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The Iraqi government is hamstrung by the very causes that are driving Iraqis to the streets

January 20, 2021 by Strife Staff

by Gareth Jonas and Tom Webster

Tahrir Square (Liberation Square) with the Freedom Monument in the background – Baghdad, Iraq.
Source: Next Century Foundation

On October 25, thousands of Iraqi protesters mobilised throughout the country to commemorate the October 2019 “Tishreen Revolution,” with huge demonstrations in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the protest movement. Their latest demands? Much the same as the original grievances that first drew Iraqis to the streets last year: economic reform, and tackling corruption and constitutional change—albeit now with the additional call for justice for the 600 protesters killed by pro-Iran militia groups and security forces since the initial protests. Despite these waves of mass protest, progress continues to be extremely limited with the Iraqi state remaining constrained by pro-Iranian parties, economic crises, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The perpetuation of demonstrations since October 2019 highlights the limited progress made by the Iraqi state to address protester demands. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that further progress will be made anytime soon.

While the original grievances in October 2019 centred around corruption and a lack of economic opportunities, the extensive use of violence against protesters has since made security sector reform the core demand of protests. Yet, justice for the deaths of protesters continues to be absent, magnifying the glaring lack of accountability within the Iraqi security sector. The July raid in which 14 Kataib Hezbollah members were arrested, only to be released days later after threats from the group, underscores the difficulty Prime Minister Mustafa  Al-Kadhimi has in enforcing that accountability. Therefore, though Kadhimi has repeatedly emphasised his support for the protesters and dedication to serving justice for the ‘martyrs’ of the protests, his actions (or lack thereof) suggest that these are empty promises. Protesters’ concerns will be little allayed by the reinstatement of Abdel-Wahab al-Saadi to the head of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service. That was a victory for protesters, but a pyrrhic victory when one considers the death toll of the protests and the much more far-ranging demands to improve public safety. Today, protesters continue to place improved security and justice for the 600 or so killed protesters at the top of their agenda. That this remains the case six months after taking office, combined with the continued assassinations of high-profile activists and intellectuals across the summer, shows the evident lack of progress Kadhimi has been able to make in this area.

On the economy—the original core issue of protesters demands—the picture looks even bleaker. Mass rallies began in October 2019 in Tahrir Square calling for more job opportunities and improved services. One year on, it is hard to point at anything resembling progress as Iraq’s struggle with COVID-19 has only exacerbated its pre-existing economic woes and deprived the government of the resources to combat them. This, combined with the overinflated public sector, has led to a new strain of protests, in which medical workers and employees of the Ministry of Electricity across the country are demanding the disbursement of unpaid wages. It is thus apparent that Kadhimi has even more to contend with economically now than when he entered office.

The government’s greatest success in this area could be said to be the white paper published in October 2020 containing a historical diagnosis of Iraq’s financial woes and a prescription for a way out of it—by diversifying Iraq’s economy away from its dependence on oil whilst providing economic opportunities for Iraqis. It aims to achieve this by following International Monetary Fund guidelines which require spending cuts on basic needs such as health and education, alongside the devaluation of the currency to increase exports. However, the estimated 450 articles of legislation needed to be approved for the implementation of these recommendations are highly unlikely to pass due to opposition from various political parties who were not consulted, and little political will exists to pass them anyhow. As the country continues to teeter on the edge of an economic implosion, most protesters now seem resigned to simply wait out the pandemic until Iraq sees an increase in oil revenues.

There has also been very little progress towards domestic political reform. Calls for early elections and electoral reform to tackle corruption have increased throughout 2020 as protesters seek to do away with sectarian politics. Yet, the Iraqi Parliament is beset with factional infighting along sectarian lines as members of parliament continue to advance their individual and party interests at the cost of political reform. Whilst the recently passed electoral law goes some way towards weakening the dominance of traditional parliamentary blocs by dissolving provincial constituencies into electoral districts, protesters have accused it of dividing constituencies along ethnic and sectarian lines. This has effectively worked to buttress the reviled Muhasasa system; that is, the ethno-sectarian quotas by which cabinet positions are awarded amongst Iraq’s demographics. In addition, whilst early parliamentary elections have been scheduled for June 2021, the continued understaffing of the Independent High Electoral Commission and Federal Supreme Court—necessary to manage the elections and ratify the results—calls into question the current timeline for next year’s elections.

It is thus apparent that the majority of protesters’ demands have yet to be fulfilled, and the opportunity for progress in the short-term appears bleak. However, in considering the evolution of the protest movement’s response to the changing security and economic conditions that Iraq faces, we must acknowledge the limitations which the government faces in trying to meet many of the protesters’ demands. As a caretaker prime minister predominantly intended to navigate Iraq to new elections next year, whilst facing staunch opposition from pro-Iran parties and blocs in Parliament, there is little hard progress which Kadhimi can achieve. Nevertheless, the frustrations behind the protests are deep-set and not going away anytime soon. The antipathy voiced against Kadhimi at Tahrir Square in October was a significant moment in a movement which had hitherto been hesitant to criticise a leader who wants to clamp down on the militias and make progress on security and economy. The patience of protesters is quickly running out, so it seems as though Kadhimi will have to make a better effort in co-opting the energy of the streets if he is to bolster Iraq’s security and drive meaningful change in the lives of millions of Iraqis.


Gareth Jonas is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International. He can be found tweeting about identity, ethnic conflict, and international security at @jonas_gareth.  He is a Senior Editor at Strife.

Tom Webster is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International who has conducted extensive research on the Popular Mobilization Units and their place in Iraqi state-building.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: gareth jonas, Iraq, le beck international, Protests, security, tishreen revolution, tom webster

Strife Series on Human Rights, Security, and Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific – Introduction

March 28, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Anna Tan

(Image Credit: Shannon Stapleton/Reuters)

 

Editorial 

In recent years, the world has seen a rising number of civil protests and movements globally. The eruption of the Hong Kong crisis in mid-2019, where mainstream political dialogues reached a new level of fixation on the increasingly looming authoritarian power of China that pervades well beyond its mainland territories, shook many of us. The rise of China has been overwhelmingly redefining the overall regional security of the Asia Pacific, and how that development influences the shift in the nature of international relations is undoubtedly dependent on the alliance of the Asian countries with the West, especially with the United States.

Reflecting on Müllerson’s theory on the relationship of intrastate human rights and international security[1}, it is indisputable that China under Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a very strong authoritarian state, and its overtly aggressive policies against Hong Kong’s mass civil resistance not just made headlines for an incredibly sustained period of time throughout the year, but also threatens the international stability by means of possible similar aggressions. It threatens liberal democratic values that are upheld by many free and democratic nations from across the world, especially in a time where American influence has been on a rapid decline since the assumption of the Trump administration. In the Asia Pacific, while nations such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea face new challenges in manoeuvring through the changing dynamics of international security now jeopardised by the “America first” policy of the United States, other countries such as Myanmar welcome the rising Chinese hegemony. Why and how does this happen?

This Strife Series explores the interplay between human rights and security through diplomatic exchanges in the Asia Pacific. The series analyses how in some countries, addressing human rights, democratic freedom and maintaining status quo national and/or regional security seem to be mutually exclusive at times instead of being mutually reinforcing, despite sharing the common factor of China’s domineering economic leverage.

Publications:

In the first article (12/2019) “China’s Turbulent Year: 2019”, Professor Kerry Brown analyses how China’s aggression in response to the Hong Kong protests and its draconian policies to the Uighur population in Xinjiang have both comparable ‘tit-for-tat’ elements that the Chinese leadership may not have thought through carefully, but will have detrimental consequences to the international opinion on China’s usually very cautious and deliberate efforts on maintaining its diplomatic image.

In the second article (01/2020) “China, Myanmar, War Crimes and the Issue of National Sovereignty”, Anna Tan looks at how Myanmar under Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership, has strangely shifted from being a Western ally during the landmark victories of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 elections to an even stronger adherence to China’s orbit than ever before. She describes how the Sino-Burmese relations have evolved dramatically under the light of the Rohingya conflict in Rakhine and Myanmar’s subsequent genocide trial at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The third article (03/2020) “Taiwan Elections: Continuity, Change and the Cross-Strait Conundrum”, Evita Liagka explores what the victories of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen could mean for the future of Taiwan and its cross-strait relations. She points out that the China-Hong Kong crisis came in a convenient timing for DPP’s mobilisation of garnering greater support than ever before and since the public consensus on maintaining the status quo international diplomatic status of Taiwan has remained largely unchanged, we might not see a drastic shift in DPP’s policies from its previous term. However, KMT’s recent decision to swerve away from its pro-China stances might pose newer challenges for Taiwan in the years ahead.

The final articles are contributed by Yeseul Woo, analysing North Asia’s security issues from the perspective of South Korea.

  • In Part 1 (02/2020) “South Korea’s Dangerous Silence on Human Rights Abuses in North Korea”, Yeseul Woo argues why the US lack of sponsorship in the UN Security Council meeting on the discussion of North Korea’s human rights issues should not mean that South Korea should remain silent. Ms Woo explains why, in fact, South Korea’s silence justified by the importance of the nuclear security framework would actually be counterproductive in regional security in the long run.
  • In Part 2 (03/2020) “The First Tech War? Why the Korea-Japan Tensions are about US-China Competition on AI”, Ms Woo further explains that South Korea’s silence on North Korea’s human rights issues for the sake of North Asia’s nuclear security (described in Part 1) is actually the result of the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations which has led to South Korea withdrawing from the GSOMIA pact. Though Seoul retracted its decision last minute, Ms Woo argues that the tensions between Seoul and Tokyo are less about the debate surrounding comfort women and wartime forced labour, and is actually influenced by the US-China competition on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in nuclear surveillance technology.

  1. Müllerson, R. (1997). “Human Rights Diplomacy.” Routledge.

Anna Tan is a postgraduate student for MSc Global Affairs at King’s College London. Her research is focused on how Western human rights diplomacy affects democracy and authoritarianism in Asia Pacific. She has previously worked for UNDP Myanmar and the American Red Cross, and is a member of the Programme Committee of the Conflict, Security and Development (CSD) Conference 2020 hosted by the Department of War Studies and the Department of International Development (DID). Anna holds a BSc in Neuroscience. You can follow her on Twitter: @AnnaTanGTW.

 

Filed Under: Announcement, Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Anna Tan, China, Diplomacy, East Asia, human rights, security

Insurgency Scenario in Arunachal Pradesh

February 9, 2018 by Strife Staff

By Athul Menath

 

Arunachal Pradesh, located in north east of India (Credit Image: The Tribune India)

The North Eastern states of India – often referred to as ‘the Seven Sister’ states – have been affected by insurgency in varying proportions since the 1950’s. Although the root causes of insurgencies can be traced back to India’s chaotic partition and colonial history, these violent movements arguably have been sustained due to failures of the Indian state, including a lack of transparent governance and employment opportunities, as well as the support  provided to militants by hostile neighbours .

Geography is also a big factor. Arunachal Pradesh borders Myanmar in the east, China in the north, Bhutan in the west, as well as the two insurgency affected states of Nagaland and Assam. Despite the absence of sustained high level violence or indigenous insurgency, this state has been adversely affected by armed conflicts in adjacent areas and has become the life line of militant movement in the region. According to Assam Director General of Police (DGP), Assam was facing militant threat from groups’ based out of Arunachal and Nagaland.

On February 1, Indian Security Forces (SFs) killed two militants of the independent faction of the United Liberation Front (ULFA-I) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Shankapani in Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. Only a week earlier, on January 24, 2018, an Indian Army trooper of the 11 Grenadiers regiment was killed in a joint ambush by Coordination Committee (CorCom) of Manipur and ULFA-I, at Namsai District along the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border.  This was the first SF fatality in more than a year. The last in state SF fatality was recorded in December 3, 2016 when two SFs were killed and eight wounded in Nginu village in Tirap District in a joint operation by Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), ULFA-I and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).

The highest militancy-related fatality in Arunachal was recorded in 2001 with 63 fatalities, however between 2007-17 only three years recorded more than ten insurgency related fatalities.

        Year Civilians Security Forces Terrorists Total
2000 7 3 24 34
2001 40 12 11 63
2002 7 4 21 32
2003 7 1 31 39
2004 6 2 35 43
2005 3 1 15 19
2006 0 0 4 4
2007 2 3 16 21
2008 0 0 2 2
2009 0 0 9 9
2010 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 41 41
2012 0 0 4 4
2013 0 0 4 4
2014 3 0 6 9
2015 2 4 4 10
2016 0 2 7 9
2017 0 0 6 6
2018 0 1 2 3
Total 77 33 242 352

*    Militancy fatalities between 2000-18 (Source : SATP)

Significance and Spillover Threat

Arunachal Pradesh – which spreads over 83,743 square kilometres with a population of about 1.3 million – is a logistical hub for militants from adjacent states of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. The militants use the state to cross over to the loosely governed Sagaing region of Naga Self-Administered Zone (NSAZ) in Myanmar, where at least 2,500 Indian militants are based.

The Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts of the state share 520 kilometers of the 1, 643 Kilometers long porous border with Myanmar. According to security agencies, these Districts  along with Nagaland’s Mon and Tuesang Districts have become the nerve centre of militant activity in the region. As of January 31, 2018, in the last ten years these five Districts accounted for about 313 fatalities.

 

District Civilian Security Forces Terrorists Total
Mon 6 13 110 129
Tirap 1 11 73 85
Tuesang 18 0 43 61
Changlang 5 3 26 34
Longding 0 0 4 4
Total 30 27 256 313

Fatalities from five bordering districts of India (Source* SATP)

 

The three districts of Arunachal host militant groups such as NSCN-K, a reformation faction of NSCN (NSCN-R); the ULFA-I; the Saigora faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S); and CorCom. According to a Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) report, ‘several armed modules of ULFA-I either individually or jointly with CorCom are active in several locations….in Longding, Tirap and Changlang Districts.’ The notification also adds that the Assam-Arunachal interstate boundary continues to be used as hideouts and corridors for movement by militant groups.

NSCN-K, which abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Indian Government in 2015, has been the predominant  organisation in Arunachal Pradesh. With a plethora of groups present in the region, the possibility of one militant group attempting to gain dominance in the area remains likely, which may result in a spike in factional clashes. According to an intelligence official, NSCN-IM, which currently conducts peace talks with Indian Government and is also a rival to NSCN-K, has attempted to gain dominance and destabilize NSCN-K by propping up local proxy militant groups such as the Eastern Naga National Government (ENNG).

Arunachal Pradesh Police records from 2016 indicate that there were at least 80 cases of extortion and about 103 incidents of abduction. In 2017, the number of abduction cases stood at 106 and extortion at 75. A majority of these incidents are perpetrated by militant groups as means to generate funds. Moreover, Arunachal Pradesh is located adjacent to the ‘golden triangle’, one of the primary opium producing regions in the world comprised of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. According to a 2016 report, NSCN-R has reportedly been recruiting drug addicts across the opium belt of Arunachal Pradesh to broaden its extortion racket. Apart from Longding, Tirap and Changlang, Lohit and Anjaw Districts are notorious for opium cultivation. According to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Arunachal topped the list of states in illegal poppy production for opium during 2014-15. NCB officials also claim that illegal poppy farms are guarded by armed militia who are known to work with insurgents.

 

Shift in Centre of Gravity & Future of Violence

After Sheikh Hasina became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 2014, Dhaka cracked down on Indian insurgents based in the country, resulting in militant groups relocating to Myanmar’s Sagaing region. With this development, the ‘centre of gravity’ for the insurgent movement shifted to Myanmar. Union Minister for Home Hansraj Ahir stated that between 2015 and March 31, 2017, the Indo-Myanmar border witnessed a steady rise in insurgent activities, resulting in the death of 18 security personnel and 32 insurgents, as well as the arrest of 337 militants .

Other Indian militants groups such as PLA and ULFA-I have shifted their bases to Shan State in Myanmar bordering China’s Yunnan province. Chinese intelligence has reportedly renewed relations with some militant leaders. ULFA has established links with Beijing’s proxy in Myanmar the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Additionally, Chinese intelligence officers arguably favoured the constitution of UNFLWESA, a conglomerate of various groups . In 2017, ULFA-I issued a statement against the visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh.

 

Conclusion

Although the Indian Army has been able to keep violence contained in three Districts, rampant extortion, abduction and drug production highlight the inefficiency of the policing machinery of the state. The inefficient policing apparatus could also be an indicator of a possible deficiency in human intelligence, since the police is likely to have more local level contacts as they are indigenous to the area, unlike the Army. Consequently, intelligence-based targeted operations carried out at a grass root level also suffer.

The primary causality for the drop in insurgent violence can be attributed to the security cooperation extended by Dhaka, but the Indian counter insurgency strategy can only occupy a peripheral secondary position. With Myanmar becoming the primary base of operations for insurgent groups, the Arunachal Pradesh will play a vital role in strategy of Indian insurgent groups. In light of Beijing’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the supply of weapons to insurgents makes it a geopolitical issue rather than an internal security issue. The Indian government would do well to act accordingly.

 


Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56


Image Source

Banner: here (Image Credit: File Photo – PTI)

Image 1: http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/mod-clears-key-road-along-china-after-fresh-alignment/276202.html

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: #COIN, feature, India, insurgency, security

Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

June 2, 2016 by Strife Staff

Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees
Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

Filed Under: Interview Tagged With: #COIN, Al Shabab, al-Qaeda, Brexit, Counter-Extremism, counterterrorism, Energy, Environment, Europe, extremism, feature, foreign policy, ISIL, ISIS, RUSI, Russia, security, UK, USA

Tackling Iraq’s Shia Militia Crisis

April 11, 2016 by Strife Staff

By: Peter Kirechu

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Iraqi Shia Militia Fighters Near Tikrit. Source: Al-Jazeera

Iraqi security forces are engaged in a contentious fight against a determined and effective foe in the self-styled Islamic State (also referred to as IS, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh). Iraq’s security sector, while resilient in the face of tens of thousands of jihadist militants has nonetheless required substantial external assistance from the Islamic Republic of Iran and a US-led international coalition. Heeding calls for drastic military assistance against the IS juggernaut, both external powers have expended substantial financial and technical resources in an effort to shift the battleground calculus to the government’s favor.

These external efforts, distinguished mainly by the gradual blunting of the IS’s prior momentum have nonetheless exacerbated a growing rift between the central government and various ascendant Shia militias. The fracturing of the security sector along lines of external sponsorship has since left Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the herculean task of navigating a politically volatile environment dominated by opposing US-Iranian interests, and a fledgling balance between Iraq’s internal security forces.

Iraq’s Sectarian Challenge

The problems with Iraq’s security sector are as numerous as they are complicated. Yet, between rampant corruption, extra-judicial application of lethal force, and problematic management of scarce resources, the growing use of sectarian militias remains the most urgent threat to the security sector.

Following Saddam Hussein’s removal from power, Iraq’s official security apparatus fell under the command of former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, whose tenure in office characterized him as a polarizing Shia political figure. Under Maliki’s rule the country’s sectarian crises deteriorated further as he increasingly used the state’s coercive instruments to settle political scores and secure his own political survival. This trend escalated with the official withdrawal of US forces in 2011.

However, the marginalization of the Sunni population facilitated al-Qaida in Iraq’s (AQI) return to Iraq under the banner of the Islamic State (then only known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). The group launched a ferocious insurgency against the Maliki’s government, capturing Fallujah and most of Anbar province in the Summer of 2013, and in 2014, triggered Maliki’s eventual removal from power. Maliki’s partisan rule  ended when thousands of IS fighters routed the better armed, trained and numerically superior Iraqi military and police forces. These blistering defeats also surged Islamic State ranks with millions worth of US-provisioned military hardware. IS fighters looted banks and swelled their war chests with roughly $2 billion after Mosul’s fall. Once the city was occupied the group expanded its extortion, human trafficking and oil smuggling and theft rackets earning $3 million a day.

Efforts at sectarian reconciliation by Iraq’s new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi have done little to temper sectarian tensions within Iraq’s political society. The government’s dependency on the wide constellation of dominant Shia militia groups (under the general banner of the Popular Mobilization Units, PMU) is an indication of the central government’s overall weakness. Further, these groups serve as a constant reminder to the Sunni population of its subjugation under Shia governance—a grievance commonly employed by the Islamic State in its recruitment efforts. The militias’ material and financial support from the Iranian government similarly undermines the central government’s authority and highlights Iran’s influence on Iraqi domestic affairs.

Within this volatile sectarian environment, Iraq’s new premier must foster reconciliation, not only defeat the Islamic State, but also restore sectarian harmony to ensure the overall stability of the state. This arduous task begins with the security services and its success will likely determine the prime minister’s political fortunes and those of the state writ large.

Taming the Militia Problem

Crafting effective solutions to Iraq’s security sector predicament requires an honest acceptance of Iran’s long-term influence on Iraqi security politics. However, the roles played by Iran and the US coalition need not be mutually exclusive. While Al-Abadi’s government receives aid from both the United States and Iran, the prime minister still maintains executive authority over the allocation and disbursement of military assistance. As each element of the security sector relies on the central government for resources, if the prime minister can reassert his authority over the ministries of defense and interior, the Iraqi government would gain immense leverage over the forces fighting against the Islamic State.

Financial control, if effectively leveraged, will likely serve as both the carrot and stick in the prime minister’s limited toolset when facing an unwieldy relationship between the renegade militias and the slowly improving Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Exercising such power will allow Al-Abadi to selectively reward Shia militias whose conduct is in-line with the central government’s agenda, while sidelining other rogue elements.

The Prime Minister certainly recognizes the precarious position that he currently occupies; overreliance on either the US-led coalition or Iran risks aggravating existing tensions between rival leaders within his governing party. Nonetheless, achieving the terminal goal of expelling IS militants from Iraqi territory will require that the ISF and Shia militias cooperate on the field of battle, while benefiting from continued support from the US coalition. But since Shia militias–specifically those allied with Iran–hold different equities from those of the central government, the Prime Minister requires financial leverage which may be parlayed as political capital to undermine the militias influence.

Given Iraq’s fragile economy which is currently burdened by an austerity budget, an uncertain oil revenue deal with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and globally depressed oil prices, Abadi’s government is in severe need of economic relief. The World Bank completed a  $350 million loan agreement with the Iraqi government in early July, 2014 and this agreement was swiftly followed by 1.24 billion in rapid financial assistance approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States has already commitment $623.8 million in recovery and stabilization assistance in areas liberated from IS. The collective desire of all these programs is to not only facilitate reconstruction, but also lend visibility to the central government as a stabilizing agent. These levels of financial assistance, if well executed, can produce the local effect of undermining militias in areas where they serve as surrogates of the state. Yet these measures which require long-term investment should be complemented by equal commitments to the security sector.

The first of these security-focused measures should target select elements of the Iraqi security sector that are competently functioning, despite numerous limitations. The Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) as discussed here has served as an apolitical, yet tactically and operationally competent force in the anti-IS campaign. CTS combines with the newly built 16th Army Division and the 76th Brigade to form Counterattack Brigades that have effectively routed IS fighters from Ramadi and are now pushing northwards toward Mosul and its environs.

The expansion of President Obama’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund provides the necessary equipment and training support to sustain the maturation of these forces, and others like them. A recommitment to presidential engagement between President Obama and Prime Minister Abadi (which may take the form of increasing communication between the two leaders then publicizing these interactions as detailed here) is urgently needed. Raising the level of these interactions provides a strong public image of the United States’ unwavering commitment and support of Iraq’s long-term stability.

Ultimately, the prime minister’s ability to leverage control over financial and technical support from external sponsors confers great internal power that can be used to entice cooperation amongst internal rivals. The task is not simple and requires great diplomatic skill, but if effectively applied it will likely yield favorable results.

Stronger Shia militias will certainly rebuff these efforts, but if a substantial number can be convinced to follow the central government’s lead, those operating outside the government’s mandate will likely ostracize themselves from the general population over time. For Al-Abadi’s aggressive efforts on purse control to succeed, government forces must perform exceedingly well to allay domestic concerns among Shia leaders who seek to exploit the Islamic State’s campaign to advance their independent political agendas. Creating a counterbalance to their influence ensures that all Iraqi security forces operate in a manner that preserves the unity of the state in the post-Islamic State era.

This strategy does not guarantee concessions by Iran, but it does limit Tehran’s delicate grip on the Iraqi security sector. Opposition to the prime minister’s bolder actions on financial and resource distribution vis-a-vis the security sector will continue; Iran is unlikely to relinquish its levers of influence in Iraq absent a strong deterrent from the United States. Since the US-led coalition holds influence on combat operations (as a factor of its air capabilities), the United States must firmly message its support of Al-Abadi’s efforts to limit Iranian meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Risks certainly abound and the proposals provided here require long-term US-Iraq engagement. This is perhaps the greatest handicap of the current US strategy in Iraq. The level of US commitment need not return to pre-2011 levels, but the amount of financial and technical resources currently deployed have the ability to achieve substantial progress in the long-term. Any expectations that Iranian influence in Iraqi politics will completely erode is unrealistic and unrepresentative of Iraq’s current political sphere. The technical approach presented here provides an alternative that builds Iraqi security forces, provides them with the capabilities required to confront unwieldy militias, and provides the economic benefits required for the government to slowly restore its trust within the local population.

Thousands of US-led sorties across Iraqi airspace have, with pronounced effect, limited the self-proclaimed Caliphate’s advances in Iraq. US air superiority, if strategically combined with a united ground component, featuring both mainline forces and responsible PMU militias, will likely accelerate the Islamic State’s defeat. Yet, more importantly, slowly degrading the influence of the militias on the campaign will likely aid  demobilization efforts as the ISthreat recedes and is eventually defeated. The prime minister’s ability to control the influence of Shia militia’s within the security services will ultimately determine the future stability of Iraq.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. @PeterKirechu

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Demobilisation, Iraq, ISIS, security, Shia Militarisation

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