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Understanding the 1965 Indonesian Coup

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By George Loh

Image credit: Kawan Kawan Media

The 12th DMZ International Documentary Film Festival screened Director Fanny Chotimah’s debut film, “You and I”. It features the story of two elderly women, Kaminah and Ksdalini who have grown old since their ordeals following their jail term in 1965 (The film later won the Asian Perspective Award in the same Festival). The decision to feature a documentary outlining the effects of the 1965-1966 period, according to Fanny, was to educate the audience on the continued significance of this period to Indonesian history. Until Fanny’s expose on this issue, this controversial piece of history had been arguably blindsided amongst Indonesian media sources, despite the horrific death tolls and the curious rise of President Suharto, whose role throughout the period will be examined.

Context

Kaminah and Ksdalini were the victims of a failed coup, also termed the “September 30 movement”, which occurred after leftist leaders and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) youth members abducted and killed 6 out of 7 Indonesian generals en route to Halim Air Base. The junior officers argued that they did so to forestall a military coup planned for 5th October, but upon carrying out the killings, they proceeded to seize power in Jakarta in the name of a Revolutionary Council. The movement was very poorly planned, and was quickly stopped, according to official accounts of the story, by General Soeharto who assumed command of the military. Under Soeharto’s control, the soldiers attacked Halim Air Base, where the movement leaders were based. Meanwhile, President Sukarno moved from Halim to Bogor Palace. Soeharto’s swift response sent the coup leaders to flight early on 2nd October, and the coup attempt was over in less than two days. This led to a pogrom (mass riots targeted towards an ethnic/religious group) against the PKI, where mass roundups of PKI members and sympathisers took place. The two women featured in the film are falsely accused of their involvement with the Communists, and the documentary recounts how the sequence of events set in stone the overthrow of the Sukarno regime and the eventual installation of Soeharto into power. This ushered in the famed “New Order” which lasted for decades. More importantly, the subsequent purge of the PKI between 1965-1966 resulted in the deaths of approximately more than 500,000 people (with many more unreported killings).  

The coup took place during a precarious time in Indonesian politics. By 1965, the only significant powers at the centre of Indonesian politics were the President, the PKI and the military. Under Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy,” presidential authority was supreme, but his ailing health meant increasing tussles for power between these three forces. Furthermore, President Sukarno’s increasingly anti-American foreign policy rhetoric, and warm ties with China had also led to American concerns that Indonesia may become a communist state. According to a memo released on 29 September 1965 (one day prior to the coup), the CIA had received intelligence that Indonesia was looking to attain nuclear weapons from China, a significant Communist threat. This accentuated the CIA’s involvement with the September 30 movement, given that they were already involved in previous regional rebellions around Indonesia in 1958. 

Lingering controversies

Today, the motivations behind the 1965 coup remain a mystery, with several different popular interpretations of why the coup came about. The first version, the official version maintained by the Government and taught in Indonesian history textbooks, is that the coup was used by the PKI as an institution to seize state power. Declassified CIA documents have shown that the US Embassy supplied the army with a list of thousands of PKI cadres for targeting following the attack, which made convenient the narrative that the PKI as an institution was responsible, much like their involvement in Madiun in 1949. The second, proposed by the likes of Anderson and McVey, argued that it was an internal army push by junior officers who were disgruntled with the corruption and mismanagement by top military officials (Anderson and McVey, 2009). The third version, according to Crouch, was that the coup was the work of different discontented military officials but that the PKI played a key supporting role (A movement where PKI, Sukarno and Soeharto became entangled.) More recently, the fourth version, according to W.F. Wertheim was that Soeharto and other anti-communist army officials organised the movement through double agents in order to provide a pretext for attacking the PKI and overthrowing Sukarno (Wertheim, 1966). 

As the differing accounts show, there are obvious loopholes in the way the coup materialised. The leftist soldiers and PKI youth members had not kidnapped Soeharto, despite his prominence in the military leadership. Soeharto was also exceptionally quick with his counter-measures and assumption of Army demand. It was these curious loopholes that led Kammen & McGregor to argue that September 30th “was a complex process that lacked a simple schema or linear development.” (Kammen and McGregor, 2012)

Wertheim, meanwhile, argued Soeharto was likely to be in charge of the coup. He had significant implications with the coup leaders, being a friend of both movement’s leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Untung and Colonel Latief. Wertheim highlights that Soeharto was not targeted despite being a key commander of troops in Jakarta and a potential threat to any mutiny or coup attempt.  The movement’s troops did not blockade the Army Strategic Reserve Command’s (KOSTRAD’s) headquarters, although it was not far from their position in front of the palace.   Emotionally, Soeharto had also reacted with “uncanny efficiency in extremely confusing circumstances.”  While most military officials were unsure of what to do, Soeharto seemed to know exactly how to defeat the movement. Finally, the identity of Sjam, who Soeharto claimed was a confidante of PKI leader Aidit, was also suspicious.  Wertheim believes he was a double agent, but it remains to be seen if he was really Aidit’s subordinate, or in charge of the movement to forestall the military coup.

However, even this narrative is difficult to believe. Werthiem’s conjecture makes Soeharto out to be a figure of superhuman genius and foresight. Besides, a plan that involved the removal of top generals would significantly weaken the KOSTRAD, and there is no indication amongst the archival material available that Soeharto had fallen out of favour with his comrades. His goal of crushing the PKI could have been carried out in a more straightforward manner, such as having Untung declare they were working for the PKI. After the coup, the movement leaders did not demand Sukarno appoint Soeharto as Yani’s replacement. While CIA involvement did make it easier for Soeharto to coordinate the process that ultimately resulted in his overthrow of Sukarno, and later the communist killings, the forced confessions of some conspirators cloud narratives that they were not acting on Soeharto’s behalf.

Despite the different accounts available, it is clear that Soeharto was aware of the internal conflict between the PKI and the Army, and that the CIA had supported him in the PKI pogrom that came after. However, the true intentions of the movement leaders remain contested, and continue to cast doubt over the validity of these different accounts put forth. What we also know is that a communist Indonesia, given the state of the Indonesian economy then, as well as deep schisms between it and the majority Muslim groups in the country, was never likely. However, not only did this movement become a pretext for the mutual suspicion and indiscriminate killings of hundreds of thousands of people, it also affected Indonesian life profoundly, with old wounds that have not healed despite the passage of time. 

 

George is a Masters’s student at the Department of Methodology at The London School of Economics (LSE). He received his double bachelors in Political Science and International Relations from The Australian National University, before furthering his studies at the LSE. His interests include examining the phenomenon of democratic backsliding across Southeast Asian states, and the study of the political systems of Southeast Asian states from a comparative perspective. Prior to the commencement of his graduate studies, George held roles in various research capacities, notably an internship stint at Control Risks’ Global Risks Analysis (GRA) team as well as AKE International’s, covering the broader Asia Pacific region.

Legitimacy Crisis: scandals in the heart of the Cypriot Government

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By Rafaela Piyoti

Justice. By Paris Christophi.

 

A new round of UN-led negotiations on the Cyprus Problem is currently ongoing. Representatives from the UN have already held discussions with the leaders of both communities on the island, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot, as well as with the Prime Ministers of Greece and the United Kingdom. But, as the official government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) is taking part in the peace negotiations, its legitimacy on the island is at stake. This is the result of a series of scandals that have been revealed in the last six months, to which the government has failed to successfully respond. 

The first scandal was revealed by Al Jazeera on the 12th of October 2020, wherein they uncovered that the Cypriot government was selling passports to foreigners who had been previously engaged in illegal activities. After this ‘Golden Passports’ scandal emerged, additional accusations were made against the President of the RoC regarding his approach to the Cyprus Problem. Finally, unprecedented  police violence was used on the 13th of February 2021 at a protest against corruption and state authoritarianism. These scandals have challenged the current government and with the parliamentary elections taking place next month, a change might be coming. Al Jazeera’s investigation into the Cyprus Investment Programme revealed that a number of senior Cypriot officials, businessmen and lawyers were involved in discussions with convicted criminals regarding ways to acquire Cypriot passports illicitly. As part of the investigation Al Jazeera revealed a video recording and what they referred to as The Cyprus Papers, more than 1000 leaked documents related to the Cyprus Investment Programme.  The controversy became known as the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal and it led to the resignation of Demetris Syllouris, the Cypriot parliament speaker, and Christakis Giovani, a Cypriot MP.

 In addition, the President of the RoC, Nicos Anastasiadis, was also accused of profiting from the ‘Golden Passports’ with his law firm amongst those mentioned in Al Jazeera’s investigati. However, according to Anastasiadis, he is not currently involved in its operation, it is instead being run by his children. Anastasiadis is additionally alleged to have travelled to the Seychelles with the private jet of a Saudi Arabian prince who has since acquired a Cypriot passport. Andreas Paraschos, the Cypriot journalist who accused Anastasiadis of receiving economic benefits from the scheme was forced to resign from his job. His resignation has been criticised as a violation of freedom of expression, a basic human right for any democratic government. Furthermore, following the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal, the European Commission has opened formal legal action against the RoC to decide whether the Cyprus Investment Programme was lawful or not. According to the European Commission, ‘Golden Passports’ raise concerns over money laundering and corruption which are prohibited in  EU member states.   

Paraschos’ accusations about the RoC’s President, however, did not stop at the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal. He revealed that Anastasiadis was considering the possibility of a two-state solution to the Cyprus Problem in a conversation he held with Alexis Tsipras, the Greek Prime Minister at the time, in which Paraschos was present. In support of Paraschos’ claims, the Cypriot Archbishop made a public announcement claiming that in a private conversation he had with the President, Anastasiadis claimed that a two-state solution could be favourable for the Cypriot economy which could continue operating programs like the Cyprus Investment Programme. To make things even worse, in an interview with a Cypriot newspaper, the former UN special envoy for the Cyprus Problem, Espen Barth Eide, has also referred to Anastasiadis’ support for a two-state solution. The RoC’s President defended himself by arguing that Eide has always shown a preference to promote Turkish interests and that’s the reason he spreads such ’unfounded fiction’. 

As for Paraschos’ and the Archbishop’s claims, Anastasiadis dismissed their claims as gossip and said that his words have been misinterpreted. Nevertheless, following recent developments on the peace negotiations, Anastasiadis sent a letter with his recommendations about the new peace talks to the UN –  the letter has not been made public.

The lack of transparency and the refusal of Anastasiadis to state publicly his opinion on the Cyprus Problem has only further angered Cypriots. NGOs and independent journalists on the island describe the current government of the RoC as an authoritarian regime, rather than a democratic government, and they continue to call for Anastasiadis to resign. 

To show their opposition to the government, NGOs and non-profit organisations joined forces, and organised a protest– attended by several hundred people, in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, against corruption and state authoritarianism. The covid-19 pandemic and the economic impact of the measures taken by the government to limit the spread of the virus were used as a trigger for the protest, but the more fundamental cause was the dissatisfaction of the people with the government, in light of recent scandals.

According to people who took part, the protest had a peaceful character but once the police got involved to break up the demonstration violence sparked. The police used a water cannon and teargas against the protestors which resulted in several people being injured. One woman was hit by the water cannon and underwent an emergency surgery to save her eyesight. A lawyer who took part in the protest argued this constituted an unprecedented use of police violence on the island. The official statement of the government was that the police were deployed to stop the demonstration as it was violating the rules in relation to Covid-19. 

There was no official statement, however, on what the government’s exact orders were and why the police showed such force against the protestors, some of which were families with children. An independent investigation committee has been formed to look into the extreme police violence incident. The organisers of the protest argue that the police brutality is evidence of the oppression that endangers not only the legitimacy of the current government but it is also an attack on democratic values.

The main consequence of these scandals has been a severe damaging of people’s trust in the government of the RoC. Al Jazeera’s investigation uncovered its economic corruption, accusations made by Paraschos revealed President Anastasiadis support of a two-state solution, and unprecedented police brutality made apparent its increasingly desperate attempts to cling onto power. As such, the President of the RoC must either apologise and become more transparent towards the Cypriot citizens, or else resign from his position. 

 

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy. She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. She also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys traveling and learning about new cultures in her free time.

Want to tackle disinformation? Stop using the same tactics.

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By Sophia Rigby

General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith presents on how the British Army is adopting to new warfighting domains, including information operations (MOD, 2020)

Disinformation is nothing new. It seems to be a commonly held belief that disinformation is a new style of warfare and interference, put to perfect use in the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis, the 2016 US election, and the 2016 Brexit referendum. But disinformation has been around for centuries to spread malicious rumours and to discredit rivals; what is new is the manner of spreading disinformation and how quickly it can spread.

The advent of social media and technological advances have meant that we have a mass of information at our fingertips and expect to be able to find a concise answer to complex problems in seconds. Or 0.37 seconds, which is how long it took Google to find me results relating to the Internal Market Bill. However, unlike the encyclopaedias of old, few of these results will come with verifiable and reliable evidence attached. Anyone can post on a blog or Wikipedia and almost anyone can doctor a photograph or a video (to varying degrees of success),yet we have very little in the public sphere, especially education, about evaluating sources of information and treating news critically. 

The 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review[1] failed to recognise disinformation as a significant threat to national security under its cyber section. But the recently published Russia Report[2] in the UK found that Russian disinformation was fomenting political extremism around Brexit and other divisive issues. This puts disinformation purely in the domain of political and national security, an area of life that for many people seem as remote from their daily lives, as the countries in which the threats originate.

However, in the context of the growing anti-vax movement and alternative therapies for Covid-19, we observe how disinformation coupled with public ignorance of the facts are negatively  impacting our everyday lives. Anti-vax and anti-lockdown conspiracy theorists have taken to the streets in European capitals (including London on 19 September), to protest against the lockdown measures and the mandatory wearing of face masks, in attempts to discredit any future vaccine[3]. Anti-vax theories are gaining a greater following in the UK, but the impact can be clearly seen in many American cities which are seeing an increase in cases of measles, mumps, and tuberculosis as vaccination levels decrease[4]. 

Despite accumulated scientific evidence pointing to the reliability of vaccines, not least the eradication of devastating diseases in the UK such as polio, and the discreditation of the scientists who first supported anti-vax theories, people are still inclined to believe some stranger on Facebook. This is made possible by disinformation methods that have become far more sophisticated and appear in articles on websites, in videos on news sites, and rarely find engagement with vigorous debate. The anonymity of social media and the courage (or bravado) this instils in people mean that reasonable voices are drowned out by those spouting vitriolic abuse at any dissenting voices. Mainstream views are pushed out as extreme voices resort to threats and insults to get their point across more firmly. 

‘Knowledge is power’ (was first written down in Thomas Hobbes’ political tome Leviathan in 1668) is perhaps not the most powerful argument in favour, but how are we to make sure that the knowledge being distributed and circulated in social media networks is accurate? Firstly, and most importantly, we have to stop using the same tactics. From the politician who purposely manipulates statistics to make a false impression of reality, to the wordsmith who uses language to mask the truth, to the politician who rebrands their party political account to appear as an independent fact checking organisation.  

We know statistics can be manipulated and it is done time and time again in debates on poverty statistics. Relative poverty and absolute poverty are two different measures – relative poverty is set at 60% of the average net household income in the year in question and can fluctuate from year to year whereas absolute poverty is set at 60% of the average net household income of 2010/11 and does not fluctuate over time. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies data[5], relative poverty rates have increased for children and everyone overall, for working-age non-parents and pensioners they have stayed fairly level. However, absolute poverty rates have decreased for pensioners and working-age non-parents, stayed fairly level for everyone overall, and increased for children. So, the Government can claim to have reduced poverty and use statistics to back up that fact, the Opposition and charities can claim poverty has increased, and the public are none the wiser to the actual state of affairs. 

Politicians will always use the best evidence to support their claims, and the opposition will always pull another piece of evidence that seems to suggest otherwise – that’s just the way politics works. With elections and Government at stake, it seems impossible as well as naïve to assume that for politicians would speak plainly and leave the party-political rhetoric at the door. But journalists have a responsibility, not just to support the politicians whose party their editor or paper supports, but to analyse claims and show their respective strengths and weaknesses. They also need to look at the use of anonymous sources and treat them as factual. Without the opportunity to assess the reliability of sources, we are both failing to look critically at information and encouraging belief in faceless facts. 

Ultimately, we need critical thinkers. Schools try to teach critical thinking through History and English Literature, but all subjects have a role to play in teaching us to look at the world more critically and analyse what is being told to us. Maths is important in showing us how statistics can be manipulated, Science can show us the complex systems in place to develop vaccines as well as look at the ethics of experimentation, Drama can teach us to look at the character behind the rhetoric and eloquent speeches. Above all, coursework and project work teaches more than teamwork and presentation skills; it teaches us how to research and balance the various claims, how to look critically at who is writing and explaining, and what their motives are. This? Pedagogy you mean? is as important as the actual content, so that people learn to look past the emotive and sometimes the shocking elements to the trustworthiness of the content. 

We’ve seen the pernicious and deadly impact that disinformation can have on people’s lives. From the war in Ukraine to the Covid pandemic, disinformation is a threat to national security. But we are not taking it seriously and we are not taking adequate steps to tackle it. Social media platforms must be made responsible for the content on their sites, politicians must be made accountable for comments they make, “inside sources” must face greater scrutiny from journalists, and we must ensure that tackling disinformation is incorporated into the curriculum. National Service was used to prepare the nation when the threat of conventional war was present; education promoting critical thinking is our preparation for disinformation at present.

 

Sophia Rigby is a Doctoral Researcher in the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College, London. Her research is focusing on realist-constructivist theories of international relations and how it relates to Russian foreign policy in Europe. She holds a BA in Modern Languages and a Masters focusing on Russia and Eastern Europe. Since graduating, she has been working in political strategies and communications.

Israel’s Electoral Standoff: Challenges in Securing Centre-Left Governance

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by Kevin Nolan

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, here pictured with Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz, while meeting with President Reuven Rivlin in Jerusalem, September 2019 (Image Credit: Haim Zach/GPO)

The State of Israel, even prior to the Coronavirus outbreak, was a nation in crisis. Since April 2019, the political deadlock between Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent Prime Minister’s centre-right Likud party and Benny Gantz’s centre-left Blue and White alliance has subjugated its citizens to three national elections. The ensuing breakdown of Gantz’s opposition alliance during unity government negotiations in March 2020 enabled short-term electoral gains for leftist politics at the potential expense of its long-term prosperity. However, irrespective of the eventual tenure of the new unity administration, struggles with policy differentiation, fragmented political structures, and growing sectarian politics linked with changing demographics ultimately pose the greatest threat to a revival of leftist governance within Israel for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, until these barriers can be overcome a power-sharing agreement offers the most realistic opportunities for nationwide policy influence and implementation.

Lack of Differentiation

Despite the international perception that Israel’s leftist movement was experiencing a revival under the Blue and White alliance before its implosion, its leadership had aligned many of its policies, barring minor caveats, with the incumbent administration. For instance, despite its controversial coverage over the status of Jerusalem and annexation of large sections of the West Bank, both Netanyahu and Gantz have endorsed the 2020 Trump Peace plan. Even Gantz’s only major point of contention, the inclusion of Palestinian leadership into discussions, has been weakened through subsequent dialogue.

Indeed, whilst it does espouse several leftist policies, since its founding as the de facto anti-Bibi alliance, Blue and White’s core policies were almost entirely focused on ousting the Netanyahu administration from power either through the ballot box or via retrospectively binding legislation.[1] Such initiatives would involve enforcing term limits and preventing indicted politicians from serving as premier, thus disqualifying Netanyahu who currently awaits trial over allegations of corruption. Thus, despite overall having a more leftist platform than Likud, Netanyahu’s removal from office would be one of the only significant measures of differentiation imposed by a Gantz administration. As such, the emphasis on a political rather than ideological platform will likely struggle to attain broader support outside of a single-issue voter base in future elections.

A Fragmented Opposition

Fragmentation among oppositional factions threatens to impede their capability to govern as a genuine alternative to Likud in future electoral contests. Despite the limitations of a single-issue platform, Gantz was capable of attaining a broad array of support from multiple political factions, including the first endorsement of a Jewish politician from an Arab dominated party since 1992 via the Joint List. However, despite possessing a larger backing then Netanyahu to become the newest premier following the latest election, the misinterpreted strength of Gantz’s position made him incapable of translating this into a viable coalition government due to alliance factionalism.

Although the Joint List lent Blue and White their support for the preferred Premier, their anti-Zionist platform and fragile political formation prevents them from participating within any formal coalition government propagating Zionist ideals. Similarly, cultural apprehension among the Jewish factions against coalitions with Arab parties has permeated since the foundation of the state in 1948.[2] Irrespective of the accuracy of their assumptions, questions involving the ultimate loyalty of Arab parties and their lack of support of Zionism has resulted in the leaders of most Jewish factions, including Gantz, from opposing such an arrangement ever occurring. While Arab politicians have never served in any Israeli government, if the Joint List continues to remain the third-largest party in the Knesset, leftist parties will increasingly need to identify methods for overcoming these barriers in order to successfully challenge perpetual right-wing governance.

Additionally, regardless of their intentions behind doing so, the divisions generated among rival Blue and White factions following the initiation of unity government negotiations with Likud have damaged the cohesion of the opposition for the foreseeable future. National unity governments are not unprecedented within Israel, particularly during periods of national crisis. However, given that Blue and White’s platform was primarily based on ousting Netanyahu from power, the initiation of dialogue over any form of power-sharing agreement was enough to result in the formal exit of the Yesh Atid and Telem factions. Whilst Gantz has continued to keep the Blue and White name for his sole remaining political faction, Israel Resilience, the capitulation of the broader alliance may make it increasingly difficult for the opposition to reunify once the tenure of the unity government lapses.

Long-term Demographic Struggles

In addition to these immediate obstacles to securing governance, long-term demographic changes are likely to increasingly marginalise the capability of centre-left parties from beating right-wing blocs in elections within the next half-century. Historically,  the vast majority of citizenry have voted for parties which represent their religious or cultural beliefs, irrespective of the benefits, economic or otherwise, which may be better offered by rival factions.[3] For instance, the nation’s fastest-growing Jewish demographic, the religiously hard-line ultra-orthodox sect, are predicted to nearly double from thirteen to twenty-seven percent of the total population by 2059. Within this constituency voting patterns overwhelmingly align with their particular ethnicity, with those of Sephardic origin generally endorsing the Shah party, whilst those of Ashkenazi descent tending to favour United Torah Judaism. These allegiances transcend basis cost-benefit analyses since centre-left policies generally offer better subsidy packages for the ultra-orthodox, among whom nearly forty percent continue to live below the poverty line.

Similarly, nearly ninety percent of Arab-Israeli’s votes go to the Joint-List, despite its four factions, Hadash, Ta’al, United Arab List and Balad representing a large cross-section of differing ideologies, from socialism to Pan-Arabism. Yet while its population is also set to markedly increase from fifteen to twenty percent of the total population, unless the aforementioned tensions between Jewish and Arab political parties can be resolved they will remain outside the corridors of power indefinitely. Consequently, given the sectarian nature of a large part of Israel’s electorate, the rapid growth of the predominately right-wing Haredi threatens to increasingly undermine the long-term prospects of leftist parties securing governance throughout the next half-century, regardless of the policies which they propose.

Silver Lining

The centre-left has a long way to go before they will be able to reconcile the variety of challenges standing in its way of wresting control from Likud. Nonetheless, the current unity administration presently offers the greatest opportunity for leftist ideals to influence national policies. Despite the division of influence varying widely in prior scenarios, Gantz has successfully attained control over the influential Defence and Justice ministries, while temporarily delaying annexation plans within the West Bank. Consequently, despite the challenges which the centre-left will face in future elections, so long as the current unity arrangement is maintained in a fair and proportionate manner, leftist politics will remain capable of exercising some form of influence on federal policies within the current Likud administration.

[1] Kaḥol Lavan. 2019. “Blue And White 2019 Platform”. https://en.idi.org.il/media/12312/%D7%9B%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%91%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A2.pdf.

[2] Tessler, Mark. 2019. “Israel’S Arabs And The Palestinian Problem (1977)”. Religious Minorities In Non-Secular Middle Eastern And North African States, 325-344. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19843-5_12.

[3] Mathie, Nicola. 2016. “‘Jewish Sectarianism’ And The State Of Israel”. Global Discourse 6 (4): 601-629. doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1259284.

Kevin is a MA student in Conflict, Security and Development within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. A Series Editor for Strife, his research interests are primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific region, State building within post-conflict zones, and combating technological challenges to regional security concerns. Additionally, serving as King’s mature student officer, he is a strong advocate for exploring the correlation between the psychological impact of mental health degradation on academic well-being. Readers who identify as mature students and experience difficulties relating to any aspect of university life are encouraged to contact him at kevin.nolan@kcl.ac.uk

 

 

Death by Douze Points

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by Zenia Duell

Conchita causes controversy during Eurovision 2014 (Image credit: Getty Images)

For the first time since its conception in 1956, Eurovision has been cancelled. 2020 will not be bringing any awkward accented presenters, chicken dances, or cutting commentary from Graham Norton. Perhaps now is the best time to reflect on everything that Eurovision has graced our screens with in the last 64 years. In one respect, Eurovision is a wonderful expression of European solidarity, using the power of creativity as a unifying force for reconciliation. This musical hug extends far beyond the borders of the EU – of the 41 countries participating in Eurovision, only twenty-four are in the EU.[1]

Eurovision was originally a telecommunications initiative, rather than a political one. It was the brainchild of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which represents countries located within the European Broadcasting Area (EBA) – an area extending from Greenwich to the northern part of Saudi Arabia, spanning the entire Mediterranean basin. Membership to the EBU makes countries eligible for participation in Eurovision, thus Israel, Turkey and even Morocco have competed. Perhaps, then, another way to look at Eurovision is to view it as a statement of ‘Western values’ such as pluralism, diversity, and progressive union. This is certainly reflected in Eurovision’s slogans of the last few years: ‘celebrate diversity’, ‘building bridges’, ‘we are one’. This would explain the participation of countries like Israel and Turkey: Israel has been described as a ‘Western stronghold’[2] in the Middle East due to its firm alliance with the US, while Turkey has only recently stopped knocking at the EU’s door. In 2015, Australia was invited to participate – despite most definitely being outside the EBA, it was deemed to share those common ‘Western’ values, since its colonised history gave it more in common with the United Kingdom than with its geographical neighbours.

But as Eurovision continues to expand its horizons, it seems to be experiencing a bad case of mission creep and the musical celebration has started to become hijacked by political agendas. This is reflected in the financial clout of the so-called ‘Big Five’ (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) who, because of the amount of money they contribute to the competition, are guaranteed a place in the contest’s final regardless of the quality of their entries. Perhaps not coincidentally, these countries are also the five largest EU budget contributors of the past decade. Once again, art reflects politics: the alleged ‘diversity’ and ‘unity’ so heavily promoted in Eurovision’s slogans appear to be just a veneer, lacquering over the reality of European financial inequality. Turkey objected to the ‘Big Five’ rule so strongly that they withdrew from the competition completely, and set up their own rival song contest: Turkvisyon. Although it only ran for three years, this alternative contest coincided with Turkey’s decision to shelve its effort to join the EU. Both these actions were a clear manifestation of Turkey’s new foreign policy, as Turkey turns its head from the West to fix its gaze on the East.[3]

The ongoing tension between Europe and Russia has also found a platform on Eurovision. When the cross-dressing Austrian singer Conchita Wurst won Eurovision in 2014 with her seismic ballad ‘Rise Like a Phoenix’, Russian officials proposed an alternative ‘straight’ Eurovision (though this never came to fruition). In 2016, Russia expressed further outrage when Ukraine won with their entry ‘1944’, which commemorated the deportation of the Crimean Tartars during the titular year, and doubled as a thinly veiled critique of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

And then there’s the fraught political voting. This incredible infographic illustrates how each of the Eurovision voting ‘blocs’, roughly organised geographically into Northern, Eastern, Southern and Iberian, exchange votes. Only four countries have ‘broken rank’ and have, on average, awarded the most votes to another country outside their voting bloc. One study notes that these blocs may have formed due to similar cultural traits that result in homogenous music tastes[4] – although another study points out that loyal bloc voting also correlates to countries with less impartial political institutions.[5] Countries with impartial governments tend to vote more meritocratically. The infographic also demonstrates that eight countries share ‘special relationships’ – consistently awarding each other the most points in Eurovision. Notably, Cyprus regularly awards their douze points to Greece, and Greece responds in kind. Enosis, the desired political union of Greece and Cyprus so famously (and destructively) advocated by Bishop Makarios III may still be a political pipe dream, but it is a Eurovision reality.

In 2008, MP Sir David Amess tabled a motion in the Houses of Parliament for Britain to leave Eurovision on the basis that it was ‘more about politics than about talent’. However, I for one would much prefer political wars to be waged by sequinned singers than with fraught rhetoric, political fragmentation and economic disengagement. The latent political subtext of Eurovision can be seen as a healthy pressure valve, a cathartic performance which relieves global political tensions and should therefore be embraced. As the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei once said, ‘everything is art; everything is politics’. This, to me, is why Eurovision is everything.

[1] Eurovision. “Countries”. Accessed 17th March 2020. https://eurovision.tv/countries

UK Government. “EU-EEA”. Accessed 17th March 2020. https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea

[2] Russell, “Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State”, in Glennon, John P. (ed). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. (1955 – 1957, Vol XVI), pp. 136-138.

[3] Ersen, Emre and Seckin Kostem. “Introduction: Understanding the dynamics of Turkey’s pivot to Eurasia”, in Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, ed. Emre Ersen and Seckin Kostem, (Routledge 2019), pp. 2-4.

[4] Stockemer, Daniel, Andre Blais, Filip Kostelka and Chris Chhim. “Voting in the Eurovision Song Contest”, Politics, (2018), Vol. 38 (4), p. 432.

[5] Charron, Nicholas. “Impartiality, friendship-networks and voting behaviour: Evidence from voting patterns in the Eurovision Song Contest”, Social Networks 35 (2013), p. 495.

Zenia is a documentary producer and part-time MA student in Strategic Communications. Outside of the office or the library, Zenia enjoys reading about ancient history, doing burpees and trying out new recipes.