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Does Malaysia have concrete counterterrorism strategies to mitigate potential terrorist attacks?

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By: Munira Mustaffa

Unit_Tindak_Khas_of_PGK_on_CT's_drill
The Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) Special Operations Command unit undergoing a tactical counterterrorism training. Source: Wikimedia

While Indonesia successfully demonstrated remarkable resilience with her defiant cry of “Kami tidak takut” (“We are not intimidated”) on social media after the January 2016 attack,[1] there are some uncertainties that the same level of fortitude can be witnessed in Malaysia should a Daesh-inspired attack happen.[2] This raises some pressing debates about Malaysia’s existing counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies.

It is already known that Daesh has issued warnings that they had planned attacks on Westerners in Kuala Lumpur.[3] To date, there has been one attempt by local Daesh’s sympathisers which was successfully disrupted by members of the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) in January.[4] Last month, in the latest government crackdown on local terror cells, over 100 individuals were detained for suspected involvement with the core Daesh militancy.[5] In previous arrests since 2013, many of them were reportedly first-time offenders who were radicalised online.[6]

However, capturing ringleaders or copycats do not guarantee our safety or guarantees against terrorist attacks. If anything, as demonstrated by open source media, the fact that Daesh as an organisation is weakening does not mean that it will not influence groups abroad.[7] Daesh supporters may be even more determined to intensify their overseas strategies.[8]

The probability that Kuala Lumpur could be the next target is rather sobering.[9] Filled with complex and multi-ethnic communities, along with abundant international visitors, countless international corporates and multi-national companies centred around an urban hub, one could argue that these factors make Kuala Lumpur a high-value target. Moreover, Putrajaya is currently being encumbered by grand corruption controversies involving the country’s sovereign wealth that could erode its “moderate Islam” image and status as the custodian of Malaysia Muslims’ religious interests.[10] The fact that Kuala Lumpur is highly populated by a large percentage of Muslims who Daesh sympathisers might consider as takfiri could be a potential concern.[11]

The Malaysia experience

Malaysia is no stranger to asymmetric warfare. Much of Malaysia’s experience and formation of current antiterrorism laws and legislation are legacies of the days of Malayan insurgencies. Post-insurgency, homegrown radical militant groups began to surface in the late 1960s, slowly evolving into today’s mujahideen extremists who are enjoying a revival and enthusiastically responding to the rallying call for global Muslim solidarity.[12] Although not all of them agree with Daesh’s brand of violence, one thing is clear: Daesh does make a convenient vehicle for them to realise their Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) ambitions in this region that imposes stricter Islamic interpretation of the law and way of life.[13]

Malaysia’s current counterterrorism (CT) measures

On the morning of November 26, 2014, Prime Minister Najib Razak tabled a white paper in Parliament entitled, “Towards countering threats posed by Islamic State Militant Group”.[14] Delivered entirely in Malay, Najib condemned the violence propagated by Daesh, encouraged support from the public to reject extremist ideas, and promised to increase efforts in reducing the threat of terrorism.[15]

It has been a little over a year since the submission of the white paper, which is available only in scanned copy online (and difficult to find).[16] Upon review, what was striking about the concluding remarks in the document was that the only solution proposed was to further stiffen existing anti-terror laws. These included the Security Offences (Special Measures Act) (SOSMA), Prevention of Crime Act (POCA) and the Penal Code. No other policy recommendations were provided to substantially elevate the current threat. This is worrying, considering the questionable way Malaysia’s anti-terror laws and legislation could be enforced and regulated.

For instance, in the past, opposition activists of the incumbent government have been arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) that was originally intended as a preventive measure against communist threats that no longer exist.[17] When the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2015 was introduced as a response to the emerging Daesh threats, there were serious and justifiable concerns that it was just “a reincarnation of the ISA”.[18] Furthermore, the Communications and Multimedia Ministry recently submitted a proposal to the Attorney General for legal amendments to be made on the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998. If passed, this new law will require the registration of political blogs and online news portals with the government as an effort to counter “defamatory news” and “inflammatory opinions”.[19] Antithetical to the current administration’s previous pledge in 2012 to repeal the Sedition Act for more freedom of expression,[20] this proposal is a grim reminder how freedom of speech and Internet freedom in the country are being tightly scrutinised and regulated.[21]

Absence of robust policy framework and lack of public engagement

If we are to believe that the Najib administration is serious about mitigating terror threats at domestic level, then some further research, serious reassessments and critical revisions should be carried out to improve current policies. Information should be available in an efficiently accessible form that can be promptly found and used to maintain public interest, and keep them in the loop. As it stands, apart from the crackdowns, arrests and promises to tighten the law, it is difficult for the rakyat to gauge if other preventive measures have been implemented.[22] This lack of transparency and accountability in leadership creates unnecessary political vulnerabilities and heightens anxiety.

Dissidents would argue that the current administration benefits from the rakyat’s ignorance because the dynamics of the power play here allows more room for manipulation of the general public. In reality, the inadequate effort in engaging the public signifies how much the Malaysian government undervalues public contribution. Key security strategies should always include engaging the public as part of a concerted state effort to mitigate terrorism. Support from the public is crucial in assisting local law enforcement agencies, be it for crime prevention or counterterrorism. Everyone should be encouraged to feel like they are part of the nation-building narrative and meaningful governing process. The desired outcome could motivate people to step up to be part of the solution. Increasing community capabilities in acknowledging legitimate social problems, dispelling disruptive views and identifying suspicious behaviour would be productive, as opposed to citizens relying on false assumptions on what terrorism is or looks like.[23]

At present, there is no document or policy paper that is readily available online (or otherwise) that could comprehensively explain to the Malaysian public the nature of threat we are currently facing and how the government plans to react to terrorist threats or emergencies. Officially-released notices bear no semblance of even a formal presentation that could help distinguish them easily from rumours, which further exacerbate fear-mongering. One such instance is the Federal Territories Minister Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor (aka Ku Nan) who decided to “notify” the public of the “list of targets” in possession of the captured Daesh members. It was not even within his jurisdiction to release such statement, of which even the PDRM themselves were mystified as to where and how did he receive his intelligence.[24] Regardless of the motive behind the public disclosure of the list of targets, Ku Nan’s action was not viewed favourably by the public at all – in fact he was slammed for being an alarmist.[25]

This is why many Malaysians feel excluded, mishandled and abandoned by top-level officials. Unless they are full of praise (such as the recent PR disaster of the #RespectMyPM Twitter campaign) or they carry certain myopic viewpoints that are supported from within the government, critical debates and discussions are actively discouraged.[26] For example, a popular Malaysian news portal, The Malaysian Insider, which has been blocked several times for allegedly publishing “inflammatory content” finally shuttered to a close after persistently reporting on the PM’s alleged misuse of sovereign funds.[27] More significantly, foreign journalists were recently deported for asking uncomfortable questions about the corruption allegations directed at the PM.[28] So when it was revealed last month that there was a terror plot to kidnap PM Najib Razak, of course it was greeted with a great collective disbelief.[29]

Counterproductive Outcomes

These latest episodes serve as a stark reminder that the Malaysian public’s value, trust and well-being are not a priority for the incumbent government. If anything, their reluctance to acknowledge their hand in the growing problem at the domestic level, and their stubbornness to adopt a more sensible policy-building approach is greatly impacting the situation. Considering that the ruling party has shown a lack of accountability and failed at fulfilling their political pledges on more than just one occasion, it is no wonder that the public is becoming exceedingly distrustful of it.

Meanwhile, despite assertions in news reports of the “success” of Malaysia’s de-radicalisation programmes which have been boasted as “the best in the world”, there is no official indication how these government programmes were planned or assessed for implementation.[30] Additionally, there is no clear definition for what “success” means in the programme’s introduction either.[31] Even more worrying, one of the agencies involved in the process is the controversial Islamic Development Department (JAKIM), well-known for their invasive and boundary-violating “moral-policing” activities which aimed to “preserve the chastity of Muslims” everywhere in the country.[32] In short, the question whether or not Malaysia is capable of coping with the growing terrorist threat remains unanswered.

Conclusion: rethinking security policies

It is true that Daesh’s brand of extremism has limited appeal in the Southeast Asia.[33] The Jakarta attack itself was poorly executed and, at best, amateurish. The probability of a Daesh attack to occur in Kuala Lumpur is still considerably low and and its threats should not be overestimated. However, the growing indoctrination, radicalisation and rising extremist views amongst Malay-Muslims continue to be worrying security conundrums and should be seen as a major counterterrorism challenge.[34]

There is also a disconcerting number of high-level people who are only too quick to shift the blame to external factors such as liberal values and pluralism, Jewish conspiracies, and Wahhabism/Salafism, of which local religious authorities are only too eager to distance themselves from.[35] Compound these all together, they build a grave picture that shows how far removed and complacent the Malaysian government can be from the reality of the current global threat.

While there is no doubt that the PDRM have been successful in their anti-terror sting operations, nevertheless tactical operations alone are not sufficient without robust counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies in place. More conscious efforts should also be made to improve cohesiveness amongst the diverse communities in Malaysia as part of a nation-wide strategy of building resilience against terrorism. The government would significantly benefit from public confidence in their capabilities. In turn, a mutually rewarding collaborative relationship could be forged.

Nonetheless, with the Prime Minister’s loss of legitimacy in the storm of his corruption scandal, fractured inter-community relations, and growing demands from the conservatives for a more Islamic and divisive Malaysia, one thing is certain, however: the country’s security landscape will become increasingly turbulent should things stay the way they are.

 

 

Munira Mustaffa is a strategic intelligence analyst and due diligence consultant for a private London-based firm. She earned her Master’s degree in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism from the University College of London. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1][1] Rishi Iyengar, ‘Indonesians display defiance toward Jakarta attackers through rallies and social media’, Time, January 15, 2016, http://time.com/4182106/jakarta-rally-attacks-kami-tidak-takut/

[2] Zachary Abuza, ‘Terror attack could rip apart Malaysian society’, Southeast Asia Globe, March 7, 2016, http://sea-globe.com/terrorism-in-malaysia-zachary-abuza/

[3] Tom Batchelor, ‘ISIS targets Malaysia: terror group ‘very real’ threat after jihadis warn of reprisals’, Express, January 26, 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/638163/Islamic-State-Malaysia-terror-attacks-Jakarta-bombing

[4] Eileen Ng, ‘Malaysian police foil suicide blast hours before planned attack in Kuala Lumpur’, Stuff, January 17, 2016, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/75970763/Malaysian-police-foil-suicide-blast-hours-before-planned-attack-in-Kuala-Lumpur

[5] Victoria Ho, ‘Malaysia detains 13 suspected ISIS militants’, Mashable, March 24, 2016, http://mashable.com/2016/03/24/13-arrests-isis-malaysia/

[6] Elina Noor, ‘Identifying the root causes of terrorism’, New Straits Times, March 22, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/03/134311/identifying-root-causes-terrorism

[7] Henry Johnson, ‘Mapped: the Islamic State is losing its territory – and fast’, Foreign Policy, 16 March, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/

[8] Joshua Holland, ‘Here’s what a man who studied every suicide attack in the world says about ISIS’ motives’, The Nation, December 2, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-what-a-man-who-studied-every-suicide-attack-in-the-world-says-about-isiss-motives/

[9] James Chin, ‘Malaysia: clear and present danger from the Islamic State’, Brookings, 16 December, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/12/16-malaysia-danger-from-islamic-state-chin

[10] Daniel Woker, ‘In Malaysia and Turkey, are we witnessing the end of moderate Islam?’, The Interpreter, 5 August, 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/05/In-Malaysia-and-Turkey-the-end-of-moderate-Islam.aspx

[11] Hayat Alvi, 2014, ‘The diffusion of intra-Islamic violence and terrorism’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 38-50.

[12] Mohd. Mizan Aslam, 2009, ‘The thirteen radical groups: Preliminary research in understanding the evolution of militancy in Malaysia’, Jati, 14, p.145-161

[13] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Counterterrorism conundrum: rethinking security policy in Australia and Southeast Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 17 December, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[14] NajibRazak.com, ‘Ucapan pembentangan kertas putih ke arah menangani ancaman kumpulan Islamic State’, 26 November, 2014, https://najibrazak.com/bm/blog/ucapanpembentangan-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state/

[15] Razak is the patronymic and refers to the Prime Minister’s father’s administration. In this essay, we will use Najib to denote this current administration.

[16] Malaysia, ‘Ke Arah Menanangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State’, Dewan Rakyat/Dewan Negara, 2014, http://www.airforce.gov.my/images/PENERBITAN/kertasputihislamicstate.compressed.pdf

[17] Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513.htm

[18] Munira Mustaffa, 2015, ‘Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?’, Strife, 9 May, 2015, https://strifeblog.org/2015/05/09/can-pota-counter-the-isil-threat-in-malaysia/

[19] Shazwan Mustafa Kamal, ‘Putrajaya weighing new leash for news portals, blogs’, The Malay Mail Online 16 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-weighing-new-leash-for-news-portals-blogs

[20] Centre for Independent Journalism – CIJ Malaysia, ‘[Malaysia] Disappointments and promises in freedom of expression’, Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 6 May, 2015, https://www.seapa.org/disappointments-and-promises-in-freedom-of-expression/

[21] Mong Palatino, ‘Malaysia will likely force “political blogs” and news websites to register with the government,’ Global Voices, 23 April, 2016, https://globalvoices.org/2016/04/23/malaysia-will-likely-force-political-blogs-and-news-websites-to-register-with-the-government/

[22] Malay word for “ordinary citizens”.

[23] Munira Mustaffa, ‘Dismantling terrorism myths’, The Malay Mail Online, 22 February, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/dismantling-terrorism-myths-munira-mustaffa

[24] Eunice Au, ‘Top KL tourist areas cited as possible terror targets’, The Straits Times, 17 January, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/top-kl-tourist-areas-cited-as-possible-terror-targets

[25] Sebastian Loh, ‘Malaysian minister under fire for naming IS targets in Kuala Lumpur’, Asian Correspondent, 18 January, 2016, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/01/malaysian-minister-under-fire-after-naming-is-targets-in-kuala-lumpur/

[26] BBC, ‘#RespectMyPM: Online war breaks out in Malaysia’, March 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35742118

[27] Jahabar Sadiq, ‘Eight proud years of being “The Malaysian Insider”’, The Bangkok Post, 22 March, 2016, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/906004/eight-proud-years-of-being-the-malaysian-insider

[28] BBC, ‘Australian journalists leave Malaysia after avoiding charges’, March 15, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-35800172

[29] Amy Chew, ‘ISIS, Malaysia, and the risks of lost moral authority’, The Diplomat, March 22, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/isis-malaysia-and-the-risks-of-lost-moral-authority/

[30] The Star, ‘Zahid Hamidi: Malaysia’s deradicalisation programme “best in the world”’, 20 February, 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/02/20/zahid-hamidi-malaysia-deradicalisation-programme-best-in-the-world/

[31] New Straits Times Online, ‘Malaysia’s deradicalisation process a success’, 22 January, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/01/123407/malaysias-deradicalisation-process-success

[32] Kamles Kumar, ‘Moral policing driving youths away from Islam, Ku Li tells Jakim’, Malay Mail Online, 5 December, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/moral-policing-driving-youths-away-from-islam-ku-li-tells-jakim

[33] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘ISIS reaches Indonesia’, Foreign Affairs, 8 February, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[34] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, 21 April, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

[35] The Malay Mail Online, ‘Putrajaya in espionage, psychological warfare against “liberal” Islamic groups, minister says’, 18 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-in-espionage-psychological-warfare-against-liberal-islamic-groups;

Robert Fulford, ‘Malaysia: a hotbed of anti-Semitism’, National Post, 2 January, 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/robert-fulford-malaysia-a-hotbed-of-anti-semitism;

The Malay Mail Online, ‘No place for Wahhabism in Malaysia, fatwa council says’, 1 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/no-place-for-wahhabism-in-malaysia-fatwa-council-says

 

Malaysia's Daesh problem: extremism in the shadow of moderation

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By Munira Mustaffa:

Malaysians participating in a rally to express their desire for change. (Photo: Obtained via a Flickr account. Licensed under Creative Commons.)
Malaysians participating in a rally to express their desire for change. (Photo: Hitoribocchi, CC 2.0)

Regional analysts and Western pundits may be inclined to wonder why Daesh’s[1] influence still persists in Malaysia, despite concerted efforts to combat the group.[2] The answer lies in the fact that with a population of approximately 240 million Muslims in the region, Southeast Asia is an ideal ground for Daesh’s radicalisation ventures. Its geostrategic position in energy and commercial trade routes and maritime affairs could prove to be of value, and may even allow Daesh more latitude to expand their influence.

This much is evident from Daesh’s newly formed Bahasa-speaking unit known as Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy (aka Katibah Nusantara).[3] Recent developments have shown that Malaysia could potentially shift from its current status as a terrorist transit point to becoming a target state. Reports are rife that Daesh is encouraging their supporters through the organisation’s online magazine, Dabiq, to carry out attacks in Malaysia, as well as Singapore and Indonesia.[4] If such attacks materialise, the consequences could potentially destabilise the country’s politics and socioeconomy.

With the intention of narrowing “the divide between the moderates and the extremists”, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Najib Razak, boasts of being the pioneer of the Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (GMOMF).[5] But he is also embroiled in a grand corruption scandal[6] that even managed to grab the attention of the international media, and warranted an FBI investigation.[7] His rapidly deteriorating reputation as a state leader triggered nationwide outrage that prompted calls for his resignation.[8] The serious loss of confidence in Najib, both personally and as leader of the UMNO party, has intensified the bellowing from restless conservatives who fervently believe that it is time for the country to be governed by “a pure Islamic leader” who is willing to introduce hudud (lit: “limit” or “prohibition”) law[9] as the ultimate answer to crime and corruption.

The clamour for a more orthodox Islamic Malaysia is not a new phenomenon. Nor is it one that has occurred in a vacuum. One might argue that as much as moderation is a counter-reaction to fundamentalism, religious extremism can be seen as a reaction to modernity. While religious conservatives do not resist harnessing technology for their own purposes, the goals they espouse and the rejection of other modern values such as pluralism is a clear separation of religion, state and democracy that points back to a “simpler time”. This is even more apparent from their use of modern processes (like guerrilla warfare), technology (like encryption and social media), and ideologies, like modified forms of Marxism.

Communism and socialism have anti-clerical and anti-religious undertones, possibly resulting from their criticism of religion from a Western background. Both the anti-clerical and anti-religious elements of modern Western ideologies came from the desire to reduce something to its purest and truest form, eliminating superstition. The same is true of fundamentalist ideology, which is hostile to innovations and ‘corruption’ of tradition and culture. A lot of the doctrine of Daesh came from earlier writings and the influence of the first modern Muslim revival in the late 19th and 20th century.[10] It has been argued that the Daesh movement is rooted in the Wahhabism[11] doctrine, which demanded that all Muslims pledge their allegiance to a single Islamic authority. Those who refused would be denounced as takfiri (infidel), and would thereby deserve the punishment of death.[12]

This is why it is essential to recall Malaysia’s past association with Communism prior to Independence. As a former colony of Britain and a strategic partner of the US, multi-ethnic Malaysia is frequently described as a moderate and progressive nation. Grassroots militant jihadism in the country emerged in the late 1960’s after the insurgency era, and gained momentum during the Islamic revivalism period of the 1980’s. Anxious to detach themselves from the country’s left-wing anti-religious communist past, a number of eager young Malay Muslims took off for Afghanistan to join the mujahideen (guerrilla fighters)[13] during the Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 as an expression of solidarity and Muslim camaraderie, much like those who ventured into Syria to participate in Daesh today. There, these recruits received their training in the art of militant war, and this educational package included extreme interpretations of Islam.

Upon their return, not only did they bring back knowledge of military combat to share with fellow sympathisers, but also their radical ideology. More homegrown militant groups have surfaced since then, such as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and al-Mau’nah. By the late 1990’s, a number of these sympathisers enlisted with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), after being moved by the plight of oppressed Muslims around the world.[14] Two of them gained infamy in their own right, the now-deceased Noordin Md. Top and Azahari Husin. One study identified 13 homegrown radical militant groups, and they all share one common goal: to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) out of Malaysia.[15]

Since its Independence on 31st August 1957, much of Malaysia’s national security and nation building has centred on race relations, given the country’s diverse population. Those who believe that the iron-fisted Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) – recently enforced in September 2015 – will be an effective countermeasure to terrorism will be disappointed if policymakers continue to reject and dismiss reality. Enabling racist and polarising views, fanning paranoia of the Jewish/Chinese conspiracy purportedly seeking to dismantle Muslim faith[16], and legitimising and empowering Malay supremacist sentiments are all reasons why extremism exists in the first place. There is no doubt that the incumbent Malaysian government is very keen on promoting fundamentalist and austere elements of religion only when it suits their purposes and benefits the state.

Moreover, the model of Malaysia’s religious authority is similar to models of how religious authorities in the Muslim world are treated as extensions of the state, which finds its origins in the relationship between the Egyptian state, the al-Azhar University, and Egypt’s religious leaders. Malaysia’s religious authorities are appointed by the state, therefore it is in their best interests to collude with state authority and legitimise the state’s policies. Despite government reassurances that POTA is employed only to tackle radicalisation and mitigate terror activities, it could possibly be misused and abused to subdue critics of the incumbent leadership. In fact, a dissident critic of Najib Razak was recently detained under SOSMA (Security Offences (Special Measures) Act) for having the audacity to demand government accountability over the corruption allegations.[17]

In the face of extremism, a more active state effort in addressing bigotry and dissociating itself from racial chauvinism and religious supremacy is pivotal for reformation. This is a necessary step in strengthening nation building and community resilience. Much of this must come from a demonstrably positive leadership, one that requires accountability and transparency.

There is no denying that the root of Malaysia’s growing extremism lies not just related to the global spread of fundamentalist religious ideologies, but is also ingrained in the attitude of the country’s irresponsible policymakers, community leaders and politicians – all of whom refuse to be held accountable for their actions. This much is evident from UMNO Supreme Council member Tan Sri Annuar Musa, who proudly and wrongfully proclaimed that racism is acceptable in Islam, knowing full well that his peers in power would never castigate him.[18] Nevertheless, such statements feed and validate Islamophobic rhetoric that marginalises Muslim minorities across the globe, which in turn is a reactive co-radicalisation factor in the formation of reactionary extremism.[19]

Two wrongs will never make a right. When one recognises Malaysia’s history of religious policing, and the way that its authoritative ruling power breaches even the most personal boundaries[20] of its people and infringes the space of both Muslims and non-Muslims[21] alike, is it any wonder that Malaysia is suffering from a problem of extremism?

Munira Mustaffa completed her MSc in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism at the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, University College of London, and her dissertation was on mapping and analysing terrorism in Malaysia. She is also an intelligence analysis consultant for several corporate intelligence and security firms based in London and New York. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

NOTES

[1] Throughout this entire essay, ISIS/ISIL will be referred to as Daesh.

[2] John Hudson, ‘Why does Malaysia have an Islamic State problem?’, Foreign Policy. September 9, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/09/why-does-malaysia-have-an-islamic-state-problem/

[3] TRAC. ‘Kuala Lumpur Cell / Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah / Malay archipelago unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria / Majmu’ah al Arkhabiliy / Katibah Nusantara’, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/kuala-lumpur-cell-katibah-nusantara-lid-daulah-islamiyyah-malay-archipelago-unit-islamic-state

[4] The Malay Mail Online. ‘Police counter-terrorism unit says beefing up security after IS threatens attack on Malaysia’, September 11, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/police-counter-terrorism-unit-says-beefing-up-security-after-is-threatens-a

[5] The Global Movement of Moderates, http://www.gmomf.org/

[6] Jennifer Pak, ‘1MDB: the case that’s riveting Malaysia’, BBC News, August 28, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33447456

[7] Oliver Holmes, ‘US investigators launched probe into scandal-hit Malaysian PM Najib Razak,’ The Guardian, September 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/us-investigators-launch-probes-into-scandal-hit-malaysian-pm-najib-razak

[8] Ansuya Harjani, ‘Malaysia’s anti-government protests: what’s next?’, CNBC, August 31, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/31/malaysias-anti-government-protests-whats-next.html

[9] Islamic penal law for severe crimes considered being against the rights of God as outlined in the Holy Quran and hadith. See Oxford Islamic Studies, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757

[10] Karen Armstrong, ‘Wahhabism to ISIS: how Saudi Arabia exported the main source of global terrorism’, Newstatesman, November 27, 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/wahhabism-isis-how-saudi-arabia-exported-main-source-global-terrorism

[11] A Sunni movement founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, described to be radical and extremely orthodox. See Crooke (2014) and Armstrong (2014).

[12] Alastaire Crooke, ‘You can’t understand ISIS if you don’t know the history of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia’, The Huffington Post, October 27, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html

[13] “Mujahideen” is translated as “one who engages in jihad (struggle)”, but in contemporary conflicts the term has become synonymous with Muslim guerilla fighters.

[14] Sidney Jones, 2005, ‘The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:2, p.169-178.

[15] Mohd. Mizan Aslam, 2009, ‘The thirteen radical groups: Preliminary research in understanding the evolution of militancy in Malaysia’, Jati, 14, p.145-161.

[16] Ian Buruma, ‘The ‘Jewish conspiracy’ in Asia’, The Guardian, February 9, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/06/judaism-race

[17] The Malay Mail Online, ‘Khairuddin rearrested under Sosma moments after court orders his release’, 23 September, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/khairuddin-rearrested-under-sosma-moments-after-court-orders-his-release

[18] Sheridan Mahavera, ‘I am racist and my racism based on Islam, says Umno’s Annuar Musa’, The Malaysian Insider, September 16, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/i-am-racist-and-my-racism-based-on-islam-says-umnos-annuar-musa

[19] Douglas Pratt, ‘Islamophobia as reactive co-radicalization’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 26:2, p.205-218, January 28, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09596410.2014.1000025

[20] Kamles Kumar, ‘Cover up to “respect” Muslims, mufti tells non-Muslims in dress code rows’, The Malay Mail Online, June 28, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/cover-up-to-respect-muslims-mufti-tells-non-muslims-in-dress-code-rows

[21] The Malaysian Insider, ‘What more do you want from me, Borders manager asks JAWI’, 25 March, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/cover-up-to-respect-muslims-mufti-tells-non-muslims-in-dress-code-rows

The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred

by

By Samar Batrawi:

Jihad caravan1

Montasser AlDe’emeh and Pieter Stockmans, De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat [The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred], Tielt, Belgium: Uitgeverij Lannoo, 2015. 19,99 (e-book). Pages: 518. ISBN: 9789401427708

‘I was born and raised in Antwerp. A year and a half ago I left to go to Syria. I have not for a single second regretted burning my bridges in Belgium. You may analyse me, how I have become what I am now. But I am not returning to Belgium. In this area I am the third highest military commander of Jabhat al-Nusra. Today I celebrate the birth of my daughter. I am happy!’ [1]

We will never fully comprehend extremism in Europe and the Middle East without an appreciation of the interplay between the intimate life stories of those involved and the bigger geopolitical picture.[2] This is the main premise behind ‘De Jihadkaravaan’ (The Jihad Caravan), in which the personal stories of Dutch-speaking foreign fighters from the Netherlands and Belgium are combined with accounts of the developments in their European home countries and the countries on which the jihadist struggle often focuses, such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine.

The book engages with the ideas, hopes, and fears of the people involved in the struggles in the Middle East. It is not a strictly academic book, but this is precisely where its value lies as it helps us comprehend the human narratives behind the statistics and the headlines, and therefore helps us make sense of that vague yet incredibly relevant word that we hear so much in relation to radicalisation: ‘identity’. It approaches homegrown radicalisation in the West as a societal problem, and it calls upon everybody to become engaged in the resolution of this issue. The book is largely narrated through the eyes of Montasser AlDe’emeh, a Palestinian-Belgian who decided to travel to Syria to get to know the stories of his fellow countrymen who had decided to leave their old lives behind.

This review is aimed at making the main ideas of this book more accessible for those that do not speak Dutch, as this book not only offers an insight into the Dutch and Belgian foreign fighter issue, but it may also carry important insights for other European countries from which foreign fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq in the past years.

Narratives of Displacement and Oppression

‘Belgium has pushed us away with its hypocritical laws. Muslim women could not attend school without removing their headscarf. You decided how we had to live. We chose not to sell out our religion.’[3]

There are currently approximately 200-250 Dutch and 440 Belgian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Belgian nationals form the largest per capita number of foreign fighters from Western Europe (of the 11.2 million total population) and the Netherlands comes in sixth (with a total population of 16.8 million).[4] To put these numbers in perspective: with a population of 64.1 million, the United Kingdom has around 500-600 foreign fighters in the region, putting it three places below the Netherlands per capita.

Though the Netherlands and Belgium are societies that differ on a number of levels, the linguistic connection between the Dutch-speaking foreign fighters from both countries has fostered an intimate connection between them. For example, the group Sharia4Holland – a radical Salafist group that was active in the Netherlands from 2010 onwards and from which several members have travelled to Syria[5] – is in fact an offshoot of the Belgian Sharia4Belgium. Belgian fighters that travelled to Syria in 2012 and 2013 have been linked to this group.[6]

Some of the Dutch and Belgian people Montasser meets in Syria are former members of these networks.[7] Those following the Dutch and Belgian fighters are familiar with this alleged connection, though it should be made clear that it is ideological rather than organisational in nature. It is doubtful that Sharia4Holland and Sharia4Belgium have played an active role in the recruitment and the arrangement of travelling to Syria.[8]

As Montasser explains, Sharia4Belgium’s and Sharia4Holland’s aim and success has been creating an awareness of a certain notion of Muslim identity among their followers.[9] This, in turn, has proven to be fertile soil for further radicalisation and incentives to action. This complicates the attempts of government and security agencies to tackle the flow of foreign fighters from their countries to Syria and Iraq, as the more straightforward method of targeting active recruiters would be an insufficient - if not largely misguided – policy in this case.

Radicalisation processes and the choice to become a foreign fighter may more often than not occur at a closed-off individual level, perhaps (but not necessarily) preceded by direct contact with an organisation such as Sharia4Holland or Sharia4Belgium. And as more and more stories have emerged of Dutch and Belgian fighters in Syria and Iraq, it has become clear that often the most evident connection to ‘networks’ in their home country and Syria is either through ideological sympathy or through friend or family connections. What seems to be key in understanding the foreign fighter contingent may therefore not be these official networks, but rather some notion of identity and belonging.

The centrality of identity is obviously manifested in the ideological and political aims of European jihadists abroad, but this book gives us a valuable insight into another component of the identity of Dutch and Belgian fighters: their intimate connection through their shared Dutch language, which they speak amongst each other. Interestingly, even though they have made it to the land that they believe will allow them to escape European oppression and free their equally oppressed Middle Eastern brothers, they speak in the language of their home countries of Belgium and the Netherlands. They refer to their world in Syria as a ‘mini Europe’.[10] The identity of these people is not merely a religious one, but it is also one of having felt out of place in - yet inevitably having been shaped by - a European context. The stories of these people may teach us more than we think about the societies from which they emerge, as they are not purely a product of Islam but also of their Dutch and Belgian experiences.

Conclusion

The Jihad Caravan concludes with a number of recommendations for us all – not merely for the policy world – as the authors view the issue of foreign fighters as a global issue which can only be addressed with everybody’s involvement. They make two particularly important recommendations:[11]

First, they make a call for people to support the Arab Spring, and to pierce through the false choice between peace and security in the Middle East. This entails recognising that the old model of international support for local dictators in the name of stability has failed, as it was part of the reason why a new form of global terror (Salafi-jihadism) has emerged. Though this implies that the Arab Spring is a uniform movement rather than - what I would argue – more of a chain of interlinked yet distinct popular uprisings, what the authors mean by their call for ‘support of the Arab Spring’ is in fact an international backing of genuine change as demanded by the people in the Middle East, unhindered by an obsession with security and stability in the region.

The observation that Salafi-jihadism emerged because of internationally backed local dictators is the subject of many studies, and questionable simply because the rise of secular Arab dictators happened in conjunction with a number of different historical developments which may have triggered the rise of Salafi-jihadism. It is therefore difficult to strictly isolate the chain of events that led to this form of global terror, but it is true that Salafi-jihadism is new in the sense that it is a phenomenon of the past few decades, though its ideological influences date back to the early days of Islam.

Moreover, and in my opinion incredibly important, is the call to stop focusing solely on Islamic State horror stories in reports about the developments in Syria and Iraq, but to also focus on the terror that largely feeds Islamic State support: that of the Assad regime which has killed around 50 civilians for each one that the Islamic State has killed to date. The Islamic State is a terrifying entity, but death and suffering at the hands of non-jihadists must not be forgotten.

The second recommendation made in the book is to create a better foundation for European Islam to flourish. The underlying thought is that homegrown Muslim extremism in Europe cannot be solved without giving new life to a European Islam. Muslim communities in Europe have suffered immensely from the radicalising and polarising effects that the rise of the Islamic State has had in the global debate on Islam, which has compounded much of the exclusion and discrimination they were already feeling. This essentially brings us back to questions of displacement and oppression – precisely those issues that are at the heart of the foreign fighter issue.

Though this book ends on a political tone, which not everybody will appreciate, the least we can take from this account is what it tells us about the deeply human nature of what we so distantly call – as I do above – ‘the foreign fighter issue’. It also reminds us of the substantial human grievances that inspire these low-level recruits, as well as the undeniable human suffering that they cause on their path to fulfilment.

Samar Batrawi is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has worked for the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in London, and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Follow her at @SamarBatrawi

NOTES

[1] Quote from a Belgian foreign fighter interviewed in AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 159

[2] AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 12

[3] Quote from a Belgian woman in Syria interviewed in AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 161

[4] Neumann, P.R. (January 2015), Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s, ICSR Insight (http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/)

[5] De Volkskrant (23 May 2013), ‘Nederlander Vast in Marokko om Ronselen voor Syrie’ (http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-burgeroorlog-in-syrie/nederlander-vast-in-marokko-om-ronselen-voor-syrie~a3447299/)

[6] De Volkskrant (24 April 2013), Sharia4Holland Speelt Rol bij Jihad-reizen (http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/sharia4holland-speelt-rol-bij-jihad-reizen~a3430968/)

[7] AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 128

[8] Ibid. p. 143

[9] Ibid. pp. 136-141

[10] Ibid. p. 129

[11] Ibid. pp. 461-503

Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?

by

By Munira Mustaffa:

Malaysia
A snapshot of ISIL’s recruitment video featuring Malay-speaking children training with weapons. Photo: uploaded by ISIL’s Malay-speaking media division, Azzam Media.

Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Razak is painting Malaysia as “a model of moderate Islam” to the rest of the world, but the emergence of a recent recruitment video and photos from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatens to shatter that harmonious image.[i] The video and photos feature Malay-speaking youths training with weapons in an undisclosed ISIL-controlled location.

It was recently revealed that the Royal Malaysian Police had identified 39 more Malaysians who have joined ISIL, and eight Malaysian families are now in Syria.[ii] There are reportedly over 100 Malaysian fighters in Syria and Iraq.

The strength of ISIL’s reach is not to be underestimated; authorities are increasing their monitoring of sympathisers and making arrests to disrupt possible threats by ISIL in the country. In fact, a new terror group with a Nusantara[iii] element operating under ISIL’s command has emerged under the name Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy (lit: “the Archipelago Group”).[iv]

To counter these new threats of Islamic extremism, Malaysian policymakers introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) just over a month ago, on 7 April, 2015. This new anti-terrorism law has drawn fire from all quarters for its draconian measures. Critics have described it as ‘a reincarnation of the Internal Security Act’. There are legitimate concerns about the potential inconsistencies in state practice in its attempts to eradicate terrorism at the local level. This is largely because there is no universally agreed definition for terrorism that could facilitate the available legal frameworks for prosecuting the actors[v] of terrorism in a court of law. This is an issue faced not only by Malaysia, but internationally as well.

Taking this into perspective, it is necessary to examine how policymakers at Putrajaya define terrorism within Malaysia’s experience. Malaysia had a history of countering insurgencies even before the nation gained independence from the British Empire on 31 August, 1957, by employing preventive detention law as national security measures. After independence, the Internal Security Act (ISA) was enacted in 1960 to deter communist threats that no longer exist today. Under the ISA, the accused can be detained without trial or criminal charges under limited and legally defined circumstances for up to two years.[vi]

In the last few decades, there have been instances when ISA was used to detain members of the opposition for ‘instigation’. Therefore, it should come as no surprise why so many are fearful that POTA will be wielded to curb free speech and silence the opposition in the same manner.[vii] At present, Malaysian policymakers have yet to define exactly what qualifies as terrorism. Just like the ISA, POTA enables law enforcement officers to detain suspects of terrorism without a judicial review or a trial for up to two years, with an initial remand for 60 days with no guarantee of legal representation.[viii] This drew ire from Human Rights Watch, who called the law ‘repressive’.[ix] However, the Deputy Home Minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Wan Junaidi Tuanku Wan Jaafar, argued that POTA is nothing like the ISA, in that the executive power rests on a five-member advisory board and not on the minister.[x]

It is all very well that Malaysian policymakers are stepping up to combat terrorism threats at the national level. However, a problematic law with the purpose of preventing terrorism is not sustainable in the long run, especially when a nebulous term like ‘terrorist’ is so ill-defined. POTA carries unrealistic expectations in reducing terrorism and extremism in this region.

In terms of concrete action, it is a lot more practical to try to understand why so many Malaysian Muslims are drawn into ISIL. The Malaysian authorities believe that they are influenced by the desire to be martyred and wish to express solidarity with the Muslims suffering in Syria.[xi] Regardless, the fact of the matter cannot be denied – radicalisation in Malaysia is a serious concern, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims.

Joseph Chinyong Liow was correct when he argued that Malaysia’s current brand of Islam could be the main cause of concern for the ISIL dilemma. This brand alienates non-Muslims by establishing exclusivity and ownership on the religion and language with ‘no intentions to encourage pluralism or compromise’.[xii] This feeds into a form of state-sponsored extremism, where Islam is consistently utilised to legitimise and justify state power to interfere with not only the private and political lives of Muslims in Malaysia, but also to encroach on the right of non-Muslims to simply exist.

There are community leaders and politicians who encourage this divisive behaviour with their own polarising views and loose statements on religious policing, that can be seen as “othering” the non-Muslims and non-Malays, and even excluding gender and sexual minorities. Some recent notable examples include the cow-head protest incident, prohibiting non-Muslims from using the word “Allah”, and refusing to acknowledge Muslim women’s agency. To illustrate his point, Liow highlighted the worrying results of 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which showed that 39% of Malaysian Muslims believe that “violence against enemies of Islam is justifiable”.

In order to counter extremism more effectively, policymakers in Malaysia should consider aiming for a more realistic disruption and prevention goals rather than enacting an iron-fisted anti-terrorism law that may not be constructive in the long term, as well as opening the door to abuse. It is more feasible to put a concerted effort into increasing community resilience and wellbeing, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims, to make them less susceptible to extremist ideologies.

This could potentially be done through a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, a a sense of nationhood between Malaysians could be fomented through governmental policies that emphasise inter-community cooperation. On the other, the government could censure those who stoke hatred. It is important that the Malaysian government should make a point of refusing to give legitimacy to divisive views.

In Malaysia’s context, community resilience could mean the ability to withstand threats of extremism through an active engagement with local communities and education. Promoting interfaith acceptance and encouraging an embrace of diversity can achieve this. People should be encouraged to challenge and question religious sermons and teachings that contain insidious and dangerous messages that could incite hatred and exclusions.

Considering the country’s diverse cultural and religious identity, interfaith discussions should not be seen as a threat or viewed with suspicions by certain quarters, but instead should be welcomed as a crucial part of nation-building efforts. Through a strong and supportive community, empathy can be promoted and a safe space for an open dialogue can be created. In the long run, counter-radicalisation efforts could potentially encourage vulnerable Malaysian Muslim youths to reject extremist ideologies and reduce the threats that emanate from extreme and false interpretations of Islam.

Munira Mustaffa is pursuing her MSc in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism at the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, University College of London. She is also an intelligence analysis consultant for several corporate intelligence and security firms in London and New York. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

NOTES

[i] Zakir Hussain, ‘ISIS Posts Footage of Boy-Trainees From South-East Asia’, The Straits Times, March 17, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/isis-posts-footage-boy-trainees-south-east-asia-20150317

[ii] The Malaysian Insider, ‘Jumlah Keluarga Rakyat Malaysia Sertai ISIS Meningkat’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/jumlah-keluarga-rakyat-malaysia-sertai-isis-meningkat-kata-polis

[iii] It varies depending on national and historical context, but in this essay, nusantara refers to both Malay- and Indonesian-speaking archipelago.

[iv] The Malay Mail, ‘New IS Militant Wing for Malaysians, Indonesians Uncovered’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/new-is-militant-wing-for-malaysians-indonesians-uncovered

[v] ‘Actors’ in this write-up is defined as any non-state individuals or organisations engaged in acts of terror.

[vi] 8. Internal Security Act, 1960, Laws of Malaysia Act No. 82 (January 1, 2006), The Commissioner of Law Revision, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf

[vii] Bilveer Singh, ‘Prevention of Terrorism: Relevance of POTA In Malaysia’, RSIS Publications, March 31, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co15075-prevention-of-terrorism-relevance-of-pota-in-malaysia/

[viii] FMT Reporters, ‘Legal Fraternity United in Denouncing POTA’, Free Malaysia Today, April 13, 2015, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/04/13/legal-fraternity-united-in-denouncing-pota/

[ix] Human Rights Watch, ‘HRW Slams Malaysia’s New ‘Repressive’ Anti-Terrorism Law’, April 7, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/07/hrw-slams-malaysias-new-repressive-anti-terrorism-law

[x] Elizabeth Zachariah, ‘POTA Not Like ISA, Deputy Minister Tells Critics’, The Malaysian Insider, April 6, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/pota-not-like-isa-deputy-minister-tells-critics

[xi] The Royal Malaysian Navy, Ke Arah Menangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State, Dewan Rakyat, November 26, 2014, p.vi, http://navy.mil.my/index.php/media-massa/galeri/penerbitan/category/45-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state#

[xii] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, April 21, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

Made in prison: Copenhagen and the Paris attacks

by

By Charlie de Rivaz:

The cafe in Copenhagen where the gunman attacked. Photo: Benno Hansen (CC)
The cafe in Copenhagen where the gunman attacked. Photo: Benno Hansen (CC)

When news trickled through about Saturday’s attacks in Copenhagen, it was difficult to avoid a sense of déjà vu. Another Islamic extremist attacks another cartoonist. Then he targets Jews. Was this another Charlie Hebdo? Another gruesome episode in the increasingly depressing battle between radical Islam and the West?

This is not another Charlie Hebdo, there were important differences that should impact on the way we understand and react to the Copenhagen attacks. However, there were also similarities, one of which shines a light on a little-reported aspect of the Charlie Hebdo story: the importance of prisons in radicalising young Muslims.

Copenhagen is not another Charlie Hebdo

Why was Copenhagen not another Charlie Hebdo? First, unlike the gunmen in Paris, the gunman in Copenhagen, named as 22-year-old Omar El-Hussein by Danish media, was not a trained militant with links to al-Qaeda groups in the Middle East. He was a gang member with convictions for crimes like grievous bodily harm, burglary and dealing in weapons. There is no indication that El-Hussein had even travelled abroad, let alone to countries with terrorist training camps. Indeed, the Danish Prime Minister said she wanted to “make it very clear” that she had “no indication at this stage that [El-Hussein] was part of a [terrorist] cell”.

Contrast this with the gunmen in Paris: Said and Cherif Kouachi had both been known to police for militant Islamist activities since 2003, when Cherif was involved in sending would-be jihadists to fight for al-Qaeda in Iraq. He was arrested in 2005 trying to escape to Syria and imprisoned in 2008. Two years later he was named in the plot to free Smain Ait Ali Belkacem from jail. Belkacem was serving life for the 1995 Paris metro bombing that wounded 30 people. Yemeni sources say that both Kouachi brothers had trained in camps run by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2011 in the deserts of Marib in Yemen. The other gunman in Paris, Amedy Coulibaly, had also been imprisoned for his role in the 2010 plot to free Belkacem.

The second important difference is that while the Paris attacks were coordinated and carried out with near-military precision, the Copenhagen attacks were carried out by a lone gunman and appear to have been somewhat haphazard.

The Kouachi brothers struck hard and fast in Paris. Armed with Kalshnikov assault rifles, they identified and killed their targets, mostly cartoonists, as well as killing two policemen in their escape. Coulibaly similarly succeeded in taking the shoppers in a Kosher supermarket hostage. He killed four of the hostages. The fact that some 80,000 police and security personnel were mobilised in response to the attacks shows just how effective the gunmen were.

By contrast, El-Hussein only succeeded in killing one man in his initial attack on the café, documentary film-maker Finn Noergaard. The person who was probably his real target, cartoonist Lars Vilks, escaped unscathed. Vilks has been targeted several times since drawing pictures of the Prophet Muhammad dressed as a dog in 2007. The café where Vilks was due to speak was being guarded by armed police and security agents, as well as Vilks’ own bodyguards, so it is difficult to see how El-Hussein ever thought that he might replicate the kind of mass killings seen in Paris. His later shooting of a synagogue guard seemed unplanned and opportunistic.

Copenhagen is not the same as Charlie Hebdo. It was not a well-planned attack led by trained gunmen with links to terrorist groups; on the contrary, it was a clumsy attempt to replicate the Paris killings by a lone gunmen without any terrorist links or training.

The prison connection

Of course, the intentions behind both attacks appear similar: to kill those cartoonists who have published depictions of the Prophet Muhammad (often in provocative poses) and to kill Jews. This is why the copycat theory is plausible.

But the more interesting similarity relates to where these intentions come from, and, in particular, where the motivation to kill is cultivated. This is where the role of prison is key.

El-Hussein attacked the café just two weeks after his release from prison, where he had served two years for stabbing a man on a subway train. It was while in prison that he became radicalised. The head of the country’s prison and probation service had become so concerned about El-Hussein’s radicalisation that he informed Danish intelligence. It is currently unclear exactly who was involved in turning this gangster into a religious extremist.

In France the key players are well known. In 2005 Cherif Kouachi found himself in the infamous Fleury-Merogis prison, the largest in Europe with 150% over-crowding and a culture of violence, drugs and decay. There he met Djamel Beghal, who would become his chief inspiration and mentor, and Coulibaly, the third gunman in the Paris attacks.

Beghal was halfway through a 10-year sentence for his part in a plot to bomb the US embassy in Paris. In the late 1990s he had visited the Finsbury Park mosque in London to hear the radical preachings of Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada, and by the turn of the century was considered one of al-Qaeda’s chief recruiting agents in Europe after returning from training in Afghanistan. According to Jean-Charles Brisard, the head of the French Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “Beghal was in direct contact with the highest ranking members of al Qaeda at the time.”

Beghal was the defining influence on Kouachi and Coulibaly, and they both continued to visit him in the south of France after Beghal had been placed under house arrest there in 2009. Although Said Kouachi never went to prison, it is safe to assume that what his brother learned inside was passed on.

The key role that prisons play in radicalising young Muslims was little reported in the aftermath of the Paris attacks. We heard much about the gunmen’s marginalised background, their difficult childhoods, their upbringing among the estates and the decaying parks of the banlieues; but we heard little about how their deep-seated sense of injustice and dislocation was moulded into the motivation to kill. The attacks in Copenhagen have now put the role of prisons centre-stage. It is while serving in prison that many of these young Muslims are turned from angry young men into religious extremists carrying the motivation to kill in the name of Allah.

The Copenhagen attacks were not the same as Charlie Hebdo, but it is important to recognise that the killers’ murderous motivations were formed in the same place: in the cold corridors of prison.

Charlie de Rivaz is an MA student on the Conflict, Security and Development programme at King’s College, London. For three years he worked in Argentina and Colombia as an English teacher and journalist. His main interests include the political economy of war, international human rights law, conflict resolution, and state-failure and state-building. Charlie is currently the Managing Editor of the Strife blog.