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Still asking to vote

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by Sonia Martínez Girón

Photo by Dominik Mecko on Unsplash

There seems to be some sort of 404 error in cartography. Internet maps plainly show ‘no data’ in Western Sahara. How exactly did this global anomaly to the twenty-first-century nation-state construction occur? Most importantly, can it change? Examining diverse perspectives can help venture into what could ease Western Sahara’s socio-political situation.

Western Sahara covers a 266,000-sq-km area within the Sahara Desert on the Atlantic coast of Northwest Africa. In this territory, the sovereignty of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has not been internationally recognised. This is an intricate conflict where numerous parties and identities are involved. Morocco has just initiated military operations in the area, raising tensions within the ‘stable instability’ that characterises the territory and disrupting the brittle ceasefire of the last three decades. The Polisario Front, the pro-independence unit supported by Algeria, is based in Tindouf since 1975. The position of the Polisario is that the irresolution of the Security Council has given it no alternative than to “escalate its fight”, as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been ineffective in preventing confrontations. Despite this state of affairs, the UN has accorded to extend the United Nations mission until 31 October 2021. Historical context can help appreciate the big picture.

To begin, the ‘Spanish Sahara’ was what the Territory of Western Sahara was called between 1884 and 1976, while it was occupied by Spain. It was within the context of the Berlin Conference of 1885 where Spain was permitted to occupy the region over which the country could make historical claims. In 1975, Spain withdrew from the colony. Spain was undergoing a period of instability, in which profound divisions and internal conflict marked by the end of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship. The United Nations (UN) mission had intervened in the territory in response to the Morocco-Mauritania campaign to prevent the self-determination vote that the Spanish government had professed in 1974.

In November of 1975, Hassan II of Morocco took advantage of the circumstances to organise the Green March, a protest aiming to annex the Spanish Sahara to Morocco where troops of volunteers crossed to the Spanish Sahara. Arias Navarro, the Spanish president at the time, ordered the colony to be withdrawn and abandoned. That same year, just days before Franco died, Morocco, Mauritania and Spain signed the Madrid Pact to formally end the Spanish occupancy of the Western Sahara territory, which stated that the decolonisation of the region and the opinions of the Saharan population would be respected. While the treaty came into force, its international recognition was not expressed. After the Spanish withdrew from the territory in the 1970s, Western Sahara was annexed by Morocco and Mauritania in 1976. In 1979, Mauritania renounced ‘its share’ of this land and Morocco constructed a 2,700-kilometre wall with landmines alongside that has retained the Polisario. Since then, Western Sahara has been a territory administered de facto by Morocco.

In September 1991 and after 16 years of war, a truce was signed by the parties of the conflict. Still, the intended plebiscite of auto-determination for Western Sahara has been recurrently suspended, as there seems to be no consensus between Rabat and the Polisario Front – who the UN considers to be the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people – over the conformation of the electorate and the status of the zone. A political settlement in Western Sahara has been even more difficult after Morocco intervened last month. According to Morocco, the country had merely erected a “security cordon”.

The Polisario Front considered the truce with Morocco to be over after Morocco’s attacks. Bachir Sayed, the Polisario Front leader, stated that the 13th of November was a turning point in the Saharawi national struggle and stressed how Sahrawi people support the Polisario Front. On that day, Moroccan soldiers had shot at civilians who had been protesting against what they consider to be Morocco’s exploitation of reserves. Sayed suggested that the war of national liberation was caused by Morocco’s violation of the ceasefire and the UN’s indifference. Since last month, the UN has multiplied its efforts to prevent further escalation in the Buffer Strip in the Guerguerat area. Morocco’s position on the sovereignty of the Guerguerat area is that it is a ‘no man’s land’; while the Front considers it its ground, appealing to the agreement signed by all parties in 1991. This back-and-forth between both sides is a continuation of previous themes of the territorial dispute. During these decades, the UN has been trying to balance the possible applications of sovereignty and self-determination. Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson of the UN, alleged that both Morocco and the Polisario should show some responsibility. Regarding how this unsolved dispute has affected the Sahrawi population, Amnesty International highlights that human rights abuses have been committed in the disputed territory over the last 40 years.

The Sahrawi population has waited for a legal referendum that has not yet arrived. Although this ceasefire was thought to entail peace, the absence of active conflict does not mean that the dispute has settled. The promise of a referendum remains crucial, especially for the many exiled Sahrawis involuntarily living in camps near Tindouf. Still, there seems to be no consensus regarding the census for a referendum for the West Sahara natives. Adding fuel to the fire, President Trump newly recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara via Twitter as compensation for the normalisation of Morocco-Israel relations. While this can account for the existing trade relations between Rabat and Washington, Trump’s announcement shows little engagement with the conflict itself and the pleas of the Sahrawi’s.

In the future, the international community will continue to observe how Western Sahara events unfold, most likely with significant concern. Ironically enough, the etymology of the word ‘referendum’ means ‘that must be brought back or taken back’. Concerning the Sahrawi community, maybe the word choice of ‘election’ would be more accurate, as one cannot have back what one never had. In this sense, it is consistent to state that those who were part of the problem should be part of the solution. The UN should embrace a new approach, as this strategy has not proved efficient for the last decades. If the Sahrawi people had the choice of independence or incorporation to Morocco, this setting would feasibly alter.

Sonia is an MA International Affairs student at KCL. She holds a Bachelor in Modern Languages from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. In her Bachelor thesis she explored the use of language in the context of the Spanish Civil War. She is a gastronomy enthusiast. Sonia follows International Security issues with particular interest.

Libya strikes historic ceasefire but prospects for peace remain limited

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by Rafaella Piyioti

Libya Map with Flag Pin. Source: iStockPhoto

At present, Libya’s two governments, each with their own parliament and central bank system, are competing for power. The situation is further complicated by the overlapping and intersecting involvement of regional and international actors. On the 23 October 2020 an UN-mediated ceasefire was signed to establish the foundations for peace in the country. This agreement is the result of a series of UN-led talks between Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, leader of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and General Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA). To ensure a successful peace settlement in Libya, the disarmament of domestic militia organisations and the withdrawal of foreign forces is of paramount importance. Moreover, to understand the complexities of the civil war in Libya and the fragility of the UN ceasefire agreement, it is essential to focus on the role of foreign actors in Libya.

Since the toppling of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, civil war has raged across Libya. While the Colonel’s pan-Arabist leanings granted the country strong regional influence, his financing of terrorism led to frequent confrontations with the West. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya entered a new era of instability and insecurity. From this General Haftar has emerged as a self-proclaimed new Libyan leader, aiming to establish his own military rule over the nation with the support of various regional and international actors.  The UN, in a bid to establish stable civilian governance and prevent domestic militias from gaining control of the country, instead supported the formation the GNA in 2016.

Failing thus far to unify Libya, the GNA has only managed to establish its authority in Tripoli and has been engaged in long-term fighting with Haftar’s LNA. Libyan domestic militias are divided between those who support the GNA and those who support Haftar. Haftar promised his supporters military control of the country based on the Egyptian model of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his campaign against political Islam has led many regional actors to form alliances with him. Egypt, the UAE and Israel provided political support and funding to Haftar, in an attempt to prevent radical Islamist groups from gaining control of Libya and advancing their regional influence.

In the past year, the conflict between the GNA and the LNA has intensified, piquing when Haftar’s troops invaded Tripoli on the 4th April 2019. Since then, foreign actors have played an increasingly decisive role in how events have unfolded.

In January 2020, Turkey signed an agreement with the GNA to provide military support and send mercenaries to al-Sarraj’s army. Turkey’s alliance with the GNA is an extension of its current foreign policy, to advance its regional influence, using a politically pro-Islam rhetoric. Al -Sarraj, is accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation known for its Pan-Islam ideology, that calls for the unity of all Muslims worldwide, and its alliance with Turkey. Erdogan’s support to the GNA led Israel, Egypt and the UAE to increase their support to General Haftar to counter the rise of political Islam.

Russia, although one of the ‘Permanent Five’ members on the UN Security Council, supports Haftar’s LNA, offering military aid in an attempt to advance its own geopolitical influence in the region. Post-Soviet Russia has struggled to establish itself as a recognised global power and Libya’s strategic position offers Russia options for both naval and air bases which could support its activities in the region. Haftar’s troops, establishing a number of defence contracts with Russia, have also served as an economic boon. Nonetheless, following the escalation of violence in Libya, President Putin has joined the German Chancellor Merkel and the British Prime Minister Johnson, in calling the two Libyan leaders to negotiate a ceasefire agreement.

France, another member of the ‘Permanent Five’, has also supported Haftar, though this has not always been the case, with its overarching foreign policy on Libya being more ambiguous. While initially a neutral actor, Turkey’s involvement in Libya pushed France towards Haftar’s LNA as the two countries are experiencing increased tensions over their conflicted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Macron’s opposition to radical Islam, is yet another contributing factor in France’s alliance with Haftar, who has established an anti-Islamist political campaign in Libya to counter the rise of Islamist militias.

In the absence of a holistic European Union policy towards Libya, France pledged an alliance with Haftar, joined by Greece and Cyprus.  This is mainly due to their political dispute with Turkey on the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis. Other EU states have formed their own policies on Libya.  Italy has long established historic and strategic interests in Libya and is one of the only EU member states that supports the GNA over the LNA. Not only does Italy depend on Libyan hydrocarbons, but it has also reached a deal with the GNA to cooperate in countering illegal migration and human trafficking. Libya thus serves as an opportunity for Italy to maintain its interests and advance its own influence in the region.

Following a year of intensive fighting Haftar and al-Sarraj signed an UN-initiated ceasefire agreement on the 23 October 2020. The ceasefire, welcomed by the UN and the EU, is an important step towards the re-establishing peace in Libya. The UK and Germany offered to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which has set a timeline of three months for the disarmament of domestic militias and for foreign actors to withdraw from Libya. Yet, there remains a feeling of mistrust between al-Sarraj and Haftar which could undermine the prospect of a long-lasting peace. The three months’ timeframe is almost over, and the LNA has already accused Turkey of continuing its presence in Libya. For peace and stability, it is necessary that foreign actors, whether regional or international, follow the rules of the ceasefire agreement and withdraw their troops from Libya.

The UN, as the body traditionally at the forefront of global conflict mediation, should therefore lead efforts to ensure that all parties are following the ceasefire rules. Still, even if Turkey exits Libya, important challenges will remain. A tenuous peace and real political unity are two completely different things. As long as the ideological and political differences between the GNA’s policy of promoting political Islam, and the LNA’s anti-Islamist campaign remain unaddressed, political unity cannot be achieved.

While the UN ceasefire agreement is an important step towards lasting peace, without the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to the pursuit of regional interests through Libya, the conflict will inevitably continue. A ceasefire shows that there is a willingness, or at least a possibility, for peace. What remains now is for the GNA and LNA to be given the space and impetus to seize the opportunity for a lasting peace.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy.

She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking.

Rafaela is a Staff Writer at Strife.

EU Migration Mismanagement: Canary Islands the new Lesbos?

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by Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell

Hundreds of migrants crammed in unseaworthy boats.
Source: Council of Europe

Migrants embarking in unseaworthy boats from Northern and Western African shores or making arduous overland journeys on foot from Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria or Afghanistan, to reach Europe demonstrate the harsh reality of irregular migration. These movements are normally prompted by the perilous circumstances such as wars, ethnical violence or scarcity of essential resources affecting their home countries.

In addition to their tough past and uncertain future, many migrants find themselves alone and vulnerable in foreign lands, often enduring dangerous, inhumane, and degrading circumstances caused by governmental policies where they arrive. For its part, the EU continues to turn a blind eye to the humanitarian issues underlying such migratory movements, focusing mainly on the associated security and logistical matters. This failure to give help where it is most needed is causing extreme suffering at its borders, proving the lack of empathy and solidarity of EU migration laws and regulations towards the arrivals.

The EU aims to show on occasions, the apparent importance it places on safeguarding migrants, leading the European population to believe its actions are sufficient. Germany´s decision in 2019 to take in vulnerable refugees through the European Resettlement Programme, and the provision of EU aid to Turkey to support refugees escaping from Syria, are just some examples. Both overtures initially appear altruistic; yet closer examination reveals they are, by all accounts, insufficient. In March 2020, when the unsustainable situation in Turkey led it to threaten to allow migrants to cross the border into Greece, the EU acted swiftly by providing aid to Greece to seal its Turkish borders.  This response was not born from a spirit of goodwill and solidarity; as expected, the EU was simply trying to secure its borders to prevent a reignition of the 2015 crisis. Likewise, the response from other powerful European actors, such as the UK and France, to the plight of migrants has been begrudging at best, and shameful at worst, as exemplified by the recent drownings in the English Channel.

Such a lacklustre response is a deeply controversial issue as the EU aims to protect the interests of all Europeans by ensuring their safety and economic growth; but it fails to do enough for the displaced, asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants. The EU is, in effect, preventing genuine refugees from seeking asylum through laws that disregard outsiders by complicating and slowing down such processes, as dictated, for instance, by the Dublin Regulation. Such law, only permits refugees to seek asylum in the country where they arrive, leaving many without protection since the receiving countries, such as Greece, Italy, Malta or Spain, are overwhelmed. Furthermore, through such laws, refugees are being denied their right to freely choose where to live. Denying such protection and freedom is in breach of the human rights upheld by international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, and the 1990 Migrant Workers Convention. This insular and nationalistic approach is dehumanising the lives of those escaping from wars, genocides, terrorist regimes, and the effects of climate change in order to find a place where they can live, instead of remaining in one where they are simply trying to survive.

To confront African migration, the EU is seeking to establish Migration Agreements with third countries in Northern Africa, the ultimate territorial border before the Mediterranean and, hence, European waters. The strong relationship established with Morocco attests to this. Since the 1990s, a series of bilateral re-admission agreements have been signed between Morocco and Spain to cooperate in the control of irregular migration. This cooperation was later complemented by FRONTEX, the EU External Border Agency. In 2013, a new tool was put forward to North African countries as part of the EU Global Approach to Migration. This ‘Mobility Partnerships Facility’, a “long-term framework based on political dialogue and operational cooperation” for collaboration on migration, was accepted by Morocco and Tunisia. Although certain aspects have not yet been finalised, including the controversial readmission issue of third-country nationals (TCN), its implications are visible: higher securitization, and stricter border controls.

West African Maritime Route.
Source: International Organization for Migration

What sounds like a great step forward in helping Morocco to manage the large influx of migrants is, in reality, just shifting part of the migratory issue from the north of Morocco to the south and west, and to southern Sub-Saharan countries such as Senegal, Gambia, and Mauritania, where less control exists. Thus, migrants seeking a better life in Europe now view the more dangerous West African Maritime route, crossing to Spain’s Canary Islands from Africa’s Western Coast, as their only viable option. This is a route that has witnessed over five hundred deaths in 2020, a figure which is likely much higher as not all shipwrecks are reported. Despite the patrols between the archipelago and the African coast, the abundancy of boats has overwhelmed the islands’ rescue and humanitarian services.

As a result, the Canary Islands are currently suffering a  humanitarian emergency and Europe is once again ignoring  another migratory issue affecting its southern border. Migrant arrivals in Spain’s Canary Islands are at their highest level in over a decade. Although the number of migrants arriving in Spain via the Mediterranean Sea has decreased by fifty per cent versus 2019, arrivals in the Canaries have increased by more than a thousand per cent. These are shocking numbers, but they fail to reflect the reality of the harsh journey as one in every sixteen migrants who embarks upon this gruelling journey dies along the way. For example, on 24 October 2020, a boat caught fire off the coast of Senegal and almost all of its 140 occupants drowned.

Problems do not end upon reaching land as Canary Island authorities lack the capacity to manage the enormous influx of migrants. Gran Canaria is the island feeling the heaviest toll, with its reception centres full and over two-thousand people at a time forced to camp on the dockside in the port of Arguineguin. Concurrently, this humanitarian crisis is impeding the maintenance of coronavirus prevention measures, putting at risk the lives of migrants and those involved in their rescue and care. Moreover, due to tedious bureaucratic and legal procedures, further hampered by COVID-19, these migrants are facing another deadlock as the Spanish government has hindered their transfer to other Spanish regions to prevent the establishment of a new migratory route into Europe. This, together with the closure of African countries’ borders due to the pandemic, is effectively converting the islands into an open-air prison for the 18,000 freedom-seekers currently being held on them, mirroring the appalling situation on the Greek island of Lesbos.

The Spanish Government and the EU both believe that protection should only be provided to those who have the right to it and those who comply with the Dublin Regulation. A study on arrivals in the Canary Islands completed by the UN Refugee Agency in 2020 revealed that over sixty-two per cent were escaping from generalised, gender-based, ethnic, religious or political violence, hence having the right to seek asylum; therefore, Spain and the EU are duty-bound to come to their aid. Nevertheless, there are also, the so-called economic migrants, escaping from the hardship exacerbated by COVID-19 in their home countries. This group is not entitled to international protection and such migrants are liable for deportation to their countries of origin.

To some extent, the caution shown by the Spanish authorities and the EU when handling the irregular arrivals is understandable. Whilst some are genuine refugees, striving to reach a destination where their life is not in danger, this does not assuage the fears of the Spanish government and the EU that some may be members of criminal groups, thereby endangering the security of Europe. For this reason, two measures are required: procedures that ensure protection is provided to all those entitled to it under international law; and, in parallel, the creation of safe deportation routes. Without these improvements to guarantee a dignified response, Gran Canaria risks suffering a similar humanitarian catastrophe to the one befalling Lesbos.

Although logistical processes have commenced, with migrants finally being transferred to tourist complexes unoccupied due to COVID-19, and receiving more dignified shelter, the problem remains unresolved as very few migrants are being transferred to other parts of Spain or Europe, or extradited, due to European and Spanish bureaucracy and the pandemic. Unsurprisingly, some experts suggest that a “Call Effect” has been created, as migrants encourage others to make the dangerous journey, putting further strain on the Spanish system, and placing more lives at risk. Consequently, collaboration between the EU, Spain, and African countries to address the underlying factors spurring migration in the countries of origin is the only way forward. It will not be easy, but the push factors driving migrants from Northern Africa to make the perilous voyage to Europe must be addressed to enable a more long-term solution than the piecemeal efforts undertaken to date. Until such a time, the EU’s moral duty must be to offer help and support to all of those who reach its shores.

Cristina Romero-Caballero Cuttell is a part-time MA International Relations student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interests are around the topics of Migration, especially African migration into Europe, Gender and Human Rights. She is currently a Spanish Red Cross volunteer in the Canary Islands helping with the management of the latest influx of migrants to the islands.

Cristina is a part of the Strife Women in Writing Programme.

Feature – Tigray: A Potential Humanitarian Crisis

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by Philip Mayne

Militia from the Amhara border region with Tigray rides out to face the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Ethiopia, 9 November 2020 (Image credit: Reuters/Tiksa Negeri)

In 2018 the newly appointed Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed formally brought an end to the Ethiopia-Eritrean War. The armed conflict, fought between 1998 and 2000 following the invasion of Badme by Eritrean forces, killed around 80,000 people and resulted in nearly two decades of tension between the two countries. It was in 2019 that PM Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing peace to Ethiopia. Less than a year later, in October 2020, Ethiopia faces a civil war between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Abiy’s government. Following a reported attack from Tigray regional forces, Abiy ordered a military offensive in the Tigray region on 4 November 2020. The conflict is quickly becoming a major security concern for the country and its neighbours in the Horn of Africa. As the violence increases, there are increasing signs of a potential humanitarian crisis and instability in the region. Hundreds have already been killed, both sides are claiming war crimes, and thousands of refugees are fleeing the country.

The source of the conflict

The TPLF dominated Ethiopian politics between 1991 and 2019 as part of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was made up of four parties each one representing each ethnic group in the country. Although all four parties were intended to have equal representation, the EPRDF was dominated by the TPLF, resulting in ethnic-based inequality and tensions. Following protests for reform, in 2019 Prime Minister Abiy merged former member parties of the EPRDF, and other ethnic parties that had been overlooked by the EPRDF, into the Prosperity Party (PP) in an attempt to have fairer representation in central government. However, the TPLF opposed the merger because they would lose their disproportionate influence, as Tigrayans only constitute six per cent of the population. The TPLF made a statement, claiming that the merging of the parties would be akin to bringing together “fire and hay”, and called for the public to oppose the reforms. Rising opposition to the government led to an increase in tensions between the TPLF and Abiy Ahmed.

In August 2020, landmark elections were meant to be held in Ethiopia; this was to be the Prosperity Party’s first electoral campaign. However, in March 2020 it was declared that all national and regional elections were to be postponed due to the coronavirus outbreak. Opposition groups questioned the decision, claiming that the prime minister was deliberately refusing to hold the elections. Tigray took the unilateral decision to hold regional elections in defiance of the governments’ demands on 8 September 2020. The Prime minister declared the election as illegal and compared them to the construction of shanties by ‘illegal dwellers.’ In October, the federal government began to withhold funds for social welfare programs in retaliation to the ‘illegal’ elections in Tigray.

(Image credit: VOA)

By November tensions between the government and the Tigray region had reached boiling point, and on 4 November Abiy ordered the military to enter the Tigray region, reportedly in response to an attack on government forces by the TPLF. Abiy warned Tigray’s leaders that there is no place for ‘criminal elements’ in Ethiopia, adding that they would ‘extract these criminal elements [from Tigray and] relaunch our country on a path to sustainable prosperity for all.’ The TPLF, however, see the use of troops as punishment for the September vote, and an act of aggression. Debretsion Gebremichael, President of the Tigray region, said: ‘what has been initiated against us is clearly a war, an invasion … this is a war we’re conducting to preserve our existence.’

The government declared a six-month state of emergency across the Tigray region on 5 November. The declaration grants the government the power to suspend political and democratic rights. It also allows for the government to impose curfews, searches without warrants, communications and transportation restrictions and the detention of any person or suspect that is taking part in illegal activities. Under these regulations, Prime Minister Abiy had cut all communication and transport links to the Tigray region.

A humanitarian disaster?

At the time of writing, Ethiopia appears to be on the brink of a potentially long and bloody civil war. The fighting is already believed to have claimed the lives of hundreds of people and fighting has spread across the region. Even with the government cutting off all media and communication with the Tigray region, there have already been reports of atrocities across the region. Amnesty International reported that a massacre occurred in Tigray on 9 November possibly killing hundreds. Amnesty International has been unable to establish who is responsible for the hacking to death of civilians on 9 November. However, witnesses claim that both have been killing civilians. If the situation worsens, there are concerns that this will result in a major humanitarian crisis. The UN has warned that “if the Tigray national (and) regional forces and Ethiopian Government forces continue down the path they are on, there is a risk this situation will spiral totally out of control”.

Not only are civilians at risk of being killed by violence, but because government forces have closed the roads to Tigray, aid agencies are struggling to reach the most vulnerable; prior to the conflict there were already 96,000 Eritrean refugees living in Tigray and 100,000 internally displaced people. Currently, the UN provides food for 600,000 people in Tigray and there have already been shortages of basic commodities such as flour. There have also been cuts to essential services such as electricity and water. If the conflict continues, the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia will continue to worsen.

In less than two weeks, the fighting in Tigray has resulted in at least 21,000 refugees fleeing the violence into Sudan. One border point, which can typically accommodate 300 refugees, is currently overwhelmed with 6,000 people. If the conflict continues, it is expected that potentially hundreds of thousands of people may flee the violence.

Prospects for de-escalation/improvement

At present, the future for Ethiopia looks bleak. The country is on the cusp of a major humanitarian crisis, akin to the suffering endured during Ethiopia’s civil war of the 1980s. The flow of refugees is putting pressure on to neighbouring countries, and the conflict seems to be worsening. On 13 November reports of troops firing into the Amhara region, an area that backs the Abiy government raises fears that the conflict could spread across more regions of the country. Today, some reports also claim that Tigrayan forces have fired into Eritrea, with the TPLF forces suggesting that Eritrean forces are supporting the Ethiopian government. Relations between the TPLF leaders and Isaias Afwerki, the ruler of Eritrea, have been poor for decades. Eritrean conscription, a call-up of retired Eritrean senior officers, and troop movements towards to border have recently worsened tensions between the TPLF and its northern neighbour. If the violence in Ethiopia cannot be abated, then the conflict has the potential to spill further into Eritrea, and potentially into powers across the Horn of Africa.

However, there are efforts that can help alleviate the humanitarian crisis. One of the main issues concerns the ability of aid to reach the most vulnerable. Every day without aid the thousands of vulnerable people in the region become more vulnerable as access to necessities is becoming increasingly harder. The UN is negotiating with both sides for humanitarian corridors to be opened, but as of yet, they are still unable to enter the region. The government must open the Tigray region to aid agencies to begin alleviating the suffering of the Ethiopian people. One of the major concerns for the UN is food insecurity in the region. Currently, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council says that it has enough resources to meet the needs of 300,000 people until January 2021, half of those that needed it before the conflict, and the Joint Emergency Operation Plan NGO says that it needs to restock in December 2020 to ensure it can continue to assist the population. Without a resupply of food, there are fears that hundreds of thousands of people will be left without access to food. The UN reports show a similar situation for medicine and emergency supplies.

The most pressing priority is bringing about a cessation of hostilities to stop the violence before the conflict escalates into a protracted civil war that could further destabilise the region. Analysts have argued that it is not too late to stop the war from spiralling out of control. Pressure must be applied to get both parties to agree to a ceasefire. The United Nations Secretary-General has called for “all stakeholders to take urgent steps to calm tensions in the country and to resolve challenges through an inclusive and peaceful dialogue”. But if more pressure is applied from parties within Ethiopia, its neighbours in the Horn of Africa, the African Union and abroad, then perhaps the parties may be brought to the negotiating table and to agree on a potential ceasefire. By stopping the fighting, opening the Tigray region, a humanitarian disaster could be averted.

The best-case scenario for Ethiopia would be for both the TPLF and the Abiy Government to agree to a ceasefire, both communication and transport links would be opened in Tigray allowing for aid to reach those who need it. The worst-case would be the escalation of violence, resulting in a catastrophic humanitarian disaster, the deaths of thousands of Ethiopians and potentially destabilise the region. The current circumstances indicate the worst-case scenario is more likely to become the reality, as Prime Minister Abiy said on 17 November that the chance for a ceasefire has expired, and the TPLF have reiterated that they will not back down. Therefore, there must be more international pressure on both parties to change their position and come to the negotiating table.

Philip Mayne is a final year PhD candidate at the University of Hull. He has a special interest in strategy, counterinsurgency, military ethics, military history, international security and relations. His thesis examines the relationship between military ethics and military effectiveness. Specifically, his work focuses on adherence to the Just War Tradition, and success in counterinsurgencies; through analysing the case studies of the Malayan Emergency, the Kenyan Emergency, the Algerian War and the Vietnam War. Philip has contributed to the Huffington Post and is an active member of the Hull University War Studies Research Group. Find him on Twitter @phil_mayne.

Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front and its Violence: Liberia’s Charles Taylor, Colonial Legacies, and Oppressive Rule

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by Edit Kruk

“The Slaughterhouse” where rebel civil war victims were butchered. Kailahun, eastern Sierra Leone, pictured on 23 April 2012 (Image credit: Reuters/Finbarr O’Reilly)

Proxy warfare and warlord politics in the African region, symptomatic of longstanding colonial legacies, play out in states that are on the brink of collapse and where the state leader, desperate to preserve a grasp on power, will privatise security in exchange for natural resources whilst neglecting other essential functions of the state. This article will argue that under the conditions of proxy warfare and warlord patronage, the Civil War that raged in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002 can be linked to the figure of Charles Taylor, a Liberian warlord financed by the trade of illicit blood diamonds.

In March of 1991, a group of rebels known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed the Liberian border and entered the Kailahun District in neighbouring Sierra Leone. This action initiated a civil war that lasted over a decade, displacing two million people. Its body count of 75,000 and another 20,000 mutilated renders it one of the most violent conflicts in history. As a force, the RUF specialised in the hacking of limbs and tongues, rape, and the wide use of child soldiers (with estimates of recruited children under the age of 14 being around 10,000). The faction was organised by Foday Sankoh, who met Taylor at an insurgency training camp in Libya. Both warlords shared a keen interest in Pan-Africanism—a movement that promoted a politically unified Africa and criticised the neo-colonial regime—which formed the backbone of the RUF’s ideology.

During the Sierra Leone Civil War, Sankoh received resources, arms and troops from Taylor in return for a physical extension to the Liberian Civil War (1989-96). Even though Charles Taylor was most commonly known for initiating the first Liberian Civil War in an attempt to liberate the state from the fraudulent and corrupt government of Samuel Doe, the connection between Taylor and the Sierra Leone Civil War was indisputable. The warlord’s interest in the region was as early as the 1980s as indicated by his request to Joseph Momoh (President of Sierra Leone during 1985-1992) to use Sierra Leone as a launchpad for his rebellion, but Momoh refused. Taylor’s warlordism solidified as a result of Momoh harbouring Nigerian forces (ECOMOG) that intervened in Liberia in 1990 and in so doing posed a direct challenge to Taylor’s control of the region. Therefore, through the provision of leadership and weapons to the RUF, Taylor crafted the neighbouring state’s instability to his advantage, effectively making it his proxy.

These signposts of Taylor’s influence with the RUF are due an analysis, paying special attention to the ways it shaped strategical decisions and terror tactics. Whilst Taylor was never in effective command of the RUF he was found guilty for the sponsorship of the faction and by default the abetting of the rebellion. However, between 1992-96, the RUF was forced to retreat into the bush and turn to guerrilla warfare, thereby increasing their use of terror to compensate for their lack of adequate equipment. The decline of the faction’s military sophistication came as a result of Taylor no longer sending sufficient resources, a result of a revolt in Liberia which blocked the RUF’s main feeding line. Whilst there was a sufficient link between Taylor and the RUF during the conflict, a deeper structural crisis was already harbouring further violence. This article will study this development through the analysis of the socio-political environment as a product of colonialism and an oppressive regime.

Colonial Legacies

The violent behaviour of Sierra Leone’s rebels becomes less reprehensible when perceived as a means of rebellion against years of colonial rule, rather than a tool of proxy warfare. In 1787, Sierra Leone was established as a settlement for freed slaves and by 1896 it was proclaimed a British protectorate. Creole people, upon their arrival, dominated the civil service employment sector which forced the indigenous population to the periphery of the state, creating the blueprint for a two-class society. The colonial suzerainty of the state can be criticised for embedding a weak bureaucracy and neglecting the local dynamics which divided Sierra Leone into chiefdoms, thereby decentralising the state and fuelling inter-ethnic rivalry by elevating the status of freed slaves above the Temne and Mendi people which made up sixty per cent of the local population. Unsurprisingly, the resulting two-class society and a raging welfare gap were carried into the post-independence period and, thus, an environment predisposed to patrimonialism emerged. Marginalisation and subsequent frustration amongst the youth of Sierra Leone manifested as hypo-aggressive tactics and was symptomatic of colonial legacies.

The feeling of hopelessness that accompanied the youth living in the harsh environment of Sierra Leone was tactically encouraged to manifest as acts of aggression by the RUF leadership. Indeed, the youths’ ideological barrenness when coupled with RUF leaders taking advantage of their lack of knowledge, through the spread of disinformation, was able to fuel drug use, removing their ability to consent, and, ultimately, dehumanising them. Moreover, the extreme violence deployed by the RUF was, in fact, a reflection of a deeper structural crisis of youth and modernity which were facilitated by the removal of Cold War constraints. Subsequently, whilst Taylor’s link to RUF attributes for some of the violent behaviour, colonial grievances set the conditions for the successful appropriation of long-standing local frustrations by warlords, to fulfil their agenda, and thereby create proxies. The Sierra Leonean rebel faction was able to augment considerable support from areas that failed to be emancipated from domestic slavery, itself remnants from the project of decolonisation. However, whilst historical grievances enabled mobilisation, they also proved unsustainable as the violence grew more acute and made the faction an unpopular one.

Oppressive Rule

Siaka Probyn Stevens, leading Sierre Leone from 1967 to 1985, oversaw a regime of aggressive policing that propelled frustration amongst the marginalised population and consequent outbursts of violence. By 1978, Stevens and his All People’s Congress (APC) were able to consolidate one-party rule, that resembled a dictatorship characterised by brutality and totalitarianism. In particular, Stevens closed railway networks that connected the North and the South East of the country in an attempt to prevent civilians from voting against the APC and passed the Killer Bill in 1980 which removed all media outlets other than those that were state-owned. These draconian measures granted Stevens control of the political discourse. Due to the historical context, patrimonialism thrived and Stevens’ rule was defined by a disparity in the dissemination of scarce resources, nepotism, and the subsequent rise of a shadow state.

Resentment towards the oppressive government quickly resulted in the formation of an insurgent people’s army, which exponentially garnered support through its critique of the neo-colonial regime, promising a coup, and the subsequent return to a multiparty democracy. Whilst this argument is convincing in its attribution of the violence committed by the RUF, as a response to the oppressive rule, the same rationale does not account for 9 to 10-year-old children being victims of revenge. For this reason, it is essential to view colonial history, the political context, and potential actors as inseparable and as enabling each other, when attempting to analyse the roots of violence in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Nonetheless, an oppressive regime was a trigger for civilians and radical students to initiate a rebellion in which violence was treated as a vehicle of change. Means of terror have been commonly known to be a response to the collapse of patrimonialism, and symptomatic of new barbarism, both key features of an insurgent movement.

To conclude, Charles Taylor successfully instrumentalised the neighbouring conflict into proxy warfare, thereby perpetuating the Sierra Leonean conflict, while physically extending the Liberian domain. Taylor did not intend to carry the RUF to victory, as the cessation of a stronger connection in 1992 proves. Meanwhile, the violence did not discontinue. Colonial grievances ensured widespread fragmentation and a sense of hopelessness while oppression fostered a desire for change and revenge which ultimately came to fruition in the form of terror, a means of achieving the rebel’s goals. Sierra Leone resembled a microcosm of the conflict that pervaded the rest of the continent, indicating a need to draw stronger parallels between African states for a better understanding of eruptions of violence in the region.

Edit Kruk is a final year (BA) War Studies student with a keen interest in modern slavery and the African region. Narratives through art and the history of early modern Imperial Spain, have been life-long areas of fascination.