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Syria

Feature – Climate Change, Conflict, and Children’s Rights Abuses: Syrian Refugees in Turkey

December 18, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Chiara Scissa

In limbo in Lesbos: Doctors without Borders labelled the Mória Refugee Camp as the ‘worst refugee camp on earth’ (Image credit: Getty Images/AFP/F. Perrier)

Introduction

The world is becoming increasingly aware of the interconnections between climate change, human rights, and its implications on affected populations and countries. It is now widely recognised that climate change adversely impacts the right to life, property, and an adequate standard of living by hampering access to hygiene, water, and food but also adequate healthcare, among many basic necessities. This fact has been most visible during the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011.

According to the data of the Syrian Ministry of State for Environment Affairs and the World Bank, the annual temperature in Syria has increased at a rate of 0.8°C per century since the 1950s. This change is reflected in an increased frequency, length, and intensity of droughts and heatwaves. Decades of unsustainable agricultural policies, the consequent overexploitation of water and soil resources, coupled with the effects of climate change resulted in desertification, higher temperatures, and reduced precipitations. These developments dramatically impacted the agricultural industry, at that time representing twenty-five per cent of Syrian GDP.

Although in-depth research studies have so far not confirmed a causal link between climate change and conflicts, other scholars, such as Ingrid Boas, nevertheless stress that drought and water scarcity may be included among the complex and interlinked pressures that characterise the unrest in Syria. To make matters worse, water infrastructure there was consistently under attack. In a country already hit by drought, attacks on water networks cut services for weeks during the armed conflict, with millions of people suffering from long and deliberate interruptions to a water supply.

According to UNICEF, disruptions in Aleppo encompassed a deliberate forty-eight-day shutdown of a water treatment plant that served two million people. Indeed, the organisation  straightforwardly claimed ‘attacks on water and sanitation are attacks on children.’ Without safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), children’s health, nutrition, safety, and education are at risk. They are exposed to preventable diseases including diarrhoea, typhoid, cholera and polio which may potentially disrupt their early development if not treated on time. Children are also at risk of undernutrition and malnutrition, vulnerable to sexual violence and injury as they collect water.

The report continues by noting that children under fifteen are, on average, nearly three times more likely to die than adults from vector-borne diseases, such as diarrhoeal disease, related to unsafe water and sanitation than violence directly linked to conflict. As a matter of fact, seventy per cent of annual children’s death are attributable to diarrhoea, malaria, neonatal infection, pneumonia, preterm delivery, and the lack of oxygen at birth. For children under five, this probability increases more than twenty times.

With millions of refugees streaming into Europe since the onset of the war, Turkey, as Syria’s closest and ‘safest’ neighbour has been the focal point of this population movement. However, Turkey’s response to the refugees has been a human rights abomination, particularly when it comes to children and minors. This article will describe the steps Turkey has taken to undermine the human rights of Syrian children and why it should not be considered a safe third country.

Children’s rights abuses in Turkey

It has been estimated that due to the Syrian civil war, as of March 2019, one million Syrian children became orphans, 4.7 million children are in need of humanitarian assistance, and another 490,000 of said children are in hard-to-reach areas. Overall, six million Syrians are internally displaced, while another 5.6 million people have left their home country. Most of them fled to Turkey. In response, Turkey passed two foundational pieces of legislation in 2013. First, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection no. 6458, which entered into force in April 2014, and second, the Temporary Protection Regulation – TPR, in 2014. Given that Turkey is one among very few countries which still has the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Syrians and non-European asylum seekers may only be entitled to the weaker standards provided under the TPR.

As pointed out by several authors, temporary protection has a more limited scope than the refugee protection and, in non-compliance with its provisions, health and education services as well as access to social assistance and employment to Syrians are often not delivered. For instance, UNICEF stressed that the situation for refugee children in Turkey remains particularly challenging, given that around 400,000 Syrian children are still out of school and are therefore at likely risk of isolation, discrimination and exploitation. Of 4 million registered Syrians in Turkey, 3.6 million were awarded the TPR, including around 1.5 million children under 18, of which 532,000 are under 5 years of age.

To date, Ankara is yet established a comprehensive human rights framework. Nor does it provide for a specific law addressing (un)accompanied minors. However, under Article 3 of the TPR, (un)accompanied minors are persons with special needs, thus entitled to additional safeguards and priority access to rights and services, such as healthcare, psychosocial support, and rehabilitation. Pursuant to the Turkish Civil Code, unaccompanied minors shall be appointed with a legal guardian, a provision that the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) claims is not respected most of the time.

In this respect, it has been noted that lawyers in Ankara have witnessed difficulties, while in some cases appointed guardians had no qualification for that role. AIDA also noted the persistent coexistence of different procedures applying to the reception and guardianship of unaccompanied minors in Turkey, which gives rise to different standards of treatment. AIDA considers, for instance, that in 2019 the legal assessments of new guardians in Antakya have not been conducted carefully.

Additionally, although Turkey has ratified both the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Exploitation and Abuses, Amnesty International claims that, between 2014 and 2018, Turkey has unlawfully deported Syrians to their home country, violating the principle of non-refoulement. According to such peremptory norm, States are not allowed to remove, deport or expel a person to a country where their life and liberty would be threatened, or where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

This allegation has been also confirmed by Human Rights Watch and questions have been raised by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on migration and refugees of the Council of Europe, on the observance of its international obligations. Amnesty showed that episodes of deportation persisted respectively in July 2019 and May 2020. The victims are mostly men, but there is evidence of children and families deported. Moreover, Syrians at risk of deportation are often left without legal recourse or remedy to prevent their illegal removal, and the UNHCR does not have access to immigration removal centres, as also noted by the European Parliament.

Furthermore, Amnesty International, Save the Children, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, and the Council of Europe accuse Turkey of unlawfully detaining Syrian asylum seekers. In 2017, there were 21 temporary accommodation centres for temporary protection beneficiaries. Some of these have turned into de facto detention centres for Syrians with insufficient food and dire conditions, especially for children. In practice, unaccompanied minors are kept in removal centres in border cities and a number of children begging or selling small objects in the street are detained in police stations, where they often receive documents cancelling their right to stay.

Children with their families are generally detained in removal centres where they are not granted education. For all these reasons, recently, the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey violating Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture), Article 5.4 ECHR (right to remedy), Article 5.1 ECHR (freedom of movement), and Article 13 ECHR (fair trial) in the case of detention pending expulsion of a mother and her 3 children, all Russian nationals, arrested for attempting to cross the Syrian border after entering Turkey.

Finally, another severe breach of children’s rights in Turkey concerns the employment of children under the age of 15, which remains a considerable problem in Turkey. The influx of refugees has led to a quickly growing number of Syrian children working especially in textile factories and agriculture. A 2020 Save the Children report finds that often families only pay smugglers for their children’s trip to Turkey. From there the children need to find jobs to continue their journey to Western Europe.

This particular pattern of emigration exposes them to exploitation, abuses, kidnapping, and detention by smugglers as well as by Turkish authorities. According to Save the Children, ‘out of 254 children interviewed in March 2019, almost thirty per cent worked in one of the transit countries before reaching Belgrade. Almost all of these children (97%) worked in Turkey. Based on the testimonies of those willing to provide this information, the prices of transferring migrants from the country of origin to the desired destination ranged from EUR 6,000 to over EUR 10,000’.

Conclusion

In light of the persistent violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights of Syrians and other non-European persons in need of international protection in general and of (un)accompanied minors in particular, the unfilled lack of a comprehensive human rights framework, and the increasing limitation to basic civil and political rights by the central Turkish government, it comes clear that Turkey cannot be considered anymore, if ever, as a safe third country, where international protection applicants may find guarantees of adequate protection standards.

Similarly, the heads of government and state of the EU Member States that in 2016 signed together with Turkey the so-called EU-Turkey Statement cannot shy away anymore from their international obligations and responsibilities. Neither Turkish President Erdoğan’s autocratic regime, nor the absence of a national human rights framework persuaded the EU to consider Turkey as an unsafe country for refugees and asylum seekers. On this behalf, President Erdoğan repeatedly threatened the EU to open the border with Greece as a way to convince the Union to financially support Turkey’s intervention in Syria. In March 2020, the EU refused to increase its financial aid to Ankara, claiming that EU Member States would not bow to President Erdoğan’s threats. A few days later, the Turkish President opened the gate and thousands of migrants stuck at the Turkish-Greek border to exit the country.

Ankara used migration to put pressure on a weak EU, unwilling to take on its responsibilities towards migratory challenges. The externalisation of actions to curb migration through informal agreements with unsafe non-EU countries, which unlawfully impedes people to leave their soil in exchange for financial and economic benefits, leads to human rights abuses, to breaches of international and EU law, and to extremely serious damages against the victims involved. Many scholars have also pointed out the high risk for the parties involved to violate the principle of non-refoulement, since the removal of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey as the first country of asylum seems not to fulfil the requirement of sufficient and effective protection.

Such a human rights-breaching deal – that trapped over twelve thousand asylum seekers in the Moria refugee camp, which has a capacity to house two thousand – should end immediately. As long as EU Member States will continue to limit the access to international protection in their national territories and to add external barriers to stem migration flows, the Common European Asylum System cannot be more than empty words on the EU Official Journal.


Chiara Scissa is a PhD student in Law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies (Pisa, Italy) and Human Rights and Migrant Protection Focal Point at the United Nations Major Group for Children and Youth (UNMGCY). Her main research interests in migration and refugee studies include the impact of climate change on human rights and environmental migration. Email: chiara.scissa@santannapisa.it

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: children’s rights, Climate Change, conflict, displacement, Syria, Turkey

Should Female Foreign Fighters be Repatriated?

December 14, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Francesco Bruno

While as devoted as their male counterparts, female Jihadis are an underexplored topic of analysis in understanding racidalisation (Image credit: AFP)

It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr‘s death … It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meager, and weak body … It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women‘s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.

-Al-Sha’ab editorial, February 2002

Since the decline of Islamic State (IS), national governments are faced with the dilemma of leaving the remaining Jihadi foreign fighters and their families in Syria or repatriating them for prosecution in their home countries. This article focuses on the choice of the British Government to leave these individuals in Syria. It does so by discussing the associated difficulties to reintegrate jihadi women within society and its impact on existing counterterrorism (CT) strategies and de-indoctrination processes in the United Kingdom. Specifically, the role of female foreign fighters within the culture of Salafi-Jihadism remains underestimated, particularly with regards to their devotion to the cause and survival of the terrorist network.

Historically, a large participation of women in terrorists networks can be seen. According to Jessica Davis, female suicide bombers counted between twenty-eight to thirty-one per cent in Chechnya, while these numbers stand at fifty-four per cent in Nigeria. Similarly, during the 1970s and 1980s in the German Red Army, women counted for one third of the overall number. In the meantime, between 1986 and 2005, of the seventeen terrorist organisations which used suicide-bomb as a tactic, women were active in half of them. The article concludes that due to the lack of access to terrorist networks and their affiliated organisations, experts generally focus on male foreign fighters, as they cover positions of relevance within the organisation. In this sense, opting for repatriation of these individuals could result in a unique opportunity to advance the knowledge on rehabilitation and de-indoctrination procedures.

In terms of numbers, in 2017, there were over 40,000 jihadi fighters who travelled to Syria to fight under the banner of IS. Of the total number, thirteen per cent (or 4,761) were women, with another twelve per cent (4,640) were minors, who joined the terrorist grouping between 2013 and 2018. Since its defeat, around four-hundred foreign fighters, among them about fifty to sixty women, could or have returned to the United Kingdom (UK). A number of these women have not been able to return as Downing Street exercised its power to strip such citizens of their British nationality. This power, granted by the Immigration Act 2014, states that the British Government reserves the authority to deprive a person of their citizenship should that individual have conducted himself or herself in a manner that could compromise the UK’s interests.

One example of a female foreign fighter stripped of her British citizenship is Shamima Begum, a case which British newspaper put in the spotlights. The problem, however, is larger than her. Causing devastation on multiple occasions, the UK confronts a long history of home-grown terrorists which keep CT agencies in constant pursuit. One of the most prominent and famous cases is Samantha Lewthwaite also named the White Widow, the wife of the London 7/7 attacker, Germaine Lindsey, and currently on Interpol’s most-wanted list. Lewthwaite fake her detachment from her husband’s actions and beliefs and convinced the prosecutors of her innocence. She escaped British and European authorities disappearing shortly after. Lewthwaite is also linked to a series of other terror plots including the 2012 bombing in Kenya and in the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013.

At present, the British government decided that foreign fighters should remain in Syrian prison camps. However, the terrorist threat continues, with al-Qaeda’s increased activity in the region could potentially see remaining IS fighters join, detainees released, and both groups absorbed into the Base’s operations. According to the head of MI6: ‘They are likely to have acquired both the skills and connections that make them potentially very dangerous and also experienced extreme radicalisation.’ In this sense, IS’ weaker presence in the region does not reflect a decrease in the overall influence of terrorist organisations, which are likely to benefit from the situation. At the same time, repatriating these individuals would likely result in a higher investment of resources for monitoring and de-indoctrination purposes. Such a development would add further pressure on the criminal justice system and counterterrorism units.

What makes female jihadi fighters so significant in light of such debates? Academics tend to focus primarily on the role of men in terrorist organisations as they cover positions of relevance. The lack of ample information regarding female fighters makes them equally dangerous, and all the more important to understand. Lacking the most up-to-date information on women’s ‘path to Jihad’ makes it difficult for Counterterrorism experts to produce appropriate de-indoctrination procedures fitting these profiles. However, from the available information on radicalisation and focusing on case studies in which women were the subjects, it is possible to understand this important element.

Women often cover ‘less visible,’ albeit critical roles within terrorist organisations. They are educators of the next generation, facilitators, and perpetrators of the jihadi cause through recruitment and management of finances displaying a deep devotion to the cause and a continuation of the religious struggle. The level of indoctrination they have been subjected to in their homes or in camps, but also due to the nature of the motivations for joining the organisations contests to this fact. Multiple psychologists including Yoram Schweitzer and Farhana Ali identified these causes as being much more personal for women. Indeed, they can be with the ‘Four Rs:’ Revenge (the loss of a dominant male in their lives such as husband, father or brother), Redemption (due to alleged or real sexual misconducts), Respect (inability to conceive children or being considered marriageable), and Relationship (being daughters, wives or sisters of well-known insurgents).

Based on their analysis, it is crucial to consider the individual’s unique path to radicalisation and indoctrination. Such a path is clearly based on personal experiences via the justification of events happening to them, their families, and their community. Specifically, each individual justifies the use of violence and the adoption of Islamic extremism based on how they interpret their familiar links to terrorists, often citing hatred against those who killed their family members, and even societal pressure. In a nutshell, ‘terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives.’ Therefore, this link between personal experiences and an individual’s personality transform women, who choose to follow the path of radicalisation, becoming strong believers in violent jihad and demonstrating extreme devotion to the cause.

To conclude, whether to support or criticise the British government on its decision to deny the return of these individuals depends on an in-depth and accurate analysis of the pros and cons of such decisions. The long history of home-grown terrorism in the United Kingdom constitutes an important element of analysis in the choice to repatriate or leaving these individuals in Syria. The example of Samantha Lewthwaite, for example, shows the difficulties associated with the processes of de-indoctrination. In this sense, women have demonstrated to cover essential roles in the fields of recruitment, finance, and perpetration of terrorism, showing a new way to interpret the figure of the ‘terrorist.’ Such a shift inspired scholars to coin an alternative version named the ‘female jihad,’ to understand female fighters’ unique path to radicalisation and, thus, creating a new window of analysis. In this context, repatriation ought to be seen as an opportunity to develop more rigorous de-indoctrination processes which are currently still in the pioneering stage, while using the protection of these individuals as examples to disillusion prospective foreign fighters.


Francesco Bruno is a full-time first-year PhD Candidate in Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, focusing on the organisational practices and choices of terrorist organizations with al-Qaeda as a primary case study. He received a BScEcon in International Politics from Aberystwyth University in 2016 before moving to the University of Manchester where he obtained a MA in Peace and Conflict Studies in 2017. During his studies, he took part in research trips in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda where he conducted fieldwork regarding the pacification and peace processes. Francesco’s main areas of interest span from Peace processes to state-building as well as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency with a focus on Afghanistan and Iraq

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, bomber, female jihadi, female terrorist, Francesco Bruno, Iraq, IS, Islamic State, jihadi, Syria, terrorism, terrorist, terrorist bomber

The Lasting Relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Case of Syria

August 13, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Etfa Khurshid Mirza

Unexploded barrel bombs allegedly dropped by government helicopters are pictured here in Idlib, Syria in 2015 (Image credit: Getty Images)

 

A history of conventions, agreements, and treaties runs throughout human civilisation. The 19th and 20th Centuries witnessed a rise in such conventions, thereby paving the way to cap burgeoning conflicts globally. Yet, despite such mechanisms being implemented, the world still witnesses many of the deadliest wars, with toxic chemicals being a primary weapon of choice. The poison gasses of the Great War and the atomic bomb that settled the Second World War left many casualties in its wake; with the former compelling world leaders to negotiate a new convention that sought to prohibit the deployment of Chemical Weapons (CW). 


Being largely non-binding, an ongoing effort to ban the use of CW can be discerned since at least the 17th Century. It is only starting from the late 19th Century onwards that formal agreements were made between states.
The Hague Declaration of 1899 banned the use of asphyxiating or deleterious gasses such as nitrogen or noble gases. Then, in 1907, the Hague Convention on Land Warfare banned the use of poisonous weapons. The Geneva Protocol signed of 1925 further prohibited the use of poisonous gases and bacterial methods of warfare. In so doing, these Hague conventions laid out the rule of war and the prohibition of CW in war; while the Geneva conventions sought to protect the victims of war. This was followed by the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in 1980 which prohibited conventional weapons that were deemed to be inhumane. Nonetheless, despite such efforts, chemical weapons (CW) were still used during conflicts.

 

Between the two World Wars, the use of CW was reported in many conflicts: Spain used chemical weapons in Morocco during the Rif War between 1923 to 1926 war. Italy, in turn, deployed chemical weapons to Libya in 1930 and again to Ethiopia in 1935, all resulting in heavy casualties. Since 1945, millions of casualties were caused by such means. After the Second World War, despite acquiring nuclear weapons, the US and the former Soviet Union continued the development of CW. The US used anti-plant agents in the Vietnam War of 1961-73, while Egypt used chemical weapons during the Yemen war of 1963-67. Iraq similarly aimed its CW capabilities towards the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War of 1988. 

 

Extensive use of CW in various conflicts despite the earlier agreements signed as part of the Hague and Geneva Conventions necessitated the formation of a comprehensive treaty that can cap the production, use, and stockpiling of such toxic weaponry. Therefore, negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) began in early 1968. While initially developing at a protracted pace, these talks eventually gathered momentum after the Iran-Iraq war of 1988. This war, however ironically, also generated interest among Middle Eastern countries for the acquisition of CW. This sentiment ultimately expedited the negotiations, leading to the conclusion of CWC in 1992. The CWC formally entered into force in 1997, with its implementation monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).


The CWC aims to ban chemical weapons in terms of their development, production, stockpiling, and use. It is the most comprehensive disarmament treaty to date having 193 member states. Since its formation, the most important cases of use of CW were reported in
Syria. In 2012 and 2013, the Assad Regime used these weapons against opposition forces, killing around 1,400 civilians. The use of chlorine gas in attacks has also been documented during attacks in 2017 and 2018. Already in 2014, the OPCW sent its Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to the country to investigate whether CW were used in Syria and if so, to determine the type of weapons used. 


Since then, the OPCW’s FFM has investigated over eighty suspected attacks and collected evidence in sixteen of those attacks. Still, it is important to note that the FFM does not carry the mandate to investigate which party holds the responsibility. To determ
ine which party is to be held accountable the OPCW-UN Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) was established in 2015. This mechanism concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for four CW attacks, while the Islamic State (IS) was responsible for two. Despite such useful insights, however, the JIM findings were unfortunately challenged by Russia; and after its veto in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding its extension, the JIM ceased to exist. 


In March 2019, another Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) was finalised after repeated attempts by the U.S and other states to carry out investigations based on shreds of evidence and to determine responsibility for CW use by the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT initiated its investigation in June 2019 and focused on the events for which FFM had ascertained the use or likely use of CW by the Syrian government but had not yet reached a final conclusion. The IIT published its first report: ‘
Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’ on 8 April 2020, acknowledging that the Syrian government has used CW against its people.


The three key events specified in the report occurred after the Syrian accession to the CWC. Before, in 2016, the OPCW confirmed the destruction of all CW declared by Syria. The incident of 24 March 2017 was the first such event that established the use of sarin gas in Syria after it had acceded to the CWC. On the Syrian city of Ltamenah, three different attacks were carried out, on 24 and 30 March, a fighter jet of the Syrian Arab Air Force dropped M-4000 aerial bombs containing sarin and on 25 March a Syrian military helicopter flying from Hama airbase dropped cylinders containing chlorine gas. 


Sa
rin is a nerve agent, whereas chlorine is a legal industrial gas; yet both their usage as CW is a war crime. The IIT based its conclusions from the information gathered through interviews, analyses of samples obtained from attacked sites, remnants of ammunition, and other relevant material. The team also expressed its concern that the Syrian government did not cooperate in its investigation and denied access to several sites. As such, the IIT concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian government had used CW on its citizens in the attacks carried out in March 2017.


Following the findings of this report, the Executive Council of OPCW, which consists of forty-one members from five regional groups, decided the use of CW in Syria through voting on 9 July 2020. The Council condemned the use of CW by the Syrian government in 2017 and as per paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the CWC, the Syrian government is required to declare all the relevant details of the used CW mentioned in the report and all other CW that it possesses with details of production facilities, as well as resolve all of the remaining issues regarding the previous declaration within ninety days. If it fails to comply, the Council will take appropriate action against the Syrian government as per paragraph 2 of Article X11 of the Convention. 


Considering its activities towards destroying chemical weapons and as the overseeing body for the CWC, which is considered the most successful disarmament treaty to date; the OPCW is playing a significant role as a watchdog. In recognition of its efforts; it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013. The role of the OPCW is becoming more pertinen
t with the growing chemical industry and its use in both civil and military applications and, therefore, can play an active role in assisting the state parties for the legislation and effective enforcement in its implementation. Decisions in respect of CWC implementation for long-term governance are also needed. However, technological developments and political interests are increasingly pressuring the treaty. Timely measures and special efforts are presently required to counter these challenges and to prevent the future use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world taking lessons from the use of CW in the past and, most recently, in Syria.


Etfa Khurshid Mirza is a Research Fellow at Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Pakistan. Her area of specialisation is Nuclear and Strategic Affairs. She can be found on Twitter @sky_limiter.

 

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Chemical Weapons, Etfa Khurshid Mirza, Syria, Syrian Civil War

War’s Invisible Killer: We Must Not Forget Populations Affected by Conflict during COVID-19

April 20, 2020 by Strife Staff

by Charlotte Hooker

A Syrian boy poses for a picture during an awareness workshop on coronavirus at a camp for displaced people in Atme town in Syria’s northwestern Idlib province (Image Credit: Aaref Watad/AFP)

 

Governments across the globe are acting on the informed assumption that deaths related to COVID-19 will rise so long as the number of cases exceeds the capacity of domestic healthcare services. The necessary response is compulsory social isolation and strict hygiene measures. In China, Europe, and the US, public places have been closed, mass gatherings banned, and public awareness campaigns have been initiated to offer guidance on how to wash one’s hands effectively. But in war-torn countries, where governments and healthcare systems have collapsed, running water is scarce, and soap is an unaffordable luxury, these measures are near impossible to implement. COVID-19,  just like the countless diseases before it, will “ruthlessly exploit the conditions created by war.” Without a collective global response that accounts for the needs of conflict states and its displaced populations, the consequences of COVID-19 could be catastrophic.

The connection between war and disease is well documented in history. Before the 20th Century, combatants were more likely to die from disease than they were from battle wounds. In the Crimean War, for example, British soldiers died from sickness almost eight times more than they did from conflict-induced injuries (Pennington, 2019). As medicine advanced and basic hygiene practices improved, the emergence and spread of infectious disease amongst combatants was curbed considerably. However, this did little to contain the influenza pandemic of 1918–1919. The pandemic coincided with the mass migration of soldiers back to their home countries and resulted in the death of between 20 million–100 million people worldwide. This highlighted the burden that war placed on the health of civilian populations, which has only worsened as densely populated urban settings have become the primary hosts of major hostilities (Haraoui, 2018).

In Syria, healthcare services became an integrated part of the conflict. Between 2011 and 2014 alone, 57% of public hospitals were damaged and 160 doctors were jailed or killed. Vaccination coverage fell from 91% in 2010 to 45% in 2013 contributing to the re-emergence of polio, measles, and cutaneous leishmaniasis in Syria and neighbouring countries, particularly amongst displaced populations. COVID-19 presents the greatest threat to these people.

According to the UN High Commission on Refugees, there are currently 70.8 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, most of whom live in deplorable living conditions. On the Greek island of Lesbos, the Moria refugee camp “has one water point for every 1,300 people and one toilet for every 200 people,” says Apostolos Veizis, Director of Medical Operational Unit at Doctors Beyond Borders for Greece. In Idlib, refugee camps in north-western Syria, there are 1.4 doctors per 10,000 people, only 100 adult ventilators and fewer than 200 intensive care unit beds. Fatima Um Ali, a Syrian refugee, and her family have avoided death on multiple occasions since fleeing the Syrian conflict, “but what now,” she says, “we are going to be afraid of [COVID-19].” Without running water and soap, and no chance of isolating her family of 16 in the crowded settlements of Idlib, it will be difficult for Fatima’s family to dodge death once more.

Displaced populations are often dependent upon humanitarian assistance for survival. This is because healthcare services in conflict zones have long since collapsed, and any remaining government regime usually lacks funds or geographic reach to mobilise the necessary health, food, or economic resources. Bangladesh, for example, relies upon youth activists to educate Rohingya refugees from Myanmar on the importance of proper hygiene. Even in camps that are better off, conditions are ripe for COVID-19 to run rampant. According to Muriel Tschopp, Jordan Country Director at the Norwegian Refugee Council, the quasi-lockdown in Jordan in response to COVID-19 has grounded all Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), preventing them from providing daily service assistance, and reducing cash opportunities for refugees as local organisations are forced to halt business.

That is not to say that action has stopped entirely. In a recent interview, Muriel Tschopp explains that they have been using existing mechanisms, such as their database of refugee contact details, to contact those living in temporary settlements to provide guidance on how to limit the spread of disease. Similar action has to be taken by other NGOs. Doctors Beyond Borders representatives explain that they have been working with displaced peoples living in the camps to ensure the populations have access to information that will prevent disease spread and reduce panic. But this is not enough.

What is required is an international commitment to the protection of basic needs and care of conflict-affected populations. In a virtual press conference on March 23, 2020, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for “an immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world.” Warring parties in some states, including Yemen and Cameroon, have agreed to the ceasefire in order to allow focus on the fight against COVID-19. This is a good start. Now, states across the world must mobilise funds to support the provision of basic resources such as water sanitation systems, hygiene kits, and food over the coming months, with immediate effect—if there is one lesson the world can learn from the 1918 flu, it is that early and sustained action saves lives.

Some believe that it is the duty of the government to prioritise its own citizens. The Trump Administration is proposing a USD$3 billion cut in funding for global health programmes, including halving its funding for the World Health Organisation who currently leads the fight against COVID-19. But if we turn our focus inward, and let fear be used as ammunition to stigmatise those who are not ‘one of us,’ we will have failed the test of humanity. A failure to address the basic needs of conflict-affected populations will mean thousands of needless deaths and this will not be contained to displaced populations. Disease knows no borders, so the only way to prevent the spread across temporary settlements, neighbouring states, and beyond is to ensure universal preparedness. A collective global response that accounts for all human life is crucial in the fight against COVID-19. The world has come together in the past to fight common evils. We can do it again.


Charlotte is studying for a MA in International Relations at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Prior to postgraduate study, Charlotte studied Politics and Economics BSc at the University of Southampton where she was awarded the highest dissertation mark in the discipline. During her undergraduate studies, she completed a Year in Employment at Ofgem, supporting work on domestic energy policy. Her research interests include space security, cybersecurity, energy security and the role of industry in the fight against climate change, and the international political economy and security implications of a rising China.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Uncategorized Tagged With: Charlotte Hooker, Coronavirus, COVID-19, Refugees, Syria, United Nations, World Health Organisation

Franchise Jihad: The Role of the Bedouin for ISIL in Sinai

November 24, 2019 by Strife Staff

by Joseph Jarnecki

A snapshot of life for civilians in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula – a region wracked by conflict between Sinai’s ISIL affiliate and Egyptian security forces (Image Credit: 2017 CGTN)

The fall of Baghouz – the last bastion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – was meant to mark the end of the US-led coalition’s war. Instead, the battle was yet another milestone in the evolution of the self-appointed Caliphate. Stripped of contiguous territory, the pseudo-state now pursues its global Jihad by franchising its own brand of militancy to those groups it established, supported, or co-opted whilst at its height.[i]

The grouping Wilayat Sinai (WS) – or “Sinai Province” – which operates in Egypt’s easternmost region, the Sinai Peninsula, is an exemplar franchise. Swearing allegiance to ISIL in 2014, the group originally coalesced in 2011 from a diverse array of militant outfits under the name Ansar Bayat al-Maqdis (ABM – “the Partisans of Jerusalem”).[ii] Spearheading Sinai’s militant activity since its founding, WS’s campaign alone has inflicted over 1,200 casualties on security forces since 2014, leading Human Rights Watch (HRW) to classify the Peninsula as host to a Non-Intentional Armed Conflict (NIAC).[iii] Appreciating this context then, a broadened understanding of the enabling factors behind WS is fundamental to tackling both intra-Egypt militancy and the next steps of ISIL.

In this article, I will highlight the harmful nature of regime governance and its targeting of Sinai’s majority Bedouin population. Historic marginalisation of the Bedouin by Cairo, I believe, has been crucial to creating a climate in which WS could emerge and thrive.

Sinai’s Bedouin population: a rough outline of tribal land (Image credit: 2017 Discover Sinai and 2009 Clinton Bailey)

The return of Sinai and the reincorporation of the 15-20 Bedouin tribes whose lands criss-cross the Sinai/Israel/Palestine border in 1982 was a hollow victory for those Bedouin who gathered intelligence and facilitated Egyptian espionage whilst under Israeli occupation.[iv] The Cairo government pushed a narrative that quickly branded the Bedouin as Israeli ‘collaborators’ for taking available economic opportunities whilst under Israeli rule.[v] This perception has since been institutionalised and cements Egyptian nationalist sentiment wherein Bedouin identity is synonymous with primitiveness, criminality, and terrorism.[vi] A comment made by an Egyptian security official operating in Sinai that ‘the only good Bedouin is a dead Bedouin’ typifies this attitude.[vii]

Perceptions of Bedouin as “non-Egyptian” – emphasised by Cairo – then legitimise discriminatory policies which formalise the Bedouin as second-class citizens and Egypt as the Bedouin’s ‘fourth colonizer’.[viii]  Strategies reflecting this perception include the confiscation of over 200,000 acres of tribal land since Egyptian reoccupation, stripping the Bedouin of access to an agrarian livelihood.[ix] Meanwhile, this stolen land is given to Nile Valley settlers – as part of government plans to ‘Egyptianise’ Sinai [x] – or sold to state-linked tourism developers in South Sinai, promoting an industry in which Bedouins are barred from participating.[xi] Moreover, beyond the private sector, the Bedouin are excluded from the security forces and until 2007 were unable to vote.[xii] Both these measures exemplify the contempt with which the Bedouin are held by the government. Specific day-to-day governance in Sinai extends this contempt to broader securitisation of the Bedouin (wherein speech acts by the Egyptian government transform Bedouin communities from political constituencies into security threats)[xiii] with arbitrary mass arrests and forcible disappearances becoming ‘part of daily life’.[xiv]

Many Bedouins who are disaffected with government and are cut adrift from legitimate economic opportunities have in desperation turned to clandestine alternatives. Tribes, especially those with strong Gazan links and with lands which straddle the Israeli-Egyptian border now smuggle arms, drugs, and, more infrequently, militants. The 2008 escalation between Hamas and Israel as well as the imposition of an Egyptian supported embargo of Gaza has only increased this activity. Estimates now put the annual revenue from smuggling at $300 to $500 million [xv] and in just 2008 an expansion of smuggling and its related activities shrunk the estimated formal and informal unemployment rate of Rafah – a large North Sinai town – from 50% to 20%.[xvi]

As a result of smuggling, ‘sophisticated and heavily armed gangs’[xvii] have emerged which provide economic opportunities and a chance of retaliation against the security forces. At the same time, because of their inability to provide similar incentives, tribal leaders have lost influence, especially over ‘new generations of disgruntled youth’.[xviii] These gangs smuggle for WS who have used ISIL’s funds and its ideational authority to source sophisticated weaponry and recruit approximately 1,500 combatants.[xix] Some of these fighters are young Bedouins who work the smuggling lanes and are either radicalised or lured by the chance to get back at security forces.[xx] Examples of WS Bedouin are few, however, with the ISIL affiliate being mostly composed of deserters from Egyptian security forces, ‘persistent local insurgents,’ and foreign veteran insurgents.[xxi] The prevalence of the last category within WS means local guides and boltholes, crucial to operating an insurgency that relies on asymmetrical information to combat superior armed forces, are needed and are most easily sourced from amongst the Bedouin.

In the  ‘880 attacks between the beginning of 2014 and the end of 2016’ [xxii] carried out by WS, Bedouin assistance has been indispensable, providing local knowledge without which the militant’s hit-and-run tactics would fail in the face of an estimated ‘500:1 [military] power’ imbalance.[xxiii] Their provision of auxiliary support by procuring weapons and personnel whilst also acting as guides and maintaining safe havens demonstrates the true cost of their marginalisation for the Egyptian government.

Despite the generation’s worth of persecution faced by the Bedouin, the current status quo does not have to continue. The relationship between the Bedouin, even those in charge of smuggling operations, and WS is not positive. Replicating ISIL strategies, WS has sought to seize areas and enforce their interpretation of Islam.[xxiv] To this end, they operate ‘multiple detention sites where they interrogate detained civilians,’ including Bedouins.[xxv] Additionally, extensive attacks on Sinai’s Christian population ostracise some Bedouin like the Jebeliya tribe, who has deep-rooted historical links to Sinai’s Christian orthodox population. Moreover, a WS crackdown on cigarette and marijuana smuggling damages relations with those same Bedouin smugglers on whom they rely.[xxvi]

In light of this, the door is not closed for a rapprochement between Bedouin tribal leaders and Egypt’s government, though the intricacies of this process will require careful handling. The first step must be to reincorporate Sinai as an integral part of Egypt’s identity and to acknowledge the Bedouin’s place within the Peninsula. By legitimising their status as citizens and bringing arbitrary arrests to an end, the government may win over those Bedouin who are on the front-line of insurgent violence. Reconciliation with the Bedouin, however, will also require an end to their economic exclusion from agriculture and tourism. As Bedouins integrate within the legitimate economy, WS will be deprived of the auxiliary support on which they must rely to survive.  Whilst Sinai only offers a snapshot into the future of ISIL, it is an important one. A central lesson the conflict offers is that when a franchise of ISIL emerges, we must look beyond its links to the self-appointed Caliphate and examine the unique structural conditions which facilitate its existence where it arises.


Joseph is a third-year BA student in International Relations at the King’s War Studies Department. His main areas of focus are conflict and (in)security in the Middle East and North Africa, particularly Egypt, and on theories of subjectivity within International Relations. His dissertation project aims to incorporate these areas of interest when investigating how critical military studies – specifically its reappraisal of militarism – contribute to analyses of formerly colonised spaces. Before joining King’s Joseph interned with the Huffington Post and established a school magazine on a diverse range of subjects. You can follow him on Twitter @Jarnecki.


[i] Michael Hart, ‘The Troubled History of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula’, International Policy Digest, 2016 <https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/05/30/the-troubled-history-of-egypt-s-sinai-peninsula/> [accessed 10 June 2019].

[ii] Iffat Idris, Sinai Conflict Analysis (Britghton: Institute of Development Studies, 2 March 2017), p. 3 <https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/13052> [accessed 29 May 2019].

[iii] Human Rights Watch, ‘If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, Leave Sinai!’: Egyptian Security Forces and ISIS-Affiliate Abuses in North Sinai (Human Rights Watch, 2019), pp. 2 & 35 <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/egypt0519_web3_0.pdf>.

[iv] Sahar F. Aziz, ‘Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS: Lessons from Sinai’, Nebraska Law Review, 95.2 (2016), 308–65 (p. 322).

[v] Oliver Walton, Conflict, Exclusion and Livelihoods in the Sinai Region of Egypt (Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 20 September 2012), p. 7 <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq834.pdf> [accessed 6 November 2019].

[vi] Sahar F Aziz, De-Securitizing Counterterrorism in the Sinai Peninsula (Washington and Doha: Brookings Institution, April 2017), pp. 13–14 <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/de-securitizing-counterterrorism-in-the-sinai-peninsula_aziz_english.pdf> [accessed 3 June 2019]; Idris, pp. 8–10.

[vii] Wikileaks, Internal Security in Sinai–an Update (Egypt Cairo, 14 March 2005) <https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05CAIRO1978_a.html> [accessed 1 August 2019].

[viii] Angela Joya and Evrim Gormus, ‘State Power and Radicalization in Egypt’s Sinai’, The Researcher: The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies, 1.1 (2015), 42–40 (p. 52).

[ix] Sahar F. Aziz, p. 327.

[x] Joya and Gormus, p. 55.

[xi] Idris, p. 10.

[xii] Walton.

[xiii] Ole Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research Copenhagen, 1993).

[xiv] Human Rights Watch, p. 3.

[xv] Idris, p. 10; Sahar F Aziz, p. 3.

[xvi] Sahar F. Aziz, p. 337.

[xvii] Walton, p. 6.

[xviii] Sahar F. Aziz, p. 328.

[xix] Hart.

[xx] A Batrawy, ‘Egypt’s Most Extreme Hardliners in Sinai Revival’, Associated Press, 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10392343>.

[xxi] Omar Ashour, ISIS and Wilayat Sinai: Complex Networks of Insurgency under Authoritarian Rule, DGAP Kompakt (Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 2016), p. 8 (p. 6) <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/54270/ssoar-2016-ashour-ISIS_and_Wilayat_Sinai_Complex.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2016-ashour-ISIS_and_Wilayat_Sinai_Complex.pdf>.

[xxii] Omar Ashour, ‘Sinai’s Insurgency: Implications of Enhanced Guerilla Warfare’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 42.6 (2019), 541–58 (p. 546) <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1394653>.

[xxiii] Ashour, ISIS and Wilayat Sinai: Complex Networks of Insurgency under Authoritarian Rule, pp. 5–6.

[xxiv] Human Rights Watch, p. 9.

[xxv] Human Rights Watch, p. 37.

[xxvi] Idris, p. 4.

 

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Bedouin, feature, IS, ISIL, ISIS, Joseph Jarnecki, Syria

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