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On the verge of Statelessness

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By Prachi Aryal

People from the state of Assam stand in que to verify their documents. Source: PTI

Hannah Arendt in her book ‘The Origin of Totalitarianism’ raised citizenship as the “right to have rights”. In the Indian state of Assam, over 1.9 million people are being denied citizenship, and thus rights, after the Government of India on August 31, 2019 released the National Register of Citizens (NRC) . The list ostensibly attempts to identify illegal immigrants especially those who percolated through the porous border with Bangladesh. The NRC’s update in the state was the first since 1951, following long-standing demands from the indigenous Assamese people. 

Historical Significance of the NRC

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 was a crucial event that signified the end of colonialism, the birth of two nations and the emergence of varied national identities for its residents. The cartographic solutions of post-colonial countries have impacted the language of citizenship as they grapple with regulation of the movement of people across territories that are contiguous and porous. 

The Northeast region of India is tucked away in a remote corner of the subcontinent wedged between China, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The mass exodus of people from Bangladesh (then East-Pakistan) following the Liberation War on 1971 to the state of Assam has fostered a political climate in which questions of ethnic identity, language and migration are central. During the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan and became the independent country of Bangladesh, the Assamese fear of influx of immigrants was accentuated. The rising fear of threats to Assamese identity and indigeneity led to an anti-immigration movement in 1980s. This period witnessed heightened communal riots and bouts of violence that led to the Nellie massacre, killing almost 1800 Muslims. The movement ended with the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985. 

The Assam Accord was a Memorandum of Settlement signed by the Governments of India and Assam, and the All-Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) in New Delhi on August 15, 1985. It established a system that used date of entry to India as the basis of determining citizenship. The Accord legitimized the citizenship status of those who had entered Assam from then East Pakistan before 1 January 1966, while a provision for 10 years of disenfranchisement was set for those entering between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971. The accord further recommended that people who had entered after 24 March 1971 would be deported as illegal migrants. 

The implications of the NRC 

The August 31st list has left 1.9 million on the brink of statelessness, of these many are amongst the Muslim minority. The people excluded from the list do not have an alternate Bangladeshi citizenship and are mostly people who come poor backgrounds without access to proper paperwork. 

The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs has amended the 1964 Foreigners (Tribunal) Order to establish tribunals across the country to monitor the complaints of people excluded from the NRC. If they are declared foreigners by the quasi-judicial courts, they can make an appeal to the State High Court or the Supreme Court. 

The quasi-judicial courts have been criticized as being led by inexperienced people who often hold bias against Muslim communities. Moreover, the long battle of litigation puts immense pressure on the minorities in Assam. 

 With annual flooding and calamities hitting the poor in the state of Assam, the reliance on nearly 50-year-old documents as the basis of their citizenship renders them uniquely precarious. The NRC exercise is the worst-case scenario of how in a weak capacity state like Assam, where documents are poorly distributed, excessive reliance on paper to mediate citizenship works as an instrument of exclusion. The people who are unable to prove their citizenship will either be deported or placed in detention camps.

The Problematic created by NRC and CAA

At the heart of the problem of statelessness is the geneses of the NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA). The CAA mandates that Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan will not be treated as illegal immigrants. Instead, they will be eligible for citizenship after six years of residence in India. This is in accordance with the fear of many constitutionalists and observers that the laws, rule and jurisprudence on citizenship in India has become increasingly inflected by religion. 

As highlighted by N.G. Jayal, there has been a transformation from the jus soli or birth-based principle of citizenship to a more jus sanguinis or descent-based principle in India. The enactment of CAA signifies a conspicuous deviation from the religion-neutral conception of citizenship contained in the constitution, thereby undermining the principle of jus soli.

Rizwana Shamshad mentions how the current popular discourse of Hindu nationalists in India advocates for the citizenship for Hindu Bangladeshis whilst demanding deportation of Muslim Bangladeshis. This results in the false narrative of identifying Hindu Bangladeshis as ‘refugees’ whilst labelling the Muslim Bangladeshis as ‘infiltrators.’ These narratives are then used for advocacy and campaigning during elections to secure votes by resonating with ‘hyper-nationalist’ emotions.

Furthermore, by rendering people stateless, India stands in violation of various articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee freedom to choose residence and enshrine equal rights to minorities. Exclusions by the state based on race and descent also violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 

The uncertain battle ahead

The geneses of the NRC and CAA set out a path of uncertainty for the many minorities in the region of Assam. Through the CAA those who are excluded from the NRC and identify as any religion other than Muslim can get the status of refugee and hence seek citizenship in India. However, the Muslim population will not have any legal recourse to claim refugee status and will be labelled illegal immigrants. The immigrants face risk of indefinite detention and deportation. 

The plight of these 1.9 million people has been overshadowed by the current pandemic. With minimal resources and in constant fear they risk being detained indefinitely without the access to  legal recourse. The concern remains that the move to continue with the NRC, the poor from a weak capacity state will be the most disadvantaged. In trying to maintain popular support along the religious lines, India might create a new cohort of stateless people. 

 

Prachi Aryal is an MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.

Gendered Partition of India: An Untold Story

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By Akshara Goel 

Women during the partition. Source – Sabrang India.

‘Partition has caused the politics of the belly’ – Francois Bayart.

On 15th August 1947 India attained independence from the two hundred years of British rule, but, witnessed its  secondly, partition into present-day Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh. The date, 15th August, is chiefly remembered as the victory from colonial domination? achieved through non-violence. Concurrently, its bemoaned for partition the narratives which are limited to national leaders, political causes and high politics dominated by the upper-class male perspective leaders. However, Indian feminist scholarships have argued that this recollection has disregarded the gendered understanding of wide spread communal violence – the story of displacement and dispossession and, the process of realignment of family, community and national identities. Women survivors of partitioned India occupied a distinctly marginalised space in the partition violence. They were not only subjected to barbarity from men of the ‘other’ community but also from their family members and community which began in the pre-partition period (before 1947), and carried on until the 1950s. The ‘other’ here refers to ‘enemy community’ who were not part of the dominant ethnic community of India or then West Pakistan or Pakistan. 

Women partition survivors were made attached to their male family member or community as they were assumed incapable of making their decisions on migrating to the other side of the border. Consequently, theywere compelled to agree with the twin concept of ‘Azadi’ – translated as Freedom – that was the loss of community, networks, identity and more or less stable inter and intra-personal relationships . Simultaneously, they witnessed double jeopardy. Firstly, by many human right discourses that were packed up recognize them as victims during the conflict occurred at the time of partition. Secondly, since males couldn’t perform their “role of protector” or unable to participate in “income generation activities” it drove to the domestic violence or resurgence of religious practices. This resulted in re-composition of the patriarchal structure which got disintegrated under the partition conflict, wherein, it led to greater control of women rather than, letting providing them with a mechanism to create their agency otherwise their agency was limited to the act of producing or reproducing the nation, according to the Indian government.  

The predominant memory of partition for these destitute women consisted of confusion, dislocation and severing roots. The day-to-day violence caused by the partition formed the everyday experience for these women. They were exposed to distinct forms of sexual violence that carried the symbolic meaning designated to their status in the male dominated -patriarchal society where  gender relations are arranged along the beliefs and traditions of the religious and ethnic communities. The most predictable form of violence was sexual assault inflicted the men of one community upon the women of the ‘other’ community to assert their own identity and ‘subduing the other by dishonouring their women’. However, the most notorious action was the sadistic pleasure these perpetrators sought from the humiliation of women. 

According to anecdotes by the women partition survivor, they were raped in front of their male family members and some of them were paraded naked in the market or danced in gurudwaras (holy shrine of Sikhs). For the stigmatization purpose and its legacy onto the future generation, the perpetrators sexually appropriated these women by desexualizing her as wife or mother through mutilating or disfiguring her breasts and genitalia (tattooing-branding on their breasts and genitalia with triumphant slogans like a crescent moon or trident) so that they no longer remain a nurturer. The motivation was to make her an inauspicious figure by degrading into an unproductive woman. These barbarian acts reflected the thinking of the patriarchal community wherein women are just considered objects of honour constructed by the male. Women survivors of Partition encountered or witnessed the episodes of violence from their family members and community as well. The latter, coerced their women to death, in some cases women were forced to kill themselves, to avoid being sexually offended and to preserve their chastity along with the shielding the honour of individual, family and community. According to the anecdote by Taran, a partition survivor who successfully came to India in 1947– “We girls would often talk about death – some were afraid, others thought of it as a glorious death – dying for an end, for freedom, for an honour. For me everything was related to freedom (from British colonial rule), I was dying for freedom”. Fortunately, she didn’t have to go through the ‘choice’ of death while her women friends were planning how to prepare for their death- an interview was taken by the Ritu Menon and Kamala Bhasin – Indian feminist writer and activist, respectively. However, women were made to ‘volunteer’ for death coerced to poison, put to the sword or drowned or set ablaze individually or collectively that is with other younger women or women and children (Butalia 1998 cited in Chakraborty, 2014, pg. 41-43) .

Some of the partition survivors were women who got abducted by ‘others’ and went through the identity crisis concerning the dominant ethnic community. They were abducted as Hindu (dominant community of India) married as Muslim (dominant community of Pakistan) and again recovered as Hindus and eventually had to go through a lot of bitter and painful “choices”. Women who were brought back ‘home’ after getting abducted, following the 1947 partition period with Pakistan,  weren’t given choice to decide  their home. It was assumed that Hindu women will retreat to India while Muslim women will be transmitted to Pakistan (during 1947 partition). Their space of home could have changed wasn’t given consideration. It wasn’t the boundary of domestic that defined home but it was the boundary of a nation, yet, they met the fate of non-acceptance from their natal families. In theory, everyone had a choice to move or stay but in practice staying on was virtually impossible. The ‘choice’ of whether to move, stay or return was a decision being made for women, by the patriarchal nation-state and their families. Women’s agency wasn’t a principal concern in any of the conflicts and its aftermath . 

The partition of violence affected the everyday world and the lives of women. This concept of the “everyday world” was promulgated by Dorothy Smith (1987). She maintains that “everyday world” refers to lived reality in the private sphere in which women’s representation and gendered lives on the domestic space gets effected and affected by the major events in the political sphere – “the domain of men”. The primary meaning of “everyday world” is to connect the political space with domestic (private) lives of women in a given historical instance. In other words, women survivors of partition have illustrated that there is a definite continuity between the “everyday world” and “extraordinary historical times” of the partition era. This everyday world consists of the private/domestic space in which a woman identifies herself’ and a ‘safe space’ as assumed by the patriarchal structure. However, in the partition violence, their ‘safe space’ gets threatened and compromised as they get dragged into the turmoil of public/political space where their male counterparts take an authoritative position but with no or negligible space for women. The patriarchal mechanisms decided everyday belonging of these women survivors. The fate of these women become tied to that of the nation-state or family and community which dictated how the women should live their life in post-partitioned independent India. 

The partition violence and Indian nation-state – their efforts and narratives towards the women survivors- have played a crucial role in deconstruction and reconstruction of the women’s identity, space and role. It can be observed that the national belonging for all the partition women survivors was meditated through the institution of the heterosexual and patrilineal nuclear family and community concurrently they were disenfranchised as sexual commodities, patriarchal properties and communal commodities by the nation-state and their respective community and family. After partition, the Indian patriarchal state has explicitly infantilized women survivors by denying them to represent themselves and this process eventually has caused their disenfranchisement.

 

Akshara is a prospective PhD candidate and has completed her Master of Arts in Diplomacy, Law and Business (2020) from Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, Delhi-NCR, India.  Presently, she is a Commissioning Editor in E-International Relations and Associate Editor of Law & Order. 

Galwan Gaffes: Turbulent Times for the Sino-Indian Relationship?

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By Prachi Aryal

India and China have been involved in regular skirmishes alongside their disputed border (Al Jazeera)

On June 15, 2020, Indian and Chinese troops were involved in an unexpected hand to hand combat in Galwan valley, resulting in at least 20 casualties. This confrontation doubtless has its roots in the 3,500km unmarked and disputed border shared by the two nations, that since the birth of both countries has been the site of successive minor clashes The Galwan valley incident marks a break with these more reserved skirmishes as it’s the first since 1975 that has resulted in loss of life. It has subsequently led to the deployment of thousands of soldiers by both sides, raising concerns of an unintentional war. 

Galwan valley, in India’s Ladakh region, lies along the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (a line separating Indian and Chinese territory) and close to Aksai Chin, a disputed area claimed by India but controlled by China. Shivshankar Menon, former Security Adviser of India has warned that the militarization by either side of the border is troubling for the Asian region as it opens the possibility of a fully-fledged war between the two nuclear armed nations. 

Speculation surrounding the clash suggests several micro-causes but underlying each are the powers’ competing strategic goals. Strategists assert that India’s growing economic development and global diplomatic influence have become impediments for their Chinese counterpart, thus the move to intrude into Indian territory was China’s attempt to disrupt the status quo in the region. 

Experts assert that China’s strategy of modern conquest is that of fait accompli, a calculated risk to establish dominance by seizing small territories. This strategy often leaves the victim with few viable options to restore the previous status quo. Fait accomplis, allow unilateral gains of power and changes to the existing state of affairs; reminiscent, therefore, of China’s actions in the Aksai Chin, Spartly Islands in South China Sea, Doklam and the skirmishes with India. 

The 15 June clash accentuates not just the strategic tensions but the more fundamental problems in the Sino-India relationship. China’s continued military assistance to Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative, on disputed territory claimed by India, has created an environment of mistrust between the two nations. Similarly, India’s opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), coupled with historically sour relations stemming from India granting sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, has intensified bilateral tensions. 

Many reports claim that the clash was triggered by India’s construction of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road in the Ladakh region, which would give India the upper hand in accessing the Daulat Beg Oldi airstrip, thereby paving the way for easy transportation of troops and material during conflicts. Indeed, the occurrence of skirmishes and clashes have usually mirrored the construction of infrastructure around the disputed region. Both the countries view such projects as being imbued with strategic and tactical motives, leading to exacerbated skirmishes. 

The growing public discontent surrounding India’s response to the situation in Ladakh poses a strategic difficulty for the government in New Delhi. Chinese retreat is unlikely as it has adopted a fait accompli strategy of land grabs with the purpose of intimidating and coercing nearby rivals in order to establish itself as a regional hegemon. India’s traditional approach of quiet diplomacy, whilst working to soothe domestic public sentiments, will provide China the space to continue with such land grabs. With limited military options, and an increased need to address public discontent surrounding the government’s inaction, India finds itself in a strategic quagmire. Its move to ban Chinese mobile phone applications, citing national security interests, is unlikely to have any effect on China’s position on the border. 

Regular border skirmishes are fundamentally products of slapdash colonial cartography which imposed arbitrary and contested borders between the two nations. The Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has made repeated public statements reiterating that the only viable way of restoring Sino-India ties is by disengaging and de-escalating the military situation in the LAC (Line of Actual Control)LAC (Line of Actual Control) The regular cross-border clashes are contrary to the Wuhan spirit championed by the two nations, who had agreed to significant economic cooperation for development in the South Asian region. 

China’s resort to military trespassing in the Galwan, as on 15 June, has created an atmosphere of mistrust and antagonism with its Indian neighbour. The frozen diplomatic talks compounded with China’s unchanged position and its fait accompli strategies of land grabbing are likely to create a geopolitical and strategic crisis in the Asian region. Sino-India relations in the future are likely to see mixed elements of conflict and cooperation as each side is driven, by their strategic objectives, to ever more aggressive actions. It is possible that, without a clear demarcation of the border, skirmishes like these can create destabilizing consequences for the Asian region. 

Editor’s Note:  There have been a number of recent events since the time this article was finalized for publication that impact this topic and region. The information contained in this article was current as of January 2021.

Prachi Aryal is a MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.

Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations: Islamabad Calling, Will Dhaka Respond?

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Bangladeshi youth commemorate the Bengali freedom fighters of the 1971 war at the National Memorial in Dhaka, on Victory Day, 16 December 2019

By Silvia Tieri

In South Asia, music speaks politics. Among uncountable melodic masterpieces, there is a moving Pakistani ghazal, Woh Humsafar Tha, that goes like this:

Woh humsafar tha magar us sey humnawai na thi…

Adavatein thi, taghaful tha, ranjishein thi magar

Bicharne walay main sab kuch tha, bewafai na thi…

(He/She was my companion (fellow-traveller) but there was no harmony between us…

There were feelings of animosity, indifference, and anguish but

In my departing partner I had found all but unfaithfulness…)

The composition gained new popularity within and beyond the country in 2011 thanks to its indie-style remake that served as a soundtrack for a romantic soap-opera also named “Humsafar” (Hum: together; Safar: journey). However, few among its younger fans will know that this song tells the story of no typical heartbreak. In fact, the two co-journyers who had so much in common yet could not quite stick together – as the lyrics say – are Pakistan and Bangladesh, parting ways five decades ago. The ghazal was written by Naseer Turabi soon after the news of the fall of Dhaka (for Indians: Lt. Gen. Niazi’s surrender to Indian forces; for Bangladeshis: Victory Day) reached West Pakistan on 16 December 1971, leaving him shocked and in tears.

When the great partition of the Indian subcontinent divided Punjab and Bengal in 1947, Bengalis of the East had joined their Western co-religionists into a brave political journey called Pakistan: a homeland for South Asian Muslims, forming a nation separate from the Hindus’. However, while they officially constituted a single nation-state, the two wings of Pakistan (one’s capital was Karachi, the other’s Dhaka) were divided by significant cultural, ethnolinguistic, and socio-economic differences, as well as by more than two thousand kilometres of Indian territory. It could not last. Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib “Bangabandhu”,  father of Bangladeshi nationalism as well as the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the East eventually seceded, militarily supported by India. East and West Pakistan had existed as one for less than twenty-five years. In 1971 they split. It was a massive blow to the Two-Nations Theory that had been Pakistan’s raison d’être.

On paper, Pakistan and Bangladesh have much in common. They are the two Muslim-majority nations of the Indian subcontinent, carved out of British India by means of partition(s). They also both share a complicated relationship and some long borders with South Asian hegemon India, although the Indo-Bangladeshi border is rather porous, while the Indo-Pakistani is the most militarised in the world. Nonetheless, relations between Dhaka and Islamabad, which replaced Karachi as Pakistan’s capital in 1967, have been strained ever since Bangladeshi independence.

Hasina’s perceived closeness to India, as well as her government’s vigorous prosecution of former pro-Pakistani and Islamist forces since the late 2000s, have cast a long shadow on post-1971 bilateral relations. A partial rapprochement had occurred earlier, under the rule of Ziaur Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), traditionally closer to Pakistan. However, Hasina’s Awami League (AL) inherited the independence legacy and in 2008 returned to power, maintaining a solid grasp over it ever since. In 2009 the AL administration created the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a special court in charge of prosecuting war crimes, including genocide, committed by the Pakistani Army and its collaborators during the 1971 war. Because the convicted belong to political forces that are AL’s archenemies, the ICT receives criticism not only for its supposed low judicial standards, but also for being allegedly used to knock out political competition. In Bangladesh, it still counts on considerable popular support.

Bilateral relations between the once humsafars have been almost non-existent in the last decade. The execution of Bangladeshi members of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) in 2013 and 2016, strongly condemned by the Pakistani Parliament, marked their lowest points. In May 2019, it even seemed that the two countries temporarily suspended reciprocal visa issuance. The last high-level official visit of a Bangladeshi head of state to Pakistan dates back to February 2006, when Islamabad received then-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, heiress of husband Ziaur Rahman’s BNP leadership.

Speculations about a possible thaw, however, emerged following a series of gestures initiated by Pakistan in 2019 and continued in 2020. In September 2019, Pakistani Foreign Minister S.M. Qureshi phoned his Bangladeshi counterpart A.K.A. Momen to apprise him on Pakistan’s position over Kashmir after New Delhi revoked of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had granted special status to the disputed region until August 2019.The two talked again in March 2020 regarding the  pandemic. In July 2020, Pakistani High Commissioner I.A. Siddiqui met Momen in Dhaka. Days later Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan paid a courtesy call to Sheikh Hasina, exchanging views on the COVID-19 emergency, Kashmir, and inviting the Prime Minister to visit Islamabad. Khan also expressed commitment to deepen relations. This was reiterated on 3 December 2020, when High Commissioner Siddiqui and Hasina held a courtesy meeting in Dhaka. Additionally, Pakistan expressed its interest in deepening the trade relationship with Bangladesh, especially in terms of partnerships and investments in the textile sector.

These unusual overtures alerted Indian hawks in particular, as they caught India in a turbulent period, dotted by protests and lockdown impositions in Kashmir, border tensions with China, and a general deterioration of relations with regional neighbours. Some consider that Pakistan’s move towards Bangladesh is an attempt to take advantage of the widening vacuum left by New Delhi’s policy towards its eastern neighbour, less attentive in the latest years despite declared intentions to “Look East” and to “Neighbourhood First”. One emerging commonality between Islamabad and Dhaka is their convergence towards China as a key investor, development partner, and defence supplier, proving Bangladesh has other reliable options besides India. While Pakistan remains China’s major ally in South Asia, Dhaka-Beijing relations have been recently upgraded to a “strategic partnership of cooperation” in 2016. 

Overall, Pakistan’s recent openings towards Bangladesh undoubtedly signalled an interest to rekindle an otherwise frosty bilateral relationship. But the critical issues that keep poisoning it have been left untouched. These are rooted in the divergent Pakistani and Bengali nationalisms, and their irreconcilable narratives of the facts of 1971. The AL and most Bangladeshis are determined that Pakistan owes a formal apology for its actions against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, acknowledges neither the accusation of genocide nor the number of victims alleged by Dhaka. Because the matter is so controversial, to establish where history ends and national narratives begin remains a challenging task. Other pending bilateral issues include the status of Bangladesh’s Biharis, the question of asset sharing, as well as the 1974 trilateral agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, of whose violation Bangladesh and Pakistan have accused each other. Meanwhile, to the dismay of Pakistan, the war crime trials have continued in Bangladesh. In 2019, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court resumed hearing appeals of such trials after a three year interruption. In the same year, the ICT emanated 14 new death sentences to former militants of JeI and Razakar Bahini. Also, Bangladesh’s official stance on Kashmir remains non-intervention. Although the notorious abrogation of Article 370 was met with protests in Dhaka, Foreign Minister Momen reiterated that it is an internal issue of India into which Bangladesh will not get involved. 1971 was a bad break-up. Pakistan is now making a move. But Dhaka still wants Islamabad to apologise and make amends, before they can embark on a new journey, together.

Silvia Tieri is a political scientist and ethnographer in training based at King’s India Institute. In 2019 she joined the King’s College London-National University of Singapore Joint PhD Programme. Her doctoral research concerns the politics of linguistic identity in contemporary India and Pakistan. Before joining KCL, she was a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore. She holds a Master’s in International Relations from the University of Pisa (Italy) and a Master’s by Research in South Asian Studies from the National University of Singapore.

Article 370’s Revocation: Integrating or Alienating Kashmir?

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by Prachi Aryal

There has been heavy military deployment in Kashmir in order to contain protests following the revocation of Article 370 (Image credit: Dar Yasin)

“Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameen ast, Hameen ast-o hameen ast-o hameen ast…”

“If there is a heaven on earth, it’s here, it’s here…”

– Amīr Khusrau (1253–1325), Indian poet on Kashmir

The land of Kashmir, often portrayed as heaven on earth, finds itself marred in a conflict between India and Pakistan, two countries that share a colonial past. The end of British Colonial control of the Indian subcontinent, in August 1947, led to the formation of India and Pakistan. In the aftermath of the partition, the many former princely states which had persisted under British suzerainty were left to decide which country to join. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies in the northern mountainous region was seen as a strategically important area by both new-born states who each wanted it incorporated within their territory. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, chose to remain independent.

The bloody saga which ensued through the partition and the infiltration by tribal militants posed a great threat to the state of Kashmir. The state, in a severe political dilemma, was required to take urgent action, leading to a request to the Indian state for military help. After multiple deliberations, the Instrument of Accession (IoA) was signed in October 1947 by Maharaja Singh and the Indian state in return for military help, thereby integrating Kashmir into India. The IoA stated that the Dominion of India would have control of the state in three major areas – defence, communications, and foreign affairs.

Nevertheless, the claim on Kashmiri land continued to be debated between India and Pakistan with specific counterclaims that the IoA was a farce. Nonetheless, negotiations between Kashmiri representatives and India led to the creation of Article 370 – which granted special autonomous status to the state of Kashmir in the Indian Constitution. While this legislation was being laid down, the state of Kashmir faced constant threats from tribal invaders who had their bases in Pakistan. Against the backdrop of large scale massacres that the nation had just witnessed, India decided not to resort to military actions and took the issue to the United Nations, following the advice of Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India,

The UN responded in January 1948 by passing Resolution 39  establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In April of the same year, the Security Council decided to increase the power of the UNCIP under Resolution 47 to facilitate mediation between India and Pakistan. The resolution called upon the countries to withdraw their troops, after which point the UN would establish a temporary plebiscite administration in Kashmir, which would then carry out a fair and impartial plebiscite deciding the accession or autonomy of the state. Both the countries eventually agreed upon a ceasefire and a Line of Control (LOC) came into effect in January 1949, demarcating the territorial lines between the nations. Despite resolution 47, the failure to hold a plebiscite resulted in a divided rule over the region.

The Indian-administered area of Kashmir has been subject to internal violence ever since claims of a rigged election surfaced in 1987. An armed rebellion has existed against New Delhi’s rule in Kashmir, growing anti-India statements and a massive outcry for ‘azadi’ – freedom from Indian rule –  have triggered stringent military reactions from the Indian state. In August 2019, the Hindu Nationalist government of Narendra Modi abrogated Article 370 against the will of large numbers of Kashmiri people. This move was claimed to be yet another step towards ‘integrating’ Kashmir into India, a six-decades long nationalist endeavour supported in particular by the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Following the revocation of the special status of Kashmir, the dream of freedom from India’s rule has become stronger (Image credit: Dar Yasin).

The government went on to divide the state of Kashmir into two centrally administered territories. Indian military forces operating in Kashmir are shielded by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which grants them immunity from human rights convictions, such as rape, extrajudicial killing and torture. Parallelly, the government is set to embark on a witch hunt of activists and journalists who raise their voices against the violence perpetrated by enforcing draconian anti-terrorism laws such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). Furthermore, critics claim that the government’s pseudo-secularism agenda has been furthered by the revocation of the article, where Hindu-nationalist policies are used to garner electoral votes.

Despite several concerns highlighted by the UN Human Rights Chief  Michelle Bachelet and UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, any mediation on the issue of Kashmir has been blocked by India under claims that it is an internal issue, an exclusive concern of Indian sovereignty. Given the presence that India has in the international sphere, there have been little to no repercussions for the grave violations of human rights in the region. The lack of global attention due to restrictive anti-media practices alongside a rejection of third-party mediation has granted the government more leverage to continue unlawful activities. There have been mounting claims that the situation in Kashmir is getting worse by the day with Internet shutdowns, a government crackdown on media organisations and journalists, the arrest of political leaders and civilians many of them who are children.

Arundhati Roy, asserts that, ‘Indian Muslims have been effectively disenfranchised and are becoming the most vulnerable of people – a community without political representation.’ Critics claim that the government’s pseudo-secularism agenda has been furthered by the revocation of the article, where politics is used to secure votes. In the expansion of the Hindu Nation under Modi, international organisations have fallen victim, Amnesty International’s office in India was shut down following reprisal from the government over its coverage of human rights violations that occurred in Kashmir. This further erodes any ground for seeking justice or accountability for Kashmiris who have been subjected to various atrocities.

Since the revocation of article 370, civilians have been arbitrarily arrested and the valley remains in a state of siege with a stringent curfew. Meanwhile, the Indian government refutes claims of human rights violations, maintaining that this legislative move will pave the way for economic growth in the state. Inclusivity, however, remains a far-off dream for the people of Kashmir. Furthermore, the information ban and the detention of Kashmiri political leaders, civilians, and journalists outlines a rather meek prospect for the accountability of the Indian government.

The longstanding conflict has polarized the Kashmiris even further as they have been side-lined in political discussions and the decision on the fate of the valley of Kashmir is carried out by those who centrally rule the country. The aspirations of the Kashmiri people have been overlooked and they have been rendered voiceless with the revocation of the special status. The crisis requires the integration of Kashmiri people into the mainstream discussion, addressing their issues and concerns. The Indian government needs to be held accountable for its actions, decades of violence, and mass unnamed graves of Kashmiris if it wishes to truly integrate Kashmir and Kashmiris.

Prachi Aryal is a MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.