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You are here: Home / Archives for displacement

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Feature – Climate Change, Conflict, and Children’s Rights Abuses: Syrian Refugees in Turkey

December 18, 2020 by Chiara Scissa

by Chiara Scissa

In limbo in Lesbos: Doctors without Borders labelled the Mória Refugee Camp as the ‘worst refugee camp on earth’ (Image credit: Getty Images/AFP/F. Perrier)

Introduction

The world is becoming increasingly aware of the interconnections between climate change, human rights, and its implications on affected populations and countries. It is now widely recognised that climate change adversely impacts the right to life, property, and an adequate standard of living by hampering access to hygiene, water, and food but also adequate healthcare, among many basic necessities. This fact has been most visible during the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011.

According to the data of the Syrian Ministry of State for Environment Affairs and the World Bank, the annual temperature in Syria has increased at a rate of 0.8°C per century since the 1950s. This change is reflected in an increased frequency, length, and intensity of droughts and heatwaves. Decades of unsustainable agricultural policies, the consequent overexploitation of water and soil resources, coupled with the effects of climate change resulted in desertification, higher temperatures, and reduced precipitations. These developments dramatically impacted the agricultural industry, at that time representing twenty-five per cent of Syrian GDP.

Although in-depth research studies have so far not confirmed a causal link between climate change and conflicts, other scholars, such as Ingrid Boas, nevertheless stress that drought and water scarcity may be included among the complex and interlinked pressures that characterise the unrest in Syria. To make matters worse, water infrastructure there was consistently under attack. In a country already hit by drought, attacks on water networks cut services for weeks during the armed conflict, with millions of people suffering from long and deliberate interruptions to a water supply.

According to UNICEF, disruptions in Aleppo encompassed a deliberate forty-eight-day shutdown of a water treatment plant that served two million people. Indeed, the organisation  straightforwardly claimed ‘attacks on water and sanitation are attacks on children.’ Without safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), children’s health, nutrition, safety, and education are at risk. They are exposed to preventable diseases including diarrhoea, typhoid, cholera and polio which may potentially disrupt their early development if not treated on time. Children are also at risk of undernutrition and malnutrition, vulnerable to sexual violence and injury as they collect water.

The report continues by noting that children under fifteen are, on average, nearly three times more likely to die than adults from vector-borne diseases, such as diarrhoeal disease, related to unsafe water and sanitation than violence directly linked to conflict. As a matter of fact, seventy per cent of annual children’s death are attributable to diarrhoea, malaria, neonatal infection, pneumonia, preterm delivery, and the lack of oxygen at birth. For children under five, this probability increases more than twenty times.

With millions of refugees streaming into Europe since the onset of the war, Turkey, as Syria’s closest and ‘safest’ neighbour has been the focal point of this population movement. However, Turkey’s response to the refugees has been a human rights abomination, particularly when it comes to children and minors. This article will describe the steps Turkey has taken to undermine the human rights of Syrian children and why it should not be considered a safe third country.

Children’s rights abuses in Turkey

It has been estimated that due to the Syrian civil war, as of March 2019, one million Syrian children became orphans, 4.7 million children are in need of humanitarian assistance, and another 490,000 of said children are in hard-to-reach areas. Overall, six million Syrians are internally displaced, while another 5.6 million people have left their home country. Most of them fled to Turkey. In response, Turkey passed two foundational pieces of legislation in 2013. First, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection no. 6458, which entered into force in April 2014, and second, the Temporary Protection Regulation – TPR, in 2014. Given that Turkey is one among very few countries which still has the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Syrians and non-European asylum seekers may only be entitled to the weaker standards provided under the TPR.

As pointed out by several authors, temporary protection has a more limited scope than the refugee protection and, in non-compliance with its provisions, health and education services as well as access to social assistance and employment to Syrians are often not delivered. For instance, UNICEF stressed that the situation for refugee children in Turkey remains particularly challenging, given that around 400,000 Syrian children are still out of school and are therefore at likely risk of isolation, discrimination and exploitation. Of 4 million registered Syrians in Turkey, 3.6 million were awarded the TPR, including around 1.5 million children under 18, of which 532,000 are under 5 years of age.

To date, Ankara is yet established a comprehensive human rights framework. Nor does it provide for a specific law addressing (un)accompanied minors. However, under Article 3 of the TPR, (un)accompanied minors are persons with special needs, thus entitled to additional safeguards and priority access to rights and services, such as healthcare, psychosocial support, and rehabilitation. Pursuant to the Turkish Civil Code, unaccompanied minors shall be appointed with a legal guardian, a provision that the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) claims is not respected most of the time.

In this respect, it has been noted that lawyers in Ankara have witnessed difficulties, while in some cases appointed guardians had no qualification for that role. AIDA also noted the persistent coexistence of different procedures applying to the reception and guardianship of unaccompanied minors in Turkey, which gives rise to different standards of treatment. AIDA considers, for instance, that in 2019 the legal assessments of new guardians in Antakya have not been conducted carefully.

Additionally, although Turkey has ratified both the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Exploitation and Abuses, Amnesty International claims that, between 2014 and 2018, Turkey has unlawfully deported Syrians to their home country, violating the principle of non-refoulement. According to such peremptory norm, States are not allowed to remove, deport or expel a person to a country where their life and liberty would be threatened, or where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

This allegation has been also confirmed by Human Rights Watch and questions have been raised by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on migration and refugees of the Council of Europe, on the observance of its international obligations. Amnesty showed that episodes of deportation persisted respectively in July 2019 and May 2020. The victims are mostly men, but there is evidence of children and families deported. Moreover, Syrians at risk of deportation are often left without legal recourse or remedy to prevent their illegal removal, and the UNHCR does not have access to immigration removal centres, as also noted by the European Parliament.

Furthermore, Amnesty International, Save the Children, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, and the Council of Europe accuse Turkey of unlawfully detaining Syrian asylum seekers. In 2017, there were 21 temporary accommodation centres for temporary protection beneficiaries. Some of these have turned into de facto detention centres for Syrians with insufficient food and dire conditions, especially for children. In practice, unaccompanied minors are kept in removal centres in border cities and a number of children begging or selling small objects in the street are detained in police stations, where they often receive documents cancelling their right to stay.

Children with their families are generally detained in removal centres where they are not granted education. For all these reasons, recently, the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey violating Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture), Article 5.4 ECHR (right to remedy), Article 5.1 ECHR (freedom of movement), and Article 13 ECHR (fair trial) in the case of detention pending expulsion of a mother and her 3 children, all Russian nationals, arrested for attempting to cross the Syrian border after entering Turkey.

Finally, another severe breach of children’s rights in Turkey concerns the employment of children under the age of 15, which remains a considerable problem in Turkey. The influx of refugees has led to a quickly growing number of Syrian children working especially in textile factories and agriculture. A 2020 Save the Children report finds that often families only pay smugglers for their children’s trip to Turkey. From there the children need to find jobs to continue their journey to Western Europe.

This particular pattern of emigration exposes them to exploitation, abuses, kidnapping, and detention by smugglers as well as by Turkish authorities. According to Save the Children, ‘out of 254 children interviewed in March 2019, almost thirty per cent worked in one of the transit countries before reaching Belgrade. Almost all of these children (97%) worked in Turkey. Based on the testimonies of those willing to provide this information, the prices of transferring migrants from the country of origin to the desired destination ranged from EUR 6,000 to over EUR 10,000’.

Conclusion

In light of the persistent violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights of Syrians and other non-European persons in need of international protection in general and of (un)accompanied minors in particular, the unfilled lack of a comprehensive human rights framework, and the increasing limitation to basic civil and political rights by the central Turkish government, it comes clear that Turkey cannot be considered anymore, if ever, as a safe third country, where international protection applicants may find guarantees of adequate protection standards.

Similarly, the heads of government and state of the EU Member States that in 2016 signed together with Turkey the so-called EU-Turkey Statement cannot shy away anymore from their international obligations and responsibilities. Neither Turkish President Erdoğan’s autocratic regime, nor the absence of a national human rights framework persuaded the EU to consider Turkey as an unsafe country for refugees and asylum seekers. On this behalf, President Erdoğan repeatedly threatened the EU to open the border with Greece as a way to convince the Union to financially support Turkey’s intervention in Syria. In March 2020, the EU refused to increase its financial aid to Ankara, claiming that EU Member States would not bow to President Erdoğan’s threats. A few days later, the Turkish President opened the gate and thousands of migrants stuck at the Turkish-Greek border to exit the country.

Ankara used migration to put pressure on a weak EU, unwilling to take on its responsibilities towards migratory challenges. The externalisation of actions to curb migration through informal agreements with unsafe non-EU countries, which unlawfully impedes people to leave their soil in exchange for financial and economic benefits, leads to human rights abuses, to breaches of international and EU law, and to extremely serious damages against the victims involved. Many scholars have also pointed out the high risk for the parties involved to violate the principle of non-refoulement, since the removal of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey as the first country of asylum seems not to fulfil the requirement of sufficient and effective protection.

Such a human rights-breaching deal – that trapped over twelve thousand asylum seekers in the Moria refugee camp, which has a capacity to house two thousand – should end immediately. As long as EU Member States will continue to limit the access to international protection in their national territories and to add external barriers to stem migration flows, the Common European Asylum System cannot be more than empty words on the EU Official Journal.


Chiara Scissa is a PhD student in Law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies (Pisa, Italy) and Human Rights and Migrant Protection Focal Point at the United Nations Major Group for Children and Youth (UNMGCY). Her main research interests in migration and refugee studies include the impact of climate change on human rights and environmental migration. Email: chiara.scissa@santannapisa.it

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: children’s rights, Climate Change, conflict, displacement, Syria, Turkey

The World's Forgotten Migrants

July 3, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Isobel Petersen:

A displaced woman sits on a bed next to the remnants of her burnt house in Khor Abeche, South Darfur. April, 2014. Photo: Albert Gonzalez Farran, UNAMID (CC 2.0)
A displaced woman sits on a bed next to the remnants of her burnt house in Khor Abeche, South Darfur. April, 2014. Photo: Albert Gonzalez Farran, UNAMID (CC 2.0)

Human migration exists on a large scale across the globe, but in a variety of forms and for a variety of reasons. Conflict is one of the key causes of displacement, which is unsurprising considering the devastating effects of living in a conflict zone: poor health; economic instability; familial tragedy and lack of education opportunities, amongst others.

Today’s conflicts are increasingly asymmetric with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) taking the lead in waging wars, resulting in a multitude of competing factions and loyalties heightening the threat to citizens of a state in conflict. Furthermore, the lines are blurred between combatant and civilian all too easily, normalising both the intentional targeting of civilians as well as their destruction as ‘collateral damage’. During the past 50 years, wars of independence evolved into civil wars, which splintered into NSAGs pursuing their own gains, the targeting of minorities, battles for resources, and border disputes. Today across Iraq and Syria there is a new supra-state crisis with the rise of Islamic State (IS).

In Europe the issue of displaced persons is most visible as thousands cross the Mediterranean into Italy and Greece or by land into the Balkan states. The rate at which they have arrived has doubled in the past year, although Europe is still home to less than 10% of the world’s displaced persons. This is a life-threatening journey with the risk of injury, separation from family, poverty and arrest along the way to a hopefully better life. We are all aware of the tragedies along the southern coastlines of the Med’s beaches, but with the rising political popularity of the European Right there has been a tendency to overlook the more disastrous bigger picture.

The significance of a European Right is that it has become a prominent mouthpiece for anti-immigration, nationalist voices. On the international scale, this has consequently presented the issue of immigration as a concern for the destination countries for immigrants rather than the reasons behind migration. This problem has been exacerbated by the lack of global responsibility to tackle the issue, and focuses instead on the socio-political climate of the countries that have the capacity to assist.

Migrants are displaced peoples, admittedly not always by force, but with sufficient reason to dare to start somewhere unfamiliar and potentially hostile. Displaced peoples can also be refugees, political exiles, stateless peoples and unwelcome minorities. Migration is considered as a last resort, whether to escape persecution, natural disaster, and extreme poverty or conflict zones, and it is not a new phenomenon.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) by the end of 2014 there were 59.5 million people forcibly displaced – that is, involuntarily displaced people. That is only a few million shy of the total UK population. This figure is too large to ignore and states must recognise that they are increasingly going to have to accommodate non-nationals as part of the wider solution to solve the problem. This is arguably precisely why the understanding of migration has narrowed, so much so that the vast majority of those displaced by conflict have been forgotten. These forgotten migrants are internally displaced peoples (IDPs); those who – predominantly as a result of conflict – have had to move within their own countries leaving them economically unstable and at risk from persecution. The issue of cross-border migration is so headline-grabbing that the vast number of IDPs have been pushed to one side, although they are in need of humanitarian assistance too.

A little over a month ago the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) released their latest annual report for the global trends and figures of IDPs. The report makes for powerful and shocking reading, as one realises just how many people are in transitory and volatile living situations within their own country. Across the 60 countries that the IDMC included in the study, there was an equivalent of 30,000 new IDPs every day between January and December 2014, bringing the global total to a staggering 38 million people; a 15% rise from 2013. When one then considers that this is about 65% of all displaced people, it becomes hard to ignore that this is a matter for academics, practitioners and policy-makers alike.

Photo: UNHCR
Photo: UNHCR

Earlier this month the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Lise Grande, made an urgent plea for £316m in assistance for Iraqis affected by the IS campaign, this includes over 3 million Iraqi IDPs. The financial contribution of international organisations and states is an essential part of the immediate and life-saving relief that people affected by conflict need. However, displacement cannot quickly be reversed or solved simply with funding; it must be a long-term policy movement to help not just the state structure but also the individuals. States impacted by intense conflict are likely to struggle through economic instability and weak state governance, thus making it difficult to provide for their own citizens and migrants.

In a 2009 report published by the International Committee of the Red Cross about IDPs, a key suggestion the organisation made was to assist in providing economic security in areas which are both likely to face the repercussions of conflict and those areas which receive IDPs in order to prevent future destabilisation. Post-conflict peacebuilding is accepted as a role for the UN and its member states; this must include acknowledging IDPs and assisting post-conflict governments in adjusting to the new social, economic and political demands of internal displacement.

The African Union’s (AU) 2009 Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, (informally known as the Kampala Convention), was the first legally binding instrument specifically catering to IDPs. By December 2014 22 AU member states had ratified it, with a further 20 member states signing it. This is an example of positive action taken by states affected directly, or as regional actors, by IDPs. It particularly reaffirms the obligation of governments to address the needs of those in their own states.

Implementation of concrete change is still, however, a challenge because states hosting displaced persons tend to be fragile, without the economic means to sufficiently address the issue. The Kampala Convention is an example of a decision that needs international support for it to be effectively implemented.

The numbers of IDPs in Colombia are the second worst in the world after Syria with 6 million counted in 2014, although UNHCR has said that may be an underestimate. This is as a result of a 50-year civil war between government forces and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), alongside other paramilitary groups and bandit gangs.

The poor of Colombia are becoming poorer and the ethnic minorities are suffering the most, as they live in the rural areas where most armed conflict takes place. There are legal frameworks in place to respond to internal displacement; however, this is hampered by poor enforcement on the part of the Colombian government, administrative errors, and most importantly a reactive rather than a proactive attitude. The weaknesses in the Colombian strategy of dealing with IDPs demonstrates the all-too-easy potential to provide reactive, short-term responses instead of prioritising a collaborative, long-lasting effort.

Once a ceasefire agreement has been signed, this does not mean that those IDPs who have fled the violence are once again able to continue with their lives. It should not be accepted that forcible displacement is an inevitable result of conflict; a new norm must take hold. Leaving the economic and physical security of one’s home as a result of conflict has long-term consequences for the future stability of a country, jeopardizing sustainable peace. This is the most important reason for why governments of countries with large numbers of IDPs must take the issue seriously and prioritise legal, financial and social assurances in the post-conflict environment. This requires the help of the international community who must continue to contribute to the essential humanitarian needs of those affected by conflict, including IDPs.

Most importantly, however, is the long-term recognition that migrants are not always cross-border refugees who are visible and demand a political response; a political response is needed for the ‘invisible’ migrants who have been displaced within their own countries too. Both issues must be tackled, but the issues are also separate, and demand separate responses.

Finally, it is essential that in countries such as the UK there is an attitude transformation regarding migration, as increasingly our domestic policy and attitude towards foreign relations is becoming narrow-minded and selfish. If this public attitude continues to prevail then there is no hope for a positive British contribution by policy-makers to the international tragedy of forcible internal displacement.


Isobel Petersen studied International Relations at the University of Exeter and is currently reading for an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Her particular interest is post-conflict resolution with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli crisis. Isobel is an Editor at Strife. 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: colombia, conflict, displacement, IDPs, Migration, Syria, UN

A Rapid Escalation: Violence in South Sudan

May 8, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Christian Stensrud:

South Sudan Soldiers (Flickr/Steve Evans)
South Sudan Soldiers (Flickr/Steve Evans)

According to US Secretary of State John Kerry, the risk of genocide in South Sudan is horribly real. Over one million people have been displaced from their homes in South Sudan since December 2013.[i] While the short time frame is chilling enough, these displacements run parallel with large scale human rights abuses, increasing inter-ethnic conflict, and rampant arms proliferation. Civilians bear the brunt of the fighting, with 4.9 million needing some form of humanitarian assistance.[ii]

Media coverage has presented the situation as a conflict between President Kiir and Vice President Machar, or as a tribal conflict between Dinka and Neur. The battle between the two men is one catalyst for the conflict, however the reasons for the dramatic escalation in violence, to the point where large scale genocide is possible, is more enigmatic. Not only does this view simplify the intricate political environment of South Sudan, but ignores the increasing divisions within the army (SPLA) and the role it has played in the conflict.[iii]

Events Leading to the Violence

The political hostility between President Kiir and Vice President Machar is one of the primary causes of the conflict in South Sudan. Both disagree over who should head the party in 2015; each favouring themselves. The fallout stems from a Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) meeting in March 2013, which discussed many issues including how the upcoming election in 2015 should be conducted. Machar and Pagan Amum announced previously their decision to run for President. In July 2013, President Kiir reshuffled the party; dismissing Vice President Machar alongside most of his cabinet. Dismissed politicians sought to counter the President through decision-making bodies within the SPLM. Kiir retaliated by disabling these institutions.[iv]

During the meeting of the National Liberation Council on December 14th,tensions exploded at the main military command centre at al-Qayada, southwest of Juba. Members of the National Guard turned on each other, exchanging fists and then bullets. The cause of the battle is unclear. President Kiir accuses Machar of attempting a coup; Machar denies this, rebutting that Kiir is guilty of inciting ethnic violence and has publicly called for his overthrow.[v]

What is clear is that Kiir assured the public that the perpetrators would be dealt with. On the night of December 16th the Presidential Guards were given control of the city to root out the perpetrators. Instead of only rounding up political rivals, they targeted Nuer neighbourhoods, rounding up young men and killing them in cold blood; some eyewitnesses claim 1,000 Nuer were massacred in three days.[vi] Many Neur reacted to their families and friends being killed, which spread the fighting all over the country and gave the political conflict an ethnical dimension.[vii]

The Complex Political Reality and Ethnic Tensions

Historically conflicts in Sudan can be categorized in three ways: the liberation wars where the south fought the north for independence; ethnic feuds over resources; and rivalries between political leaders.[viii] The current conflict can be seen as an interlinking of the last two.

The political infighting of 2013 is not new to the SPLM, which has a history of competition for political power. The SPLM first split into two warring factions in August 1991.[ix] Rich Machar, a Nuer, was involved in these very first fallouts, and alongside other SPLA officers broke away from their commander-in-chief John Garang, a Bor Dinka. The political rift resulted in military confrontation between Nuer and Dinka, the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan, for the next seven years. Both sides are guilty of human rights abuses, and Machar himself committed atrocities against the Dinka in Jonglei state. The North vs. South dimension of the conflict eroded, and southern groups became increasingly hostile to each other. Southern Sudanese have been blighted by ethicised, South-on-South military violence ever since, and the political turmoil that came to a head in 2013 reopened these old wounds.[x]

The violence during the first split was extremely destructive to ethnic relations, but was swept under the rug in the interest of keeping focussed on the common goal of liberation from Khartoum. The crimes committed have never been addressed and no one has been held accountable. No victims have been offered recompense or justice. The lack of accountability for previous atrocities was one factor in the escalation of the current crisis, with many civilians and militiamen either seeking revenge for previous crimes or scared of what violations may yet be committed. The immunity from recriminations has also created a type of politics where political ambition can be achieved through the use of force.

The Role of the SPLA

The structure of the SPLA offers little security in South Sudan, allowing the violence to escalate.[xi] The current SPLA is an amalgamation of several previously warring factions that were integrated into a national army through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. This union involved incorporating militiamen into the SPLA that were never disciplined enough to be involved in a national defence force, compromising the army’s professionalization and ability to reform.[xii] The result was an army with no shared ethos or centralized command. This loose structure encourages ethnic divisions, with key commanders often remaining loyal to their former militia leaders. During the outbreak of the current crisis many soldiers chose to fight without commanding officers, not wanting officers to direct them or hold them back.[xiii]

Before the signing of the CPA in 2005, the SPLA was not only a guerrilla force, but also conducted civilian law enforcement. One problem with the CPA is that it transformed the SPLA into a national army, based in military encampments, without replacing it with any other form of law enforcement. Civilians have no protection and there is no way to prevent disputes or reduce weapon ownership. This lack of law enforcement twinned with 30 years of war have made the nation awash with accessible weapons.

While it is true that the SPLA is not responsible for causing the violence currently underway, it has contributed to its escalation. The integration by Kiir of militias in 2006 was undone by the first shots fired in December 2013, and the SPLA is unravelling under the new political fallout with militias starting to splinter away and fight each other.

 Conclusion

There were roughly 228,000 refugees in late November 2013[xiv] before the political engagement in December, compared to 1.05 million in March 2014. While the fracture within the ruling party has been the catalyst, the causes for its rapid escalation are complex: the lack of recriminations for past atrocities; the security vacuum in rural areas; the ease of acquiring small arms in South Sudan; as well as the lack of a coherent or unified command structure in the SPLA are all relevant factors.

Since the outbreak, violence has escalated dramatically. US Secretary of State John Kerry has warned against the possibility of genocide, and it is becoming clear that some form of international intervention is needed. Before any action is taken, the international community must acknowledge that the conflict is not simply ethnic groups fighting each other; it is more precise to see the violence as politically based; as political leaders mobilizing their military resources and personnel along ethnic lines.

 

______________________

Christian Stensrud has a M.A. in Public Policy from King’s College London. He has also worked at Alive and Kicking, a social enterprise that aims to alleviate unemployment, poverty and promote health awareness in Kenya, Zambia, and Ghana.

 

NOTES

[i]Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (2014). South Sudan Crisis: Situation Report No.30 (April 2014). [pdf]. South Sudan: Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South_Sudan_Crisis_Situation_Report_30_as_of_3_April_2014.pdf
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Jok, J.M. (2014) South Sudan and the Prospects for Peace amidst Violent Political Wrangling. South Sudan: The Sudd Institute. [Online] Available at: http://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/south-sudan-and-the-prospects-for-peace-amidst-violent-political-wrangling/
[iv] Gal, K. (2014) The Root Causes of the Current Conflict. South Sudan News Agency. [Online] Available at: http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/the-root-causes-of-current-conflict
[v] International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (2014). The Crisis in South Sudan. New York: International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect [Online] Available at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-south-sudan
[vi]Gal, K. (2014) The Root Causes of the Current Conflict. South Sudan News Agency. [Online] Available at: http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/the-root-causes-of-current-conflict
[vii] Human Rights Watch (2013) South Sudan: Soldiers Target Ethnic Groups in Juba Fighting. [Online] Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/19/south-sudan-soldiers-target-ethnic-group-juba-fighting
[viii] Jok, J.M. (2014) South Sudan and the Prospects for Peace Amidst Violent Political Wrangling. South Sudan: The Sudd Institute. [Online] Available at: http://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/south-sudan-and-the-prospects-for-peace-amidst-violent-political-wrangling/
[ix] Hutchinson, S.E. (2001) A Curse from God? Religious and political dimensions of the post-1991 rise of ethnic violence in South Sudan. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39(2): pp. 307-331.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Crisis Group. (2013) South Sudan Needs Respected Outside Mediation. [Online] Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/africa/south-sudan-needs-respected-outside-mediation.aspx
[xii] Waal, A. Mohammed, A. (2014) Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong, and How to Fix It. Foreign Affairs. [Online] Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140617/alex-de-waal-and-abdul-mohammed/breakdown-in-south-sudan
[xiii] Jok, J.M. (2014)
[xiv] Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (2013). South Sudan Crisis: Situation Report No.25 (November 2014). [pdf]. South Sudan: Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs. Available at:http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20South%20Sudan%20WHB%2025%20Nov-1%20Dec%202013.pdf

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: displacement, Riek Machar, Slava Kiir, South Sudan

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