India

A Balancing Act? Women’s Participation in Indian Politics

May 16, 2019 by Strife Staff

By Saawani Raje

17 May 2019

Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman with military chiefs (Indian Express)

On 9 August 1942, Aruna Asaf Ali walked into a highly charged gathering of thousands of Indians at the Gowalia Tank Maidan in Mumbai and unfurled the tricolour flag launching the ‘Quit India’ movement against British rule. A prominent political leader in the Indian nationalist movement, she later went on to become the first mayor of Delhi in 1958.

Female leadership of this kind was not without precedent in India. As early as 1925, Sarojini Naidu became the president of the Indian National Congress, the main nationalist party in India before and after independence. Since then, the number of women in leadership positions in Indian politics has only increased. Indira Gandhi became the first female Prime Minister of India in 1966 and the second democratically elected female leader in the world. Sonia Gandhi, President of the Congress Party from 1998 to 2017 was one of the most powerful women in India and led her party to power twice at the Centre in two general elections. Other prominent female figures include Jayalalitha Jayaram– the first female Opposition leader in India, Mayawati, the leader of the third-largest party in India in terms of vote share, and Mamata Banerjee, the only female Chief Minister in India today.

Significantly, both the Defence Minister and the External Affairs Minister in India today—Nirmala Sitharaman and Sushma Swaraj— are women, holding portfolios that have been traditionally male-dominated. While cause for celebration, these examples are the exceptions to the rule when it comes to female participation in politics and decision-making.

This piece explores the juxtaposition of women’s participation in politics in India—as voters and as political leaders. It argues that using examples of powerful women leaders to point to the success of female empowerment in India ignores more structural and systemic limitations women in politics face in India today.

Women as voters

Women have played a key role as voters since the first election in India. With the introduction of Universal Adult Franchise, women were given equal voting rights to men since India became independent in 1947. However, in a stunning manifestation of the entrenched patriarchy, many women, especially in North India, wanted to be registered on the electoral role as “wife of” or “daughter of” instead of under their own names. The electoral officials did not allow this and Ornit Shani estimates that out of a total of nearly 80 million potential women voters in independent India, nearly 2.8 million failed to disclose their names and therefore could not be included in electoral rolls.

Women’s participation as voters in the decades after Indian independence remained low—female voter turnout lagged behind male turnout by 11.3% in 1967. This gap began to narrow in the 1990s, falling to 8.4% in 2004 and further reducing to 4.4% between 2004 and 2009. The past election in 2014 saw the closing of this gender gap to its narrowest on record—only 1.8%. In fact, in half of all Indian states and union territories, the female turnout surpassed the male turnout. This trend was repeated in the recent state elections held between 2012 and 2018 where women voters surpassed the male turnout in twenty-three Indian states.

Women casting their vote in a recent election (LiveMint)

This has made female voters a significant voter block for the leading political parties in the run up to the elections—and women and women’s issues have started to come to the fore in election rhetoric. At a recent rally in Rajasthan, Congress President Rahul Gandhi said that his party would seek to appoint women as Chief Ministers in half the states it rules by 2024. Another example is the controversy surrounding Gandhi’s statement that the Prime Minister had “asked a woman to defend him”, referring to Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s speech in a parliamentary debate about the contentious Rafale deal. The BJP responded with alacrity. Prime Minister Modi immediately rebuked the Congress leader for his “insult to the women in the country,” while BJP President Amit Shah demanded that Gandhi apologise for the remark. This seems to reflect an increase in the power of women voters. Women are now a significant enough voting block for political parties to turn comments like these into a battleground for their rhetoric in the run-up to the election. In contrast however, women continue to be underrepresented in policymaking roles within politics.

Women as political leaders

Women have occupied positions of power in Indian politics. Women made up almost five percent of elected representatives in the first Lok Sabha (lower house) in 1952 as compared to two percent in the US House of Representatives and three in the UK Parliament during the same period. However, over the next seven decades, women’s growth in policymaking roles has stagnated. Women make up only 11.2% of the members of the Lok Sabha after the 2014 elections^[1] and only 9% in state legislatures. India ranks fifth in women’s political representation in parliament in South Asia, behind Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal.

There are many reasons for this underrepresentation. A significant factor is patriarchal attitudes towards female leadership in politics, where women politicians are often seen as fulfilling certain gender-specific roles. An exemplar of this is Indira Gandhi’s rise to the Congress party leadership—a move orchestrated by senior Congress leaders who saw Gandhi as a puppet willing to do their bidding. According to the Economic Survey 2018, other major obstacles faced by aspiring female representatives include domestic responsibilities, female illiteracy, financial disparity, lack of confidence and an increase in threats of violence.

An initiative to combat this disparity was implemented in 1993 as part of the 73^rd amendment of the Indian constitution, whereby 33% of all seats in local self-government institutions were reserved for women. Since the enactment of this legislation, the representation of women in local administrations has increased to 44.2%. A study commissioned by the Poverty Action Lab showed that this increase in female representation heightened police responsiveness to crimes against women, improved children’s nutrition and education, improved male perceptions of female leaders, increased the aspirations of girls, and helped women get elected in subsequent elections.

In spite of this, deep-rooted structural problems remain. In 1996, the Women’s Reservation Bill was introduced which proposed to reserve 33% of the seats in the Lok Sabha for women. The bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha (upper house) in 2010 but lapsed in 2014 with the dissolution of Parliament. Passing this bill was also an election pledge of the current government but, five years later, there remains little sign of it becoming law. This bill has been left languishing for 22 years, and the representation of women therefore remains severely limited. The women voters turning out in large numbers actually have very few women to represent their issues and views in law-making bodies.

The political imbalance

Female representation in Indian politics thus remains conflicted and suffers from deep structural and systemic difficulties. The many examples of female leadership in Indian politics do tell a story of female empowerment—but celebrating this without looking deeper into existing disparities risks only half the story being told. To really address the gender disparity in Indian politics, the focus instead needs to turn to the representation of women as decision-makers and policymakers—the keepers of real political power in the world’s largest democracy.

Saawani is a PhD candidate at the King’s India Institute and a recipient of the King’s India Scholarship. Her PhD research is primarily a historical examination into civil-military decision-making during crises in independent India. After graduating from the University of Cambridge, she obtained an MA in South Asia and Global Security. She was previously a Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi, on the Oxford University Press Handbook on Indian Foreign Relations. While at King’s, she has been the Programme Manager for the FCO Diplomatic Academy South Asia Conference and has been teaching undergraduates at the Department of War Studies. Her wider research interests include diplomatic history, foreign policy, diplomacy and the study of contemporary conflicts. You can follow her on Twitter @saawaniraje.

India and Pakistan on the Brink of War at Jammu and Kashmir: What Role for China?

March 6, 2019 by Strife Staff

By Axel Dessein

6 March 2019

Putting the RIC back in BRIC. Russia, India and China met for a trilateral meeting between the country’s foreign ministers, against the backdrop of the unfolding crisis in Jammu and Kashmir (China Daily)

Next to the ongoing U.S.-China trade war and the premature ending of Donald Trump’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un in Vietnam’s Hanoi, it seems somewhat odd that the risk of war between the two nuclear-armed countries India and Pakistan was only the third newsworthy item last week. In retaliation of a suicide bombing against Indian paramilitary police in the Pulwana district of Jammu and Kashmir earlier last month, Mirage 2000 planes of the country’s air force on February 26 bombed a presumed stronghold of Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists in the town of Balakot, located inside Pakistani territory. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) shot down two Indian Air Force (IAF) MiG-21 fighter jets on February 28, leading to the arrest of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman. While the captured pilot was released on March 1 as a peace gesture by Pakistan’s prime minister Imran Khan, the fog of war has not yet receded.

The other fighter pilot presumably went down in Indian-controlled Kashmir, according to Major General Asif Ghafoor. There are also reports which indicate that the IAF shot down an F-16 of the PAF, but proof remains meagre at best. The suicide bombing, the deadliest since the beginning of the insurgency in 1989, set into motion a simmering spiral of events, which seemed to carry through over the weekend, with shelling resuming across the Line of Control (LoC) on Friday but declining in intensity later on. In this article, I aim to first focus on the crisis that took place, adding some more information to two earlier pieces. Next, I bring into account the role of China, Pakistan and India’s big neighbour to the East.

Don’t get MAD

Last week’s hostilities were yet another violent iteration of the countries’ territorial claims over the region of Jammu and Kashmir. In earlier articles published on the Strife blog, Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu and Saawani Raje graciously analysed the risk of nuclear war between the two countries according to an escalation ladder (or pyramid) with its three rungs of sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear response. Somewhat counterintuitively at first sight, the authors noted that the nuclear capabilities of both Pakistan and India in fact increase the stability in the region. Little wonder, since a nuclear exchange between these countries would be disastrous. As Karthika Sasikumar of San Jose State University notes, even a single strike on a big city, would lead directly to nuclear midnight, wreaking havoc on the socio-economic and political systems of both countries and the wider region. It is clear, nuclear war is MAD, as it would almost directly lead to mutually-assured destruction of Pakistan and India.

Nevertheless, it is clear that India has upped the ante by employing conventional firepower in the contested region of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Express even calls it a “milestone in India’s retaliatory response to terror.” The nature and scale of which was something like seen in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, as one senior officer is quoted as saying. Following the Pulwana attack, India’s prime minister Narendra Modi noted Pakistan’s involvement and publicly gave clearance to the country’s military brass to “decide the time and place of response.” However, details of what happened on the operational level remain scarce. Uncertainty is equally high about the success of the IAF mission. Indeed, satellite imagery is raising doubts about whether the IAF’s Israeli-made SPICE-2000 precision-guided munitions actually hit the Madrassa Taleem al-Quran, a JeM religious school and the specific number of insurgent casualties. It is also unclear whether the IAF actually crossed the LoC or whether the SPICE missiles were launched from the Indian side of the line.

A road sign points the way to the Madrassa Taleem al-Quran, the religious school and presumed JeM training base on the hilltop that was hit by the IAF bombing. (Asad Hasim/Al Jazeera)

Reports are also unclear about whether the PAF scrambled F-16 or JF-17 fighter jets in response to the presumed IAF incursion of Pakistan’s air space. A deployment of the U.S.-made F-16s in this scenario for example would be an infringement on the end-user agreement, now said to be under investigation by the U.S. State Department. In contrast, the JF-17 is a product of a joint-venture between the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) of China. A further display of the ties between the countries whom define their relationship as an “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership,” was also visible shortly after the escalation by the IAF.

The neighbour to the East

With no real end in sight, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi on February 27 called on his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi for China to play a “constructive role in easing the tensions.” As published on Sina News, Wang expressed his deep concern about the tensions between Pakistan and India, briefing Qureshi on the Chinese efforts to persuade and facilitate talks and reiterating the hope that both countries will exercise restraint and fulfil their commitment to prevent the escalation of the situation. The statement followed an earlier Chinese acknowledgement at the U.N. Security Council of the “heinous and cowardly suicide bombing” by JeM. Indeed, China’s Foreign Ministry repeated its condemnation of any form of terrorism and called upon the countries involved to cooperate in preserving regional peace and stability.

Interestingly, it was right in the middle of the Kashmir crisis that the 16^th trilateral meeting between Russia, India and China took place on February 27 in Yueqing, China’s Zhejiang province. At this meeting, the country’s respective foreign ministers Sergei Lavrov, Sushma Swaraj and Wang Yi issued a joint statement condemning “terrorism in all its forms and manifestation” and called for the strengthening of the U.N.-led counter-terrorism efforts. Here, it is interesting to draw attention to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a multilateral security alliance which Pakistan and India both joined as a full member during the June 2017 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. With China and Russia leading this organisation’s struggle against terrorism, these countries could act as important mediators in the tensions between Pakistan and India.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: bringing peace or worsening tensions? CPEC runs right through many contentious areas, including China’s Xinjiang, the region of Jammu and Kashmir and all the way to Balochistan. (Dawn)

However, China itself also has territorial disputes with India, tensions which undoubtedly complicate the manner in which China can play a mediating role. Most important among these disputes is the region of Aksai Chin, part of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the northern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. But a small corridor between China, India and Bhutan is also cause for concern. To halt Chinese road-building, the area known as the Chicken’s Neck was the main stage of a long-lasting standoff at the Doklam plateau in the Summer of 2017. While not disputed territorially, it was the proximity of Chinese troops and their intrusion into Bhutan’s Doklam that raised Indian suspicion and ultimately triggered a reaction. In those towering heights of the Himalayas, Indian and Chinese troops even engaged in a stone-fight. To complicate matters even more, there is also the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to connect the Chinese north-western city Kashgar with the Pakistani port of Gwadar. As such, the CPEC can be traced right through many of disputed regions within Pakistan.

In an article for The Diplomat, Vasabjit Banerjee of Mississippi State University and Prashant Hosur Suhas of Eastern Connecticut State University offer important analysis on the Indian capabilities to handle a war with Pakistan or even a two-front war with Pakistan and China. While that may be so, the author similarly points to the fact that China’s military is primarily geared towards the U.S. and its allies, such as Japan. Rather than focusing on the possibility of nuclear war, one could do well by considering more broadly the many escalatory actions that can take place below the nuclear threshold. Indeed, when considering the close relationship between China and Pakistan, one can beg the question whether China may ultimately employ its relationship with Pakistan to add increasingly more pressure on India, in an area already rife with terrorist factions opposed to the Indian government. Somewhat contradictory, there is also the question of China’s expanding role in counter-terrorism and peace-keeping in Central Asia and beyond. Indeed, Gerry Shih of the Washington Post recently reported about Chinese uniformed presence in Tajikistan, near Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. The question one can ask here is whether China’s political-territorial interests would prevail over the preservation of stability in the region itself.

Conclusion

While the meeting between Russia, India and China went largely unnoticed, it is an interesting development showcasing China’s commitment in creating a more secure region. In light of the deadly attack in Pulwana, the country strictly condemned the terrorists while calling on Pakistan and India to de-escalate the tensions. At the same time, China has many stakes of its own in the region. With the CPEC running right through Pakistan, it could very well be that the country would help its “all-weather” partner Pakistan secure its claims against India, the country with which China has several territorial disputes itself. Nevertheless, this episode has shown the potential role of China as a mediator between states. Let’s watch this space.

Axel Dessein is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. His research focuses on interpreting the rise of China. Axel completed his BA and MA in Oriental Languages and Cultures at Ghent University in Belgium. You can follow him on Twitter @AxelDessein.

Image sources:

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/28/WS5c771b3ca3106c65c34ebd56.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/indian-air-raid-site-casualties-mysterious-madrassa-190227183058957.html

https://www.dawn.com/news/1371720

Will India and Pakistan Go To War?

February 28, 2019 by Strife Staff

By Saawani Raje

28 February 2019

“Will India and Pakistan ever go to war?” This question has gained new significance since Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter jets early on the morning of 27th February and captured the pil ot of on e. For Pakistan, this escalation makes sense if you consider the escalation pyramid explained in the preceding piece. It could be in Pakistan’s strategic interests to frame Indian strikes on terrorist camps as a violation on Pakistani territory. This deflects from the main issue at hand — the existence of terrorist training camps in Pakistani territory (a claim that Pakistan has always vociferously denied) — and avoids the risk of international isolation. This piece unpacks the question of the possibility of war by analysing the trend of Indian and Pakistani crises through the lenses of nuclear deterrence, international intervention, and crisis management. It argues that while there might be escalation in confrontational rhetoric even up to the level of a limited conflict, an all-out war on a scale seen previously in 1965 or 1971 is highly unlikely for a number of reasons.

Historically, it has been argued that India practices strategic restraint. However, a re-reading of past crises, especially wars against Pakistan in 1948, 1965 or 1971, actually shows Indian political and military leaders’ willingness to escalate.^[1] Any restraint in these crises was influenced by issues like limited capabilities, risks associated with escalation, and the need to maintain national and international legitimacy.^[2] Under Narendra Modi’s government, the ‘surgical strikes’ of 2016 reiterate the political and military leadership’s willingness to use force against Pakistan as an answer to its provocation. For India, this escalation is a risk the Modi government can afford to take. The possibility of war refocuses any discontent that the Indian public has with the government. It serves to unite Indian citizens behind the government against a common enemy: Pakistan. The social and news media rhetoric in India evidences this with repeated calls for war with Pakistan since the 14 February attack.^[3] This rhetoric is especially significant given that this is an election year, and the BJP campaign has engaged quite strongly with the idea of nationalism. It is also India’s chance to call Pakistan’s bluff about its nuclear red lines. A show of strength in this regard might be a strong signal to the Pakistani establishment that India does not tolerate provocation and refuses to be held hostage to its nuclear doctrine. However, the evidence is greater to support the argument that India and Pakistan will in fact not go to war, especially on this occasion.

Firstly, both India and Pakistan have made it clear that they do not want war. When addressing the Pakistani retaliatory strikes on 27 February, Pakistani Major General Asif Ghafoor emphasised that no Indian military targets had been hit because Pakistan does not ‘want to go on the pat h of war.’ The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj echoed this sentiment when she said, ‘India doesn’t wish to see further escalation.’ Escalation to war is a risk neither side is willing to take. The existence of nuclear weapons and the economic costs of war are two factors that greatly influence this reluctance. Secondly, it is in the interests of the international community to step in with increased concern about the stability of the region in an attempt to stop escalation, as has been seen before.

Nuclear weapons in South Asia

Between 1974 and 1998, both India and Pakistan went through a period of ‘nuclear opacity.’ This was a situation in which neither state’s leaders had acknowledged the existence of their state’s nuclear program, but there was enough evidence about the program’s existence to influence the other nation’s perceptions and actions.^[4] During this time, awareness about the other’s nuclear arsenal raised insecurities; however, neither state wanted to escalate tensions because they were unsure about the other’s nuclear posture. Such was the case in the 1986 Brasstacks Military exercise and a 1990 crisis between the two states that CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr described as ‘the most dangerous nuclear situation’ he had faced. In both cases, the states reached the brink of crisis and withdrew, in part due to concern and ambiguity about each other’s nuclear posture.^[5]

Following tests in 1998, both states declared themselves nuclear weapon-capable states. The Pakistani nuclear doctrine was India-specific and emphasised that given Indian conventional capability, Pakistan reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first in extremis.^[6] This provided Pakistan with compelling incentive to provoke India, while remaining secure in the knowledge that its nuclear policy severely limited Indian retaliatory options. As exemplified in the 1999 Kargil conflict when, despite rhetoric from both sides showing willingness to explore nuclear avenues of escalation, India showed restraint in not crossing the Line of Control, avoiding crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red line.

Ironically, the years of nuclear opacity have been relatively more stable than the years following the declaration of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. In addition, cases like Kargil, the 2001-02 military standoff between India and Pakistan, or the 2008 Mumbai attack show an emboldened and provocative Pakistan that uses its first strike nuclear doctrine as a shield against a restrained India that is limited by its no-first use doctrine. Pakistan’s testing of tactical nuclear weapons further complicates issues, as this operationalises nuclear weapons. Pakistan thus continues to attack India in low-level unconventional methods because it is safe in the knowledge that India’s ability to retaliate is limited. It thus falls upon India to call Pakistan’s bluff. The excuse of targeting terrorist havens in Pakistani territory, as the much-publicised surgical strikes showed, provide an efficient instrument for India to do just that. Thus, escalation of conventional conflict is a much bigger risk in South Asia than is purported.

International involvement in de-escalation:

The question then is, despite the increased instability, why does the conflict between the two states not lead to war? The answer lies in the examination of past wars between India and Pakistan and the role of the international community in bringing them to a close. India-Pakistan crises in 1965, 1999 and the 2001-02 standoff all saw the international community scramble to bring about de-escalation.^[7] In all the crises, India adopted a strong coercive posture, possibly with the knowledge that in event of increased escalation, the international community will step in to cease hostilities as it did in each of those conflicts.

In sum, nuclear weapons increase stability in the region in general. They do increase the likelihood of low-level conflict, but they decrease the likelihood of all-out war between the two states. Secondly, escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan has always been looked at with growing concern by the international community, which has more often than not played a pivotal role in the cessation of hostilities, as the cases of 1948, 1965 and Kargil show. These factors decrease the likelihood of India and Pakistan going to war with each other despite the possibility that they will engage in an escalation of rhetoric or even low-level hostilities. While the rhetoric in India today is inherently advocating strong retributive action against Pakistan, the above factors show that despite an escalation of rhetoric, diplomatic efforts or even limited military action, India and Pakistan will not actually end up in an all-out war with each other. The social media #saynotowar hashtag that is currently seen across a lot of Indian and Pakistani social media might be more on point than ever.

Saawani Raje is a PhD candidate at the King’s India Institute and a recipient of the King’s India Scholarship, as well as a Senior Editor at Strife. Her PhD research is primarily a historical examination into civil-military decision-making during crises in independent India. You can follow her on Twitter @saawaniraje.

Notes:

^[1] Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “Strategic Restraint” Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War’, India Review 17, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415277; Srinath Raghavan, 1971 A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013).

^[2] Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “Strategic Restraint” Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War’, India Review 17, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415277.

^[3] Fatima Bhutto, ‘Opinion | Hashtags for War Between India and Pakistan’, The New York Times , 27 February 2019, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/opinion/india-pakistan-crisis.html.

^[4] Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia , Reprint edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Security Studies, 2009).

^[5] Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis’, International Security 20, no. 3 (1995): 79–114, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539140.

^[6] ‘Krepon et Al. – 2013 – Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in Sou.Pdf’, accessed 27 February 2019, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web_1.pdf.

^[7] Farooq Naseem Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2013); Malik V. P. General, Kargil : From Surprise To Victory (New Delhi: Harpercollins, 2010); ‘To the Brink: 2001-02 India-Pakistan Standoff’, accessed 27 February 2019, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/to-the-brink-2001-02-india-pakistan-standoff/; Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April 2005): 290–324.

Image source: https://www.dailypioneer.com/uploads/2016/story/images/big/9431_1.gif

Is Balakot a Point of No Return? Revisiting Asymmetric Escalation in South Asia

February 28, 2019 by Strife Staff

By Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu

28 February 2019

On 26 February 2019, Indian Mirage 2000s carried out an air raid in Pakistan, which escalated the conflict between the two states.

The current situation

In the early hours of 26 February 2019, twelve Indian Mirage-2000 aircrafts carried out an air raid in Balakot, Pakistan, in retaliation of a suicide attack on India’s Central Reserve Police Force (paramilitary force used for internal security) convoy in Pulwama near Srinagar in Jammu & Kashmir which killed 44 soldiers on 14 Feb 2019. Jaish-e-Mohammad, a terrorist outfit known to have its bases in Pakistan, claimed the responsibility for the suicide attack. India contests that the raid was carried out on a JeM training camp and no civilian or military infrastructure was targeted; thus the raid is categorised it as a ‘non-military, pre-emptive strike’ and hence is not an act of war.

Pakistan’s military spokesperson Major General Asif Ghafoor, while acknowledging the strike, counter-claimed that the strike aircrafts were forced to a hasty withdrawal due to Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) quick response and dropped the bombs in a hurry which fell in an open area with no casualties. Both sides claim credibility through impending details.

The current situation has showcased a new security paradigm in the asymmetric escalation of conflict or the escalation pyramid (normally called the escalation ladder). I chose to call it a ‘pyramid’ for a simple reason – as the rungs go higher, besides being alarming and dangerous, the retaliatory options become more and more limited to both the adversaries.

Background

Not having any conventional capability and under desperation to capture Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan started this vicious cycle at a sub-conventional level by sending the irregulars, the Afridis and Hazaraas from its North West Frontier Province, to capture the state of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947. After the success of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in 1980s, which forced a Soviet withdrawal, the same model of insurgency has been used in Jammu & Kashmir since 1990. Slowly these non-state actors grew powerful and challenged the writ of the state itself. For instance, the terrorist outfit JeM carried out three attacks on Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf during his time in office. For the past few decades, any peace initiative by India or Pakistan has been followed by a terrorist attack in India which sets this escalatory cycle in motion. Lately, since the declaration of opening of the Kartarpur corridor by Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a terrorist attack such as Pulwama was predicted, given the pattern of such attacks .

India’s response has mostly been using its conventional infrastructure, demonstrated by ex-Brasstracks in 1986-87, the Operation Parakaram (Twin Peak crisis) in 2001-02, the Cold Start doctrine from 2004 onward and the surgical strikes in 2016. Yet, Pakistani mainland has not been attacked since the 1971 war. Even during the Kargil War, India refrained from crossing the Line of Control.

The Line of Control is the de facto border between the Indian and Pakistan-controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir. (Image edited from Google Maps)

The Rubicon of Escalation?

Calling it the need of the hour, India crossed the Rubicon by hitting inside Pakistan territory. India had long argued that ‘restraint’ is not its weakness but a strategic necessity due to the risk of rapid escalation along the pyramid. With the September 2016 surgical strikes and now the Balakot air strikes, that policy is clearly out of the window. The problem with the escalation pyramid above is that while it is easy to climb up, it is difficult to climb down from one level to another, as elaborated below.

In response to India’s air raids, which was done using conventional assets, Indian security specialists speculate that as usual a retaliatory attack by Pakistan will most probably be using the non-state actors (in the sub-conventional spectrum). However, a sub-conventional response by Pakistan has to be plausibly denied and cannot be given any official recognition and hence will not satisfy the domestic population to which the narrative of ‘India as an enemy’ has been fed since 1947. In other words, there will be no face saving in front of the domestic audience constantly fed by the narrative of a “1000 years’ war with India” if the attack is not claimed and acknowledged by the state. On the other hand, if acknowledged, this will only feed India’s narrative of Pakistan being a terrorist sponsor state and will exacerbate Pakistan’s isolation in the international forums. It was only due to such dilemmas, Pakistani Military leadership managed to get away with 2016 surgical strikes by denying it altogether.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Modi’s government in India drew some political mileage by celebrating the surgical strikes as an annual event. Riding on the same success wave, India crossed the Rubicon by striking the Pakistani mainland. In addition, unlike before, the strikes have been immediately acknowledged by the Pakistan military.

This time nevertheless, Pakistan promised a retaliation. But, as experts claim that a conventional response from Pakistan is a non-starter because there are no viable targets in India that Pakistan can hit without carrying out an ‘act of war’. India claims that its air strikes were not an act of war since no military or civilian target was targeted or harmed. Hence, in retaliation, Pakistan can only increase firing along the Line of Control, which has already started. Pakistan’s military also called for a meeting of its National Command Authority, the apex body in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals which signals the usual ‘nuclear rattling’. As the escalation pyramid suggests, this is a next logical escalatory step which will draw lots of international attention and mediation that will call for de-escalation of the situation. Anything else will only cause more harm, as shown by downing of two fighter aircrafts, one from each side and capture of an Indian pilot by Pakistan on the morning of 27 Feb 2019. The conflict might continue in such duels and skirmishes but further escalation is least likely as explained in the accompanying piece.

The urgency of escalation

What is the urgency of escalation? This can be explained by the rapid spread of news on social media to a hysterical population, fed by frenzy media asking for revenge which puts pressure on those in power to act fast – a government for which time is running out due to an upcoming election and a powerful military running the affairs on the other side, which needs an immediate face saving to retain its legitimacy to remain in charge. Hence the retaliations are necessary, urgent and must be escalatory in order to dominate the deterrence.

Beyond all this…

While addressing an election rally immediately after the air strikes, Prime Minister Modi assured the audience that the ‘country is in safe hands’. Historical evidence suggests that this escalatory cycle of revenge and retaliation has not brought safety in the sub-continent. The violence has only killed soldiers and civilians on both sides. Further escalation will take it to the brink of devastation.

So what purpose does it serve? Pacifists claim that it certainly helps keep the belligerents on both sides of the border stay in power by giving a sense of honour and pride to the populations fed with the misconstrued sense of nationalism. It boosts the morale of the armed forces of the side which strikes last and dominates. It also distracts the electorate from other social and developmental issues, such as poverty, sanitation, lack of jobs and keeps it ‘rallied round the flag’.

Realists claim that this was the need of the hour since the public opinion of a thriving democracy demanded it. Indian Generals have long believed that there is enough space below the nuclear threshold where a limited conventional war with Pakistan can be fought and have backed calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff on several occasions. Having just done that, has India finally crossed the Rubicon of escalation and set a wrong precedence? At the moment the answer depends upon lot of things including the treatment and fate of the captured pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan. In the meantime and amidst this debate, a belligerent game of revenge and retaliation is being played for honour and dominance where the skies are devoid of civil flights and the military radars are churning.

Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu is a doctoral student at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London and a Senior Editor for Strife. His research interests include South Asian security, military culture and defence diplomacy. An alumnus of National Defence Academy, Pune and Army War College, Mhow, he has served as an officer with the Indian army’s Parachute Regiment for ten years. You can follow him on Twitter @kamal_sandhu78.

Image source: https://www.mudspike.com/dcs-world-mirage-2000-c-hunter-is-here/

Hizbul Mujahideen in Assam: A non-existential threat

October 17, 2018 by Strife Staff

By M.A. Athul, published 17 October 2018

Hizbul Mujahideen militants (Credit Image: Swarajya)

Assam, in Northeast India, has been experienced a long spell of ethnic insurgency since 1979. Yet the state is witnessing a consolidation of peace and stability, (the insurgency related fatalities has fallen from 305 in 2014 to nine in 2018), with ethnic insurgent violence in its last leg. However, the recent arrest of Islamist militants from the state is an indicator that religious militant groups are also trying to find footing in the state, which borders Bangladesh.

three individuals, identified as Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) militants on 14^th and 15^th September 2018. They were arrested from Hojai, Udali (Nagaon District) and Byrnihat along Assam-Meghalaya border respectively. Reports indicate that the HM operatives were attempting at supplying arms including the AK 47 assault rifles for its operatives in the state.

On 18 September 2018, three more people were arrested for links with the Kashmiri insurgent group, from Hojai District and on on 23 September 2018, an HM linkman identified as Abhumanyu Chouhan was arrested from Mosoka .

The arrests came soon after a HM militant of Assam origin, identified as Qamar-uz-Zama was arrested by Uttar Pradesh Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) on 13 September 2018 from Kanpur. According to reports, he was planning to conduct attack during Ganesh Chaturthi, a Hindu religious festival. Initial reports of Qamar-uz-Zama joining HM had surfaced on 8 April 2018 after his picture holding an automatic rifle went viral on the social media declaring him having joined Hizbul Mujahideen with the codename “Dr Hurairah”. According to his family, he had gone to the United States of America in 2011, returning in 2014 and going to Bangladesh the same year.

Hizbul Mujahideen

HM, which became operational in 1989 in Jammu Kashmir with Pakistani patronage, is one of India’s oldest militant groups. The group was formed as a proxy for Pakistan and a counter weight for another militant group Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was propagating ‘independence’ rather than accession to Pakistan. HM was established by Master Ahsan Dar as its chief. It was formed as a militant wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir. Mohammed Yusuf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin has been heading the organisation since 1990. Although earlier the group has a cadre strength of about 1,500, current estimates point at 400 active militants.

Security forces in J&K have had a significant tactical success against the group in recent times. According to partial data compiled by SATP, From January 2017 to September 2018 at least 74 HM militants have been killed in J&K, with about 29 HM militants being killed in the first eight months of 2017.

Back ground of Islamist Groups Operating in Assam

Traditionally, Assam’s insurgency landscape has been dominated by ethnic insurgent groups such as United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA-Independent) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). However, groups such as Muslim United Liberation Army (MULTA) and Bangladesh based Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) have also been operating as Islamist groups in Assam in addition to Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULF), Islamic Liberation Army of Assam and People’s United Liberation Front (PULF). According to the Assam Police, the Islamic terrorist groups started appearing in Assam after the Nellie massacre in 1983.

During the Assam violence in July 2012, the Central Government identified at least 19 Muslim fundamentalist organisations to watch in connection with violence in Assam.

NO	Name of Organisation
1	Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA)
2	United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA)
3	Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA)
4	Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF)
5	Muslim Liberation Army (MLA)
6	Muslim Security Force (MSF)
7	Islamic Sevak Sanng (ISS)
8	Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI)
9	Revolutionary Muslim Commandos (RMC)
10	Muslim Tiger Force (MTF)
11	Muslim Liberation Front (MLF)
12	Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MLTA)
13	Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)
14	Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULTA)
15	Islamic National Front (INF)
16	Islamic Revolutionary Front (IRF)
17	United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA)
18	United Islamic Revolutionary Army (UIRA)
19	Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF)

Historically, the most active among these groups were the MULTA, and the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF)]. While the former confines its activities to Assam, the latter operates in Manipur as well.

Major global Islamist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and IS are also reportedly targeting the region. Notably, at the time of its formation in September 2014, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) had specifically mentioned Assam as its target, along with Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, IS in its ‘world dominion map’ has covered Assam among other parts of India. However, there is no visible signs of presence of these formations in the state.

Recent incidents

The presence of JMB in Assam was exposed after discovery of the Burdwan Module in West Bengal: an accidental blast at Burdwan on 2 October 2014, in which two JMB militants were killed and another was injured. NIA claimed that during the course of investigations, it had been found that operatives of JMB had established their networks in different Districts of Assam, Jharkhand, and West Bengal. According to the NIA Charge sheets, five accused in the case belonged to Assam. The NIA also , JMB operatives ‘were engaged in preparation of bombs, ammunition/arms, maintaining hideouts and organizing terrorist training camps in pursuance of a larger conspiracy to organise terrorist attacks in different parts of India and in Bangladesh’. One of the charge sheeted persons, Lal Mohammed aka Ibrahim, a JMB cadre arrested by Jharkhand Police on 18 April 2015 (the NIA officially arrested him on 27 April 2015), reportedly revealed to interrogators that JMB’s sabotage plans in Assam were to counter Bodo . Reports indicated that MTFA was formed for the massacre of Muslims in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) in May 2014.

In a significant incident, six JMB militants were arrested in back-to-back operations in Goalpara and Chirang Districts of Assam on 25 September 2015. Earlier on 18 September 2015, a JMB training camp was uncovered at Daukhanagar in Chirang District.

Number of Islamist Militants arrested in India’s Northeast Region from 2015 to September 2018

Year	Militant Groups
2015	JMB	MTFA	MULTA	MLA	PULF	IM	HM	NS
	20	19	10	1	1	0	0	6

2016	24	6	1	0	0	1	0	0

2017	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	2

2018	0	0	2	0	0	0	7	2

Total	45	25	18	1	1	1	7	10

(Source : SATP)

State Parliamentary Affairs Minister Rockybul Hussain had informed the State Assembly on December 16, 2014, that between January 2001 to November 2014, 130 Islamist extremists, including 106 MULTA militants, 14 Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and 10 JMB militants, were arrested in Assam. He also added that between 1995 to 2014, 626 militants of Harkat-ul-Jihad (HuJI), MULFA, PULF and Islamic Security Force of India (ISFI) were arrested.

Despite the long list of Islamist militant groups present in Assam the fact that there is indicative of the lack of operational capabilities of such groups and the success . Moreover, given that groups such as Bangladesh-based JMB is using the region more as a safe house to escape crack down by the Bangladeshi authorities than as an operational area, likelihood of Islamist groups pulling of a successful attack remains rather remote. Moreover, with HM coming under pressure in its core area of operations in J&K its ability of expand its area of operation is rather limited. In this light, possibility of more militant groups finding a foot hold in the state is a remote possibility and the detection and arrest of HM cell is unlikely to be a harbinger of a new trend. That being said, arrest of more than 100 religious militants being arrested in the region since 2015 and the fact that Assam has the second largest internet traffic related to Islamic State (IS) (after Jammu Kashmir) is a possible indicator that a segment of population is susceptible to Islamist radical ideology. Although the threat of Islamist militancy has been kept under check by law enforcement agencies, a pro-active effort by authorities to identity and ween away the susceptible population from extremist ideologies is required.

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on LinkedIn

Image Source: https://swarajyamag.com/politics/hizbuls-foray-into-north-east-at-pakistans-behest-triggers-alarm

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