Israel

Order of Battle Analysis and Military Intelligence in the 1973 Yom Kippur War

March 16, 2021 by Leonardo Palma

By Leonardo Palma

Israeli Tanks advancing during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/yom-kippur-war

The 1973 Yom Kippur War has been regarded by traditional historiography as an intelligence failure. Western intelligence services, as well as Israeli military intelligence, failed in anticipating President Anwar Sadat’s intentions, to the point that the war provoked the intervention of both the US and the USSR and the risk of a nuclear confrontation. However, declassified archive materials, interviews, and memoirs allow us to tell a different story: though it is true that the Israelis underestimated the Egyptians, the former had all the information they needed to anticipate the invasion. Western intelligence services correctly sensed Sadat’s intentions in waging war but failed to grasp Egypt’s military capabilities and misread the expulsion of Soviet advisors. The Italian foreign Intelligence Service (SID), however, communicated to its Israeli military counterpart (Aman) in 1971 how Egypt would attack. Thanks to intelligence gathered in Eastern Germany and a brilliant order of battle analysis of the Egyptian Army, the SID inferred that Sadat’s generals would intend to use a new concept of tactical movement tested by the Soviets to cope with Israel’s air superiority: the static coverage of the battlefield. After having examined British and American intelligence evaluations, misconceptions, and cognitive dissonance, this post will assess the Italian order of battle analysis, Egypt’s tactical concept, and the delicate balance between failure and success in military intelligence.

Foreseeing the War. Western Military Intelligence before October 1973

Between 1970 and 1973, military intelligence failure was not due to an inability to understand motivations and intentions, as previous historiography has argued, but rather capabilities. Sadat, facing domestic turmoil, low-popularity, and the risk of being overthrown, needed a limited military action to bolster his role as president. Moreover, he knew that it would not be possible to ensure the Israelis’ withdrawal from the Sinai without Soviet-US mediation. Therefore, in the second-half of 1973, Sadat sought a war that could allow him to reinvigorate Egyptian prestige by demonstrating its military prowess on the battlefield and the ability to negotiate from a renewed position of strength. In effect, it was necessary to prove that the Israeli invincibility was a false myth. While British and American intelligence analysts broadly understood that fact, they still failed when it came to judging Egypt’s ability to carry out such goals, and the result was the same as not having understood Sadat’s intentions in the first place – an erroneously reduced perception of threat.

It happened because they could not distinguish the ʺsignalsʺ correctly (that is, Egypt’s true intentions and capabilities) from the ʺnoiseʺ (that is, the boisterous and frequently pompous political rhetoric emanating from the region). The British and the Americans rightly applied a cultural approach to their analysis, but the latter had a double-edged effect. At the same time, the ʺspecificity of Arab political culture were a major contributing factor to analytical strengths in reading Sadat’s intentions in 1973, yet similar cultural beliefs culminated in a fundamental misreading of Egypt’s military capabilitiesʺ. Western intelligence services, as well as their Israeli counterparts, believed that the Arabs were not good fighters and that even if rhetoric and intentions overlapped, capabilities were largely scarce. Further, they also misread the Soviet role in the crisis after Egypt expelled them in early 1972. As long as Soviet advisors were in Cairo, analysts consciously resisted the temptation to look at the USSR-Egypt relationship only through the prism of the Cold War; instead, they focused on regional dynamics. Ironically, as soon as the Soviets left, these analysts reversed to a more simplistic assessment of Egypt’s capabilities within a Cold War-framework, in which they lacked Soviet backing, In such an assessment, Egypt stood no chance of military success.

Whatever the reasons for failure, Richard Aldrich, a leading intelligence historian, concludes that the war “was not foreseen by any of the world’s major intelligence services”. We know now that that is not the case, since the Italian SID correctly predicted not only the war but even the tactical concept beneath the Egyptian army doctrine of operation.

The Italian Job. SID Order of Battle Analysis and Predictions

At the beginning of the 1970s, thanks to NATO intelligence-gathering network, the Italian SID acquired details about some Soviet military exercises in Eastern Germany. The 8th Guards Combined Arms Army was a Soviet elite unit comprised of mechanized and armoured divisions and deployed nearby the Fulda Gap. The latter had tested a new kind of anti-aircraft defence that Italian analysts had labelled as ʺstatic coverage of the battlefieldʺ. The Army moved at a slow pace, a few miles per day, which was nothing compared to the speed of the Nazi armoured divisions during the 1940 French Campaign. However, slowness was compensated by a five-layered anti-aircraft coverage: four SAM (Surface-to-Air) systems at various heights and one of mobile anti-aircraft artillery. This new approach to manoeuvre was a Soviet answer to the Western air-superiority in the European theatre.

Nonetheless, the Soviets had thousands of military advisors in Egypt and Syria, and Italian intelligence tracked the shipment to Cairo of several SAM-1, SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6, SAM-7, and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. Admiral Fulvio Martini, Chief of the Service, recalled in his memoir that his analysts foresaw the connection between Sadat’s strategic goals and the ʺstatic coverage of the battlefieldʺ. The latter could indeed serve the purposes of the former.

Italian SID adopted a more pragmatic mindset than their British and American counterparts, leaving aside cultural aspects while focusing on the material ones. They assumed that Sadat would behave as any leader would do once he had assessed that, to survive politically, he needed to wash the shame of the 1967 naksah (setback) and recover the Sinai Peninsula. If he could have managed to keep even one soldier beyond the Canal before a ceasefire, he would not only have avenged the 1967 defeat but altered bargaining positions to his favour too. Accepting this assumption, it was only a matter of understanding how the Egyptian President intended to do so tactically. Egypt had to cope with three problems: ensuring surprise, combating Israeli air-superiority, and creating a strategic cushion of time before the superpowers would inevitably get involved. Yom Kippur celebrations and the operations’ secrecy (platoon commanders knew that they were going to war only five hours before the beginning of the invasion) guaranteed surprise. The ʺstatic coverageʺ offset Israeli air-superiority, allowing ground troops to cross the Bar-Lev Line, consolidate strategic positions and earn time waiting for international diplomacy to work things out.

Between 1971 and 1973, Israel was aware that both Egypt and Syria needed only 6-hours to shift from defensive to offensive posture along the borders. Conversely, Tel Aviv required at least 30-hours for a full-scale mobilization, and its operational doctrine was built on the assumption that air-superiority was enough to halt enemies’ advance and gain time. This ʺstrategic conceptʺ revolved around the assumption that Egypt would not attack Israel without acquiring Soviets fighter bombers to provide air-superiority. However, the use of static coverage rendered Israeli air-superiority less efficient.

Admiral Martini, then Chief of the ʺUfficio Situazioneʺ (Situation Section, i.e., the Directorate for Analysis), presented his analysts’ conclusions in 1971 to General Shalev. The latter, his counterpart within the Aman and a close friend of prime minister Golda Meir, rebutted the warning, claiming that Egypt could not put in place such a complex tactical manoeuvre and that war was simply not possible.

The ambiguous utility of military intelligence

The case of Israel in the 1973 war is altogether singular and shows the flaws beneath the idea that knowledge superiority, or a lack of it, is essential to military success. Tel Aviv possessed objective superiority over its enemies and, thanks to Western intelligence services and a presumed mole, knowledge superiority as well. What it lacked was flexibility in political and military thinking, which, matched with a misplaced sense of hubris, pushed the military evaluators to underestimate Egypt. Nonetheless, after the US airlift and the start of the counter-offensive, Israel’s military strength remained unmatched throughout the remainder of the war. Therefore, we should remember that knowledge of the enemy’s intentions ʺcannot destroy or deflect or damage or even defy an offensive initiative by an enemy unless the possession of knowledge is also allied to objective forceʺ.

Leonardo Palma attended the Military Academy of Modena (196th Commissioning Course) and holds a MA in International Relations and a BA in Political Science from University of Roma Tre. He has been visiting student at King’s College London (War Studies).

Can the Abraham Accords Encourage the Denuclearisation of Israel?

October 28, 2020 by Aleix Nadal Campos

by Aleix Nadal Campos

From left to right, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, the Prime Minister of Israel, the President of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the United Arab Emirates sign the Abraham Accords at the White House (Image credit: Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead).

The Arab states have laid two pathways for Israel to normalise its diplomatic ties with them. The first is through the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which establishes that Arab states will only recognise Israel once a peace settlement with Palestine has been achieved. The second, and less noticed one, is through the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East’s (WMDFZME) initiative, whereby the Arab states and Iran have implicitly acknowledged that Israel could gain their formal recognition once the latter has dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Yet, the agenda of the Arab states and Iran in regard to the Zone initiative is presumably incompatible with Israel’s, whose single objective is to establish diplomatic relations with regional states. In this vein, by offering diplomatic normalisation with two Gulf countries without any stipulation that binds Israel to clear disarmament commitments, the Abraham Accords have undermined the few instruments that Arab states and Iran had at their disposal to entice Israel into foregoing its nuclear capabilities.

The Abraham Accords

Israel’s (unrecognized) nuclear arsenal serves to ultimately safeguard the country from self-perceived existential threats and quantitative asymmetries vis-à-vis other regional states. These asymmetries, however, could soon be diminished. On 15 September 2020, U.S. President Donald J. Trump hosted a ceremony at the White House where the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain forged official bilateral diplomatic ties with Israel. Immediately following this, the three Middle Eastern countries issued a joint declaration of principles that has been since dubbed as the Abraham Accords. Statements by US and Israeli officials suggest that other regional countries may soon follow in Bahrain’s and UAE’s footsteps, giving Israel the official recognition it has always sought. Because Israel has justified its nuclear arsenal on the basis of a threat of an all-out war against them, one could surmise that the Abraham Accords could become a watershed moment for the eventual de-nuclearisation of Israel and the region as a whole. Unfortunately, diplomatic and security-related factors emerging from the Accords will further deter Israel from acquiescing to join a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

The history of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

To dismantle Israel’s nuclear monopoly and shrink its strategic superiority, Arab countries and Iran have long advocated for the de-nuclearisation of the Middle East. In 1974, Iran and Egypt submitted a joint proposal to the United Nations General Assembly to create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZME) that would forbid the development, testing, possession, acquisition, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons in the region. Since 1980, annual resolutions from the UN General Assembly endorsing the proposal were approved unanimously until 2018, including by Israel, demonstrating that even the latter supports the initiative. The scope of the prospective treaty was subsequently broadened to include all weapons of mass destruction following a proposal by the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1990.

Whilst several dialogues have taken place since the initiative’s inception, through both official channels and backchannel diplomacy, progress has been notably absent, at least until recently. In November 2019, a conference under the United Nations’ auspices was held where all Arab states and Iran, as well as extra-regional countries, participated to discuss the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME). Henceforth, the November Conference is expected to be held annually until an agreement on the Zone is secured. Citing that the conference represented an attempt by the Arab states and Iran to impose a diplomatic process without prior consultation, Israel declined to participate in the first edition and is not expected to attend the second one, partly withering away the momentum generated by the new multilateral process. If this opt-out continues, the credibility of the entire process could be put into question, for the dismantlement of Israel’s nuclear capabilities remains the chief target of the initiative.

In essence, the persistent lack of progress and Israel’s non-involvement in the Conference reflects the fact that the ultimate objectives of Arab countries and Iran are diametrically opposed to those of Israel. For the former countries, the Zone is an instrument to dismantle Israel’s nuclear arsenal and erode the military edge that Israel enjoys over other regional countries. For the latter, any framework to negotiate a WMDFZ in the Middle East is desirable to the extent that Israel can use the process itself to normalise diplomatic relations with regional countries. These conflicting objectives have translated into a sort of chicken-and-egg dilemma about the sequencing between ‘regional peace’ and ‘disarmament’. In particular, Israel has adopted a security-based approach whereby disarmament should only occur in a context where regional peace has been previously reached. Conversely, Arab countries and Iran contend that disarmament itself creates regional peace and as such Israel should proceed with dismantling its nuclear arsenal if it ever wants peace in the region.

The question that remains, then, is whether the Abraham Accords can encourage Israel to re-engage with the Zone initiative and participate in the yearly conferences until its de-nuclearization is agreed upon.

The Abraham Accords and the de-nuclearization of Israel

In addition to the UAE’s and Bahrain’s failure to extract disarmament commitments from Israel, which undermines the ‘disarmament first’ approach taken by Middle Eastern countries, there are two security-related factors emanating from the Abraham Accords that thwart the efforts to establish the Zone. First, the Accords are an extension of the increasing bilateral cooperation that has taken place for the past few years between Israel and some of the Gulf countries in the security field. This cooperation has been largely motivated by their shared interest to contain the emergence of Iran as a determined geopolitical player and by their hostility towards the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). By formalising this anti-Iran coalition, the deal may then contribute to exacerbating inter-state polarisation in the Persian Gulf, potentially encouraging Iran to resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In turn, the escalation of tensions could strengthen Israel’s self-perceived legitimacy to have a nuclear deterrent as the country considers Iran as its largest security threat. Thus, in Iran, Israel would have the perfect alibi to not seriously engage with the Zone initiative.

Second, reports that the US would reward the UAE’s normalisation agreement with Israel by allowing it to purchase the F-35 fighter further dwindles the prospects of a WMDFZME. Such a sweetener would not be unprecedented in the context of a US Administration brokering a peace deal between Israel and an Arab country. Indeed, the US delivered significant military assistance to both Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994, respectively, when they signed their peace treaties with the Jewish state. If the UAE was to receive this military payoff, however, Israel’s qualitative military edge over Middle Eastern countries that the US has long been committed to would be compromised, albeit only partially.

Other Arab countries could then interpret that peace with Israel in exchange for US military assistance would be the new gold standard and subsequently demand analogous conditions, contributing to the erosion of Israel’s conventional military superiority in the region. In such a scenario, it would be hard to envisage Israel being more willing to take progressive steps towards nuclear disarmament when nuclear superiority would constitute the ultimate strategy to offset this potentially new military reality. In fact, some Israeli officials have already aired their concerns that an arsenal of the F-35 fighter jet in the hands of an alternative leadership cadre in the UAE that is less keen on building bridges with Israel would constitute a security threat.

Conclusion

The Abraham Accords might usher in a new era in the Middle East where regional peace is progressively achieved. Accordingly, they could result in the configuration of novel security conditions that are more conducive to Israel’s nuclear disarmament. Seen in this light, the Accords could be positively assessed in terms of its contribution to nuclear disarmament. In fact, it is not implausible to assume that Israel could participate in upcoming editions of the November Conference as a gesture of goodwill towards the Arab states, for its participation would not entail any binding commitments with respect to its nuclear posture. Nevertheless, despite their positive potential, the Accords may have entrenched a series of incentives that undercut the (already) dim prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East in the foreseeable future.

Aleix Nadal Campos received his MA in European Studies: International Relations and European Politics from Maastricht University. He is currently an EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium intern at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. In the course of his internship, he has published a paper on the policy options that the European Union can adopt to streamline the prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. You can find him on Twitter @AleixNadal.

Israel’s Electoral Standoff: Challenges in Securing Centre-Left Governance

April 24, 2020 by Kevin Nolan

by Kevin Nolan

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, here pictured with Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz, while meeting with President Reuven Rivlin in Jerusalem, September 2019 (Image Credit: Haim Zach/GPO)

The State of Israel, even prior to the Coronavirus outbreak, was a nation in crisis. Since April 2019, the political deadlock between Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent Prime Minister’s centre-right Likud party and Benny Gantz’s centre-left Blue and White alliance has subjugated its citizens to three national elections. The ensuing breakdown of Gantz’s opposition alliance during unity government negotiations in March 2020 enabled short-term electoral gains for leftist politics at the potential expense of its long-term prosperity. However, irrespective of the eventual tenure of the new unity administration, struggles with policy differentiation, fragmented political structures, and growing sectarian politics linked with changing demographics ultimately pose the greatest threat to a revival of leftist governance within Israel for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, until these barriers can be overcome a power-sharing agreement offers the most realistic opportunities for nationwide policy influence and implementation.

Lack of Differentiation

Despite the international perception that Israel’s leftist movement was experiencing a revival under the Blue and White alliance before its implosion, its leadership had aligned many of its policies, barring minor caveats, with the incumbent administration. For instance, despite its controversial coverage over the status of Jerusalem and annexation of large sections of the West Bank, both Netanyahu and Gantz have endorsed the 2020 Trump Peace plan. Even Gantz’s only major point of contention, the inclusion of Palestinian leadership into discussions, has been weakened through subsequent dialogue.

Indeed, whilst it does espouse several leftist policies, since its founding as the de facto anti-Bibi alliance, Blue and White’s core policies were almost entirely focused on ousting the Netanyahu administration from power either through the ballot box or via retrospectively binding legislation.[1] Such initiatives would involve enforcing term limits and preventing indicted politicians from serving as premier, thus disqualifying Netanyahu who currently awaits trial over allegations of corruption. Thus, despite overall having a more leftist platform than Likud, Netanyahu’s removal from office would be one of the only significant measures of differentiation imposed by a Gantz administration. As such, the emphasis on a political rather than ideological platform will likely struggle to attain broader support outside of a single-issue voter base in future elections.

A Fragmented Opposition

Fragmentation among oppositional factions threatens to impede their capability to govern as a genuine alternative to Likud in future electoral contests. Despite the limitations of a single-issue platform, Gantz was capable of attaining a broad array of support from multiple political factions, including the first endorsement of a Jewish politician from an Arab dominated party since 1992 via the Joint List. However, despite possessing a larger backing then Netanyahu to become the newest premier following the latest election, the misinterpreted strength of Gantz’s position made him incapable of translating this into a viable coalition government due to alliance factionalism.

Although the Joint List lent Blue and White their support for the preferred Premier, their anti-Zionist platform and fragile political formation prevents them from participating within any formal coalition government propagating Zionist ideals. Similarly, cultural apprehension among the Jewish factions against coalitions with Arab parties has permeated since the foundation of the state in 1948.[2] Irrespective of the accuracy of their assumptions, questions involving the ultimate loyalty of Arab parties and their lack of support of Zionism has resulted in the leaders of most Jewish factions, including Gantz, from opposing such an arrangement ever occurring. While Arab politicians have never served in any Israeli government, if the Joint List continues to remain the third-largest party in the Knesset, leftist parties will increasingly need to identify methods for overcoming these barriers in order to successfully challenge perpetual right-wing governance.

Additionally, regardless of their intentions behind doing so, the divisions generated among rival Blue and White factions following the initiation of unity government negotiations with Likud have damaged the cohesion of the opposition for the foreseeable future. National unity governments are not unprecedented within Israel, particularly during periods of national crisis. However, given that Blue and White’s platform was primarily based on ousting Netanyahu from power, the initiation of dialogue over any form of power-sharing agreement was enough to result in the formal exit of the Yesh Atid and Telem factions. Whilst Gantz has continued to keep the Blue and White name for his sole remaining political faction, Israel Resilience, the capitulation of the broader alliance may make it increasingly difficult for the opposition to reunify once the tenure of the unity government lapses.

Long-term Demographic Struggles

In addition to these immediate obstacles to securing governance, long-term demographic changes are likely to increasingly marginalise the capability of centre-left parties from beating right-wing blocs in elections within the next half-century. Historically, the vast majority of citizenry have voted for parties which represent their religious or cultural beliefs, irrespective of the benefits, economic or otherwise, which may be better offered by rival factions.[3] For instance, the nation’s fastest-growing Jewish demographic, the religiously hard-line ultra-orthodox sect, are predicted to nearly double from thirteen to twenty-seven percent of the total population by 2059. Within this constituency voting patterns overwhelmingly align with their particular ethnicity, with those of Sephardic origin generally endorsing the Shah party, whilst those of Ashkenazi descent tending to favour United Torah Judaism. These allegiances transcend basis cost-benefit analyses since centre-left policies generally offer better subsidy packages for the ultra-orthodox, among whom nearly forty percent continue to live below the poverty line.

Similarly, nearly ninety percent of Arab-Israeli’s votes go to the Joint-List, despite its four factions, Hadash, Ta’al, United Arab List and Balad representing a large cross-section of differing ideologies, from socialism to Pan-Arabism. Yet while its population is also set to markedly increase from fifteen to twenty percent of the total population, unless the aforementioned tensions between Jewish and Arab political parties can be resolved they will remain outside the corridors of power indefinitely. Consequently, given the sectarian nature of a large part of Israel’s electorate, the rapid growth of the predominately right-wing Haredi threatens to increasingly undermine the long-term prospects of leftist parties securing governance throughout the next half-century, regardless of the policies which they propose.

Silver Lining

The centre-left has a long way to go before they will be able to reconcile the variety of challenges standing in its way of wresting control from Likud. Nonetheless, the current unity administration presently offers the greatest opportunity for leftist ideals to influence national policies. Despite the division of influence varying widely in prior scenarios, Gantz has successfully attained control over the influential Defence and Justice ministries, while temporarily delaying annexation plans within the West Bank. Consequently, despite the challenges which the centre-left will face in future elections, so long as the current unity arrangement is maintained in a fair and proportionate manner, leftist politics will remain capable of exercising some form of influence on federal policies within the current Likud administration.

[1] Kaḥol Lavan. 2019. “Blue And White 2019 Platform”. https://en.idi.org.il/media/12312/%D7%9B%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%91%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A2.pdf.

[2] Tessler, Mark. 2019. “Israel’S Arabs And The Palestinian Problem (1977)”. Religious Minorities In Non-Secular Middle Eastern And North African States, 325-344. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19843-5_12.

[3] Mathie, Nicola. 2016. “‘Jewish Sectarianism’ And The State Of Israel”. Global Discourse 6 (4): 601-629. doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1259284.

Kevin is a MA student in Conflict, Security and Development within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. A Series Editor for Strife, his research interests are primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific region, State building within post-conflict zones, and combating technological challenges to regional security concerns. Additionally, serving as King’s mature student officer, he is a strong advocate for exploring the correlation between the psychological impact of mental health degradation on academic well-being. Readers who identify as mature students and experience difficulties relating to any aspect of university life are encouraged to contact him at kevin.nolan@kcl.ac.uk

Can the Trump Peace Plan Survive Political Upheaval in Israel’s Upcoming Elections?

March 4, 2019 by Lauren Mellinger

By Lauren Mellinger

4 March 2019

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump shake hands during a press conference in February 2017. Netanyahu is up for reelection in April, after which Trump plans to release a Middle East peace plan. (Benjamin Applebaum)

As Israelis prepare to vote on April 9, the Trump administration has announced that at long last, the U.S. peace plan, which President Trump has referred to as ‘the deal of the century’, will be unveiled in April. The fate of the plan however, and of the prospect of an American role in getting the parties to return to the negotiating table, remains an open question.

From an “election about nothing” to a referendum on Netanyahu

In September 1992, the popular TV-sitcom Seinfeld aired an episode titled ‘The Pitch’, in which Jerry Seinfeld and his friend, George Constanza, pitch a pilot to NBC, predicated on a half hour of, well, nothing. Fast forward 27 years, and one could similarly describe the current Israeli elections as a race about nothing. Israel faces formidable challenges at home and abroad — including the threats from Iran’s increasing presence in Syria and their assistance in Hizballah’s growing arsenal; the withdrawal of the US from Syria and the challenge of Russia’s expanding presence in the region; and ongoing tensions in Gaza. In addition, a host of unresolved religion and state issues, in particular matters pertaining to burden-sharing, continue to vex slimmer, right-wing-led coalitions, while challenges to Israel’s relationship with Diaspora Jewish communities and the ongoing stalemate in negotiations with the Palestinians merit more debate time. In lieu of a substantive debate regarding the geopolitical and domestic challenges facing Israel however, the election thus far has largely focused on whether Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent prime minister, should win another term.

The prospect of Israel’s incoming government led by someone other than Netanyahu increased this past week, following Attorney General Avishai Mandelblit’s announcement of the intent to indict Netanyahu on charges including bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Following the announcement, Israel’s newest party, the Blue White list, eclipsed Netanyahu’s Likud Party in the polls for the first time, suggesting that Netanyahu might not be able to form a coalition.

Though damaging to Netanyahu, per Israeli law, Mandleblit’s announcement does not preclude him from running, or serving in office —pending a verdict. Thus far Netanyahu responded by doubling down on populist rhetoric, a move that will most likely preclude the formation of anything other than a right-wing coalition, in the event Netanyahu can win another term. This would then put the incoming Israeli government squarely at odds with the Trump administration’s plan, should the Americans proceed with the plan’s release.

The ‘deal of the century’ is finally set to be unveiled in April . . . maybe

The lack of substantive issue-oriented discussions in the election thus far is by no means evidence of the lack of a campaign strategy — by either side of the political spectrum. By not formally taking a position on the issue of future peace with the Palestinians outright, the centre-left bloc may be hoping to pry votes away from the right. If their efforts ultimately pay off, it would likely be due to two key reasons: a party list which has prioritized leaders with bona fide security credentials, namely three former military chiefs of staff (including one who also served as defence minister); and the fact that Netanyahu, who until recently faced the prospect of an indictment on corruption charges, has moved so far to the right to maintain his grip on the premiership that he coordinated a deal that could bring the extremist group Otzma Yehudit — a group anathema to even right-leaning Israeli voters — into the Knesset.

And here is where the Trump administration lost a critical opportunity. Most veteran Mideast observers would undoubtedly caution an American administration against announcing a potentially game-changing peace effort amid an Israeli election — both to avoid an outward appearance of intervening in Israel’s domestic politics and to insulate the administration from having the initiative fail. Yet, in the current political environment, waiting until April to release the plan is a missed opportunity. As Beilin argued, for the moment, neither Netanyahu nor former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, head of the Blue White Party, appeared bothered by the administration’s decision to delay the unveiling of the plan until after the elections. Gantz’s new alliance has yet to reveal their platform, but the presence of one of his bloc partners, former defence minister Moshe Ya’alon, currently #3 on the Blue White List, having ruled out support for a two-state solution, together with the party’s reported opposition to dividing Jerusalem and evacuating settlement blocs in the West Bank, suggest that a two-state solution is a non-starter. Recent statements from Naftali Bennett’s new party, and those of parties to the right of Bennett that are now aligned with Netanyahu, as well as recent statements by Netanyahu himself, seem to suggest that this may be one area of agreement for the right and centre. Laying out the terms of the Trump peace plan now, rather than after April 9, would have required the parties to address the issue in a more substantive way.

Should Netanyahu manage to emerge the victor in April’s elections, he will come to a crossroad in his relationship with Trump, which until now has arguably been the closest relationship Netanyahu has ever had with a U.S. president. The farther right the prime minister has to move in order to secure his reelection and manage to assemble a coalition, the more difficult it will be to make any concessions regarding a peace agreement. Nor does the prime minister appear willing to do so. As Netanyahu himself recently stated, if he wins, he will form a religious, right-wing governing coalition, and will not offer a partnership to his centrist challengers. The possibility that Otzma Yehudit crosses the 3.25% threshold and forms a part of a future government poses yet another challenge for the Trump peace plan, and for U.S.-Israel relations more broadly, in light of U.S. anti-terrorism laws. (Under U.S. law, Otzma Yehudit is led by followers of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, and Kahane Chai/Kach is still designated as a foreign terrorist organisation).

An added complication likely to hamper the success of Trump’s peace plan is the current U.S. relationship with the Palestinians, which has deteriorated significantly while President Trump has been in office, due to a host of missteps by the administration, including aid cuts, the President’s decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem, and his more recent decision to downgrade the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem by merging the two, a move largely considered a further affront to the Palestinians, and suggests that the pending announcement of the Trump peace plan will not endorse a two-state solution.

Now with five weeks to go before the election, with the race essentially boiling down to a referendum on the incumbent prime minister, it remains to be seen whether a substantive, issue-oriented debate about the future of a two-state solution can occur before Israelis head to the polls. With what appears to be a close race between Netanyahu and Gantz for the premiership, both parties would be well advised to develop their positions on the pending Trump plan. The U.S. president is well-known for maintaining a transactional relationship with politicians and world leaders. As President Trump has demonstrated a penchant for responding to praise while doubling down on petty, yet damaging, attacks on opponents when he feels criticized, precisely how much attention the U.S. will give to efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the next two (or six) years will likely depend on how both sides — Israelis and Palestinians — respond to his administration’s proposed peace plan.

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a 2018-19 Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. She is also a former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?search=Netanyahu+Trump&title=Special%3ASearch&profile=advanced&fulltext=1&advancedSearch-current=%7B%22namespaces%22%3A%5B6%2C12%2C14%2C100%2C106%2C0%5D%7D&ns6=1&ns12=1&ns14=1&ns100=1&ns106=1&ns0=1#/media/File:President_Donald_Trump_and_Prime_Minister_Benjamin_Netanyahu_Joint_Press_Conference,_February_15,_2017_(01).jpg

Gaza, Israel, and Netanyahu’s Latest Coalition Crisis

December 21, 2018 by Lauren Mellinger

By Lauren Mellinger

21 December 2018

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to avoid an early election for fear that he might lose due to the public’s displeasure with his handling of the Gaza crisis. (Photo credit: David Shankbone)

This past tumultuous month in Israeli politics challenged two key assumptions about Israel’s long-serving prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First, despite speculation in recent months that the Netanyahu-era is drawing to a close, it is certainly not over yet. Perhaps of greater significance is the second element to emerge from last month’s political crisis: Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ — who recently said that ‘[t]here is no diplomatic solution to Gaza’ and compared Hamas to ISIS — is not going to topple Hamas in Gaza.

How Gaza precipitated Israel’s latest domestic political crisis

In November Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Qatar agreed to provide $90 million in cash to Gaza over the next six months, along with an immediate infusion of fuel into the Strip. The initial $15 million instalment was paid out to Palestinian civil servants in the Gaza Strip on November 11 and served to further bolster Hamas amongst its Gaza-based supporters. The deal was controversial for several reasons: first, whereas Israel has periodically allowed Gulf States to transfer materials for civilian projects and fuel to Gaza, it typically rejects cash donations due to concerns that it would reach Hamas militants. Hamas’s Gaza-based leader Yahya Sinwar responded to the first cash delivery by publicly allying himself with Hamas’s military wing. It is also noteworthy that Israel approved the terms despite having long regarded Qatar as a ‘terror-supporting state.’ Lastly, the move was heavily debated within the security cabinet, but was not coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, suggesting that the Netanyahu government was seeking some form of long-term compromise with Hamas in Gaza, despite a long history of stating the opposite.

Then the political crisis began. Shortly after images of the first suitcases of Qatari cash entering Gaza went public, news broke of a botched IDF raid near Khan Younis, followed by a 48-hour barrage of rockets from Gaza — for which Hamas claimed responsibility. Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned, and withdrew his party from the coalition — arguing that the ceasefire, together with the Qatar arrangement, was ‘capitulating to terror.’ Then, Education Minister and Jewish Home Party leader Naftali Bennett threatened to quit the coalition unless he were assigned the defence portfolio. Given the likelihood that Netanyahu would reject Bennett’s ultimatum, both right and left-wing parties began to call for new elections.

As Israel’s government teetered on the brink of collapse, Netanyahu once again shrewdly outmanoeuvred his political rivals. Speaking from the Defence Ministry — a portfolio which Netanyahu currently holds, as well as that of prime minister and foreign minister — he rejected calls for new elections stating, ‘We are in the middle of a military campaign, and you don’t abandon a campaign to play politics.’ In an embarrassing about-face the following morning Bennett announced he would remain in the coalition — reneging on his prior ultimatum.

Though Kulanu leader and current Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon signalled to his faction that they should prepare for early elections, he too has not yet resigned from the government. For now, Netanyahu’s coalition stands with a fragile 61-seat majority.

Why delay early elections?

Early elections are routine in Israel’s domestic politics. In the 70 years since the country’s founding not one government has completed a full term. The current prime minister himself has engineered conditions for snap elections on more than one occasion. While it appeared that early elections seemed inevitable following Lieberman’s resignation, Netanyahu acted swiftly, doing everything possible to delay them.

Growing dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s Gaza policies left him open to a challenge by both the right-wing parties within his coalition, and the public. This latest political crisis had Netanyahu challenged by junior coalition partners from his right, and specifically on matters of national security. Netanyahu has long proclaimed himself to be the best protector of Israel’s security. Indeed his campaign slogan in the 2015 elections translates to ‘Only the Likud — Only Netanyahu.’ New elections under such circumstances would have forced Netanyahu to face his ‘worst-case election scenario.’

Public opinion was also a critical factor in Netanyahu’s efforts to avoid early elections. Following the events last month, polls showed that 74 percent of Israelis were dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s performance in the Gaza crisis. Likud remained in the lead in most polls, albeit with a record-low 29 seats — a significant drop from August 2018, when Netanyahu told a Likud faction that he anticipated winning between 35 and 40 seats in the next elections. Furthermore, by holding onto the defence portfolio, at least for now, Netanyahu made himself vulnerable to criticism by becoming the main target for the public’s outrage. This was evident from demonstrations in southern towns bordering Gaza, as well as outside of the defence ministry in Tel Aviv following Lieberman’s resignation, where protestors shouted ‘Bibi go home!’ among other slogans expressing disapproval with the prime minister’s Gaza policies.

Can Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ win another term?

With Israel heading into a definite election year, all politicians are officially in campaign mode. It is highly unlikely that this government will continue until November 2019, when elections are scheduled to be held. For the moment, if everything is held constant, the Likud remains in the lead to net the most seats in the next election. As political consultant Mitchell Barak remarked, ‘[Netanyahu’s] got no competition. . . He’s running against himself.’ Yet, the polls referenced above did not take into account the prospect of a viable centre or centre-left bloc forming ahead of the elections. Nor did they account for the likelihood that former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz will announce a new party. Though Gantz’s party may not be able to surpass Likud in the next elections, it is expected to chip away at Likud’s lead.

Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Netanyahu’s efforts to outmanoeuvre his rivals did more to damage them electorally, than him. Shortly after the crisis was resolved, a poll found that 58 percent of Israelis did not believe Netanyahu’s claims that the government should not be brought down at present due to a ‘sensitive security situation’ for which he provided no further explanation. This is compared with only 31 percent who felt his concerns for Israel’s national security were genuine.

In a region with countless hostile adversaries popping up like a never-ending game of whack-a-mole, Netanyahu’s reputation as ‘Mr. Security’ is a high bar to uphold. The public’s disapproval of his latest Gaza policies however, should be understood in the broader context. Despite a history of brash public statements calling for a tough response to Hamas, and terrorism in general, and having criticised his predecessors in office on numerous occasions for their handling of Hamas and Gaza, his actions in office indicate that he is risk-averse — in particular when it comes to employing military force, and is reluctant to commit to putting boots on the ground in Gaza. His past public statements stand in marked contrast to his actions in recent weeks, including working towards a ceasefire and allowing an influx of Qatari cash. Thus it is hardly surprising that residents of Gaza-border communities — a core base of Likud voters — and several of his coalition partners spent much of the past few weeks accusing him of being ‘weak’ on Gaza.

Moreover, in recent weeks Netanyahu has struggled to restore the public’s faith in his reputation as ‘Mr. Security.’ A Tel Aviv University poll earlier this month found 76 percent of Jewish Israelis thought that Netanyahu failed when dealing with Hamas. The increase in terror attacks in the West Bank in recent weeks has renewed protests against Netanyahu — once again, from members of his base, challenging his recent decisions regarding Gaza. Despite the recently launched Operation Northern Shield’s initial successes in uncovering Hizballah-built tunnels under the Israel-Lebanon border, many have raised questions as to whether the timing of the operation was politically motivated, in light of the hit to his reputation Netanyahu has experienced in recent weeks, and with the prospect of indictments hanging over his head.

Though polls indicate that Netanyahu averted the prospect of early elections for now and has, for the moment, avoided a referendum on his handling of Gaza, the situation with Hamas in both Gaza and the West Bank has yet to be stabilised. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent Netanyahu can proceed with the arrangements with Qatar, absent broader public support. It remains to be seen whether Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ can prevail in the next elections, or whether Netanyahu has run out of political life lines.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Netanyahu_campaign_posters_in_Jerusalem.jpg