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Made in America?: Poland’s Defence Industry

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Polish mobile artillery shown at International Defence Industry Exhibition 2008 in Kielce, Poland. Licensed under Creative Commons.

On 8 March, the Polish government released a statement indicating their eagerness to hand over the country’s entire MiG-29 fleet for use in Ukraine.[1] Warsaw intended to transfer the jets to Ramstein Air Base in Germany at the disposal of the U.S. government, in exchange for a purchase of similarly-capable American-made aircraft.[2] While the scheme is unlikely to go forward, Warsaw’s request reveals a two-pronged strategy for its own national defence: 1) bolstering Ukraine’s capabilities to contest Russian military power in Europe, and 2) accelerating Poland’s defence modernization efforts. The request also perfectly captures the limits of Poland’s domestic arms industry. Throughout the last decade of crises, the Polish government has struggled to invest in and reform its domestic arms industry, antithetical to its stated objective of not only modernising, but also autonomizing, its national defence.

Military transformation has defence industrial implications that require systematic examination.[3] In the post-Communist era, Poland’s defence industry remained geared towards the production of Soviet-type equipment that was exported to countries such as India well into the 2000s, despite those weapons becoming increasingly obsolete in the Polish military itself.[4] While some production of legacy systems needed to be sustained in order to maintain and modify the Soviet-era systems that the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) did use, it was also decided that industrial restructuring was needed to become a ‘labour-saving, capital-intensive professional fighting force’[5] inter-operable with NATO allies.[6]

The Polish government’s military modernization plans were defined along the lines of strengthening its territorial defence, becoming an exemplary member of the North Atlantic Alliance, and bolstering Polish defence industry capabilities.[7] While Poland maintains a Euro-Atlantic security posture and holds its relationship with the United States in the highest regard, both the current PiS-led government and its predecessor, Civic Platform, emphasised ‘Polishness’ in defence development.[8] Pandering to a domestic industrial base is on point for a populist government such as PiS, but there are pragmatic, material reasons for this emphasis as well. By relying on itself as much as possible for weapons procurement, Warsaw could prove its military prowess within NATO, increase its export of weapons systems, and fortify its territory against potential Russian attacks. Moreover, increased defence autonomy would provide insulation against shifts in American foreign policy, as well as the turbulence of Brussels’ attempts to develop the European Union’s own defence autonomy.[9]

Accordingly, Poland’s initial defence modernisation plans were designed to not only contribute more militarily within existing transatlantic security structures, but also increase Poland’s defence autonomy. The 2012 Armed Forces Modernization Plan (PMT) provided the structural roadmap for the country’s military procurement through 2022. The “Komorowski Doctrine,” named after then-President Bronisław Komorowski and outlined in the 2013 White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, framed Poland’s own defensive potential as the “core”[10] of Poland’s national security system. A decade later Warsaw has fallen short of its goals with respect to domestic industrial development.[11]

Overwhelmingly, the Polish government has opted to expedite and/or expand foreign imports of weapons systems. In 2013, Tomasz Szatkowski declared this as inevitable, if not ideal, given that “the small or medium state does not create the conditions for a comprehensive defence industrial base.”[12] However, this position ignores the strengths of defence industries in other nearby countries that are similar to Poland in economic and technological terms, such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Furthermore, Szatkowski’s comment neglects the political power Warsaw has to utilise domestic scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities in order to boost the Polish defence industry. Indeed, the Polish defence industry has developed some formidable systems such as WB group’s Topaz integrated command system, the SAMOC and Łowcza-Reha anti-aircraft defence systems, the SCOT ship command system, and other communications and unmanned systems.[13] In 2016, Warsaw abandoned a deal with Airbus in order to pursue a contract with local producer PZL-Mielec, a Sikorsky Aircraft subsidiary, for Black Hawk helicopters.[14]

Despite these triumphs, there are both structural and political obstacles to increased contracts for Polish arms manufacturers. The Polish government has made clear its own quips with its defence industrial base, most notably structural inefficiencies, delays, high costs, and lack of funding.[15] These are co-dependent variables. By 2013, the remnants of the Cold War-era Polish defence industry came under an overarching governing entity, the Polish Armaments Group (PAG) which is state-owned and accounts for most defence production within Poland.[16] Some observers have noted that delays in development and delivery are the result of unrealistic timetables from political leadership and a lack of resources for the Polish military to collect equipment and that a lack of collaboration/communication between political leadership, industry leaders, research centres, and the military disadvantages both state-owned and private Polish companies against foreign competitors.[17] Moreover, many state-owned firms offer foreign licensed products, while some segments of the industry have been acquired by foreign entities, such as PZL Mielec by Sikorsky/Lockheed Martin, and WSK ‘PZL Świdnik’ by Augusta Westland.[18] These foreign subsidiaries perform reasonably well, as does the private segment of the Polish arms industry, which utilises available local technical talent.[19]

Another problem for Poland’s defence modernisation program and industry is the current government’s focus on quantitative gains over technological development. The 2012 PMT prioritised technology over acquisition of large numbers of combat-tested systems, something the then-opposition PiS criticised as defence divestment. While some defence scholars have identified temporary cuts as indicative of modernisation programs that have long-term benefits, the PiS-led government emphasised the need for expedient procurement of high quantities of existing systems and a radical increase in personnel, increasing aggregate defence spending.[20] In order to accomplish this, the Polish government has heavily relied on the purchase of foreign licences and cooperation with international defence contractors.[21] Hundreds of millions of zloty are spent on research programmes, however these are largely theoretical programmes that have little immediate relevance.[22]

Poland’s defence industry struggles with a lack of investment, though there is not a shortage of dollars for defence in the state budget. Poland has long been one of the handful of NATO Europe members that spends over the bottom-line two percent of GDP on defence, and in March 2022 stated its intention to raise its defence spending to three percent of GDP in 2023.[23] The 2022 PMT runs a price tag of 524 billion zlotys (124.8 billion USD). Moreover, Poland has successfully acquired or is working towards acquiring high-tech weapons systems made in the U.S., including the U.S.-made F-35 Lightning II jet, the Patriot air-and-missile defence system, and the M1 Abrams tank.[24] These systems are certainly impressive compared to the Soviet-era systems the Polish military is still in the process of shedding, but rarely stipulate offset arrangements that would benefit the local industry.[25] Moreover, the preference for imported goods deters against resources being directed towards domestic arms makers that would use it to develop competitive products and modernise their production processes, making systems more affordable and attractive for export.[26]

A decade into its efforts, Poland has shown significant progress in modernising its military. Warsaw has deftly leveraged weapons procurement as an arm of its foreign policy, utilised crises to accelerate its modernization program, and has been explicit in its goals. But much work remains to be done, particularly in defence industry reform. Poland’s defence industry struggles with inefficiencies, coupled with and exacerbated by a lack of focus on research and development. Foreign imports appear politically expedient and can have lower upfront costs, but come with significant opportunity costs, including obstruction of Warsaw’s stated objective of supporting the domestic defence industry and increasing the state’s defence autonomy.

Poland’s hardline position towards Russia and its show of support for Ukrainians has inspired some observers to describe Poland as an emerging strategic player.[27] This is true regarding its role within the NATO alliance, as well as as an autonomous actor. PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski stated earlier this year that as a frontline state, Poland will need to be able to “sustain itself alone under Russian attack,” until NATO can help.[28] Poles are witnessing both the state’s growing strength within NATO, as well as the its potential vulnerabilities in this frontline position; some Polish observers have noted that the war in Ukraine makes apparent the difficulties large countries can face trying to receive equipment from abroad when it is needed most, even with strong and eager partners and allies.[29] Warsaw will continue to grapple with the opportunity costs posed by industrial reform and imported weapons systems, though it remains unclear whether the government will be able to find a balanced approach.

[1] “Oświadczenie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Związku z Wypowiedzią Sekretarza Stanu USA w Sprawie Przekazania Samolotów Ukrainie,” Oświadczenie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w związku z wypowiedzią Sekretarza Stanu USA w sprawie przekazania samolotów Ukrainie § (2022).

[2] RFE/RL Staff, “Poland Ready to Hand over All MiG-29 Warplanes to U.S.. in Germany,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Poland Ready To Hand Over All MiG-29 Warplanes To U.S. In Germany, March 8, 2022), https://www.rferl.org/a/poland-mig29s-handover-us/31743397.html.

[3] Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, “Military Transformation and the Defense Industry After Next: The Defense Industrial Implications of Network-Centric Warfare,” The Newport Papers, January 2002, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada421889, 2.

[4] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” in Economics of the Global Defence Industry (London, UK: Routledge, 2021), pp. 251-264, 256.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Paweł Wroński, “Błaszczak Chwali Się Modernizacją Armii. Jak Jest Naprawdę? [SPRAWDZAMY],” Wyborcza.pl (Wyborcza.pl, January 10, 2019), https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24347993,blaszczak-chwali-sie-modernizacja-armii-jak-jest-naprawde.html.

[7] Justyna Zając, Poland’s Security Policy: The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order (London, UK: Palgave MacMillan, 2018).; “Poland – Defense Industry,” International Trade Administration | Trade.gov (U.S. Commercial Service Poland, September 3, 2019), https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/poland-defense-industry.

[8] “Orędzie Prezydenta RP Andrzeja Dudy. ‘Świat z Podziwem Patrzy Na Polaków,’” Polsat News (polsatnews.pl, March 24, 2022), https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2022-03-24/oredzie-prezydenta-rp-andrzeja-dudy-czwartek-godz-20/?ref=slider.

[9] Justyna Zając, Poland’s Security Policy: The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order, 104.

[10] Ibid, 119.

[11] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence,” Notes From Poland (Notes From Poland, February 19, 2021), https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/02/17/what-next-for-the-polish-defence-industry/.

[12] Tomasz Szatkowski, “Polish Defense Modernization in the Era of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing,” CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis, March 1, 2013), http://cepa.ecms.pl/index/?id=40d4415f72e9b4896ac2406b4a458d64.

[13] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[14] Marek Strzelecki, “Poland to Boost Own Defense Industry as Airbus Chopper Deal Axed,” Bloomberg Quint (BloombergQuint, October 11, 2016), https://www.bloombergquint.com/amp/onweb/poland-to-boost-own-defense-industry-as-airbus-chopper-deal-axed.

[15] Maciej Kucharczyk, “Modernizing Poland’s Armed Forces,” Warsaw Institute (Warsaw Institute, March 1, 2017), https://warsawinstitute.org/modernizing-polands-armed-forces/.

[16] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 257.

[17] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[18] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 257.; Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[19] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 262.

[20] Drew Hinshaw, “Poland Backs Large Increase in Military Spending,” The Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company, February 26, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/poland-approves-large-increase-in-military-spending-YbPmtbmDlhlxSyXcY04a.

[21] ​​Kaija Schilde and Lenka Wieluns, “European Defense Budget Cuts, Defense Posture, and Reform,” Conference proceedings (2015), http://aei.pitt.edu/79661/, 21.; Maciej Kucharczyk, “Modernizing Poland’s Armed Forces.”

[22] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[23] Ana-Roxana Popescu, “Poland to Increase Defence Spending to 3% of GDP from 2023,” Janes.com (Jane’s, March 4, 2022), https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/poland-to-increase-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp-from-2023.

[24] Jen Judson, “$6 Billion Tank Deal to Poland Cleared by State Department,” Defense News (Defense News, February 18, 2022), https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/02/18/state-department-clears-6-billion-sale-of-tanks-to-poland/.; Andrew A. Michta, “Polish Hard Power: Investing in the Military as Europe Cuts Back,” American Enterprise Institute (American Enterprise Institute, December 19, 2013), https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/polish-hard-power-investing-in-the-military-as-europe-cuts-back/.

[25] Marek Swierczynski, “Making Poland’s Military Great Again,” Balkan Insight (Balkan Insight, February 8, 2022), https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/08/making-polands-military-great-again/.

[26] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 262.

[27] Michal Kranz, “How the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Is Turning Poland into a Strategic Player,” Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, February 23, 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/23/poland-ukraine-russia-crisis-nato-strategic-role-military-diplomacy-war/.

[28] Marek Swierczynski, “Making Poland’s Military Great Again.”

[29] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

Turkey is Winning the War of the Narrative

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Photo Credit: Toetoe, licensed with CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

When it comes to strategic messaging, Turkey has been a glutton for punishment in recent years by seemingly fuelling crises as much as trying to spin them. In 2017, the Turkish government announced it would purchase Russia’s S400 missile defence system, which caused significant tension with the US and other NATO members. Tensions with Greece and Cyprus following Turkey’s gas exploration in the East Mediterranean have led to a ‘historic low point’ in relations between Turkey and the European Union.

At first glance the antagonising of supranational organisations to which Turkey is (NATO) or aspires to be (EU) a member seems counter-intuitive. But this overlooks the fact that the EU and US are no longer the target audience for their strategic communications. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is looking to position Turkey as a ‘model for the Muslim world’. This article will demonstrate how Turkey is reaching out to Muslims in the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and Central Asia, combining soft and hard power to form their strategic narrative.[i]

Media and the arts illuminate Turkey’s focus and success in pan-Islamic messaging. Turkish television dramas (dizi) have had a particularly powerful effect in Pakistan. Dizi have seen a global rise in popularity recently: between 2004 and 2017, their export value grew from $10,000 to $350 million. Turkish dramas have seen significant investment from hedge funds in the last few years, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has launched cash incentives for film productions in Turkey, which points to a clear understanding at a government level of their power to influence audiences abroad. The investment has paid off – Turkish is now the most watched non-English language in the world. 55 million people in Pakistan watched the finale of the Turkish drama Forbidden Love, and Pakistan makes up 25% of the global audience on YouTube for Resurrection Ertugrul, a series about a Turkic warrior who was the father of the founder of the Ottoman Empire. Audiences watch Ertugrul battle a variety of enemies – Christian crusaders and Byzantines being recurring characters.[ii] Erdogan has said of the show ‘until the lions start writing their own stories, the hunters will always be the heroes’[iii]  – a reverse engineering of the idea that history is written by the victors. Whoever writes (or broadcasts) history, is by default, the victor.

This classic storytelling trope of goodies and baddies, with the Christians as the baddies, was inadvertently reinforced by the West’s reaction to the new Turkish law reinstating the Haghia Sophia as a mosque. This should not have come as a surprise to Western commentators, as Erdogan had already declared this to be his intention, yet emotive reactions to the ruling emerged from the Greek press, the Pope, and France’s Foreign Affairs minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, among others. These expressions were disproportionate to UNESCO’s own muted response (after all, there are plenty of other UNESCO Heritage Sites that are also mosques). Combined, they expressed a perceived offence against Christianity, rather than to the cultural value of the Haghia Sophia, and this in turn had had the effect of reinforcing  Erdogan’s strategic narrative (also expressed in Resurrection Ertugrul) of a religious and ideological dichotomy between Christian Europe and the Muslim ‘East’, placing the Haghia Sophia and Turkey at the centre of that ideological (and geographical) battle.

The Gulf region was the largest international consumer of Turkish dizi – until 2017, when the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman pulled all dizi from MBC Group, the Middle East’s largest media conglomerate – a significant blow to Turkey’s cultural exports. [iv] But far from a banana republic, Turkey’s cultural exports are diverse and competitive – this is well-demonstrated by Turkey’s appeal for ‘halal tourism’. In 2017, Turkey became ‘the world’s third most popular destination for halal travellers’,[v] and dominates the all-inclusive beach holiday sector. Recent reports suggest that the Gulf states may be seeking to normalise relations once more – perhaps willing to overlook Turkey’s assertive behaviour in order to cement the coalition against Iran.

Turkey faces significant competition for influence against Russia and China in the Balkans.[vi]  This region used to comprise some of the key heartlands of the Ottoman Empire, and remained important right up to the early Republic of Turkey. In the first parliaments of the Republic, more than 50% of MPs in the National Assembly came from the Balkans.[vii] While the popularity of dizi is an important factor in Turkish influence in the region, investment in schools and supporting migration to Turkey from the Balkans are policies that have resonated even more powerfully. ‘Ordinary Balkan people…realised there was a leader in Turkey who could hear their voices’.[viii] During the Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan, the President of Serbia said he was considering buying Turkish-made armed drones – a sign that Turkish soft power has reaped hard power rewards.

The Nagorno-Karabakh war has also been a key turning point in Turkish influence in Central Asia. Michael Tanchum’s analysis points out that countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, already inclined towards Turkey by their common Turkic language, now also share a trade corridor thanks to Azerbaijan’s victory. To celebrate the Azerbaijani recapture of Shusha, Turkey announced that it would host its version of Eurovision, Turkvision, in the historic city. This soft power signal was reinforced by various defence agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Turkish influence in Africa is also growing, particularly in Sudan. Turkish aid to Sudan exceeds that given by the United Nations,[ix] and 2017 Turkey was granted part of the former Ottoman port of Suakin, in order to rebuild it as a tourist destination as well as a possible military port. This would support Turkey’s $50 million military training base in Somalia, as well as their current military presence in Libya.

Turning to the domestic front, Turkey’s internal policies reinforce its message to other Muslim nations. Turkey has shown itself to be a safe haven for Muslims the world over, taking in 3.6 million Syrian refugees as well as thousands of Uighur refugees. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has allocated up to $14 million to Islamic schools and youth organisations between 2017 and 2018, with the aim of creating a new generation of religiously grounded Turkish youth.[x] The budget of the Diyanet, Turkey’s religious authority that oversees the country’s 85,000 mosques, has quadrupled during President Erdogan’s tenure.[xi]

This strategy is so much more than neo-Ottomanism. It is an exercise in influence, not empire. Strategic communications is a holistic study, and all these communicative acts weave together to form Turkey’s clear narrative, a narrative that is ostensibly effective with its target audience in the Muslim world.

[i] Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin use strategic narratives as a tool to understand and measure the impact of soft power strategy. Soft power resources may be designed or structured to fit an existing or developing narrative, which helps to explain a state’s actions according to a communicative structure. Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin. “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power.” Media, War & Conflict 7, no. 1 (April 2014): 70–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696.

[ii] Bhutto, Fatima. New Kings of the World: Dispatches from Bollywood, Dizi, and K-Pop. Columbia Global Reports: New York [2017], p139.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Izzet Pinto, founder of dizi distribution company Global Agency, estimated a loss of $500 million from the MBC decision – but this would affect the overall business only by about 15%, due to additional uptake of dizi in Latin America. Bhutto, Fatima. New Kings of the World: Dispatches from Bollywood, Dizi, and K-Pop. Columbia Global Reports: New York [2017], p158.

[v] Smith, Hannah Lucinda. Erdogan Rising. William Collins: London [2019], pp74-5.

[vi] Erdi Ozturk, Ahmet. “Ahmet Erdi Ozturk on Turkey’s cultural, political and religious footprint in the Balkans”. Turkey Book Talk #139 [Podcast], 13th April 2021. See also Aydintasbas, Asli. “From Myth to Reality: How to Understand Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans”. European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 13th March 2019. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from_myth_to_reality_how_to_understand_turkeys_role_in_the_western_balkans/

[vii] Erdi Ozturk, Ahmet. “Ahmet Erdi Ozturk on Turkey’s cultural, political and religious footprint in the Balkans”. Turkey Book Talk #139 [Podcast], 13th April 2021. See also Zurcher, Erik-Jan. Turkey: A Modern History. Bloosmbury: I.B. Tauris. 2017.

[viii] Erdi Ozturk, Ahmet. “Ahmet Erdi Ozturk on Turkey’s cultural, political and religious footprint in the Balkans”. Turkey Book Talk #139 [Podcast], 13th April 2021.

[ix] Bhutto, Fatima. New Kings of the World: Dispatches from Bollywood, Dizi, and K-Pop. Columbia Global Reports: New York [2017], p137.

[x] Yabanci, Bilge. “Work for the Nation, Obey the State, Praise the Ummah: Turkey’s Government-oriented Youth Organisations in Cultivating a New Nation”. Taylor and Francis Online, published 17th October 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1676536. This can be seen as a move by the state to challenge the influence of Gulenist schools, which have been blamed for promoting anti-government sentiment and contributing to the 2016 coup. As Yabanci outlines in her paper, the Turkish youth has historically been instrumental in pushing reform in Turkish politics.

[xi] Turkey with Simon Reeve. “Taurus Mountains to Istanbul”. BBC Two, first broadcast 2nd April 2017, 46:35. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b08ll1wy/turkey-with-simon-reeve-series-1-2-taurus-mountains-to-istanbul

 

The Case Against Mexico Joining NATO

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By Raúl Zepeda-Gil

Artwork: “Esquadron 201,” The 201st Mexican Fighter Squadron, Mexican Expeditionary Air Force Artist: Ginny Sherwood

Mexico has no benefit in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In a pragmatic sense, the relation with the United States constrains how Mexico employs its foreign policy. Adding a new layer of complexity, coming from an international organisation that has an overwhelming leadership from the U.S., would futher hinder Mexico’s foreign policy by reducing its freedom degrees of action by excesing a neutralilty instance in international security matters.

Historically, Mexico has diverged from the U.S. foreign policy and acted in a semi-neutral basis for the rest of the world. After the recurrent invasions from the U.S. and France during the 19th Century, Mexico adopted constitutional principles enshirend in article 89, fraction X: self-determination, peaceful conflict resolution, follow international law, and the proscription to threat to use force against other State. 

Mario Ojeda, one the most relevant experts on Mexico’s foreign policy, described the paradox of a relatively weak country neighbouring through a long border with the United States: it has independence in foreign policy in exchange for cooperation in everyday matters. Mexico does not engage in international security affairs of the U.S., but has intensive cooperation in other maters: border protection, migration issues, having a Free Trade Agreement, and Plan Merida for anti-drug initiatives. 

In 2019, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, in response to the integration of Colombia as a partner of the alliance, mentioned that other Latin American countries could integrate in the same way. This appeal happened in a particular geopolitical moment: Brazil had requested to join NATO to help Donald Trump pressure the rest of the member states internally. 

2021 has changed the scenario: Trump is now out of office. And Joe Biden will reinforce the U.S. presence in NATO. However, before these junctures, two members of the Atlantic Council have made their case for Mexico in NATO. Skaluba and Doyle argued: 

“Mexico could serve as a gateway for an intensified NATO presence in Latin America where the alliance is absent outside of a formal partnership with Colombia. Given Russia’s criticality in propping up Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela and China’s growing influence throughout the Global South, an augmented NATO role in Latin America could further democracy promotion while providing a timely deterrent effect, including on Russia’s solicitation of Mexico to increase bilateral trade and security agreements.”

This idea has been widely debated. In 2012, Christopher Sands, of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkin’s University, said:

President Obama and Prime Minister Harper should consider Mexico when they meet with other NATO leaders in Chicago. NATO with Mexico as a member could also confirm the alliance’s role as a guarantor of security and mutual cooperation against transnational security threats that contributes to the prosperity of the west, in Europe and North America equally.

Both pieces, plus the Stoltenberg declaration, do not mention why or how Mexico would benefit from a NATO membership beyond the current benefits from the bilateral relationship with the U.S. or the integration within the free trade agreement government Canada. Both quotes show that having Mexico’s main interest in NATO is to be functional to the NATO agenda. Nonetheless, history has shown that Mexico’s geographical closeness to the U.S. automatically requires Mexico to be auxiliary to the Atlantic agenda. Mexico is so entwined with the U.S. that it will choose to be with the U.S. on a global scale conflict. 

Nonetheless, beyond a real common threat to Mexico and the U.S., such as the Japanese Empire during the Second World War, Mexico does not need to enter into the agenda of international conflicts of the U.S. The advantage of Mexico’s independent foreign policy is that Mexico exchanges cooperation of its own agenda without the need to be involved in issues that are not geopolitically relevant to Mexico. For example, the George W. Bush administration pressured Mexico to enter the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq in 2002. Nonetheless, México denied joining that endevour initially because it was not supported in the UN Security Council. Afterwards, with the negative vote of Mexico in the UN Security Council in 2003, the Iraq War was not athorised, therefore, giving Mexico the main reason to deny any future involvement: it was against the Mexican constitutional principle of following the international law. Indeed, diplomatic tensions arose, but the bilateral agenda continued as usual, and Mexico did not embark in a conflict; it not needed be involved. 

For a country so dependent on the U.S. economy, joining to NATO would mean relinquishing degrees of freedom in foreign policy. Mexico is in line with North America’s defence by cooperating with the U.S. Northern Command and follows constitutional principles of peaceful resolutions of conflict and democratic values. However, joining with NATO would mean that Mexico could be pressured to integrate to conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Bosnia, or Yemen, contentious by themselves in other multilateral forums. 

As stated before, Mexico usually disagrees with NATO countries in the UN on international security matters. For example, Mexico has never supported Responsibility to Protect as a policy, instead prefers diplomatic mediation. And has never supported military responses for international security matters, rather than just peacekeeping operations.

The previously mentioned authors argued that Mexico would benefit from the Security Sector Reform (SSR) framework that NATO implemented in Eastern Europe. Is it necessary that Mexico join NATO to ask for bilateral or multilateral cooperation in implementing SSR framework? The authors were not aware that bilateral cooperation with the U.S. in anti-narcotics agenda has involved some SSR programs under the Merida Initiative signed during the George W. Bush administration. Nowadays, UN peacekeeping is a more effective way to engage in SSR reform in the defence sector than NATO initaitives. Mexico has established a new peacekeeping educational centre for its recent engagement in UN peacekeeping since 2014, after a long absence from any peacekeeping since the late 1950s. Therefore, there are no apparent benefits in cooperating with NATO.

Finally, we remember why NATO was founded: to combat Soviet influence Undeniably, Mexico also was under the influence of Cold War global politics. However, instead of following the US foreign policy agenda, Mexico has followed a foreign policy agenda based on promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts, neutrality in conflicts, and the promotion of de-nuclearisation. Mexico has developed a diverse portfolio of multilateral initiatives in the UN that are possible because it does not follow U.S. foreign policy: migration agreements, small arms trafficking and recently, promoting the global vaccine alliance for developing countries. Close cooperation in real bilateral problems with the U.S. allows Mexico to act with more freedom in global issues. Joining NATO would hinder that freedom.

it is not a problem to argue that a country has a role in the global scenario. But, the problem with the Atlantic Council’s arguments is that they do not consider any of the current foreign policy traditions of Mexico. In simpler terms: they did not even mind asking or thinking in Mexican terms why would it be useful to be in NATO, beyond a random menu or SSR reform, without knowing what is happening in its SSR agenda. In even more practical terms: if there is something that unsettles the U.S. about the Mexico’s bilateral relations with Russia or China, a phone call between the State Department and the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Affairs would be more effective than a long and exhaustiative process in joining NATO. 

 

Raúl Zepeda-Gil is a Mexican PhD Student in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London. He holds degree in political science by the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and a master’s degree in political science by El Colegio de Mexico. One of his research topics is Mexican multilateral foreign policy and civil-military relations. You can follow him on Twitter at @zepecaos. 

Enhancing Cyber Wargames: The Crucial Role of Informed Games Design

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by Amy Ertan and Peadar Callaghan

“Risk – Onyx Edition (Ghosts of board games past)” by derekGavey.
Licensed under Creative Commons

 

‘A game capable of simulating every aspect of war would become war.’

Martin Van Creed, Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes, 2013.

 

The launch of the MoD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory first Defence Wargaming Centre in December 2019 is an opportunity for future wargaming design. While current games do enable some knowledge transfer, the tried-and-tested techniques employed by the serious games community would enhance these exercises with more effective strategising and training mechanisms.  This article highlights how the characteristics of cyberspace require a distinct approach to wargames, and provides recommendations for improved development and practice of cyber wargames by drawing on established games design principles.

The use of games in educational settings has been recognised since the 4th century BC. Wargames, however, are a more recent invention. Wargaming first emerged in modern times via the Prussian Army. Kriegsspiel, as it was called, was used to teach tactics to officers as part of the Prussian Military Reforms in the wake of their devastating defeats at the hands of Napoleon. Ever since, military wargames have become a feature of training military personnel. The UK Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Red Teaming Guide defines a wargame as ‘a scenario-based warfare model in which the outcome and sequence of events affect, and are affected by, the decisions made by the players’. These games, as noted by the MoD’s Wargaming Handbook, can be used to simulate conflicts in a low-risk table-top style setting across all levels of war and ‘across all domains and environments’. Wargames have repeatedly proved themselves a reliable method in communicating and practising military strategy that can be applied to explore all varieties of warfare.

As cyber becomes an increasingly important warfighting domain, both by itself and in collaboration with other domains, cyber wargames have begun to be played with the same frequency and importance as the traditional domains. Since 2016, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) has annually coordinated Crossed Swords, focusing on technical training, while NATO’s annual Cyber Coalition focuses on goals including information-sharing and collaboration and the Atlantic Council’s Cyber 9/12 focuses on strategic policy-making. Military examples include the U.S. Naval War College’s Defending Forward wargames, where, in its simplest form, cyber defenders (‘blue teams’) defend against cyber adversaries (‘red teams’). While these games are a great step forward in understanding, analysing, and preparing for the problems of cyberwarfare, these exercises tend to draw on existing conceptions of traditional serious games. This represents a missed opportunity; the cyber domain differs from traditional conflict in ways that warrant a fresh look at the design of wargames.

By design, wargames create an abstracted model of reality containing primary assumptions and simplifications that allow the model to be actionable. Underlying assumptions include: that the enemy is known, rational and ruthless; that the conflict being modelled is zero-sum in nature; that the games are effective tools even without specifically conceptualising how knowledge transfer takes place; and that the scope of the game should mirror reality as closely as possible. While these assumptions are appropriate for—or at least not detrimental to—traditional models of kinetic warfare, they are problematic for cyber wargame design. The challenges with each underlying assumption are described in turn.

The Known, Ruthless, and Rational Enemy

As Larry Greenemeier noted a decade ago, in cyberspace, the fog of war is exacerbated. While traditional warfare often limits available knowledge on an adversary’s location, in the cyber domain the reality is that defenders may not know who the enemy is nor their goals. When the enemy is an unknown, they can appear to act in an irrational way, at least from the perspective of the defender. This is due to the inherent asymmetry of the attacker. Through reconnaissance, the attacker will more than likely hold more information about intended targets than the defenders. Each of these issues, individually and collectively, are typically under-emphasised in most rigid wargames.

A Zero-Sum Nature of Conflict

Rigid wargames use a unity of opposites in their design, the goals of one side are diametrically opposed to the other. This creates a zero-sum game in which the goal of both the red and blue teams is the destruction of the other side. However, cyber conflict holds features of non zero-sum games, such as how the victory of one side does not always come with an associated loss to the other. Additionaly, there is an asymmetry introduced that should be addressed in the game design stage.

Knowledge Transfer: What is Actually Being Taught?

Another assumption made in the deployment of wargames is that they teach. However what is being taught is not as closely examined. In general, serious games can be categorised into two broad types: low road (or reflexive transfer) games; and high road (or mindful transfer) games. Low road transfer games are concerned with direct training of a stimulus and a response in a controlled environment that is as similar as possible to the context that the player is presented with in real life. For example, a flight simulator. The second type high road games are designed to encourage players to mindfully make connections between the context of play and the real world. Reflexive games are more likely to emphasise speed whereas mindful transfers are more likely to emphasise communication between players. Games must be designed using the knowledge transfer type most appropriate to the intended learning outcomes of the game.

Overenthusiastic Scoping

Cyber operations do not exist in isolation from traditional models of warfare. The integration of cyber operations with kinetic warfare, however, dramatically increases the complexity. Even attempting to capture the whole cyber landscape in a single game runs the real risk of detail overload, decision paralysis, and distracting the player from the game’s intended learning objectives. The longer it takes to learn to play, the less time the player has available to learn from the play. In reality, one cannot accurately simulate the real-world threat landscape without sacrificing effective learning (unless the learning point is simply to illustrate how complex the cyber threat landscape might be). For example, if the cyber wargame is focusing on the protection of critical national infrastructure, then side-tasks focusing on several other industries are likely to confuse, rather than assist, participants in achieving the desired learning goals.

Recommendations

How should we best approach the challenge of effective cyber wargame design?

We propose that designed cyber wargames must be in line with the following four principles:

  • Include ‘partial knowledge’ states.If the cyber wargame player has full knowledge of the game state, the game becomes nothing more than an algorithmic recall activity where a player can predict which actions are likely to result in successful outcomes. Certain ludic uncertainties can be included to induce ‘partial knowledge’, simulating the fog of war as required for each game.
  • Include ‘asymmetric positions’ for the players.The character of cyberwar is better modelled through asymmetric relationships between players. Cyber wargame designers need to consider the benefits to having this asymmetry inside the game.
  • Confirm learning objectives and knowledge transfer type before commencing design.Both low road and high road transfer games are valuable, but they serve different functions in the learning environment. A conscious choice for whether the game is attempting to promote low road or high road transfer should be confirmed before game design commences to ensure the appropriateness of the game.
  • Clearly scoped game to explore specific challenges.A well-scoped smaller game increases players’ willingness to replay games multiple times, allowing players to experiment with different strategies.

Conclusion

As both cybersecurity and wargames increase in importance and visibility, so does research on the use of cyber wargaming as a pedagogical tool for practitioners, policymakers, and the military. Existing principles within the games design profession around clear scoping of goals, game narratives, and appropriate player capabilities may all be applied to enhance existing cyber wargame design. The inclusion of partial knowledge states and asymmetric player capabilities both reflect crucial aspects of the cyber domain, while explicit attention to a game’s desired learning objectives and scope ensures that the resulting designs are as effective as possible. In a world in which cyberspace is only expected to become a more common feature of modern conflict, it is strongly advised that the MoD’s Defence Wargaming Centre leverages these tools and training opportunities. In the asymmetric and unpredictable field of cyber warfare, we need all the advantages we can get.

 

Amy Ertan is a cybersecurity researcher and information security doctoral candidate at Royal Holloway, University of London, and predoctoral cybersecurity fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. She is an exercise designer for cyber incident management scenarios for The CyberFish Company. As a Visiting Researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, Amy has contributed to strategic scenario design for the cyber defence exercise, Locked Shields 2021. You can follow her on twitter: @AmyErtan, or via her personal webpage: https://www.amyertan.com

Peadar Callaghan is a wargames designer and lectures in learning game design and gamification at the University of Tallinn, Estonia. His company, Integrated Game Solutions, provides consultancy and design services for serious games and simulations, with a focus on providing engaging training outcomes. You can find him at http://peadarcallaghan.com/

NATO’s 21st Century Agenda: In Conversation with Paul King

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by Hélène Kirkkesseli

On 11 March 2020, Strife had the pleasure of welcoming Paul King, Programme Officer/Editor at NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, to discuss the Alliance’s history, as well as its current agenda. The event, which was well attended by MA and PhD students, was chaired by Strife Senior Editor Stanislava Mladenova, currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of War Studies and former member of the NATO international staff.

Just months after NATO’s seventieth anniversary, this event served as an opportunity to discuss the evolving security threats the Alliance must face. It looked at how, seventy years after its founding, NATO has learned to adapt to emerging challenges, beyond the physical and visible threats outlined in its Article 5, by tackling hybrid warfare and countering international terrorism through shared intelligence. The need to adapt to this new reality was clearly demonstrated by the 2007 cyberattack against Estonia, or the international terrorist attacks in the Alliance’s own capitals. These threats have to lead to NATO improving its awareness, preparedness, and response capabilities through, for example, the standing up in 2017 of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division in its Headquarters.

In terms of the Alliance’s enlargement, King highlighted the Alliance welcoming its thirtieth, and newest member – Northern Macedonia. NATO’s ‘open door policy’ under the Washington Treaty welcomes any country willing and able to meet accession requirements. NATO’s many partners have played an integral part in NATO’s political agenda, and its military missions. But this continued strength, and physical expansion, especially in the last three decades, have sometimes been perceived as threats, especially by Russia, with which the Alliance had cultivated a crucial relationship. This abruptly ended with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 – an act, which violated international law, as it changed borders by force.

Among the several questions from the audience and particularly one about China’s defence expansion, King reiterated what NATO Secretary-General expressed in December of 2019, that ‘There’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea, but we have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure.” King emphasised that NATO is a collective defensive alliance, and it has no interest in a conflict with China, which is undoubtedly a significant player in the world

This event reaffirmed that despite some criticism of the Alliance, and questioning its strength in the current global security climate, NATO’s agenda for the 21st Century is busier than ever. It is continuing to strengthen its ability to deal with old threats, most recently exhibited by more countries reaching 2% GDP of defence spending, but also evolving to meet the challenges of cyber, terrorism, and the shifting geopolitical military strength of China.

Hélène is currently pursuing an MA in International Peace and Security within the War Studies department of King’s College London. Prior to this, she graduated from the double Law degree program between the universities of Paris-Nanterre in France and Essex in the UK, specializing in international public law and EU law. Having previously interned at the DG for External policies of the European Parliament and the US Embassy to France, she is now focusing her studies particularly on the South Caucasus region. You can follow her on Twitter: @hkirkkesseli