Pakistan

India and Pakistan on the Brink of War at Jammu and Kashmir: What Role for China?

March 6, 2019

By Axel Dessein

6 March 2019

Putting the RIC back in BRIC. Russia, India and China met for a trilateral meeting between the country’s foreign ministers, against the backdrop of the unfolding crisis in Jammu and Kashmir (China Daily)

Next to the ongoing U.S.-China trade war and the premature ending of Donald Trump’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un in Vietnam’s Hanoi, it seems somewhat odd that the risk of war between the two nuclear-armed countries India and Pakistan was only the third newsworthy item last week. In retaliation of a suicide bombing against Indian paramilitary police in the Pulwana district of Jammu and Kashmir earlier last month, Mirage 2000 planes of the country’s air force on February 26 bombed a presumed stronghold of Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists in the town of Balakot, located inside Pakistani territory. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) shot down two Indian Air Force (IAF) MiG-21 fighter jets on February 28, leading to the arrest of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman. While the captured pilot was released on March 1 as a peace gesture by Pakistan’s prime minister Imran Khan, the fog of war has not yet receded.

The other fighter pilot presumably went down in Indian-controlled Kashmir, according to Major General Asif Ghafoor. There are also reports which indicate that the IAF shot down an F-16 of the PAF, but proof remains meagre at best. The suicide bombing, the deadliest since the beginning of the insurgency in 1989, set into motion a simmering spiral of events, which seemed to carry through over the weekend, with shelling resuming across the Line of Control (LoC) on Friday but declining in intensity later on. In this article, I aim to first focus on the crisis that took place, adding some more information to two earlier pieces. Next, I bring into account the role of China, Pakistan and India’s big neighbour to the East.

Don’t get MAD

Last week’s hostilities were yet another violent iteration of the countries’ territorial claims over the region of Jammu and Kashmir. In earlier articles published on the Strife blog, Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu and Saawani Raje graciously analysed the risk of nuclear war between the two countries according to an escalation ladder (or pyramid) with its three rungs of sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear response. Somewhat counterintuitively at first sight, the authors noted that the nuclear capabilities of both Pakistan and India in fact increase the stability in the region. Little wonder, since a nuclear exchange between these countries would be disastrous. As Karthika Sasikumar of San Jose State University notes, even a single strike on a big city, would lead directly to nuclear midnight, wreaking havoc on the socio-economic and political systems of both countries and the wider region. It is clear, nuclear war is MAD, as it would almost directly lead to mutually-assured destruction of Pakistan and India.

Nevertheless, it is clear that India has upped the ante by employing conventional firepower in the contested region of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Express even calls it a “milestone in India’s retaliatory response to terror.” The nature and scale of which was something like seen in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, as one senior officer is quoted as saying. Following the Pulwana attack, India’s prime minister Narendra Modi noted Pakistan’s involvement and publicly gave clearance to the country’s military brass to “decide the time and place of response.” However, details of what happened on the operational level remain scarce. Uncertainty is equally high about the success of the IAF mission. Indeed, satellite imagery is raising doubts about whether the IAF’s Israeli-made SPICE-2000 precision-guided munitions actually hit the Madrassa Taleem al-Quran, a JeM religious school and the specific number of insurgent casualties. It is also unclear whether the IAF actually crossed the LoC or whether the SPICE missiles were launched from the Indian side of the line.

A road sign points the way to the Madrassa Taleem al-Quran, the religious school and presumed JeM training base on the hilltop that was hit by the IAF bombing. (Asad Hasim/Al Jazeera)

Reports are also unclear about whether the PAF scrambled F-16 or JF-17 fighter jets in response to the presumed IAF incursion of Pakistan’s air space. A deployment of the U.S.-made F-16s in this scenario for example would be an infringement on the end-user agreement, now said to be under investigation by the U.S. State Department. In contrast, the JF-17 is a product of a joint-venture between the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) of China. A further display of the ties between the countries whom define their relationship as an “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership,” was also visible shortly after the escalation by the IAF.

The neighbour to the East

With no real end in sight, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi on February 27 called on his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi for China to play a “constructive role in easing the tensions.” As published on Sina News, Wang expressed his deep concern about the tensions between Pakistan and India, briefing Qureshi on the Chinese efforts to persuade and facilitate talks and reiterating the hope that both countries will exercise restraint and fulfil their commitment to prevent the escalation of the situation. The statement followed an earlier Chinese acknowledgement at the U.N. Security Council of the “heinous and cowardly suicide bombing” by JeM. Indeed, China’s Foreign Ministry repeated its condemnation of any form of terrorism and called upon the countries involved to cooperate in preserving regional peace and stability.

Interestingly, it was right in the middle of the Kashmir crisis that the 16^th trilateral meeting between Russia, India and China took place on February 27 in Yueqing, China’s Zhejiang province. At this meeting, the country’s respective foreign ministers Sergei Lavrov, Sushma Swaraj and Wang Yi issued a joint statement condemning “terrorism in all its forms and manifestation” and called for the strengthening of the U.N.-led counter-terrorism efforts. Here, it is interesting to draw attention to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a multilateral security alliance which Pakistan and India both joined as a full member during the June 2017 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. With China and Russia leading this organisation’s struggle against terrorism, these countries could act as important mediators in the tensions between Pakistan and India.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: bringing peace or worsening tensions? CPEC runs right through many contentious areas, including China’s Xinjiang, the region of Jammu and Kashmir and all the way to Balochistan. (Dawn)

However, China itself also has territorial disputes with India, tensions which undoubtedly complicate the manner in which China can play a mediating role. Most important among these disputes is the region of Aksai Chin, part of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the northern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. But a small corridor between China, India and Bhutan is also cause for concern. To halt Chinese road-building, the area known as the Chicken’s Neck was the main stage of a long-lasting standoff at the Doklam plateau in the Summer of 2017. While not disputed territorially, it was the proximity of Chinese troops and their intrusion into Bhutan’s Doklam that raised Indian suspicion and ultimately triggered a reaction. In those towering heights of the Himalayas, Indian and Chinese troops even engaged in a stone-fight. To complicate matters even more, there is also the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to connect the Chinese north-western city Kashgar with the Pakistani port of Gwadar. As such, the CPEC can be traced right through many of disputed regions within Pakistan.

In an article for The Diplomat, Vasabjit Banerjee of Mississippi State University and Prashant Hosur Suhas of Eastern Connecticut State University offer important analysis on the Indian capabilities to handle a war with Pakistan or even a two-front war with Pakistan and China. While that may be so, the author similarly points to the fact that China’s military is primarily geared towards the U.S. and its allies, such as Japan. Rather than focusing on the possibility of nuclear war, one could do well by considering more broadly the many escalatory actions that can take place below the nuclear threshold. Indeed, when considering the close relationship between China and Pakistan, one can beg the question whether China may ultimately employ its relationship with Pakistan to add increasingly more pressure on India, in an area already rife with terrorist factions opposed to the Indian government. Somewhat contradictory, there is also the question of China’s expanding role in counter-terrorism and peace-keeping in Central Asia and beyond. Indeed, Gerry Shih of the Washington Post recently reported about Chinese uniformed presence in Tajikistan, near Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. The question one can ask here is whether China’s political-territorial interests would prevail over the preservation of stability in the region itself.

Conclusion

While the meeting between Russia, India and China went largely unnoticed, it is an interesting development showcasing China’s commitment in creating a more secure region. In light of the deadly attack in Pulwana, the country strictly condemned the terrorists while calling on Pakistan and India to de-escalate the tensions. At the same time, China has many stakes of its own in the region. With the CPEC running right through Pakistan, it could very well be that the country would help its “all-weather” partner Pakistan secure its claims against India, the country with which China has several territorial disputes itself. Nevertheless, this episode has shown the potential role of China as a mediator between states. Let’s watch this space.

Axel Dessein is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. His research focuses on interpreting the rise of China. Axel completed his BA and MA in Oriental Languages and Cultures at Ghent University in Belgium. You can follow him on Twitter @AxelDessein.

Image sources:

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/28/WS5c771b3ca3106c65c34ebd56.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/indian-air-raid-site-casualties-mysterious-madrassa-190227183058957.html

https://www.dawn.com/news/1371720

Will India and Pakistan Go To War?

February 28, 2019

By Saawani Raje

28 February 2019

“Will India and Pakistan ever go to war?” This question has gained new significance since Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter jets early on the morning of 27th February and captured the pil ot of on e. For Pakistan, this escalation makes sense if you consider the escalation pyramid explained in the preceding piece. It could be in Pakistan’s strategic interests to frame Indian strikes on terrorist camps as a violation on Pakistani territory. This deflects from the main issue at hand — the existence of terrorist training camps in Pakistani territory (a claim that Pakistan has always vociferously denied) — and avoids the risk of international isolation. This piece unpacks the question of the possibility of war by analysing the trend of Indian and Pakistani crises through the lenses of nuclear deterrence, international intervention, and crisis management. It argues that while there might be escalation in confrontational rhetoric even up to the level of a limited conflict, an all-out war on a scale seen previously in 1965 or 1971 is highly unlikely for a number of reasons.

Historically, it has been argued that India practices strategic restraint. However, a re-reading of past crises, especially wars against Pakistan in 1948, 1965 or 1971, actually shows Indian political and military leaders’ willingness to escalate.^[1] Any restraint in these crises was influenced by issues like limited capabilities, risks associated with escalation, and the need to maintain national and international legitimacy.^[2] Under Narendra Modi’s government, the ‘surgical strikes’ of 2016 reiterate the political and military leadership’s willingness to use force against Pakistan as an answer to its provocation. For India, this escalation is a risk the Modi government can afford to take. The possibility of war refocuses any discontent that the Indian public has with the government. It serves to unite Indian citizens behind the government against a common enemy: Pakistan. The social and news media rhetoric in India evidences this with repeated calls for war with Pakistan since the 14 February attack.^[3] This rhetoric is especially significant given that this is an election year, and the BJP campaign has engaged quite strongly with the idea of nationalism. It is also India’s chance to call Pakistan’s bluff about its nuclear red lines. A show of strength in this regard might be a strong signal to the Pakistani establishment that India does not tolerate provocation and refuses to be held hostage to its nuclear doctrine. However, the evidence is greater to support the argument that India and Pakistan will in fact not go to war, especially on this occasion.

Firstly, both India and Pakistan have made it clear that they do not want war. When addressing the Pakistani retaliatory strikes on 27 February, Pakistani Major General Asif Ghafoor emphasised that no Indian military targets had been hit because Pakistan does not ‘want to go on the pat h of war.’ The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj echoed this sentiment when she said, ‘India doesn’t wish to see further escalation.’ Escalation to war is a risk neither side is willing to take. The existence of nuclear weapons and the economic costs of war are two factors that greatly influence this reluctance. Secondly, it is in the interests of the international community to step in with increased concern about the stability of the region in an attempt to stop escalation, as has been seen before.

Nuclear weapons in South Asia

Between 1974 and 1998, both India and Pakistan went through a period of ‘nuclear opacity.’ This was a situation in which neither state’s leaders had acknowledged the existence of their state’s nuclear program, but there was enough evidence about the program’s existence to influence the other nation’s perceptions and actions.^[4] During this time, awareness about the other’s nuclear arsenal raised insecurities; however, neither state wanted to escalate tensions because they were unsure about the other’s nuclear posture. Such was the case in the 1986 Brasstacks Military exercise and a 1990 crisis between the two states that CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr described as ‘the most dangerous nuclear situation’ he had faced. In both cases, the states reached the brink of crisis and withdrew, in part due to concern and ambiguity about each other’s nuclear posture.^[5]

Following tests in 1998, both states declared themselves nuclear weapon-capable states. The Pakistani nuclear doctrine was India-specific and emphasised that given Indian conventional capability, Pakistan reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first in extremis.^[6] This provided Pakistan with compelling incentive to provoke India, while remaining secure in the knowledge that its nuclear policy severely limited Indian retaliatory options. As exemplified in the 1999 Kargil conflict when, despite rhetoric from both sides showing willingness to explore nuclear avenues of escalation, India showed restraint in not crossing the Line of Control, avoiding crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red line.

Ironically, the years of nuclear opacity have been relatively more stable than the years following the declaration of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. In addition, cases like Kargil, the 2001-02 military standoff between India and Pakistan, or the 2008 Mumbai attack show an emboldened and provocative Pakistan that uses its first strike nuclear doctrine as a shield against a restrained India that is limited by its no-first use doctrine. Pakistan’s testing of tactical nuclear weapons further complicates issues, as this operationalises nuclear weapons. Pakistan thus continues to attack India in low-level unconventional methods because it is safe in the knowledge that India’s ability to retaliate is limited. It thus falls upon India to call Pakistan’s bluff. The excuse of targeting terrorist havens in Pakistani territory, as the much-publicised surgical strikes showed, provide an efficient instrument for India to do just that. Thus, escalation of conventional conflict is a much bigger risk in South Asia than is purported.

International involvement in de-escalation:

The question then is, despite the increased instability, why does the conflict between the two states not lead to war? The answer lies in the examination of past wars between India and Pakistan and the role of the international community in bringing them to a close. India-Pakistan crises in 1965, 1999 and the 2001-02 standoff all saw the international community scramble to bring about de-escalation.^[7] In all the crises, India adopted a strong coercive posture, possibly with the knowledge that in event of increased escalation, the international community will step in to cease hostilities as it did in each of those conflicts.

In sum, nuclear weapons increase stability in the region in general. They do increase the likelihood of low-level conflict, but they decrease the likelihood of all-out war between the two states. Secondly, escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan has always been looked at with growing concern by the international community, which has more often than not played a pivotal role in the cessation of hostilities, as the cases of 1948, 1965 and Kargil show. These factors decrease the likelihood of India and Pakistan going to war with each other despite the possibility that they will engage in an escalation of rhetoric or even low-level hostilities. While the rhetoric in India today is inherently advocating strong retributive action against Pakistan, the above factors show that despite an escalation of rhetoric, diplomatic efforts or even limited military action, India and Pakistan will not actually end up in an all-out war with each other. The social media #saynotowar hashtag that is currently seen across a lot of Indian and Pakistani social media might be more on point than ever.

Saawani Raje is a PhD candidate at the King’s India Institute and a recipient of the King’s India Scholarship, as well as a Senior Editor at Strife. Her PhD research is primarily a historical examination into civil-military decision-making during crises in independent India. You can follow her on Twitter @saawaniraje.

Notes:

^[1] Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “Strategic Restraint” Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War’, India Review 17, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415277; Srinath Raghavan, 1971 A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013).

^[2] Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “Strategic Restraint” Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War’, India Review 17, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415277.

^[3] Fatima Bhutto, ‘Opinion | Hashtags for War Between India and Pakistan’, The New York Times , 27 February 2019, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/opinion/india-pakistan-crisis.html.

^[4] Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia , Reprint edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Security Studies, 2009).

^[5] Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis’, International Security 20, no. 3 (1995): 79–114, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539140.

^[6] ‘Krepon et Al. – 2013 – Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in Sou.Pdf’, accessed 27 February 2019, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web_1.pdf.

^[7] Farooq Naseem Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2013); Malik V. P. General, Kargil : From Surprise To Victory (New Delhi: Harpercollins, 2010); ‘To the Brink: 2001-02 India-Pakistan Standoff’, accessed 27 February 2019, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/to-the-brink-2001-02-india-pakistan-standoff/; Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April 2005): 290–324.

Image source: https://www.dailypioneer.com/uploads/2016/story/images/big/9431_1.gif

Is Balakot a Point of No Return? Revisiting Asymmetric Escalation in South Asia

February 28, 2019

By Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu

28 February 2019

On 26 February 2019, Indian Mirage 2000s carried out an air raid in Pakistan, which escalated the conflict between the two states.

The current situation

In the early hours of 26 February 2019, twelve Indian Mirage-2000 aircrafts carried out an air raid in Balakot, Pakistan, in retaliation of a suicide attack on India’s Central Reserve Police Force (paramilitary force used for internal security) convoy in Pulwama near Srinagar in Jammu & Kashmir which killed 44 soldiers on 14 Feb 2019. Jaish-e-Mohammad, a terrorist outfit known to have its bases in Pakistan, claimed the responsibility for the suicide attack. India contests that the raid was carried out on a JeM training camp and no civilian or military infrastructure was targeted; thus the raid is categorised it as a ‘non-military, pre-emptive strike’ and hence is not an act of war.

Pakistan’s military spokesperson Major General Asif Ghafoor, while acknowledging the strike, counter-claimed that the strike aircrafts were forced to a hasty withdrawal due to Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) quick response and dropped the bombs in a hurry which fell in an open area with no casualties. Both sides claim credibility through impending details.

The current situation has showcased a new security paradigm in the asymmetric escalation of conflict or the escalation pyramid (normally called the escalation ladder). I chose to call it a ‘pyramid’ for a simple reason – as the rungs go higher, besides being alarming and dangerous, the retaliatory options become more and more limited to both the adversaries.

Background

Not having any conventional capability and under desperation to capture Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan started this vicious cycle at a sub-conventional level by sending the irregulars, the Afridis and Hazaraas from its North West Frontier Province, to capture the state of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947. After the success of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in 1980s, which forced a Soviet withdrawal, the same model of insurgency has been used in Jammu & Kashmir since 1990. Slowly these non-state actors grew powerful and challenged the writ of the state itself. For instance, the terrorist outfit JeM carried out three attacks on Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf during his time in office. For the past few decades, any peace initiative by India or Pakistan has been followed by a terrorist attack in India which sets this escalatory cycle in motion. Lately, since the declaration of opening of the Kartarpur corridor by Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a terrorist attack such as Pulwama was predicted, given the pattern of such attacks .

India’s response has mostly been using its conventional infrastructure, demonstrated by ex-Brasstracks in 1986-87, the Operation Parakaram (Twin Peak crisis) in 2001-02, the Cold Start doctrine from 2004 onward and the surgical strikes in 2016. Yet, Pakistani mainland has not been attacked since the 1971 war. Even during the Kargil War, India refrained from crossing the Line of Control.

The Line of Control is the de facto border between the Indian and Pakistan-controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir. (Image edited from Google Maps)

The Rubicon of Escalation?

Calling it the need of the hour, India crossed the Rubicon by hitting inside Pakistan territory. India had long argued that ‘restraint’ is not its weakness but a strategic necessity due to the risk of rapid escalation along the pyramid. With the September 2016 surgical strikes and now the Balakot air strikes, that policy is clearly out of the window. The problem with the escalation pyramid above is that while it is easy to climb up, it is difficult to climb down from one level to another, as elaborated below.

In response to India’s air raids, which was done using conventional assets, Indian security specialists speculate that as usual a retaliatory attack by Pakistan will most probably be using the non-state actors (in the sub-conventional spectrum). However, a sub-conventional response by Pakistan has to be plausibly denied and cannot be given any official recognition and hence will not satisfy the domestic population to which the narrative of ‘India as an enemy’ has been fed since 1947. In other words, there will be no face saving in front of the domestic audience constantly fed by the narrative of a “1000 years’ war with India” if the attack is not claimed and acknowledged by the state. On the other hand, if acknowledged, this will only feed India’s narrative of Pakistan being a terrorist sponsor state and will exacerbate Pakistan’s isolation in the international forums. It was only due to such dilemmas, Pakistani Military leadership managed to get away with 2016 surgical strikes by denying it altogether.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Modi’s government in India drew some political mileage by celebrating the surgical strikes as an annual event. Riding on the same success wave, India crossed the Rubicon by striking the Pakistani mainland. In addition, unlike before, the strikes have been immediately acknowledged by the Pakistan military.

This time nevertheless, Pakistan promised a retaliation. But, as experts claim that a conventional response from Pakistan is a non-starter because there are no viable targets in India that Pakistan can hit without carrying out an ‘act of war’. India claims that its air strikes were not an act of war since no military or civilian target was targeted or harmed. Hence, in retaliation, Pakistan can only increase firing along the Line of Control, which has already started. Pakistan’s military also called for a meeting of its National Command Authority, the apex body in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals which signals the usual ‘nuclear rattling’. As the escalation pyramid suggests, this is a next logical escalatory step which will draw lots of international attention and mediation that will call for de-escalation of the situation. Anything else will only cause more harm, as shown by downing of two fighter aircrafts, one from each side and capture of an Indian pilot by Pakistan on the morning of 27 Feb 2019. The conflict might continue in such duels and skirmishes but further escalation is least likely as explained in the accompanying piece.

The urgency of escalation

What is the urgency of escalation? This can be explained by the rapid spread of news on social media to a hysterical population, fed by frenzy media asking for revenge which puts pressure on those in power to act fast – a government for which time is running out due to an upcoming election and a powerful military running the affairs on the other side, which needs an immediate face saving to retain its legitimacy to remain in charge. Hence the retaliations are necessary, urgent and must be escalatory in order to dominate the deterrence.

Beyond all this…

While addressing an election rally immediately after the air strikes, Prime Minister Modi assured the audience that the ‘country is in safe hands’. Historical evidence suggests that this escalatory cycle of revenge and retaliation has not brought safety in the sub-continent. The violence has only killed soldiers and civilians on both sides. Further escalation will take it to the brink of devastation.

So what purpose does it serve? Pacifists claim that it certainly helps keep the belligerents on both sides of the border stay in power by giving a sense of honour and pride to the populations fed with the misconstrued sense of nationalism. It boosts the morale of the armed forces of the side which strikes last and dominates. It also distracts the electorate from other social and developmental issues, such as poverty, sanitation, lack of jobs and keeps it ‘rallied round the flag’.

Realists claim that this was the need of the hour since the public opinion of a thriving democracy demanded it. Indian Generals have long believed that there is enough space below the nuclear threshold where a limited conventional war with Pakistan can be fought and have backed calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff on several occasions. Having just done that, has India finally crossed the Rubicon of escalation and set a wrong precedence? At the moment the answer depends upon lot of things including the treatment and fate of the captured pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan. In the meantime and amidst this debate, a belligerent game of revenge and retaliation is being played for honour and dominance where the skies are devoid of civil flights and the military radars are churning.

Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu is a doctoral student at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London and a Senior Editor for Strife. His research interests include South Asian security, military culture and defence diplomacy. An alumnus of National Defence Academy, Pune and Army War College, Mhow, he has served as an officer with the Indian army’s Parachute Regiment for ten years. You can follow him on Twitter @kamal_sandhu78.

Image source: https://www.mudspike.com/dcs-world-mirage-2000-c-hunter-is-here/

India’s eye in the sky: combat drones in the Kashmiri equation

November 1, 2016

By: Gen Kawasaki and Chu Kah Leong

A Predator C Avenger Unmanned Aircraft System (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor/Released) — A Predator-C Avenger Unmanned Aircraft System (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor/Released)

The use of drones as a sophisticated means of deterrence and tactical precision has constituted one of the most prominent features of counterinsurgency in the twenty-first century. Represented in this instance by India’s ongoing negotiations for a drone partnership with the U.S., this newfound interest sheds important light on the changing means and ends of counterinsurgency and political violence within the already tenuous cords of Kashmiri security.[1]

Historically, India has proven itself as a seasoned practitioner of conventional force to achieve strategic goals in Kashmir. Military responses to Kashmiri insurgent movements since the 1980s – culminating in tens of thousands of casualties thus far – testify to the readiness to absorb the attendant repercussions of unrestrained political violence.[2] Viewed in unison with the newly formulated Cold Start doctrine, with its emphasis on tactical flexibility, the time remains early for the introduction of an attack medium that is both ubiquitous and efficient.[3] The role of drones as a selective yet no less brutal means of violence thus gains fresh relevance particularly in the wake of the devastating Uri attacks.[4]

On a broad note, a considerably strengthened Indian drone fleet is likely to contribute to stronger Pakistani responses in future disputes. While a surveillance drone deal will likely shift the India-Pakistan balance of power, New Delhi’s endgame is to obtain the Predator-C Avenger armed with Hellfire missiles – which would enable India to conduct pre-emptive, cross-border strikes along its porous borders against potential terrorist threats.[5] Acquiring such a capability would fit within the strategic boundaries established in the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1990 . The act legally justifies any ‘use of armed forces’, including that of drones, in territories explicitly classified as ‘disturbed areas’, which is the case of Kashmir.[6]

It is therefore not a stretch to conceptualize the deployment of drones – both lethal and nonlethal – to enforce Kashmiri security, albeit without the regulatory oversight of courts and legislative committees that actively work to define the parameters of drone activity. Coupled with evidence of Pakistani complicity in the Kashmiri insurgency movement,[7] what transpires is a drone platform that may exacerbate the already tenuous strains of low-intensity conflict in the region. Denoted by periodic exchanges of armed violence and border clashes, it remains an unsettling yet imperative task to ponder the dire consequence of an ill-informed drone strike mission – say, a missile that was launched on a location populated both by the suspected target as well as large numbers of civilians. Indian policymakers attracted to the tactical precision of drones will eventually have to be prepared to absorb the attendant strategic perils in an already confrontational atmosphere.

This drone push comes as President Obama wishes to finalize a key facet of US-Indian military cooperation before his successor assumes office. A key challenge, however, is that drones in the Line of Control – the de facto military control line between India and Pakistan – merely adds fuel to the fire. Operator proficiency, which is far from guaranteed, could result in collateral damage or even in-flight crashes. Such incidents, which would likely spark an overreaction from Pakistan, would test the resilience of U.S.-Indian military cooperation but would also open up further discussions for other possible bilateral defense programs.

Concurrently, whilst India’s recent entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has broadened existing avenues of military technology transfers, it still finds itself in a slight predicament.[8] New Delhi has long been reluctant to sign the accordant foundation agreements, consisting of the LSA (Logistical Support Agreement – currently LEMOA, a diluted version has been ratified), CISMOA (Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement) and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). While they are not prerequisites for bilateral cooperation with the U.S., they nevertheless expedite rates of interoperability and technology transfers, speeding up drone acquisitions in the process.

There remain a number of additional concerns regarding merits of signing these agreements. Firstly, the LSA requires India to provide access to its bases for U.S. Military Transporters – meaning that it would be compelled to forgo neutrality and strategic autonomy completely in the geopolitical frictions between the U.S. and China. Secondly, BECA would afford the U.S. unrestricted access to Indian intelligence reports and battlefield satellite data imagery whilst CISMOA forbids all Indian personnel from utilizing U.S. military communication devices. In the wake of such crucial diplomatic talks, many Indians have been increasingly concerned over how willing their government is to accept such lopsided and intrusive agreements.

With recently escalating tensions, the Indo-Pakistani dilemma remains crucial for both regional and international hegemons. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, which occurred weeks after the U.S. presidential elections, had dragged the international community into fierce multilateral negotiations to de-escalate the situation. With this in mind, India and its allies must carefully tread their bilateral drone programs as it is sure to have serious implications in the geopolitical future of the region.

Gen Kawasaki is a third year undergraduate at King’s College London. He is the researcher and coordinator for the King’s College London Crisis Simulation that will replicate tensions in the India-Pakistan region this year. LinkedIn: Gen Kawasaki

Chu Kah Leong is a third year undergraduate in the King’s War Studies Department. He recently concluded a year long exchange program in Tokyo, Japan and aspires towards graduate studies in the near future.

Notes:

[1] Sanjeev Miglani. “Update 1-India in talks to buy US Predator drones, has eye on China, Pakistan” Reuters, April 8, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/india-usa-drones-idUSL3N17B3YU

[2] Kaz De Jong, Nathan Ford, Saskia van de Kam, Kamalini Lokuge, Silke From, Renate van Galen, Brigg Reilley and Rolf Kleber, “Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I: exposure to violence”, Conflict and Health 2:10 (2008), 2.

[3] Abishek Saksena, “Here’s Why the Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ‘Cold Start’ Is Giving Jitters to the World”, India Times (22 April 2015), accessed 6 October 2016. http://www.indiatimes.com/culture/who-we-are/heres-why-the-indian-army%E2%80%99s-new-war-doctrine- cold-start-is-giving-pakistan-the-jitters-232034.html

[4] Muhammad Daim Fazil, “Responding to Uri Attack: What Are India’s Options?”, The Diplomat (29 September 2016), accessed 8 October 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/responding-to-uri-attack-what-are-indias-options/

[5] Sanjeev Miglani. “India in talks to buy U.S. Predator drones, has eye on CHina, Pakistan” Reuters, April 11 2016. Accessed September 24, 2016. http://in.reuters.com/article/india-usa-predator-drones-china-pakistan-idINKCN0X51BW

[6] Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 (No. 21 of 1990), Sec. 3.

[7] PTI, “Pakistan Role Behind Violent Protests in Kashmir: MoS PMO”, The Times of India, 11 July 2016, accessed 6 October 2016. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-role-behind-violent-protests-in-Kashmir-MoS-PMO/articlesh ow/53157261.cms

[8] LDWO, Missile Technology Control Regime. “Report by the MTCR Chair: accession of India to the MTCR” MTCR, June 27, 2016. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://mtcr.info/report-by-the-mtcr-chair-accession-of-india-to-the-mtcr/

Image credit: Public domain photograph from defenseimagery.mil, available at http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imageRetrieve.action?guid=39eddc33aac4199784b181043137d0e6f2c9d301&t=2

Daesh in Pakistan: The allure for the urban militant – Part II

February 8, 2016

By: Zoha Waseem

Islamic-State-and-Pakistan

Daesh, otherwise referred to as Islamic State or ISIL, has been expanding its presence around the world beyond its stronghold in Syria and Iraq. In the coming weeks, Strife will be focussing a number of articles more closely on emerging areas of concern in Asia, speaking with practitioners on the ground and academics who interrogate the potential threat posed by Daesh. The first piece is from Strife Senior Editor Zoha Waseem who contributes this two-part analysis on Daesh from Pakistan. You can access Part I here.

Daesh and the ‘New Generation Militant’ in Pakistan

Through a sophisticated campaign of information dissemination, Daesh has become a brand that is carefully manufactured and delivered to a tech-savvy, younger generation that has an appetite for learning and doing more, and is particularly drawn to the internet.[1] A few traits can be loosely applied to urban jihadists emerging in Pakistan and elsewhere over the last several years.

They are born and raised in cities and not always combat-trained in the northern areas of Pakistan or Afghanistan (or the Middle East). They do not necessarily belong to the stereotypical martial races (Punjabi, Pashtun, or Baloch) but include Urdu-speaking and Bengali minorities as well. They are educated, possibly up to university levels, most likely in co-education institutions and not madrassas. They are raised by middle or upper-middle class families and reside in affluent neighbourhoods. They are self-radicalised or influenced by religious or sectarian (not necessarily extremist) companions, online, within social or familial networks, or through a movement known as Tableeghi Jamaat.[2] Further, they may prefer a certain degree of comfort as a recruitment motivator, such as promises of money, payment of debts, a chance at family life, and employment in other sectors of a terrorist organisation, not just its militant wings. They may also be allured by a sense of adventure, belonging, and alternative social environments.[3] Moreover, they take a keen interest in local, national and international politics and current affairs which become key motivators complementing their religious sentiments.

What differentiates them from previous generations of militants is a desire to be a part of something bigger – a ‘utopia’ of sorts, which Daesh promises through grand narratives of a Sunni caliphate and a functioning society[4], which is not soft on religious minorities, kafirs (non-believers) or apostates, but merciful towards those ‘who repent for their past beliefs and practices’.[5] As such, urban jihadists are generally more aware of their religious and sectarian identities. In many ways, the existing sectarian divisions in Pakistan and the high number of sectarian attacks between 2010 and 2015 (with a declining trend in violence but not in the existence of sectarian outfits)[6] have already exacerbated these differences for exploitation and capitalisation by Daesh’s sectarian narrative.

Urban areas are attractive for terrorists for multiple purposes that are well-established, including: access to financial and other resources, through employment or fund-raising, property and wider recruitment pools; and the potential to liaise with criminal groups for arms, drugs, safe houses and escape routes. There is also the possibility of assimilation and camouflage in ethnically and religiously diverse environments; the publicity generated from high-profile attacks in cities; and opportunities for networking, connectivity, and access to information. They are also particularly attractive for lone-wolf urban jihadists.

In October 2015, a 60-page security manual titled ‘Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf Mujahideen and Small Cells’ was translated into English and circulated online, allegedly by a Daesh supporter.[7][8] It is an adaptation of an older al Qaeda manual and tackles concepts such as security, vigilance, and covert warfare. Important for urban jihadists are instructions on how to manage information, ‘hide in plain sight’, keep up to date with technology, and avoid having links with other cells within a country. At the time of writing, there was no evidence to suggest that the Sialkot, Lahore or Karachi cells were in contact with one another, though their handlers, within or outside Pakistan, may have been aware of their existence. There is also no evidence to suggest that they were in contact with the commanders of Wilayat Khorasan in Afghanistan, suggesting that while the Wilayat may be recruiting from a certain pool of jihadists, the urban cells are generally self-proclaimed ‘jihadi’ volunteers who are not necessarily interested in being trained under the leadership of a previous generation of militants in Afghanistan-Pakistan.

Karachi is, by no means, unfamiliar with urban terrorism and has been a strategic hub for sectarian militants as well as TTP, al Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban.[9] In 2011, a Pakistani naval base was attacked jointly by TTP and al Qaeda militants in the port city. In June 2014, Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport was attacked by militants belonging to the TTP and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (a close affiliate of al Qaeda). In September 2014, days after its formation, al Qaeda in South Asia (AQIS) claimed the attack on a naval dockyard in Karachi. These recent attacks, all high profile, are multiple reminders that terrorists have been familiarising themselves with Pakistan’s financial capital and largest city for years. For the Daesh-inspired Karachi cell, this familiarisation preceded individual decisions to turn to religious militancy.

The case of the Karachi Cell

It is believed that the Tahir Saeen group became active in Karachi in January 2015, shortly after al-Adnani’s statement recognising Wilayat Khorasan. Known members of this group include Abdullah Yousuf (one of the masterminds, suspected of being in Syria according to interviews with security officials), and Tahir Minhas alias ‘Saeen’, the second mastermind. Saeen, along with Saad Aziz, Hafiz Nasir, Azhar Ishrat, and Asad ur Rehman were arrested shortly after the Safoora attack, but an unknown number of perpetrators and facilitators remain at large.[10] Saeen’s previous affiliation was with al Qaeda, since the 1990s,[11] but ended after a falling out over resources. Saeen met other members of the Karachi cell in Hyderabad and Karachi (Sindh’s two urban centres). He himself was from Punjab.

All of the arrested attackers were educated, barring Saeen – who was a high-school dropout.[12] Nasir and Rehman had degrees from the University of Karachi; Ishrat studied at Sir Syed University (Karachi) and worked for a mobile service provider; and the most infamous of attackers, Saad Aziz had an undergraduate degree from the Institute of Business Administration (Karachi), a prestigious university.[13] Another perpetrator, not yet arrested, was an engineering student. Together, the Karachi cell was allegedly responsible for a host of attacks, including an attack on a paramilitary official, Brigadier Basit, in February 2015, grenade attacks on schools between February and March, an attempted targeted killing of American professor Debora Lobo, the assassination of social activist Sabeen Mahmud in April, and the attack on the Ismaili community in Safoora Goth in May.[14]

From this series of operations, Saad Aziz became the most publicised attacker. A resident of Karachi from an upper-class background and member of the Tableeghi Jamaat, Aziz graduated from IBA in 2011. At university, he joined the Iqra Society, a religious discussion group. It is believed that it was here that Aziz ‘drifted towards radicalisation’.[15] Fluent in English, he familiarised himself with the works of Sayyid Qutb and notable writings on political Islam.[16] He met an al Qaeda operative in 2013, after which he met Tahir Saeen.[17] Together, they pledged allegiance to Daesh. After his arrest, he confessed to murdering Sabeen Mahmud because she was ‘promoting liberal, secular values’.[18]

Even more concerning revelations emerged following the arrests of two couples in Karachi in December 2015, facilitators of the Tahir Saeen group. Adil Masood, a resident of an affluent neighbourhood in Karachi and board member of the College of Accounting and Management Sciences was taken into remand by CTD Sindh.[19] Masood was allegedly also a business partner in Saad Aziz’s Mexican restaurant in central Karachi and had graduated from Indiana University and Fordham University in the United States.[20] A second facilitator taken into custody was Khalid Bari, a former employee of Pakistan International Airlines. Security officials have alleged that the wives of these two facilitators ran a so-called ‘women’s wing’ of Daesh in Karachi, under the garb of an organisation known as Al Zikra Academy through which they collected funds from affluent women in the names of donations and charity for the Karachi cell.[21] Their roles beyond financial support for this cell are difficult to ascertain but nonetheless help understand the reasons outlined above as to why terrorists find urban centres attractive for their operations and why urban militancy remains a complex and complicated threat for Pakistan to tackle.

The Way Forward: A Need for Non-Militaristic Approaches

Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies have been struggling to cope with militancy in urban areas over the last few decades because of the difficulties of profiling terrorists and distinguishing them from ordinary civilians in densely populated neighbourhoods; enduring a politicised and corrupt police force that favours tall budgets for military equipment and training but insufficiently fund investigations; and continued reliance upon paramilitary forces that are inadequately trained in urban counterinsurgency but increasingly equipped with policing powers. Above all, Pakistani counterterrorism practices have generally been ad hoc and highhanded, lacking long-term strategies and foresight.

In retaliation for the ongoing military operation, Zarb-e-Azb, militants affiliated with the TTP attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014. Following the attack, the government of Pakistan launched a twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism. Prior to NAP, the government had relied upon the National Internal Security Policy and the Pakistan Protection Act 2014 as part of its counterterrorism strategy, both of which were haphazardly drafted.[22] The NAP complemented the establishment of military courts for speedy trials and the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty. National subcommittees and provincial apex committees (consisting of senior civil and military leadership but no overseeing body, legal framework, or transparency) were set up to oversee NAP’s implementation. The NAP also escalated operations in northern Pakistan and Karachi, reducing terrorist and sectarian violence considerably during 2015.[23]

However, the lack of implementation of non-military aspects of the NAP remains a source of much criticism, with one report describing this as the ‘militarisation of counterterrorism policy’.[24] Of relevance here, are aspects of the plan dealing with (a) countering hate speech and extremist propaganda; (b) banning the glorification of terrorist organisations through print and electronic media; (c) dismantling communication networks of terrorist organisations; (d) taking measures against the use of social media for terrorism; and (e) dealing with sectarianism.[25] Though these points have not been elaborated upon further in the NAP, taken together, they provide a non-militaristic framework that may help contain Daesh’s ideology, prevent cells from carrying out potential activities, and make it difficult for new recruits to be influenced towards radicalisation.

Yet there have been reports of Daesh using radio transmissions in northern areas of Pakistan to spread their propaganda from Afghanistan[26], and pro-Daesh pamphlets are known to be distributed across Pakistan[27], including those discovered at the site of the Safoora attack. According to a report, despite NAP provisions directed against hate speech and the use of media for terrorism, publications and electronic media produced by groups such as Jamaad-ud-Dawa and Jaish-e-Muhammad, are still being circulated.[28] Further, residents of Islamabad remain perplexed at why Lal Masjid’s cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz, who defended the 2014 Peshawar massacre, threatened suicide attacks[29], and has publicly endorsed the female students of Jamia Hafsa madrassa supporting Daesh, has been allowed to operate in Islamabad. In late 2015, residents began complaining of the state’s inability to prevent Abdul Aziz from delivering sermons through the mosque. Through these sermons, the cleric reportedly spoke in favour of Daesh and called for the imposition of Sharia in Pakistan.[30] The state, instead of arresting Aziz for repeated violations of the NAP, chose to disrupt mobile phone services on a number of days to prevent the sermon from being heard, which served merely to inconvenience local residents.[31]

Selective implementation of the NAP can be the result of multiple factors. First, deep-rooted religious sentiments exist in Pakistani society (across classes) that can be ignited in retaliation to extreme measures by the state, possibly escalating violence in the country. Second, patronisation by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan of sectarian organisations and madrassas dating back to the late 1970s continues, as Islamabad’s policy towards the recent conflict between Riyadh and Tehran remains unclear. Third, Pakistan’s history of supporting non-state actors in the region (particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir) has created monsters too big to reign in without backlash. And lastly, each of Pakistan’s four provinces and disputed territories has internal militant or criminal elements of its own.[32] These are Pakistan’s complex ‘tiers of militancy’[33], which makes its war on narratives that much more challenging.

However, some practical considerations are worth mentioning. Given Pakistan’s social and cultural realities, it is unlikely that Daesh will achieve territorial gains in the country. Majority of Pakistanis are not Wahhabi, Salafi, or Deobandi (minority subsects of Sunni Islam from which individuals are most likely to turn to jihad) but rather followers of the Barelvi subsect. Despite pan-Islamist and sectarian narratives, Daesh promotes a predominantly Arab culture, which is distinct from that of South Asia, and can pose another barrier to Daesh’s large-scale penetration into regional societies. Also, most Pakistanis do not speak Arabic, nor are they familiar with Arab pop-culture, fashion or literature (aside from Quranic texts). Pakistan is also incomparable with Afghanistan or Iraq in terms of ungoverned spaces and has been actively seeking to restore the writ of the state in areas such as FATA.[34] That said, should existing sectarian divisions and tensions within Pakistan be exacerbated, Daesh’s strong Sunni narrative might continue luring jihadists from the region (including those from local militant groups).[35]

This is why Pakistan must prioritise countering Daesh’s narrative and propaganda which requires reading beyond militarised frameworks. In addition, Pakistan should understand the nexus between political grievances and ideological greed which is fuelling resentment within a growing young population with easy access to online forums. Grievances towards the state because of lack of employment, corruption, and highhandedness of security forces, coupled with the search for a strong ideological identity (due to a lack of consensus over what is Pakistan’s Islamic identity[36]), give the youth resentment, excitement and a need to belong, which is a combination that groups like Daesh will continue exploiting, unless the state provides alternatives.

Zoha Waseem is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, researching urban security and policing in Pakistan. She is also a senior editor at Strife and the head of the Afghan Studies Research Group at King’s. She tweets at @zohawaseem.

* This is the second part of the two-part analysis on Daesh in Pakistan. I am thankful to Mr Abdul Basit, Mr Zia ur Rehman, and officials of the Counter Terrorism Department, Sindh, for their continued support.

[1] C. Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual “Caliphate”’, Quilliam Foundation (October 2015), available at http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf.

[2] Tableeghi Jamaat is a Sunni movement that began in India in the 1920s and spread worldwide. According to participants interviewed for this article in Karachi in January 2016, tableegh is the preaching of basic Islamic principles. Volunteers travel within or outside Pakistan, visiting mosques to spread Islamic teachings, at their own expense. They do not advocate jihad or debate politics. However, participants may independently choose or be influenced by certain elements within a jamaat (assembly) to move from tableegh to askariyat (militancy). According to affiliates of the Jamaat, some tableeghs may be used by militant as a safe place to protect themselves from law enforcement agencies for months at a time.

[3] R. Barrett, ‘The Islamic State’, The Soufan Group (November 2014), p. 9, available at http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf.

[4] C. Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual’.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report (2016), p. 27.

[7] ‘Safety and Security Guidelines for the Lone Wolf Mujahideen and Small Cells’, initially by Al-Fajr Media Center, available at https://ansarukhilafah.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/safety-and-security-final.pdf.

[8] M. W. S. Ryan, ‘Hot Issue: How Daesh’s Lone Wolf Guidance Increases the Group’s Threat to the United States’, The Jamestown Foundation (24 November 2015), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44834&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381#.Vpjs9_l97IU.

[9] Z. Rehman, ‘Is ISIS Knocking on Karachi’s Doors?’, The News (16 March 2015), available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/29453-is-isis-knocking-on-karachis-doors.

[10] Personal interviews with security officials, October 2015 and December 2015, Karachi.

[11] F. Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group’, p. 155-156.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid; personal interviews with security officials between October and December 2015, Karachi.

[14] F. Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group’, p. 155.

[15] Ibid, p. 157.

[16] N. Hussain, ‘Pakistan’s New Breed of Militants’, Foreign Policy (09 June 2015), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/pakistans-new-breed-of-militants/.

[17] N. Ali & F. Zaman, ‘Anatomy of a Murder’, Herald, available at http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153209.

[18] Ibid.

[19] F. Khan, ‘Alleged Financer? College Co-Owner Held Over Safoora Bus Attack’, The Express Tribune (19 December 2015), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1012606/alleged-financer-college-co-owner-held-over-safoora-bus-attack/.

[20] Ibid.

[21] F. Khan, ‘Assistants of Terror: How Women Raise Funds for Da’ish in Karachi’, The Express Tribune (21 December 2015), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1013558/assistants-of-terror-revealed-how-women-raise-funds-for-daish-in-karachi/.

[22] For a more detailed discussion on NAP, NISP and PPA, see International Crisis Group, ‘Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Pakistan’, Asia Report No. 271 (22 July 2015), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf.

[23] PIPS, Pakistan Security Report, pp. 7-10.

[24] ICG, ‘Revisiting Counter Terrorism’.

[25] A. Manan, ‘Fight against Terrorism: Defining Moment’, The Express Tribune (25 December 2014), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/811947/fight-against-terrorism-defining-moment/.

[26] M. Achakzai, ‘Radio Caliphate’, The Friday Times (15 January 2016), available at http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/radio-caliphate/.

[27] A. Basit, ‘How Big is ISIS Threat in Afghanistan-Pakistan’, The Counter Terrorist, vol. 8 (3), pp. 46-48.

[28] International Crisis Group, ‘Revisiting Counter Terrorism’, pp. 14-15.

[29] K. Ali, ‘Suicide Attack Threats Again Ring Out of Lal Masjid’, Dawn (20 December 2014), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1151981.

[30] K. Shahid, ‘ISIS in Punjab?’.

[31] ‘Mobile Signals Suspended for Third Friday Now’, Dawn (19 December 2015), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1227313.

[32] T. Noorani, ‘War of Narratives, Dawn (27 June 2014), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1115282.

[33] K. Hyat, ‘Finding the Real Enemy’, The News (24 December 2015), available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/83978-Finding-the-real-enemy.

[34] H. Abbas, ‘ISIS Eyes Influence in Pakistan: Focus, Fears and Future Prospects’, Jinnah Institute (23 December 2014).

[35] Abdul Basit also warns that the threat can multiply in Afghanistan-Pakistan if fighters returning from Syria-Iraq join Wilayat Khorasan or if existing militant groups begin siding with ISIS for strategic purposes (A. Basit, ‘How Big is ISIS’, p. 47).

[36] See C. Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox (Random House India, 2015), pp. 439-541.

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