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EU Foreign Policy: More Grand Delusion than Grand Strategy

by Eliz Peck

24 May 2019

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron after the signing of a new Germany-France friendship treaty at the historic Town Hall in Aachen, Germany on Tuesday, 22 January 2019. (AP Photo/Martin Meissner).

Henry Kissinger once said that “no foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none”. With the EU divided not just between – but within – its member states, a united EU foreign and security policy seems less likely than ever to succeed, regardless of the strength of its leaders.

The job title ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ sounds important. And yet, relatively few everyday people living in the EU have probably heard of Federica Mogherini, or her job. In June 2016, Mogherini’s office published a European Union Global Strategy. It projected its vision of the EU’s grand strategy. In its introduction she urgently called for a united EU foreign and security policy in the face of “increasingly fractured identities.” Her calls came following the crises in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, where the EU proved itself an inadequate foreign policy actor, incapable of coordinating amongst its member states an effective and timely response to international crises.

It is misguided to simply attribute these foreign policy failures to weak political leadership. At state-level, leaders of the larger European countries have been as pro-active as domestic contexts have allowed in seeking to combat international crises. Chancellor Merkel sacrificed her political longevity when she threw open Germany’s doors in 2015 in response to the migrant crisis, asserting Wir Schaffen Das (‘We Can Do This’). The growth of the far-right, anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) party can be traced back to Merkel’s ambitious open-door refugee-policy. This domestic backlash pushed her to back-peddle on a liberal policy, instead striking a deal with Turkey in March 2016 that would curb the number of refugees arriving in Europe.

Although countries can cooperate in certain foreign policies, grand strategy is typically the preserve of an individual state. Hal Brands, Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, sees grand strategy as “a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world”. At their very core, grand strategy and foreign policy are a projection of the values and identity of the state. We see this clearly in President Truman’s policy of ‘containment’ between 1945 and 1953, which Brands describes as ‘the golden age of grand strategy’. First articulated in George Kennan’s so-called Long Telegram, the strategy of containment sought to mobilise the military, economic and diplomatic resources of the American state during the Cold War in order to mitigate the rise of their ideological and strategic rival, the USSR. Viewed from this perspective, the Marshall Plan not only aimed for a peaceful post-war economic reconstruction of Europe but sought to promote capitalist notions of liberty and prosperity that lie at the very heart of the American Dream.

Launching a coordinated European grand strategy for multiple states and multiple identities was always going to be tough. What is more, the EU is vast. Individual strategic priorities differ because of the way that they are shaped by historical context and the geo-political landscape. Russian aggrandisement is a pressing concern for Eastern European countries like Poland, but not for Southern European countries like Italy who are struggling with the flow of migrants crossing the Mediterranean.

No issue more clearly illustrates the failure to coordinate a single EU grand strategy than the rise of China. Despite the recently published EU-China document deeming China a ‘systemic rival’ and calling for ‘full unity’ in EU responses, the member states have nevertheless prioritised national interests over falling in line with Brussels. This is seen in the growing bilateral links between China and the Central and Eastern European states – the so-called 16+1 group, eleven of whom are in the EU – who are hungry for Belt and Road investments. In March 2019, President Macron tried to show a united front when he invited Chancellor Merkel and European Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker to his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He triumphantly claimed “The face of a Europe that speaks with one voice on the international scene is emerging.” Only days later, this claim was undermined when Italy became the first G7 partner to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with China, endorsing the Belt and Road.

The new critical focus on EU foreign and security policy comes in the wake of the radically changed geopolitical landscape. Before 2016, there was little desire for a coordinated EU foreign policy as outlined in the EU Global Strategy. After plans for a European Army were abandoned in 1954, the European integration project was first economic and later political. Secure in their defensive NATO alliance, and on American support for individual foreign policy, the larger EU countries felt an officially coordinated foreign policy with their non-NATO neighbours was not a priority.

Yet Trump’s erratic ‘America First’ policies have thrown doubt on the previously steadfast NATO pact. In a somewhat frantic response, EU countries have had to look to each other for support. The 2017 formation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – an EU defence union – and Macron’s proposal of a European Intervention Initiative (E2I) at Sorbonne can be viewed in this light.

But this comes too little, too late. The time for establishing the groundwork for a common foreign and security policy was when times were good, not now. Euroscepticism dominates today’s political landscape. The rise of the far-right in Hungary and Poland, the populism of Brexit and Italy’s Five Star Movement and the domestic turmoil facing Macron and Merkel are calling into question certain values – multilateral cooperation and human rights, to name a few – that are the founding assumptions of EU cooperation. What we see now is a crisis of identity that goes to the very heart of the European project.

Collaboration between these countries is not impossible. The success of Europol and the European Counter Terrorism Centre show that states unite against a common-enemy. EU foreign policy has been even more effective in coordinating maritime missions aimed to disrupt acts of Somali-piracy based off the Horn of Africa, which threaten trade routes off the Gulf of Aden. But arguably, this success traces to the clear economic incentive for participation; most other foreign policy issues do not have such direct economic benefits. Without a wholehearted commitment to the European project, states will run into difficulty.

The last time the European territories’ foreign and security policies were coordinated under one single grand strategy was under Charlemagne, the ‘Father of Europe’ who died in the year 814 and was buried in Aachen. President Macron and Chancellor Merkel symbolically met there at the start of this year, in a show of solidarity and mutual commitment more than half a century after the Élysée Treaty was signed. Designed as a show of strength and renewed commitment, the limited progress made at the meeting only reinforced just how difficult foreign and security coordination is in the context of the current European disharmony.

Eliz Peck is an MA candidate in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter @PeckEliz

Image source: https://www.apnews.com/02d7f1384f454f09b31a7c852d275e4e

Europe’s Greatest Gamblers: Anticipating Wars of the Future and Why European Leaders Are Choosing to Ignore Such Possibilities

Anticipating war is out of fashion, yet the potential destruction and impact on global society of a major war are huge.

 

By James M R Thorp

 

Soldiers from Poland’s 6th Airborne Brigade and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, during The Poland-led multinational exercise Anakonda-16 (Credit image: KACPER PEMPEL/REUTERS)

Back in February, Elisabeth Braw wrote an article for POLITICO titled, ‘Europe isn’t ready to face modern threats’. Braw’s case is that NATO is ‘preparing for the wrong war’ and needs to ‘become more creative in defending against hybrid attacks’. ‘[H]ybrid’, a term coined by Frank Hoffman, is defined as incorporating ‘a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts… and criminal disorder’ acting at ‘all levels of war.’[1] Braw’s point that Russia and China have the will and ability ‘to bring a country to a standstill long before a conventional war takes place’ is one that is only just being heeded; for a start, the rate of cyber-attacks has increased dramatically in the last couple of years.[2] But Braw’s article misses the greater issue at hand: Western policies, economics, and its way of life all rely on the notion that war between the leading states of the world is no longer a real possibility. So, not only is the West unprepared for modern ‘hybrid’ threats, as Braw states, but it is almost entirely unprepared for any type of modern major conflict, even a conventional one.

But how likely is such a war and why has that possibility been ignored? Firstly, the world today is increasingly unstable: it faces a resurgent Russia, an unpredictable North Korea, and a ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the form of an increasingly dominant China, which is expanding its power and influence through measures such as building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Secondly, it may be that the US is globally dominant, and any major war would inevitably involve it, but it is rare to find someone who would solidly wager that such a major war (involving the US) would break out in the next five, or even ten, years. Yet, by looking at the case of the UK in the 1860-1910s – like the US now – the UK was globally dominant yet its share of global GDP was declining compared to its rivals, leading to a competition that culminated in the First World War – it is only rational to assume a similar situation could arise by the late 2020s.[3] Despite this, we continue to live in an age where the idea of ‘permanent peace’ is prevalent.

The moral, ethical, economic, and systematic structures that were formed after 1945, a world system dominated by the US and the West, has led to a decrease in conventional war and direct military confrontation; which in turn has led to a widespread global illusion – in the West especially – that the peace is prevalent and violence has been mostly eliminated. In reality, violence has been suppressed; human psychology has not changed enough since we formed as a species for us to have suddenly become incapable of violence. We have and always will be biologically and psychologically capable of both violence and peace, regardless of our moral and ethical systems.[4]

Europe unequivocally relies on the stability of this post-1945 order to remain safe and prosperous. Yet, with President Trump’s unpredictability, largely unknown agenda and open condemnation of NATO, Europe can no longer rely on the US to lead and remain a bastion of deterrence. The US itself stands highly divided, to the extent that the small, but genuine, chance of a second American civil war has become a talking-point amongst some security experts.[5] Similarly, Europe and the EU also stand divided, with waves of nationalism sweeping through, particularly in Austria, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. If one is to consider global issues that will greatly impact Europe, climate change is an existential threat that has the potential to violently destroy not just the post-1945 order, but our global society as we know it.[6] But, after the US pulled out of the Paris Climate Accord in 2017, neither can Europe rely on the US to lead us through that, nor is there much evidence to show that anyone in Europe is realistically stepping up to the challenge.

Then, in spite of these weaknesses among its members, NATO on the one hand is a powerful alliance with over three million troops and around ten thousand tanks, making it a force that is certainly to be reckoned with. But on the other hand, this force is significantly weakened by certain factors. As a fighting force weapons systems are disparate, for example 20 different types of fighter aircraft are used; in-theatre hierarchies and command systems are unclear [7]; and most importantly, there exists an adversary with capability to exploit NATO’s ‘Article 5’, by obfuscating whether a member state has been attacked by another state[8]. Then, despite NATO’s European Reassurance/Deterrence Initiative and the very recently announced ‘Four Thirties’ Plan, defence spending across member states has dramatically reduced over the past decade or two and it remains to be seen whether defence spending promises will be kept.

Perhaps most important of all is one of the key lessons taught to us by the father of modern military strategy, Carl von Clausewitz: that chance is an intrinsic feature of war[9], and because war is, in his words, a ‘continuation of policy with other means’, so too then is politics affected by chance[10]. If chance cannot be eliminated, it follows that the possibility of any type of war can never be eliminated from political interaction. On top of that, wars of a more ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey zone’ nature have become, and will continue to be, an even greater possibility.[11]

Some European leaders may have taken certain measures to prepare for a major modern war, including promises to achieve or come close to the two percent of GDP expenditure benchmark on defence. But are such promises little more than lip-service to NATO and the USA, with only four nations in Europe achieving the benchmark last year?[12]  If one considers that the world’s population has grown faster than exponentially[13], leading to massive urbanisation – two-thirds of the world’s population in cities by 2040 –, it becomes entirely probable that a modern major war would be indiscriminate and catastrophic.[14] Then consider what this article has highlighted regarding the likelihood of such a war. Taking this combined consideration, it then follows that despite NATO’s usually significant efforts, defence measures by European leaders are not nearly enough, that most politicians are repeatedly betting on war not occurring and the European public are kept blissfully unaware of a perilous future. Meanwhile, the stakes remain high, and the gamble is at the greatest level.

 

James is a recent MA Intelligence & International Security candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He graduated in January 2018 and is currently based in both Suffolk and London. You can find him on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-thorp-280595/

 

Notes: 

[1] Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, December 2007), p. 8.

[2] Cyber-attacks increased by double in 2017, with Russia the main source of activity, see ‘Cyber-attack Volume Doubled in First Half of 2017’, Infosecurity, 11 August 2017.

[3] Look at the graph on page 335 and then go to pages 338-340, see Ian Morris, What Is War Good For: The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, from Primates to Robots, (London: Profile Books, 2015), p. 335 & pp. 338-340.

[4] Steven Pinker, in his seminal work, ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’, highlights this inner battle within humans, who ‘are equipped with five distinct motives of violence, and four faculties that allow them to inhibit or avoid violence’, see Steven Pinker, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’

[5] See Chris Arkenberg, ‘What a new U.S. civil war might look like’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017 & Lt. Col. Robert F. McTague, ‘Some thoughts on how we might get from where we’re at now to a Second Civil War’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017.

[6] For the NATO special report on this, see ‘Special Report: The Importance of Climate Change for Transatlantic Security’, NAOC, 29 November 2017, also see Steven Jermy, ‘Perfect Storm?’, Russian International Affairs Council, 12 August 2013.

[7] This was displayed very clearly within ISAF in Afghanistan: ISAF was a coalition made up from NATO members and due to inequal commitments, cultural differences and (often) incompatible caveats a potentially unified command structure was fractured – information taken from lecture by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jonathan Riley, King’s College London, 17th November 2016. See also Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Lessons in coalition warfare: Past, present and implications for the future.’ International Politics Reviews, 1.2 (2013), pp. 78-82.

[8] Russia’s ‘little green men’ in Ukraine being a case in point, see Robert R. Leonhard and Stephen P. Philips, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2015), p. 3 & 43.

[9] Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 7. University Press

[10] ibid, p. 30.

[11] For “grey zone” see United States Special Operations Command White Paper: The Gray Zone, September 2015, p. 1.

[12] Only France, Greece, Poland and Romania spent over 2% of GDP on defence in 2017, see ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’.

[13] Simon Lewis & Mark Maslin, The Human Planet: How We Created the Anthropocene, (London: Penguin, 2018), pp. 6-7.

[14] ‘The Future of War: the new Battlegrounds’, The Economist, 25 January 2018.

Image Source: https://www.newsweek.com/europeans-are-quietly-preparing-war-russia-487307

NATO is wounded, this Summit could break it

By Dr Zachary Wolfraim

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Summit (Credit Image: NATO HQ)

In light of the recent chaos consuming British politics and the looming NATO summit, I revisited an article I wrote on the eve of the US election in 2016 hoping it would outline a worst-case scenario, rather than reality. At that time, NATO was heading into uncertainty with the reality of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s significantly reduced majority in Parliament just starting to sink in. Turkey was moving steadily towards autocracy and Donald Trump was a long-shot, but nonetheless threatening Presidential candidate. This scenario has since come to pass and with the critical ongoing summit  (on the 11th and 12th July 2018), NATO has again been pushed into a corner and forced to defend its existence. This is a frequent occurrence for the alliance, particularly since the end of the Cold War.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than disbanding, the alliance found new purpose both as a vehicle for promoting US interests in Europe but also as a security organisation capable of undertaking coordinated multilateral interventions. In occupying this role, NATO has reinvented itself from collective defence organisation established to prevent Soviet expansionism into one able to execute complex, coordinated multilateral military interventions. In doing so it has responded to crises in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and has now reoriented back towards countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The threat it faces now is not from an external crisis, however, but internal within the alliance and the effect of radical realignments in policy both in the US and the UK.

As a backdrop to current events, suspected Russian interference into both countries have undermined mechanisms of political campaigning and cast doubt on democratic outcomes while delivering policies that dramatically upend decades of Western international security policy. President Donald Trump and specifically his transactional view of international alliances and a complete lack of consistency in policymaking present an existential threat to the organisation and consequently, creates another way of undermining US influence in Europe. Concurrently, Britain has been rendered politically unstable, consumed with Brexit which adds to years of austerity that have diminished much of its defence capability. Both countries play a central role in providing military support and a diplomatic vision to NATO and are struggling to define their respective relationships within the broader international order.

In the UK specifically, both major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, are completely riven by Brexit with the Conservative party engaging in open conflict over the UK’s future relationship with the EU, most recently losing its Foreign Secretary and its Brexit minister. This has not yet spilled into the UK-NATO sphere but nonetheless has planted seeds of doubt in the minds of allies over the type of reliable member the UK will continue to be. Despite the country’s position as a framework nation contributing to vital capabilities and forces alongside meeting its 2% budgetary commitment, it has continued to under invest in maintaining its military capabilities and by extension limiting its ability to act as a capable partner in NATO operations. This is now reaching  a point where its future effectiveness could be called into question. Stagnant economic realities mean that future defence investment decisions are likely to be pushed down the road until there is a clearer UK-EU relationship. As a result, one of Europe’s critical NATO members is effectively in a holding pattern for the next few years.

The US, on the other hand, presents an even more fundamental question. President Trump has made it relatively clear that he does not believe the values that underpin NATO are sufficient to justify its existence. Trump’s sole emphasis has been on the disparity between US defence spending and the continuing 2% spending target, disregarding the agenda setting influence this spending has bought. While this has often been a point of contention in NATO, the President’s willful misunderstanding of how this spending target works has only compounded his sense of grievance with NATO allies. Fundamentally, the President seems willing to dismantle the security architecture that has underpinned the safety and security of Europe, the North Atlantic and the West more broadly since the end of the Second World War over the issue of spending and budgets. Despite reassurances from the US Permanent Representative to NATO and US Defence Secretary, James Mattis, about the alliance’s central role to US defence priorities, no one actually knows what President Trump will say as he has no defined priorities or identifiable value structure when it comes to international relations.

Regardless of what happens in this summit, NATO remains in serious trouble during the tenure of the Trump presidency and until Britain has decided its future relationship with the EU. For the time being NATO member states must remain defensive about their continued increases in spending, proactive in their policymaking and vocal about what NATO’s value added is to international security. The 2% spending goal, while admirable, should be adapted to place emphasis on effectiveness and thus increase coordination between Allies to enhance the capability of NATO as a whole. Though the UK has made its commitments to NATO clear, its ability to follow through on them is variable and thus the ability to coordinate with similarly effective NATO forces creates a way of preserving influence and capability. Ultimately, despite the UK’s diminished international presence, NATO can potentially continue to limp along with US disengagement until the next presidential election. However, there is no doubt that this is one of the lowest points for the transatlantic relationship since the beginning of the Iraq War. At that time, major NATO members both publicly rebuked the US invasion of Iraq and refused to support US efforts in mobilising NATO to defend Turkey. This previous rift in the alliance seems minor in hindsight, however, it nonetheless demonstrated that the organisation can endure difficult diplomatic relations and carve out a relevant international role.

During this summit and beyond, Canada and European NATO Allies will need to prioritise the relevance of NATO, invest in maintaining the organisation and prepare to speak up in its defence. There remains considerable support for NATO in the US and Allies should make every effort to maintain links with aligned US Senators and Representatives to continue making the case for NATO. In terms of operations, NATO must continue its presence in Eastern Europe and continue to be a proactive force in international affairs, driven by the initiative of Canada and European members, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming a discussion forum rather than an active force for stability and progress. More generally, NATO member states will need proactive strategies to deal with Russian disinformation and spend time on reaffirming and rebuilding trust with voters. With time and perhaps a different administration, the alliance will recover somewhat, however, the damage that has already occurred will take time and dedication, particularly on the part of the US, to recover.

 

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Dr. Zachary Wolfraim graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as political risk and intelligence sectors in London.

Image source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156597.htm

The Future of European Defence Cooperation: a win-win for Transatlantic security

By Bolton Smith and Gabriel White

Mali – Barkhane French operation, part of the ‘War against Terrorism’. Photo: Fred Marie (CC 2.0)

 

Any mention of independent European defence efforts usually raises concern amongst pundits in Washington. From fears that European defence initiatives are meant to replace NATO to suggestions that Germany is trying to consolidate a European army under its command, commentary from the American perspective has the unfortunate tendency to grossly misrepresent the scope and intent of European defence reforms. Instead of raising false alarms, Americans should be supportive of these and future endeavours from Europeans which seek to reduce redundancy and take a more proactive role in their own defence.

Defense issues are on the minds of bureaucrats in Brussels and, increasingly, the minds of ministers in the member states. From most recent “State of the Union” speech given by President Jean-Claude Juncker to a speech given by Emmanuel Macron on the 26th of September, European leaders are sending clear signals of a renewed defense focus.  Changes to the European Security framework are coming, whether America wants them to or not, and progress has already been made.

In June of this year the European Commission earmarked some 1.6 billion euros for defence research and development couched in the “European Defence Fund” (EDF), which will allow the EU to dip its toes into competencies usually reserved for, and fiercely defended by, member states. Adding to this effort, Brexit will simultaneously remove the most historically obstinate opponent  to EU defence cooperation, politically opening a golden opportunity for ambitious reform. Along with internal incentives and moves, the perceived looming threat of Russian aggression lingers on, continually pushing Eastern European countries to call for greater European cooperation and competencies to act as deterrent. While the threat of overt Russian aggression is often assessed as being low, even along NATO’s eastern flank, the lingering possibility of conflict, intentional or otherwise warrants addressing the tremendous imbalance in conventional capabilities. The current environment is ripe for change, and Europe is, and will be in the future, planting seeds for greater cooperation.

Europe’s collective defence capabilities as of now are nowhere close to replacing NATO capabilities, much less enough to provide an effective independent defensive cover for the continent. Much of the initial EU  defence expansion and cooperation will have to make up for failures of the past or underperformance in the present. From the failure of enacting the European Defence Community, to attempts to create an operationally effective “eurodrone,”many good ideas in European  defence have lacked requisite political will. Even comparatively simple efforts, such as the creation of  EU battlegroups, such as battalion size formations designed for so-called Petersberg tasks, have yet to be deployed .

In the face of an aggressive Russia, following two separate wars into the former Soviet Republics of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, the EU has largely failed to make significant progress to address the massive disparity in conventional capability with Russia. Worse yet, several member states (most notably Germany) face an uphill domestic political battle just to reach the 2% defence spending goal set by the 2014 NATO Wales Summit. In light of these prior failures and contemporary difficulties, the United States should be supportive, not apprehensive, of actual progress made by Europeans in security enhancement. Given Europe’s deterrence deficit in conventional capabilities, as well as other ancillary benefits of military integration and coordination, both practical and rhetorical  pushes for deeper European military cooperation are essential for beginning to chip away at imbalances and inadequacies.

The recent steps and proposals are small, but important efforts that will set the foundation for better future cooperation. The sum of recent changes in European defence cooperation effectively amount to a substantial increase in investment in streamlining of capability development opportunities – with the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) later this year. This growth promises to provide a framework for EU members to voluntarily opt in to various joint ventures. That being said, Europe still faces a long road to common procurement and addressing some challenges in interoperability. However, while issues persist, the existence of projects like the PESCO indicate, if anything else,  that deeper cooperation may be realized in the future.

 

NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Photo: European Parliament (CC 2.0)

 

Other areas of potential growth offer perhaps the clearest cut value of European defence cooperation to NATO, a security/defence Schengen-zone. In 2016, former Italian Foreign Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, first suggested the establishment of a European Defence Schengen Zone largely in to response to growing counter-terrorism challenges. Gentiloni’s government had suggested that the creation of a system to voluntarily pool capabilities in different scenarios might address individual shortcomings within the EU member states.  Others have rightly raised the logistic and legal difficulties of even moving NATO forces across the EU. In either case, both proposals offer opportunities to cut back on restrictions that make European defence more difficult.

Europe is moving in the right direction in terms of security, and both American observers and the U.S. government should recognise recent developments as a win-win opportunity worth supporting. Pre-emptive criticism and fears of a full European Army or even whispers of a joint-command nuclear weapon, are premature at best.  While these conversations will happen for the foreseeable future, allowing them to cast a negative light on contemporary positive steps is neither intellectually honest nor productive in bulking up European and Transatlantic security. Instead, American perspectives should appreciate that Europe is proving itself to be a committed partner in enhancing its own, regional, and global security. So long as this is the case, the Transatlantic Alliance can only benefit.

 

Bolton Smith is a graduate student at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service pursuing a Masters in German and European Studies. His research interests focus around German electoral and defense politics, paradiplomacy in separatist regions, as well as other topics related to European governance. You can follow him @BoltonMSmith  

Gabriel White  is a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service pursuing a Masters in International Security. His research interests focus on military history, statecraft, and Eurasian affairs. He is 2017 a recipient of the NSEP Boren Fellowship, working on Baltic regional security issues in Tallinn Estonia. You can follow him @Gabriel___White

Image Sources: 

Image 1: https://www.flickr.com/photos/148665880@N07/albums/72157684476432636 

Image 2: https://www.flickr.com/photos/european_parliament/4128509538/in/photostream/

Strife Feature | Contemporary Russian foreign policy – Examining the Ukraine crisis

By William Moray

The 2014 Ukrainian Revolution – or Revolution of Dignity – and the subsequent Donbass War (Donbas, in Ukrainian) severely impacted the relations Russia held not only with Ukraine but also the international community. Moscow’s involvement in this conflict holds few secrets. Russian annexation of Crimea and its support provided to secessionist rebels in Donbas provinces has led the USA and its allies to impose a series of sanctions against Russia, in March 2014. Furthermore, the Western press often labels this as an ‘invasion’, which suggests the Kremlin is solely motivated by territorial expansionism. This article will argue that such limited views reflect a lack of understanding Russian politics. This article uses the Ukrainian crisis as a case-study – to examine key factors that arguably drive contemporary Russia’s foreign policy.

The role of ideology

Putin justified Russia’s annexation of or ‘reunification with’ Crimea on 18th of March 2014. Source: Creative Commons BY 4.0 license

According to mainstream Western media and politicians, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine allegedly serve a renewed Russian nationalism. Such a claim is as easy as convenient. A referendum took place in Crimea on 16th March 2014, during which 96% of the participants voted in favour of a ‘reunification’ with Russia.[1] Subsequently, President Vladimir Putin gave a speech two days later, and the language used has been qualified as ‘legal rhetoric’[2] as it provides a perfect illustration of the multiple Russian national identity narratives. Vera Tolz argues that there are five definitions of the Russian nation: the Union identity, the Eastern Slav identity, the Russian language identity, the racial identity, and the civic identity.[3] Several of these key concepts can be found in Putin’s speech.

For instance, given that Crimea shares a lot with Russia, Putin emphasised the vote’s result as logical. Religious Orthodoxy allegedly provides a basis for ‘culture, civilisation and human values’ which are shared by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This claim alludes to the Eastern Slav identity concept, the ‘community of Eastern Slavs’,[4] that people from these three countries allegedly have in common. Putin also qualifies ‘Kiev [as] the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other’.

Secondly, he describes Crimea as ‘blend of different peoples’ in the same way as Russia itself. This fits in well with the ’Union identity’ which emphasizes the multinational and multi-ethnic dimension of the country.[5] Richard Sakwa also suggests that the word ‘Rossiyanin’, one possible label of a Russian, designates a community of all nationalities living in the ‘Russian Federation and beyond’,[6] a reference to former Soviet states.

Another argument put forward relates to the threats faced by Russian minorities. Putin insists that the Russian community in Crimea became endangered following the Euromaidan Revolution, perpetrated by ‘nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites’. Consequently, it was the duty of Russia to defend this community, in accordance to the ‘Community of Russian speakers’.[7] The Russian diaspora constitutes ‘an inseparable part of the Russian nation’[8] and defending them is a moral obligation. Russians abroad can be designed as either ‘Russian-speakers’ (‘Russkoyazychnye’) or ‘compatriots’ (‘sootechestvenniki’).[9] Putin also uses this argument to threaten Ukraine, as he underlines that ‘Russia will always defend their interests [Russians living in Ukraine] using political, diplomatic and legal means.’ Therefore, Moscow’s support for the pro-Russian rebels was a matter of protecting fellow Russians.

Another element of Russian nationalism is present in Putin’s speech. He blamed the 1954 unification of Crimea with Ukraine as a ‘personal initiative’ made by the then head of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev. This gesture was made at the time to consolidate the union between Russia and Ukraine, on the 300th anniversary of their union. Although Sakwa adds another element, arguing that the Soviet Union’s ‘inside borders’ were administrative and thus held no political or ethnic logic.[10] Nonetheless, even at the time, ceding Crimea to Ukraine had been a source of controversy.[11]

These national identity narratives offer an explanation to Moscow’s policy in Crimea and subsequently, Eastern Ukraine. Based on these claims, Russia did not ‘annex’ any foreign territory. Rather, it merely allowed the ‘reunification’ of a region that historically has been part of the Russian empire since the late 1700s. However, this nationalistic rhetoric is insufficient to properly grasp the motives behind Russia’s foreign policy on this matter.

 The limits of the nationalist agenda

Providing support to the Rebels allows Russia to control any resolution of this ‘frozen conflict’ and prevents Ukraine from joining NATO. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Marlene Laruelle argues that the protection of Russian minorities argument is taken from a nationalistic concept – the ‘divided nation’.[12] However, the true influence of the nationalist ideology in shaping Russia’s foreign policy is profoundly debatable. For instance, Laruelle is adamant that far-right organisations ‘have never directly participated in decision-making processes on foreign policy’.[13] Consequently, the nationalist ideas were ‘a tool of Russia’s foreign policy, not its engine’.[14] Luke March similarly argues the Kremlin’s objective ‘is not the expression of nationalism per se, but its control and utilisation for regime goals’.[15] About Ukraine, Laruelle argues that the Kremlin’s actions were not ideology-motivated. Had ideology been an overarching factor, according to her, Russia would have annexed the secessionist provinces.[16] Instead, the rebels established the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). These self-proclaimed entities, in the likes of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Transnistria, can be qualified as ‘de facto states’, as they possess all the classic attributes of a state whilst lacking international recognition. This process results in a given conflict either to remain frozen, as with the Abkhazian-Georgian example;[17] or to fester, such as in Ukraine. Russia is able to use this situation as a lever to maintain pressure against Kyiv. Therefore, the ‘Divided Nation’ narrative remains a justification used by Putin and will not be applied on all countries which include Russian minorities. For instance, Laruelle is adamant that Moscow will not intervene if states such as Kazakhstan, agree to its rules, i.e. stay under its influence.[18]

In other words, the Russian expansionism witnessed in Eastern Ukraine serves a very different purpose. The next part will demonstrate it is their will to be recognized as an equal partner by the West.

Equality as the ultimate objective

From Moscow’s perspective, NATO and EU enlargement, as well as the ‘Color Revolutions’, are tools used by Western powers to expand their interests in Russia’s sphere of influence, namely the Former Soviet Union (FSU), also known as the ‘Near Abroad’. Yevgeny Primakov – the then Minister of Foreign Affairs – qualified in 1997 the first post-Cold War wave of NATO expansion as ‘the biggest mistake in Europe since the end of World War II’.[19] Similarly, Margot Light states that NATO expansion is viewed after 2000 as ‘a fundamental threat’ to Russia.[20] Regarding Euromaidan, Putin was similarly convinced that it ‘was the result of a US-led operation’. This line of thinking was reinforced by the support provided to demonstrators in December 2013, by US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Senator John McCain during a visit to Kiev.[21] The rhetoric used by Russian officials serves the same purpose, to portray NATO as an aggressive alliance against which Russia legitimately needs to defend itself. For instance, Colonel General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance between Russia and five other FSU states, recently accused NATO of wanting to transform the former Soviet space into ‘another Syria’.

The point here is that one could argue Russia genuinely believed it was ‘the victim, not the aggressor’, in regard to the Ukraine crisis, and that its intervention was an act of self-defence.[22] Laruelle takes a slightly different approach in suggesting that Putin’s objective was to punish Ukraine for two reasons. First, she argues that the new post-Revolution government in Kiev attempted to ally with the West and move away from Russia. Secondly, she claims that during the 2014 Revolution, Ukraine demonstrated poor governance and instability, as proven by the ‘Maidan’, which is defined here as demonstrations resulting in regime changes.[23] Laruelle’s theory is more convincing than the ‘victim, not aggressor’ stance as it also takes into consideration the fact that Russia views Ukraine as a part of the Near Abroad. Therefore, Russia is not just a victim, it also defends its status of great power. These two elements are not in opposition but need to be understood as two pieces of a larger picture – the actions Russia feels it must take in order to prevent a perceived Western infringement in the FSU, its traditional sphere of influence [24].

Russia sees this matter as a question of survival, which requires preserving – or rather re-establishing – its status of great power. Indeed, from Moscow’s perspective, the NATO/EU enlargement does not just pose a threat. It also proves the hypocrisy of the international order the West has been imposing since the end of the Cold War. Russia wishes to be considered as an equal, thus it defends an alternative international order. This disconnect between Western and Russian views of international order was underlined on 28 September 2015, when both the then American President Barack Obama and Putin gave speeches before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Obama insisted that ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’ concepts should be the new pillars of international order.[25] Whereas Putin defended a rather conservative approach, as he insisted on the value of ‘equality’; he also criticised that ‘after the end of the Cold War […] a single centre of domination emerged in the world’.[26] Indeed, Putin has constantly accused the West of imperialist views. This reproach was evident after the wars in Kosovo, Iraq [27] and more recently Libya. The defence of ‘liberty’, according to this view, is merely an excuse to justify aggressive expansionism. By contrast, Russia’s alternative international order seeks to respect sovereignty, promote equality and consequently, to preserve international law.  Ironically, this approach to international order does not apply to Russia’s Near Abroad. Hence Ukraine is in Russia’s view as FSU states are its sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Based upon a nationalist-like rhetoric, Russia’s actions were however not necessarily ideologically-motivated, nor based on a desire to acquire territory. Instead, fear of NATO’s enlargement constituted a more important driving factor, and relatedly, the need to stop Ukraine from moving closer to the West, in order to protect its historical sphere of influence. Russia’s also hoped its Ukraine intervention would serve a greater strategic objective: to restore an equal status vis-a-vis the West.

William Moray is the BA representative for Strife Blog and he has just graduated in War Studies BA from King’s College London. He will read the Intelligence and International Security MA at King’s next September onwards. His research interests include intelligence and the history of intelligence, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the relations between Russia and the West. You can follow him @WilliamMoray

Notes

[1] Putin, Vladimir, Speech on the annexation of Crimea (18 March 2014) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 This speech is referred to several times in the first part of this essay

[2] Roy Allison ‘Russian “Deniable” Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules’, International Affairs, 90:6 (2014), pp. 1258

[3] Vera Tolz, ‘Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Sep. 1998), p. 995

[4] Ibid, p. 999

[5] Tolz, Forging the Nation, op. cit., p. 996

[6] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, op. cit., p. 218

[7] Tolz, Forging the Nation, op. cit., p. 1000

[8] Ibid, p. 1001

[9] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, op. cit., p.219

[10] Ibid, p.230

[11] Stephen White, Understanding Russian Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.297

[12] Marlene Laruelle (2015) ‘Russia as a “Divided Nation,” from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy’, Problems of Post-Communism, 62:2, p. 88

[13] Ibid, p.89

[14] Ibid, p.90

[15] Luke March (2012) ‘Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’ ‘, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:3, 402

[16] Laruelle, Russia as a “Divided Nation”, op. cit., p.95

[17] Dov Lynch, ‘Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No.4 (Oct. 2002), p. 834

[18] Laruelle, p.95

[19] White, Understanding Russian Politics, p. 284

[20] Margot Light, ‘In search of an identity: Russian foreign policy and the end of ideology’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19:3, p.50

[21] Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, (NY: Public Affairs, 2016), p. 263

[22] Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, p. 292

[23] Laruelle, Russia as a “Divided Nation”, op. cit., p.94

[24] Ruth Deyermond, ‘What are Russia’s real motivations in Ukraine? We need to understand them’ The Guardian, 27 April 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/27/russia-motivations-ukraine-crisis

[25] Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General Assembly (28 September 2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly

[26] ‘Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly Speech’, The Washington Post, (28 September 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/?utm_term=.e3f0817a207a

[27] White, Understanding Russian Politics, p. 281