Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for Israel

Israel

Can the Abraham Accords Encourage the Denuclearisation of Israel?

by

by Aleix Nadal Campos

From left to right, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, the Prime Minister of Israel, the President of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the United Arab Emirates sign the Abraham Accords at the White House (Image credit: Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead).

The Arab states have laid two pathways for Israel to normalise its diplomatic ties with them. The first is through the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which establishes that Arab states will only recognise Israel once a peace settlement with Palestine has been achieved. The second, and less noticed one, is through the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East’s (WMDFZME) initiative, whereby the Arab states and Iran have implicitly acknowledged that Israel could gain their formal recognition once the latter has dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Yet, the agenda of the Arab states and Iran in regard to the Zone initiative is presumably incompatible with Israel’s, whose single objective is to establish diplomatic relations with regional states. In this vein, by offering diplomatic normalisation with two Gulf countries without any stipulation that binds Israel to clear disarmament commitments, the Abraham Accords have undermined the few instruments that Arab states and Iran had at their disposal to entice Israel into foregoing its nuclear capabilities.

The Abraham Accords

Israel’s (unrecognized) nuclear arsenal serves to ultimately safeguard the country from self-perceived existential threats and quantitative asymmetries vis-à-vis other regional states. These asymmetries, however, could soon be diminished. On 15 September 2020, U.S. President Donald J. Trump hosted a ceremony at the White House where the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain forged official bilateral diplomatic ties with Israel. Immediately following this, the three Middle Eastern countries issued a joint declaration of principles that has been since dubbed as the Abraham Accords. Statements by US and Israeli officials suggest that other regional countries may soon follow in Bahrain’s and UAE’s footsteps, giving Israel the official recognition it has always sought. Because Israel has justified its nuclear arsenal on the basis of a threat of an all-out war against them, one could surmise that the Abraham Accords could become a watershed moment for the eventual de-nuclearisation of Israel and the region as a whole. Unfortunately, diplomatic and security-related factors emerging from the Accords will further deter Israel from acquiescing to join a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

The history of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

To dismantle Israel’s nuclear monopoly and shrink its strategic superiority, Arab countries and Iran have long advocated for the de-nuclearisation of the Middle East. In 1974, Iran and Egypt submitted a joint proposal to the United Nations General Assembly to create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZME) that would forbid the development, testing, possession, acquisition, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons in the region. Since 1980, annual resolutions from the UN General Assembly endorsing the proposal were approved unanimously until 2018, including by Israel, demonstrating that even the latter supports the initiative. The scope of the prospective treaty was subsequently broadened to include all weapons of mass destruction following a proposal by the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1990.

Whilst several dialogues have taken place since the initiative’s inception, through both official channels and backchannel diplomacy, progress has been notably absent, at least until recently. In November 2019, a conference under the United Nations’ auspices was held where all Arab states and Iran, as well as extra-regional countries, participated to discuss the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME). Henceforth, the November Conference is expected to be held annually until an agreement on the Zone is secured. Citing that the conference represented an attempt by the Arab states and Iran to impose a diplomatic process without prior consultation, Israel declined to participate in the first edition and is not expected to attend the second one, partly withering away the momentum generated by the new multilateral process. If this opt-out continues, the credibility of the entire process could be put into question, for the dismantlement of Israel’s nuclear capabilities remains the chief target of the initiative.

In essence, the persistent lack of progress and Israel’s non-involvement in the Conference reflects the fact that the ultimate objectives of Arab countries and Iran are diametrically opposed to those of Israel. For the former countries, the Zone is an instrument to dismantle Israel’s nuclear arsenal and erode the military edge that Israel enjoys over other regional countries. For the latter, any framework to negotiate a WMDFZ in the Middle East is desirable to the extent that Israel can use the process itself to normalise diplomatic relations with regional countries. These conflicting objectives have translated into a sort of chicken-and-egg dilemma about the sequencing between ‘regional peace’ and ‘disarmament’. In particular, Israel has adopted a security-based approach whereby disarmament should only occur in a context where regional peace has been previously reached. Conversely, Arab countries and Iran contend that disarmament itself creates regional peace and as such Israel should proceed with dismantling its nuclear arsenal if it ever wants peace in the region.

The question that remains, then, is whether the Abraham Accords can encourage Israel to re-engage with the Zone initiative and participate in the yearly conferences until its de-nuclearization is agreed upon.

The Abraham Accords and the de-nuclearization of Israel

In addition to the UAE’s and Bahrain’s failure to extract disarmament commitments from Israel, which undermines the ‘disarmament first’ approach taken by Middle Eastern countries, there are two security-related factors emanating from the Abraham Accords that thwart the efforts to establish the Zone.  First, the Accords are an extension of the increasing bilateral cooperation that has taken place for the past few years between Israel and some of the Gulf countries in the security field. This cooperation has been largely motivated by their shared interest to contain the emergence of Iran as a determined geopolitical player and by their hostility towards the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). By formalising this anti-Iran coalition, the deal may then contribute to exacerbating inter-state polarisation in the Persian Gulf, potentially encouraging Iran to resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In turn, the escalation of tensions could strengthen Israel’s self-perceived legitimacy to have a nuclear deterrent as the country considers Iran as its largest security threat. Thus, in Iran, Israel would have the perfect alibi to not seriously engage with the Zone initiative.

Second, reports that the US would reward the UAE’s normalisation agreement with Israel by allowing it to purchase the F-35 fighter further dwindles the prospects of a WMDFZME. Such a sweetener would not be unprecedented in the context of a US Administration brokering a peace deal between Israel and an Arab country. Indeed, the US delivered significant military assistance to both Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994, respectively, when they signed their peace treaties with the Jewish state. If the UAE was to receive this military payoff, however, Israel’s qualitative military edge over Middle Eastern countries that the US has long been committed to would be compromised, albeit only partially.

Other Arab countries could then interpret that peace with Israel in exchange for US military assistance would be the new gold standard and subsequently demand analogous conditions, contributing to the erosion of Israel’s conventional military superiority in the region. In such a scenario, it would be hard to envisage Israel being more willing to take progressive steps towards nuclear disarmament when nuclear superiority would constitute the ultimate strategy to offset this potentially new military reality. In fact, some Israeli officials have already aired their concerns that an arsenal of the F-35 fighter jet in the hands of an alternative leadership cadre in the UAE that is less keen on building bridges with Israel would constitute a security threat.

Conclusion

The Abraham Accords might usher in a new era in the Middle East where regional peace is progressively achieved. Accordingly, they could result in the configuration of novel security conditions that are more conducive to Israel’s nuclear disarmament. Seen in this light, the Accords could be positively assessed in terms of its contribution to nuclear disarmament. In fact, it is not implausible to assume that Israel could participate in upcoming editions of the November Conference as a gesture of goodwill towards the Arab states, for its participation would not entail any binding commitments with respect to its nuclear posture. Nevertheless, despite their positive potential, the Accords may have entrenched a series of incentives that undercut the (already) dim prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East in the foreseeable future.

Aleix Nadal Campos received his MA in European Studies: International Relations and European Politics from Maastricht University. He is currently an EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium intern at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. In the course of his internship, he has published a paper on the policy options that the European Union can adopt to streamline the prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. You can find him on Twitter @AleixNadal.

Israel’s Electoral Standoff: Challenges in Securing Centre-Left Governance

by

by Kevin Nolan

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, here pictured with Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz, while meeting with President Reuven Rivlin in Jerusalem, September 2019 (Image Credit: Haim Zach/GPO)

The State of Israel, even prior to the Coronavirus outbreak, was a nation in crisis. Since April 2019, the political deadlock between Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent Prime Minister’s centre-right Likud party and Benny Gantz’s centre-left Blue and White alliance has subjugated its citizens to three national elections. The ensuing breakdown of Gantz’s opposition alliance during unity government negotiations in March 2020 enabled short-term electoral gains for leftist politics at the potential expense of its long-term prosperity. However, irrespective of the eventual tenure of the new unity administration, struggles with policy differentiation, fragmented political structures, and growing sectarian politics linked with changing demographics ultimately pose the greatest threat to a revival of leftist governance within Israel for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, until these barriers can be overcome a power-sharing agreement offers the most realistic opportunities for nationwide policy influence and implementation.

Lack of Differentiation

Despite the international perception that Israel’s leftist movement was experiencing a revival under the Blue and White alliance before its implosion, its leadership had aligned many of its policies, barring minor caveats, with the incumbent administration. For instance, despite its controversial coverage over the status of Jerusalem and annexation of large sections of the West Bank, both Netanyahu and Gantz have endorsed the 2020 Trump Peace plan. Even Gantz’s only major point of contention, the inclusion of Palestinian leadership into discussions, has been weakened through subsequent dialogue.

Indeed, whilst it does espouse several leftist policies, since its founding as the de facto anti-Bibi alliance, Blue and White’s core policies were almost entirely focused on ousting the Netanyahu administration from power either through the ballot box or via retrospectively binding legislation.[1] Such initiatives would involve enforcing term limits and preventing indicted politicians from serving as premier, thus disqualifying Netanyahu who currently awaits trial over allegations of corruption. Thus, despite overall having a more leftist platform than Likud, Netanyahu’s removal from office would be one of the only significant measures of differentiation imposed by a Gantz administration. As such, the emphasis on a political rather than ideological platform will likely struggle to attain broader support outside of a single-issue voter base in future elections.

A Fragmented Opposition

Fragmentation among oppositional factions threatens to impede their capability to govern as a genuine alternative to Likud in future electoral contests. Despite the limitations of a single-issue platform, Gantz was capable of attaining a broad array of support from multiple political factions, including the first endorsement of a Jewish politician from an Arab dominated party since 1992 via the Joint List. However, despite possessing a larger backing then Netanyahu to become the newest premier following the latest election, the misinterpreted strength of Gantz’s position made him incapable of translating this into a viable coalition government due to alliance factionalism.

Although the Joint List lent Blue and White their support for the preferred Premier, their anti-Zionist platform and fragile political formation prevents them from participating within any formal coalition government propagating Zionist ideals. Similarly, cultural apprehension among the Jewish factions against coalitions with Arab parties has permeated since the foundation of the state in 1948.[2] Irrespective of the accuracy of their assumptions, questions involving the ultimate loyalty of Arab parties and their lack of support of Zionism has resulted in the leaders of most Jewish factions, including Gantz, from opposing such an arrangement ever occurring. While Arab politicians have never served in any Israeli government, if the Joint List continues to remain the third-largest party in the Knesset, leftist parties will increasingly need to identify methods for overcoming these barriers in order to successfully challenge perpetual right-wing governance.

Additionally, regardless of their intentions behind doing so, the divisions generated among rival Blue and White factions following the initiation of unity government negotiations with Likud have damaged the cohesion of the opposition for the foreseeable future. National unity governments are not unprecedented within Israel, particularly during periods of national crisis. However, given that Blue and White’s platform was primarily based on ousting Netanyahu from power, the initiation of dialogue over any form of power-sharing agreement was enough to result in the formal exit of the Yesh Atid and Telem factions. Whilst Gantz has continued to keep the Blue and White name for his sole remaining political faction, Israel Resilience, the capitulation of the broader alliance may make it increasingly difficult for the opposition to reunify once the tenure of the unity government lapses.

Long-term Demographic Struggles

In addition to these immediate obstacles to securing governance, long-term demographic changes are likely to increasingly marginalise the capability of centre-left parties from beating right-wing blocs in elections within the next half-century. Historically,  the vast majority of citizenry have voted for parties which represent their religious or cultural beliefs, irrespective of the benefits, economic or otherwise, which may be better offered by rival factions.[3] For instance, the nation’s fastest-growing Jewish demographic, the religiously hard-line ultra-orthodox sect, are predicted to nearly double from thirteen to twenty-seven percent of the total population by 2059. Within this constituency voting patterns overwhelmingly align with their particular ethnicity, with those of Sephardic origin generally endorsing the Shah party, whilst those of Ashkenazi descent tending to favour United Torah Judaism. These allegiances transcend basis cost-benefit analyses since centre-left policies generally offer better subsidy packages for the ultra-orthodox, among whom nearly forty percent continue to live below the poverty line.

Similarly, nearly ninety percent of Arab-Israeli’s votes go to the Joint-List, despite its four factions, Hadash, Ta’al, United Arab List and Balad representing a large cross-section of differing ideologies, from socialism to Pan-Arabism. Yet while its population is also set to markedly increase from fifteen to twenty percent of the total population, unless the aforementioned tensions between Jewish and Arab political parties can be resolved they will remain outside the corridors of power indefinitely. Consequently, given the sectarian nature of a large part of Israel’s electorate, the rapid growth of the predominately right-wing Haredi threatens to increasingly undermine the long-term prospects of leftist parties securing governance throughout the next half-century, regardless of the policies which they propose.

Silver Lining

The centre-left has a long way to go before they will be able to reconcile the variety of challenges standing in its way of wresting control from Likud. Nonetheless, the current unity administration presently offers the greatest opportunity for leftist ideals to influence national policies. Despite the division of influence varying widely in prior scenarios, Gantz has successfully attained control over the influential Defence and Justice ministries, while temporarily delaying annexation plans within the West Bank. Consequently, despite the challenges which the centre-left will face in future elections, so long as the current unity arrangement is maintained in a fair and proportionate manner, leftist politics will remain capable of exercising some form of influence on federal policies within the current Likud administration.

[1] Kaḥol Lavan. 2019. “Blue And White 2019 Platform”. https://en.idi.org.il/media/12312/%D7%9B%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%91%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A2.pdf.

[2] Tessler, Mark. 2019. “Israel’S Arabs And The Palestinian Problem (1977)”. Religious Minorities In Non-Secular Middle Eastern And North African States, 325-344. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19843-5_12.

[3] Mathie, Nicola. 2016. “‘Jewish Sectarianism’ And The State Of Israel”. Global Discourse 6 (4): 601-629. doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1259284.

Kevin is a MA student in Conflict, Security and Development within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. A Series Editor for Strife, his research interests are primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific region, State building within post-conflict zones, and combating technological challenges to regional security concerns. Additionally, serving as King’s mature student officer, he is a strong advocate for exploring the correlation between the psychological impact of mental health degradation on academic well-being. Readers who identify as mature students and experience difficulties relating to any aspect of university life are encouraged to contact him at kevin.nolan@kcl.ac.uk

 

 

Can the Trump Peace Plan Survive Political Upheaval in Israel’s Upcoming Elections?

by

By Lauren Mellinger

4 March 2019

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump shake hands during a press conference in February 2017. Netanyahu is up for reelection in April, after which Trump plans to release a Middle East peace plan. (Benjamin Applebaum)

 

As Israelis prepare to vote on April 9, the Trump administration has announced that at long last, the U.S. peace plan, which President Trump has referred to as ‘the deal of the century’, will be unveiled in April. The fate of the plan however, and of the prospect of an American role in getting the parties to return to the negotiating table, remains an open question.

From an “election about nothing” to a referendum on Netanyahu

In September 1992, the popular TV-sitcom Seinfeld aired an episode titled ‘The Pitch’, in which Jerry Seinfeld and his friend, George Constanza, pitch a pilot to NBC, predicated on a half hour of, well, nothing. Fast forward 27 years, and one could similarly describe the current Israeli elections as a race about nothing. Israel faces formidable challenges at home and abroad — including the threats from Iran’s increasing presence in Syria and their assistance in Hizballah’s growing arsenal; the withdrawal of the US from Syria and the challenge of Russia’s expanding presence in the region; and ongoing tensions in Gaza. In addition, a host of unresolved religion and state issues, in particular matters pertaining to burden-sharing, continue to vex slimmer, right-wing-led coalitions, while challenges to Israel’s relationship with Diaspora Jewish communities and the ongoing stalemate in negotiations with the Palestinians merit more debate time. In lieu of a substantive debate regarding the geopolitical and domestic challenges facing Israel however, the election thus far has largely focused on whether Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent prime minister, should win another term. 

The prospect of Israel’s incoming government led by someone other than Netanyahu increased this past week, following Attorney General Avishai Mandelblit’s announcement of the intent to indict Netanyahu on charges including bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Following the announcement, Israel’s newest party, the Blue White list, eclipsed Netanyahu’s Likud Party in the polls for the first time, suggesting that Netanyahu might not be able to form a coalition.

Though damaging to Netanyahu, per Israeli law, Mandleblit’s announcement does not preclude him from running, or serving in office —pending a verdict. Thus far Netanyahu responded by doubling down on populist rhetoric, a move that will most likely preclude the formation of anything other than a right-wing coalition, in the event Netanyahu can win another term. This would then put the incoming Israeli government squarely at odds with the Trump administration’s plan, should the Americans proceed with the plan’s release.

The ‘deal of the century’ is finally set to be unveiled in April . . . maybe

The lack of substantive issue-oriented discussions in the election thus far is by no means evidence of the lack of a campaign strategy — by either side of the political spectrum. By not formally taking a position on the issue of future peace with the Palestinians outright, the centre-left bloc may be hoping to pry votes away from the right. If their efforts ultimately pay off, it would likely be due to two key reasons: a party list which has prioritized leaders with bona fide security credentials, namely three former military chiefs of staff (including one who also served as defence minister); and the fact that Netanyahu, who until recently faced the prospect of an indictment on corruption charges, has moved so far to the right to maintain his grip on the premiership that he coordinated a deal that could bring the extremist group Otzma Yehudit — a group anathema to even right-leaning Israeli voters — into the Knesset.

And here is where the Trump administration lost a critical opportunity. Most veteran Mideast observers would undoubtedly caution an American administration against announcing a potentially game-changing peace effort amid an Israeli election — both to avoid an outward appearance of intervening in Israel’s domestic politics and to insulate the administration from having the initiative fail. Yet, in the current political environment, waiting until April to release the plan is a missed opportunity. As Beilin argued, for the moment, neither Netanyahu nor former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, head of the Blue White Party, appeared bothered by the administration’s decision to delay the unveiling of the plan until after the elections. Gantz’s new alliance has yet to reveal their platform, but the presence of one of his bloc partners, former defence minister Moshe Ya’alon, currently #3 on the Blue White List, having ruled out support for a two-state solution, together with the party’s reported opposition to dividing Jerusalem and evacuating settlement blocs in the West Bank, suggest that a two-state solution is a non-starter. Recent statements from Naftali Bennett’s new party, and those of parties to the right of Bennett that are now aligned with Netanyahu, as well as recent statements by Netanyahu himself, seem to suggest that this may be one area of agreement for the right and centre. Laying out the terms of the Trump peace plan now, rather than after April 9, would have required the parties to address the issue in a more substantive way.

Should Netanyahu manage to emerge the victor in April’s elections, he will come to a crossroad in his relationship with Trump, which until now has arguably been the closest relationship Netanyahu has ever had with a U.S. president. The farther right the prime minister has to move in order to secure his reelection and manage to assemble a coalition, the more difficult it will be to make any concessions regarding a peace agreement. Nor does the prime minister appear willing to do so. As Netanyahu himself recently stated, if he wins, he will form a religious, right-wing governing coalition, and will not offer a partnership to his centrist challengers. The possibility that Otzma Yehudit crosses the 3.25% threshold and forms a part of a future government poses yet another challenge for the Trump peace plan, and for U.S.-Israel relations more broadly, in light of U.S. anti-terrorism laws. (Under U.S. law, Otzma Yehudit is led by followers of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, and Kahane Chai/Kach is still designated as a foreign terrorist organisation).

An added complication likely to hamper the success of Trump’s peace plan is the current U.S. relationship with the Palestinians, which has deteriorated significantly while President Trump has been in office, due to a host of missteps by the administration, including aid cuts, the President’s decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem, and his more recent decision to downgrade the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem by merging the two, a move largely considered a further affront to the Palestinians, and suggests that the pending announcement of the Trump peace plan will not endorse a two-state solution.

Now with five weeks to go before the election, with the race essentially boiling down to a referendum on the incumbent prime minister, it remains to be seen whether a substantive, issue-oriented debate about the future of a two-state solution can occur before Israelis head to the polls. With what appears to be a close race between Netanyahu and Gantz for the premiership, both parties would be well advised to develop their positions on the pending Trump plan. The U.S. president is well-known for maintaining a transactional relationship with politicians and world leaders. As President Trump has demonstrated a penchant for responding to praise while doubling down on petty, yet damaging, attacks on opponents when he feels criticized, precisely how much attention the U.S. will give to efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the next two (or six) years will likely depend on how both sides — Israelis and Palestinians — respond to his administration’s proposed peace plan.

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a 2018-19 Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. She is also a former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?search=Netanyahu+Trump&title=Special%3ASearch&profile=advanced&fulltext=1&advancedSearch-current=%7B%22namespaces%22%3A%5B6%2C12%2C14%2C100%2C106%2C0%5D%7D&ns6=1&ns12=1&ns14=1&ns100=1&ns106=1&ns0=1#/media/File:President_Donald_Trump_and_Prime_Minister_Benjamin_Netanyahu_Joint_Press_Conference,_February_15,_2017_(01).jpg

 

Gaza, Israel, and Netanyahu’s Latest Coalition Crisis

by

By Lauren Mellinger

21 December 2018

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to avoid an early election for fear that he might lose due to the public’s displeasure with his handling of the Gaza crisis. (Photo credit: David Shankbone)

 

This past tumultuous month in Israeli politics challenged two key assumptions about Israel’s long-serving prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First, despite speculation in recent months that the Netanyahu-era is drawing to a close, it is certainly not over yet. Perhaps of greater significance is the second element to emerge from last month’s political crisis: Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ — who recently said that ‘[t]here is no diplomatic solution to Gaza’ and compared Hamas to ISIS — is not going to topple Hamas in Gaza.

How Gaza precipitated Israel’s latest domestic political crisis

In November Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Qatar agreed to provide $90 million in cash to Gaza over the next six months, along with an immediate infusion of fuel into the Strip. The initial $15 million instalment was paid out to Palestinian civil servants in the Gaza Strip on November 11 and served to further bolster Hamas amongst its Gaza-based supporters. The deal was controversial for several reasons: first, whereas Israel has periodically allowed Gulf States to transfer materials for civilian projects and fuel to Gaza, it typically rejects cash donations due to concerns that it would reach Hamas militants. Hamas’s Gaza-based leader Yahya Sinwar responded to the first cash delivery by publicly allying himself with Hamas’s military wing. It is also noteworthy that Israel approved the terms despite having long regarded Qatar as a ‘terror-supporting state.’ Lastly, the move was heavily debated within the security cabinet, but was not coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, suggesting that the Netanyahu government was seeking some form of long-term compromise with Hamas in Gaza, despite a long history of stating the opposite.

Then the political crisis began. Shortly after images of the first suitcases of Qatari cash entering Gaza went public, news broke of a botched IDF raid near Khan Younis, followed by a 48-hour barrage of rockets from Gaza — for which Hamas claimed responsibility. Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned, and withdrew his party from the coalition — arguing that the ceasefire, together with the Qatar arrangement, was ‘capitulating to terror.’ Then, Education Minister and Jewish Home Party leader Naftali Bennett threatened to quit the coalition unless he were assigned the defence portfolio. Given the likelihood that Netanyahu would reject Bennett’s ultimatum, both right and left-wing parties began to call for new elections.

As Israel’s government teetered on the brink of collapse, Netanyahu once again shrewdly outmanoeuvred his political rivals. Speaking from the Defence Ministry — a portfolio which Netanyahu currently holds, as well as that of prime minister and foreign minister — he rejected calls for new elections stating, ‘We are in the middle of a military campaign, and you don’t abandon a campaign to play politics.’ In an embarrassing about-face the following morning Bennett announced he would remain in the coalition — reneging on his prior ultimatum.

Though Kulanu leader and current Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon signalled to his faction that they should prepare for early elections, he too has not yet resigned from the government. For now, Netanyahu’s coalition stands with a fragile 61-seat majority.

Why delay early elections?

Early elections are routine in Israel’s domestic politics. In the 70 years since the country’s founding not one government has completed a full term. The current prime minister himself has engineered conditions for snap elections on more than one occasion. While it appeared that early elections seemed inevitable following Lieberman’s resignation, Netanyahu acted swiftly, doing everything possible to delay them.

Growing dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s Gaza policies left him open to a challenge by both the right-wing parties within his coalition, and the public. This latest political crisis had Netanyahu challenged by junior coalition partners from his right, and specifically on matters of national security. Netanyahu has long proclaimed himself to be the best protector of Israel’s security. Indeed his campaign slogan in the 2015 elections translates to ‘Only the Likud — Only Netanyahu.’ New elections under such circumstances would have forced Netanyahu to face his ‘worst-case election scenario.’

Public opinion was also a critical factor in Netanyahu’s efforts to avoid early elections. Following the events last month, polls showed that 74 percent of Israelis were dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s performance in the Gaza crisis. Likud remained in the lead in most polls, albeit with a record-low 29 seats — a significant drop from August 2018, when Netanyahu told a Likud faction that he anticipated winning between 35 and 40 seats in the next elections. Furthermore, by holding onto the defence portfolio, at least for now, Netanyahu made himself vulnerable to criticism by becoming the main target for the public’s outrage. This was evident from demonstrations in southern towns bordering Gaza, as well as outside of the defence ministry in Tel Aviv following Lieberman’s resignation, where protestors shouted ‘Bibi go home!’ among other slogans expressing disapproval with the prime minister’s Gaza policies. 

Can Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ win another term?

With Israel heading into a definite election year, all politicians are officially in campaign mode. It is highly unlikely that this government will continue until November 2019, when elections are scheduled to be held. For the moment, if everything is held constant, the Likud remains in the lead to net the most seats in the next election. As political consultant Mitchell Barak remarked, ‘[Netanyahu’s] got no competition. . . He’s running against himself.’ Yet, the polls referenced above did not take into account the prospect of a viable centre or centre-left bloc forming ahead of the elections. Nor did they account for the likelihood that former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz will announce a new party. Though Gantz’s party may not be able to surpass Likud in the next elections, it is expected to chip away at Likud’s lead.

Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Netanyahu’s efforts to outmanoeuvre his rivals did more to damage them electorally, than him. Shortly after the crisis was resolved, a poll found that 58 percent of Israelis did not believe Netanyahu’s claims that the government should not be brought down at present due to a ‘sensitive security situation’ for which he provided no further explanation. This is compared with only 31 percent who felt his concerns for Israel’s national security were genuine.

In a region with countless hostile adversaries popping up like a never-ending game of whack-a-mole, Netanyahu’s reputation as ‘Mr. Security’ is a high bar to uphold. The public’s disapproval of his latest Gaza policies however, should be understood in the broader context. Despite a history of brash public statements calling for a tough response to Hamas, and terrorism in general, and having criticised his predecessors in office on numerous occasions for their handling of Hamas and Gaza, his actions in office indicate that he is risk-averse — in particular when it comes to employing military force, and is reluctant to commit to putting boots on the ground in Gaza. His past public statements stand in marked contrast to his actions in recent weeks, including working towards a ceasefire and allowing an influx of Qatari cash. Thus it is hardly surprising that residents of Gaza-border communities — a core base of Likud voters — and several of his coalition partners spent much of the past few weeks accusing him of being ‘weak’ on Gaza.

Moreover, in recent weeks Netanyahu has struggled to restore the public’s faith in his reputation as ‘Mr. Security.’ A Tel Aviv University poll earlier this month found 76 percent of Jewish Israelis thought that Netanyahu failed when dealing with Hamas. The increase in terror attacks in the West Bank in recent weeks has renewed protests against Netanyahu — once again, from members of his base, challenging his recent decisions regarding Gaza. Despite the recently launched Operation Northern Shield’s initial successes in uncovering Hizballah-built tunnels under the Israel-Lebanon border, many have raised questions as to whether the timing of the operation was politically motivated, in light of the hit to his reputation Netanyahu has experienced in recent weeks, and with the prospect of indictments hanging over his head.

Though polls indicate that Netanyahu averted the prospect of early elections for now and has, for the moment, avoided a referendum on his handling of Gaza, the situation with Hamas in both Gaza and the West Bank has yet to be stabilised. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent Netanyahu can proceed with the arrangements with Qatar, absent broader public support. It remains to be seen whether Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ can prevail in the next elections, or whether Netanyahu has run out of political life lines.

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a 2018-19 Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. She is also a former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Netanyahu_campaign_posters_in_Jerusalem.jpg

A Victory for Whom? Lessons from the 1982 and 2006 Lebanon Wars

by

By Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith 

Israeli troops in South Lebanon, June 1982 (Credit Image: P.mielen, CC BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

 

‘Historia (Inquiry); so that the actions of people will not fade with time.’[1] Herodotus

 

Although Israel achieved a tactical victory in the First Lebanon War, it was a ‘strategic mishap’ because it catalyzed Hezbollah’s formation, failed to produce a durable peace agreement with Lebanon and set in motion the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Here, the word tactical refers to the Israeli Defense Force’s military victory in forcing the Lebanese government to expel Yasser Arafat and purge Beirut of PLO members.[2] This essay evaluates the causes and outcome of the two Lebanon wars.

 

The Lebanon Civil War (1975-1990) 

First, applying Herodotus’ recommendation: A proper historia of these wars must feature Lebanon’s 1975 Civil War; for what use is a sail boat’s mast and boom if it is not attached to the mainsail?

Lebanon’s Civil War began in 1975[3] and for 15 years the nation was caught in a cycle of conflict and unstable political settlements.[4] Internally, the Lebanese government’s consociational democracy – a system of power sharing between diverse ethno-religious groups – had collapsed after becoming imbalanced with migration shifts.[5] Externally, Farid El Khazen cites competing strategic interests, for ‘throughout the war, external actors, particularly the regional actors that took an active part in the war, [Israel, Syria, Iran and the PLO], had as much at stake as the Lebanese parties themselves.’[6] His observation that conflict exists in internal and external dimensions deftly captures the spirit of the Lebanon Wars.[7]

 

The 1982 Lebanon War

For two decades after Israel’s founding, the state’s involvement in Lebanon had been kept to a minimum under a limited action policy.[8]  Stemming from Israel’s 1981 election and Syria’s increasing military presence in Lebanon, however, this policy was reversed by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.[9] Although personality politics did accelerate military action, it was not the sole factor.[10] Any victor of the 1981 election would have grappled with choosing between military action, or inaction, as Israel’s northern border was besieged.[11] Prime Minister Begin faced two decisions: If Israel took no action, ‘it would abandon a two-decade-old commitment to oppose Syrian involvement in Lebanon. On the other hand, if Israel moved to deter Syria from intervening on the side of the Christians, it would in fact save the PLO-Left coalition and abandon its own Christian allies.’[12] Thus, the 1982 war was caused by a combination of political, social and religious factors.

Israel’s strategic objectives were to (1) solidify an alliance with the Christian Maronites to eradicate the Lebanese-Palestinian terrorist network;[13] (2) remove Yasser Arafat from power; (3) protect Israel’s northern border; and (4) defeat the Syrians in Lebanon.[14] Begin and Sharon, however, held different visions of achieving this.[15] According to Hala Jaber, ‘Israel’s invasion was the brain-child of Ariel Sharon[.]’[16] While Begin held ‘narrower military objectives’ in leveraging the strength and power of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), Sharon envisioned a more aggressive campaign to eradicate the PLO.[17]

These competing visions were harmonized under the July 1981 ceasefire agreement.

Anver Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber explain, ‘Begin’s Cabinet needed a reasonably acceptable pretext for moving into Lebanon. . . . Israeli officials repeatedly presented the July 1981 cease-fire as a matter of linkage. Either the PLO respected the cease-fire on all fronts or the cease-fire was null and void.’[18]

Apart from the involvement of regional actors, the United States and USSR were also involved.[19]  In 1982 Sharon visited Washington DC to speak with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, about the planned offensive.[20] Haig cautioned that there must be an internationally recognized provocation to justify an invasion.[21] Critical of the US’ discussions with Israel, Zeev Schiff writes ‘[a]lthough the Americans sounded circumlocutory warnings for public consumption, the American nay was so feeble that the Israelis regarded it merely as a diplomatic maneuver designed to exonerate the United States should the military operation go sour.’[22] According to Schiff, Israeli leaders opined that the US would support the operation if it undermined the USSR’s allies.[23]

On 3 June 1982, this provocation basis was met when the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, was shot in the head by a Palestinian gunman.[24] Despite the Israeli intelligence forces’ knowledge that the gunman was not part of the PLO, but a dissident faction of Abu Nidal, Prime Minister Begin publicly declared it to be a violation of Israel’s cease-fire agreement with the PLO.[25] As a result, Israel commenced its invasion of Lebanon the following day. [26]  Israel mounted a successful aerial offensive and land campaign against Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee.[27] In the end, the war was a tactical victory for the IDF because it forced the Lebanese government to remove Arafat and purge Beirut of PLO members.[28]

Israel’s strategic objective to secure a durable peace with Lebanon, however, was a failed effort. Why? Hala Jaber explains ‘Sharon traumatized Lebanon, shocked the Israeli public and succeeded in creating a new enemy to harry Israel’s northern border: Hezbollah[.]’[29] Israel allowed the Phalange militia to enter the Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatilla, which led to the massacre of refugees, and galvanized the formation of the Lebanese National Resistance[30] and Hezbollah.[31] As Ahron Bregman of King’s College London War Studies notes in Israel’s Wars: A History Since 1947, the aftermath of the Palestinian refugee massacre resulted in Sharon’s removal from office and the resignation of senior military commander, Colonel Eli Geva, during the conflict.[32] By 1983, Hezbollah formed its first council (shoura), established a newspaper, Al-Ahed (The Pledge) in 1984, and by 1985 Hezbollah published its manifesto on Islamic Resistance.[33] Although a peace agreement was entered into by Israel and Lebanon, it was a short-lived gain because Syria coerced Lebanon’s leader, Amin Gemayel, to repeal it.[34] Overall, Israel’s conduct in 1982 unintentionally triggered the growth of the Islamic Resistance Movement and conditions leading to the 2006 war.[35]

 

The 2006 Lebanon War

This 34-day war was caused by a combination of unresolved political, social and religious grievances from the 1982 war. The primary actors were Israel, Iran and Hezbollah, and the fighting was concentrated in Lebanon and Israel.[36] Despite Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in May 2000, hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah steadily escalated with fringe conflicts.[37] On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah initiated war when it crossed into Israel and killed and kidnapped several soldiers.[38] In retaliation, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) commenced Operation Specific Gravity against Hezbollah.[39] The IDF also mounted a ground campaign to combat Hezbollah’s Katyusha rocket attacks and dispersed guerilla network.[40] Both sides sustained high casualties. Israel was struck with 3,970 rockets as it sought to weed out guerilla fighters. [41] Schmuel Tzabag characterizes this conflict as an ‘asymmetrical confrontation between a sovereign state [Israel] and a guerrilla organization [Hezbollah] controlling part of a neighbouring state [Lebanon] and operating against its will by means of terrorism[.]’[42] On 14 August 2006, the UN intervened in brokering a ceasefire agreement.[43]

The war’s outcome, however, is shrouded in controversy. While it ended in a ceasefire, some scholars credit Israel’s military for deterring a future war with Hezbollah, whereas Hezbollah regards it as a victory for its resistance strategy.[44] Regardless, Israel initiated the Winograd Commission to investigate why its military reached a tactical impasse with Hezbollah.[45]  The Commission found that ‘Israeli military officers and Israel’s political leadership placed severe restraints on ground action because of the fear of repeating the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon and the war of attrition that followed Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.’[46] For Matt M. Matthews, the IDF suffered a tactical defeat because it was ‘confused by its new doctrine, soldiers were deficient in training and command, and senior officers seemed woefully unprepared to fight a “real war.”’[47] Overall, Israel’s military and civilian leadership lacked a unified vision in 2006 for combatting this asymmetrical threat.[48]

 

Conclusion

Although Israel achieved a tactical victory in 1982, in terms of achieving its strategic objectives, history shows it was a strategic mishap. Not only was the peace agreement with Lebanon short-lived, but the handling of the conflict also served to precipitate the emergence of Hezbollah and conditions for the 2006 war.

 

 This article has been updated and republished on Strife Blog with the author’s permission. It was originally published on Small Wars Journal.

 

 

Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith is a M.A. candidate with King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Previously, she served as a Captain in the US Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Prior to the military, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Jessica holds a J.D. from the University of California, Davis, and B.A. from Wellesley College, where she was a Fellow of the Madeleine Korbel Albright Institute. Opinions expressed in her articles are those of the author’s and not those of the US Department of Defense or US Air Force.  

Notes: 

 

[1] ‘Herodotus Quotes’, The Famous People, https://quotes.thefamouspeople.com/herodotus-1626.php (May 2018).

[2] Farid El Khazen, ‘Ending Conflict in Wartime Lebanon’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40:1, (2004), p. 68.

[3] ‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

[4] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 66.

[5] Joel Krieger, ‘Consociational Democracy’, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195117394.001.0001/acref-9780195117394-e-0156?rskey=ujOyS9&result=152 (May 2018).

[6] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 65.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Anver Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber ‘Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?’, International Security, 8:2, (1983), p. 118.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid. at p. 127.

[13] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’, (May 2018).

[14] ‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

[15] Yaniv, ‘Whim’, pp. 131-132.

[16] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, (Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 7.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Yaniv, ‘Whim’, pp. 135.

[19] Ibid. at pp. 134-135.

[20] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Zeev Schiff, ‘The Green Light’, Foreign Policy, 50, (1983), p. 73.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Yaniv, ‘Whim’, pp. 135.

[25] Shlomo Argov, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1422910/Shlomo-Argov.html (June 2018)

[26]  KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[27]  ‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

[28] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 68.

[29] Jaber, Hezbollah, pp. 7-8.

[30] Ibid. at p. 19.

[31] Ibid. at p. 220.

[32] Ahron Bregman, Israel’s Wars: A History Since 1947, (Routledge, 2010), p.  177.

[33] Jaber, Hezbollah, pp. 220-21.

[34] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 68.

[35] Jaber, Hezbollah, pp. 7-8.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Anthony Cordesman, et. al., Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, (CSIS Press, 2007), pp. 24-25.

[38] Ibid. at p. 4.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[42] Schmuel Tzabag, ‘Ending the Second Lebanon War’, Israel Affairs, 19:4, (2013), p. 640.

[43] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[44] Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, (OP 26, 2008), pp. 1-2.

[45] Cordesman, ‘2006’, p. 6.

[46] Ibid. at p. 7.

[47] Matthews, Unprepared, p. 1.

[48] Cordesman, ‘2006’, p. 7.

 

Image Source: 

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3218834

 

Bibliography:

 

Ahron Bregman, Israel’s Wars: A History Since 1947, (Routledge, 2010).

 

Anthony Cordesman with George Sullivan and William D. Sullivan, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, (CSIS Press, 2007).

 

Anver Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber ‘Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon’, International Security, 8:2, (1983).

 

Farid El Khazen, ‘Ending Conflict in Wartime Lebanon: Reform, Sovereignty and Power 1976–88’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40:1, (2004).

 

Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, (Columbia University Press, 1997).

 

‘Herodotus Quotes’, The Famous People, https://quotes.thefamouspeople.com/herodotus-1626.php (May 2018).

 

King’s College London War Studies Online: Unit 2, ‘The Lebanon Wars’, (May 2018).

 

‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

 

Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, (OP 26, 2008).

 

Schmuel Tzabag, ‘Ending the Second Lebanon War: The Interface between the Political and Military Echelons in Israel’, Israel Affairs, 19:4, (2013).

 

Zeev Schiff, ‘The Green Light’, Foreign Policy, 50, (1983).