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Troubles Ahead: Will Brexit See a Return of The Troubles in Northern Ireland?

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by Gideon Jones

Forensic experts examining the remains of a car bomb detonated by the New IRA in front of the courthouse in Derry, January 2019 (Image credit: Justin Kernoghan)

Though the Northern Ireland of today is a vastly different place than it was when the Troubles began in 1968, it would be a mistake to assume that those original divisions have completely healed. Despite boasting one of the lowest murder rates in Western Europe, the divisions that led to the conflict are still present, with both the Protestant and Catholic communities still living largely separated from one another, without a strong shared identity to unite them and with the Loyalist and Republican labels remaining salient. Brexit, however, is now threatening to lay bare this sectarian division like no other event ever has. Unfortunately, many are now asking themselves whether the UK leaving the European Union (EU), especially without a deal, will see the return of terrorism in Northern Ireland.

The question of Northern Ireland, and by extension its border with the Republic of Ireland, held only a minor position in the  Brexit referendum discourse, some campaigners even denied the very existence of the issue. Regardless, the border has remained a thorn in the side of successive British Prime Ministers. The main concern has been with the economic arrangements that need to be put in place once the UK leaves the EU. What makes this an even more contentious issue in Northern Ireland is that eighty five percent of Catholics voted to remain, whilst sixty percent of Protestants voted to leave. This split along religious lines is concerning to say the least. Britain’s membership in the EU allowed an invisible border to exist between North and South, allowing communities on both sides to remain in close contact, as well as unhindered passage of goods and people. This was a settlement that most in Northern Ireland were happy to keep in place, but Brexit will be seen by many in the Catholic (as well as forty percent of the Protestant) community as being imposed on them by the British against their will.

The prospect of a united Ireland is still an ideal that holds a great deal of weight in the Catholic community, and many persist in rejecting the legitimacy of Westminster (with Sinn Fein still declining to take their seats).  Perception matters, and Brexit looks to a great deal of Catholics like a political project of a distant power, meddling in their lives with little to no concern for their needs, or even their consent. If a border and custom checkpoints were to be created through a no-deal scenario, the resentment it would cause amongst Catholics can hardly be understated. Indeed, they would likely become useful recruiting tools for Dissident Republicans, as well as a targets for terrorist attacks.

The threat posed by terrorist and paramilitary groups remains a very real one. Though the Provisional IRA loyalist paramilitaries like the UVF and are unlikely to mount any campaign of violence similar in scale to that of The Troubles, according to a 2015 governmental report, all the main paramilitary groups are still in existence and remain a potential national security threat . The main Republican and Loyalist groups remain committed to achieving their political aims through peaceful means. In contrast, Dissident Republicans continue to carry out an armed campaign to end what they see as British imperialism on the island of Ireland. Dissident Republicans, those republicans who rejected the Good Friday Agreement,  are still actively opposing the peace through groups like the New IRA, and have been responsible for several attacks in Northern Ireland, as well as the death of the journalist Lyra McKee. There is a good reason to believe that groups like the New IRA will attempt to capitalise on Brexit and the discontent that it will cause, and may use it as a way to draw many young and disaffected Catholics into their ranks, carrying out further attacks across Northern Ireland.

There is no doubt that Dissident groups would have attempted to carry out attacks with or without Brexit. In fact, it could be argued that Brexit has simply brought into sharp focus the violence they have been carrying out in Northern Ireland for years. The real danger, however, is that Brexit can provide them an opportunity to get back into the spotlight, and to once again legitimise violence as a way of achieving political aims.  Brian Kenna, the chairman of Saoradh, a small republican party in Northern Ireland thought to be the political arm of the New IRA,  claimed that:

“Brexit is a huge opportunity. It’s not the reason why people would resist British rule but Brexit just gives it focus, gives it a physical picture. It’s a huge help.”

 Dissident Republicans will see Brexit, and especially a no-deal, as an opportunity too good to resist passing up – there is a very real chance that they will seek to exploit underlying resentments and take violent action. Though they may receive a bump in support and could feel emboldened by the political landscape, it remains unlikely that we are witnessing the return of The Troubles.

Whilst Northern Ireland’s political landscape may be going through a shift due to Brexit, it is not yet a forgone conclusion that people will give up on democratic means of achieving their political goals. In fact, many non-violent supporters of a united Ireland are feeling more confident of achieving it after Brexit, and believe that, in time, unification will be won through the ballot box.

It is not without some irony that as Northern Ireland approaches its centenary, there is a strong chance that it will have a Catholic majority. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this will automatically translate into majority support for a united Ireland. Being Catholic no longer equates to being a nationalist, nor does being Protestant mean you are a unionist, with recent polling showing that people are feeling less bound by tribal loyalty and are increasingly neutral on Northern Ireland’s union with the UK. This though does mean that Northern Ireland is no longer the Protestant state for a Protestant people as it was originally envisioned to be – and the state’s ties to Britain will more likely be decided on pragmatism rather than a deep cultural or religious affinity. Republicans are given to feeling that time is on their side, and Brexit may have just sped up the process of reunification. There is moreover a deep feeling within both Protestant and Catholic communities that reunification with Ireland is more a matter of ‘when’, rather than ‘if’, as support for a united Ireland goes up, but also due to a feeling among Unionists that the British people increasingly no longer care if they stay or go.

So, will Brexit bring about a return to the Troubles in Northern Ireland? Dissidents will undoubtedly use it as an opportunity to carry out attacks and increase their own levels of support.

But a return to the Troubles? This is possible, yet highly unlikely. Politics is thankfully still seen as the arena to advance one’s goals, and the ballot box is still seen as more powerful than the bomb.

Gideon Jones is a MA student in Terrorism, Security & Society at the War Studies Department, King’s College London, and completed his BA in History at the University of Warwick.

Coming from Northern Ireland, he has been brought up in a country scarred by the issues of terrorism, conflict, sectarianism, and extremist ideology. Through this experience, he has been given valuable insight into how the legacies of such problems can continue to divide a society decades after the fighting has stopped, and how the issues left unresolved can threaten to upend a fragile peace.

Gideon is a Staff Writer at Strife.

Feature – Et Tu Cod? Reliving Fishy Fantasies

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by William Reynolds

 

“Everybody would just love to see one of them sunk…that’s what we’re here for! Sink the bloody things!”

– Royal Navy crewman interviewed on HMS Bacchante (1975)

“Gunboats? Threatening the civilian citizens of NATO ally over fish? Have you lost your fucking minds?”

–Victoria Freeman, Twitter (2020)

Introduction

Although separated by 45 years and vast differences of opinion, the two statements above accurately reflect what can only be described as a clash of competing fantasies currently taking place on social media. A recent article in The Guardian highlighting the readied usage of four Royal Navy vessels to patrol British waters in the case of a No Deal between the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK), and its comparison to the Cod Wars, has proliferated commentary on the case of fish and how best to manage them.

Immediately after The Guardian’s publication, a number of well-respected academics and practitioners waded into the debate. Sir Lawrence Freedman, also alluding to the comparison made, reminded us that Britain ‘lost’ all three of the Anglo-Icelandic fishery disputes, coined the Cod Wars (1958-61, 1972-73 and 1975-76). Elisabeth Braw couched the news in deterrence terms, referring to it sounding “like a parody”. By contrast, the various jingoistic calls for force through attacking retweets of MP and Chair of the Defence Select Committee Tobias Ellwood’s exasperation very much mirrored Brexit MEP Robert Rowland, who in 2019 called for any foreign fishing vessel in British waters be “given the same treatment as the Belgrano!”

In reality, and perhaps a consequence of the lack of nuance on social media, both ‘sides’ support arguments that can only be described as simplistic in the extreme. First, and foremost, the Cod Wars are not an appropriate comparison for the current situation around UK waters, and The Guardian article has much blame to shoulder for alluding to the connection. Whilst the operational, day-to-day activities that took place during the successive ‘wars’ may offer some insights into the UK-EU tensions, strategically both cases are in very different places. Secondly, the narrative regarding the ship deployments itself is false. Rather than being seen as deployment in response to the tensions, the Fishery Protection Squadron should instead be seen for what it really is, an expansion of already conducted duties by default.

The Cod Wars – A ‘storm in a teacup’

As seen from the commentary on social media, the Cod Wars have clearly captured the imagination of the British public in lieu of raising tensions vis-à-vis fishing around the UK and a Brexit Deal. It is somewhat fitting that the term ‘Cod Wars’ was in fact coined by Fleet Street in September 1958. As yet again, it is the British media who is raising its ghost for today’s issue. However, the comparison is deeply flawed. If one had to identify the core elements of the three Cod Wars, themselves individually distinct in character, it would be the asymmetry of commitment between Iceland and Britain and the political environment, both international and domestic, that these conflicts occupied.

Asymmetry of commitment played a huge role in the dynamics and eventual outcomes of the three Cod Wars. The already struggling British trawling industries of the mid-1950s, and by extension the communities in Hull and Grimsby, were heavily reliant on the fisheries within fifty nautical miles of Iceland, with such an extension reported in 1971 by the Under-Secretary to the FCO Anthony Royle as likely to lead to a decrease in catches by forty to sixty per cent. Whilst the First Cod War’s (1958-61) extension to twelve nautical miles from four was worrying, it was the Second War (1972-3), and the fifty mile extension, which really started to hurt the industry. By the Third Cod War (1975-76) it was understood that a 200 nautical mile limit, which was the planned final extension by Iceland, would kill the industry altogether.

HMS Mermaid ‘Riding Off’ ICGV Baldur during the Third Cod War (Image Credit: Caledonian Maritime Research Trust)

However, the British fishing community as a whole only contributed to around one per cent of the entire British economy during the period of the Cod Wars. By 1956 the trawling industry was no longer profitable to the British state, Britain did not fear damage to the British economy as a whole, rather localised mass unemployment, which was still a fair concern. Thus, preventing the communities from automatically going on social welfare benefits (the Dole) by default was the key objective of the British state. In contrast, the fishing industry was viewed as a real existential issue for the Icelanders. Around 89% of Iceland’s export involved the industry, and there were very real fears that overfishing would see this collapse. Nor was this fear unfounded, when herring suddenly disappeared from Icelandic waters in the mid-60s, it led to a drop in real per capita income by sixteen per cent. It was with no embellishment that a Panorama team based in Iceland (1972) stated: “Icelanders are haunted by the fear that one day the fish will no longer be there.”

This asymmetry of commitment permeated all the actions taken by both states, particularly in domestic politics. In essence, whilst the British government was more beholden to its fishing communities, rather than the wider public, the Icelandic government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the entire public was founded on extending its limits and holding them.

The Icelandic population, around 200,000 in 1956 (and smaller than the 300,000 of Hull) supported five viable political parties and five newspapers. Thus, when the Cod Wars ignited, this politically engaged population was like the fuel for a lighted match. Quite quickly, nationalist rhetoric portrayed Iceland as the plucky ex-colony fighting the colonialist power, with each of the conflicts later compared to the Battle of Britain in terms of their cultural significance vis-à-vis a ‘national struggle’. This nationalist sentiment quickly spiralled out of control for Iceland’s Politicians. In 1958, when the British side reached a compromise in Paris, the Icelandic Foreign Minister stated [N]o Icelander will even consider a further discussion about settlement…”. This led the Icelandic representative at Paris to grumble that “everyone in Reykjavik has gone stark staring mad.” Indeed, such domestic pressures would be prevalent throughout each conflict. In 1975 Prime Minister Hallgrimsson felt compelled to deploy the Coast Guard due to domestic ire, despite favouring a negotiated settlement.

Heath and the stubborn cod, from Stuttgater Zeitung, reprinted in Þjóðviljinn newspaper, 30 May 1973 (Image Credit: Herring and Class Struggle)

By contrast, while the British government was often compelled by the British trawling community to deploy ships, the government ultimately held on to control. This was highlighted by the three successive de-escalatory measures, one for each conflict, which, in essence, capitulated to the Icelanders. As the conflicts escalated, successive British governments ultimately decided the fight was not worth the cost, both politically and economically. After all, the wider British public was rather apathetic to each conflict, and economically, that 1%, was a drop in the water. Perhaps the best example of the British government’s ultimate control, despite domestic pressure, was that Tony Crossland, the Foreign Secretary who hashed out the final Cod War agreement, was the MP for Grimsby!

Send in the gunboats! False comparisons invoked by Brexit

Therefore, the driving forces behind the three Cod Wars hold little water when it comes to comparisons with the fishing disputes between Britain and the EU. Without even touching upon the wider political factors such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Cold War, it is clear that Britain and Iceland were playing with cards, and for a prize, of considerable difference to Britain and the EU in the modern day. Basically, the actors, the geography, the time and space, are all different today.

Chiefly, Britain is now interacting with waters that, even as a member of the EU, are legally its responsibility. Concepts of 12, 24 and 200 nautical miles, as enshrined under the United Nations Convention for the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS), were still under intellectual development during the three Cod Wars. Today, they are foundational. This change automatically places the UK on a more even footing when it comes to levels of commitment present in order to achieve a favourable UK outcome. Whereas the conflicts with Iceland were ultimately some 1,600km away from London, these waters are figuratively, and legally, Britain’s ‘back yard’. As a result, Boris Johnson’s government has to consider a playing field, with its advantages and disadvantages, which are radically different to his predecessors of Harold Macmillan’s, Harold Wilson’s, Ted Heath’s and Jim Callaghan’s, former PMs at the time of the Cod Wars. One could even suggest the British playing field looks far closer to what Iceland would have seen back in the day. This is not to say the various European states do not have equal concerns, after all, the waters are equally important to them. But in this case, the Britain-Iceland asymmetry in concerns and distance is no longer present, making the comparison poor.

Secondly, whereas the Cod Wars required a ‘deployment’ of naval vessels to far waters, what follows after 1 January 2021 if no deal occurs would, in fact, be an extension by de facto. River class naval vessels who, alongside their forbearers, have been doing Fishery Protection since 1586, and includes medical and technical support for fishermen, search and rescue and liaison with other constabulary forces. Fundamentally, the four River-1 class patrol vessels are doing the exact same job as the Japanese Coast Guard, French Maritime Gendarme and Icelandic Coast Guard, with similar vessels in terms of weaponry and tonnage to boot! British vessels may be naval, but that is a quirk of history rather than a conscious decision.

Collection of similar Patrol Vessels, from left clockwise: HMS Tyne, FS Champlain, ICGV Thor and the JCG Yonakuni (Image Credits: Seaforces.org, NavyRecognition.com, Baird Maritime and J-Hangar.com)

Thus, it is wrong to say that these vessels are being deployed, when in actuality they are already present. Rather, if the waters revert to purely UK jurisdiction after the end of January 2021, their existing commitments will simply expand by de facto. This is not an aggressive deployment of gunboats, ready to ride off French Gendarme and ‘torpedo’ French fishing vessels, it is an expansion of commitment in line with Britain’s responsibility to conduct effective Maritime Governance, including not just Law and Order, but combatting pollution and search & rescue operations. For the UK to not do this would be an abdication of its responsibilities under UNCLOS.

Conclusion

Whilst there are many more factors and arguments that could be drawn upon to highlight the false mindset of comparing the current disputes with the Cod War, it is clear that the core elements of the three Cod Wars, asymmetry of commitment and political environment, are rather different to that of today.

Moreover, not only are the elements different, but the more tangible structural causes are equally different in flavour. This is not a deployment to waters over 1600km away, nor is the UK legally in a more nebulous environment. Furthermore, no deployments are necessitated, as the Fishery Protection Squadron has been in place in these waters since at least the 16th century.

This may all seem pedantic, but as highlighted by the Icelanders, rhetoric matters. If framing it in terms of the Cod Wars, we risk not only underestimating Britain’s natural position but additionally polarising the British population further, as both more nationalist ‘Brexiteer’ sentiments and false fantasies from the opposing, predominantly ‘Remainer’ sider entrench further and clash in increasingly heated discussions. If one lesson can be learned from all this, it is perhaps a more nuanced understanding of the historical case studies that are being used. Just as Brexit is not a rehash of the Second World War, the fishing dispute is not a repeat of the Cod one.

William Reynolds is a Leverhulme Scholar Doctoral Candidate with the Centre of Grand Strategy and Laughton Unit in the War Studies Department, Kings College London. Graduating with a Bachelor’s in War Studies, and Master’s in National Security Studies from the same department, William’s interests have evolved from military history to maritime security and grand strategy, particularly regarding Britain and the Indo-Pacific area. William’s research focuses on British and Japanese interactions in the grand strategic space post-1945. Over the years, William has conducted work with the King’s Japan Programme regarding maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region, with a particular focus on the maritime arena as a domain for interstate interactions. This has included United States Navy carrier and amphibious group deployments, Royal Navy deployments in the region from 1998 and, more recently, Chinese and Japanese Coast Guard procurement, history and interactions in the East China Sea. Outside of University, he has worked as a research analyst for an IED threat mitigation company, with a focus on Europe and Syria. You can follow him on Twitter @war_student.

Does the History of Britain’s Relationship with Europe mean that Brexit was Inevitable?

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by Ryan Chan

The European flag, a contentious issue in Brexiting Britain (Image credit: Flickr)

 

In most analyses regarding the 2016 Referendum, Britain’s legacy of Exceptionalism and Empire is commonly cited as a crucial reason for the 2016 Referendum by critics and proponents alike. Yet this article will problematise the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable as it dismisses crucial explanations on the historical development of British Euroscepticism and marginalises the plethora of reasons as to why ordinary Britons voted as they did in the referendum.

The French saying ‘l’Angleterre est insulaire’ summarises the idea that Britain is an ‘island nation’, geographically and geopolitically detached from Europe, able to choose between the ‘continent or the open seas’. In his veto against British membership in what was then the European Economic Community, Charles de Gaulle asserted in 1963 that Britain is unfit to join: “She is unlike other European countries […] linked by her markets […] to the most diverse and farthest-flung nations.’ This view of an ‘insular Britain’ was not limited to De Gaulle’s time: Stephen George’s An Awkward Partner, for instance, argues that Britain had always preferred a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and given Britain’s legacy of empire and ‘rehearsal of historical anti-French and German attitudes,’ it led to a ‘disdainful’ relationship between Britain and the EU, seeking for a ‘looser relationship based on free-trade’ rather than a political union.

Critically, the idea of Britain as an ‘island nation’ was a phenomenon that preceded a united Europe or the existence of Great Britain. After the loss of her French possessions following the Hundred Years War, Britain (then England) was more concerned with empire-building overseas rather than within Europe unlike the continental European powers. When Britain did engage with Europe however, her role as a ‘balancer’ coerced her into ‘difficult relationships’ and rivalries with most of her neighbours. Allusions to this history were prevalent in the rhetoric of the Leave Campaign. Many referenced the re-establishing of a Britain formulated on the ‘island nation’ concept: a Britain that once ruled the waves and through its Parliament opposed the evil continental European powers. For Eurosceptics, the EU is a German-led ‘fourth Reich’ and Brexit is a return to ‘global Britain’ and British sovereignty.

Over the centuries, there was little change to what ‘Britain’ was, and as a consequence, Britain placed less importance on being ‘European’ than her counterparts on the continent who experienced devastation from war and tyrannical rule. However, one does not need to look too far into British history in order to substantiate De Gaulle’s view. The inevitability of Brexit is also reflected in how Britain ‘tumbled’ into the European Community in 1973. Unlike founding members of the Community (like France, Germany and the Benelux Countries) who stress the importance of the European Union as a ‘historic success’ that brought a lasting peace to a region embroiled in centuries of conflict, Britain entered the Community during a decade of economic turmoil and the decline of empire, keen to re-establish her influence within Europe: She viewed the Community (and Europe) in economic, transactional and intergovernmental terms. Because of this history, Britain was a peripheral member within the Union, unwilling to compromise on sovereignty, strongly detested integration initiatives and only desired access to the single market. Britain’s historical legacy therefore does De Gaulle’s claim justice: Britain never belonged in Europe – she sought to redefine the Union in her own terms and was therefore first and foremost incompatible with EU values. Along with staggeringly low participation rates in European Elections, the decision to leave in 2016 seemed inevitable.

Yet, if Britain was too ‘insular’ and did not belong in the European Union, surely the decision to join the Community in 1973, the ratification of Maastricht in 1992 which founded a politically united Europe, or British support for EU expansion in the early 2000s would logically not have occurred? Could these instances dispute the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable? Such a claim overlooks Britain’s ‘Europhilic’ history, as Tim Oliver and Daddow highlight, Britain championed many European causes such as advocating for EU enlargement to central European states and was closer to EU policy decisions than generally ‘pro-European’ states like France, Holland or Ireland.

But what changed by 2016? It is important to acknowledge that British Euroscepticism was not given by virtue of history, but a ‘development’ against a perceived encroachment on British sovereignty and can be clearly demonstrated through Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s legacy. In her Bruges Speech of 1988, although she questioned the direction of European integration, she clearly states that ‘Britain’s future is in Europe’ and campaigned for Community policy reforms. This tone is unrecognisable after the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. In response to the prospects of a monetary union, Thatcher declared in 1992 that she could not support the ratification of Maastricht as it ‘conflicted with British democratic institutions and the accountability of Parliament’. British Euroscepticism was a development against an increasingly integrated Europe, as it was no longer, as Thatcher stated, in Britain’s interest to remain in a ‘federal Europe.’

Indeed, many Britons felt so as well – subsequent European policies that pushed Britain into a direction without the consent of the British electorate did much to exacerbate public opinion about Integration. A prominent case would be Prime Minister Blair’s premature push for free movement expansion to ‘A8’ EU countries in 2004, compromising support for core EU values. This would have serious repercussions in the following decade, where areas in which immigration drastically increased between 2001 and 2014 would experience a ‘94% chance of voting leave.’ These considerations therefore compromise the claim that the Referendum’s outcome was inevitable by virtue of history: the vote to leave was instead dealing with recent developments in European Integration, rather than premises of nationalistic nostalgia.

Yet, if we are to discern the core reasons for the vote to leave, we must acknowledge one fundamental truth: the ‘identity of Britain’ in relation to Europe is socially constructed and decided by the British people. Given that the vote to leave won by a mere margin of four percent and not a unanimous consensus, it is inaccurate to claim that ‘Leave’ was a product of historical nostalgia and a rejection of Integration. While some may have voted on grounds of nostalgia, it is equally probable that there are those who have voted for mundane reasons, such as immigration or political detachment from Brussels. It is also probable that many voted on pro-European issues, where some, although not a majority, voted on the premise of a shared ‘European Identity’. How British people perceive the Union could change within the near future, potentially altering the result of another Referendum as evidenced by the ever-changing opinions of Brexit polls, thus rendering the Brexit vote anything but historically inevitable or a universally shared sentiment.

Crucially, the vote to leave was not determined by Britain’s historical relationship with Europe, but more so by the attitudes of ordinary Britons towards the European Project which could significantly change in the near future given that the ‘remain’ vote was heavily concentrated among younger generations. Although it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, European policymakers cannot ignore that increasing retaliation against the process/direction of integration that won the vote to leave. This is an issue not exclusive to Britain, but also elsewhere in Europe like France, where the perceived loss of ‘sovereignty’ has given credence to Hard-Eurosceptic parties. Perhaps Macron’s proposal of a European Renaissance to stress the importance of Europeanism, or the creation of a European Constitution and greater representation of National Parliaments within the EU may be necessary solutions in order to quell sentiments of Euroscepticism or prevent future ‘exits’. These solutions to the problems of the EU can only be appreciated if it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, but a reaction.

Ryan Chan is a third year History and International Relations student at King’s College London and an opinion writer at King’s College London’s award-winning tabloid Roar News. He is interested in Modern 20th Century World History, particularly the Global Cold War, European Integration and Communist Chinese history. This article is the first of two winning essays of a writing competition jointly organised by the convenors of the module “Contemporary Issues in International History” and the Strife Blog.

Event Review — The Future of UK Grand Strategy

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By Harrison Brewer

4 January 2019

Georgina Wright, Cllr. Peymana Assad, and Dr. Charlie Laderman spoke at a Strife-PS21 event, which was moderated by Peter Apps (left to right). (Image credit: Kayla Goodson)

 

Strife and PS21 joined forces to present a fascinating panel discussion on the future of the UK’s grand strategy. We live in an uncertain world that gets more uncertain by the minute, as the United Kingdom flails around Brexit, Trump’s America turns away from Europe, and Europe looks to redefine what it means to be in the Union. All the meanwhile, the UK avoids the aging imperialist elephant in the room: who are we, what are we doing, and how can we do it? PS21 brought in an expert, an academic, and a practitioner to help disentangle the UK’s approach to grand strategy in the 21st Century.

Dr. Charlie Laderman, a lecturer in International History at King’s College London, first explained his definition of grand strategy, believing it to be the intellectual architecture that forms foreign policy. It is a historically British concept — although Dr. Laderman questioned whether Britain ever got it right — and is predicated on balancing peacetime goals with war and using limited resources to achieve a state’s goals. Dr. Laderman suggested that British foreign policy experts have a ‘maddening pragmatism’ that is borne out of Britain’s historical pole position in global politics but argued that it is imperative for the UK to break out of this mould and to reassess.

The UK has long been perceived as the facilitator and bridge between the US and Europe, but this relationship is at risk. Trump’s de-Europeanisation policy and Merkel’s and Macron’s attempts at firming the bonds of European fraternity leave the UK out of the loop post-Brexit; therefore, Dr. Laderman believes the UK must engage in the business of trade-offs. Britain must consider how it can use its limited yet still formidable capabilities in defenCe, soft power, and international development to continue to be a reliable partner, as well as a global player. Lastly, Dr. Laderman noted that the UK needs a stable EU in order to thrive. Therefore, despite leaving the union, the UK must look to fortify it relationships with EU states and support the EU as best as it can.

Cllr Peymana Assad, a defence and international development expert, as well as a local councillor in the London Borough of Harrow, discussed how the UK must address its relationship with its imperialist and colonialist past to improve its foreign policy. Assad underlined the need for the UK to champion equality in its foreign policy, acknowledging that the UK could use soft power to correct some of its mistakes made under colonialism. Assad referenced her work in Afghanistan and recalled a conversation she had with Afghan tribal leaders about the Durand Line, the internationally accepted border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan people were absent in this international decision-making process, she noted, which showed a disregard for the people directly affected by this decision. She argued that the UK’s grand strategy needs to be founded on principles of equality for all actors, both international and local, and it needs to address Britain’s imperial history and the suffering it caused.

To summarise, she stated the focus should be on the following points:

1) The key to establishing ourselves in the world is seeing all as equals. In order to do this, we must understand the real impact of colonisation and imperialism on the countries we left behind, and we must understand how some of those actions of the past haunt us today.

2) The UK needs to consider and seek opportunities with non-western powers like China and India, but also continue to facilitate between European and other allies, such as the United States — it’s too important not to do both. We should not solely focus on Europe.

3) Britain must use its soft power and understand that the world has changed; we can command more influence through art, culture and education by way of exchange and scholarships. India currently leads through music, film and education, for example in the South Asian region.

Finally, Assad stated that in order to achieve this, we need to bring the British public with us, on the ride and convince them, that engaging with Europe and the non-western world, brings us benefits and also stops us being swallowed up in a world of constant changing super powers.

Georgina Wright, a research associate in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, began by stating that British foreign policy must be separate from the Brexit process. Britain has a privileged position in global affairs — it is both one of the leaders in official development assistance and a strong partner of both the US and the EU — and the UK should not forgo this position as a consequence of Brexit. Rather than turning further inwards, the UK should take the opportunity to engage more meaningfully and extensively with its allies. This change, however, must be managed carefully and swiftly to prove the UK’s commitment to the international community.

Wright outlined three risks the country faces post-Brexit: a more inward-looking Britain that is fully consumed by Brexit; incoherent external policy that is driven commercially rather than politically; and a failure to grapple with the changing international context, evidenced by the rise of China and Russia, as well as rising levels of inequality and popular insurgency.  Wright then proposed five areas the foreign office should focus on to form its foreign policy. First, the foreign office needs to clearly articulate the vision for Global Britain. Second, the UK must figure out how to do more with less and avoid commitment without impact. Third, without the stage of European Union politics for alliance building, the UK must prioritise how it uses the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and where. Fourth, the government must mobilise the entire British population, not just London, behind any grand strategy to ensure its success. Finally, the foreign office needs to be consistent. Wright ended by pointing out that Brexit will only become more intense with trade negotiations on the horizon and a plethora of actors and interests that will need to be balanced at home and abroad. Above all, the UK needs to ensure that it builds a strong, deep partnership with the EU despite its departure.

Editor’s note: This event review was also published by PS21. 

Harrison Brewer is pursuing an MA in Conflict, Security, and Development. He recently graduated from McGill University in Montréal, Canada with a degree in Classics, Political Science, and Art History. Harrison has previously worked for Deverell Associates, a security consultancy firm in London, specialising in crisis preparedness and leadership training. He is now working for Boxspring Media, a tech-driven learning disruptor for corporate firms. Harrison’s interests include strategic analyses of paramilitary violence in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on gendered violence, insurgency patterns, and conflict simulation. Harrison has designed and produced a simulation modelling the urban warfare of the Iraqi Army’s campaign for Mosul in 2016-2017 that is being developed for commercial use. You can follow Harrison on twitter at @_HarrisonBrewer.

Feature — Beyond the Strife and Rhetoric: Have the lights gone out for Theresa May’s Brexit Deal?

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By Amber Boothe and Tasneem Ghazi

30 November 2018

Anti-Brexit groups protested the draft Brexit deal agreement outside the Houses of Parliament. (Image credit: AFP/Getty)

 

The Shock of a Finalised Deal

On the 14th November, in a moment of triumphant relief, Prime Minister Theresa May announced that the cabinet and the European Council had finally agreed to a ‘realistic Brexit Deal’. In her somber and resolute speech, May emphasised the primacy of such a deal to Britain’s national interests. Whilst this deal is dense and lengthy (some 585 pages), it may have been a victory for May — had it not been undermined by fellow Tories, beginning with her former ally, ex-Brexit secretary Dominic Raab. Raab’s damning statement following his resignation painted the deal as a pro-European attempt at appeasement. Likewise, rumour has it that Eurosceptic Conservative rebellion is amassing its ranks, as five cabinet colleagues, including Michael Gove and Andrea Leadsom, announced their commitment to changing the Prime Minister’s mind. Yet, it is worth considering the implications of this long-sought agreement, for inter-party strife may butcher Britain’s last chance before a ‘No-Deal’.

A Reality Check on Britain’s Bargaining Power

Following the deal’s vilification by Brexiteers, German Chancellor Angela Merkel steadfastly announced Britain will not receive a better — or even another — deal from the European Council. This damning fact of the matter ought to ground the British public’s expectations. For the surge of nationalism — from both the left and right — in the UK is to blame for the 2016 referendum’s outcome. Brexit is and has always been a non-partisan matter of extremes. When examining this deal then, one must consider not just its contents; but the implications of its failure; as well as Labour’s divided state and, crucially, Jeremy Corbyn’s stringent position of Pro-leave and Anti-People’s vote.

 The Terms of the Brexit Agreement

The deal’s two major weaknesses are, first, that the British taxpayer must pay a ‘divorce’ fee, estimated to be between £35-39 billion to cover existing financial obligations; and second, that Britain must abide by the majority of EU law during the transition period whereby both parties hope to secure a trade deal.

The agreement is, however, not without merit. First, the skillful concessions made in Protocol 1 pertaining to the Northern Irish backstop is a minor victory. The very phrasing of the article solves the issue of a ‘hard border’, while respecting the integrity of the Good Friday agreement and the Irish Republic’s sovereignty.

The deal also grants Britain the flexibility and time (until 2020) to negotiate a separate trade deal with the European Union.  Under this arrangement, Britain is granted free trade cooperation with the EU on goods, as well as a zero tariffs quota and the ability to strike other trade deals with other British partners. Short of remaining within the single market and the ‘Norway option, (rejected by Brexiteers), this is the best alternative Britain has.

Last— but most importantly for Brexiteers —  the deal ends Britain’s adherence to the European system of ‘Free Movement’ and long-vilified system of immigration. Appeasing the primary complaint of those who voted ‘Leave’, Britain may then transition to another, individual highly specialised, skill-based immigration system. In short, May’s Brexit deal is a flexible trade arrangement that allows Britain to pay its way through Brexit and abandon its most contentious commitment to the EU: Freedom of Movement. Put simply, it will deliver what many Brexiteers rallied for without wrecking a future relationship with the EU.

Yet, even though this draft agreement was unilaterally approved by EU27 as swiftly as 25th November, its future cannot be predicted without the arithmetic of parliamentary votes.

The Turbulent Passage of the Deal

The turning point now is the deal’s passage through parliament. Until it receives a simple majority, it is neither legally nor politically binding. Whether or not May will be able to obtain the necessary votes is uncertain. To secure Parliamentary backing, May needs 320 votes (discounting Sein Fein’s abstentionists, the Speaker and his deputies). Losing the Conservative Parliamentary majority in 2017 left May short of her majority. But in theory, the ‘confidence and supply’ deal with the Democratic Unionist Party should give her a 13-vote lead.

Nevertheless, recent events tell another story. In light of Arlene Foster’s fiery denunciation of the agreement and the DUP’s abstention from voting on the budget, many argue that the DUP will revolt.  But this assumption greatly overstates the DUP’s autonomy. The DUP has entered into billion-pound investment with the Conservatives that has afforded them more power than ever before. Bearing this in mind, it would be unlikely for the DUP to risk their future by standing against May’s proposal; thus, an abstention on their part is (realistically) the worst case possible.

These calculations indicate May might have a theoretical majority. But, unfortunately for the Prime Minister, strife within the Tory party risks crippling her deal. Realistically, around 80 hardline Tory Brexiteer are liable to vote against the party line. Add this figure to the eight or so Remainers in her party, May could have a deficit of nearly 90 votes. According to this, one could easily presume this deal shall not make it through Parliament.

However, another caveat remains forgotten: votes in the Conservative camp are half the story.

Labour: A Crippled Camp

The focus has been on whether May can obtain enough votes, and most calculations assume that the opposition will be united against the deal. In reality though, Labour’s poor choice of leader has left the party divided and ineffectual. Whilst some hope that calling a general election will be the opportunity Labour needs to take control, deep cracks exist within the party. ‘We can’t stop Brexit,’ said Corbyn. ‘We can stop Brexit,’ countered Sir Keir Starmer, the party’s Brexit spokesman. On one hand, polls suggest that 49 percent of the country are in favour of a public vote, but Corbyn maintains that a second referendum is ‘not an option for today’.  Ironically, Corbyn’s refusal to back a People’s Vote has undermined Starmer’s meaningful efforts to ensure that ‘we will vote down a blind Brexit‘. This ongoing inter-party strife prevents Labour from unifying into a force to be reckoned with.

Considering the conflict within the opposition, one may wonder how Corbyn will ensure that abstentions in the Labour party don’t make up the votes Mays lacking. One cannot and must not forget that if Labour were to come into power (unless there is a change in leadership), reversing Brexit would not be an option. Beyond Corbyn’s Euroscepticism, many Labour Remainers represent constituencies that voted Leave and would be unlikely to vote against a deal.

A recent Opinium poll  found that Leave voters are defecting from the Conservative party, evidenced by a drop-in points by 10 to 49 percent of the proportion of Leavers backing the Tories. Meanwhile, Labour has seen a 4-point increase to 24 percent. A further 22 percent of Labour supporters felt the party should back the deal. This tension between the will of the people and the widespread hostility towards May’s deal crucially incentivises neutrality on the part of Labour MPs. As diverging opinions fracture the political landscape, it is in their best interest not to pick a side. So widespread abstentions could be a reality that would benefit the Government.

Predicting the Deal’s Parliamentary Passage

Doing the arithmetic demonstrates that this agreement might survive, albeit narrowly. The question then ought to be why this agreement should survive. It is hardly an ‘easy Brexit’. Although it negates Britain’s unpopular obligation to ‘free movement’, it is inevitably shaped by the EU’s interests, particularly because of Britain’s lack of bargaining power. The European Council will not, for its own sake, give Britain another deal. If it did, Britain would be setting a precedent for rising right-wing parties in Europe to painlessly withdraw their membership of the European Union. [1]

Thus, a ‘No-Deal’ is Britain’s most likely alternative.  Labour, under Corbyn, has refused otherwise. While a second referendum with the outcome of ‘Remain’, would undoubtedly be a better option for Britain, the likelihood of this is very uncertain. This outcome of another ‘People’s Vote’ is the hope of brilliant optimists like Keir Starmer, alongside a string of former prime ministers and prominent politicians, including Brown, Blair, Clegg, Cable, Major, McDonnel, Hague and Heseltine.

As their statements imply, the support a second referendum commands is rooted in the realisation that by leaving the EU in the current socio-economic climate, Britain stands to lose more sovereignty than ever before. Likewise, optimists emphasise that the Prime Minister did not rule out reversing Brexit in her speech. But, realistically, until a united front of prominent politicians working together against Brexit appears, another referendum is both constitutionally dubious and uncharted territory.

To this Deal or to ‘No-Deal’?

As it stands, Britain’s position is best realised by considering the implications of a ‘No-Deal’. An economic  catastrophe for Britain is the first ailment, and tellingly, the pound has already begun to drop. Exacerbating matters, a recent UN report revealed an appallingly rife level of poverty and homelessness across the United Kingdom. With the current disastrous cuts on welfare, the decapitated NHS and almost non-existent legal aid, Britain will suffer further. Wages will inevitably drop, and taxes will increase. Reports have shown that a ‘No-Deal’ would cost young people up to 3,000 pounds per year. Such a dire state of economic affairs will undoubtedly compel Britain to look for cooperation and aid abroad.

Foreign policy-wise, a vacuum must be filled. Britain will be left with no choice but to rely upon less dependable foreign partners, many of whom are notorious for blatantly disregarding human rights, such as Saudi Arabia. By giving in to such an arrangement, Britain would abandon European allies and re-align British interest with those who, like Saudi Arabia, trample on dearly-held national values: democracy, freedom of speech, and human rights.

In sum, a ‘No-Deal’ does not just entail betraying steadfast European allies with shared values; it shall prolong the age of austerity, poverty, and an ailing economy, all of which are painful consequences that Britain should not endure. Looking closely at May’s deal demonstrates that it is a compromise protecting the EU’s interests (as well as an Anglo-European relationship) while delivering the promise of Brexiteers. So, if one does not support resurrecting Britain’s membership of the EU — and the gamble of another referendum — one should hope that this agreement survives. The fact of the matter is that this deal is the uncomfortable medicine prescribed to Britain by Europe to cure a bitter bout of nationalism. Only now can we genuinely see the dark irony behind the Brexiteer mantra of ‘restoring sovereignty’, for as Britain leaves the EU, we stand on the brink of losing more sovereignty than ever before.

Amber Boothe and Tasneem Ghazi are fourth year students reading Politics, Philosophy and Law (joint honours LLB) at King’s College London. They serve as Communications Director and Manager Editor (respectively) of the Dickson Poon School of Law’s postgraduate Law Journal: The King’s Student Law Review. Amber and Tasneem are also passionately involved in a number of public law projects. Their research specialises in UK constitutional law and legal theory.

The authors would also like to thank Dr. Elin Weston for her advice. 

Notes:

[1] Since the beginning of the Brexit campaign,  Le Front Nationale’s Marine Le Pen (amongst others) proudly announced a plan to follow the UK’s example.

 

 

Image source: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-interview-labour-momentum-2022-general-election-leader-theresa-amy-dup-local-council-a8124766.html