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India

Strife Series: Colonial Legacies – Re-Drawing the Lines: The Construction of India’s Geopolitics and Its Impact on the Rise of Insurgencies and Separatist Movements Post-Independence

June 7, 2022 by Carolina Borjas

A. J. Johnson’s 1865 map of India and Southeast Asia. Public Domain

In 1947, the Independence from British rule promised both political and religious freedom for India. However, through the last-minute implementation of partition, the British secured independence for India at the cost of a massive displacement and rise in discontent among the population. Branding India painfully, Partition has become central to modern identity in the Indian subcontinent. During this time, Partition represented the shift of political borders cutting through India to create Pakistan resulting in riots, mass casualties, and a colossal wave of migration which still weighs heavily in the hearts of many today. This event saw the movement of around 16 million Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims to what later became known as modern India. Across the Indian subcontinent, communities began experiencing a massive outbreak of sectarian violence with Hindus and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other. Why does it matter? To this day the redrawing of India’s borders continues to play a role as social division and separatist sentiments have given rise to insurgencies and separatist movements.

As a mosaic of ethnicities, languages, and religions, India faces the challenge of being a single homogenous state. Once ruled under different rajas, the India known to the world today is a product of British colonial legacies. Bearing in mind previous cases of the British dividing their former colonies, it comes as no surprise that most of their former colonies currently face secessionist movements. Likewise, since the independence of the country, the Indian separatists and insurgent movements have been a big issue for the country. Inheriting borders and divisions created by the colonial masters, post-colonial countries such as India continued similar policies of emphasizing existing ethnic, racial, and religious divides to manage dissent.

In addition to this factor, the Theory of deprivation states that insurgencies are preceded by a mismatch in social, economic, and political conditions along with the belief that governments are incapable of maintaining social order (339)[1]. Facing relative deprivation, India’s rise of insurgencies post-Partition, as further explored in this article, comes as no surprise.[2] India’s social division and separatism link most insurgent groups with the desire to control a particular area. Considered to be the country’s most important internal security threat, the rise of the Maoist insurgency in India can be traced back to British colonial rule. Shivaji Mukherjee highlights that ethnic/land inequality and weak development/state capacity created by the British colonial administrators set up the political opportunity structures for insurgency and secession movements[3].

To rule India, the British depended on indirect rule through princely states and zamindars known as the landlord revenue system. Through the administration of princely states, native rulers were allowed to oversee administration, taxation, and law with the condition of obeying the British[4]. Although this gave rulers substantial autonomy, past studies suggest that princely states tended to be on the lower ranks of development, bureaucratic quality, and institutions and produced prominent levels of social exclusion for the poor[5]. Despite indirect rule institutions being banned in 1947, Mukherjee points out that their effects persisted from 1950 to 1970. Therefore, capitalizing on the inequalities left behind the British rule, rebels have been able to use weak state capacities with low development and grievances to heighten their influence to become a prominent threat.

Since its Independence, India has contended with ethnic movements in various states based on demands for complete secession from India—for example, the state of Punjab wishing to form a separate country called Khalistan. Other movements are those pushing for insurrections to earn autonomy within India—for example, the Maoist Insurgency. The Khalistan movement and Maoist Insurgency in India, used indirect rule institutions, sustained ethnic/land inequality and weak development/state capacity to their advantage to expand their ideological frames. By adding a new dynamic order which drastically changed the existing social and economic order, many princely states continued to struggle to redress the grievances of their population. The Indian government’s response to the movements has varied widely, ranging from violent repression or partial accommodations to demands.

Case Studies

Khalistan Movement: In the 1980s, Punjab experienced a nationalist group imposing violent extremism to demand a separate country, ‘Khalistan’, based on the Sikh religion.[6] These claims to a new nation have been rooted as early as independence. In due course after India’s Independence, tensions between the Sikhs and the Hindus in Punjab surfaced, leading to grievances from the Sikhs against the Indian government.  Disappointed by the outcome of the partition, Sikh leaders had wanted a state along Pakistani lines for the creation of a Sikh nation. Separated into the states of Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh in 1966, many Sikhs saw their original state being further divided along linguistic lines and religious beliefs. As a result, between 1980 and 2000, the Khalistan movement gained traction for its attempts to create an independent state followed by a series of violent events including bombings, the assassination of Indira Gandhi, kidnappings, selective killings, and massacres of civilians. In 1984, the movement took to the international stage as Canada-based Khalistan separatists conducted an attack on an Air India flight en route from Toronto to New Delhi.[7] As the movement continued and the violence escalated, tensions between the Hindu and Sikh communities furthered. On the one hand, anti-Hindu propaganda encouraged violence against the Hindus and on the other, the Indian Government with the local Punjab police responded with force, at times committing human rights abuses to end the militancy.

Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency: India’s Naxalite-Maoist started in the 1920s as an anti-colonial struggle when the country was still ruled by Britain. The first radical Marxist movement arose shortly after independence in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. The first armed uprising was launched in 1967 when a landlord killed a landless worker in Naxalbari village for ploughing a patch of land (253).[8]  Encountering the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), the Naxals and the Communists united to overthrow the ‘semi-colonial and semi-feudal Indian state’ through a people’s war which was put down by force after 72 days (about 2 and a half months).  However, while the attack was officially shut down other actors were inspired to take up the cause. During the following eight years, the movement splintered, and grievances witnessed a decline. With the liberalization of the Indian economy in 2004, the movement relapsed as the exploitation of forest resources by the private sector grew. Following the merger of the CPI-M-L (People’s War) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), the Naxals became a powerful agrarian movement to establish a socialist-communist rule. Estimated to be around 11,500 fighters and 38,000 fighters armed with basic weapons (bows and arrows and machetes), the Naxalites fought for anti-mining agitation, land acquisition and discrimination based on caste[9]. Due to the resulting Naxalite threat, the Indian government took drastic measures against the movement as 84 million tribal became victims of violence and counter-violence with the eradication of the group[10]. While the government was successful in crushing the insurgency, the impact of the British colonial legacy remains to be a root issue of the grievances faced by many including those who attempted to take on the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency.

Seven and a half decades later, India continues to be impacted and shaped by its colonial past. Constituting diverse ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs, when governed as a homogenous place, India faces the risk of abetting insurgencies and separatist movements. While insurgencies are extremely difficult to defeat once entrenched, by addressing community grievances and recognizing the importance of inclusive politics it is possible to prevent them from taking root in the first place. Thus, moving forward the rise of radical politics with inflammatory language is a serious threat to India’s stability.

[1] Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.

[3] Mukherjee, Shivaji. “Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India: Historical Institutions and Civil War.” The Journal of conflict resolution 62, no. 10 (2018): 2232–2274.

[4] Fisher, Michael H. 1991. Indirect Rule in India. Residents and the Residency System, 1764- 1858. Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.

[5] Wucherpfennig, Julian, Philipp Hunziker, and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2016. “Who Inherits the

State? Colonial Rule and Post-Colonial Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science

60 (4): 882-98.

[6] Gupte, Pranay. 1985. “THE PUNJAB: TORN BY TERROR.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/08/magazine/the-punjab-torn-by-terror.html.

[7] Chakraborty, Chandrima. 2019. “Canada”s indifference to the 1985 Air India bombing is disturbing.” Quartz. https://qz.com/india/1652007/canadas-indifference-to-the-1985-air-india-bombing-is-disturbing/.

[8] Ahlawat, Dalbir. “Maoist Insurgency in India: Grievances, Security Threats and Counter-Strategies.” Journal of policing, intelligence and counter terrorism 13, no. 2 (2018): 252–266.

[9] Kumar, Kamal. 2013. “Analysis: India”s Maoist challenge | Features.” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/8/24/analysis-indias-maoist-challenge.

[10] Ibid

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Series Tagged With: carolina borjas, Colonial Legacies, colonial legacies series, India

Strife Series: Colonial Legacies – Macaulayism – a colonial legacy that lingers long in India

June 6, 2022 by Vindhya Patchava

Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. Public Domain Photo.

In a country as diverse as India would anyone imagine that many Indians feel comfortable writing in English rather than writing in their native language/ mother tongue. How did the language English spread its influence in this heavily populated country? To know the answer to this we need to start from the 1600s when the British East India Company entered the subcontinent via Surat (located in the west of India) as spice traders.[1] The company were awarded permission from the Mughal rulers in the north and the Vijayanagara Gadariya rulers in the south to establish factories. Slowly, but steadily, the company realized the fortunes the subcontinent held and used the cracks among the Indian princes by the 1750s to evolve from a trading company into a ruling company. The East India Company grew tremendously powerful, but due to the Sepoy’s mutiny (1857-1858), the company finally dissolved, and the British Crown took complete control over the subcontinent.[2]

The British Raj gave India “gifts” such as liberalism, the rule of law, cricket, incipient democracy, and a well-knit railway system. Moreover, the welding together of 17 provinces and 562 princely states (except partition)[3] enabled India to become the vast united country that it is today. Also, let us not forget about the architectural traces left behind by the Raj, such as the marvellous high courts, government buildings, libraries, universities, and the many splendours of New Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Madras.[4]

The above indeed represent the country’s colonial legacy, yet the most deliberate gift given to India by the British Raj (which most people undermine), is the English language. Who we should give credit to is Mr. Thomas Babington or Lord Macaulay, the man who brought the English language and British education to India in the 1830s.[5] He wrote in the Minute that “We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indians in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and intellect.”[6]

Thanks to him, the East India Company and the British government invested in the provision of English language education and the promotion of ‘European learning’ in the region.[7] Nevertheless, the primary purpose behind teaching the language to a handful of middlemen (their local assistants/workers) was that conveying the orders of the British Raj to their colonial subjects would be made easier with the presence of these intermediaries. Without a doubt, it can be said that the British had no plans to provide language education to the enormous population of India, nor was the Raj willing to spend its money on ‘the Indians or the dogs.’[8] It is the Indians who seized the opportunity to learn the English language and turned it into an apparatus for their own independence, that is, by using it to express nationalist sentiments against the Raj.

Within a few years after Independence, 15th August 1947, the Constitution of India came into effect on 26th January 1950.  The Constitution of India represents the longest handwritten constitution ever, with 25 parts containing 448 articles and 12 schedules, and was originally written down both in English and Hindi.[9] The Indian Constituent Assembly’s usage of English for writing the constitution can be seen as a mark of the growing importance of this language in the subcontinent.

With around seven decades of independence, India claims to be the world’s second-largest English-speaking country.[10] In a globalized economy, this represents an advantage and helps in social mobility. However, every coin has two sides; parents are under tremendous pressure to earn enough money to send their children to an ‘English medium labelled school’ instead of the state-sponsored or the central government schools, as the teaching in these schools is not done in English (considered as a waste of government resources). Moreover, children are pressurised by parents to enter these ‘English medium schools’ and must go through stressful interviews and exams. Whilst it can be considered problematic that children are taught English before their native language or mother tongue, it is understandable that parents want their children to get a decent job. In a globalized world, English is a must. This leads to English being regarded as the language of status and achievement in India (to the extent where middle-class and higher-class families see English as a basic requirement for the bride and the groom, in a society where around 90 per cent of the marriages are arranged).[11] This perpetuates another layer of societal hierarchy, internalized oppression, and control that the country can do without. Similarly, the Indian government is unable to abolish the caste system as it is deeply embedded in the grassroots of Indian society.

India has 22 scheduled languages recognized by its Constitution (one of which is Hindi – a language spoken by the majority of the Indian population) and thousands of other languages with rich cultural heritage. However, with the rising dominance of English, an imminent conflict over which language should be considered the national language of India can be expected sometime in the future. The British colonization did not end when the British flag went down, and the Indian flag went up, as the effects of colonization linger in the psychological realm, where self and identity (mother tongues) become subject to a second form of colonization,[12] all thanks to Lord Macaulay.

[1] When and why did the British first choose to invade India? August 26, 2019.

[2] The National Archives, CASE STUDY 4: BACKGROUND LIVING IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE: INDIA.

[3] Hemant Sigh, History and date of formation of Indian states since 1947, 6 August 2019.

[4] DAVID GILMOUR, HOW MODERN INDIA WAS BUILT ON THE LEGACY OF BRITISH INSTITUTIONS, JANUARY 30, 2019.

[5] A minute to acknowledge the day when India was ‘educated’ by Macaulay, September 17, 2019.

[6] Shashi Tharoor, ‘But what about the railways …?’ ​​The myth of Britain’s gifts to India, March 8, 2017.

[7] A minute to acknowledge the day when India was ‘educated’ by Macaulay, September 17, 2019.

[8] Gajendra Singh, No dogs, no Indians: 70 years after partition, the legacy of British colonialism endures, August 15, 2017.

[9] Hemant Sigh, Constitution of India: Parts, Schedules & Articles- All In A Glance, 25 November 2021.

[10] Zareer Masani, English or Hinglish – which will India choose?, 27 November 2012.

[11] What the data tells us about love and marriage in India, 8 December 2021.

[12] Sunil Bhatia, HOW ENGLISH CREATES A NEW CASTE SYSTEM IN INDIA, JUN 14, 2017.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Series Tagged With: British Raj, colonial legacies series, colonialism, English language, India, Strife series, Vindhya Patchava

On the verge of Statelessness

April 1, 2021 by Prachi Aryal

By Prachi Aryal

People from the state of Assam stand in que to verify their documents. Source: PTI

Hannah Arendt in her book ‘The Origin of Totalitarianism’ raised citizenship as the “right to have rights”. In the Indian state of Assam, over 1.9 million people are being denied citizenship, and thus rights, after the Government of India on August 31, 2019 released the National Register of Citizens (NRC) . The list ostensibly attempts to identify illegal immigrants especially those who percolated through the porous border with Bangladesh. The NRC’s update in the state was the first since 1951, following long-standing demands from the indigenous Assamese people. 

Historical Significance of the NRC

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 was a crucial event that signified the end of colonialism, the birth of two nations and the emergence of varied national identities for its residents. The cartographic solutions of post-colonial countries have impacted the language of citizenship as they grapple with regulation of the movement of people across territories that are contiguous and porous. 

The Northeast region of India is tucked away in a remote corner of the subcontinent wedged between China, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The mass exodus of people from Bangladesh (then East-Pakistan) following the Liberation War on 1971 to the state of Assam has fostered a political climate in which questions of ethnic identity, language and migration are central. During the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan and became the independent country of Bangladesh, the Assamese fear of influx of immigrants was accentuated. The rising fear of threats to Assamese identity and indigeneity led to an anti-immigration movement in 1980s. This period witnessed heightened communal riots and bouts of violence that led to the Nellie massacre, killing almost 1800 Muslims. The movement ended with the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985. 

The Assam Accord was a Memorandum of Settlement signed by the Governments of India and Assam, and the All-Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) in New Delhi on August 15, 1985. It established a system that used date of entry to India as the basis of determining citizenship. The Accord legitimized the citizenship status of those who had entered Assam from then East Pakistan before 1 January 1966, while a provision for 10 years of disenfranchisement was set for those entering between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971. The accord further recommended that people who had entered after 24 March 1971 would be deported as illegal migrants. 

The implications of the NRC 

The August 31st list has left 1.9 million on the brink of statelessness, of these many are amongst the Muslim minority. The people excluded from the list do not have an alternate Bangladeshi citizenship and are mostly people who come poor backgrounds without access to proper paperwork. 

The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs has amended the 1964 Foreigners (Tribunal) Order to establish tribunals across the country to monitor the complaints of people excluded from the NRC. If they are declared foreigners by the quasi-judicial courts, they can make an appeal to the State High Court or the Supreme Court. 

The quasi-judicial courts have been criticized as being led by inexperienced people who often hold bias against Muslim communities. Moreover, the long battle of litigation puts immense pressure on the minorities in Assam. 

 With annual flooding and calamities hitting the poor in the state of Assam, the reliance on nearly 50-year-old documents as the basis of their citizenship renders them uniquely precarious. The NRC exercise is the worst-case scenario of how in a weak capacity state like Assam, where documents are poorly distributed, excessive reliance on paper to mediate citizenship works as an instrument of exclusion. The people who are unable to prove their citizenship will either be deported or placed in detention camps.

The Problematic created by NRC and CAA

At the heart of the problem of statelessness is the geneses of the NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA). The CAA mandates that Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan will not be treated as illegal immigrants. Instead, they will be eligible for citizenship after six years of residence in India. This is in accordance with the fear of many constitutionalists and observers that the laws, rule and jurisprudence on citizenship in India has become increasingly inflected by religion. 

As highlighted by N.G. Jayal, there has been a transformation from the jus soli or birth-based principle of citizenship to a more jus sanguinis or descent-based principle in India. The enactment of CAA signifies a conspicuous deviation from the religion-neutral conception of citizenship contained in the constitution, thereby undermining the principle of jus soli.

Rizwana Shamshad mentions how the current popular discourse of Hindu nationalists in India advocates for the citizenship for Hindu Bangladeshis whilst demanding deportation of Muslim Bangladeshis. This results in the false narrative of identifying Hindu Bangladeshis as ‘refugees’ whilst labelling the Muslim Bangladeshis as ‘infiltrators.’ These narratives are then used for advocacy and campaigning during elections to secure votes by resonating with ‘hyper-nationalist’ emotions.

Furthermore, by rendering people stateless, India stands in violation of various articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee freedom to choose residence and enshrine equal rights to minorities. Exclusions by the state based on race and descent also violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 

The uncertain battle ahead

The geneses of the NRC and CAA set out a path of uncertainty for the many minorities in the region of Assam. Through the CAA those who are excluded from the NRC and identify as any religion other than Muslim can get the status of refugee and hence seek citizenship in India. However, the Muslim population will not have any legal recourse to claim refugee status and will be labelled illegal immigrants. The immigrants face risk of indefinite detention and deportation. 

The plight of these 1.9 million people has been overshadowed by the current pandemic. With minimal resources and in constant fear they risk being detained indefinitely without the access to  legal recourse. The concern remains that the move to continue with the NRC, the poor from a weak capacity state will be the most disadvantaged. In trying to maintain popular support along the religious lines, India might create a new cohort of stateless people. 

 

Prachi Aryal is an MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: human rights, India, Refugees, statelessness

Gendered Partition of India: An Untold Story

March 8, 2021 by Akshara Goel

By Akshara Goel 

Women during the partition. Source – Sabrang India.

‘Partition has caused the politics of the belly’ – Francois Bayart.

On 15th August 1947 India attained independence from the two hundred years of British rule, but, witnessed its  secondly, partition into present-day Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh. The date, 15th August, is chiefly remembered as the victory from colonial domination? achieved through non-violence. Concurrently, its bemoaned for partition the narratives which are limited to national leaders, political causes and high politics dominated by the upper-class male perspective leaders. However, Indian feminist scholarships have argued that this recollection has disregarded the gendered understanding of wide spread communal violence – the story of displacement and dispossession and, the process of realignment of family, community and national identities. Women survivors of partitioned India occupied a distinctly marginalised space in the partition violence. They were not only subjected to barbarity from men of the ‘other’ community but also from their family members and community which began in the pre-partition period (before 1947), and carried on until the 1950s. The ‘other’ here refers to ‘enemy community’ who were not part of the dominant ethnic community of India or then West Pakistan or Pakistan. 

Women partition survivors were made attached to their male family member or community as they were assumed incapable of making their decisions on migrating to the other side of the border. Consequently, theywere compelled to agree with the twin concept of ‘Azadi’ – translated as Freedom – that was the loss of community, networks, identity and more or less stable inter and intra-personal relationships . Simultaneously, they witnessed double jeopardy. Firstly, by many human right discourses that were packed up recognize them as victims during the conflict occurred at the time of partition. Secondly, since males couldn’t perform their “role of protector” or unable to participate in “income generation activities” it drove to the domestic violence or resurgence of religious practices. This resulted in re-composition of the patriarchal structure which got disintegrated under the partition conflict, wherein, it led to greater control of women rather than, letting providing them with a mechanism to create their agency otherwise their agency was limited to the act of producing or reproducing the nation, according to the Indian government.  

The predominant memory of partition for these destitute women consisted of confusion, dislocation and severing roots. The day-to-day violence caused by the partition formed the everyday experience for these women. They were exposed to distinct forms of sexual violence that carried the symbolic meaning designated to their status in the male dominated -patriarchal society where  gender relations are arranged along the beliefs and traditions of the religious and ethnic communities. The most predictable form of violence was sexual assault inflicted the men of one community upon the women of the ‘other’ community to assert their own identity and ‘subduing the other by dishonouring their women’. However, the most notorious action was the sadistic pleasure these perpetrators sought from the humiliation of women. 

According to anecdotes by the women partition survivor, they were raped in front of their male family members and some of them were paraded naked in the market or danced in gurudwaras (holy shrine of Sikhs). For the stigmatization purpose and its legacy onto the future generation, the perpetrators sexually appropriated these women by desexualizing her as wife or mother through mutilating or disfiguring her breasts and genitalia (tattooing-branding on their breasts and genitalia with triumphant slogans like a crescent moon or trident) so that they no longer remain a nurturer. The motivation was to make her an inauspicious figure by degrading into an unproductive woman. These barbarian acts reflected the thinking of the patriarchal community wherein women are just considered objects of honour constructed by the male. Women survivors of Partition encountered or witnessed the episodes of violence from their family members and community as well. The latter, coerced their women to death, in some cases women were forced to kill themselves, to avoid being sexually offended and to preserve their chastity along with the shielding the honour of individual, family and community. According to the anecdote by Taran, a partition survivor who successfully came to India in 1947– “We girls would often talk about death – some were afraid, others thought of it as a glorious death – dying for an end, for freedom, for an honour. For me everything was related to freedom (from British colonial rule), I was dying for freedom”. Fortunately, she didn’t have to go through the ‘choice’ of death while her women friends were planning how to prepare for their death- an interview was taken by the Ritu Menon and Kamala Bhasin – Indian feminist writer and activist, respectively. However, women were made to ‘volunteer’ for death coerced to poison, put to the sword or drowned or set ablaze individually or collectively that is with other younger women or women and children (Butalia 1998 cited in Chakraborty, 2014, pg. 41-43) .

Some of the partition survivors were women who got abducted by ‘others’ and went through the identity crisis concerning the dominant ethnic community. They were abducted as Hindu (dominant community of India) married as Muslim (dominant community of Pakistan) and again recovered as Hindus and eventually had to go through a lot of bitter and painful “choices”. Women who were brought back ‘home’ after getting abducted, following the 1947 partition period with Pakistan,  weren’t given choice to decide  their home. It was assumed that Hindu women will retreat to India while Muslim women will be transmitted to Pakistan (during 1947 partition). Their space of home could have changed wasn’t given consideration. It wasn’t the boundary of domestic that defined home but it was the boundary of a nation, yet, they met the fate of non-acceptance from their natal families. In theory, everyone had a choice to move or stay but in practice staying on was virtually impossible. The ‘choice’ of whether to move, stay or return was a decision being made for women, by the patriarchal nation-state and their families. Women’s agency wasn’t a principal concern in any of the conflicts and its aftermath . 

The partition of violence affected the everyday world and the lives of women. This concept of the “everyday world” was promulgated by Dorothy Smith (1987). She maintains that “everyday world” refers to lived reality in the private sphere in which women’s representation and gendered lives on the domestic space gets effected and affected by the major events in the political sphere – “the domain of men”. The primary meaning of “everyday world” is to connect the political space with domestic (private) lives of women in a given historical instance. In other words, women survivors of partition have illustrated that there is a definite continuity between the “everyday world” and “extraordinary historical times” of the partition era. This everyday world consists of the private/domestic space in which a woman identifies herself’ and a ‘safe space’ as assumed by the patriarchal structure. However, in the partition violence, their ‘safe space’ gets threatened and compromised as they get dragged into the turmoil of public/political space where their male counterparts take an authoritative position but with no or negligible space for women. The patriarchal mechanisms decided everyday belonging of these women survivors. The fate of these women become tied to that of the nation-state or family and community which dictated how the women should live their life in post-partitioned independent India. 

The partition violence and Indian nation-state – their efforts and narratives towards the women survivors- have played a crucial role in deconstruction and reconstruction of the women’s identity, space and role. It can be observed that the national belonging for all the partition women survivors was meditated through the institution of the heterosexual and patrilineal nuclear family and community concurrently they were disenfranchised as sexual commodities, patriarchal properties and communal commodities by the nation-state and their respective community and family. After partition, the Indian patriarchal state has explicitly infantilized women survivors by denying them to represent themselves and this process eventually has caused their disenfranchisement.

 

Akshara is a prospective PhD candidate and has completed her Master of Arts in Diplomacy, Law and Business (2020) from Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, Delhi-NCR, India.  Presently, she is a Commissioning Editor in E-International Relations and Associate Editor of Law & Order. 

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: Gender, history, human rights, India, Pakistan, partition

Galwan Gaffes: Turbulent Times for the Sino-Indian Relationship?

February 19, 2021 by Prachi Aryal

By Prachi Aryal

India and China have been involved in regular skirmishes alongside their disputed border (Al Jazeera)

On June 15, 2020, Indian and Chinese troops were involved in an unexpected hand to hand combat in Galwan valley, resulting in at least 20 casualties. This confrontation doubtless has its roots in the 3,500km unmarked and disputed border shared by the two nations, that since the birth of both countries has been the site of successive minor clashes The Galwan valley incident marks a break with these more reserved skirmishes as it’s the first since 1975 that has resulted in loss of life. It has subsequently led to the deployment of thousands of soldiers by both sides, raising concerns of an unintentional war. 

Galwan valley, in India’s Ladakh region, lies along the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (a line separating Indian and Chinese territory) and close to Aksai Chin, a disputed area claimed by India but controlled by China. Shivshankar Menon, former Security Adviser of India has warned that the militarization by either side of the border is troubling for the Asian region as it opens the possibility of a fully-fledged war between the two nuclear armed nations. 

Speculation surrounding the clash suggests several micro-causes but underlying each are the powers’ competing strategic goals. Strategists assert that India’s growing economic development and global diplomatic influence have become impediments for their Chinese counterpart, thus the move to intrude into Indian territory was China’s attempt to disrupt the status quo in the region. 

Experts assert that China’s strategy of modern conquest is that of fait accompli, a calculated risk to establish dominance by seizing small territories. This strategy often leaves the victim with few viable options to restore the previous status quo. Fait accomplis, allow unilateral gains of power and changes to the existing state of affairs; reminiscent, therefore, of China’s actions in the Aksai Chin, Spartly Islands in South China Sea, Doklam and the skirmishes with India. 

The 15 June clash accentuates not just the strategic tensions but the more fundamental problems in the Sino-India relationship. China’s continued military assistance to Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative, on disputed territory claimed by India, has created an environment of mistrust between the two nations. Similarly, India’s opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), coupled with historically sour relations stemming from India granting sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, has intensified bilateral tensions. 

Many reports claim that the clash was triggered by India’s construction of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road in the Ladakh region, which would give India the upper hand in accessing the Daulat Beg Oldi airstrip, thereby paving the way for easy transportation of troops and material during conflicts. Indeed, the occurrence of skirmishes and clashes have usually mirrored the construction of infrastructure around the disputed region. Both the countries view such projects as being imbued with strategic and tactical motives, leading to exacerbated skirmishes. 

The growing public discontent surrounding India’s response to the situation in Ladakh poses a strategic difficulty for the government in New Delhi. Chinese retreat is unlikely as it has adopted a fait accompli strategy of land grabs with the purpose of intimidating and coercing nearby rivals in order to establish itself as a regional hegemon. India’s traditional approach of quiet diplomacy, whilst working to soothe domestic public sentiments, will provide China the space to continue with such land grabs. With limited military options, and an increased need to address public discontent surrounding the government’s inaction, India finds itself in a strategic quagmire. Its move to ban Chinese mobile phone applications, citing national security interests, is unlikely to have any effect on China’s position on the border. 

Regular border skirmishes are fundamentally products of slapdash colonial cartography which imposed arbitrary and contested borders between the two nations. The Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has made repeated public statements reiterating that the only viable way of restoring Sino-India ties is by disengaging and de-escalating the military situation in the LAC (Line of Actual Control)LAC (Line of Actual Control) The regular cross-border clashes are contrary to the Wuhan spirit championed by the two nations, who had agreed to significant economic cooperation for development in the South Asian region. 

China’s resort to military trespassing in the Galwan, as on 15 June, has created an atmosphere of mistrust and antagonism with its Indian neighbour. The frozen diplomatic talks compounded with China’s unchanged position and its fait accompli strategies of land grabbing are likely to create a geopolitical and strategic crisis in the Asian region. Sino-India relations in the future are likely to see mixed elements of conflict and cooperation as each side is driven, by their strategic objectives, to ever more aggressive actions. It is possible that, without a clear demarcation of the border, skirmishes like these can create destabilizing consequences for the Asian region. 


Editor’s Note:  There have been a number of recent events since the time this article was finalized for publication that impact this topic and region. The information contained in this article was current as of January 2021.


Prachi Aryal is a MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: borders, China, competition, galwan, himalayas, India

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