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Strife Series: Modern Conflict & Atrocity Prevention in Africa – Introduction

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United Nations Peacekeepers Assist with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in DRC / Photo Credit: United Nations Photo, licensed under Creative Commons

Over the past year, the humanitarian consequences of conflict and atrocities have been consistently visible. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Western-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, millions of Afghans are experiencing acute hunger and starvation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been riddled with evidence of war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, sexual-based violence, torture, and looting. Evidence of ethnic cleansing is being reported in Ethiopia’s Tigray region—a consequence of the recent civil war in the country. Further, any near-term solutions to these humanitarian crises seem almost wholly out of grasp.

These events support a belief commonly espoused by advocates of conflict and atrocity prevention—that the best way to minimize the human suffering experienced during conflict and atrocities is to ensure that they never happen in the first place.

Conflict and atrocities are far from exclusive to the African continent. They have been historically prevalent and continue to occur in every geographic region in the world. However, the emphasis on conflict and atrocity prevention that has taken place over the past few decades on the African continent is unparalleled in any other region.

Conflict resolution and peace have been key objectives of the African Union since its conception, leading to heavy investment in conflict early warning systems and peacebuilding activities. Globally, half of the twelve active UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa, and 57 have been previously completed within the continent.

This emphasis entails that there is much to be learned about conflict and atrocity prevention from the efforts that have been taken in Africa. This series aims to analyze these efforts to understand their success, failures, and how they can be improved. By doing so, we hope to add to the discussion on how conflict and atrocity can be prevented throughout the world.

The Series

Part 1: Ishmael Maxwell contrasts the actions of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with insider mediation efforts, and outlines the opportunity for MUNUSCO to support these initiatives.

Part 2: Christopher Heber examines the consequences that national memory and narrative play in continuing separatists’ efforts in Nigeria and how these narratives can be transformed to promote national unity.

Part 3: In the wake of several recent coups in Western Africa, Ryan Johnson reflects on the concept of “coup-proofing” and how the structure of Gabon’s security sector has aided the country in avoiding successful coup attempts.

Part 4: I will discuss the extensive existing conflict early warning system infrastructure on the African continent and how it can be leveraged to prevent climate-change driven conflict.

Russian PMCs in Africa: How the Kremlin converts hard power into economic opportunity

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Soldier Holding Gun /Photo Credit: Jakson Martins, licensed under Creative Commons

The primary driver of Russian expansion in Africa are Private Military Contractors (PMC). Exerting hard power, while maintaining plausible deniability for the Russian state, PMCs are active across Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and more. Providing a cheaper alternative to Russian army deployments, PMCs, like the infamous Wagner Group, enable Russia to generate economic outcomes. The mechanisms by which they do so, however, remain murky. I will therefore interrogate these processes, arguing that Russia’s strategy revolves around exchanging PMC-derived hard power for economic concessions and partnerships.

Russian influence in Africa

Russia relies on Soviet legacies to maintain and build its influence in Africa. With enduring historical ties rooted in Cold War geopolitics, Russia is less affected by accusations of neo-colonialism. It never held colonies on the continent and thus carries less baggage in its dealing with regional governments. Putin has promoted Russian partnerships as “no strings attached”, differentiating their agreements from those with former colonial powers which often demand political or structural economic reforms.

Russia has acted opportunistically to offer military assistance to states affected by civil war, social unrest, and terrorism. Wagner Group was sent to CAR in 2018 following the end of French peacekeeping mission Opération Sangaris and the failure of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force to disarm rebel groups. In Sudan and Madagascar, Russia answered calls for security assistance amidst social and political unrest. In Libya, up to 1200 Wagner troops directly supported Haftar’s LNA (Libyan National Army) 2019 Tripoli Offensive. Finally, Mali’s recent contracting of Wagner Group follows the gradual end of France’s counterterrorism mission Opération Barkhane, which has not solved lingering issues of terrorism in the Sahel, while significantly heightening anti-French sentiment in the country.

A clear strategic trend is therefore apparent, Russia is identifying African security vacuums and offering PMC-led military aid. However, such Russian military aid is not free, PMC forces are often deployed in exchange for economic concessions.

Russia’s geopolitical strategy

Putin believes Russia is a great power and should retain this position, no matter the cost. While Russia’s military power is widely recognized, the same cannot be said for its economy.

The Russian president employs a foreign policy that exploits Russia’s hard power to expand its economic ties. In what are known as “packages”, Moscow offers foreign governments PMC support in exchange for natural resource concessions and the opening of national markets to Russian companies. That African governments request assistance is crucial, as it gives Russian interventions a degree of legitimacy within the international community.

In the short term, Russia focuses on exploiting natural resource concessions. Such concessions are granted as direct payments for the deployment of Wagner Group forces. On top of natural resources, the Kremlin’s economic interests in Africa revolve around arms exports to the continent. These bilateral security ties provide billions to the Kremlin, essential for keeping foreign interventions going and financing the defence industry.

In the long term, Putin is looking to position Russian export companies at the centre of CAR’s, Libya’s, and DRC’s economies. Although these countries’ populations possess little purchasing power, this will not always be the case. Their large young populations represent key emerging consumer groups, thus far untapped by the global market. By stoking new, massive export markets for Russian companies, Putin is looking to plan ahead, positioning Russia to benefit from long term shifts in the global economy.

Finally, the Russian president seeks to establish a strong base of geopolitical influence in Africa. This would give Russia a foothold on Europe’s southern border, notably in Libya, boosting Russia’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis the EU. The Kremlin will continue to offer package deals to African countries with geographically strategic locations and maturing markets.

Plausible deniability and controlling PMCs

PMCs give Putin plausible deniability. They are neither part of, nor officially affiliated with, the Russian state, therefore the Kremlin cannot be held accountable for their actions. Furthermore, PMCs technically do not exist in Russia, as they are banned by the law. Employing these companies allows Russia is to mitigate scrutiny into its overseas operations, reflected by continued uncertainty about the exact number of Wagner personnel in Libya, CAR and DRC. The PMC’s covertness acts as force multipliers to contracting armies and to hide casualties from the general public.

Putin exploits the lack of legal status to control the PMCs, who suffer consequences when they step out of line, such as the shakeup of Wagner’s command after the battle of Kasham. Wagner Group is heavily connected to Russia’s military intelligence (GRU), its founder, Utkin, was the commander of the GRU’s 700th Special Forces Unit of the 2nd Separate Special Forces Brigade. Wagner Group’s headquarters are a shared military base with the GRU’s 10th Separate Special Purpose Brigade, based in Molkino, Krasnodar. The contractors receive passports from the Central Migration Office Unit 770-001, which are only issued for GRU operatives. In 2016, Putin honoured Utkin at a reception for the “Hero of the Fatherland Day”.  When 33 Wagner Group operatives were arrested in Belarus during the 2020 presidential elections, Putin intervened personally to have them freed.

The lack of official connection between the contractors and the Russian state also makes their deployment far cheaper. A Wagner soldier’s monthly salary of $4,600 is almost four times that of a Russian soldier at $1,200. However, the mercenary’s salary, accommodation and equipment are paid by Wagner Group owner Prigozhin’s network, using income from the exploitation of natural resource concessions. Therefore, Russia deploys Wagner troops abroad with low financial drawbacks, only paying for transport and occasional medical treatment. By controlling Wagner’s operational capacity to deploy to conflict zones, the Kremlin’s exerts direct authority over the contractors.

Putin’s intercessions in favour of Wagner Group and the outfit’s very close ties to the GRU demonstrate a direct link between the mercenaries and the highest levels of the Russian state. These ties are further compounded by Putin’s inner circle often owning PMCs, natural resource companies and financial firms active in Africa.

PMC’s financial structure and economic interests

One man is at the centre of Putin’s private interests in Africa: Yuri Prigozhin. Kremlin insider and Wagner Group’s financier, Prigozhin was tasked to exploit African natural resources in exchange for Russian mercenary assistance. With Putin’s backing, the businessman set up contacts all over the continent, negotiating “package” agreements.

Prigozhin owns M Invest, an umbrella company that manages a mix of security and energy firms. Through this umbrella company, he secures natural resource concessions by negotiating “package” agreements in the Kremlin’s name. He then guards the natural resources with PMCs, exploits the resources with specialized energy companies, and distributes the profits amongst African partners, himself and likely the Kremlin. M Invest’s subsidiaries include Lobaye Invest, which extracts gold and diamonds in CAR, Meroe Gold, a gold mining operation in Sudan, and Sewa Security Services, which provides personal security for government officials.

Closely interlinked and with direct ties to the Kremlin, these companies further the interests of bigger Russian multinationals. For example, after a 9 month halt in operations that coincided with the Wagner-backed Tripoli offensive, Gazprom resumed operations in Libya in May 2021. The firm concurrently jumpstarted its pre-planned infrastructure expansion projects to boost gas production. This pattern of interlinked companies is repeated across the African countries where Russia has a significant presence.

Prigozhin is one of many oligarchs that control the system of highly interconnected security, energy and financial firms. Closely connected to these oligarchs, Putin, through his inner circle, stands to personally profit from Russia’s expansion into Africa. This operation is in line with the Russian President’s rule, defined by informal personal network connections and high military corruption.

Summary

In conclusion, Russian PMCs are a tool employed by the Kremlin to expand Russia’s economic, political and geopolitical influence in Africa. The contractors are at the heart of Russian strategy, which trades hard power assistance with natural resource concessions and long-term economic partnerships. Putin’s long-term strategy of gaining preferential market access to emerging African states furthers his Grand Strategy of maintaining Russia’s great power status. However, Putin’s private economic interests in the exploitation of natural resources points to an inability to separate personal gains from state governance. This blurring of the lines may hamper Russia’s long-term strategy on the continent. Nevertheless, in the short term, Russian PMCs are set to continue playing a defining role in Africa’s security sphere due to their efficiency and low operational costs.

Still asking to vote

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by Sonia Martínez Girón

Photo by Dominik Mecko on Unsplash

There seems to be some sort of 404 error in cartography. Internet maps plainly show ‘no data’ in Western Sahara. How exactly did this global anomaly to the twenty-first-century nation-state construction occur? Most importantly, can it change? Examining diverse perspectives can help venture into what could ease Western Sahara’s socio-political situation.

Western Sahara covers a 266,000-sq-km area within the Sahara Desert on the Atlantic coast of Northwest Africa. In this territory, the sovereignty of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has not been internationally recognised. This is an intricate conflict where numerous parties and identities are involved. Morocco has just initiated military operations in the area, raising tensions within the ‘stable instability’ that characterises the territory and disrupting the brittle ceasefire of the last three decades. The Polisario Front, the pro-independence unit supported by Algeria, is based in Tindouf since 1975. The position of the Polisario is that the irresolution of the Security Council has given it no alternative than to “escalate its fight”, as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been ineffective in preventing confrontations. Despite this state of affairs, the UN has accorded to extend the United Nations mission until 31 October 2021. Historical context can help appreciate the big picture.

To begin, the ‘Spanish Sahara’ was what the Territory of Western Sahara was called between 1884 and 1976, while it was occupied by Spain. It was within the context of the Berlin Conference of 1885 where Spain was permitted to occupy the region over which the country could make historical claims. In 1975, Spain withdrew from the colony. Spain was undergoing a period of instability, in which profound divisions and internal conflict marked by the end of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship. The United Nations (UN) mission had intervened in the territory in response to the Morocco-Mauritania campaign to prevent the self-determination vote that the Spanish government had professed in 1974.

In November of 1975, Hassan II of Morocco took advantage of the circumstances to organise the Green March, a protest aiming to annex the Spanish Sahara to Morocco where troops of volunteers crossed to the Spanish Sahara. Arias Navarro, the Spanish president at the time, ordered the colony to be withdrawn and abandoned. That same year, just days before Franco died, Morocco, Mauritania and Spain signed the Madrid Pact to formally end the Spanish occupancy of the Western Sahara territory, which stated that the decolonisation of the region and the opinions of the Saharan population would be respected. While the treaty came into force, its international recognition was not expressed. After the Spanish withdrew from the territory in the 1970s, Western Sahara was annexed by Morocco and Mauritania in 1976. In 1979, Mauritania renounced ‘its share’ of this land and Morocco constructed a 2,700-kilometre wall with landmines alongside that has retained the Polisario. Since then, Western Sahara has been a territory administered de facto by Morocco.

In September 1991 and after 16 years of war, a truce was signed by the parties of the conflict. Still, the intended plebiscite of auto-determination for Western Sahara has been recurrently suspended, as there seems to be no consensus between Rabat and the Polisario Front – who the UN considers to be the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people – over the conformation of the electorate and the status of the zone. A political settlement in Western Sahara has been even more difficult after Morocco intervened last month. According to Morocco, the country had merely erected a “security cordon”.

The Polisario Front considered the truce with Morocco to be over after Morocco’s attacks. Bachir Sayed, the Polisario Front leader, stated that the 13th of November was a turning point in the Saharawi national struggle and stressed how Sahrawi people support the Polisario Front. On that day, Moroccan soldiers had shot at civilians who had been protesting against what they consider to be Morocco’s exploitation of reserves. Sayed suggested that the war of national liberation was caused by Morocco’s violation of the ceasefire and the UN’s indifference. Since last month, the UN has multiplied its efforts to prevent further escalation in the Buffer Strip in the Guerguerat area. Morocco’s position on the sovereignty of the Guerguerat area is that it is a ‘no man’s land’; while the Front considers it its ground, appealing to the agreement signed by all parties in 1991. This back-and-forth between both sides is a continuation of previous themes of the territorial dispute. During these decades, the UN has been trying to balance the possible applications of sovereignty and self-determination. Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson of the UN, alleged that both Morocco and the Polisario should show some responsibility. Regarding how this unsolved dispute has affected the Sahrawi population, Amnesty International highlights that human rights abuses have been committed in the disputed territory over the last 40 years.

The Sahrawi population has waited for a legal referendum that has not yet arrived. Although this ceasefire was thought to entail peace, the absence of active conflict does not mean that the dispute has settled. The promise of a referendum remains crucial, especially for the many exiled Sahrawis involuntarily living in camps near Tindouf. Still, there seems to be no consensus regarding the census for a referendum for the West Sahara natives. Adding fuel to the fire, President Trump newly recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara via Twitter as compensation for the normalisation of Morocco-Israel relations. While this can account for the existing trade relations between Rabat and Washington, Trump’s announcement shows little engagement with the conflict itself and the pleas of the Sahrawi’s.

In the future, the international community will continue to observe how Western Sahara events unfold, most likely with significant concern. Ironically enough, the etymology of the word ‘referendum’ means ‘that must be brought back or taken back’. Concerning the Sahrawi community, maybe the word choice of ‘election’ would be more accurate, as one cannot have back what one never had. In this sense, it is consistent to state that those who were part of the problem should be part of the solution. The UN should embrace a new approach, as this strategy has not proved efficient for the last decades. If the Sahrawi people had the choice of independence or incorporation to Morocco, this setting would feasibly alter.

Sonia is an MA International Affairs student at KCL. She holds a Bachelor in Modern Languages from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. In her Bachelor thesis she explored the use of language in the context of the Spanish Civil War. She is a gastronomy enthusiast. Sonia follows International Security issues with particular interest.

Libya strikes historic ceasefire but prospects for peace remain limited

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by Rafaella Piyioti

Libya Map with Flag Pin. Source: iStockPhoto

At present, Libya’s two governments, each with their own parliament and central bank system, are competing for power. The situation is further complicated by the overlapping and intersecting involvement of regional and international actors. On the 23 October 2020 an UN-mediated ceasefire was signed to establish the foundations for peace in the country. This agreement is the result of a series of UN-led talks between Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, leader of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and General Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA). To ensure a successful peace settlement in Libya, the disarmament of domestic militia organisations and the withdrawal of foreign forces is of paramount importance. Moreover, to understand the complexities of the civil war in Libya and the fragility of the UN ceasefire agreement, it is essential to focus on the role of foreign actors in Libya.

Since the toppling of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, civil war has raged across Libya. While the Colonel’s pan-Arabist leanings granted the country strong regional influence, his financing of terrorism led to frequent confrontations with the West. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya entered a new era of instability and insecurity. From this General Haftar has emerged as a self-proclaimed new Libyan leader, aiming to establish his own military rule over the nation with the support of various regional and international actors.  The UN, in a bid to establish stable civilian governance and prevent domestic militias from gaining control of the country, instead supported the formation the GNA in 2016.

Failing thus far to unify Libya, the GNA has only managed to establish its authority in Tripoli and has been engaged in long-term fighting with Haftar’s LNA. Libyan domestic militias are divided between those who support the GNA and those who support Haftar. Haftar promised his supporters military control of the country based on the Egyptian model of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his campaign against political Islam has led many regional actors to form alliances with him. Egypt, the UAE and Israel provided political support and funding to Haftar, in an attempt to prevent radical Islamist groups from gaining control of Libya and advancing their regional influence.

In the past year, the conflict between the GNA and the LNA has intensified, piquing when Haftar’s troops invaded Tripoli on the 4th April 2019. Since then, foreign actors have played an increasingly decisive role in how events have unfolded.

In January 2020, Turkey signed an agreement with the GNA to provide military support and send mercenaries to al-Sarraj’s army. Turkey’s alliance with the GNA is an extension of its current foreign policy, to advance its regional influence, using a politically pro-Islam rhetoric. Al -Sarraj, is accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation known for its Pan-Islam ideology, that calls for the unity of all Muslims worldwide, and its alliance with Turkey. Erdogan’s support to the GNA led Israel, Egypt and the UAE to increase their support to General Haftar to counter the rise of political Islam.

Russia, although one of the ‘Permanent Five’ members on the UN Security Council, supports Haftar’s LNA, offering military aid in an attempt to advance its own geopolitical influence in the region. Post-Soviet Russia has struggled to establish itself as a recognised global power and Libya’s strategic position offers Russia options for both naval and air bases which could support its activities in the region. Haftar’s troops, establishing a number of defence contracts with Russia, have also served as an economic boon. Nonetheless, following the escalation of violence in Libya, President Putin has joined the German Chancellor Merkel and the British Prime Minister Johnson, in calling the two Libyan leaders to negotiate a ceasefire agreement.

France, another member of the ‘Permanent Five’, has also supported Haftar, though this has not always been the case, with its overarching foreign policy on Libya being more ambiguous. While initially a neutral actor, Turkey’s involvement in Libya pushed France towards Haftar’s LNA as the two countries are experiencing increased tensions over their conflicted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Macron’s opposition to radical Islam, is yet another contributing factor in France’s alliance with Haftar, who has established an anti-Islamist political campaign in Libya to counter the rise of Islamist militias.

In the absence of a holistic European Union policy towards Libya, France pledged an alliance with Haftar, joined by Greece and Cyprus.  This is mainly due to their political dispute with Turkey on the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis. Other EU states have formed their own policies on Libya.  Italy has long established historic and strategic interests in Libya and is one of the only EU member states that supports the GNA over the LNA. Not only does Italy depend on Libyan hydrocarbons, but it has also reached a deal with the GNA to cooperate in countering illegal migration and human trafficking. Libya thus serves as an opportunity for Italy to maintain its interests and advance its own influence in the region.

Following a year of intensive fighting Haftar and al-Sarraj signed an UN-initiated ceasefire agreement on the 23 October 2020. The ceasefire, welcomed by the UN and the EU, is an important step towards the re-establishing peace in Libya. The UK and Germany offered to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which has set a timeline of three months for the disarmament of domestic militias and for foreign actors to withdraw from Libya. Yet, there remains a feeling of mistrust between al-Sarraj and Haftar which could undermine the prospect of a long-lasting peace. The three months’ timeframe is almost over, and the LNA has already accused Turkey of continuing its presence in Libya. For peace and stability, it is necessary that foreign actors, whether regional or international, follow the rules of the ceasefire agreement and withdraw their troops from Libya.

The UN, as the body traditionally at the forefront of global conflict mediation, should therefore lead efforts to ensure that all parties are following the ceasefire rules. Still, even if Turkey exits Libya, important challenges will remain. A tenuous peace and real political unity are two completely different things. As long as the ideological and political differences between the GNA’s policy of promoting political Islam, and the LNA’s anti-Islamist campaign remain unaddressed, political unity cannot be achieved.

While the UN ceasefire agreement is an important step towards lasting peace, without the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to the pursuit of regional interests through Libya, the conflict will inevitably continue. A ceasefire shows that there is a willingness, or at least a possibility, for peace. What remains now is for the GNA and LNA to be given the space and impetus to seize the opportunity for a lasting peace.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy.

She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking.

Rafaela is a Staff Writer at Strife.

EU Migration Mismanagement: Canary Islands the new Lesbos?

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by Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell

Hundreds of migrants crammed in unseaworthy boats.
Source: Council of Europe

Migrants embarking in unseaworthy boats from Northern and Western African shores or making arduous overland journeys on foot from Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria or Afghanistan, to reach Europe demonstrate the harsh reality of irregular migration. These movements are normally prompted by the perilous circumstances such as wars, ethnical violence or scarcity of essential resources affecting their home countries.

In addition to their tough past and uncertain future, many migrants find themselves alone and vulnerable in foreign lands, often enduring dangerous, inhumane, and degrading circumstances caused by governmental policies where they arrive. For its part, the EU continues to turn a blind eye to the humanitarian issues underlying such migratory movements, focusing mainly on the associated security and logistical matters. This failure to give help where it is most needed is causing extreme suffering at its borders, proving the lack of empathy and solidarity of EU migration laws and regulations towards the arrivals.

The EU aims to show on occasions, the apparent importance it places on safeguarding migrants, leading the European population to believe its actions are sufficient. Germany´s decision in 2019 to take in vulnerable refugees through the European Resettlement Programme, and the provision of EU aid to Turkey to support refugees escaping from Syria, are just some examples. Both overtures initially appear altruistic; yet closer examination reveals they are, by all accounts, insufficient. In March 2020, when the unsustainable situation in Turkey led it to threaten to allow migrants to cross the border into Greece, the EU acted swiftly by providing aid to Greece to seal its Turkish borders.  This response was not born from a spirit of goodwill and solidarity; as expected, the EU was simply trying to secure its borders to prevent a reignition of the 2015 crisis. Likewise, the response from other powerful European actors, such as the UK and France, to the plight of migrants has been begrudging at best, and shameful at worst, as exemplified by the recent drownings in the English Channel.

Such a lacklustre response is a deeply controversial issue as the EU aims to protect the interests of all Europeans by ensuring their safety and economic growth; but it fails to do enough for the displaced, asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants. The EU is, in effect, preventing genuine refugees from seeking asylum through laws that disregard outsiders by complicating and slowing down such processes, as dictated, for instance, by the Dublin Regulation. Such law, only permits refugees to seek asylum in the country where they arrive, leaving many without protection since the receiving countries, such as Greece, Italy, Malta or Spain, are overwhelmed. Furthermore, through such laws, refugees are being denied their right to freely choose where to live. Denying such protection and freedom is in breach of the human rights upheld by international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, and the 1990 Migrant Workers Convention. This insular and nationalistic approach is dehumanising the lives of those escaping from wars, genocides, terrorist regimes, and the effects of climate change in order to find a place where they can live, instead of remaining in one where they are simply trying to survive.

To confront African migration, the EU is seeking to establish Migration Agreements with third countries in Northern Africa, the ultimate territorial border before the Mediterranean and, hence, European waters. The strong relationship established with Morocco attests to this. Since the 1990s, a series of bilateral re-admission agreements have been signed between Morocco and Spain to cooperate in the control of irregular migration. This cooperation was later complemented by FRONTEX, the EU External Border Agency. In 2013, a new tool was put forward to North African countries as part of the EU Global Approach to Migration. This ‘Mobility Partnerships Facility’, a “long-term framework based on political dialogue and operational cooperation” for collaboration on migration, was accepted by Morocco and Tunisia. Although certain aspects have not yet been finalised, including the controversial readmission issue of third-country nationals (TCN), its implications are visible: higher securitization, and stricter border controls.

West African Maritime Route.
Source: International Organization for Migration

What sounds like a great step forward in helping Morocco to manage the large influx of migrants is, in reality, just shifting part of the migratory issue from the north of Morocco to the south and west, and to southern Sub-Saharan countries such as Senegal, Gambia, and Mauritania, where less control exists. Thus, migrants seeking a better life in Europe now view the more dangerous West African Maritime route, crossing to Spain’s Canary Islands from Africa’s Western Coast, as their only viable option. This is a route that has witnessed over five hundred deaths in 2020, a figure which is likely much higher as not all shipwrecks are reported. Despite the patrols between the archipelago and the African coast, the abundancy of boats has overwhelmed the islands’ rescue and humanitarian services.

As a result, the Canary Islands are currently suffering a  humanitarian emergency and Europe is once again ignoring  another migratory issue affecting its southern border. Migrant arrivals in Spain’s Canary Islands are at their highest level in over a decade. Although the number of migrants arriving in Spain via the Mediterranean Sea has decreased by fifty per cent versus 2019, arrivals in the Canaries have increased by more than a thousand per cent. These are shocking numbers, but they fail to reflect the reality of the harsh journey as one in every sixteen migrants who embarks upon this gruelling journey dies along the way. For example, on 24 October 2020, a boat caught fire off the coast of Senegal and almost all of its 140 occupants drowned.

Problems do not end upon reaching land as Canary Island authorities lack the capacity to manage the enormous influx of migrants. Gran Canaria is the island feeling the heaviest toll, with its reception centres full and over two-thousand people at a time forced to camp on the dockside in the port of Arguineguin. Concurrently, this humanitarian crisis is impeding the maintenance of coronavirus prevention measures, putting at risk the lives of migrants and those involved in their rescue and care. Moreover, due to tedious bureaucratic and legal procedures, further hampered by COVID-19, these migrants are facing another deadlock as the Spanish government has hindered their transfer to other Spanish regions to prevent the establishment of a new migratory route into Europe. This, together with the closure of African countries’ borders due to the pandemic, is effectively converting the islands into an open-air prison for the 18,000 freedom-seekers currently being held on them, mirroring the appalling situation on the Greek island of Lesbos.

The Spanish Government and the EU both believe that protection should only be provided to those who have the right to it and those who comply with the Dublin Regulation. A study on arrivals in the Canary Islands completed by the UN Refugee Agency in 2020 revealed that over sixty-two per cent were escaping from generalised, gender-based, ethnic, religious or political violence, hence having the right to seek asylum; therefore, Spain and the EU are duty-bound to come to their aid. Nevertheless, there are also, the so-called economic migrants, escaping from the hardship exacerbated by COVID-19 in their home countries. This group is not entitled to international protection and such migrants are liable for deportation to their countries of origin.

To some extent, the caution shown by the Spanish authorities and the EU when handling the irregular arrivals is understandable. Whilst some are genuine refugees, striving to reach a destination where their life is not in danger, this does not assuage the fears of the Spanish government and the EU that some may be members of criminal groups, thereby endangering the security of Europe. For this reason, two measures are required: procedures that ensure protection is provided to all those entitled to it under international law; and, in parallel, the creation of safe deportation routes. Without these improvements to guarantee a dignified response, Gran Canaria risks suffering a similar humanitarian catastrophe to the one befalling Lesbos.

Although logistical processes have commenced, with migrants finally being transferred to tourist complexes unoccupied due to COVID-19, and receiving more dignified shelter, the problem remains unresolved as very few migrants are being transferred to other parts of Spain or Europe, or extradited, due to European and Spanish bureaucracy and the pandemic. Unsurprisingly, some experts suggest that a “Call Effect” has been created, as migrants encourage others to make the dangerous journey, putting further strain on the Spanish system, and placing more lives at risk. Consequently, collaboration between the EU, Spain, and African countries to address the underlying factors spurring migration in the countries of origin is the only way forward. It will not be easy, but the push factors driving migrants from Northern Africa to make the perilous voyage to Europe must be addressed to enable a more long-term solution than the piecemeal efforts undertaken to date. Until such a time, the EU’s moral duty must be to offer help and support to all of those who reach its shores.

Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell is a part-time MA International Relations student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interests are around the topics of Migration, especially African migration into Europe, Gender and Human Rights. She is currently a Spanish Red Cross volunteer in the Canary Islands helping with the management of the latest influx of migrants to the islands.

Cristina is a part of the Strife Women in Writing Programme.