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Israel’s Electoral Standoff: Challenges in Securing Centre-Left Governance

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by Kevin Nolan

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, here pictured with Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz, while meeting with President Reuven Rivlin in Jerusalem, September 2019 (Image Credit: Haim Zach/GPO)

The State of Israel, even prior to the Coronavirus outbreak, was a nation in crisis. Since April 2019, the political deadlock between Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent Prime Minister’s centre-right Likud party and Benny Gantz’s centre-left Blue and White alliance has subjugated its citizens to three national elections. The ensuing breakdown of Gantz’s opposition alliance during unity government negotiations in March 2020 enabled short-term electoral gains for leftist politics at the potential expense of its long-term prosperity. However, irrespective of the eventual tenure of the new unity administration, struggles with policy differentiation, fragmented political structures, and growing sectarian politics linked with changing demographics ultimately pose the greatest threat to a revival of leftist governance within Israel for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, until these barriers can be overcome a power-sharing agreement offers the most realistic opportunities for nationwide policy influence and implementation.

Lack of Differentiation

Despite the international perception that Israel’s leftist movement was experiencing a revival under the Blue and White alliance before its implosion, its leadership had aligned many of its policies, barring minor caveats, with the incumbent administration. For instance, despite its controversial coverage over the status of Jerusalem and annexation of large sections of the West Bank, both Netanyahu and Gantz have endorsed the 2020 Trump Peace plan. Even Gantz’s only major point of contention, the inclusion of Palestinian leadership into discussions, has been weakened through subsequent dialogue.

Indeed, whilst it does espouse several leftist policies, since its founding as the de facto anti-Bibi alliance, Blue and White’s core policies were almost entirely focused on ousting the Netanyahu administration from power either through the ballot box or via retrospectively binding legislation.[1] Such initiatives would involve enforcing term limits and preventing indicted politicians from serving as premier, thus disqualifying Netanyahu who currently awaits trial over allegations of corruption. Thus, despite overall having a more leftist platform than Likud, Netanyahu’s removal from office would be one of the only significant measures of differentiation imposed by a Gantz administration. As such, the emphasis on a political rather than ideological platform will likely struggle to attain broader support outside of a single-issue voter base in future elections.

A Fragmented Opposition

Fragmentation among oppositional factions threatens to impede their capability to govern as a genuine alternative to Likud in future electoral contests. Despite the limitations of a single-issue platform, Gantz was capable of attaining a broad array of support from multiple political factions, including the first endorsement of a Jewish politician from an Arab dominated party since 1992 via the Joint List. However, despite possessing a larger backing then Netanyahu to become the newest premier following the latest election, the misinterpreted strength of Gantz’s position made him incapable of translating this into a viable coalition government due to alliance factionalism.

Although the Joint List lent Blue and White their support for the preferred Premier, their anti-Zionist platform and fragile political formation prevents them from participating within any formal coalition government propagating Zionist ideals. Similarly, cultural apprehension among the Jewish factions against coalitions with Arab parties has permeated since the foundation of the state in 1948.[2] Irrespective of the accuracy of their assumptions, questions involving the ultimate loyalty of Arab parties and their lack of support of Zionism has resulted in the leaders of most Jewish factions, including Gantz, from opposing such an arrangement ever occurring. While Arab politicians have never served in any Israeli government, if the Joint List continues to remain the third-largest party in the Knesset, leftist parties will increasingly need to identify methods for overcoming these barriers in order to successfully challenge perpetual right-wing governance.

Additionally, regardless of their intentions behind doing so, the divisions generated among rival Blue and White factions following the initiation of unity government negotiations with Likud have damaged the cohesion of the opposition for the foreseeable future. National unity governments are not unprecedented within Israel, particularly during periods of national crisis. However, given that Blue and White’s platform was primarily based on ousting Netanyahu from power, the initiation of dialogue over any form of power-sharing agreement was enough to result in the formal exit of the Yesh Atid and Telem factions. Whilst Gantz has continued to keep the Blue and White name for his sole remaining political faction, Israel Resilience, the capitulation of the broader alliance may make it increasingly difficult for the opposition to reunify once the tenure of the unity government lapses.

Long-term Demographic Struggles

In addition to these immediate obstacles to securing governance, long-term demographic changes are likely to increasingly marginalise the capability of centre-left parties from beating right-wing blocs in elections within the next half-century. Historically,  the vast majority of citizenry have voted for parties which represent their religious or cultural beliefs, irrespective of the benefits, economic or otherwise, which may be better offered by rival factions.[3] For instance, the nation’s fastest-growing Jewish demographic, the religiously hard-line ultra-orthodox sect, are predicted to nearly double from thirteen to twenty-seven percent of the total population by 2059. Within this constituency voting patterns overwhelmingly align with their particular ethnicity, with those of Sephardic origin generally endorsing the Shah party, whilst those of Ashkenazi descent tending to favour United Torah Judaism. These allegiances transcend basis cost-benefit analyses since centre-left policies generally offer better subsidy packages for the ultra-orthodox, among whom nearly forty percent continue to live below the poverty line.

Similarly, nearly ninety percent of Arab-Israeli’s votes go to the Joint-List, despite its four factions, Hadash, Ta’al, United Arab List and Balad representing a large cross-section of differing ideologies, from socialism to Pan-Arabism. Yet while its population is also set to markedly increase from fifteen to twenty percent of the total population, unless the aforementioned tensions between Jewish and Arab political parties can be resolved they will remain outside the corridors of power indefinitely. Consequently, given the sectarian nature of a large part of Israel’s electorate, the rapid growth of the predominately right-wing Haredi threatens to increasingly undermine the long-term prospects of leftist parties securing governance throughout the next half-century, regardless of the policies which they propose.

Silver Lining

The centre-left has a long way to go before they will be able to reconcile the variety of challenges standing in its way of wresting control from Likud. Nonetheless, the current unity administration presently offers the greatest opportunity for leftist ideals to influence national policies. Despite the division of influence varying widely in prior scenarios, Gantz has successfully attained control over the influential Defence and Justice ministries, while temporarily delaying annexation plans within the West Bank. Consequently, despite the challenges which the centre-left will face in future elections, so long as the current unity arrangement is maintained in a fair and proportionate manner, leftist politics will remain capable of exercising some form of influence on federal policies within the current Likud administration.

[1] Kaḥol Lavan. 2019. “Blue And White 2019 Platform”. https://en.idi.org.il/media/12312/%D7%9B%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%91%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A2.pdf.

[2] Tessler, Mark. 2019. “Israel’S Arabs And The Palestinian Problem (1977)”. Religious Minorities In Non-Secular Middle Eastern And North African States, 325-344. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19843-5_12.

[3] Mathie, Nicola. 2016. “‘Jewish Sectarianism’ And The State Of Israel”. Global Discourse 6 (4): 601-629. doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1259284.

Kevin is a MA student in Conflict, Security and Development within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. A Series Editor for Strife, his research interests are primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific region, State building within post-conflict zones, and combating technological challenges to regional security concerns. Additionally, serving as King’s mature student officer, he is a strong advocate for exploring the correlation between the psychological impact of mental health degradation on academic well-being. Readers who identify as mature students and experience difficulties relating to any aspect of university life are encouraged to contact him at kevin.nolan@kcl.ac.uk

 

 

Death by Douze Points

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by Zenia Duell

Conchita causes controversy during Eurovision 2014 (Image credit: Getty Images)

For the first time since its conception in 1956, Eurovision has been cancelled. 2020 will not be bringing any awkward accented presenters, chicken dances, or cutting commentary from Graham Norton. Perhaps now is the best time to reflect on everything that Eurovision has graced our screens with in the last 64 years. In one respect, Eurovision is a wonderful expression of European solidarity, using the power of creativity as a unifying force for reconciliation. This musical hug extends far beyond the borders of the EU – of the 41 countries participating in Eurovision, only twenty-four are in the EU.[1]

Eurovision was originally a telecommunications initiative, rather than a political one. It was the brainchild of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which represents countries located within the European Broadcasting Area (EBA) – an area extending from Greenwich to the northern part of Saudi Arabia, spanning the entire Mediterranean basin. Membership to the EBU makes countries eligible for participation in Eurovision, thus Israel, Turkey and even Morocco have competed. Perhaps, then, another way to look at Eurovision is to view it as a statement of ‘Western values’ such as pluralism, diversity, and progressive union. This is certainly reflected in Eurovision’s slogans of the last few years: ‘celebrate diversity’, ‘building bridges’, ‘we are one’. This would explain the participation of countries like Israel and Turkey: Israel has been described as a ‘Western stronghold’[2] in the Middle East due to its firm alliance with the US, while Turkey has only recently stopped knocking at the EU’s door. In 2015, Australia was invited to participate – despite most definitely being outside the EBA, it was deemed to share those common ‘Western’ values, since its colonised history gave it more in common with the United Kingdom than with its geographical neighbours.

But as Eurovision continues to expand its horizons, it seems to be experiencing a bad case of mission creep and the musical celebration has started to become hijacked by political agendas. This is reflected in the financial clout of the so-called ‘Big Five’ (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) who, because of the amount of money they contribute to the competition, are guaranteed a place in the contest’s final regardless of the quality of their entries. Perhaps not coincidentally, these countries are also the five largest EU budget contributors of the past decade. Once again, art reflects politics: the alleged ‘diversity’ and ‘unity’ so heavily promoted in Eurovision’s slogans appear to be just a veneer, lacquering over the reality of European financial inequality. Turkey objected to the ‘Big Five’ rule so strongly that they withdrew from the competition completely, and set up their own rival song contest: Turkvisyon. Although it only ran for three years, this alternative contest coincided with Turkey’s decision to shelve its effort to join the EU. Both these actions were a clear manifestation of Turkey’s new foreign policy, as Turkey turns its head from the West to fix its gaze on the East.[3]

The ongoing tension between Europe and Russia has also found a platform on Eurovision. When the cross-dressing Austrian singer Conchita Wurst won Eurovision in 2014 with her seismic ballad ‘Rise Like a Phoenix’, Russian officials proposed an alternative ‘straight’ Eurovision (though this never came to fruition). In 2016, Russia expressed further outrage when Ukraine won with their entry ‘1944’, which commemorated the deportation of the Crimean Tartars during the titular year, and doubled as a thinly veiled critique of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

And then there’s the fraught political voting. This incredible infographic illustrates how each of the Eurovision voting ‘blocs’, roughly organised geographically into Northern, Eastern, Southern and Iberian, exchange votes. Only four countries have ‘broken rank’ and have, on average, awarded the most votes to another country outside their voting bloc. One study notes that these blocs may have formed due to similar cultural traits that result in homogenous music tastes[4] – although another study points out that loyal bloc voting also correlates to countries with less impartial political institutions.[5] Countries with impartial governments tend to vote more meritocratically. The infographic also demonstrates that eight countries share ‘special relationships’ – consistently awarding each other the most points in Eurovision. Notably, Cyprus regularly awards their douze points to Greece, and Greece responds in kind. Enosis, the desired political union of Greece and Cyprus so famously (and destructively) advocated by Bishop Makarios III may still be a political pipe dream, but it is a Eurovision reality.

In 2008, MP Sir David Amess tabled a motion in the Houses of Parliament for Britain to leave Eurovision on the basis that it was ‘more about politics than about talent’. However, I for one would much prefer political wars to be waged by sequinned singers than with fraught rhetoric, political fragmentation and economic disengagement. The latent political subtext of Eurovision can be seen as a healthy pressure valve, a cathartic performance which relieves global political tensions and should therefore be embraced. As the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei once said, ‘everything is art; everything is politics’. This, to me, is why Eurovision is everything.

[1] Eurovision. “Countries”. Accessed 17th March 2020. https://eurovision.tv/countries

UK Government. “EU-EEA”. Accessed 17th March 2020. https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea

[2] Russell, “Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State”, in Glennon, John P. (ed). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. (1955 – 1957, Vol XVI), pp. 136-138.

[3] Ersen, Emre and Seckin Kostem. “Introduction: Understanding the dynamics of Turkey’s pivot to Eurasia”, in Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, ed. Emre Ersen and Seckin Kostem, (Routledge 2019), pp. 2-4.

[4] Stockemer, Daniel, Andre Blais, Filip Kostelka and Chris Chhim. “Voting in the Eurovision Song Contest”, Politics, (2018), Vol. 38 (4), p. 432.

[5] Charron, Nicholas. “Impartiality, friendship-networks and voting behaviour: Evidence from voting patterns in the Eurovision Song Contest”, Social Networks 35 (2013), p. 495.

Zenia is a documentary producer and part-time MA student in Strategic Communications. Outside of the office or the library, Zenia enjoys reading about ancient history, doing burpees and trying out new recipes.

The Rise of Digital Propaganda – An ‘Alt-Right’ Phenomenon?

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by Tom Ascott

Co-founder of Breitbart News Steve Bannon described the news website as a platform for the alt-right (Image Credit: Wikimedia)

Without social media, the alt-right would not exist, Donald Trump would not be president, and the UK would not be leaving the European Union. As the American Sociological Association put it ‘the rise of the alt-right would not be possible without the infrastructure built by the tech industry’. Social media is becoming the most important way for political campaigns to reach out to potential voters, and online misinformation campaigns use coordinated inauthentic activity to subtly manipulate citizens. It is the fastest and can also be the cheapest way of targeting an audience, much more so than door to door campaigning or flyering.

The alt-right isn’t simply more popular online than the left. In fact, there are far more left-wing political blogs, and blog readers often skew left-wing. Right-wingers tend to engage less with political discourse online and, when they do, they are more likely to be bi-partisan. Despite that, the alt-right is far more successful online when they do engage.

The Success of Alt-Right Activity

Right-wing political groups have had a significant impact on international affairs through their online activity. By successfully using data harvesting, micro-targeting and meme warfare, they have sent out tailored, political messages to individuals or small groups, which are never seen by others. The messages leverage the data they have mined to be as effective as possible. It may appear unusual that there has been no left-wing equivalent of the Cambridge Analytica scandal – and it could be quite a while before we see the emergence of such – but it will be crucial to understand how the left might channel such activities.

The closest we have seen to a left-wing version of Cambridge Analytica is Project Narwhal, the database that the Obama team built in 2012. Project Narwhal started by slowly and manually joining discrete databases, each with a few data points on a single voter, to build their profile. Years later those profiles had grown, and the project had 4,000– 5,000 data points on each American voter. Looking back at the ways the media fawned over Obama’s data strategy, it is not a surprise that the right took the ball and ran with it.

It is an anomaly that the alt-right thrives online. Identification can be risky for the alt-right. Those who are seen and identified attending rallies can lose their jobs or face other repercussions. Extreme-right opinions that are clearly racist, sexist or xenophobic can lead to users being blocked on mainstream platforms, so these users begin to ‘join smaller, more focused platforms’. Alt-right figures Alex Jones and Milo Yiannopoulos were banned from Facebook because they ‘promote or engage in violence and hate’. Laura Loomer, an alt-right activist, was banned from Twitter for tweeting at Ilhan Omar that Islam is a religion where “homosexuals are oppressed… women are abused and… forced to wear the hijab.”   As a result, the alt-right has become more digitally agile, using tools to exploit larger platforms and reshare their views. Platforms like Gab have a much higher rate of hate speech than Twitter. Discord has also been used to radicalise and ‘red pill’ users towards extreme-rightist beliefs.

The tools of the alt-right represent tools for disruption. It is only by disrupting the status-quo that Breitbart founder Steve Bannon believes that the alt-right can break into the political spectrum. These tools can be used to persuade or dissuade; Pro-Publica found that adds targeting liberals often urged them to vote for candidates or parties that did not exist.

The Left’s Slow Response

One reason why left-wing political parties have not used similar tools is exactly that conflation of such activities with the alt-right. Though there is plenty of dissent in left-wing politics over how centered or left-leaning it should continue to be, groups from the left simply do not identify as alt-left. Cambridge Analytica has offered the alt-right a chance to disrupt the right-wing, but there is much less desire to disrupt on the left. Instead of a true alt-left there is only ‘an anti-Alt-Right‘. Bannon believes that Cambridge Analytica, and the chaos it created, was a tool that the right-wing needed in order to survive. The ability to harvest data and use it to target specific individuals with political messaging appears to be a content-neutral process.

Any organisation could have done it, but the first to do so was Cambridge Analytica. It was an act of ‘evil genius’ to find individuals who weren’t motivated enough to engage in politics, target them with personalised messages and convert them to their specific brand of right-wing thinking, or to urge left-wing voters to disengage. It is hard to assess how prevalent online misinformation campaigns are. Groups will use neutral-sounding names, mask the political nature of their ads, or identify as partisan. Their only aim, however, is to confuse or dissuade voters.

Consequences for Social Media Platforms

The first-comer has it the easiest and copying the process will be extremely difficult. Following the scandal, the infrastructure for data harvesting has started to be regulated. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) was granted new powers in the Data Protection Act 2018 and the European Union introduced its General Data Protection Regulation in response to the scandal. Facebook has been forced to refine its policies on data sharing and, as a result, new data from the platform is less available now than previously.

After the scandal broke, the platform started to audit data that apps could collect and began blocking apps that continued to take users’ data. As Mark Zuckerberg’s continued appearances in front of Congress show, if Facebook will not regulate itself, then perhaps it will be broken up. Where anti-trust laws may seek to punish companies for harming the consumer, it will be hard to penalise Facebook. Users continue to opt-in, voluntarily hand over data, and enjoy time browsing their personalised, if pyrrhic, feeds.

Tom Ascott is the Digital Communications Manager at the Royal United Services Institute. You can find more of his articles here.

Conflict, Competition and Legitimacy: Holding on to the Memory of Aung San

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by Anna Plunkett

A defaced statue of Aung San in Myitikyna (Photo credit: The Irrawaddy)

 

General Aung San is venerated throughout Burma as the father of the nation. He is remembered as a strong leader and switched on politician, remembered as a man of honour and loyalty that has awarded him the local title of Bogyoke. He was the leader of the Thirty Comrades movement and was set to become the much-loved leader of Myanmar’s first independent government and as such has been memorialised throughout Myanmar with statues, buildings and roads among the most common commemorations. Perhaps the most famous use of his name sits with his own daughter who conflated their names as she is known today – Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He is a man of great importance in modern day Myanmar, his status only growing since his daughter took up the mantel as state counsellor after the 2015 election. Yet, the growing endorsement of Aung San has proved controversial with students and locals in Karenni state being arrested for their opposition to the erection of a General Aung San statue in the state capital’s local park. This article will analyse the reasoning behind the growing popularity of the General’s iconic image and why such increases in popularity lack uniformity throughout Myanmar.

Legitimacy behind the General’s Image

General Aung San’s image can be found throughout Myanmar and there is no doubt it demands a great level of respect. He is remembered as the father of the nation, the leader of the Thirty Comrades, a Japanese-trained liberation army that fought the allied forces during World War Two. He transcended his military might to show his political prowess as a statesman, leading the Burmese forces to switch allegiance from the Japanese and strike deals with the allied forces toward the end of the war.[1] Then negotiating with British colonial forces to bring Burma its independence soon after the war in 1947. During this time, he also married a nurse, Ma Khin Kyi who would later become one of the country’s first diplomats and had three children. Yet, in the post-war period the Burmese nationalists began to factionalise and on 19 July 1947, he was assassinated during a committee meeting in Central Rangoon. It is suspected to have been an act by his political rivals within the nationalist movement. His death shocked and saddened the new nation, which -now leaderless- suffered from a power vacuum that left the central government scrabbling for control over Myanmar’s expansive territories. It would take General Ne Win’s military coup in 1962 and the famous ‘four cuts’ counter-insurgency strategy to restore the central government’s control over the majority of the country.

For his leadership role as a military general and as a politician General Aung San has historically been dubbed the father of the Burmese nation. He has also been titled as the father of the army. Though the relationship between the two has been turbulent over the successive military governments in Myanmar, he was a great source of legitimacy throughout the Ne Win period (1962-1988) as Ne Win himself was a member of the Thirty Comrades led by Aung San. This close relationship to General Aung San provided Ne Win with personal legitimacy as ruler and caretaker of both the military and the Burmese state. As such, during this period the imagery and promotion of General Aung San was profligate. Yet the bond between the father of the nation and his armed forces, which controlled the state lost favour after the 8888 uprising when his daughter rose to popularity on the back of the pro-democracy movement.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her Father’s Image

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi returned to Myanmar to care for her dying mother in 1988. Having studied at Oxford, she had married an academic there and settled down in her university town with their two children. Her father died when Suu Kyi was only two years old, she found herself witness to a growing uprising against Myanmar’s autocratic state. Approached by leaders of the movement Aung San Suu Kyi joined and lead the pro-democracy activists, appealing for non-violent and peaceful protest against the state. Support for the pro-democracy movement and the soon to be founded National League of Democracy blossomed under her leadership. Much like her military opponents in government she claimed her right to speak and lead the people of Myanmar through her relationship to her father, giving her first speech to the masses in-front of a poster of the General. She reclaimed the icon of the father of the nation for the opposition, using it to build her own support and support for the NLD. The importance of familial connections and networks in Myanmar can be evidenced through the success of this manoeuvre. After the brutal repression of the 8888 uprising which ended with widespread bloodshed in the capital, images of both ‘the lady’ and Aung San plummeted in popularity with the former being officially being banned under the  new military government[2].

An Aung San Statue in Bogyoke Park Taunggyi (Photo credit: author)

Since 2015 the military and the National League for Democracy have become uncooperative partners in the halls of government in Myanmar. Daw Suu’s party have taken over the parliamentary houses with landslide victories in both, yet the military’s grip on power remains. Their twenty-five per cent seat allocation in those same houses and control of central department have solidified their role as overseers of Myanmar’s political arenas[3]. It is therefore, perhaps surprising to see the increasing propagation of an image over which these two political forces have competed over in the past. General Aung San and his memory have become something of a myth tied to the legitimacy of the political forces within Myanmar’s political arena. His period of dis-favour is over, with the seventieth anniversary of Martyrs Day receiving special commemoration in Yangon in 2017. He is both the father of the army and nation and the father of the democracy movement (or at least its leader) and now this image of fatherly support is not in competition but rather represents the rightness of such cooperation between the two sides. As these two competing political forces, the military and the NLD attempt to navigate the spaces of co-existence they have found a common ground, or at least common imagery for legitimacy within General Aung San.

Aung San’s Image: Divisive Locally

Whilst the institutional support and favour has returned to General Aung San and his sacrifices to the establishment of the Burmese State, support at the local level has not followed. With the centenary of the Bogyoke’s birth in 2015 and the seventieth anniversary of his death in 2017 the unveiling of a new set of statues may not be that surprising, particularly given the changing political arena.  Nevertheless, such celebrations have been far from uniform. Protests in Karenni and Mon against the dedication and commemoration of new statues and bridges respectively have highlighted underlying tensions within Myanmar’s memory of the Bogyoke. Despite rising tensions the erection of such statues has continued including the unveiling of the largest General Aung San Statue in Mandalay in June 2017 prior to the July commemoration.

For whilst the memory and iconic image of General Aung San may legitimise the current governmental institutional establishment it has left many minority groups dissatisfied. General Aung San may have been the father of the nation that delivered Myanmar its independence, however many minorities felt betrayed by the independence negotiations which left them without a right to an independent state or secession. The infamous Panglong Agreement the General Aung San brokered with the ethnic minorities in 1947 provided some vague commitments to equality with few specifics on minority rights or protections.

The failure of the successive governments to protect minorities or recognise their independence from the state has left most with a sense of betrayal in relation to the father of the nation. The image and icon which is now appearing in their capitals, on their road signs, in relation to the infrastructure projects being developed throughout the borderlands. Rather then promoting the cooperation between the two major political forces within Myanmar, Aung San imagery is becoming the face of an encroaching hostile state within minority regions. Rather then unifying or celebrating the diversity of Myanmar through the promotion of a diverse set of icons the focus on the first nationalist leader is being perceived as at best centrist arrogance and at worst forced domination by the ethnic majority.

Conclusion

The manipulation of such imagery and historic icons within any state’s history is an important part of building a state narrative and sense of homeland. It is a history and discourse that will always be built by the victor of the struggle. Yet if Myanmar’s wishes to increase the inclusion of its ethnic minorities rather then lengthen the already extensive civil war in Myanmar they may do well to tread lightly with the establishment of such a uniform and state centric narrative in its borderlands. Myanmar is an ethnically and politically diverse state, it is also a community waiting for change and development away from the historical state domination. The commemoration of those from outside of the government-military institution even just within these localities could be an effective tool to build cooperation and goodwill over the hostility that is being entrenched through the dominance of majority narratives in minority and historically weak state regions.

Anna is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She received her BA in Politics and Economics from the University of York, before receiving a scholarship to continue her studies at York with an MA in Post-War Recovery. She was the recipient of the Guido Galli Award for her MA dissertation. Her primary interests include conflict and democracy at the sub-national level, understanding how minor conflicts impact democratic realisation within quasi-post conflict states. Her main area of focus is Burma’s ethnic borderlands and ongoing conflicts within the region. She has previously worked as a human rights researcher focusing on military impunity in Burma and has conducted work on evaluating Bosnia’s post-war recovery twenty years after the Dayton Peace Accords. You can follow her on Twitter @AnnaBPlunkett.

[1] See Seekins(2000) for an in-depth analysis of the special Burman-Sino relationship and the role of Aung San as a political and military leader.

[2] Testimony from authors in field interviews with activists from the 8888 student protests

[3] For further analysis on the role of the military in Myanmar’s parliament see Than (2018)

A Balancing Act? Women’s Participation in Indian Politics

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By Saawani Raje

17 May 2019

Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman with military chiefs (Indian Express)

On 9 August 1942, Aruna Asaf Ali walked into a highly charged gathering of thousands of Indians at the Gowalia Tank Maidan in Mumbai and unfurled the tricolour flag launching the ‘Quit India’ movement against British rule. A prominent political leader in the Indian nationalist movement, she later went on to become the first mayor of Delhi in 1958.

Female leadership of this kind was not without precedent in India. As early as 1925, Sarojini Naidu became the president of the Indian National Congress, the main nationalist party in India before and after independence. Since then, the number of women in leadership positions in Indian politics has only increased. Indira Gandhi became the first female Prime Minister of India in 1966 and the second democratically elected female leader in the world. Sonia Gandhi, President of the Congress Party from 1998 to 2017 was one of the most powerful women in India and led her party to power twice at the Centre in two general elections. Other prominent female figures include Jayalalitha Jayaram– the first female Opposition leader in India, Mayawati, the leader of the third-largest party in India in terms of vote share, and Mamata Banerjee, the only female Chief Minister in India today.

Significantly, both the Defence Minister and the External Affairs Minister in India today—Nirmala Sitharaman and Sushma Swaraj— are women, holding portfolios that have been traditionally male-dominated. While cause for celebration, these examples are the exceptions to the rule when it comes to female participation in politics and decision-making.

This piece explores the juxtaposition of women’s participation in politics in India—as voters and as political leaders. It argues that using examples of powerful women leaders to point to the success of female empowerment in India ignores more structural and systemic limitations women in politics face in India today.

Women as voters 

Women have played a key role as voters since the first election in India. With the introduction of Universal Adult Franchise, women were given equal voting rights to men since India became independent in 1947.  However, in a stunning manifestation of the entrenched patriarchy, many women, especially in North India, wanted to be registered on the electoral role as “wife of” or “daughter of” instead of under their own names. The electoral officials did not allow this and Ornit Shani estimates that out of a total of nearly 80 million potential women voters in independent India, nearly 2.8 million failed to disclose their names and therefore could not be included in electoral rolls.

Women’s participation as voters in the decades after Indian independence remained low—female voter turnout lagged behind male turnout by 11.3% in 1967. This gap began to narrow in the 1990s, falling to 8.4% in 2004 and further reducing to 4.4% between 2004 and 2009. The past election in 2014 saw the closing of this gender gap to its narrowest on record—only 1.8%. In fact, in half of all Indian states and union territories, the female turnout surpassed the male turnout. This trend was repeated in the recent state elections held between 2012 and 2018 where women voters surpassed the male turnout in twenty-three Indian states.

Women casting their vote in a recent election (LiveMint)

This has made female voters a significant voter block for the leading political parties in the run up to the elections—and women and women’s issues have started to come to the fore in election rhetoric. At a recent rally in Rajasthan, Congress President Rahul Gandhi said that his party would seek to appoint women as Chief Ministers in half the states it rules by 2024. Another example is the controversy surrounding Gandhi’s statement that the Prime Minister had “asked a woman to defend him”, referring to Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s speech in a parliamentary debate about the contentious Rafale deal. The BJP responded with alacrity. Prime Minister Modi immediately rebuked the Congress leader for his “insult to the women in the country,” while BJP President Amit Shah demanded that Gandhi apologise for the remark. This seems to reflect an increase in the power of women voters. Women are now a significant enough voting block for political parties to turn comments like these into a battleground for their rhetoric in the run-up to the election. In contrast however, women continue to be underrepresented in policymaking roles within politics.

Women as political leaders 

Women have occupied positions of power in Indian politics. Women made up almost five percent of elected representatives in the first Lok Sabha (lower house) in 1952 as compared to two percent in the US House of Representatives and three in the UK Parliament during the same period. However, over the next seven decades, women’s growth in policymaking roles has stagnated. Women make up only 11.2% of the members of the Lok Sabha after the 2014 elections[1] and only 9% in state legislatures. India ranks fifth in women’s political representation in parliament in South Asia, behind Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal.

There are many reasons for this underrepresentation. A significant factor is patriarchal attitudes towards female leadership in politics, where women politicians are often seen as fulfilling certain gender-specific roles. An exemplar of this is Indira Gandhi’s rise to the Congress party leadership—a move orchestrated by senior Congress leaders who saw Gandhi as a puppet willing to do their bidding. According to the Economic Survey 2018, other major obstacles faced by aspiring female representatives include domestic responsibilities, female illiteracy, financial disparity, lack of confidence and an increase in threats of violence.

An initiative to combat this disparity was implemented in 1993 as part of the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution, whereby 33% of all seats in local self-government institutions were reserved for women. Since the enactment of this legislation, the representation of women in local administrations has increased to 44.2%. A study commissioned by the Poverty Action Lab showed that this increase in female representation heightened police responsiveness to crimes against women, improved children’s nutrition and education, improved male perceptions of female leaders, increased the aspirations of girls, and helped women get elected in subsequent elections.

In spite of this, deep-rooted structural problems remain. In 1996, the Women’s Reservation Bill was introduced which proposed to reserve 33% of the seats in the Lok Sabha for women. The bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha (upper house) in 2010 but lapsed in 2014 with the dissolution of Parliament. Passing this bill was also an election pledge of the current government but, five years later, there remains little sign of it becoming law. This bill has been left languishing for 22 years, and the representation of women therefore remains severely limited. The women voters turning out in large numbers actually have very few women to represent their issues and views in law-making bodies.

The political imbalance

Female representation in Indian politics thus remains conflicted and suffers from deep structural and systemic difficulties. The many examples of female leadership in Indian politics do tell a story of female empowerment—but celebrating this without looking deeper into existing disparities risks only half the story being told. To really address the gender disparity in Indian politics, the focus instead needs to turn to the representation of women as decision-makers and policymakers—the keepers of real political power in the world’s largest democracy.

Saawani is a PhD candidate at the King’s India Institute and a recipient of the King’s India Scholarship. Her PhD research is primarily a historical examination into civil-military decision-making during crises in independent India. After graduating from the University of Cambridge, she obtained an MA in South Asia and Global Security. She was previously a Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi, on the Oxford University Press Handbook on Indian Foreign Relations. While at King’s, she has been the Programme Manager for the FCO Diplomatic Academy South Asia Conference and has been teaching undergraduates at the Department of War Studies. Her wider research interests include diplomatic history, foreign policy, diplomacy and the study of contemporary conflicts. You can follow her on Twitter @saawaniraje.