellectuals across the summer, shows the evident lack of progress Kadhimi has been able to make in this area.

On the economy—the original core issue of protesters demands—the picture looks even bleaker. Mass rallies began in October 2019 in Tahrir Square calling for more job opportunities and improved services. One year on, it is hard to point at anything resembling progress as Iraq’s struggle with COVID-19 has only exacerbated its pre-existing economic woes and deprived the government of the resources to combat them. This, combined with the overinflated public sector, has led to a new strain of protests, in which medical workers and employees of the Ministry of Electricity across the country are demanding the disbursement of unpaid wages. It is thus apparent that Kadhimi has even more to contend with economically now than when he entered office.

The government’s greatest success in this area could be said to be the white paper published in October 2020 containing a historical diagnosis of Iraq’s financial woes and a prescription for a way out of it—by diversifying Iraq’s economy away from its dependence on oil whilst providing economic opportunities for Iraqis. It aims to achieve this by following International Monetary Fund guidelines which require spending cuts on basic needs such as health and education, alongside the devaluation of the currency to increase exports. However, the estimated 450 articles of legislation needed to be approved for the implementation of these recommendations are highly unlikely to pass due to opposition from various political parties who were not consulted, and little political will exists to pass them anyhow. As the country continues to teeter on the edge of an economic implosion, most protesters now seem resigned to simply wait out the pandemic until Iraq sees an increase in oil revenues.

There has also been very little progress towards domestic political reform. Calls for early elections and electoral reform to tackle corruption have increased throughout 2020 as protesters seek to do away with sectarian politics. Yet, the Iraqi Parliament is beset with factional infighting along sectarian lines as members of parliament continue to advance their individual and party interests at the cost of political reform. Whilst the recently passed electoral law goes some way towards weakening the dominance of traditional parliamentary blocs by dissolving provincial constituencies into electoral districts, protesters have accused it of dividing constituencies along ethnic and sectarian lines. This has effectively worked to buttress the reviled Muhasasa system; that is, the ethno-sectarian quotas by which cabinet positions are awarded amongst Iraq’s demographics. In addition, whilst early parliamentary elections have been scheduled for June 2021, the continued understaffing of the Independent High Electoral Commission and Federal Supreme Court—necessary to manage the elections and ratify the results—calls into question the current timeline for next year’s elections.

It is thus apparent that the majority of protesters’ demands have yet to be fulfilled, and the opportunity for progress in the short-term appears bleak. However, in considering the evolution of the protest movement’s response to the changing security and economic conditions that Iraq faces, we must acknowledge the limitations which the government faces in trying to meet many of the protesters’ demands. As a caretaker prime minister predominantly intended to navigate Iraq to new elections next year, whilst facing staunch opposition from pro-Iran parties and blocs in Parliament, there is little hard progress which Kadhimi can achieve. Nevertheless, the frustrations behind the protests are deep-set and not going away anytime soon. The antipathy voiced against Kadhimi at Tahrir Square in October was a significant moment in a movement which had hitherto been hesitant to criticise a leader who wants to clamp down on the militias and make progress on security and economy. The patience of protesters is quickly running out, so it seems as though Kadhimi will have to make a better effort in co-opting the energy of the streets if he is to bolster Iraq’s security and drive meaningful change in the lives of millions of Iraqis.

Gareth Jonas is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International. He can be found tweeting about identity, ethnic conflict, and international security at @jonas_gareth.  He is a Senior Editor at Strife.

Tom Webster is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International who has conducted extensive research on the Popular Mobilization Units and their place in Iraqi state-building.

Strife Series on Human Rights, Security, and Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific – Introduction

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by Anna Tan

(Image Credit: Shannon Stapleton/Reuters)

 

Editorial 

In recent years, the world has seen a rising number of civil protests and movements globally. The eruption of the Hong Kong crisis in mid-2019, where mainstream political dialogues reached a new level of fixation on the increasingly looming authoritarian power of China that pervades well beyond its mainland territories, shook many of us. The rise of China has been overwhelmingly redefining the overall regional security of the Asia Pacific, and how that development influences the shift in the nature of international relations is undoubtedly dependent on the alliance of the Asian countries with the West, especially with the United States.

Reflecting on Müllerson’s theory on the relationship of intrastate human rights and international security[1}, it is indisputable that China under Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a very strong authoritarian state, and its overtly aggressive policies against Hong Kong’s mass civil resistance not just made headlines for an incredibly sustained period of time throughout the year, but also threatens the international stability by means of possible similar aggressions. It threatens liberal democratic values that are upheld by many free and democratic nations from across the world, especially in a time where American influence has been on a rapid decline since the assumption of the Trump administration. In the Asia Pacific, while nations such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea face new challenges in manoeuvring through the changing dynamics of international security now jeopardised by the “America first” policy of the United States, other countries such as Myanmar welcome the rising Chinese hegemony. Why and how does this happen?

This Strife Series explores the interplay between human rights and security through diplomatic exchanges in the Asia Pacific. The series analyses how in some countries, addressing human rights, democratic freedom and maintaining status quo national and/or regional security seem to be mutually exclusive at times instead of being mutually reinforcing, despite sharing the common factor of China’s domineering economic leverage.

Publications:

In the first article (12/2019) “China’s Turbulent Year: 2019”, Professor Kerry Brown analyses how China’s aggression in response to the Hong Kong protests and its draconian policies to the Uighur population in Xinjiang have both comparable ‘tit-for-tat’ elements that the Chinese leadership may not have thought through carefully, but will have detrimental consequences to the international opinion on China’s usually very cautious and deliberate efforts on maintaining its diplomatic image.

In the second article (01/2020) “China, Myanmar, War Crimes and the Issue of National Sovereignty”, Anna Tan looks at how Myanmar under Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership, has strangely shifted from being a Western ally during the landmark victories of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 elections to an even stronger adherence to China’s orbit than ever before. She describes how the Sino-Burmese relations have evolved dramatically under the light of the Rohingya conflict in Rakhine and Myanmar’s subsequent genocide trial at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The third article (03/2020) “Taiwan Elections: Continuity, Change and the Cross-Strait Conundrum”, Evita Liagka explores what the victories of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen could mean for the future of Taiwan and its cross-strait relations. She points out that the China-Hong Kong crisis came in a convenient timing for DPP’s mobilisation of garnering greater support than ever before and since the public consensus on maintaining the status quo international diplomatic status of Taiwan has remained largely unchanged, we might not see a drastic shift in DPP’s policies from its previous term. However, KMT’s recent decision to swerve away from its pro-China stances might pose newer challenges for Taiwan in the years ahead.

The final articles are contributed by Yeseul Woo, analysing North Asia’s security issues from the perspective of South Korea.

  • In Part 1 (02/2020) “South Korea’s Dangerous Silence on Human Rights Abuses in North Korea”, Yeseul Woo argues why the US lack of sponsorship in the UN Security Council meeting on the discussion of North Korea’s human rights issues should not mean that South Korea should remain silent. Ms Woo explains why, in fact, South Korea’s silence justified by the importance of the nuclear security framework would actually be counterproductive in regional security in the long run.
  • In Part 2 (03/2020) “The First Tech War? Why the Korea-Japan Tensions are about US-China Competition on AI”, Ms Woo further explains that South Korea’s silence on North Korea’s human rights issues for the sake of North Asia’s nuclear security (described in Part 1) is actually the result of the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations which has led to South Korea withdrawing from the GSOMIA pact. Though Seoul retracted its decision last minute, Ms Woo argues that the tensions between Seoul and Tokyo are less about the debate surrounding comfort women and wartime forced labour, and is actually influenced by the US-China competition on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in nuclear surveillance technology.
  1. Müllerson, R. (1997). “Human Rights Diplomacy.” Routledge.

Anna Tan is a postgraduate student for MSc Global Affairs at King’s College London. Her research is focused on how Western human rights diplomacy affects democracy and authoritarianism in Asia Pacific. She has previously worked for UNDP Myanmar and the American Red Cross, and is a member of the Programme Committee of the Conflict, Security and Development (CSD) Conference 2020 hosted by the Department of War Studies and the Department of International Development (DID). Anna holds a BSc in Neuroscience. You can follow her on Twitter: @AnnaTanGTW.

 

Insurgency Scenario in Arunachal Pradesh

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By Athul Menath

 

Arunachal Pradesh, located in north east of India (Credit Image: The Tribune India)

The North Eastern states of India – often referred to as ‘the Seven Sister’ states – have been affected by insurgency in varying proportions since the 1950’s. Although the root causes of insurgencies can be traced back to India’s chaotic partition and colonial history, these violent movements arguably have been sustained due to failures of the Indian state, including a lack of transparent governance and employment opportunities, as well as the support  provided to militants by hostile neighbours .

Geography is also a big factor. Arunachal Pradesh borders Myanmar in the east, China in the north, Bhutan in the west, as well as the two insurgency affected states of Nagaland and Assam. Despite the absence of sustained high level violence or indigenous insurgency, this state has been adversely affected by armed conflicts in adjacent areas and has become the life line of militant movement in the region. According to Assam Director General of Police (DGP), Assam was facing militant threat from groups’ based out of Arunachal and Nagaland.

On February 1, Indian Security Forces (SFs) killed two militants of the independent faction of the United Liberation Front (ULFA-I) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Shankapani in Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. Only a week earlier, on January 24, 2018, an Indian Army trooper of the 11 Grenadiers regiment was killed in a joint ambush by Coordination Committee (CorCom) of Manipur and ULFA-I, at Namsai District along the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border.  This was the first SF fatality in more than a year. The last in state SF fatality was recorded in December 3, 2016 when two SFs were killed and eight wounded in Nginu village in Tirap District in a joint operation by Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), ULFA-I and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).

The highest militancy-related fatality in Arunachal was recorded in 2001 with 63 fatalities, however between 2007-17 only three years recorded more than ten insurgency related fatalities.

        Year Civilians Security Forces Terrorists Total
2000 7 3 24 34
2001 40 12 11 63
2002 7 4 21 32
2003 7 1 31 39
2004 6 2 35 43
2005 3 1 15 19
2006 0 0 4 4
2007 2 3 16 21
2008 0 0 2 2
2009 0 0 9 9
2010 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 41 41
2012 0 0 4 4
2013 0 0 4 4
2014 3 0 6 9
2015 2 4 4 10
2016 0 2 7 9
2017 0 0 6 6
2018 0 1 2 3
Total 77 33 242 352

*    Militancy fatalities between 2000-18 (Source : SATP)

Significance and Spillover Threat

Arunachal Pradesh – which spreads over 83,743 square kilometres with a population of about 1.3 million – is a logistical hub for militants from adjacent states of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. The militants use the state to cross over to the loosely governed Sagaing region of Naga Self-Administered Zone (NSAZ) in Myanmar, where at least 2,500 Indian militants are based.

The Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts of the state share 520 kilometers of the 1, 643 Kilometers long porous border with Myanmar. According to security agencies, these Districts  along with Nagaland’s Mon and Tuesang Districts have become the nerve centre of militant activity in the region. As of January 31, 2018, in the last ten years these five Districts accounted for about 313 fatalities.

 

District Civilian Security Forces Terrorists Total
Mon 6 13 110 129
Tirap 1 11 73 85
Tuesang 18 0 43 61
Changlang 5 3 26 34
Longding 0 0 4 4
Total 30 27 256 313

Fatalities from five bordering districts of India (Source* SATP)

 

The three districts of Arunachal host militant groups such as NSCN-K, a reformation faction of NSCN (NSCN-R); the ULFA-I; the Saigora faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S); and CorCom. According to a Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) report, ‘several armed modules of ULFA-I either individually or jointly with CorCom are active in several locations….in Longding, Tirap and Changlang Districts.’ The notification also adds that the Assam-Arunachal interstate boundary continues to be used as hideouts and corridors for movement by militant groups.

NSCN-K, which abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Indian Government in 2015, has been the predominant  organisation in Arunachal Pradesh. With a plethora of groups present in the region, the possibility of one militant group attempting to gain dominance in the area remains likely, which may result in a spike in factional clashes. According to an intelligence official, NSCN-IM, which currently conducts peace talks with Indian Government and is also a rival to NSCN-K, has attempted to gain dominance and destabilize NSCN-K by propping up local proxy militant groups such as the Eastern Naga National Government (ENNG).

Arunachal Pradesh Police records from 2016 indicate that there were at least 80 cases of extortion and about 103 incidents of abduction. In 2017, the number of abduction cases stood at 106 and extortion at 75. A majority of these incidents are perpetrated by militant groups as means to generate funds. Moreover, Arunachal Pradesh is located adjacent to the ‘golden triangle’, one of the primary opium producing regions in the world comprised of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. According to a 2016 report, NSCN-R has reportedly been recruiting drug addicts across the opium belt of Arunachal Pradesh to broaden its extortion racket. Apart from Longding, Tirap and Changlang, Lohit and Anjaw Districts are notorious for opium cultivation. According to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Arunachal topped the list of states in illegal poppy production for opium during 2014-15. NCB officials also claim that illegal poppy farms are guarded by armed militia who are known to work with insurgents.

 

Shift in Centre of Gravity & Future of Violence

After Sheikh Hasina became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 2014, Dhaka cracked down on Indian insurgents based in the country, resulting in militant groups relocating to Myanmar’s Sagaing region. With this development, the ‘centre of gravity’ for the insurgent movement shifted to Myanmar. Union Minister for Home Hansraj Ahir stated that between 2015 and March 31, 2017, the Indo-Myanmar border witnessed a steady rise in insurgent activities, resulting in the death of 18 security personnel and 32 insurgents, as well as the arrest of 337 militants .

Other Indian militants groups such as PLA and ULFA-I have shifted their bases to Shan State in Myanmar bordering China’s Yunnan province. Chinese intelligence has reportedly renewed relations with some militant leaders. ULFA has established links with Beijing’s proxy in Myanmar the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Additionally, Chinese intelligence officers arguably favoured the constitution of UNFLWESA, a conglomerate of various groups . In 2017, ULFA-I issued a statement against the visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh.

 

Conclusion

Although the Indian Army has been able to keep violence contained in three Districts, rampant extortion, abduction and drug production highlight the inefficiency of the policing machinery of the state. The inefficient policing apparatus could also be an indicator of a possible deficiency in human intelligence, since the police is likely to have more local level contacts as they are indigenous to the area, unlike the Army. Consequently, intelligence-based targeted operations carried out at a grass root level also suffer.

The primary causality for the drop in insurgent violence can be attributed to the security cooperation extended by Dhaka, but the Indian counter insurgency strategy can only occupy a peripheral secondary position. With Myanmar becoming the primary base of operations for insurgent groups, the Arunachal Pradesh will play a vital role in strategy of Indian insurgent groups. In light of Beijing’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the supply of weapons to insurgents makes it a geopolitical issue rather than an internal security issue. The Indian government would do well to act accordingly.

 

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56

Image Source

Banner: here (Image Credit: File Photo – PTI)

Image 1: http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/mod-clears-key-road-along-china-after-fresh-alignment/276202.html

 

Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

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Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees
Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle