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Contextualising the 2020 Malian coup d’état: a view on international intervention

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By Jemma Challenger

Mali, Flag, Map, Geography, Outline, Africa, Country
Outline of Mali in the colours of the Malian flag (Pixabay, 2021)

The coup d’état

On the morning of 18th August 2020, mutinous elements of the Malian Armed Forces stormed a military base in the town of Kati, in what constituted the onset of the country’s second coup d’état in under 10 years. Seized military vehicles then headed to the country’s capital, Bamako, where putschists succeeded in detaining a number of key government officials including President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. By midnight, Keïta had conceded his presidency and dissolved the government. 

Leaders of the coup fired celebratory gunshots as swathes of anti-government protestors rallied around a central square in Bamako to applaud the triumph. The ‘June 5 Movement-Assembly of Patriotic Forces’ (M5-RFP) opposition coalition, formed in mid-2020 to coordinate escalating demonstrations and civil disobedience, supported the toppling; group spokesperson, Nouhoum Togo, announced it constituted “not a military coup but a popular insurrection”.  Simultaneously, however, the mutineers were confronted by a unanimous surge of admonition from the international community. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) pressed soldiers to release detained officials immediately, and “return to their barracks without delay”. The African Union’s (AU’s) President, Cyril Ramaphosa, called for the “immediate return to civilian rule,” briefly suspending Mali from the bloc. The fifteen-nation strong  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) announced neighbouring members would close their borders with Mali, and stipulated sanctions against “all the putschists and their partners and collaborators”. France, the US, China, Turkey, Germany, South Africa and Nigeria were amongst a wealth of nations to publicly condemn the coup independently. 

Several months down the line, the military junta continues to grapple with its commitment to establish a comprehensive transition to democratic rule that adequately conciliates this international community. It remains, therefore, an apt time to reflect upon the protracted role international actors have played in Mali, and to assess their accountability vis-à-vis the latest coup. Indeed, the international community at large has long been directly embroiled within Malian affairs, to the extent that to dissect the country’s political landscape without seriously reflecting upon its external stakeholders is to abandon half the picture. How did the political scene evolve in such a way that posed conditions ripe for a coup that enjoyed such a degree of popular domestic support? And how did these quite cataclysmic developments emerge right under the nose of a corpus of intervenors comprising well over 15,000 international troops in Mali? 

This article will demonstrate that key intervenors – the United Nations (UN) and France – are prioritising short-term military, and tacitly pro-incumbent solutions to a highly political conflict. Accordingly, they jeopardise prospects for security, fail to hold leaders to account, and permit political grievances to spiral. It is vital that the 2020 coup is understood against this backdrop. 

The international community in Mali 

For scholar Nina Wilén, the coup is a stark reminder of how local political conflict endures in spite of a weighty external presence. Embodying a ‘logic of its own’, engagement in Mali – that is, a militarily well-endowed French-led counter-terrorist operation, a sizeable and robust UN peacekeeping operation, a United States (US) Africa Command drone base, three European Union (EU) missions, and the creation of a new Special Forces Joint Task Force – is insufficiently cognisant of local realities and dynamics on the ground. The intervention is, by and large, inherently state-centric and military dominated. This fails to differentiate between the needs of a range of complex parallel crises in Mali. It also fails to address local, grassroots grievances and conflicts, which in turn offer a valuable source of mobilisation for the extremists and criminal networks that external actors so committedly endeavour to eradicate. 

For instance, the UN operation was, until recently, situated almost exclusively in line with the explicit jihadist threat in the north of Mali. Meanwhile, localised agricultural conflict plaguing Central communities escalated rapidly for a number of years, into what now constitutes the epicentre of violence in Mali. This is a flagrant missed opportunity for the intervention. In prioritising symptoms over causes, and short-term security imperatives over long-term diplomatic and grassroots political efforts, the UN failed to prevent a dire security crisis from unfurling under its nose. Jihadists were able to successfully draw upon a political vacuum, popular grievances, and cleavages along ethnic lines to mobilise support from occluded rural populations. This rendered UN efforts to ‘impede, impair and isolate’ the terrorist threat’ in the North rather futile. In inadequately responding to grievance-based local conflicts, external intervention has done little to quell the root of popular unrest, whilst adding fuel to the flames of jihadist networks and transnational criminal organisations. 

Simultaneously, the permanent external military presence reduces incentives for the state to engage in crucial reforms and productive political dialogue. In what one scholar of Sahelian politics, Yvan Guichaoua, describes as the ‘bitter harvest of French interventionism’, France’s entrenched armed presence – dominated foremostly by enemy-centric security agendas – is acting as a ‘de facto military guarantor’ of the security of the Malian regime. In doing so, France effectively disincentivises any sitting government in Mali to engage in dialogue with its adversaries in order to reach political compromises. As Michael Shurkin of RAND fittingly suggests, France’s operational objective is, as of now, little more than the creation of ‘strategic possibilities’ that some other partner might be able to exploit. Thus far, the intervention has shown little inclination to hold a sitting regime to account, or push even for the somewhat lacklustre reforms proposed in a 2015 peace agreement. Against this backdrop, external intervention has something to answer for with regards to the popular discontent that paved the way for the coup it denounced so quickly last August. 

The coming months will undoubtedly play a critical role in defining the trajectory of the crisis in Mali. Colonel Major Ismaël Wagué, spokesman for the self-proclaimed National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) military junta, explicitly pledged cooperation with the international community from the outset; for him, the UN and France are “partners in the restoration of stability.” Yet, for all that the CNSP avow their dedication to maintain military collaboration with intervenors, and for all intervenors assure their sustained armed presence on the Sahel, lasting security without popular support and a comprehensive political strategy will doubtless prove untenable. Intervenors in Mali must acknowledge that the crisis of the ‘weak state’ in Mali lies not at the hands of a discontented citizenry, but in the radical social distance between this citizenry and its political class. Viewed through this optic, the coup has but foregrounded longstanding shortcomings of the international community in Mali that must be conceded and transformed in order to make meaningful progress towards stability. 

 

Jemma Challenger is an MA student of International Conflict Studies at King’s College London and a graduate of the University of Leeds, where she studied a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Her central research interests include UN intervention in conflict, peacebuilding and state-building processes, and the qualitative study of comparative civil wars. You can find her on Twitter @jemmachallenger. 

Influence on the Arabic world by Macron’s Al Jazeera interview

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By Clara Didier

 

What the Article I of the 1958 French Constitution has never been that threatened in decades and even more recently with the beheading of the French teacher, Samuel Paty. The Article I is at follows: ‘France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.’ In this article, we are going to analyse how France is fragilized between respecting all religions and denouncing religious extremism. For this purpose, a survey has been conducted, regrouping 24 answers from 87.5% being students both French or English, between 20-30 years old, 57.1% of woman, all from different religious backgrounds or none. 

The three simultaneous terrorist attacks which happened the 13th of November 2015 in Paris, killed 130 people and injured 413. But not only they have hurt people, but they also explicitly attacked freedom and freedom of expression written in the articles 10 and 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Since then, a campaign against Islamism was ordered by François Hollande, the former French president. This fight against extremism, violence, reinterpretation of Islam is now continued by Mr Macron. Nonetheless, he is being misunderstood and we can ask ourselves if his policies towards Islamism are the right ones. 

President Macron has enacted several controversial laws and actions. The first law on separatism at school and the second one being the authorization – or at least letting it happen – of circulating cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in schools. It happened in a context of national mourning, with the death of the French teacher Samuel Paty, decapitated because he showed those cartoons in class. But this authorization created an outrage among the Muslim community, both French and abroad. Boycotts were implemented against France and the French President has been severely criticized by numerous leaders and populations, it involved Turkey, Bangladesh, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan etc. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan even said that ‘Macron needs mental treatment’. 

In this context, Mr Macron delivered an interview with Al-Jazeera, a Qatari satellite television channel. French newspaper Liberation, talks about a ‘well-calibrated clarification operation’. Not only because of the Qatar-based channel’s notoriety and extensive Arabic-speaking audience, but because it has been at the forefront of relaying anti-French criticism across Arab-Muslim countries. The interview was given a day after the attack in Nice’s church. What can be remembered from his speech is his feeling of being widely misunderstood. Indeed, the Arab-Muslim world understood that he was the one authorizing cartoons to be showed to children. The cartoons of the Prophet were not published at the initiative of the government but by ‘free and independent newspapers’, he explained. He underlined, ‘I understand that one can be shocked by cartoons, but I will never accept that violence can be justified. Our freedoms, our rights, I consider that it is our vocation to protect them.’ Translations of his speeches were incorrect and as his interviewer Salam Kawakibi explains: ‘It is a lesson that is necessary in countries where all expression is locked by power and where people cannot imagine that a newspaper publishes what it wants without a green light from above’.

Through the survey I have made, I analysed the repercussion of this interview. I noticed a clear divergence of opinion, on the one hand some people thought that the speech was ‘inflammatory’, ‘unnecessary’ or even ‘paternalist’. On the other hand, some people thought it was a ‘straightforward communication from Macron’, ‘he clearly distinguishes between Islamist terrorists and moderate Muslims who practice their faith peacefully’ and that ‘any accusations of Islamophobia regarding Macron’s speech are totally unwarranted (and unfortunately politically motivated)’. 54.2% think that the last law from the French government regarding separatism and secularity is not Islamophobic, against 41.7% who think it is. Subsequently, 62.5% do not believe that showing cartoons of the Prophet in schools is Islamophobic. Almost all of those interviewed, knew the difference between Islam and Islamism. Furthermore, 70.8% condemn the boycotts against France.

Through the analysis of this survey, it has come to my understanding that it is still unclear for people how Macron is handling Islamism in France. Answers by French individuals were more straightforward and informed contrary to English ones. So, was his interview understood by everyone? And more importantly by the Arabic world? According to Qatari newspaper, the French president’s interview was ‘a world-class media event’.

Probably one of the most spectacular reactions is from the UAE Foreign Minister, Anwar Gargash. In the German daily Die Welt, he said: ‘You should listen to what Macron really said in his speech: he doesn’t want the ghettoisation of Muslims in the west, and he is absolutely right’. He added: ‘with his attacks on France, Erdogan is manipulating a religious issue for political purposes’, Muslims ‘are in need to be integrated in a better way; the French state has the right to search for ways to achieve this in parallel with combating extremism and societal closure.’ The Egyptian editorialist Waël Qandil wrote in the columns of the Qatari website Al-Araby Al-Jadid ‘Macron: more than a step back, almost an excuse’. According to him, ‘he has completely changed his language and adopted a conciliatory tone’. This statement is to be put in contrast with his last column before the interview, calling Mr Macron an ‘obsessive racist’ who ‘shoots hate bullets’ at Muslims. This reaction from some Arab media outlets suggests that this interview did have a positive impact, even if considered as an ‘excuse’, the Arabic world (for most countries), better understand Macron’s policies now. 

Nonetheless, when we look at the other end of the Arab political spectrum, with Hakem Al-Mutairi for example, one of the founding members of the Salafist movement in Kuwait, reacted on his Twitter account: ‘Macron’s retreat on Al-Jazeera is a diabolical ruse. The Islamic boycott must continue until the official stop of the exhibition of the drawings and until there is a real apology for this serious aggression against Islam’. 

On Monday 7 December 2020, Mr Macron met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. The latter told the press at the Elysée that religious values must have supremacy over human values and that ‘human rights come second’. His French counterpart replied: ‘The value of man is superior to everything’. Once again, the French president shows his determination to govern a secular country that respects everyone. However, the award of the Legion of Honour given to the Egyptian president was a sensation, once again questioning the words and convictions of President Macron. 

To conclude, France is attacked on all its fronts, on all its borders and on all its values but will never stop to respect everyone.

 

My name is Clara Didier, I’m a 20 years old French International Relations MA student at King’s College. I would like to become a war reporter in the future and work especially in two regions, the Middle-East and South America. I’ve always been interested in war related subjects as my father taught history and geography when I was younger. And more recently, since the Bataclan’s attacks as a family member was in the front line, in terrorism. Regarding war I am particularly interested in secret wars, secrecy, hidden intelligence, what is happening backstage and the results of it, sometimes leading to dirty consequences. Regarding terrorism, it’s a human and sociological curiosity that pushed me in studying how someone (especially citizens in democratic countries) can decide to enroll, radicalise and use violence.

France Must Address its Threats in Cyberspace or Face the Consequences

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By Clément Briens 

Florence Parly, the new French Minister of the Armed Forces, now has the challenge of leading national strategy- where does cyber security situate in her administration’s vision of French security? (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

 

On the 13th of October, the French Ministry of Defense, led by Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, published a white paper, the “Strategic Review of Defence and National Security”. It was the Ministry’s first major publication since the 2013 white paper, which quickly had been outdated following recent developments such as the wave of jihadist terrorist attacks on French soil; and the rise of attacks in French cyberspace. While the former is a byproduct of a complex geopolitical issue that existed at the time of the previous white paper, the latter is a relatively new development in French security, e.g. the hack of the pro-presidential party En Marche! ‘s campaign as a prime example.
This article will argue that, while the paper is comprehensive in its evaluation of the underlying nature of cyber warfare and properly provides the essential principles for a national cyber-doctrine, it fails to address current threats to France’s cyber infrastructures and democratic institutions.

Cyberspace as an equalizer

The review acknowledges how cyberspace has become a tool for asymmetrical warfare.  It outlines that on one hand, while the proliferation of cyber weapons has spread, nation states have become increasingly vulnerable to the use of such weapons. This dual dynamic effectively levels the playing field between militarily advanced states such as France and sub-state groups.

Furthermore, the white paper establishes that a variety of cyber tools have become widely accessible and distributed in various channels of the dark web. For instance, the proliferation of botnets has given a significant advantage to groups that lack the processing power to conduct large-scale operations. Botnets can be defined as networks of infected computers that contribute processing power to the hacker that infected it.[1] These were used as early as April 2007 by – allegedly Russian – hackers against Estonian infrastructure. They managed to effectively down Estonia’s credit and mobile systems as well as blocking access to government websites.[2]

The paper also acknowledges that France and moreover the EU have become increasingly vulnerable to the use of these cyber weapons. System integration and connection to the Internet has accelerated; energy, healthcare, and transport systems now all rely on vulnerable centralized systems that become targets for foreign hackers.

The problem of attribution

Another issue highlighted by the review is the accessibility to tools that provide anonymity to online users, making attacks extremely hard to trace and subsequently there is a genuine issue as to attributing attacks to specific states or groups. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) and other anonymity tools such as the The Onion Router (TOR) are now freely distributed on the internet, giving users access to military-grade technology for dissimulation of their online identities, as it was originally developed to protect intelligence communications. [3]

This makes nuclear-era principles such as deterrence much harder to implement, as it is now fairly easy for states to mask their attacks by originating them from neighboring countries, or routing their attacks from countries from other parts of the world. While we are now instantly able to detect missile launches from anywhere and determine their trajectory, cyber-attacks are now nearly instantaneous and anonymous.

The equivalence principle

The review puts forward the principle of cyber-physical equivalence, a key principle to the establishment of a national cyber doctrine. The principle states destructive cyber-attacks will be met with an equally destructive response, not necessarily only by cyber means but also by conventional physical means. The review cites Article 51 of the UN Charter on legitimate self-defense to justify this doctrine. [4] This principle can be considered a tool to theoretically deter sub-state actors from attacking France and its allies with impunity, who will now face the threat of law enforcement. However, one may question the ability to democratic states that abide by such international norms to effectively deter authoritarian states such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, who supposedly, in Clausewitzian terms, have more powerful means and less political reserve to conduct such operations.

A failure to assess the current threats: what can go wrong?

Hence France’s Ministry of Defense has effectively addressed the main challenges and characteristics of cyber warfare. However the main drawback to this theoretical exercise is the failure to address current threats to France and its Allies. The main identified threat to French cyberspace is foreign interference in its democratic processes, as demonstrated by recent reports concerning possible Russian involvement in the recent American and French elections, or the EU referendum in the UK.[5] [6] [7]

The interference is twofold: the penetration of websites and databases relating to the elections as well as propaganda campaigns on social media.

This interference is especially problematic considering foreign activity targeting President Emmanuel Macron’s own party, En Marche! during his campaign, where hacker groups released thousands of documents from the party on the internet days before the second round of the French elections.

Existence of claimed interference in the French elections has not only manifested itself through the leak that had the clear aim of damaging Macron’s party, but also through a propaganda campaign waged on social media with bot-controlled Twitter accounts to support the leaks. Some of these bots were shown to be retweeting #Macrongate leak-related tweets several thousand times a day. [8] This is a similar method as what was observed on social media during the Brexit referendum.[9]

Despite the challenge of attribution outlined above, Taiwanese cyber security firm Trend Micro claims the attacks originated from APT 28, a group thought to be linked to Russia’s military intelligence unit, the GRU, whereas the French cyber security agency ANSSI acknowledged the attacks but failed to comment on the authors’ identity.[10]

Trend Micro’s report has serious implications for French cyber security. APT 28 had already been linked to attacks on the French-owned TV5 channel in 2015. [11] Nonetheless this time around it seems that the group has vastly escalated in its methods employed and in its ambition to challenge French cybersecurity; hence one may wonder why the review ignores this very real and recurring threat. The degree of direct involvement of the Kremlin in the “hacking” of Western elections through the use of groups such as APT 28 remains unclear, which makes the task of cyber policy formulation understandably even harder.

However, one can refer to Richard C. Clarke’s theory of national cyberspace accountability and obligation to assist, two corollaries of the cyber equivalency principle outlined in the white paper. [12] National cyberspace accountability applied in this case means that France should hold the Russian state accountable for the actions of its citizens, which helps circumvent the problem of exact attribution. Furthermore, a refusal from Moscow to assist French authorities in targeting and shutting down groups such as APT28 would result in increasing suspicion about the Kremlin’s support of such groups. Using these two components to the cyber equivalency principle would have been useful in the context of the review, and would have allowed for more transparency in dealing with the problem of attribution pertaining to the hacking of Western elections.

Conclusion

In any case, this article recommends that public dialogue be initiated concerning the state of cybersecurity in France and that the French Ministry of Defense address the foreign involvement publicly. Without resorting to alarmism, public dialogue is an integral part of a country’s cyber policy, much how it was crucial in the development of a nuclear policy in the US in the 1950’s. This dialogue has been initiated in the US in light of the alleged Russian interference in the latest presidential elections, with wide media coverage and even legal action being made public.[13] The Strategic Review of Defense and National Security was the opportunity for Florence Parly to do so, but the Ministry have fallen short of assessing the threat, informing the public, and formulating coherent policy to counter this threat.

Must foreign groups be allowed to meddle with Western democratic processes with impunity?
And should the French government deal with these issues in secret, or rather initiate broad public dialogue on a national level, and hold states accountable to international norms as they would for kinetic attacks?

 

Clément Briens is a second year War Studies & History Bachelor’s degree student. His main interests lie in cyber security, counterinsurgency theory, and nuclear proliferation.

Notes: 

[1] Casserly, Martyn. 2017. “What Is A Botnet? How To Protect Your Devices From The Reaper Malware Threat”. Tech Advisor. http://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/security/what-is-botnet-reaper-3666159/.

[2] Davis, Joshua. 2017. “Hackers Take Down The Most Wired Country In Europe”. WIRED. https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/.

[3] Matthews, Lee. 2017. “What Tor Is, And Why You Should Use It To Protect Your Privacy”. Forbes.Com. https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/01/27/what-is-tor-and-why-do-people-use-it/.

[4] “Chapter VII”. 2017. Un.Org. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html.

[5] Smith, David, and Jon Swaine. 2017. “Russian Agents Hacked US Voting System Manufacturer Before US Election – Report”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/05/russia-us-election-hack-voting-system-nsa-report.

[6] Greenberg, Andy, Andrew Selbst, Brian Barrett, Andy Greenberg, Issie Lapowsky, and Garrett Graff. 2017. “NSA Director Confirms That Russia Really Did Hack The French Election”. WIRED. https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-confirms-russia-hacked-french-election-infrastructure/.

[7] “Brexit Referendum Website Might Have Been Hacked: UK Lawmakers”. 2017. U.K.. https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-website/brexit-referendum-website-might-have-been-hacked-uk-lawmakers-idUKKBN17E0NS.

[8] Glaser, April. 2017. “Twitter Bots Are Being Weaponized To Spread Information On The French Presidential Campaign Hack”. Recode. https://www.recode.net/2017/5/6/15568582/twitter-bots-macron-french-presidential-candidates-hacked-emails.

[9] Burgess, Matt. 2017. “Here’s The First Evidence Russia Used Twitter To Influence Brexit”. Wired.Co.Uk. http://www.wired.co.uk/article/brexit-russia-influence-twitter-bots-internet-research-agency.

[10] “Macron Campaign Was Target Of Cyber Attacks By Spy-Linked Group”. 2017. U.S.. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-macron-cyber/macron-campaign-was-target-of-cyber-attacks-by-spy-linked-group-idUSKBN17Q200.

[11] “How France’s TV5 Was Almost Destroyed”. 2017. BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37590375.

[12] Clarke, Richard A., and Robert K. Knake. n.d. Cyber War. Harper Collins p.178

[13] Feldman, Brian. 2017. “DNI Report: High Confidence Russia Interfered With U.S. Election”. Select All. http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/01/report-high-confidence-russia-interfered-with-u-s-election.html.

 

Image Source:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0c/Informal_meeting_of_defence_ministers_%28FAC%29._Arrivals_Florence_Parly_%2836937726031%29.jpg

 

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part I – Brexit, Empire and British Security

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By: Dr Samir Puri

The end of its Empire was Britain’s last seismic rearrangement of its alignments and alliances. Today, Britain is slowly and painfully disentangling itself from the European Union. Of course, the two processes are incomparable in all but the most analogical, journalistic terms. Or are they?

“As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human destiny, I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and democracies”, said Winston Churchill in 1948. “The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire… Then there is also the United States… And finally, there is United Europe.”

Britain’s defence and security has been underpinned by positioning itself at the centre of these three overlapping circles. Doing so has conferred to this Sceptred Isle a uniquely advantageous geopolitical position throughout the tumult of the Cold War and beyond.

While Britain has continued to provide a lynchpin between the USA, Europe and many parts of the wider world, what this means has changed a lot in the last 70 years. Britain’s relationship with the United States has experienced its peaks and troughs but has remained constant. Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 led to economic interdependence but stalled any notion of a common currency or political union. But it is the last of the three circles that merit attention here.

In anticipating Brexit’s unfolding, it is the end of Empire that is instructive. There is, as The Economist wrote, an art to leaving in evidence after decolonization, of “breaking up and staying friends”. The Empire was dismantled “as haphazardly as it began, with different territories gaining independence in different ways,” wrote Piers Brendon in The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997. The piecemeal manner of its dismantling is striking. Britain’s hold in the New World was diminished by the independence of the United States in 1776. A later iteration of Empire, with its focus on Asia, was eroded by World War Two. The wartime loss of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 presaged India’s independence five years later. The Suez Crisis of 1956 dealt a blow to British influence in the Middle East. There was, for a time, an aspiration to relocate the Empire’s centre of gravity to Africa, but these colonies became independent throughout the 1960s.

Today, it feels almost otherworldly to conjure up any sense of what the Empire meant. It can also seem immoral, given how out of step much of imperial ideology was in relation to contemporary norms. But to reflect on the defence and security implications of the breakup of the Empire is fruitful. The dismantling of a globe-spanning Empire that had existed in one form or another for centuries was transformative. There was a horrific amount of violence in some theatres of decolonization. But in others, relatively amicable arrangements were made, with security networks underpinning relations between Britain and these former colonies.

The transition from Empire to Commonwealth reminds us that a realignment does not necessarily mean severance. Brexit does not mean the end of Britain’s role in Europe. Rather, it reimagines a relationship that will not suddenly vanish, no matter the dramas of the rupture yet to come.

In a RAND Europe report on ‘Defence and security after Brexit’, the authors observe that “the decision to leave the EU arguably looks likely to have minimal impact on Britain’s conventional defence apparatus in the near term”. In other words, the upheaval for Britain’s military will be moderated by the fact that the EU has never offered a major platform for cooperative military action, and because NATO will remain Britain’s preeminent multilateral military ‘club’. But, RAND opines, “Brexit may pose more immediate practical challenges for security than defence.”

Security, rather than defence, is indeed where Brexit’s impacts will be intricate. The transnational nature of criminality and terrorism and the security implications arising from huge migration flows are for Britain inherently European-facing issues. The Brexit in-tray of UK-EU cooperative policing arrangements is considerable. Policing, serious crime investigations and intelligence work simply cannot be done in the vacuum of a nation-state, given the informational revolution and the relative ease and speed of international travel. The myriad of treaties to be renegotiated will make Brexit akin to uprooting a tree that has had several decades to lay its roots.

The biggest imperial connotation of all, however, is the mindset that led to Brexit in the first place. The essence of British exceptionalism has its roots in the fact that Britain was for so long a globe-straddling superpower. It is perilously hard to argue about the often subconscious impact of the Empire on current British foreign and security policy thinking. Generationally, the impact of the Empire is now much less direct than before. However, a grandiose sense of destiny and purpose – which need not be negative qualities if harnessed in the name of order – still pervade Britain’s sense of global identity.

All national histories are exercises in selective amnesia. The myths that parts of Britain hold of itself – as a plucky nation able to survive on its own wits – are part of the Brexit story. And they spring from the defensive conundrums of bygone ages.  Even in its darkest days, such as after the fall of France in 1940, Britain was able to stand alone and survive a horrific onslaught, while Churchill began ensuring Britain’s survival and longevity as a global player through a realignment with the USA. David Reynolds has called 1940 “the Fulcrum of the twentieth century”. It is not difficult to see why the fall of France began a turn towards the Atlantic – and why this still matters today. The release of Christopher Nolan’s film Dunkirk has almost too much significance to bear.

The Empire and the wars that were fought in its name are essential components of Britain’s sense of global identity. History tells the story that explains Britain’s geopolitical positioning today. Looking historically, and thinking self-reflectively, will be the only way to navigate the humbling that Brexit is sure to spell in relation to British influence in Europe. To imperil British security during the coming realignment is a fate that must be avoided.


Dr Samir Puri is a Lecturer in War Studies where he teaches the MA module on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also serving as a strategy adviser to the Commonwealth Secretariat in the establishment of its Countering Violent Extremism unit. Before joining King’s, Dr Puri worked for the Foreign Office (2009-2015) and for RAND (2006-2009). In 2016 his book, ‘Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups’, was released by the IISS; and he has extended this analysis to the war in Syria for the Telegraph and Observer newspapers. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Strife Interview – Defence Journalist Jean-Dominique Merchet on the French intelligence reforms

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Palais de l’Elysée, home of the President of the Republic (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

The French presidential elections are due to take place in a few weeks. They will have a significant impact on the short-term future of this country. The first round will be held on 23 April 2017 and the second round on 7 May 2017. The future Head of State will have to deal with several topics, including the terrorist threats, a hypothetical reform of the intelligence machinery, as well as the future of the European Union (EU).

Strife’s William Moray discusses these issues with defence journalist Jean-Dominique Merchet [@jdomerchet]. Mr Merchet is a journalist for the daily newspaper L’Opinion and he publishes Secret Defense – a professional blog. An expert in defence, strategy, and security issues, he is an alumni of the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence), a public Academic institution dedicated to research and education in defence-related matters. All enquiries as to this article’s content should be sent to the Strife Blog.

WM – You recently wrote an article about some potential French intelligence reforms the future President of the Republic may have to decide upon. Which of these reforms – if any – do you think should constitute a priority?

JDM – The subject of the utmost importance is the nomination of a new ‘DGSE’ (Director-General of the Foreign Security). The need is strong, as Bernard Bajolet will be tending his resignation a fortnight after the presidential election.

In general, I would personally argue on the one hand in favour of maintaining the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE, ‘Directorate-General for Foreign Security’, the foreign intelligence agency) as it is. This organisation is a French particularity, known as an ‘integrated service’ in the sense that it combines different activities. Hence, in equivalent UK terms, with regards to covert operations, the DGSE combines the activities of MI6, the GCHQ and some activities of the SAS. I believe this system is not a bad one, it is efficient. Conversely, some people would like to dismantle the agency. For instance, the military part – i.e. the Service Action, Action Service, the division in charge of covert action – would be reassigned to the Commandement des Opérations Spéciales (COS, ‘Special Operations Command’, similar to USSOCOM). Another possibility would be to establish an equivalent of the NSA which would oversee SIGINT. However, a public servant well aware of this topic has recently suggested that ‘we must make improvements, but this is as simple as changing the parts in a moving car’. I think this sums it up accurately; thus, there is no need to change anything in the DGSE.

What does not work well on the other hand is the Ministry of the Interior (i.e. the Home Office), which in France controls the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI, ‘General-Directorate for Domestic Security’, the domestic intelligence agency, which in France is under the Ministry of the Interior’s supervision). Again, this is strictly my own view, as a long-standing observer of such matters. The Ministry still functions more or less as it did in the early 20th Century, with regards to both law enforcement and domestic intelligence. To this extent, inter-service competition between police and prefets (representative of the state in local governments) remains a major characteristic. Also, the distinction between the National Police and the Paris Police Prefecture is another example of poor management, as this distinction does not make much sense. All things considered, the DGSI is a law-enforcement agency, not a domestic intelligence agency, unlike what the politicians claimed when it was established. Therefore, if there is truly a need for modernisation, it should be directed at the Ministry of Interior. In comparison, the Ministry of Defence – which supervises the DGSE – has considerably modernised in recent years.

WM – In regards to the recent controversy following the publication of the book “Un President ne devrait pas dire cela” was President Francois Hollande right to publish classified information regarding clandestine operations, more particularly ‘opérations homo’?

JDM – He was very wrong to do so. The book’s title speaks for itself, there are certain things the President should not talk about. In fact, I would argue this book finished Hollande of, as he renounced standing for re-election. In other words, this event was the final step of a long and tortuous road. However, the real problem is rather that Hollande and other decision-makers have, and continue to, abuse this military-like attitude, an attitude which I find very disagreeable. I am thinking of the vocabulary which is being used, such as ‘we are at war’. Ideally, one should continue as before whilst talking about it less. In the end, it is not up to politicians to feed the fantasy.

WM – How come the only response the French government has come up with towards the terrorist threats merely consists in the state of emergency, and not a proper strategy? This measure, similar to martial law and therefore intended to be temporary, has been ongoing for over a year (since the Paris attacks in November 2015) and has been extended on five occasions.

JDM – I would not be so categorical as to the absence of a strategy. To declare the state of emergency means to raise the level of alert up to a maximum. From there onwards, diminishing the level of alert becomes extremely hazardous, because it would be political suicide. The point is that the state of emergency is a PR operation; as with any PR operation, it is difficult to go back. For instance, I myself believe that the deployment of military personnel in the streets is of limited use. However, once a decision has been made, it is very difficult to reverse that decision. Nonetheless, the intelligence services, the anti-terrorist units and the police do their job: they prevent terrorist attacks from happening and dismantle terror networks. Nevertheless, it is important to find rules that dovetail well with the daily lives of the citizens.

WM – Yet, France’s response fails to include long-term measures (such as the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) in the UK). Why is that?

JDM – There is no perfect solution to the terrorist threat. Once a cycle of terrorist violence has been initiated, it is difficult to find a way out of it. Long-term solutions must indeed be found such as a means to tackle radicalisation, as well as considering the effects of foreign policy. A brainstorming process is required and improvements can always be found. However, an efficient antiterrorism policy also requires protective – and thus short-term oriented – measures. Short term and long term are not mutually exclusive. Coming up with criticism is one thing, such criticism is a necessity in a democratic system, however, snap judgments are another. You mentioned the United Kingdom. The British were lucky enough not to have suffered any terrorist attack lately, unlike France or Germany. I am not suggesting that the French approach is perfect, but who can claim to have the perfect strategy? The struggle against terrorism is an imprecise science.

French Soldiers patrolling near the Eiffel Tower (Credit: AFP – Gonzalo Fuentes)

WM – France will remain the only nuclear power and a UNSC permanent member of the EU in the aftermath of Brexit. Will Paris thus have increased responsibilities in terms of EU defence as well as diplomacy?

JDM – Not really, in the sense that the issue at stake is power. In that sense, the UK will always have an important role to play in the continent. After all, Great-Britain is a fundamental pillar of NATO. As Theresa May rightly pointed out, ‘the British people have voted to leave the EU, but they did not vote to leave Europe’. I do believe moreover that Brexit needs to be put in perspective, as the UK did not play a great role in either EU integrated defence or external security. Similarly, Brexit will not damage cooperation in regard to anti-terrorism, as intelligence sharing with France is the product of bilateral agreements. Conversely, I am quite sceptical about whether the departure of the UK from the EU will result in an acceleration of the work on the subjects of diplomacy and common defence.

In short, I really doubt that Brexit will cause much of an impact one way or another and thus, the effects this will have on France should be minimal. Brexit is not good for the international order, neither symbolically nor for the image it creates; the practical effects, however, will be limited.

WM – In the wake of the US national election hacks and information leaks during the campaign by several state and non-state actors, how well-equipped is French intelligence to respond to such similar threats – considering that the French presidential and legislative elections are a few months away?

JDM – Who is capable of successfully dealing with a massive cyberattack? Currently, in my view, nobody has this capacity on a large scale.

France is fully aware of the problem and has means of defending itself. The Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale (Defence and national security council) met on Wednesday 1st of March, and this topic was discussed on that occasion. The media regularly mentions this topic, if only to educate the public and raise awareness. For instance, the expression ‘cyberattack’ has different layers. First, it can mean the propaganda being spread by social media. This is also a matter of freedom of speech. The fact that these rumours originate from sources close to the Kremlin (e.g. RT, Sputnik) is not the problem; this is ‘soft power’, and many Western powers similarly make use of it. The West no longer has the monopoly of either power or legitimacy, both are heavily contested. No, the real issue at stake here is that a fraction of the public opinion here in France, believe these ‘trolls’ spread by pro-governmental Russian media. The second layer is the attack which targets and takes down a website. Here again, some defensive measures do exist. Finally, the third layer, i.e.the actual hacking is the theft of confidential data for a specific purpose. There has not – yet – been such a case in France, similar to Wikileaks; however, it might very well happen.

The important thing when it comes to cyberattack and hacking is to stick with facts instead of adopting a fantasy-like approach. For instance, the public has never complained about Wikileaks. A final point, the French electoral system has a very limited use of electronic votes; the French living abroad are the only small portion of the electorate which can vote electronically and only for the parliamentary elections. Therefore, there cannot be any hacking, the ultimate choice is that of the French people. Which brings us back to the real problem at stake, the fact that a segment of the public believes the trolls of the Russian media.

(Following publication of this interview, the French government has suspended this electronic vote on Friday 3rd March, in order to prevent hacking).

This article was translated from French by Strife’s BA Representative William Moray. You can find the French version here.

Image 1 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Paris_-_palais_de_l’%C3%89lys%C3%A9e_-_cour_05.JPG

Image 2 Source: http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/6009862-3×2-940×627.jpg

Feature image source: http://www.lopinion.fr/blog/secret-defense