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France Must Address its Threats in Cyberspace or Face the Consequences

By Clément Briens 

Florence Parly, the new French Minister of the Armed Forces, now has the challenge of leading national strategy- where does cyber security situate in her administration’s vision of French security? (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

 

On the 13th of October, the French Ministry of Defense, led by Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, published a white paper, the “Strategic Review of Defence and National Security”. It was the Ministry’s first major publication since the 2013 white paper, which quickly had been outdated following recent developments such as the wave of jihadist terrorist attacks on French soil; and the rise of attacks in French cyberspace. While the former is a byproduct of a complex geopolitical issue that existed at the time of the previous white paper, the latter is a relatively new development in French security, e.g. the hack of the pro-presidential party En Marche! ‘s campaign as a prime example.
This article will argue that, while the paper is comprehensive in its evaluation of the underlying nature of cyber warfare and properly provides the essential principles for a national cyber-doctrine, it fails to address current threats to France’s cyber infrastructures and democratic institutions.

Cyberspace as an equalizer

The review acknowledges how cyberspace has become a tool for asymmetrical warfare.  It outlines that on one hand, while the proliferation of cyber weapons has spread, nation states have become increasingly vulnerable to the use of such weapons. This dual dynamic effectively levels the playing field between militarily advanced states such as France and sub-state groups.

Furthermore, the white paper establishes that a variety of cyber tools have become widely accessible and distributed in various channels of the dark web. For instance, the proliferation of botnets has given a significant advantage to groups that lack the processing power to conduct large-scale operations. Botnets can be defined as networks of infected computers that contribute processing power to the hacker that infected it.[1] These were used as early as April 2007 by – allegedly Russian – hackers against Estonian infrastructure. They managed to effectively down Estonia’s credit and mobile systems as well as blocking access to government websites.[2]

The paper also acknowledges that France and moreover the EU have become increasingly vulnerable to the use of these cyber weapons. System integration and connection to the Internet has accelerated; energy, healthcare, and transport systems now all rely on vulnerable centralized systems that become targets for foreign hackers.

The problem of attribution

Another issue highlighted by the review is the accessibility to tools that provide anonymity to online users, making attacks extremely hard to trace and subsequently there is a genuine issue as to attributing attacks to specific states or groups. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) and other anonymity tools such as the The Onion Router (TOR) are now freely distributed on the internet, giving users access to military-grade technology for dissimulation of their online identities, as it was originally developed to protect intelligence communications. [3]

This makes nuclear-era principles such as deterrence much harder to implement, as it is now fairly easy for states to mask their attacks by originating them from neighboring countries, or routing their attacks from countries from other parts of the world. While we are now instantly able to detect missile launches from anywhere and determine their trajectory, cyber-attacks are now nearly instantaneous and anonymous.

The equivalence principle

The review puts forward the principle of cyber-physical equivalence, a key principle to the establishment of a national cyber doctrine. The principle states destructive cyber-attacks will be met with an equally destructive response, not necessarily only by cyber means but also by conventional physical means. The review cites Article 51 of the UN Charter on legitimate self-defense to justify this doctrine. [4] This principle can be considered a tool to theoretically deter sub-state actors from attacking France and its allies with impunity, who will now face the threat of law enforcement. However, one may question the ability to democratic states that abide by such international norms to effectively deter authoritarian states such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, who supposedly, in Clausewitzian terms, have more powerful means and less political reserve to conduct such operations.

A failure to assess the current threats: what can go wrong?

Hence France’s Ministry of Defense has effectively addressed the main challenges and characteristics of cyber warfare. However the main drawback to this theoretical exercise is the failure to address current threats to France and its Allies. The main identified threat to French cyberspace is foreign interference in its democratic processes, as demonstrated by recent reports concerning possible Russian involvement in the recent American and French elections, or the EU referendum in the UK.[5] [6] [7]

The interference is twofold: the penetration of websites and databases relating to the elections as well as propaganda campaigns on social media.

This interference is especially problematic considering foreign activity targeting President Emmanuel Macron’s own party, En Marche! during his campaign, where hacker groups released thousands of documents from the party on the internet days before the second round of the French elections.

Existence of claimed interference in the French elections has not only manifested itself through the leak that had the clear aim of damaging Macron’s party, but also through a propaganda campaign waged on social media with bot-controlled Twitter accounts to support the leaks. Some of these bots were shown to be retweeting #Macrongate leak-related tweets several thousand times a day. [8] This is a similar method as what was observed on social media during the Brexit referendum.[9]

Despite the challenge of attribution outlined above, Taiwanese cyber security firm Trend Micro claims the attacks originated from APT 28, a group thought to be linked to Russia’s military intelligence unit, the GRU, whereas the French cyber security agency ANSSI acknowledged the attacks but failed to comment on the authors’ identity.[10]

Trend Micro’s report has serious implications for French cyber security. APT 28 had already been linked to attacks on the French-owned TV5 channel in 2015. [11] Nonetheless this time around it seems that the group has vastly escalated in its methods employed and in its ambition to challenge French cybersecurity; hence one may wonder why the review ignores this very real and recurring threat. The degree of direct involvement of the Kremlin in the “hacking” of Western elections through the use of groups such as APT 28 remains unclear, which makes the task of cyber policy formulation understandably even harder.

However, one can refer to Richard C. Clarke’s theory of national cyberspace accountability and obligation to assist, two corollaries of the cyber equivalency principle outlined in the white paper. [12] National cyberspace accountability applied in this case means that France should hold the Russian state accountable for the actions of its citizens, which helps circumvent the problem of exact attribution. Furthermore, a refusal from Moscow to assist French authorities in targeting and shutting down groups such as APT28 would result in increasing suspicion about the Kremlin’s support of such groups. Using these two components to the cyber equivalency principle would have been useful in the context of the review, and would have allowed for more transparency in dealing with the problem of attribution pertaining to the hacking of Western elections.

Conclusion

In any case, this article recommends that public dialogue be initiated concerning the state of cybersecurity in France and that the French Ministry of Defense address the foreign involvement publicly. Without resorting to alarmism, public dialogue is an integral part of a country’s cyber policy, much how it was crucial in the development of a nuclear policy in the US in the 1950’s. This dialogue has been initiated in the US in light of the alleged Russian interference in the latest presidential elections, with wide media coverage and even legal action being made public.[13] The Strategic Review of Defense and National Security was the opportunity for Florence Parly to do so, but the Ministry have fallen short of assessing the threat, informing the public, and formulating coherent policy to counter this threat.

Must foreign groups be allowed to meddle with Western democratic processes with impunity?
And should the French government deal with these issues in secret, or rather initiate broad public dialogue on a national level, and hold states accountable to international norms as they would for kinetic attacks?

 

Clément Briens is a second year War Studies & History Bachelor’s degree student. His main interests lie in cyber security, counterinsurgency theory, and nuclear proliferation.

Notes: 

[1] Casserly, Martyn. 2017. “What Is A Botnet? How To Protect Your Devices From The Reaper Malware Threat”. Tech Advisor. http://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/security/what-is-botnet-reaper-3666159/.

[2] Davis, Joshua. 2017. “Hackers Take Down The Most Wired Country In Europe”. WIRED. https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/.

[3] Matthews, Lee. 2017. “What Tor Is, And Why You Should Use It To Protect Your Privacy”. Forbes.Com. https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/01/27/what-is-tor-and-why-do-people-use-it/.

[4] “Chapter VII”. 2017. Un.Org. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html.

[5] Smith, David, and Jon Swaine. 2017. “Russian Agents Hacked US Voting System Manufacturer Before US Election – Report”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/05/russia-us-election-hack-voting-system-nsa-report.

[6] Greenberg, Andy, Andrew Selbst, Brian Barrett, Andy Greenberg, Issie Lapowsky, and Garrett Graff. 2017. “NSA Director Confirms That Russia Really Did Hack The French Election”. WIRED. https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-confirms-russia-hacked-french-election-infrastructure/.

[7] “Brexit Referendum Website Might Have Been Hacked: UK Lawmakers”. 2017. U.K.. https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-website/brexit-referendum-website-might-have-been-hacked-uk-lawmakers-idUKKBN17E0NS.

[8] Glaser, April. 2017. “Twitter Bots Are Being Weaponized To Spread Information On The French Presidential Campaign Hack”. Recode. https://www.recode.net/2017/5/6/15568582/twitter-bots-macron-french-presidential-candidates-hacked-emails.

[9] Burgess, Matt. 2017. “Here’s The First Evidence Russia Used Twitter To Influence Brexit”. Wired.Co.Uk. http://www.wired.co.uk/article/brexit-russia-influence-twitter-bots-internet-research-agency.

[10] “Macron Campaign Was Target Of Cyber Attacks By Spy-Linked Group”. 2017. U.S.. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-macron-cyber/macron-campaign-was-target-of-cyber-attacks-by-spy-linked-group-idUSKBN17Q200.

[11] “How France’s TV5 Was Almost Destroyed”. 2017. BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37590375.

[12] Clarke, Richard A., and Robert K. Knake. n.d. Cyber War. Harper Collins p.178

[13] Feldman, Brian. 2017. “DNI Report: High Confidence Russia Interfered With U.S. Election”. Select All. http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/01/report-high-confidence-russia-interfered-with-u-s-election.html.

 

Image Source:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0c/Informal_meeting_of_defence_ministers_%28FAC%29._Arrivals_Florence_Parly_%2836937726031%29.jpg

 

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part I – Brexit, Empire and British Security

By: Dr Samir Puri

The end of its Empire was Britain’s last seismic rearrangement of its alignments and alliances. Today, Britain is slowly and painfully disentangling itself from the European Union. Of course, the two processes are incomparable in all but the most analogical, journalistic terms. Or are they?

“As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human destiny, I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and democracies”, said Winston Churchill in 1948. “The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire… Then there is also the United States… And finally, there is United Europe.”

Britain’s defence and security has been underpinned by positioning itself at the centre of these three overlapping circles. Doing so has conferred to this Sceptred Isle a uniquely advantageous geopolitical position throughout the tumult of the Cold War and beyond.

While Britain has continued to provide a lynchpin between the USA, Europe and many parts of the wider world, what this means has changed a lot in the last 70 years. Britain’s relationship with the United States has experienced its peaks and troughs but has remained constant. Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 led to economic interdependence but stalled any notion of a common currency or political union. But it is the last of the three circles that merit attention here.

In anticipating Brexit’s unfolding, it is the end of Empire that is instructive. There is, as The Economist wrote, an art to leaving in evidence after decolonization, of “breaking up and staying friends”. The Empire was dismantled “as haphazardly as it began, with different territories gaining independence in different ways,” wrote Piers Brendon in The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997. The piecemeal manner of its dismantling is striking. Britain’s hold in the New World was diminished by the independence of the United States in 1776. A later iteration of Empire, with its focus on Asia, was eroded by World War Two. The wartime loss of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 presaged India’s independence five years later. The Suez Crisis of 1956 dealt a blow to British influence in the Middle East. There was, for a time, an aspiration to relocate the Empire’s centre of gravity to Africa, but these colonies became independent throughout the 1960s.

Today, it feels almost otherworldly to conjure up any sense of what the Empire meant. It can also seem immoral, given how out of step much of imperial ideology was in relation to contemporary norms. But to reflect on the defence and security implications of the breakup of the Empire is fruitful. The dismantling of a globe-spanning Empire that had existed in one form or another for centuries was transformative. There was a horrific amount of violence in some theatres of decolonization. But in others, relatively amicable arrangements were made, with security networks underpinning relations between Britain and these former colonies.

The transition from Empire to Commonwealth reminds us that a realignment does not necessarily mean severance. Brexit does not mean the end of Britain’s role in Europe. Rather, it reimagines a relationship that will not suddenly vanish, no matter the dramas of the rupture yet to come.

In a RAND Europe report on ‘Defence and security after Brexit’, the authors observe that “the decision to leave the EU arguably looks likely to have minimal impact on Britain’s conventional defence apparatus in the near term”. In other words, the upheaval for Britain’s military will be moderated by the fact that the EU has never offered a major platform for cooperative military action, and because NATO will remain Britain’s preeminent multilateral military ‘club’. But, RAND opines, “Brexit may pose more immediate practical challenges for security than defence.”

Security, rather than defence, is indeed where Brexit’s impacts will be intricate. The transnational nature of criminality and terrorism and the security implications arising from huge migration flows are for Britain inherently European-facing issues. The Brexit in-tray of UK-EU cooperative policing arrangements is considerable. Policing, serious crime investigations and intelligence work simply cannot be done in the vacuum of a nation-state, given the informational revolution and the relative ease and speed of international travel. The myriad of treaties to be renegotiated will make Brexit akin to uprooting a tree that has had several decades to lay its roots.

The biggest imperial connotation of all, however, is the mindset that led to Brexit in the first place. The essence of British exceptionalism has its roots in the fact that Britain was for so long a globe-straddling superpower. It is perilously hard to argue about the often subconscious impact of the Empire on current British foreign and security policy thinking. Generationally, the impact of the Empire is now much less direct than before. However, a grandiose sense of destiny and purpose – which need not be negative qualities if harnessed in the name of order – still pervade Britain’s sense of global identity.

All national histories are exercises in selective amnesia. The myths that parts of Britain hold of itself – as a plucky nation able to survive on its own wits – are part of the Brexit story. And they spring from the defensive conundrums of bygone ages.  Even in its darkest days, such as after the fall of France in 1940, Britain was able to stand alone and survive a horrific onslaught, while Churchill began ensuring Britain’s survival and longevity as a global player through a realignment with the USA. David Reynolds has called 1940 “the Fulcrum of the twentieth century”. It is not difficult to see why the fall of France began a turn towards the Atlantic – and why this still matters today. The release of Christopher Nolan’s film Dunkirk has almost too much significance to bear.

The Empire and the wars that were fought in its name are essential components of Britain’s sense of global identity. History tells the story that explains Britain’s geopolitical positioning today. Looking historically, and thinking self-reflectively, will be the only way to navigate the humbling that Brexit is sure to spell in relation to British influence in Europe. To imperil British security during the coming realignment is a fate that must be avoided.


Dr Samir Puri is a Lecturer in War Studies where he teaches the MA module on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also serving as a strategy adviser to the Commonwealth Secretariat in the establishment of its Countering Violent Extremism unit. Before joining King’s, Dr Puri worked for the Foreign Office (2009-2015) and for RAND (2006-2009). In 2016 his book, ‘Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups’, was released by the IISS; and he has extended this analysis to the war in Syria for the Telegraph and Observer newspapers. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Strife Interview – Defence Journalist Jean-Dominique Merchet on the French intelligence reforms

Palais de l’Elysée, home of the President of the Republic (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

The French presidential elections are due to take place in a few weeks. They will have a significant impact on the short-term future of this country. The first round will be held on 23 April 2017 and the second round on 7 May 2017. The future Head of State will have to deal with several topics, including the terrorist threats, a hypothetical reform of the intelligence machinery, as well as the future of the European Union (EU).

Strife’s William Moray discusses these issues with defence journalist Jean-Dominique Merchet [@jdomerchet]. Mr Merchet is a journalist for the daily newspaper L’Opinion and he publishes Secret Defense – a professional blog. An expert in defence, strategy, and security issues, he is an alumni of the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence), a public Academic institution dedicated to research and education in defence-related matters. All enquiries as to this article’s content should be sent to the Strife Blog.

WM – You recently wrote an article about some potential French intelligence reforms the future President of the Republic may have to decide upon. Which of these reforms – if any – do you think should constitute a priority?

JDM – The subject of the utmost importance is the nomination of a new ‘DGSE’ (Director-General of the Foreign Security). The need is strong, as Bernard Bajolet will be tending his resignation a fortnight after the presidential election.

In general, I would personally argue on the one hand in favour of maintaining the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE, ‘Directorate-General for Foreign Security’, the foreign intelligence agency) as it is. This organisation is a French particularity, known as an ‘integrated service’ in the sense that it combines different activities. Hence, in equivalent UK terms, with regards to covert operations, the DGSE combines the activities of MI6, the GCHQ and some activities of the SAS. I believe this system is not a bad one, it is efficient. Conversely, some people would like to dismantle the agency. For instance, the military part – i.e. the Service Action, Action Service, the division in charge of covert action – would be reassigned to the Commandement des Opérations Spéciales (COS, ‘Special Operations Command’, similar to USSOCOM). Another possibility would be to establish an equivalent of the NSA which would oversee SIGINT. However, a public servant well aware of this topic has recently suggested that ‘we must make improvements, but this is as simple as changing the parts in a moving car’. I think this sums it up accurately; thus, there is no need to change anything in the DGSE.

What does not work well on the other hand is the Ministry of the Interior (i.e. the Home Office), which in France controls the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI, ‘General-Directorate for Domestic Security’, the domestic intelligence agency, which in France is under the Ministry of the Interior’s supervision). Again, this is strictly my own view, as a long-standing observer of such matters. The Ministry still functions more or less as it did in the early 20th Century, with regards to both law enforcement and domestic intelligence. To this extent, inter-service competition between police and prefets (representative of the state in local governments) remains a major characteristic. Also, the distinction between the National Police and the Paris Police Prefecture is another example of poor management, as this distinction does not make much sense. All things considered, the DGSI is a law-enforcement agency, not a domestic intelligence agency, unlike what the politicians claimed when it was established. Therefore, if there is truly a need for modernisation, it should be directed at the Ministry of Interior. In comparison, the Ministry of Defence – which supervises the DGSE – has considerably modernised in recent years.

WM – In regards to the recent controversy following the publication of the book “Un President ne devrait pas dire cela” was President Francois Hollande right to publish classified information regarding clandestine operations, more particularly ‘opérations homo’?

JDM – He was very wrong to do so. The book’s title speaks for itself, there are certain things the President should not talk about. In fact, I would argue this book finished Hollande of, as he renounced standing for re-election. In other words, this event was the final step of a long and tortuous road. However, the real problem is rather that Hollande and other decision-makers have, and continue to, abuse this military-like attitude, an attitude which I find very disagreeable. I am thinking of the vocabulary which is being used, such as ‘we are at war’. Ideally, one should continue as before whilst talking about it less. In the end, it is not up to politicians to feed the fantasy.

WM – How come the only response the French government has come up with towards the terrorist threats merely consists in the state of emergency, and not a proper strategy? This measure, similar to martial law and therefore intended to be temporary, has been ongoing for over a year (since the Paris attacks in November 2015) and has been extended on five occasions.

JDM – I would not be so categorical as to the absence of a strategy. To declare the state of emergency means to raise the level of alert up to a maximum. From there onwards, diminishing the level of alert becomes extremely hazardous, because it would be political suicide. The point is that the state of emergency is a PR operation; as with any PR operation, it is difficult to go back. For instance, I myself believe that the deployment of military personnel in the streets is of limited use. However, once a decision has been made, it is very difficult to reverse that decision. Nonetheless, the intelligence services, the anti-terrorist units and the police do their job: they prevent terrorist attacks from happening and dismantle terror networks. Nevertheless, it is important to find rules that dovetail well with the daily lives of the citizens.

WM – Yet, France’s response fails to include long-term measures (such as the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) in the UK). Why is that?

JDM – There is no perfect solution to the terrorist threat. Once a cycle of terrorist violence has been initiated, it is difficult to find a way out of it. Long-term solutions must indeed be found such as a means to tackle radicalisation, as well as considering the effects of foreign policy. A brainstorming process is required and improvements can always be found. However, an efficient antiterrorism policy also requires protective – and thus short-term oriented – measures. Short term and long term are not mutually exclusive. Coming up with criticism is one thing, such criticism is a necessity in a democratic system, however, snap judgments are another. You mentioned the United Kingdom. The British were lucky enough not to have suffered any terrorist attack lately, unlike France or Germany. I am not suggesting that the French approach is perfect, but who can claim to have the perfect strategy? The struggle against terrorism is an imprecise science.

French Soldiers patrolling near the Eiffel Tower (Credit: AFP – Gonzalo Fuentes)

WM – France will remain the only nuclear power and a UNSC permanent member of the EU in the aftermath of Brexit. Will Paris thus have increased responsibilities in terms of EU defence as well as diplomacy?

JDM – Not really, in the sense that the issue at stake is power. In that sense, the UK will always have an important role to play in the continent. After all, Great-Britain is a fundamental pillar of NATO. As Theresa May rightly pointed out, ‘the British people have voted to leave the EU, but they did not vote to leave Europe’. I do believe moreover that Brexit needs to be put in perspective, as the UK did not play a great role in either EU integrated defence or external security. Similarly, Brexit will not damage cooperation in regard to anti-terrorism, as intelligence sharing with France is the product of bilateral agreements. Conversely, I am quite sceptical about whether the departure of the UK from the EU will result in an acceleration of the work on the subjects of diplomacy and common defence.

In short, I really doubt that Brexit will cause much of an impact one way or another and thus, the effects this will have on France should be minimal. Brexit is not good for the international order, neither symbolically nor for the image it creates; the practical effects, however, will be limited.

WM – In the wake of the US national election hacks and information leaks during the campaign by several state and non-state actors, how well-equipped is French intelligence to respond to such similar threats – considering that the French presidential and legislative elections are a few months away?

JDM – Who is capable of successfully dealing with a massive cyberattack? Currently, in my view, nobody has this capacity on a large scale.

France is fully aware of the problem and has means of defending itself. The Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale (Defence and national security council) met on Wednesday 1st of March, and this topic was discussed on that occasion. The media regularly mentions this topic, if only to educate the public and raise awareness. For instance, the expression ‘cyberattack’ has different layers. First, it can mean the propaganda being spread by social media. This is also a matter of freedom of speech. The fact that these rumours originate from sources close to the Kremlin (e.g. RT, Sputnik) is not the problem; this is ‘soft power’, and many Western powers similarly make use of it. The West no longer has the monopoly of either power or legitimacy, both are heavily contested. No, the real issue at stake here is that a fraction of the public opinion here in France, believe these ‘trolls’ spread by pro-governmental Russian media. The second layer is the attack which targets and takes down a website. Here again, some defensive measures do exist. Finally, the third layer, i.e.the actual hacking is the theft of confidential data for a specific purpose. There has not – yet – been such a case in France, similar to Wikileaks; however, it might very well happen.

The important thing when it comes to cyberattack and hacking is to stick with facts instead of adopting a fantasy-like approach. For instance, the public has never complained about Wikileaks. A final point, the French electoral system has a very limited use of electronic votes; the French living abroad are the only small portion of the electorate which can vote electronically and only for the parliamentary elections. Therefore, there cannot be any hacking, the ultimate choice is that of the French people. Which brings us back to the real problem at stake, the fact that a segment of the public believes the trolls of the Russian media.

(Following publication of this interview, the French government has suspended this electronic vote on Friday 3rd March, in order to prevent hacking).

This article was translated from French by Strife’s BA Representative William Moray. You can find the French version here.

Image 1 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Paris_-_palais_de_l’%C3%89lys%C3%A9e_-_cour_05.JPG

Image 2 Source: http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/6009862-3×2-940×627.jpg

Feature image source: http://www.lopinion.fr/blog/secret-defense

Entretien avec Jean-Dominique Merchet sur les Réformes du Renseignement en France

La France vivra dans quelques semaines des élections présidentielles dont l’enjeu est de taille pour l’avenir immédiat du pays. De nombreux dossiers attendent le futur chef de l’Etat, parmi lesquels la vague de terrorisme, une hypothétique réforme du renseignement, ou encore l’avenir de la construction européenne.

William Moray, de Strife, s’entretient avec Jean-Dominique Merchet (@jdomerchet) pour évoquer l’ensemble de ces sujets. M. Merchet est journaliste au quotidien L’Opinion et anime le blog Secret Défense depuis 2007. Expert reconnu en matière de défense, de sécurité et de stratégie, il est également auditeur de l’Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN). Pour toute demande relative à cet article, merci de vous adresser à la rédaction de Strife Journal & Blog.

WM – Vous avez récemment écrit un article listant les potentielles réformes du renseignement, réformes sur lesquelles le futur Président de la République devra se pencher selon vous. Laquelle (ou lesquelles) de ces réformes devrait avoir être prioritaire?

JDM – Le point qui me parait être le plus important et le plus urgent est la nomination d’un nouveau directeur général de la Sécurité extérieure (DGSE). Il y a là une contrainte forte, dans la mesure où Bernard Bajolet quittera ses fonctions quinze jours après l’élection présidentielle.

Plus globalement, mon opinion personnelle est qu’il ne faut pas trop toucher à la Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE, le service français de renseignement extérieur). Cette dernière est une spécificité française, un service « intégré », c’est-à-dire qu’elle rassemble divers services. En comparaison avec la Grande-Bretagne, la DGSE regroupe les services du MI6, du GCHQ ainsi qu’une partie des activités des SAS. Je pense que ce n’est pas un mauvais système, qu’il fonctionne bien. Certaines personnes aimeraient ‘casser la maison’, soit pour en retirer les activités militaires (le Service Action passerait ainsi aux mains du Commandement des Opérations Spéciales, le COS), soit pour réorganiser le service technique au sein d’une nouvelle agence, qui serait une NSA à la française. Pour autant, un haut fonctionnaire très impliqué dans ce dossier a récemment suggéré que : « on doit améliorer les choses, mais c’est aussi simple que de changer les pièces d’une voiture en train de rouler ». La formule me parait très raisonnable. Je ne crois donc pas qu’il y ait lieu à transformer la DGSE.

Ce qui ne va pas bien en revanche, c’est le ministère de l’Intérieur, qui en France chapeaute la Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI, le service français de renseignement intérieur). DGSI). Encore une fois, je parle strictement en mon nom propre, en tant qu’observateur attentif de longue date. Ce ministère fonctionne toujours plus ou moins de la même façon qu’au début du 20e siècle, s’agissant aussi bien de la police que du renseignement intérieur. A ce titre, il est toujours marqué par le poids des chapelles qui le composent, à savoir les préfets, la police nationale, etc. La distinction entre la préfecture de police de Paris et la Police Nationale est un autre exemple du problème, cette séparation n’a que peu de sens. Du reste, la DGSI est un service de police au fond et non une agence de renseignement intérieur, contrairement aux affirmations des politiques à sa création. Si modernisation il doit y avoir, ce serait donc davantage au niveau de l’Intérieur. A titre de comparaison, le ministère de la Défense (qui dirige la DGSE) s’est considérablement modernisé.

WM – Pourriez-vous brièvement revenir sur la polémique née de la publication du livre « Un Président ne devrait pas dire cela » ? Le Président Hollande a-t-il eu tort de rendre publiques des informations classées ‘secret défense’ au sujet des opérations spéciales, plus particulièrement des ‘opérations Homo’ ?

JDM – Oui, il a eu tort, évidemment. Comme l’énonce le titre de ce livre, François Hollande n’aurait pas dû faire cela. Je pense d’ailleurs que cet ouvrage l’a achevé, puisqu’il n’a pas pu se représenter. En d’autres termes, cet épisode aura été la dernière étape de son chemin de croix. Le vrai problème toutefois est qu’Hollande et les gouvernants dans leur ensemble ont usé et abuse de cette posture militaire, posture que je trouve très désagréable. J’entends par là le langage qui consiste à dire entre autres choses « on est en guerre ». Dans l’idéal, il faudrait en dire moins tout en en faisant autant. In fine, ce n’est pas aux politiques de nourrir les fantasmes.

WM – Comment se fait-il que l’unique réponse trouvée à ce jour par le gouvernement a la menace terroriste consiste en l’état d’urgence, à défaut d’une stratégie ? Cette mesure, qui par essence même, se veut temporaire et répondre à des circonstances exceptionnelles, a été prolongée a pas moins de cinq reprises depuis son instauration, au lendemain des attentats de Paris.

JDM – Je ne serais pas aussi catégorique quant à l’absence d’une stratégie. L’instauration de l’état d’urgence signifie élever l’état d’alerte au maximum. Il est impossible dès lors de baisser le niveau d’alerte car un tel geste constituerait un suicide politique. En d’autres termes, l’état d’urgence est une opération de communication politique ; le problème est que comme avec toute mesure de communication politique, le retour en arrière est difficile. Par exemple, j’estime personnellement que déployer l’armée dans les rues (dans le cadre du plan Vigipirate) ne sert pas à grand-chose, mais une fois que la mesure est prise, il est très difficile de revenir en arrière. Les services de renseignement, la police font leur travail, empêchent les attentats, dénouent les réseaux. Bien entendu, il importe de trouver des règles de vie ordinaire.

WM – Pourquoi la France est-elle cependant incapable de mettre en place une stratégie avec des mesures sur le long terme, à l’image de CONTEST au Royaume-Uni ?

Personne n’a la solution miracle contre le terrorisme. Une fois engage dans un cycle de terrorisme, on ne va pas s’en sortir comme ça. Il faut penser sur le long terme, bien entendu, ce qui implique trouver une solution contre la radicalisation, ainsi que tenir compte des effets de la politique étrangère. Une réflexion devrait être menée sur ces sujets et bien d’autres, et des améliorations sont toujours possibles. Pour autant, l’effort contre le terrorisme requiert aussi des mesures de protection immédiates, donc focalisées sur le court terme. L’un n’exclut pas l’autre. Il est important d’émettre des critiques, d’autant plus dans le cadre d’un état de droit, pour autant, j’estime qu’il est tout aussi crucial d’éviter les jugements à l’emporte-pièce. Vous évoquez l’exemple du Royaume-Uni ; les Britanniques ont eu la chance d’avoir été ces derniers temps moins touchés que la France ou l’Allemagne. Cependant, la France avait précédemment été épargnée pendant vingt ans tandis que l’on pointait du doigt la politique de Londres jugée trop laxiste à l’encontre des imams (et autres prêcheurs) radicaux. Bien entendu, il y a des choses qui ne marchent pas bien en France ; mais au fond, qui a la bonne stratégie ? La lutte contre le terrorisme n’est pas une science exacte.

Un soldat en patrouille sur l’esplanade du Trocadéro, haut-lieu touristique de Paris face à la Tour Eiffel. Crédit photo : AFP / Gonzalo Fuentes

WM – A l’issue du Brexit, la France restera l’unique Etat membre de l’UE disposant de l’arme nucléaire et disposant d’un siège permanent au Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU. Cette situation place-t-elle Paris face à des responsabilités accrues en matière de politique extérieure ou de défense européenne ?

JDM – Non, pas tellement, dans la mesure où il est question de puissance. A ce titre, les Britanniques auront toujours un rôle important à jouer en sur le continent européen. Nous parlons après tout d’un Etat qui est un pilier de l’OTAN. Comme le soulignait fort justement Theresa May, « les Britanniques ont fait le choix de quitter l’UE mais pas de quitter l’Europe ». Du reste, je pense que l’impact auquel vous faites allusion est à relativiser : le Royaume-Uni ne jouait qu’un rôle limité au sein de l’UE en matière de défense et de sécurité extérieure. La coopération anti-terroriste ne sera pas non plus affectée, puisque les échanges de renseignement, notamment avec la France, ont lieu dans le cadre d’accords bilatéraux. A l’inverse, je ne suis pas non plus convaincu que le départ des Britanniques aura pour effet d’accélérer ces chantiers de diplomatie et de défense commune.

En résumé, je ne pense pas que le retrait de Londres aura grand impact sur l’UE dans un sens comme dans l’autre, et par conséquent les effets sur la France seront minimes. Le Brexit n’est pas bon pour l’ordre international, en termes de symbole et d’image. Mais d’un point de vue matériel, les effets seront limités.

WM – Eu égard aux nombreuses allégations de piratage informatique (émanant d’Etats ou d’autres entités) visant à perturber les récentes élections américaines, les services de renseignement français sont-ils aptes à faire face à une telle menace ? Les échéances électorales (présidentielles et législatives) approchent à grand pas.

JDM – Qui est capable de faire face à une cyber-attaque massive ? Je pense sincèrement que personne ne le peut à l’heure actuelle, pas sur une telle échelle (massive).

Toutefois, la France a conscience du problème et a des moyens pour se défendre. Une réunion du Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale a eu lieu à l’Elysée le mercredi 1er Mars au cours duquel la question a été évoquée. Ce sujet est régulièrement abordé dans les médias, ne serait-ce que parce qu’il importe de sensibiliser le public a la réalité du problème. Par exemple, le terme ‘cyberattaque’ regroupe plusieurs niveaux. D’abord, les réseaux sociaux. Il s’agit ici de propagande, mais nous sommes aussi dans le cadre de la liberté d’expression. Le souci n’est pas tant que ces rumeurs proviennent de sources proches du Kremlin (RT ou Sputnik). Au fond, ce dont on parle, c’est de « soft power », or nombre de puissances occidentales (USA) font de même. Les Occidentaux n’ont aujourd’hui plus le monopole de la puissance et de la légitimité, les deux sont contestés. Non, le problème tient plutôt au fait qu’une partie de l’opinion publique ici, en France, souscrive à ces ‘trolls’ diffuses par les médias russes pro-gouvernementaux. Le second niveau est celui des attaques informatiques qui peuvent bloquer les sites. Encore une fois, il existe des moyens d’y parer, dans la mesure du possible. Enfin, le dernier niveau, le vrai piratage, est le vol de documents confidentiels (données et autres) dans un but précis. En France, nous n’avons pas – encore ? – eu de fuite à l’image de l’affaire Wikileaks, mais cela peut arriver.

Il importe de ne pas se faire une représentation fantasmatique du piratage informatique, au contraire, avoir une approche réaliste et concrète. Par exemple, le public ne s’est jamais plaint de Wikileaks. Par ailleurs, n’oubliez pas que le vote électronique n’a qu’un rôle extrêmement limité dans le système électoral français ; seuls les Français de l’étranger peuvent y avoir recours et dans le seul cadre des élections législatives. Au final, c’est bel et bien l’électorat qui décide, puisque le piratage du scrutin n’est pas possible. Le problème encore une fois est qu’une partie de cet électorat adhère aux trolls de la presse russe.

Depuis cette interview, le gouvernement a annoncé Vendredi 3 mars la suspension du vote électronique, par précaution pour éviter tout risque de piratage. 

Cet article a été traduit en français par William Moray. Vous pouvez trouver la version anglaise ici.

Feature image source: http://www.lopinion.fr/blog/secret-defense

Image 1 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Paris_-_palais_de_l’%C3%89lys%C3%A9e_-_cour_05.JPG

Image 2 Source: http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/6009862-3×2-940×627.jpg

Strife Series on Counterterrorism and Human Rights, Part V – A perpetual state of emergency: the case of France

By: Silvia Sclafani

© AFP / Lionel Bonaventure | Police patrol in Paris on November 14, 2015 at the Eiffel Tower, which has been closed to the public following a series of coordinated attacks in and around Paris late November 13, that left at least 128 people dead.

In times of crisis, governments often impose a state of emergency in which national security takes priority over individual rights originally safeguarded by the state. A state of emergency and the ensuing heightened security measures are intended to last for a short period, during which the government attempts to secure the state and restore order after facing imminent danger. In the case of France, a state of emergency is declared by the President with approval by the Council of Ministers in cases of ‘imminent danger arising from grave attacks on the public order, or circumstances demonstrating public calamity.’ [1] However, the renewal of the state of emergency in France has had a minimal effect on averting terrorist threats and has had disproportionately affected citizens of migrant backgrounds as the extended powers of search, seizure and detention have led to profiling and potential abuse.

Current State of Emergency in France

Since the terrorist attacks in Paris (in 2015) and in Nice (in 2016), France has been under a continued state of emergency with no clear end in sight. After the initial Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, President François Hollande declared a state of emergency in Paris. This was then extended to a nationwide state of emergency in November 2015 after the second terror attack on various locations throughout Paris, which killed 130 people.[2] Since the Nice attacks in 2016, this nationwide-state of emergency has been maintained and recently extended by French lawmakers until after the 2017 elections.

The current state of emergency law allows the government greater policing powers and the ability to conduct searches without warrants, ‘shut down demonstrations, impose curfews, confiscate weapons, and put people under house arrest.’ Given the increasing frequency of terror attacks, France has tightened existing counter-terror measures to decrease the likelihood of yet another terrorist attack against the nation. The French government voted to write the state of emergency law into the constitution as of February of 2016 which expands policing powers even further. The ensuing proposal to ban individuals holding double citizenships of their French one – if convicted of terrorism-related offences – also sparked serious debate. Considering that most French citizens with dual citizenship come from migrant backgrounds, fears that this could lead to higher incidences of migrants being treated as ‘second-class citizens’ rose. President Hollande withdrew this proposal after it caused much backlash and controversy.

Implications for human rights

The state of emergency has proven to have negative effects on human rights. Most notably, these negative consequences affect French Muslim and North African populations, as they make up the majority of those who have been subjected to searches and placed under house arrest. This has led to increased profiling as well as tensions between ethnic French and Arab communities. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘This abuse has traumatized families and tarnished reputations, leaving targets feeling like second-class citizens.’ Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Interior Minister released a statement after the November 2015 attacks condemning the abuse of these expanded powers: some restaurants and homes near Paris were raided and had their doors broken by the police. In another report, the police broke into the home of a couple in the Barbés district in Paris and began beating two men. The police detained the couple and claimed they acted because they heard them use the term ‘Daesh.’ The use of violence and increased suspicion deny these people basic rights such as security and due process.

Effects on security remain questionable  

Despite the dramatic efforts of the French government to identify terror suspects through its emergency measures, only 7 percent of 4,000 searches under the emergency laws have led to court proceedings. Furthermore, post-November 2015 attacks, between 350 and 400 people were placed under house arrest; yet, the Paris counter-terrorism office only opened five terrorism-related investigations during the same period. In reality, French legislation offers favourable powers to its judiciary to proceed with prosecutions against terrorist suspects. The low percentage of court hearings resulting out of measures from the state of emergency laws poses serious questions about their effectiveness. A study conducted by a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry found the continued state of emergencies as having a ‘limited impact’ on security. In terms of the deployment of soldiers at heritage and religious sites, the committee has questioned their usefulness as well. Under operation ‘Sentinelle’, combat troops are deployed to patrol and protect heritage sites as well as religious sites, streets, and art galleries. With over 10,000 troops across France, 6,500 have been deployed in the Paris area alone. Their presence and effectiveness in combatting terrorism have come into question. For some, uniformed soldiers with guns normalise a militarised state. While their presence provides more comfort to the locals as well as tourists, it does not help counter-terrorism efforts, as groups like ISIS have proven to be more sporadic rather than symbolic in their targets.

The populations most affected by these extended policing powers reside in France’s suburbs or banlieues. The term ‘banlieue’ has become a pejorative term referring to poorer suburbs that are located on the outskirts of French cities contain majority migrant as well as Arab populations. These populations find themselves increasingly isolated and stigmatised by society. As these heightened policing measures are increasingly used in the banlieues of France, there is a deterioration of trust between the French-Arab communities and law enforcement. Without a positive relationship between these communities and the government, it makes it more difficult to gather intelligence concerning radicalisation. Therefore, the continued usage of the state of emergency is not effective if the government fails to develop adequate community-based preventive measures. The persistence of the state of emergency is normalising extreme security measures in the name of national security while stripping some citizens of their basic constitutional rights. In their counter-terrorism efforts, lawmakers place too much focus on stricter security without regard for ameliorating social divisions and problems. Instead, the government should focus on the de-stigmatisation of the banlieues, ensure outreach to local Mosques, and increase prison imams. The state of emergency and its policies are exacerbating societal divisions and must change in 2017.

Silvia Sclafani (@ssclafani24) is completing a master’s degree in International Conflict Studies at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has a bachelor’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University and can be reached at ssclafani24@gmail.com.

Notes:

[1] Daniel Severson. ‘State of Emergency: How the Paris Attacks Expanded France’s Police Powers,’ Lawfare. November 15, 2015.

[2] Ibid.

Image Source: http://www.france24.com/en/20151115-what-does-france-state-emergency-mean