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Strife Series: Colonial Legacies – Afghanistan – Haunted by its Colonial Borders

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British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab visits the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, September 2021. Photo credit: Number 10, used under Creative Commons

Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan is a powder keg. Last year, Taliban fighters were recorded shouting ‘Death to Pakistan’ and warning ‘if you come a step further, I will fight you’. Actual confrontations have become commonplace in recent weeks: the Taliban has attempted to destroy sections of fencing, and skirmishes have caused several deaths on both sides. To better understand this current crisis, we must look at Afghanistan’s history.

At first glance, Afghanistan stands out as an anomaly. Unlike most states in South Asia, it was never directly colonised by Europeans, and its reputation as the ‘graveyard of empires’ highlights the difficulties it has posed to numerous invaders. Yet, Afghanistan itself was a colonial conception. How can we explain this paradox, and how do the legacies of colonialism continue to afflict Afghanistan?

The British Empire was never able to conquer Afghanistan, despite repeated attempts. In one instance, the Afghans utterly humiliated a supposedly ‘superior’ force, slaughtering thousands of soldiers and civilians in 1842.[i] But such defeats were tactical, not strategic. In fact, Britain’s primary goal was always to protect India—the Empire’s ‘jewel in the crown’—from Russian expansion. In this imperial rivalry (known as the ‘Great Game’), complete control over Afghanistan was only one way of turning it into a buffer state. A ‘semi-colonial’ arrangement suited the British just fine; it was easier, in fact equally effective, to influence Afghanistan’s politics from afar.[ii]

This ‘semi-colonialism’ enabled the British to define the borders—and thus the fundamental meaning—of ‘Afghanistan’ as a nation-state. Before British meddling, Afghanistan did not exist as the clearly defined territorial entity that it is today. That was until 1893 when Mortimer Durand set out to demarcate Afghanistan’s frontier with British India. The resulting Durand Line carved the Pashtun people, a significant ethnic group, in two. Like most artificially designed colonial boundaries, the line ignored existing demarcations and cut through villages and even individual homes. Paying little heed to such consequences, the British mapped the border along with topographical features that would block mountain pathways into their sphere of influence. The Western Pashtuns were incorporated first into British India, and then Pakistan following the partition in 1947.[iii]

Much of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s present difficulties stem from this traumatic separation. The Afghan government has never accepted the Durand Line, which President Karzai called ‘a line of hatred that raised a wall between… two brothers’. Afghanistan’s repeated demands for an independent ‘Pashtunistan’ have heightened tensions surrounding the border. Pakistan, though, does recognise the Durand Line, seeing it as fundamental to preserving its territorial integrity. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is an artificial construct, and it has struggled to hold itself together. In 1971, East Pakistan fought a war of independence against West Pakistan and became Bangladesh. Subsequently, Pakistan has clung to the Durand Line, fearing that its extensive Pashtun population would seek independence too, and the country would collapse.[iv]

It is this border dispute, and the history of British colonialism, that help to explain the Taliban’s rise. Ever since its imperial subjugation, Afghanistan’s rulers have been made dependent on external resources. [v] Emir Abdur Rahman, for example, relied on cash subsidies from British India and therefore had to accept the Durand Line.[vi] The Afghan mujahidin were also hampered by dependency. They had defeated the Soviet invaders but were unable to fill the power vacuum that emerged. They possessed little unifying ideology and splintered into competing factions, a reflection of wider Afghan society, whose tribal divisions became deeply entrenched due to British rule. What’s more, the United States and Saudi Arabia no longer wished to fund Afghanistan after the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended.

Pakistan, however, kept a close eye on its neighbour, seeking to establish a sympathetic regime that would be dominated by Pashtuns. It found its answer in the Taliban, a deeply fundamentalist Islamist group, which by 1998 controlled almost all areas of Afghanistan. During the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan had become a rear base of operations for some mujahidin factions and the Pakistani-Taliban relationship had been formalised. While the security the Taliban provided was popular, its oppressive religious doctrine was not, and it led to the Taliban’s isolation from the international community. Thus, it increasingly sought the backing of Pakistan and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.[vii] Despite officially changing its policy after 9/11 and declaring that it would join the ‘war against terrorism’, sympathies toward the Taliban persist in Pakistan.[viii]

The contested nature of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has had significant implications for the War on Terror. On a map, the Durand Line appears clear, but on the ground, neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan possesses true sovereignty.[ix] Though they were quickly routed following the invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban and al-Qaeda members were able to escape across Pakistan’s porous border, where the social code (Pashtunwali) compelled Pashtuns to provide hospitality.[x] Many prominent al-Qaeda leaders—including Osama bin Laden—remained undetected there for years. Had US special forces teams been able to trap them within Afghanistan, the war would not have dragged on for so long.

Yet, thanks to its permeability, the Durand Line became a hotbed of the insurgency in Afghanistan, characterised by brutal violence. In 2008, CIA director Michael Hayden warned that the border ‘presents a clear and present danger’. The Taliban taking refuge there targeted Pakistani soldiers and police with suicide attacks and IEDs.[xi] US drone strikes, which have killed more than 9,000, including 1,000-2,000 civilians, have further violated the border’s sovereignty. Recently, the Taliban’s return to power has created an extensive refugee crisis, with many attempting to cross into Pakistan. Citing national security concerns, Pakistan has closed its border with Afghanistan and is attempting to complete the many miles of fencing being constructed across the Durand Line.[xii]

Afghanistan’s colonial borders also account for the failure of state-building there. Unable to subsume it into their empire, the British viewed Afghanistan as a ‘savage frontier’ that needed to be isolated from ‘civilization’. The Durand Line symbolised this marginalisation. Thus, Afghanistan was subjected to external control without any of the ‘benefits’ brought by outright colonisation; when the British left India, new elites could use pre-existing institutions to build a postcolonial state that imitated European ideals of behaviour. This was not possible in Afghanistan, yet the country is still expected to act as a Weberian state.[xiii]

During their occupation of Afghanistan, the US and the international community attempted to impose state institutions from the top down. They poured billions of dollars into the country for little gain, with one official claiming they were ‘given money, told to spend it and did, without reason’.  Vast sums found their way into the hands of corrupt officials and warlords, many of whom had committed or profited from human rights abuses. Several of these same actors quickly sided with the Taliban when the opportunity arose.[xiv]

When these policies failed, the US blamed Afghanistan and its culture for failing to meet its expectations of statehood. Alternative social formations, such as the jirga process (an assembly of tribal leaders aiming to solve disputes through consensus), were condemned for undermining the state-building process. However, due partly to Britain’s colonial policies, Afghan society is based on customs and norms, and the state does not possess any universal monopoly or legitimacy, being only one of several competing forces.[xv]

Nor did President Biden take sufficient responsibility for the US’ disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, which left thousands stranded, including those who had fought hard for incremental increases in their liberties. Instead, he blamed the Afghans, remarking that ‘we gave’ them ‘every chance to determine their own future. What we could not provide them was the will to fight for it’. The United States was shocked by the pace at which the Taliban was able to destroy the systems they had constructed over the course of two decades. But, given Afghanistan’s history of colonialism, should this be so surprising?

[i] Christian Tripodi, ‘Grand Strategy and the Graveyard of Assumptions: Britain and Afghanistan, 1839–1919’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2010), p. 713

[ii] Ibid., pp. 710-711

[iii] Nick Cullather, ‘Damning Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State’, The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2002), pp. 512-537, and Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2008), pp. 67-68

[iv] Elisabeth Leake and Daniel Haines, ‘Lines of (In)Convenience: Sovereignty and Border-Making in Postcolonial South Asia, 1947–1965’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 76, No. 4 (2017), pp. 973-974, and Johnson and Mason, ‘No Sign Until the Burst of Fire’, pp. 67-68

[v] Thomas Barfield, ‘Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan, Iranian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2004), p. 285

[vi] Nivi Manchanda, Imagining Afghanistan: The History and Politics of Imperial Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 81

[vii] Barfield, ‘legitimacy’, p. 288

[viii] Ijaz Ahmad Khan, ‘Understanding Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Afghan Policy’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2007), p. 141

[ix] Leake and Haines ‘Lines of (In)Convenience’, pp. 963-985

[x] Johnson and Mason, ‘No Sign Until the Burst of Fire’, p. 63

[xi] Ibid., p. 65

[xii] https://thewire.in/south-asia/pakistan-afghanistan-ties-come-under-strain-after-taliban-opposes-border-fencing

[xiii] B.D. Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 168-173, and Manchanda, Imagining Afghanistan, p. 86

[xiv] Kimberly Marten, ‘The Danger of Tribal Militias in Afghanistan: Learning from the British Empire’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2009), p. 163

[xv] Hopkins, Modern Afghanistan, p. 172

Gendered Partition of India: An Untold Story

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By Akshara Goel 

Women during the partition. Source – Sabrang India.

‘Partition has caused the politics of the belly’ – Francois Bayart.

On 15th August 1947 India attained independence from the two hundred years of British rule, but, witnessed its  secondly, partition into present-day Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh. The date, 15th August, is chiefly remembered as the victory from colonial domination? achieved through non-violence. Concurrently, its bemoaned for partition the narratives which are limited to national leaders, political causes and high politics dominated by the upper-class male perspective leaders. However, Indian feminist scholarships have argued that this recollection has disregarded the gendered understanding of wide spread communal violence – the story of displacement and dispossession and, the process of realignment of family, community and national identities. Women survivors of partitioned India occupied a distinctly marginalised space in the partition violence. They were not only subjected to barbarity from men of the ‘other’ community but also from their family members and community which began in the pre-partition period (before 1947), and carried on until the 1950s. The ‘other’ here refers to ‘enemy community’ who were not part of the dominant ethnic community of India or then West Pakistan or Pakistan. 

Women partition survivors were made attached to their male family member or community as they were assumed incapable of making their decisions on migrating to the other side of the border. Consequently, theywere compelled to agree with the twin concept of ‘Azadi’ – translated as Freedom – that was the loss of community, networks, identity and more or less stable inter and intra-personal relationships . Simultaneously, they witnessed double jeopardy. Firstly, by many human right discourses that were packed up recognize them as victims during the conflict occurred at the time of partition. Secondly, since males couldn’t perform their “role of protector” or unable to participate in “income generation activities” it drove to the domestic violence or resurgence of religious practices. This resulted in re-composition of the patriarchal structure which got disintegrated under the partition conflict, wherein, it led to greater control of women rather than, letting providing them with a mechanism to create their agency otherwise their agency was limited to the act of producing or reproducing the nation, according to the Indian government.  

The predominant memory of partition for these destitute women consisted of confusion, dislocation and severing roots. The day-to-day violence caused by the partition formed the everyday experience for these women. They were exposed to distinct forms of sexual violence that carried the symbolic meaning designated to their status in the male dominated -patriarchal society where  gender relations are arranged along the beliefs and traditions of the religious and ethnic communities. The most predictable form of violence was sexual assault inflicted the men of one community upon the women of the ‘other’ community to assert their own identity and ‘subduing the other by dishonouring their women’. However, the most notorious action was the sadistic pleasure these perpetrators sought from the humiliation of women. 

According to anecdotes by the women partition survivor, they were raped in front of their male family members and some of them were paraded naked in the market or danced in gurudwaras (holy shrine of Sikhs). For the stigmatization purpose and its legacy onto the future generation, the perpetrators sexually appropriated these women by desexualizing her as wife or mother through mutilating or disfiguring her breasts and genitalia (tattooing-branding on their breasts and genitalia with triumphant slogans like a crescent moon or trident) so that they no longer remain a nurturer. The motivation was to make her an inauspicious figure by degrading into an unproductive woman. These barbarian acts reflected the thinking of the patriarchal community wherein women are just considered objects of honour constructed by the male. Women survivors of Partition encountered or witnessed the episodes of violence from their family members and community as well. The latter, coerced their women to death, in some cases women were forced to kill themselves, to avoid being sexually offended and to preserve their chastity along with the shielding the honour of individual, family and community. According to the anecdote by Taran, a partition survivor who successfully came to India in 1947– “We girls would often talk about death – some were afraid, others thought of it as a glorious death – dying for an end, for freedom, for an honour. For me everything was related to freedom (from British colonial rule), I was dying for freedom”. Fortunately, she didn’t have to go through the ‘choice’ of death while her women friends were planning how to prepare for their death- an interview was taken by the Ritu Menon and Kamala Bhasin – Indian feminist writer and activist, respectively. However, women were made to ‘volunteer’ for death coerced to poison, put to the sword or drowned or set ablaze individually or collectively that is with other younger women or women and children (Butalia 1998 cited in Chakraborty, 2014, pg. 41-43) .

Some of the partition survivors were women who got abducted by ‘others’ and went through the identity crisis concerning the dominant ethnic community. They were abducted as Hindu (dominant community of India) married as Muslim (dominant community of Pakistan) and again recovered as Hindus and eventually had to go through a lot of bitter and painful “choices”. Women who were brought back ‘home’ after getting abducted, following the 1947 partition period with Pakistan,  weren’t given choice to decide  their home. It was assumed that Hindu women will retreat to India while Muslim women will be transmitted to Pakistan (during 1947 partition). Their space of home could have changed wasn’t given consideration. It wasn’t the boundary of domestic that defined home but it was the boundary of a nation, yet, they met the fate of non-acceptance from their natal families. In theory, everyone had a choice to move or stay but in practice staying on was virtually impossible. The ‘choice’ of whether to move, stay or return was a decision being made for women, by the patriarchal nation-state and their families. Women’s agency wasn’t a principal concern in any of the conflicts and its aftermath . 

The partition of violence affected the everyday world and the lives of women. This concept of the “everyday world” was promulgated by Dorothy Smith (1987). She maintains that “everyday world” refers to lived reality in the private sphere in which women’s representation and gendered lives on the domestic space gets effected and affected by the major events in the political sphere – “the domain of men”. The primary meaning of “everyday world” is to connect the political space with domestic (private) lives of women in a given historical instance. In other words, women survivors of partition have illustrated that there is a definite continuity between the “everyday world” and “extraordinary historical times” of the partition era. This everyday world consists of the private/domestic space in which a woman identifies herself’ and a ‘safe space’ as assumed by the patriarchal structure. However, in the partition violence, their ‘safe space’ gets threatened and compromised as they get dragged into the turmoil of public/political space where their male counterparts take an authoritative position but with no or negligible space for women. The patriarchal mechanisms decided everyday belonging of these women survivors. The fate of these women become tied to that of the nation-state or family and community which dictated how the women should live their life in post-partitioned independent India. 

The partition violence and Indian nation-state – their efforts and narratives towards the women survivors- have played a crucial role in deconstruction and reconstruction of the women’s identity, space and role. It can be observed that the national belonging for all the partition women survivors was meditated through the institution of the heterosexual and patrilineal nuclear family and community concurrently they were disenfranchised as sexual commodities, patriarchal properties and communal commodities by the nation-state and their respective community and family. After partition, the Indian patriarchal state has explicitly infantilized women survivors by denying them to represent themselves and this process eventually has caused their disenfranchisement.

 

Akshara is a prospective PhD candidate and has completed her Master of Arts in Diplomacy, Law and Business (2020) from Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, Delhi-NCR, India.  Presently, she is a Commissioning Editor in E-International Relations and Associate Editor of Law & Order. 

Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations: Islamabad Calling, Will Dhaka Respond?

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Bangladeshi youth commemorate the Bengali freedom fighters of the 1971 war at the National Memorial in Dhaka, on Victory Day, 16 December 2019

By Silvia Tieri

In South Asia, music speaks politics. Among uncountable melodic masterpieces, there is a moving Pakistani ghazal, Woh Humsafar Tha, that goes like this:

Woh humsafar tha magar us sey humnawai na thi…

Adavatein thi, taghaful tha, ranjishein thi magar

Bicharne walay main sab kuch tha, bewafai na thi…

(He/She was my companion (fellow-traveller) but there was no harmony between us…

There were feelings of animosity, indifference, and anguish but

In my departing partner I had found all but unfaithfulness…)

The composition gained new popularity within and beyond the country in 2011 thanks to its indie-style remake that served as a soundtrack for a romantic soap-opera also named “Humsafar” (Hum: together; Safar: journey). However, few among its younger fans will know that this song tells the story of no typical heartbreak. In fact, the two co-journyers who had so much in common yet could not quite stick together – as the lyrics say – are Pakistan and Bangladesh, parting ways five decades ago. The ghazal was written by Naseer Turabi soon after the news of the fall of Dhaka (for Indians: Lt. Gen. Niazi’s surrender to Indian forces; for Bangladeshis: Victory Day) reached West Pakistan on 16 December 1971, leaving him shocked and in tears.

When the great partition of the Indian subcontinent divided Punjab and Bengal in 1947, Bengalis of the East had joined their Western co-religionists into a brave political journey called Pakistan: a homeland for South Asian Muslims, forming a nation separate from the Hindus’. However, while they officially constituted a single nation-state, the two wings of Pakistan (one’s capital was Karachi, the other’s Dhaka) were divided by significant cultural, ethnolinguistic, and socio-economic differences, as well as by more than two thousand kilometres of Indian territory. It could not last. Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib “Bangabandhu”,  father of Bangladeshi nationalism as well as the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the East eventually seceded, militarily supported by India. East and West Pakistan had existed as one for less than twenty-five years. In 1971 they split. It was a massive blow to the Two-Nations Theory that had been Pakistan’s raison d’être.

On paper, Pakistan and Bangladesh have much in common. They are the two Muslim-majority nations of the Indian subcontinent, carved out of British India by means of partition(s). They also both share a complicated relationship and some long borders with South Asian hegemon India, although the Indo-Bangladeshi border is rather porous, while the Indo-Pakistani is the most militarised in the world. Nonetheless, relations between Dhaka and Islamabad, which replaced Karachi as Pakistan’s capital in 1967, have been strained ever since Bangladeshi independence.

Hasina’s perceived closeness to India, as well as her government’s vigorous prosecution of former pro-Pakistani and Islamist forces since the late 2000s, have cast a long shadow on post-1971 bilateral relations. A partial rapprochement had occurred earlier, under the rule of Ziaur Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), traditionally closer to Pakistan. However, Hasina’s Awami League (AL) inherited the independence legacy and in 2008 returned to power, maintaining a solid grasp over it ever since. In 2009 the AL administration created the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a special court in charge of prosecuting war crimes, including genocide, committed by the Pakistani Army and its collaborators during the 1971 war. Because the convicted belong to political forces that are AL’s archenemies, the ICT receives criticism not only for its supposed low judicial standards, but also for being allegedly used to knock out political competition. In Bangladesh, it still counts on considerable popular support.

Bilateral relations between the once humsafars have been almost non-existent in the last decade. The execution of Bangladeshi members of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) in 2013 and 2016, strongly condemned by the Pakistani Parliament, marked their lowest points. In May 2019, it even seemed that the two countries temporarily suspended reciprocal visa issuance. The last high-level official visit of a Bangladeshi head of state to Pakistan dates back to February 2006, when Islamabad received then-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, heiress of husband Ziaur Rahman’s BNP leadership.

Speculations about a possible thaw, however, emerged following a series of gestures initiated by Pakistan in 2019 and continued in 2020. In September 2019, Pakistani Foreign Minister S.M. Qureshi phoned his Bangladeshi counterpart A.K.A. Momen to apprise him on Pakistan’s position over Kashmir after New Delhi revoked of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had granted special status to the disputed region until August 2019.The two talked again in March 2020 regarding the  pandemic. In July 2020, Pakistani High Commissioner I.A. Siddiqui met Momen in Dhaka. Days later Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan paid a courtesy call to Sheikh Hasina, exchanging views on the COVID-19 emergency, Kashmir, and inviting the Prime Minister to visit Islamabad. Khan also expressed commitment to deepen relations. This was reiterated on 3 December 2020, when High Commissioner Siddiqui and Hasina held a courtesy meeting in Dhaka. Additionally, Pakistan expressed its interest in deepening the trade relationship with Bangladesh, especially in terms of partnerships and investments in the textile sector.

These unusual overtures alerted Indian hawks in particular, as they caught India in a turbulent period, dotted by protests and lockdown impositions in Kashmir, border tensions with China, and a general deterioration of relations with regional neighbours. Some consider that Pakistan’s move towards Bangladesh is an attempt to take advantage of the widening vacuum left by New Delhi’s policy towards its eastern neighbour, less attentive in the latest years despite declared intentions to “Look East” and to “Neighbourhood First”. One emerging commonality between Islamabad and Dhaka is their convergence towards China as a key investor, development partner, and defence supplier, proving Bangladesh has other reliable options besides India. While Pakistan remains China’s major ally in South Asia, Dhaka-Beijing relations have been recently upgraded to a “strategic partnership of cooperation” in 2016. 

Overall, Pakistan’s recent openings towards Bangladesh undoubtedly signalled an interest to rekindle an otherwise frosty bilateral relationship. But the critical issues that keep poisoning it have been left untouched. These are rooted in the divergent Pakistani and Bengali nationalisms, and their irreconcilable narratives of the facts of 1971. The AL and most Bangladeshis are determined that Pakistan owes a formal apology for its actions against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, acknowledges neither the accusation of genocide nor the number of victims alleged by Dhaka. Because the matter is so controversial, to establish where history ends and national narratives begin remains a challenging task. Other pending bilateral issues include the status of Bangladesh’s Biharis, the question of asset sharing, as well as the 1974 trilateral agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, of whose violation Bangladesh and Pakistan have accused each other. Meanwhile, to the dismay of Pakistan, the war crime trials have continued in Bangladesh. In 2019, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court resumed hearing appeals of such trials after a three year interruption. In the same year, the ICT emanated 14 new death sentences to former militants of JeI and Razakar Bahini. Also, Bangladesh’s official stance on Kashmir remains non-intervention. Although the notorious abrogation of Article 370 was met with protests in Dhaka, Foreign Minister Momen reiterated that it is an internal issue of India into which Bangladesh will not get involved. 1971 was a bad break-up. Pakistan is now making a move. But Dhaka still wants Islamabad to apologise and make amends, before they can embark on a new journey, together.

Silvia Tieri is a political scientist and ethnographer in training based at King’s India Institute. In 2019 she joined the King’s College London-National University of Singapore Joint PhD Programme. Her doctoral research concerns the politics of linguistic identity in contemporary India and Pakistan. Before joining KCL, she was a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore. She holds a Master’s in International Relations from the University of Pisa (Italy) and a Master’s by Research in South Asian Studies from the National University of Singapore.

Pakistan Paradox: Will New Intelligence Committee Erase Deficiencies or Increase Military Influence?

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By Mariam Qureshi

Image Caption: Prime Minister Imran Khan and Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa at ISI Headquarters. Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1593085

Pakistan has predominantly been a praetorian state with military overreach extending to politics and also to intelligence agencies. The intelligence community is marred with deficiencies in structural organisation and its politicization has further dampened its efficacy. In an attempt to reform the intelligence community, Prime Minister Imran Khan recently approved of a National Intelligence Coordination Committee. Would this be sufficient and effective in streamlining the two-dozen civil and military intelligence organisations existing in Pakistan? An effective reform in the intelligence community would ultimately help strengthen the civilian policy making process rather than solidifying military control. 

Pakistan’s troubled birth also accounts for the weakness of its institutions and strong military presence within them. India received the lion’s share of the division of assets of intelligence, bureaucracy, administration and army which meant that Pakistan had to start from scratch with minimal infrastructure. The initial military intelligence organisation collectively known as Defence Intelligence Services (DIS) consisted of tactical intelligence wings of the navy, air force and the Military Intelligence (MI) wing of the armed forces inherited at Partition. They specialised in carrying out offensive counterintelligence and military espionage. The only civilian-led intelligence organisation was the Intelligence Bureau (IB) which emerged from the partitioning of the British Raj’s Intelligence Bureau in 1947. It was responsible for collection, analysis and dissemination of domestic intelligence but no effective mechanism of coordination with other agencies existed. 

As the two neighbours started off with a highly volatile relationship that could boil over a plethora of disputes, Pakistan prioritised the development of its army and failed to take into account the equally essential need for a strong intelligence community to counter any Indian threat of war. With army as the only developed institute, Pakistan slipped into military dictatorship. The military dictatorships obstructed the development of a constitution and democratic political institutions, and it was not until 2008 that Pakistan witnessed the beginning of smooth democratic transitions. 

The Radcliffe Award arbitrarily divided the subcontinent along religious communal lines in 1947, creating border clashes and forcing a bloody, cross-border migration. The border dispute culminated into the 1947 war of Kashmir with India which presented an intelligence failure that highlighted the pressing need for a foreign intelligence agency. Thus, Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was established in 1948 as a military organisation to carry out collection and analysis of external threats, liaise with foreign counterparts and conduct operations. It also aimed to enhance coordination among military intelligence organisations. The ISI was tasked with collection and analysis of domestic intelligence during the unrest in East Pakistan in 1971. Following that, the unrest in the province of Balochistan during the 1970s presented another opportunity leading to expansion of ISI’s ambit to cover internal intelligence permanently. This brought the military-led ISI in direct clash with the dwarfed civilian-led Intelligence Bureau. The better resourced military intelligence organisation monopolised the intelligence community of Pakistan as it flourished under military dictatorships in the initial decades. Unfortunately, rather than a structured development, Pakistan’s agencies were created as independently functioning units on a need-by-need basis with often overlapping responsibilities. 

Though Pakistan created civilian-led intelligence agencies for specialised tasks to fulfil domestic intelligence requirements, it failed to provide a conducive environment for them to operate in. The Pakistan Special Police Establishment, inherited from British India, proved inadequate for overseeing control of organised crimes, smuggling, human trafficking and other offences. Therefore, a cumulative counterintelligence agency also responsible for countering money laundering, border control and domestic security known as the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) was formed in 1975 under civilian control of the Ministry of Interior. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was formed in 2013 under Ministry of Interior to counter terrorism although this clashed with ISI’s remit in overseeing external and internal terrorism. Similarly, other agencies were set up for specialised offenses such as drugs and narcotics control. The creation of independent agencies for specialised tasks meant their spheres of control overlapped, exacerbating the turf war between military-led and civilian-led intelligence organisations. The absence of a coordination committee to cohesively join the independent agencies meant that instead of pooling in intelligence collected for analysis, all agencies would carry out their own collection, analysis and dissemination. Further, they also faced a dearth of resources to carry out their tasks. The opportunity for these civilian-led intelligence organisations to realise and execute their responsibilities was diluted by the monopoly of military intelligence organisations. 

Perhaps the most problematic of all challenges is the deep politicisation of the intelligence agencies due to absence of oversight and accountability. The international and domestic threat of terrorism after the Soviet-Afghan War and the United States’ invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks allowed the ISI to receive aid and work closely with the America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The pre-Partition, British imposed Pak-Afghan border, Durand Line, was on the radar of the intelligence agency since 1947. The border is rejected by Afghanistan as it claims that the Pashtun and Baloch tribes divided along the Durand line should be united as a single nation. The poorly managed border became the gateway for drugs smuggling, human trafficking and refugee migration after Soviet-Afghan War and cross-border terrorism after 9/11. The crossover between foreign and domestic security threat along the Durand Line became a priority issue for ISI, increasing its might and power. The premier intelligence agency became the de facto central authority in the intelligence community. Consequently, it has been accused of conducting proxy warfare in Kashmir and surveillance on leading political figures. The subtle manifestation of military control through ISI’s increased role in politics caused it to be dubbed as ‘a state within a state’. ISI’s authority remains unchallenged in the post-2008 democratic set up. 

Proposals have been made in the past three decades for an oversight and coordination committee under the Cabinet of the Prime Minister to enhance coordination between agencies and streamline civilian-military relationship within the intelligence community. Unfortunately, the civil-military tussle in Pakistan’s politics resisted any staunch attempt at reforming the intelligence community which could effectively undermine the military monopoly. The National Intelligence Coordination Committee is expected to improve coordination between existing intelligence agencies but is to be led by the Director General of the military-led ISI, an agency that does not want to see its influence reduced. The committee is at risk of being another ineffective bureaucratic layer if it is not divorced from military control. It is imperative to strengthen the democratic institutes of Pakistan which have been unable to develop due to decades of military rule. Therefore, the reform is likely to address underlying problems if the committee is placed under the Prime Minister’s Cabinet.     Additionally, the committee needs to carry out an efficient analysis of the collected intelligence and disseminate these assessments to the executive branch. This would boost efficiency of the intelligence community within Pakistan. A revival of the existing National Security Council under the Prime Minister’s Office can provide an effective platform for the civil-military leadership to formulate policies on matters of national security. These steps will significantly empower the democratic government in policy making and execution.

 

Mariam Qureshi is an MA International Affairs student concentrating in Espionage and Surveillance at the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London. She received her BA (Honors) in Political Science from Kinnaird College for Women, Lahore, Pakistan.

Article 370’s Revocation: Integrating or Alienating Kashmir?

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by Prachi Aryal

There has been heavy military deployment in Kashmir in order to contain protests following the revocation of Article 370 (Image credit: Dar Yasin)

“Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameen ast, Hameen ast-o hameen ast-o hameen ast…”

“If there is a heaven on earth, it’s here, it’s here…”

– Amīr Khusrau (1253–1325), Indian poet on Kashmir

The land of Kashmir, often portrayed as heaven on earth, finds itself marred in a conflict between India and Pakistan, two countries that share a colonial past. The end of British Colonial control of the Indian subcontinent, in August 1947, led to the formation of India and Pakistan. In the aftermath of the partition, the many former princely states which had persisted under British suzerainty were left to decide which country to join. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies in the northern mountainous region was seen as a strategically important area by both new-born states who each wanted it incorporated within their territory. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, chose to remain independent.

The bloody saga which ensued through the partition and the infiltration by tribal militants posed a great threat to the state of Kashmir. The state, in a severe political dilemma, was required to take urgent action, leading to a request to the Indian state for military help. After multiple deliberations, the Instrument of Accession (IoA) was signed in October 1947 by Maharaja Singh and the Indian state in return for military help, thereby integrating Kashmir into India. The IoA stated that the Dominion of India would have control of the state in three major areas – defence, communications, and foreign affairs.

Nevertheless, the claim on Kashmiri land continued to be debated between India and Pakistan with specific counterclaims that the IoA was a farce. Nonetheless, negotiations between Kashmiri representatives and India led to the creation of Article 370 – which granted special autonomous status to the state of Kashmir in the Indian Constitution. While this legislation was being laid down, the state of Kashmir faced constant threats from tribal invaders who had their bases in Pakistan. Against the backdrop of large scale massacres that the nation had just witnessed, India decided not to resort to military actions and took the issue to the United Nations, following the advice of Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India,

The UN responded in January 1948 by passing Resolution 39  establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In April of the same year, the Security Council decided to increase the power of the UNCIP under Resolution 47 to facilitate mediation between India and Pakistan. The resolution called upon the countries to withdraw their troops, after which point the UN would establish a temporary plebiscite administration in Kashmir, which would then carry out a fair and impartial plebiscite deciding the accession or autonomy of the state. Both the countries eventually agreed upon a ceasefire and a Line of Control (LOC) came into effect in January 1949, demarcating the territorial lines between the nations. Despite resolution 47, the failure to hold a plebiscite resulted in a divided rule over the region.

The Indian-administered area of Kashmir has been subject to internal violence ever since claims of a rigged election surfaced in 1987. An armed rebellion has existed against New Delhi’s rule in Kashmir, growing anti-India statements and a massive outcry for ‘azadi’ – freedom from Indian rule –  have triggered stringent military reactions from the Indian state. In August 2019, the Hindu Nationalist government of Narendra Modi abrogated Article 370 against the will of large numbers of Kashmiri people. This move was claimed to be yet another step towards ‘integrating’ Kashmir into India, a six-decades long nationalist endeavour supported in particular by the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Following the revocation of the special status of Kashmir, the dream of freedom from India’s rule has become stronger (Image credit: Dar Yasin).

The government went on to divide the state of Kashmir into two centrally administered territories. Indian military forces operating in Kashmir are shielded by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which grants them immunity from human rights convictions, such as rape, extrajudicial killing and torture. Parallelly, the government is set to embark on a witch hunt of activists and journalists who raise their voices against the violence perpetrated by enforcing draconian anti-terrorism laws such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). Furthermore, critics claim that the government’s pseudo-secularism agenda has been furthered by the revocation of the article, where Hindu-nationalist policies are used to garner electoral votes.

Despite several concerns highlighted by the UN Human Rights Chief  Michelle Bachelet and UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, any mediation on the issue of Kashmir has been blocked by India under claims that it is an internal issue, an exclusive concern of Indian sovereignty. Given the presence that India has in the international sphere, there have been little to no repercussions for the grave violations of human rights in the region. The lack of global attention due to restrictive anti-media practices alongside a rejection of third-party mediation has granted the government more leverage to continue unlawful activities. There have been mounting claims that the situation in Kashmir is getting worse by the day with Internet shutdowns, a government crackdown on media organisations and journalists, the arrest of political leaders and civilians many of them who are children.

Arundhati Roy, asserts that, ‘Indian Muslims have been effectively disenfranchised and are becoming the most vulnerable of people – a community without political representation.’ Critics claim that the government’s pseudo-secularism agenda has been furthered by the revocation of the article, where politics is used to secure votes. In the expansion of the Hindu Nation under Modi, international organisations have fallen victim, Amnesty International’s office in India was shut down following reprisal from the government over its coverage of human rights violations that occurred in Kashmir. This further erodes any ground for seeking justice or accountability for Kashmiris who have been subjected to various atrocities.

Since the revocation of article 370, civilians have been arbitrarily arrested and the valley remains in a state of siege with a stringent curfew. Meanwhile, the Indian government refutes claims of human rights violations, maintaining that this legislative move will pave the way for economic growth in the state. Inclusivity, however, remains a far-off dream for the people of Kashmir. Furthermore, the information ban and the detention of Kashmiri political leaders, civilians, and journalists outlines a rather meek prospect for the accountability of the Indian government.

The longstanding conflict has polarized the Kashmiris even further as they have been side-lined in political discussions and the decision on the fate of the valley of Kashmir is carried out by those who centrally rule the country. The aspirations of the Kashmiri people have been overlooked and they have been rendered voiceless with the revocation of the special status. The crisis requires the integration of Kashmiri people into the mainstream discussion, addressing their issues and concerns. The Indian government needs to be held accountable for its actions, decades of violence, and mass unnamed graves of Kashmiris if it wishes to truly integrate Kashmir and Kashmiris.

Prachi Aryal is a MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.