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U.S. Energy, Placing Strategy ahead of Policy

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by Benjamin Flosi

Conceptual photo of energy sources. Source: LovetoKnow

U.S. Energy Production – Politics vs. Strategy

U.S. energy policy is U.S. energy politics. The fight for energy-producing states this election season demonstrated this feature. President Trump made a calculated all-out blitz for these politically essential states in 2016 and 2020 by targeting his messaging of unrestricted energy production policies to critical constituents. [i] The Democrat Party, always in a more precarious political position due to a broader base, attempted to thread the needle, moving between abruptly ending the fossil fuel industry and gently progressing away. Finally, deciding on $2T in spending as a middle ground between its constituents.

This phenomenon deviates from U.S. energy policy’s historical role, where political leadership from both parties would equate energy policy with national security. President Nixon declared an emergency after the oil embargo and increased domestic production programmes. President Carter looked to secure supplies by removing pricing controls, establishing a strategic reserve, and initiated the U.S. military’s force increase in the Gulf region.[ii] The first war in Iraq was partially justified as preventing Saddam Hussein from controlling an even greater share of the global oil supply. Similarly, the reactivation of the fifth fleet and regional basing and partnerships stem from these strategic calculations. Even as recently as President Obama, achieving energy independence from international vagaries was a central talking point of his clean and renewable energy policies. Despite different political bases and inherent beliefs, each approached energy policy from the point of strategic national benefit.

Overton Window

When tackling climate change, America would be wise not to put policy goals before a strategic approach, as demonstrated in the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussain. Here, a rush to achieve a “safer world” through removing several threats and the spread of democracy, all in one swift policy, demonstrates that having a policy goal of global change without a feasible and sustainable strategy to reach that goal can invite catastrophe.

Fortunately, the U.S. energy-producing states’ current importance to any presidential bid, the 50/50 divided in domestic politics, and a split congress offer the opportunity to implement an energy strategy over an energy policy. This is due to the current political conditions preventing either side from implementing a strictly partisan policy. Furthermore, the diverse options under any multifaceted and long-term strategy allow political actors from all sides to claim a moral victory and deliver results to their constituents.

Strategic Dilemma

 Climate change is real. Unfortunately, so is Chinese and Russian aggression. The kernel of this strategic dilemma is that most U.S. steps to reduce carbon use also reduces U.S. and global security. While climate change will continue to impose itself on the word with strategic repercussions, so will Russia and China. China’s ability to use threats about trade to compel the E.U. in times of stress was successful, as the E.U. backed down in its reporting on China’s response to COVID. China also produced similar threats to cut off medical and pharmaceutical supplies to the U.S. Furthermore, their use of salami tactics to control trade routes, energy sources, and commercial fishing in national territory and control pieces of Europe will continue independent of climate change.

Decarbonization will be costly to the U.S. Every effort to impose restrictions will decrease the strategic risk of climate change but will increase the strategic risk imposed by China and Russia due to reduced U.S. economic capacity, global economic influence, energy independence, and reduce the energy independence of its allies and partners. There is also no guarantee that enduring these costs will achieve the objectives of ending or significantly reducing global warming due to China’s continual expansion of coal power plants and occupation of oil and gas fields in the South China Sea for potential exploitation. Furthermore, projected growth across India and Asia could additionally counter any feasible reductions in the U.S.

Strategic Opportunities

Advantages of the Status Quo: In 2019, the U.S. attained a greater degree of energy independence as it transitioned from being a net importer to a net exporter of crude and refined petroleum products. This accomplishment provides an economic advantage in revenue derived through market share, integration of world-class U.S. corporations into economies around the world, sustains a robust and dynamic economy that absorbs millions of immigrants and develops everything from the P.C. to one of the first the COVID-19 vaccine, and fuels a military that maintains global security. It also provides a hedge in the event of a great power or sustained conflict. Similarly, U.S. production capacity secures European economies and militaries as it allows for an alternative to global supply chains and dependence on Russia’s energy exports.[iii] Since oil and gas trade in USD, current arrangements help solidify the USD’s strategic advantage as the reserve currency and global finance provider. This latter fact is beneficial for countering an economically ambitious China attempting to ensnare smaller countries, as revealed in Sri Lanka’s loss of Hambantota Port, by creating new trade routes and an alternate reserve currency and financing opportunities.

Advantages of Opportunity: While the U.S. does maintain a current strategic advantage in the extraction-based world, this does not mean that a future of transition is devoid of similar strategic opportunities. The U.S. possesses several inherent strategic advantages, which it can lever in the quest to develop an answer to these problems. These include its capacity for research and development through its universities, defence and federal government initiatives, and iconic inventors in their garages. It also includes its business culture, cutting edge firm practices, entrepreneurship, and its flexible and dynamic investing ecosystem. Therefore, any path towards decarbonization can maintain some of the current advantages if it applies these strengths.

Strategic Pillars

Treat Decarbonization like Disarmament: To prevent a strategic nadir, the U.S. can treat decarbonization like disarmament. Agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords, on their own, will only hurt compliers while increasing relative gains of countries savvy or cynical enough to join and evade or ignore commitments. While Xi Jinping was producing statement after statement about reducing greenhouse emissions, his party brought more new coal plants into existence, nationally and internationally, than the accords can potentially overcome. Alternately, as U.S. efforts to decarbonize increase consumers’ and exporters’ costs, reduce U.S. multinational firms’ capacity, and reduce core industrial capability and small businesses vitality, America’s rivals continue to decrease energy production and consumption costs.

Therefore, as the Biden administration starts to adjust the Trump trade war, realigns relations with China, and builds U.S. manufacturing and the post-COVID economy, an opportunity exists to create agreements that can balance these concerns and embed reciprocal actions over blanket U.S. reductions.

Secure Supply Lines: Long-term movement away from carbon dependence requires a move towards reliance on rare earth elements. While the federal government has taken steps to increase its reserves of these elements, no efforts exist to secure continued supply, especially in a national emergency or sustained conflict. The fact that Russia and China together can possess or control up to 90% of global supply, depending on the specific element, adds another security challenge that requires a solution before relying on renewables.

Fortunately, the potential for new exploration exists in the U.S., Australia, Africa, and Latin America. Similarly, other Asian countries besides China can provide a low-cost option in making these materials usable. Malaysia being one, where China’s attempt to dominate its port facilities and transportation infrastructure demonstrates the need to secure these chains. Ambitious exploration and exploitation can reduce the costs of extraction and open new supplies. Part of securing this access, against China’s attempts, could include setting up ventures between U.S. and host nation companies to address the exploration, mining, extraction, and transportation required to bring these items to market while keeping the process partly in U.S. hands. As any return on investment would be long-term and risky, the U.S. Government would need to play a role in funding, guaranteeing profits, and technology exchange. This model could also deliver structured and spill-over entrepreneurial, technology, and educational benefits to local businesses and populations through additional loans, infrastructure development, educational opportunities, and access to both global and U.S. markets and companies. It could provide a local and grassroots development model and an alternate approach to China’s state-centered and state empowering One Belt One Road initiative. [iv]

Develop Comparative Advantages at Home: Within the U.S., opportunities exist that play to America’s strength and ensure that decarbonization supports U.S. economic advancement. As renewables and batteries depend on a significant amount of rare earth elements and minerals, the government can use U.S. universities to start programs that will create technology that can extract minerals with cheaper methods. The government can also promote STEM education in these fields through subsiding education. The importance of the production of these components to national security provides an opportunity to bring advanced manufacturing back to the U.S. Although, achieving this remains complicated as production in the U.S. is more expensive than in Asia. Still, the government should examine expenses, including the cost of not controlling production, including diplomatic and military, associated with securing overseas supplies and use them in a calculation on onshoring.[v]

Conclusion

In the U.S., the election cycle, which seemingly is an almost continuous street brawl these days, limits politicians’ ability to implement longer-term and incremental solutions. Instead, they must execute the immediate option to meet their short-term political demands. Although, as the President and Congress wade through a divided government and country, the opportunity exists to trade short-term paralysis for a long-term strategy and implement a far-sighted approach to battling climate change.

[i] Guliyev, Farid. “Trump’s ‘America first’ energy policy, contingency and the reconfiguration of the global energy order.” Energy Policy, vol. 140, May 2020.

[ii] Painter, David. “Oil and Geopolitics: The Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the Cold War.” Historical and Social Research, vol. 39, no. 4, 2014.

[iii] Henderson J., Mitrova T. (2020) Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia. In: Hafner M., Tagliapietra S. (eds) The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition. Lecture Notes in Energy, vol 73. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39066-2_5.

[iv] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/) from September-November 2020.

[v] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/)from September-November 2020.

Benjamin Flosi is a first year Ph.D. student at King’s College London and a Copy Editor at Strife.

 

President Trump’s gift to Al Shabaab

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by Marie Blessing Gilbert

US Troops in Somalia. Source: Commondreams

On the 4th of December last, the withdrawal of approximately 700 US troops and assets from Somalia was announced by the Pentagon. Some of these numbers will be deployed outside of East Africa whilst the rest will be repositioned in countries neighbouring Somalia. For decades Somalia has been devasted as a result of wars and famines. The burden carried by its people has been huge. Assistance from the US forces in Somalia in attempting to stabilise the country is vital if any hope of a better tomorrow is ever to be achieved.

Al Shabaab is an Al Qaeda linked militant group in Somalia whose aim is to establish a caliphate in Somalia that would in turn spread to neighbouring countries in the ‘Horn of Africa’ and beyond. They are not the only extremist group in Somalia, ISIS too has a footing there, however they are the primary source of terrorist offences in the Horn of Africa.

US troops have been present in Somalia since the early 1990s when at its height, there were approximately 25,000 troops assisting UN aid workers in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. This number was critically cut soon after by President Bill Clinton, and has dwindled since, to the 700 that were removed from Somalia in the last days of the Trump Administration.

The timing of the decision couldn’t be worse. Somalia has already missed the deadline of its general election which was due this month. Presidential elections are due to take place in February 2021. Tensions always run high in East Africa on the run up to and in the aftermath of elections. Anxiety in Somalia, which has been decimated for years at the hands of warlords and terrorist groups like Al Shabaab will hit a pinnacle soon. Pre- and post-election violence is expected no matter what the result of either election is due to the power struggle between elected officials, opponents, jihadist groups and clan elders. It is widely believed that the Somali security forces and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are not prepared to deal with a further escalation of violence within the country. Al Shabaab, as the most powerful jihadi extremist group in Somalia, is set to capitalise in the strife that will ensue.

Further to this, Somalia’s current fragile governmental system has long been aided by troops from neighbouring Ethiopia as part of AMISOM. Ethiopia has approximately 4000 troops currently in Somalia. However published reports have shown hundreds of Tigrayans troops forming part of this number have had their weapons seized by Ethiopian troops loyal to the government in Addis Ababa as a result of the current conflict between Tigrayan and Ethiopian forces in Ethiopia. Should AMISOM forces get distracted in any way from their peacekeeping mission in Somalia a vacuum will be created where militants can thrive even further than they do already. Somalia and Ethiopia have a long, porous border and traditionally strong ties. If the conflict in Ethiopia continues or escalates Somalia will undoubtedly suffer as a consequence.

To add to the problems of this highly vulnerable state the announcement that the US will remove their troops from within Somalia’s borders in weeks will further weaken the security forces in Somalia. The brunt of the American withdrawal is expected to be felt by the Somali commando force, Danab that was set up in 2014 as an elite force of combatants. Danab was established largely with US financial help, training and equipment. Its primary aim was that of a counter terrorist force in the country. Accompanied on many missions by US forces, Danab will surely be left to fend for itself when its US counterparts leave Somalia. Given they have worked together closely for 6 years it will, without doubt be a devastating blow to the Somali counter-terrorism efforts.

Al Shabaab members in Somalia. Source: Independent.ie

Leading politicians in Somalia and neighbouring countries have been left alarmed by the Pentagon’s announcement with Somalia’s President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed expressing deep concern that the efforts to counter terrorism in the region were aided hugely by the existing US-Somali partnership. In Neighbouring Kenya, Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary, Kamau Macharia, has opined that the situation will worsen in Somalia after the US withdrawal. It had already been announced that AMISOM troops were to work towards a full withdrawal of their troops from Somalia by the end of 2021, with graduated withdrawal already underway. Should this take place on top of US withdrawal the future looks very bleak for this extremely fragile and volatile state.

It seems that everything is happening at once to hinder any hopes that Somalia has to rise from the ashes of decades-long conflict. Somalia’s loss will be Al Shabaab’s gain and undoubtedly Trump’s final actions as he leaves the White House to withdraw his forces from Somalia will have devastating effects. The final withdrawal of troops was completed just two days before the inauguration of Joe Biden as President. The hope would be that President Biden will reverse this decision. However, with the troops already out of Somalia and even the uncertainly surrounding Trump’s decision will unquestioningly strengthen Al Shabaab’s resolve and can be seen as Trump’s parting gift to these jihadi extremists.

Marie Blessing Gilbert is currently studying full time for a Masters degree in Terrorism, Security and Society in King’s College London with an interest in the terrorism threat in Ireland and East Africa.

Marie is a part of the Strife Women in Writing Programme.

The Iraqi government is hamstrung by the very causes that are driving Iraqis to the streets

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by Gareth Jonas and Tom Webster

Tahrir Square (Liberation Square) with the Freedom Monument in the background – Baghdad, Iraq.
Source: Next Century Foundation

On October 25, thousands of Iraqi protesters mobilised throughout the country to commemorate the October 2019 “Tishreen Revolution,” with huge demonstrations in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the protest movement. Their latest demands? Much the same as the original grievances that first drew Iraqis to the streets last year: economic reform, and tackling corruption and constitutional change—albeit now with the additional call for justice for the 600 protesters killed by pro-Iran militia groups and security forces since the initial protests. Despite these waves of mass protest, progress continues to be extremely limited with the Iraqi state remaining constrained by pro-Iranian parties, economic crises, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The perpetuation of demonstrations since October 2019 highlights the limited progress made by the Iraqi state to address protester demands. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that further progress will be made anytime soon.

While the original grievances in October 2019 centred around corruption and a lack of economic opportunities, the extensive use of violence against protesters has since made security sector reform the core demand of protests. Yet, justice for the deaths of protesters continues to be absent, magnifying the glaring lack of accountability within the Iraqi security sector. The July raid in which 14 Kataib Hezbollah members were arrested, only to be released days later after threats from the group, underscores the difficulty Prime Minister Mustafa  Al-Kadhimi has in enforcing that accountability. Therefore, though Kadhimi has repeatedly emphasised his support for the protesters and dedication to serving justice for the ‘martyrs’ of the protests, his actions (or lack thereof) suggest that these are empty promises. Protesters’ concerns will be little allayed by the reinstatement of Abdel-Wahab al-Saadi to the head of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service. That was a victory for protesters, but a pyrrhic victory when one considers the death toll of the protests and the much more far-ranging demands to improve public safety. Today, protesters continue to place improved security and justice for the 600 or so killed protesters at the top of their agenda. That this remains the case six months after taking office, combined with the continued assassinations of high-profile activists and intellectuals across the summer, shows the evident lack of progress Kadhimi has been able to make in this area.

On the economy—the original core issue of protesters demands—the picture looks even bleaker. Mass rallies began in October 2019 in Tahrir Square calling for more job opportunities and improved services. One year on, it is hard to point at anything resembling progress as Iraq’s struggle with COVID-19 has only exacerbated its pre-existing economic woes and deprived the government of the resources to combat them. This, combined with the overinflated public sector, has led to a new strain of protests, in which medical workers and employees of the Ministry of Electricity across the country are demanding the disbursement of unpaid wages. It is thus apparent that Kadhimi has even more to contend with economically now than when he entered office.

The government’s greatest success in this area could be said to be the white paper published in October 2020 containing a historical diagnosis of Iraq’s financial woes and a prescription for a way out of it—by diversifying Iraq’s economy away from its dependence on oil whilst providing economic opportunities for Iraqis. It aims to achieve this by following International Monetary Fund guidelines which require spending cuts on basic needs such as health and education, alongside the devaluation of the currency to increase exports. However, the estimated 450 articles of legislation needed to be approved for the implementation of these recommendations are highly unlikely to pass due to opposition from various political parties who were not consulted, and little political will exists to pass them anyhow. As the country continues to teeter on the edge of an economic implosion, most protesters now seem resigned to simply wait out the pandemic until Iraq sees an increase in oil revenues.

There has also been very little progress towards domestic political reform. Calls for early elections and electoral reform to tackle corruption have increased throughout 2020 as protesters seek to do away with sectarian politics. Yet, the Iraqi Parliament is beset with factional infighting along sectarian lines as members of parliament continue to advance their individual and party interests at the cost of political reform. Whilst the recently passed electoral law goes some way towards weakening the dominance of traditional parliamentary blocs by dissolving provincial constituencies into electoral districts, protesters have accused it of dividing constituencies along ethnic and sectarian lines. This has effectively worked to buttress the reviled Muhasasa system; that is, the ethno-sectarian quotas by which cabinet positions are awarded amongst Iraq’s demographics. In addition, whilst early parliamentary elections have been scheduled for June 2021, the continued understaffing of the Independent High Electoral Commission and Federal Supreme Court—necessary to manage the elections and ratify the results—calls into question the current timeline for next year’s elections.

It is thus apparent that the majority of protesters’ demands have yet to be fulfilled, and the opportunity for progress in the short-term appears bleak. However, in considering the evolution of the protest movement’s response to the changing security and economic conditions that Iraq faces, we must acknowledge the limitations which the government faces in trying to meet many of the protesters’ demands. As a caretaker prime minister predominantly intended to navigate Iraq to new elections next year, whilst facing staunch opposition from pro-Iran parties and blocs in Parliament, there is little hard progress which Kadhimi can achieve. Nevertheless, the frustrations behind the protests are deep-set and not going away anytime soon. The antipathy voiced against Kadhimi at Tahrir Square in October was a significant moment in a movement which had hitherto been hesitant to criticise a leader who wants to clamp down on the militias and make progress on security and economy. The patience of protesters is quickly running out, so it seems as though Kadhimi will have to make a better effort in co-opting the energy of the streets if he is to bolster Iraq’s security and drive meaningful change in the lives of millions of Iraqis.

Gareth Jonas is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International. He can be found tweeting about identity, ethnic conflict, and international security at @jonas_gareth.  He is a Senior Editor at Strife.

Tom Webster is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International who has conducted extensive research on the Popular Mobilization Units and their place in Iraqi state-building.

How China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy fuels China’s ambitious military aims

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by Orlanda Gill

Flag of China. Source: Pixabay

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is a Chinese state-directed strategy which seeks to modernise the Chinese military by creating a distinct Chinese military-industrial complex. The MCF strategy effectively seeks to eliminate the barriers between the civilian and military sectors, which consist of legal, political, communicative, and bureaucratic divisions. Once eradicated, the result is a fused civil-military sector which allows for simultaneous military and economic growth. Whilst similarities can be found in the Civil-Military Integration (CMI) of the United States in that it shares the same goals of the civilian and military industry working closely together, CMI demands co-operation either within the military industry, or with a civilian company, rather than a complete removal of barriers between the civilian and military industry. The goal of the MCF is to have a ‘world-class military’ by 2050. Whilst the exact meaning is unclear, it can be interpreted to mean China desires to be amongst the world’s greatest military powers. How this would be realised can be understood by analysing China’s strategic guidelines which can be most closely translated to operational doctrine in the West. Realisation of this aim can also be examined through China’s attitude towards the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which for China has placed and will place technological and scientific innovation at the center of war. The MCF therefore must be understood with regards to China’s strategic guidelines and the RMA. Overall, it can be demonstrated that the MCF is about having a modernised military which can fight and dominate in wars that demand technological and scientific superiority.

The MCF is not a new concept. The idea that economic growth cannot be without military is found in Deng Xiaoping, in the early 1980s, who focused on economic development before military equipment modernisation. It was, however, not until the ascension of President Jiang Zemin in 1993 when focus started to shift back more towards defence than solely economic growth. Jiang emphasised dual-use technologies, combining military facilities and civilian infrastructure to streamline military and econoomic spending. These core components, which are at the heart of the MCF, have endured from Jiang until the present, under Xi Jinping. The MCF, however, shares the most similarities to the policies of Xi’s predecessor  Hu Jintao whose Civil-Military Integration (CMI) in 2009 sought to integrate the civilian and military sectors.

Whilst this brief historical overview demonstrates the evolution of a concept, the MCF is best understood at the implementation level. The strategy can be seen at work at many different levels: institutional, provincial, and local. At an institutional level, there is a growing number of the former and current senior defence industrial cadre serving in prominent party and state posts, while President Xi Jinping leads the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development to monitor Military-Civil Fusion policies. Outside of government, the MCF also extends to universities for research. Currently, Tsinghua University is pursuing human-machine interaction with funding from the CMC Science and Technology Commission, which will likely contribute to China’s modernised military and concept of intelligentised warfare. At the provincial level, among production facilities, beginning in 2019, ten provincial-level governments are investing money into research and overseas acquisitions through guidance funds. At the local level, looking towards Tianjin, an AI Military-Civil Fusion Innovation Center was set up next to the National Supercomputer Center. This was coordinated with the Academy of Military Science.  The MCF, therefore, should be understood as a guiding principle enforced and supervised by the state to guide the civilian sector to military usages, whilst retaining the civilian economic benefits from technologically innovating and supplying dual-use technology.

President Xi Jinping has remarked that the MCF strategy is instrumental, and this view is supported by China’s prioritisation of technology in contemporary warfare. The Gulf War (1990-1991) and Kosovo War (1998-1999) for China indicated a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and therefore a new standard and future trend which puts information superiority and thus the quality of technology as a key factor in military victory and for what constitutes a powerful military.  This understanding continues in the PLA’s strategic guideline in ‘winning informatised local wars’ in July 2014. An important (although not the only) aspect of this strategic guideline is the role of information. Informatisation ‘refers to the collection, processing, and utilization of information in all aspects of warfighting in order to seamlessly link individual platforms in real time from across the services to gain leverage and advantage on the battlefield.’ The demand for information superiority therefore  places importance on the ‘cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains’. The importance of advanced information technologies is thus heightened and the MCF is made a crucial process for the PLA to advance technological innovation at a rapid pace in comparison to its adversaries to gain information superiority.  Additionally, the MCF allows China to capitalise from the tech-dominated global RMA and to become a  ‘world-class military’ by 2050.

The MCF is also important in what appears to a new and emerging concept known as intelligentised warfare. This may be understood as a ‘uniquely Chinese concept of applying AI’s machine speed and processing power to military planning, operational command, and decision support’. In President Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, intelligentisation was elevated to a guiding principle for China’s military modernisation. This  conceptualisation of future warfare marks an evolution from informatised warfare. Differences can be analysed in that intelligentised warfare involves an ‘algorithm confrontation’ rather than ‘systems confrontation’ that characterises informatised war. Winning would therefore come from having an ‘algorithm advantage’. Furthermore, whilst informatised warfare recognises the importance of the space and cyber domain, intelligentised warfare would expand the domain of warfare into the cognitive domain which concerns ‘the field of decision-making through reasoning’. Superiority in this domain would be achieved through enhanced cognitive capacity of human combatants via integrated human-machine intelligence. The expansion of warfare into new domains and the potential Revolution in Military Affairs through AI would certainly help produce a ‘world-class military’. The connection of intelligentised warfare and MCF is made explicit when we observe that the PLA’s Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative book on the PLA compiled by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), states the intention to ‘Promote deeper military-civil fusion, and leverage societal resources for the development of military intelligentisation’. The MCF is thus integral to China’s capacity to leverage science and technology to bolster their combat capabilities as well as to lead in what China envisions as future wars.

Overall, the Military-Civil Fusion is an ambitious concept and strategy that seeks to modernise the military to great heights by fusing the civilian and economic sectors. The question of its success perhaps depends on whether the PLA is a world-class military by 2050. Nevertheless, the strategy has further implications; it promises China a technological edge, the strengthening of economic security and domestic and international prestige. Therefore, rather than becoming overly attached to what may be perceived as an end goal, it is important to remain open so as to see where the fusion is leading China.

 

Orlanda Gill is a MA National Security Studies student at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. Her interest is in East Asian security with a key focus on China’s foreign and domestic policy. She is also currently exploring the technology-security nexus especially with regards to China.

Orlanda is a part of Strife’s Women in Writing programme.

You can find her on Twitter at @orlanda_gill.

 

The Overextension of Sovereignty: How states have dampened opposition to annexation

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by Andrew Scanlon

Kremlin Dome of Senate. Photo Credit: iStockPhoto.

In the twenty-first century the calculation that war is too costly to pursue in the conventional manner has kept large scale inter-state conflict from occurring. States are no longer willing to send tanks rolling across borders to invade neighboring countries. The military, economic, and political cost/benefit analyses simply do not justify those actions in the present state of international relations. Yet, this does not cure a state’s appetite to expand its control in favor of pursuing its national interest. However, it does shift the strategy used to expand its presence. The use of proxies to engage on behalf of a state has been documented in conflicts such as the ongoing war in Yemen. A number of states utilize this strategy to pursue plausible deniability. An alternative method to mollify the international community over aggressive actions has been increasing in prevalence – extending sovereignty over peoples or structures outside of their present jurisdiction in order to more forcefully justify the aggressor’s presence. By over-extending their claim of sovereignty, these states attempt to shift the perception of their actions from aggressors to defenders and dampen any possibility of a united front willing to confront their activities. We have seen this strategy play out in Crimea and eastern Ukraine under President Vladimir Putin in 2014, and more recently in the South China Sea and the Himalayas by President Xi Jinping.

The Russian case in Ukraine

The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s continued access to naval bases in warm-water ports in Crimea and Russia’s support for the fiercely pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych were national interests, but a traditional military incursion into Ukraine would have triggered costly consequences. Instead, Vladimir Putin began using rhetoric related to the protection of ethnic Russians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Following violence in Kiev, Putin declared that “We understand what worries the citizens of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian, and the Russian-speaking population in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine… we retain the right to use all available means to protect those people. We believe this would be absolutely legitimate.” After mass protests in Kiev and the formation of pro-Russian separatist militias in Ukraine, Putin used the doctrine of Protecting Nationals Abroad (PNA) as justification for sending military supplies to separatists and deploying “little green men” into Crimea and eastern Ukraine. But many of these people Putin claimed to protect were not citizens, but merely ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking peoples. Whether the doctrine of PNA is lawful or simply tolerated, its traditional application has been to citizens, not foreign nationals with ancestry to the state utilizing the doctrine. Nevertheless, in 2019, Putin issued a decree allowing close to 3.5 million people living in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donbass and Luhansk to obtain Russian passports and brings Putin’s actions closer to those previously allowed by the international community.

Putin did not stop at protecting ethnic Russians. He also used historical claims to justify retaking territory. In a speech to a joint session of parliament asking for the formal annexation of Crimea, Putin professed “All these years, citizens and many public figures came back to this issue, saying that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian city. Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds”. Russia’s relinquishing of Crimea to Ukraine, in the process suffering a ‘historical wronging’, and its subsequent use as a rationalization to retake territory followed the framework of previous annexations. A number of international leaders compared the move to Hitler’s annexation of Sudetenland in 1938. The UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions urging Russia to withdraw military forces from Crimea and supplies from going to eastern Ukraine. A certain amount of backlash was inevitable following the annexation of territory, but Putin would have been naïve to believe that there would have been silence after such a move. However, other than remarks by world leaders and a number of U.S. and EU economic sanctions, Putin has been relatively free to pursue his interests in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. His use of the PNA doctrine and historical sovereignty over territory allowed him to keep the conflict, and ensuing fallout, below a level of escalation consistent with traditional military invasions.

China’s Mountain and Sea Strategy

While Russia has used the PNA doctrine as justification for interference into neighboring countries, China has used infrastructure. In the South China Sea, the Nine Dash Line asserted by China encompasses vast majorities of the sea that extend far beyond the usual exclusive-economic zones given to each state as a result of the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Chinese explanations for this broad claim are based on historical use of the sea by China dating back thousands of years. In modern times, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) has been constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea since 2013, allowing them to issue claims of sovereignty over disputed territory. In April, China created two new administrative districts in the South China Sea. This month, China drafted a new law that would expand the Chinese Coast Guard’s ability to enforce its sovereignty over the islands, permitting them to destroy foreign construction on islands claimed by Beijing and fire weapons on foreign ships.

China has now duplicated this strategy on land. In recent weeks, China completed the initial construction of a new village where the borders of India, Bhutan, and China meet in the Himalayan Mountains. This came after a June border clash in the Ladakh region of the Himalayas, near Kashmir, that resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese casualties. The new Chinese village is reported to be constructed within the territory of Bhutan, just south of the Doklam Plateau. Bhutan and China have been engaged in territorial disputes for nearly 35 years, much of which is focused on the western regions of Bhutan. The Doklam plateau is strategically significant for India’s continued access to its eight northeastern states, as well as their land borders with Bhutan and Myanmar. Under Chinese control, they would have the ability to block this access. The new Chinese village may only be the first in a series, much like the artificial islands, that would give China anchor points to protect the ‘sovereignty’ of Chinese territory or peoples.

These anchor points are core components to the strategy of Chinese expansion. States, including Australia, Japan, Vietnam, and Malaysia, are concerned with a resurgent China, its brazen aggression, and the potential of forceful annexation of territory. These fears present a major diplomatic challenge to China’s longer-term strategy. [[i]] Therefore, China has attached rhetoric to provocative actions in an attempt to alleviate concerns over their rise, engaging in a “rhetorical trap”. China has used rhetoric such as ‘China’s peaceful rise’ to assuage fears over actions that would otherwise seem more hostile. The rhetoric emphasizes the protection of sovereign entities, instead of engaging in military conflict on existing territory of sovereign states. This rhetoric has typically been utilized around actions in the South China Sea, but Beijing may begin using similar terminology regarding its efforts in the Himalayas.

Both the Russian and Chinese strategies are aimed at expanding territorial control without the stigma or risk of conventional conflict over existing territory, structures, or peoples. This shifts the conflict from a conventional military one to a more hybrid model that incorporates higher levels of rhetoric and international public opinion. Both the Russian and Chinese approaches try to build a framework that give them a defensive right to use force instead of an aggressive seizure of territory. While these strategies have allowed Russia and China to extend their ambitions over neighboring territories, how long will it take for their neighbors, and world leaders, to effectively respond to these enigmatic strategies… if ever?

 

[i] For more on the diplomatic challenges facing China in Asia over their renewed presence as a great power, Anisa Heritage and Pak K. Lee (2020) use an international order perspective to analyze the tension in the South China Sea, available here.

Andrew Scanlon is a MSc candidate in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh and an External Representative at Strife. Prior to postgraduate studies, he completed is B.A. in Political Science from the University of Dayton. During his undergraduate, Andrew worked for the Ohio Attorney General’s office and in the United States House of Representatives. His areas of research interest includes blockchain and its use as a tool for diplomacy, the impacts of the conflict in the South China Sea on the current international order, and international political economy.