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Feature – From Debates to Processes: Trajectories of Intelligence Oversight in the UK

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by Joseph Jarnecki

The British Parliament, seen from across the Thames (Image credit: Britannica)

On 17 October 2019, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) handed their report on Russian interference into British democracy to Prime Minister Boris Johnson. A bipartisan committee, the ISC is mandated by the British Parliament to oversee the British intelligence services – replacing open debates with formal parliamentary procedures.

Following significant delays to its release, the report saw light of day only nine months later. As a result, questions regarding the ISC’s ability to fulfil its brief have begun to be asked more loudly. This has only been exacerbated by the failed installation of Chris Grayling MP to Committee Chairmanship. With members of the ISC being nominated and not elected, and with recent events exposing the limits of the committee’s independence, how effective are current procedures of democratic oversight on holding intelligence services and their ministers to account? And is a nominated committee truly more efficient than open parliamentary discussions?

The 1984 controversy surrounding union membership for Government Communication Head Quarters (GCHQ) employees generated the first substantial debates on intelligence services and democratic oversight in Parliament. To illustrate this point, that year there were over three hundred mentions of GCHQ in Parliament; in all its previous history there had been just fourteen. The rest of the decade continued this trend with increased attention for the intelligence services by parliamentarians. Here, debates frequently turned to questions of the politicisation of security as well as principles of parliamentary and collective democracy.

Of those debates, the 1985 Interception of Communications Bill is notable for opposing parliamentary sovereignty and royal prerogative – that is, those powers held under sovereign authority but exercised by the executive. The legislation, as asserted in the chamber by former Labour MP Tony Benn, expanded the executive’s ability to deploy surveillance such that it undermined ‘parliamentary democracy.’ He argued that those executive justifications for wiretapping on the grounds of ‘national security’ stripped parliament of its central purpose of discussing and deciding national interests, especially its capacity to determine British security interests.  Benn’s assertion, that ‘security in Britain is controlled by the Prime Minister,’ seems to therefore echo the thought of later academic work regarding the instrumentalization of security which, despite recent controversies over increasing surveillance through the use of prerogative powers in line with Coronavirus measures, receives little mention in contemporary Parliaments.

Two years later, the 1987 House of Commons (Services) debate, regarding the Speaker of the House’s decision to suspend Ronan Bennett’s parliamentary pass also centralises themes of security versus parliamentary democracy. Employed as a researcher for then backbencher Jeremy Corbyn, Bennett had been previously linked to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and had been convicted for the murder of a police officer – though this was overturned a year later. The decision to rescind his access was justified by advice received from the security services that Bennett was a ‘security risk,’ an accusation that quickly found its way into the media.

The foremost issue that MPs took with this incident, other than asserting that it subverted their right to hire as they please, was that the Speaker had not questioned the reasoning for this advice and that the recommendation was not a matter of public record. As such, neither the accused, his employer, the House services committee, nor the issuer of the ban knew the justification for the advice to exclude Bennett. This led backbench MPs to articulate a broader critique of undefined ‘security risks’ as instruments used to claim authority and to construct boundaries to debate, all whilst avoiding transparency. Tony Benn in this debate raised such limits on open debate in order to critique what he saw as executive overreach, saying that ‘Members of Parliament are in danger of being licensed only to discuss what Ministers want them to discuss.’ Whilst Benn’s words again stand out for what Conservative MP John Biffen called his ‘characteristic zeal,’ upon looking at the debate in full its apparent that references to themes of democratic oversight and its tensions with security were habitual touchstones for this cohort of parliamentarians.

These two accounts highlight that amongst initial debates on the intelligence services, the problematisation of security and liberty, as well as contestations over principles of parliamentary sovereignty, were apparent. This stands in contrast to the belief that these themes are unique to our current moment or else only emerged following 9/11, the so-called “migrant crisis”, or the Snowden revelations. Indeed, these subjects which were evident in the 1980s persisted in parliament into the early 1990s, accumulating momentum such that the government was pressured to establish the ISC. With the creation of the committee, however, direct debates on the intelligence services have become limited to the yearly presentation of the ISC’s report or else to issues with a high public profile. Accompanying this drop in frequency has been a shift away from discussing the politicisation of security and principles of democracy. In their place, there has been a movement towards reflexively supporting intelligence activities and an increasing emphasis on vesting authority in procedures and professionalised bodies.

Whilst this shift has been gradual since 1994 a key case that illustrates a change is the 2013 debate regarding the operations of GCHQ. Held in the wake of revelations by whistle-blower Edward Snowden that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was operating illegal mass surveillance, the debate saw then Foreign Secretary William Hague address questions regarding active GCHQ-NSA cooperation and whether comparative GCHQ initiatives existed. Hague opened the debate by outlining what he saw as the three main issues raised by the controversy, these therefore can inform our reflections on how government positioning has adapted to the existence of the ISC.

First, in describing ‘the action that the Government are taking in response to recent events’ the Foreign Secretary solely refers to the ISC. Saying that they have ‘already received some information from GCHQ and will receive a full report tomorrow,’ and adding that they ‘will be free to decide what, if any further action’ to take. His response here, barely longer than the included extracts is telling for two reasons. Centrally, Hague seems to equate action by the government with action by the committee, or else he seeks to derive legitimacy from the committee’s presumed authority as a parliamentary body exerting oversight. Secondly, by sidestepping a commitment to substantive action by deferring to potential ISC scrutiny the foreign minister is pushing the discussion far into the future. Any ‘further action’ the committee could take would necessitate a long report process with the possibility of executive delay in publication.

The second issue raised by Hague, regards how intelligence services work ‘in accordance with UK law’ and democracy. His justification here being that agencies operate under 1994 and 2000 legislation and are therefore legitimate in their actions. Regardless of the flawed assumption that law is necessarily good, which tellingly was not challenged by other debate participants, his point is undermined by his own government’s 2013 Justice and Security Act, which imposed greater restrictions, later that year.

Lastly, the Secretary’s third issue relates to how the law is upheld in international intelligence cooperation, which he acknowledges is regular between the NSA and GCHQ. He quickly outlines again that legislation alongside oversight by ministers and the ISC ensures adherence to the law, however in contrast to speakers in the 1980s, who might have interrogated the underlying rationalities for these agencies, Hague instead advocates for them through the prism of threat. In doing so he invokes physical and economic security, without a single mention of the preservation of life or democracy. As such, he displays an instrumentalisation of the authority the ISC is supposedly vested with as a scrutinising body, alongside an unreflexive prioritisation of the actions of the intelligence services.

Besides Hague’s statements what is also telling about this debate is what is excluded from the responses and questions to him. Of the forty-one MPs who spoke not one mentioned the word “democracy” nor “rights,” and of the three mentions of “liberty” two came as part of an exchange citing the paradox of Snowden’s invocation of the ideal from within the People’s Republic of China.

The final mention of ‘liberties’ came from former Conservative MP Rory Stewart wherein he urged Hague to focus not on the ‘legal problem’ of secret operations but instead on their repercussions for ‘balancing security and liberty.’ In what constitutes the only Benn-like elevation of the debate, Stewart went on to emphasise that the continuation of these operations relies on an informed public, who ‘through understanding, consent.’ Hague’s response to this assertion was to offer agreement that the public should be engaged, though he hedged this commitment with a call-back to the greater importance of secrecy as a guarantor of our security and the cooperation of our intelligence partners.

What is shown through these three debates is that there is no linear development of accountability for the intelligence services. Whilst the ISC provides a mechanism through which a select number of parliamentarians can access information the state has made secret; it has guaranteed neither substantive change in the powers afforded to Parliament nor multifaceted and nuanced debate. Moreover, the committee’s procedures provide ample excuses for governments to deflect or delay, as we have observed with the Russia report, and its annual sessions in parliament often do not receive great consideration. Whilst the executive retains the power of appointment and the ISC’s ability to launch formal investigations is limited, its capacity to achieve significant accountability is narrow.

The original full-length article can be found at the King’s Research Centre in International Relations (RCIR) Forum. The piece was written as part of the King’s Undergraduate Research fellowship held in the context of the GUARDINT project, which is supported by the Economic and Social Research Council.

Joseph Jarnecki is a MA International Conflict Studies student at King’s College London and the Coordinating Editor for Strife blog. His research interests include the politics of knowledge production, the proceduralisation of democratic accountability, as well as violence and (in)security. He completed his BA in International Relations at King’s. You can follow him @Jarnecki.

The British Security Service: Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Brexit Order

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by Gemma MacIntyre

The SIS Building in London features as the headquarters of the British Secret Intelligence Service (Image credit: Wikimedia)

British security services traditionally played a leading role in protecting both international and national security interests. In so doing, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), since it was first established in 1909, has benefitted from unrivalled access to issues of a covert nature. In turn, this has allowed the SIS to gain vast amounts of intelligence, that have enriched the conduct of both British and European foreign policy. Most notably, access to international data has enabled the SIS to be both preventative as well as proactive in tackling foreign threats, matters that are increasingly paramount in the current information age.

However, the British security environment in 2020 is very different to that of the early 1900s. In addition to a variety of emerging security issues – such as the ubiquity of hostile non-state actors, tensions with an increasingly clandestine Russia, and the threat of cyber-attacks – the impact of Brexit on security relations with the EU remains unclear. Nonetheless, by considering to what extent the UK has allied with the EU on security matters, particularly those most prominent today – one could speculate the challenges, and potential opportunities, that leaving the EU may serve.

In 2018, the National Security Capability Review (2018: 5) underscored the impact of security threats in the twentieth century on the ‘rules-based’ international system. The threat of cyber-attacks to British public services (as evidenced by the 2017 WannaCry attack on the NHS); instability in Middle Eastern and African areas that could give rise to Islamic-extremists; threats posed by Russia (underscored by the 2018 Salisbury nerve-agent poisoning); and, of course, the speed and access to telecommunications worldwide – all convey the increasingly transnational nature of security threats to twenty-first century Britain. This, coupled with uncertainties of Brexit, will inevitably impact the conduct of British security.

On paper, British policy-makers recognise the importance of adapting British security services to respond to evolving needs in an increasingly globalised order. In 2018, the British Government conceptualised the term ‘Global Britain’, to convey Britain’s commitment to multilateral cooperation (UK Parliament, 2018). The UK Government stressed that, despite leaving the EU, Britain continued to share mutual security interests with EU states; so cooperation would continue. Pro-Brexit advocates, such as British Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, have made clear that by leaving the EU, the British intelligence service would benefit from increased levels of funding, and the capacity to be more flexible in foreign policy security (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2019: 6). Scholars such as Hadfield (2018: 181) have also suggested that by leaving the EU, the UK may have greater freedom to enrich its bilateral security-relationships with EU states.

On the other hand, many remain dubious about the impact of Brexit on security. Neil Basu, Head of Counter-Terrorism in the UK, reported that, in the case of a no-deal Brexit, ‘The UK’s safety and security would suffer’ (The Guardian, 2019). Furthermore, it remains unclear to what extent the UK will continue to benefit from European security initiatives. The Schegen Information System II (SIS II) and the European Arrest Warrant are two European databases, which have helped to provide intelligence to the SIS on a range of security threats. Most critically, the SIS II has, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2019), enriched the UK’s counter-terrorism policy – by enabling Britain to track terrorists from Europe more easily. The IISS also highlighted the benefit of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which enables EU convicts to be extradited in their home country. In the case of the Spivrak attack, the EAW enabled Russian perpetrators to be extradited outside of the UK. British intelligence also benefits from the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which significantly widens Britain’s security database. As a result, a no-deal Brexit, according to IISS (2019) would delay this process, making Brits more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Coupled with this uncertainty, there is a lack of political-security leadership. Jeremy Corbyn has been criticised for not taking security seriously enough, with representatives from MI5 having to brief him on the current severity of issues (The Sunday Times, 2019). Jonson, on the other hand, faces a different – though, still concerning – sort of criticism. His crass comments about Islam not only underline his lack of sensitivity; they also risk exacerbating security issues further – by isolating minority groups. The proliferation of terrorist attacks in the UK by home-grown jihadists underline the saliency of this threat, as well as the need to understand and integrate minority groups – rather than ostracising them further.

While the impact of Brexit on UK security capabilities remains unclear; it is nonetheless important for the UK to consider potential measures, to strengthen its security capabilities. If the FCO does experience cuts, this may limit its previous capacity and access abroad. Dr. Champa Patel, Head of the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, argued that in order for the UK to remain a leader in international security, the British government has to improve its cross-departmental cooperation (Chatham House, 2018). Sir John Sawers, former head of MI6, reinforced this argument, by stating that in the current security environment, intelligence data is vital to protect British interests (Financial Times, 2018). In other words, there is perhaps now, more than ever, a greater need for the intelligence service and policy-makers to work collaboratively in the interest of British security.

Of course, the arguments for cross-departmental cooperation are not new. Former intelligence officer-turned-academic, Michael Herman (1988), conceptualised the analogy of policy-makers as ‘consumers’ and intelligence agents as ‘producers’ over thirty years ago, to evoke the benefits of intelligence to British foreign policy-makers. Moreover, scholars have underscored the dangers of tensions between intelligence and diplomacy for years Bjola, 2014; Gookins, 2008; Pinkus, 2014). Blair’s fabrication of intelligence to justify Iraqi intervention (2003), is a case in point of the potential dangers of politicised intelligence, as well as the need for greater cooperation.

While advocacy for greater cross-departmental cooperation is hardly novel, what is relatively unprecedented is the use of intelligence in British foreign policy conduct – particularly in an increasingly uncertain security environment. This, coupled with the impact of Brexit on FCO funds and access to European security initiatives, underscores the increased need for cross-departmental cooperation. If security ties with the EU weaken; the UK must search for alternatives. Its domestic intelligence service serves the greatest beacon of hope to remain an influential leader in both national and international security policy.

References:

Bjola, C. (2014). The Ethics of Secret Diplomacy: A Contextual Approach. Journal of Global Ethics, 10(1): 85-100

Chatham House. (2018). The UK Needs to Speak with One Voice to Prevent Mass Atrocities. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/uk-needs-speak-one-voice-prevent-mass-atrocities

Gookins, A. J. (2008). The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making. Review of International Affairs, 28(1): 65-73

Hadfield, A. (2018). ‘Britain against the World? Foreign and Security Policy in the ‘Age of Brexit’’. In: B. Martill and U. Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London: UCL Press

Herman, M. (1998). Diplomacy and Intelligence. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9(2): 1-22

Pinkus, J. (2014). ‘Intelligence and Public Diplomacy: The Changing Tide.’ Journal of Strategic Security, 7(4): 33-46

The Financial Times. (2018). 5 Concerns for UK-EU Defence After Brexit. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5c9898e0-124a-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277

The Guardian. (2019). Brexit: No Deal Would Harm UK Security, Senior Officer Warns. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/07/no-deal-brexit-would-harm-uk-security-senior-officer-warns

The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2019). Brexit and Security. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-december2018january2019/606-04-inkster-cm

The Times. (2019). Spy Chiefs Sit Corbyn Down for Chat About Russia and Jihadist Terror Threat. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spy-chiefs-sit-corbyn-down-for-chat-about-russia-and-jihadist-terror-threat-9mzf8wczd

UK Parliament. (2017). Brexit: Implications for National Security. Available at: https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7798

UK Parliament. (2018). Appendix: Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/780/78008.htm

UK Parliament. (2018). National Security Capability Review: A Changing Security Environment. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtnatsec/756/75602.htm

Gemma recently graduated from the University of St Andrews in International Relations and Management, and is now studying an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s. Through her academic studies and voluntary experience with VSO in Nigeria, she has developed a strong interest in the relationship between corruption and development. During her undergraduate degree, she studied a range of post-conflict cases, with a particular focus on intractable conflicts such as Israel-Palestine and Bosnia. Her experience with VSO Nigeria furthered her interest, as she was made aware of the acute impacts of governance on public services, such as health and education. She hopes to pursue further research on the impact of conflict on health security.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Strife Series on Cyberwarfare and State Perspectives, Part III – The argument for a more critical analysis on the United States

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By Shivali Bhatt

Military Operation in Action, Soldiers Using Military Grade Laptop Targeting Enemy with Satellite (Credit Image: Gorodenkoff / Stock Image)

A critical line of argument regarding cyber warfare today is how it has supposedly brought about contextual changes that challenge the balance of power in the international system. The broad consensus is that large, powerful states, like the United States, are losing leverage against those – traditionally – deemed small and weak. According to an article published earlier this year by the World Economic Forum Global Platform, the rising domain of cyber warfare can be somewhat seen to be causing a levelling effect in the world today. Any state or non-state entity with access to the Internet and digital technology can develop powerful cyber weapons. At the same time, some news sources have claimed how the much-anticipated cyberwar is already underway, and how the United States is not ready or will most likely lose. The simplistic nature of such discourse fails to allow for a more critical understanding of what factors influence the nature and reality of cyber warfare. This article shall critique these narratives by analysing the factors that influence the strategic efficacy of cyberwarfare. Bearing the current state of cyberwarfare in the United States in mind, it shall contextualise these factors.

The United States is the most powerful state in the world, particularly regarding its military and intelligence capacity. President Trump elevated the original Cyber Command to a Unified Combatant Command earlier this year.

 

The importance of intelligence and collaboration

While it takes a lot of skill and effort to appropriately develop a powerful cyber weapon, the most complicated part of this process is application or deployment. It is this stage that determines the extent to which a cyber operation will yield strategic leverage for a state; one that relies on intelligence agencies and international alliances. In other words, cyber weapons are generally part of an extensive collection of capabilities.

Theoretically, the state with the most resourced and well-connected intelligence community will likely reel in greater strategic benefits from the domain of cyberwarfare, on the basis they are active political players in global affairs. The more in-depth and holistic the collecting and analysing of intelligence data, the smarter the cyber offensive strategy. In this context, the United States has notable leverage. The U.S. spends approximately $1 trillion on establishments and organisations that serve a national security purpose; in which its intelligence community spans across seventeen federal agencies. Moreover, these bureaus have strictly woven relationships with a large number of agencies operating in other states, with bases and ground-level operatives in over forty countries, including Israel and the United Kingdom. As NATO’s Operation Locked Shields demonstrates, cyberwarfare is a multi-dimensional domain that is determined by the nature of cooperation and collaboration between states. The Stuxnet virus, for instance, was planted with the assistance of the CIA’s regional partners in Israel; assets that were crucial to such a clandestine and sensitive operation. These practical steps to implementing cyberwarfare strategies explain why the U.S. is still and will always technically be a dominant player in the field.

 

The broader political context

Given that cyberwarfare is an aspect of broader political strategy, states that are regularly engaged in international affairs are more likely to determine the context for cyber-attacks. The United States is considered extremely influential, while North Korea – regardless of how large, fast-growing or highly skilled its ‘cyber army’ appears – a back-seat driver. Narratives that present North Korea as a case study to exemplify the ‘levelling effect’ in the world today, often present highly fragmented arguments outside of context.

It is useful to consider how economics and politics are woven together into the strategic context of cyber warfare, given that a prime part of developing cyber warfare strategy involves gathering in-depth knowledge on a person or situation. Similar to how former President Obama’s administration exploited the weaknesses of Russia’s economy by imposing heavy sanctions against Moscow in 2014, Washington can gain a notable edge by targeting Putin’s private affairs offshore; the consequences of which would be determined by the extent to which Putin’s private affairs affect Russia’s domestic political context. According to a National Bureau of Economic Research paper, the total accumulation of Russian offshore holdings amounts to approximately between $800 billion and $1.3 trillion; most of which belongs to President Putin and associates. This wealth power has been a contributing factor to his political power and ability to maintain authority in Russia, enabling him to govern and preside over state institutions and the secret police. Targeting his foreign assets would be a strategic application of U.S. cyber power.

 

Underlying factors

In this discussion, it is useful to recognise the longer-term damage traditional military weapons can have on both intellectual and physical infrastructures, and how those induced by cyberspace have not yet demonstrated such ability. At the same time, the Stuxnet weapon and newer versions inspired from its technological layering, such as the relatively recent Triton bug, can act as catalysts to broader military strategy. However, the accurate deployment of such a weapon not only requires a significant amount of skill and resource, both of which are usually available to higher-earning economies but also can go wrong. In the case of Stuxnet, several sources confirmed that the Americans and Israelis ‘lost control’ of their act.

It goes without a doubt saying that the United States is a powerful influencer in the world today, and especially so in a context of increasing globalisation and digital technology. There are a lot of concepts, processes and cultural embedding that would also need to be in the firing line for this argument to hold any traction in the longer term.

 

Conclusion

Today, it is really popular to consider cyberwarfare as this rising domain that challenges all other pre-existing tenets of global politics, with the narrative being how weaker states such as North Korea are on the rise and those powerful ones such as the United States should watch their back. However, the authors of such arguments seem also to disregard any more in-depth aspects of warfare analysis, such as the power of alliance, broader context, and particularly the underlying factors found within societal construct and culture that have existed before the advent of the digital age. While cyber warfare has proven to be a powerful mechanism, its scope of threatening powerful actors like the United States needs to be assessed through a more critical lens. Further, doing so will help better conceptualise its strategic worth in comparison to more conventional methods of warfare strategy.

 

Shivali is currently pursuing her MA Intelligence and International Security at Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She is also a Series Editor at Strife, as well as a Creative Writer at cybersecurity startup PixelPin, where she contributes articles on ‘Thought Leadership’, encouraging readers to approach security issues through innovative means. Prior to that, she spent some time in Hong Kong under the InvestHK and EntrepreneurHK organisations, engaging with the cybersecurity and tech scene on the East Coast. Her core research interests include modern warfare and contemporary challenges, cybersecurity, and strategic policy analysis. You can follow her  on @shivalixb

Image Source: https://www.istockphoto.com/gb/photo/military-operation-in-action-soldiers-using-military-grade-laptop-targeting-enemy-gm879913090-245205517

SIS Emerges from the Shadows: Causes and Implications of Recruitment Reform

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By Oliver Davey

SIS headquarters at Vauxhall Cross, London (Credit Image: Getty)

 

On Thursday 24 May 2018, viewers of Channel 4 Evening News—wittingly or unwittingly—witnessed a watershed moment in British Intelligence history: The first televised recruitment advertisement from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), more famously known as MI6.[1] Although the service has been openly advertising on its website for over twelve years, never has it chosen to advertise in the public sphere so visibly.[2] It is unknown territory for an organisation that was only officially acknowledged by the UK Government in 1994.[3] So what motive does SIS have for recruiting so publicly? And will its actions have the desired effect? The following will demonstrate that the organisation’s motivations are both principled and pragmatic, and the consequences of such actions will not only have a progressive effect on its public image, but strengthen the service’s capacity to combat foreign threats.

SIS is growing rapidly and aiming to meet the ever-increasing demands for counter-terrorist intelligence and support to UK military forces overseas, whilst maintaining global coverage of other key foreign policy and defence requirements.[4] In 2016, the service had a workforce numbered at around 2,500 but is looking to take on an extra 800 people by 2021.[5] As such, it seems that Alex Younger—the chief of the service (often referred to as ‘C’)—is looking to use the opportunity to recruit a more diverse workforce. The advertisement makes the point clear enough. After focusing in on a sinister-looking shark tank, the scene widens to show an ethnic minority mother comforting her child in an aquarium. The advertisement finishes with the tagline: “MI6—secretly, we are just like you.” SIS has said that the 14-second film is a deliberate attempt to flip the service’s white male James Bond façade. Although the image of a ruthless spy with a license to kill has done wonders for the SIS brand oversees, it does not reflect the reality of work inside the organization, nor does it encapsulate the diversity of the workforce that SIS wants to champion. The latest official figures from March 2016 indicate that the organization has a serious gender imbalance, with women making up 38 per cent of non-senior staff and occupying just 25 per cent of the senior posts.[6] Perhaps even more concerning is that British, Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) members comprise only 6.8 per cent of the workforce, of which none are senior staff.[7] It is a serious problem that Younger knows must to be remedied if the service hopes to gain the ‘public legitimacy’ that it craves.

But more importantly, Younger will know that by harnessing talent from the widest possible range of backgrounds, he will be overseeing a stronger and more effective service. A key component to the work of SIS is the ability of its officers to forge and develop relationships with sources. For this to happen, a source must establish a trusting personal relationship with a case officer, and ultimately have to be willing to break his or her institutions rules, often at their own personal risk. It is therefore less of a surprise that SIS has specifically earmarked mothers as a potential demographic for recruitment. Research suggests that when it comes to emotional intelligence—a famed attribute of an SIS intelligence officer—women outperform men in eleven out of twelve tested competencies.[8] It is not an exaggeration to say that key sources of intelligence—that have likely produced reports over numerous years—would have become so because of a strong affinity for their early intelligence interlocutors.[9] Theoretically, this process could be rendered easier if SIS was to become more ethnically diverse. For instance, a human source in Pakistan may well feel more comfortable interacting with an SIS officer who had strong ties to the region—be it religiously, culturally, or through extended family. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons that SIS is looking to relax its restrictions on nationality and heritage.[10] It would also present SIS with the opportunity to further develop local level—on the ground sources of intelligence—as opposed to the sort of diplomatic human intelligence (HUMINT) that the service has been historically famous for. Research suggests that the type of intelligence most useful in disrupting terrorist networks is often low-level, factual, and fragmented.[11] It will be information such as this which will perhaps prove most useful to SIS in years to come.

Yet, intelligence is only useful if analysed correctly, which is why Younger is inviting candidates who will look to challenge the institutional ‘group think’ approach. It is a problem that has been haunting British intelligence services for the last decade. The common concern in the Iraq  War inquiries was that ‘not so much one of intelligence analysis as of the inability of the UK’s analytical community to put themselves into the minds of those whose behaviour they were analysing.’[12] These analytical failings can be summarized as confirmation bias—the use of evidence that supports an existing hypothesis and mirroring it—assuming that the target organization has the same influences and thorough processes as one’s own. The heuristics are well-known in the field of psychology and have been thoroughly explored in the literature on cognitive biases and analytical failings.[13] Biases have been a consistent problem for Britain’s intelligence community, as pointed out in Percy Cradock’s examination of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) performance between the Second World War and 1968.[14] Younger will hope that his increasingly diverse workforce, ‘who challenge the status-quo,’—together with his more classically trained intelligence officers—will help prevent such an intelligence failure from happening again.[15]

Whilst Younger’s efforts to diversify are commendable, only time will tell if SIS can soon become the service that reflects contemporary Britain. In many ways the service is a victim of a broader societal trend. Like any organization—especially one that works on issues of national security—SIS should be expected to compete for the brightest and most talented graduates, who more often than not come from the UK’s top universities. It is only once said universities truly become diverse that SIS will be able to follow suit.[16] But recent history suggests that public exposure has a positive influence. In March, the service received a spike in applications after the poisoning of former informant Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia.[17] Such increases in interest are normally reserved for when espionage makes the headlines, and one wonders—on the back of Daniel Craig’s final outing as James Bond—whether a BAME Bond could ironically provide the catalyst for a service that reflects today’s society.

 

Oliver is a former MA candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, He graduated with Distinction in January 2018. He is currently based in New Delhi, India. You can find him on twitter @OliverJDavey and on LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/oliverdavey.

 

Notes:

[1] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IOViUQwOgdU (Retrieved 2 June 2018).

[2] Newspaper adverts have become more common over the past 2­­­­­­­­­­­­­­–3 years, whilst a bold new cinema campaign was launched last year; ‘MI6 to boost recruitment prospects with launch of first website’, Brand Republic, 13 October 2005, https://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/mi6-boost-recruitment-prospects-launch-first-website/521906?src_site=brandrepublic (Retrieved 28 May 2018).

[3] ‘Intelligence Service Act 1994’ Government of the United Kingdom, No. 2734, 14 October 1994.

[4] ‘Strategic Survey’, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London: IISS, 2008, p. 56.

[5] House of Commons, Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2015–6, 5 July 2016, p. 12.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] ‘Women Outperform Men in 11 of 12 Key Emotional Intelligence Competencies’, Emotional and Social Competency Inventory, Los Angeles: Korn Ferry, 7 March 2016.

[9] S.D. Gibson, ‘Future roles of the UK intelligence system’, Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, (October 2009) pp. 917–28.

[10] ‘MI6 seeks to recruit more women and ethnic minorities in first ever TV ad’, The Independent, 24 May 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/m16-recruitment-women-ethnic-minorities-service-a8366896.html (Retrieved 28 May 2018).

[11] The management implications of handling garmented intelligence are discussed in P. Wilson, ‘Preparing to Meet New Challenges’ in S. Tsang, ed., Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, pp. 111–20.

[12]‘Strategic Survey’, IISS p.53.

[13] See R. Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1999.

[14] P. Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World, London: John Murray, 2002.

[15] ‘MI6 looks to recruit more women and ethnic minorities’, The Independent, 2018.

[16] ‘Five charts that tell the story of diversity in UK universities’, BBC, 24 May 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/education-44226434 (Retrieved 2 June 2018)

[17] ‘MI6 advert seeks to ditch “mythical” James Bond Image’, 24 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/24/mi6-recruitment-advert-james-bond-image-shark-aquarium (Retrieved 28 May 2018).

 

Image Source: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mi5-and-mi6-thames-side-headquarters-could-be-moved-into-other-government-buildings-in-whitehall-a6701946.html

Book Review: ‘Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11’

by

Reviewed by Ioana Ilie

 

Michael Allen, Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11. USA, University of Nebraska Press, Potomac Books, Inc., 2013. ISBN: 978-1-61234-823-0. Pp. 280. Paperback. £13.99.

 

Michael Allen’s book Blinking Red attempts to be the authoritative legislative history of the U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. Following the shock of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent public demand to ‘do something’, a reorganisation of the intelligence community was overdue. Having been considered, debated, and researched for a long time beforehand, a reform was finally in the works. The reform resulted in the creation of two institutions – the National Intelligence Director (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Blinking Red is an account of the legislative process surrounding IRTPA while also depicting the great sense of urgency to make the U.S. safer post-9/11, that was bestowed upon the U.S. government. More striking, perhaps, is Allen’s focus on the personalities and interpersonal relationships that shaped this bill. Individuals such as Scott Palmer (the House Speaker’s chief of staff), for example, who made significant efforts to revive the legislation even after the 2004 re-election because he truly believed in it and its importance. Or, then Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet who made the position he held more powerful due to his charismatic personality. The book also gives the reader a real taste of the internal and external pressures under which policymakers had to work. Pressures from the President, especially before the re-election campaign, and from groups such as The 9/11 Families for a Secure America are just a couple of the many examples put forward in Blinking Red.

Allen’s position as the legislative affairs officer for the Homeland Security Council in the White House gave him access to many high-level officials and meetings. The book brims with information, that Allan either acquired himself as an eyewitness; or through interviews. In this context Blinking Red is an invaluable resource for students of government and intelligence studies, as the reader develops a good understanding of the working relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government. The book is also very readable despite its handling of complex legislative procedures and the many actors involved. Chapters like ‘Dirty Bombs’ are true page-turners due to their vivid description of political intrigue.

The 9/11 Commission Report was put together by the 9/11 Commission, formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which comprised of ten members, five Republicans and five Democrats. While Allen does not address this point specifically in his book, the even split between Democrats and Republicans is an important display of unity and compromise at a time of great partisan division. It can perhaps also be interpreted as an attempt at objective reporting on a divisive and controversial topic. Its main recommendations, put forward in the Executive Summary, fall into two categories – ‘what to do’ and ‘how to do it’. The ‘what’ can be summarised as a strategy, one that aims to match the means to the ends. The Commissioners proposed a three-pronged approach: ‘attack terrorists and their organizations, prevent the continued growth of Islamic terrorism, and protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.’ In terms of ‘how’, the report calls for a better organised government and the need ‘to build unity of effort across the U.S. government.’ The Commissioners gave five suggestions towards achieving that. The first, to bridge the foreign-domestic divide by establishing a NCTC. The second, to work towards ‘unifying the intelligence community’ under a DNI. The third, to create a ‘network-based information sharing system’ in order to improve the inter-agency counterterrorism effort. The fourth, to spare no effort in ‘unifying and strengthening congressional oversight’. Finally, the fifth, to ensure the ‘strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.’[1]

However, theory did not translate into practice, as Allen clearly argues towards the end of the book. What ended up being implemented was rather disappointing for many who expected a reform of the intelligence community. Instead of having a DNI who could easily and quickly move money and people across the intelligence community in order to meet the new threats of the post-Cold War world, the DNI was given a vague job description and limited powers. In fact, Allen gives an illuminating account of how differently officials – from the President, to the Senate, and the DNIs themselves – saw the job of the DNI.

The law gave the DNI some authority over budget and personnel but not enough to be the unifying leader of the intelligence community. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder how effective an intelligence director can be without being involved on a strategic and operational level. Allan argues, that in the end, the DNI is only as strong as the President allows him or her to be, a situation which does not inspire continuity or stability. While President Bush believed in a strong DNI, President Obama was not sold on the idea and was against the strengthening of the DNI role. Ever-hostile towards the intelligence community, President Trump also doubts the need for a DNI.[2]

At the centre of the book lies the discussion about the DNI, what he or she should be able to do and how. The reader gets real insight into many different opinions and demands that needed to be considered and managed when formulating the bill. Chapters such as ‘The Devil in the Details’ and ‘Attackers’ describe the difficult task of reaching a compromise, and the clash of ideas between three main groups: the group that was interested in a strong DNI, which was mainly the White House; the group that was interested in strengthening the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) instead, opinion voiced by the CIA and many of its former DCIs; and finally a third group, which was not interested in creating either a DNI position or a NCTC. This was the view of the Department of Defence, as well as Rumsfeld’s, arguing that such a drastic reform would only hurt the military in the field in the middle of two raging wars. Such big differences settled in a short amount of time (about four months from the time The 9/11 Commission Report was published until IRTPA was passed) resulted in a weak law. In order to get enough votes and to please all conflicting sides, the language of the bill was left intentionally vague.

‘Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists’[3], warned the Commissioners. However, four months later the U.S. settled exactly for that.

 

Ioana Ilie is a recent War Studies and History graduate from King’s College London. She is passionate about Anglo-American foreign policy and grand strategy as well as geopolitics and intellectual history.You can follow her on Twitter @ioana_a_ilie

Notes:

[1] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Executive Summary. [Washington, DC] :[National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States], 2004.

[2] NPR, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/16/515590646/wheres-the-director-of-national-intelligence. Accessed 30th of October 2017.

[3] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Executive Summary. [Washington, DC] :[National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States], 2004.

Image Source

Banner: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aerial_view_of_the_Pentagon_during_rescue_operations_post-September_11_attack.JPEG

 

Bibliography:

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Executive Summary. [Washington, DC] :[National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States], 2004.

NPR, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/16/515590646/wheres-the-director-of-national-intelligence. Accessed 30th of October 2017.