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An ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’: a too distant dream?

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By Georgina McDonald

Figure 1 The Mosque-Cathedral of Córdoba (Image credit: Author’s own, G.M.)

Cementing and expanding the Islamic State is of the utmost importance to its leaders and supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) who, broadly, advocate for the destruction of the West, a return to traditional Wahhabism for all Muslims and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate to unite Muslims worldwide under their leadership. ISIL rejects traditional nation-state identities, instead favouring an absolutist Islamist identity. This was reflected in a 2014 speech by former ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi upon the declaration of the Caliphate, who exclaimed ‘Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis’.  Consequently, multiple branches of ISIL have emerged across the world. Most recently and ferociously in Africa, where the Islamic State of the Central African Province, Islamic State of Somalia, and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, for example, have appeared to spread their influence. However, if ISIL yearns for a restoration of the Caliphate, then why has Andalusia, or Al-Andalus, the region which holds the ‘Ka’aba of the West’, been neglected from this vision? Why have we not seen an ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’? 

Historical Background

The region of Andalusia spans nearly 90,000 square kilometres across the southern most land of Spain. It boasts incredible mountain ranges such as the Sierra Nevada and stunning beaches along the Costa del Sol. However, it is in the architecture in the cities of Seville, Granada and Córdoba where the history of the region comes to light. This history is rich in culture and by walking the city streets one is easily able to identify Andalusia’s historic rulers.

In 711 CE, under the leadership of Tariq ibn Ziyad, an Islamic army crossed the Strait of Gibraltar from Tangier. Within seven years they had conquered the region of Andalusia, ending Visigoth rule, and beginning an 800-year Muslim rule which eventually expanded as far as the borders of León, Castille, Navarra and Barcelona. During this period, the region became known as Al-Andalus. The invasion is generally viewed as an extension of the Muslim conquest of North Africa and a successful attempt to expand territory and influence. 

Stability was henceforth brought to the region by the Umayyad Caliphate in 756 CE. Amir Abd al-Rahman I had travelled from Damascus to Córdoba where he united the various Iberian Islamic factions under his rule. Later, in 929 CE, Abd al-Rahman III became Caliph and so, the Caliphate of Córdoba emerged. Arabic architecture and influence can be found in almost every city and town in Andalusia as a result. In Córdoba, the mosque, or mezquita, was converted from a Visigoth place of worship by al-Rahman in 786 CE, and is the main tourist attraction, known for its hidden Christian cathedral within. In Seville and Granada, the Giralda and the Alhambra respectively, evidence the intensifying rule which swept through Al-Andalus. 

The significance of Al-Andalus to the Islamic State has not been completely lost, however. After the 2017 Barcelona attacks claimed by the Islamic State, for the first time the terrorist organisation released a propaganda video in Spanish. One of the men in the video identifies himself as Al Qurtubí, the Arabic name for ‘the Córdoban’. Al Qurtubí threatened Spanish Christians, claiming that Al-Andalus will once again belong to the caliphate. Despite this acknowledgement, ISIL and its affiliates have not used terrorist tactics in the major cities of the region such as Seville, Málaga, Granada or Córdoba. Instead, their attacks have been focused on Barcelona and Madrid.

Barriers to retaking Al-Andalus

Theoretically, and historically, Andalusia should have great significance for Islamists. Reconquering the region would represent a remarkable step towards the return to the caliphate to unite Muslims worldwide. However, there are significant barriers to this vision. Firstly, the reason that ISIL was able to gain such large ground in Iraq and Syria was a direct result of existing political instability in the region. ISIL remarkably exploited the power vacuum which the US invasion and the capture of Saddam Hussein created in Iraq. Similarly, post-2011 saw ISIL exploit the collapse of the Assad regime and eventually control an area larger than the size of Great Britain. However, as an economically stable, democratic, western nation, Spain and the Spanish government have fortunately not experienced political strife on the level of that in Iraq and Syria. Without a power vacuum, ISIL could not take advantage of a lack of stable government in the same way it has done previously. Furthermore, many Iraqis and Syrians joined the ISIL citing economic reasons. In their war-torn communities where work was scarce, and with ISIL paying recruits, some felt they had no option. And some did not have an option at all. Many men were forced to join the terrorist organisation or face certain death. Fortunately, the inhabitants of Andalusia do not face the same difficulties, therefore are less likely to feel forced to seek aid from a terrorist organisation. 

In Europe, ISIL has mainly targeted major cities such as London, Paris, Barcelona and Brussels. This is more than likely a strategic move, to attract attention to their cause from politicians, the press and the public. Due to not being capital cities, the cities of Andalusia are less likely to draw as much attention. However, if ISIL was to attack Córdoba, for example, and it was framed in such a way that the attack indicated a resurgence of the old Muslim Caliphate, this then may draw more European eyes and instil more fear than any attack on London or Paris. Using a historical connection to the region as reasoning for attacks would potentially add legitimacy to their stake in the land in the eyes of their believers. Fortunately, this would not stand with the Spanish government nor with any Muslim who did not hold extremist Islamist views in Spain. Therefore, any attempt at resurgence into the area would undoubtedly be suppressed by Spanish civil and military authorities. 

Finally, Andalusia, while once a flourishing Muslim Caliphate, today does not have a large Muslim community in comparison to countries where ISIL thrived at its peak. In 2020, out of a total 8.4 million inhabitants in Andalusia, there were approximately 149,000 Muslims in the region with Spanish nationality, and a further 145,000 with Moroccan nationality. While a large Muslim population is of course not necessary for ISIL to commit terror attacks, it is perhaps more necessary, or at least helpful, for a realistic takeover of the region and formation of an Islamic State as seen in Iraq and Syria. ISIL attempts to use Islamic teachings in order to justify its actions, and while it could encourage a minority of those of the Muslim faith to join the cause, it is more likely fall on deaf ears of Andalusians as the majority are of different faiths or no faith at all.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the region of Andalusia in the past has flourished under Muslim rule for an 800-year long period, it seems today that the Islamic State are not interested in developing an ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’. Perhaps they do not see the value of expending resources to commit terror attacks in a region in order to reclaim it as they know the Spanish civil and military authorities would quickly thwart their efforts. In addition, committing attacks in major European capital cities draws more attention to their cause. At this stage in the Islamic State’s existence, perhaps just gaining attention from the western world is more important than attacking with the aim to conquer. And in order to rule, having the popular support of the population, or at least marginal support, is significantly beneficial. Spain’s stable economy means its inhabitants are not forced to turn to extreme ideas and with only a marginal Muslim population, the Islamic States reliance on old Islamic scripture will not persuade the numbers they need to succeed in a resurgence. For these reasons, it seems an ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’ will likely remain a distant dream for Al Qurtubí and the Islamic State. 

 

Georgina is a recent graduate of King’s College, London where she studied for an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society, for which she achieved a Distinction. This article is Georgina’s first contribution to Strife but she hopes to write further blogs on topics including terrorism, international relations and foreign and domestic policy.

Should Female Foreign Fighters be Repatriated?

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While as devoted as their male counterparts, female Jihadis are an underexplored topic of analysis in understanding racidalisation (Image credit: AFP)

It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr‘s death … It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meager, and weak body … It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women‘s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.

-Al-Sha’ab editorial, February 2002

Since the decline of Islamic State (IS), national governments are faced with the dilemma of leaving the remaining Jihadi foreign fighters and their families in Syria or repatriating them for prosecution in their home countries. This article focuses on the choice of the British Government to leave these individuals in Syria. It does so by discussing the associated difficulties to reintegrate jihadi women within society and its impact on existing counterterrorism (CT) strategies and de-indoctrination processes in the United Kingdom. Specifically, the role of female foreign fighters within the culture of Salafi-Jihadism remains underestimated, particularly with regards to their devotion to the cause and survival of the terrorist network.

Historically, a large participation of women in terrorists networks can be seen. According to Jessica Davis, female suicide bombers counted between twenty-eight to thirty-one per cent in Chechnya, while these numbers stand at fifty-four per cent in Nigeria. Similarly, during the 1970s and 1980s in the German Red Army, women counted for one third of the overall number. In the meantime, between 1986 and 2005, of the seventeen terrorist organisations which used suicide-bomb as a tactic, women were active in half of them. The article concludes that due to the lack of access to terrorist networks and their affiliated organisations, experts generally focus on male foreign fighters, as they cover positions of relevance within the organisation. In this sense, opting for repatriation of these individuals could result in a unique opportunity to advance the knowledge on rehabilitation and de-indoctrination procedures.

In terms of numbers, in 2017, there were over 40,000 jihadi fighters who travelled to Syria to fight under the banner of IS. Of the total number, thirteen per cent (or 4,761) were women, with another twelve per cent (4,640) were minors, who joined the terrorist grouping between 2013 and 2018. Since its defeat, around four-hundred foreign fighters, among them about fifty to sixty women, could or have returned to the United Kingdom (UK). A number of these women have not been able to return as Downing Street exercised its power to strip such citizens of their British nationality. This power, granted by the Immigration Act 2014, states that the British Government reserves the authority to deprive a person of their citizenship should that individual have conducted himself or herself in a manner that could compromise the UK’s interests.

One example of a female foreign fighter stripped of her British citizenship is Shamima Begum, a case which British newspaper put in the spotlights. The problem, however, is larger than her. Causing devastation on multiple occasions, the UK confronts a long history of home-grown terrorists which keep CT agencies in constant pursuit. One of the most prominent and famous cases is Samantha Lewthwaite also named the White Widow, the wife of the London 7/7 attacker, Germaine Lindsey, and currently on Interpol’s most-wanted list. Lewthwaite fake her detachment from her husband’s actions and beliefs and convinced the prosecutors of her innocence. She escaped British and European authorities disappearing shortly after. Lewthwaite is also linked to a series of other terror plots including the 2012 bombing in Kenya and in the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013.

At present, the British government decided that foreign fighters should remain in Syrian prison camps. However, the terrorist threat continues, with al-Qaeda’s increased activity in the region could potentially see remaining IS fighters join, detainees released, and both groups absorbed into the Base’s operations. According to the head of MI6: ‘They are likely to have acquired both the skills and connections that make them potentially very dangerous and also experienced extreme radicalisation.’ In this sense, IS’ weaker presence in the region does not reflect a decrease in the overall influence of terrorist organisations, which are likely to benefit from the situation. At the same time, repatriating these individuals would likely result in a higher investment of resources for monitoring and de-indoctrination purposes. Such a development would add further pressure on the criminal justice system and counterterrorism units.

What makes female jihadi fighters so significant in light of such debates? Academics tend to focus primarily on the role of men in terrorist organisations as they cover positions of relevance. The lack of ample information regarding female fighters makes them equally dangerous, and all the more important to understand. Lacking the most up-to-date information on women’s ‘path to Jihad’ makes it difficult for Counterterrorism experts to produce appropriate de-indoctrination procedures fitting these profiles. However, from the available information on radicalisation and focusing on case studies in which women were the subjects, it is possible to understand this important element.

Women often cover ‘less visible,’ albeit critical roles within terrorist organisations. They are educators of the next generation, facilitators, and perpetrators of the jihadi cause through recruitment and management of finances displaying a deep devotion to the cause and a continuation of the religious struggle. The level of indoctrination they have been subjected to in their homes or in camps, but also due to the nature of the motivations for joining the organisations contests to this fact. Multiple psychologists including Yoram Schweitzer and Farhana Ali identified these causes as being much more personal for women. Indeed, they can be with the ‘Four Rs:’ Revenge (the loss of a dominant male in their lives such as husband, father or brother), Redemption (due to alleged or real sexual misconducts), Respect (inability to conceive children or being considered marriageable), and Relationship (being daughters, wives or sisters of well-known insurgents).

Based on their analysis, it is crucial to consider the individual’s unique path to radicalisation and indoctrination. Such a path is clearly based on personal experiences via the justification of events happening to them, their families, and their community. Specifically, each individual justifies the use of violence and the adoption of Islamic extremism based on how they interpret their familiar links to terrorists, often citing hatred against those who killed their family members, and even societal pressure. In a nutshell, ‘terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives.’ Therefore, this link between personal experiences and an individual’s personality transform women, who choose to follow the path of radicalisation, becoming strong believers in violent jihad and demonstrating extreme devotion to the cause.

To conclude, whether to support or criticise the British government on its decision to deny the return of these individuals depends on an in-depth and accurate analysis of the pros and cons of such decisions. The long history of home-grown terrorism in the United Kingdom constitutes an important element of analysis in the choice to repatriate or leaving these individuals in Syria. The example of Samantha Lewthwaite, for example, shows the difficulties associated with the processes of de-indoctrination. In this sense, women have demonstrated to cover essential roles in the fields of recruitment, finance, and perpetration of terrorism, showing a new way to interpret the figure of the ‘terrorist.’ Such a shift inspired scholars to coin an alternative version named the ‘female jihad,’ to understand female fighters’ unique path to radicalisation and, thus, creating a new window of analysis. In this context, repatriation ought to be seen as an opportunity to develop more rigorous de-indoctrination processes which are currently still in the pioneering stage, while using the protection of these individuals as examples to disillusion prospective foreign fighters.

Francesco Bruno is a full-time first-year PhD Candidate in Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, focusing on the organisational practices and choices of terrorist organizations with al-Qaeda as a primary case study. He received a BScEcon in International Politics from Aberystwyth University in 2016 before moving to the University of Manchester where he obtained a MA in Peace and Conflict Studies in 2017. During his studies, he took part in research trips in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda where he conducted fieldwork regarding the pacification and peace processes. Francesco’s main areas of interest span from Peace processes to state-building as well as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency with a focus on Afghanistan and Iraq

Strife Feature | The Islamic State’s Social Contract: A ‘state’ founded on fear or freedom?

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By Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi

 

A man cries as he carries his daughter while walking from an Islamic State-controlled part of Mosul towards Iraqi special forces soldiers during a battle in Mosul, Iraq, on March 4, 2017. Image Credit: REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic

 

With the Islamic State’s caliphate crumbling, many in the towns and villages on the brink of liberation fear their post-Islamic State future.  To understand why the group succeeded to such an extent and to establish a lasting end to the conflict, we must look back at how the Islamic State managed to win the hearts and minds of the people, thus allowing the rise of its caliphate.  Whilst the group has attempted to portray itself as a concerned and capable ruler, the reality is that its social contract is built on a foundation of fear.

Annie Barnard and Hwaida Saad of The New York Times write: ‘The Islamic State alternates between terrorizing residents and courting them.’  The group succeeded precisely because it realised that there is no single method by which to persuade its target audiences to its cause – in this case, the revival of the Islamic caliphate.  Rather, it carefully constructs its strategic communications so that it resonates with numerous audiences, appealing both to their desires and fears.

The question of whether the basis for the state – the Islamic State or otherwise – is freedom or fear is an old one.  In this regard, the influences of both Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are evident in the Islamic State’s approach to establishing its caliphate.  For instance, Hobbes suggests that the desire for security lies at the heart of the formation of the social contract.  Ultimately, fear lays the foundations of the state.  On the contrary, Rousseau’s approach to the social contract is based on freedom which, in essence, is the right of an individual to pursue his/her will.  And so, the question arises: Does the philosophy of fear or the philosophy of freedom found the basis for the state?  Is fear more powerful than freedom?

Mara Revkin argues that the existence of a social contract goes beyond the theoretical realm in the context of the Islamic State, as evidenced by the Wathīqat al-Madīnah [Document of the City].  The document is distributed by the group throughout territories under its control, defining the rights and duties binding together the residents of the caliphate and the Islamic State.

 

Excerpts of the Wathīqat al-Madīnah[i]

 

So, the question remains: what is – or, more accurately, was – it about the Islamic State that resonated with certain individuals?

Hobbes believes that humans are fundamentally governed by our ‘appetites and aversions’ – in other words, our desires and our fears.  The Islamic State has recognised this.  It capitalises on the desires and fears of its target audiences in order to construct the Islamic State, and gain and maintain support for its rule.  Beyond those who are ‘ideologically committed to the goal of establishing a caliphate that is governed according to sharia’, [ii] many of those who support – or, at least accept – Islamic State control are attracted to its claims to be able to provide security and services to its residents.

Consider just one example of a target audience: Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria.

Certain individuals view the Islamic State as the only actor actively addressing its (immediate) desires for a sense of belonging, and fears of continued alienation.  The group claims that ‘There is only one sect here, Sunni Islam […] Here in the Caliphate, there is no room for pluralism’.[iii]  Such claims resonate with many Sunnis who feel marginalised by the relevant non-Sunni ruling sect.  By nature, humans seek power so that they are able to preserve themselves.  It appeals to Iraqi Sunnis’ desires to restore the power lost in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War; and, it appeals to many Sunni Syrians living under an Alawite regime (a minority sect), as evidenced in the accounts given by former Islamic State members.  Peter Neumann observes that defectors’ critiques are ‘framed in jihadist and/or sectarian terms’, with some members deserting as a result of brutality against Sunnis, whom they believed the Islamic State ought to protect.[iv]

Others fear the Islamic State itself, viewing the group as a threat to their self-preservation.  Whilst the role of the government should be to dispel fear, the Islamic State utilises it to consolidate its control in areas it has seized.  William McCants argues that brutality can be a very efficient means with which to ‘subdue a population’ and ‘establish your own state’ – at least, in the short-term.  The Islamic State made clear that violations of its strict understanding of sharī‘a codes of conduct would result in harsh punishments – from lashes to execution.

It could be argued that, as consideration for a Hobbesian social contract, subscribing citizens voluntarily give up their natural rights and pool their liberties, agreeing to live by the rule of the state in return for which the state provides them security.  Yet, at least in the case of the Islamic State, the choice is often taken away from many residents living in areas under its control.  They are often left with little choice but to accept the group’s rule.  In a somewhat twisted version of the Hobbesian state, it could be argued that individuals accept this social contract as a means to avoid a state of war with the state itself.

Those who break the social contract – or, those who the Islamic State deem to have done so – revert to the state of war, and, thus, the state is no longer required to protect them.  Rather, the state is at liberty to protect itself against such a threat to its preservation – an approach followed by the Islamic State.  This is evident when considering its brutal reaction to deserters.  By 2016, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had recorded more than 400 executions carried out by the group on its own fighters and followers, including many whom were trying to return to their home countries.

Whilst many of the arguments Hobbes makes are still pertinent to the construction of a state based on fear, there is an obvious flaw in applying the Hobbesian explanation of the social contract to the Islamic State.  The group is actively seeking the coming of ‘the Major Malhamah’,[v] ‘eagerly awaiting’ the arrival of its opponents’ armies. [vi]  Rather than avoiding war at all costs, the Islamic State invites war, and, thus, the inevitable insecurity that accompanies it.  Moreover, whilst Hobbes argues that the social contract is formed so that man can live together in society without fearing one another, this is not the case with the Islamic State.  Rather, many residents of the caliphate live in fear of their rulers.

Furthermore, contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau argues that the social contract is essentially founded on freedom.  Individuals surrender their natural liberties in the hope that the state can protect the civil liberties that they receive in return.  However, the Islamic State provides very limited rights within its social contract.  It claims to abide by the religious teachings of the ḥadīth which states: ‘The people are as equal as the teeth of a comb’.[vii]

(In theory), most non-Muslims within Islamic State-controlled areas would be protected so long as they paid the jizyah tax.  However, in reality, protection is only afforded to the ‘true believers’, determined by the Islamic State as only Sunni Muslims.  Christians and other religious minorities are the victims of genocide at the hand of the group.  This contradicts the idea that the social contract establishes mutual protection amongst citizens within society, in return for the enjoyment of the same rights as every other citizen.  Thus, it appears as though this protection only extends to certain contracting parties.

The promise of rights, liberties, and security serves as a means with which to entice individuals to accepting Islamic State rule, playing to the fears of those feeling marginalised by national governments.  The Islamic State attempts to construct the perception of being a compassionate, embracing, and capable governing group so that it can demand allegiance in return for the provision of security, public services, and justice – responsibilities typically associated with a traditional understanding of a state.  This is explicitly demonstrated in its social contract: in the Wathīqat al-Madīnah, the Islamic State promises to provide safety and security, rights (albeit limited), and justice in return to those who ‘join the society [the Islamic State] and renounce factions and strife’. [viii]

Yet, as coalition efforts continue, the Islamic State continues to suffer considerable financial and territorial losses, affecting its ability to provide security and services in the caliphate.  With its caliphate crumbling around it, the group seems to rely on fear as a sort of fail-safe.  In reality, the Islamic State seems, first and foremost, based on fear – fear of the alternative and/or fear of the Islamic State itself.

Whilst the group has made attempts to demonstrate its commitment to protecting the rights of the residents of the caliphate, it is its reputation as a strict, authoritative ruler that dominates.  It relies on coercive credibility, leaving residents fearful of acting out of line with Islamic State rule.  Following a somewhat Hobbesian mindset, the group seems to believe that less freedom will lead to less anarchy.

As it fails to uphold the mirage of protector, even those supporting the group begin losing faith in its abilities to govern.  Yet, it remains evident that the Islamic State will follow through on what it says regarding punishment of those who it deems an enemy of the group.  Moreover, Hobbes argues that man is able to connect together his sensory experiences to garner what may occur in the future; consequently, mankind fears not only its present but, also, its future.  Given its high coercive credibility, many residents of Islamic State-controlled areas continue to live in fear for their lives, and those of their family.

Although this has been a somewhat simplistic discussion of the Islamic State’s social contract, it is worth considering in more depth what it is that attracts individuals to the Islamic State: What do they desire? What do they fear?  What made them believe the Islamic State was more able to fulfil the responsibilities and duties of the State?  The Islamic State evidently possessed an answer to these questions.  From its inception, the group has purported to address the disaffection of Muslims worldwide.  It claims that the ‘revival of the Khilāfah [caliphate]’ has allowed each Muslim to ‘satisfy his natural desire for belonging to something greater.’ [ix]  Yet, the rise of the caliphate was largely due to the Islamic State’s ability to play on the fears of its target audience(s).  Rather than Hobbes or Rousseau, the success (at least, initially) of the Islamic State in establishing its State is perhaps more accurately summarised by Niccolò Machiavelli:

‘it is desirable to be both loved and feared, but it is difficult to achieve both, and if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved.’

 

Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi has just completed her MA International Peace and Security at King’s College London.  She holds a LLB Law with French Law from the University of Birmingham, with a year spent studying at Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II).  Her research interests include strategic communications, counter-extremism and the MENA region.  You can follow her @kieratsambhi

Notes:

[i] Revkin, Mara. 2016. “The legal foundations of the Islamic State.” Analysis Paper No.23, July, 2016. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-legal-foundations-of-the-islamic-state/, 15.

[ii] Revkin, Mara, and Mhidi, Ahmad. 2016. “Quitting ISIS.” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2016.  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis.

[iii] Dabiq #12. 2015. “Just Terror.” Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. November 18, 2015. https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 47.

[iv] Neumann, Peter R. 2015. “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors.” ICSR. http://icsr.info/2015/09/icsr-report-narratives-islamic-state-defectors/, 10.

[v] ‘Malhamah is the singular of malahim, which are the bloody battles that occur before the Hour.’ – Rumiyah #3. 2016. Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. November 11, 2016.  https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 25.

[vi] Al-Furqan Media. 2014. “Although the disbelievers dislike it.” November 16, 2014. https://clarionproject.org/gruesome-islamic-state-video-announces-death-peter-kassig-50/, 15:12.

[vii] Revkin, Mara, and Mhidi, Ahmad. 2016. “Quitting ISIS.” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2016.  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis.

[viii] Revkin, Mara. 2016a. “The legal foundations of the Islamic State.” Analysis Paper No.23, July, 2016. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-legal-foundations-of-the-islamic-state/, 15, Table 1, Articles 3 & 9.

[ix] Dabiq #7. 2015. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. February 12, 2015.  https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 57.

 

Image source: 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-father/terror-on-the-mosul-front-line-idUSKBN16D2F2

Turning technology from an asset into a liability: using big data to fight ISIS

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By: Sabina Ciofu

How-Big-Data-is-Aiding-in-the-Fight-Against-Terrorism
Source: www.datafloq.com

Unlike any other terrorist organisation, the so-called Islamic State has consistently and efficiently made use of social media tools for self-promotion and recruitment. With an estimated 200,000 tweets a day for at least the last couple of years, it is by far the most aggressive social media offensive we have ever seen from a radical group. Western powers, often focused on traditional military and political responses to conflict and aggression, have initially reacted in a weak and fragmented manner to the wave of social media activity. It is only recently that concerted action has been taken by national and regional counter-terrorism authorities to respond to the threat of online radicalisation and recruitment. This has led to some decrease in the number and activity of English-speaking ISIS accounts, but it is still far from achieving the dismantling of their online networks.

That there is no coordinated military and political solution to the crisis in Syria and Iraq is getting more and more obvious by the day. The Western powers cooperate with the Arab countries and Sunni groups on one side, while Russia is closely working with Iran and the Shia militias on the other. With such a complex landscape of strategic interests, it is no surprise that coming up with a coherent approach to ending the war in Syria is proving a big mountain to climb. However, the latency to counteract ISIS’ charm offensive on social media – even when it targets Western citizens who have in significant numbers fallen for the Islamist rhetoric – is far more problematic.

Public-private cooperation

Following a slow initial response, in recent times several meetings have taken place between Western governments and the largest American internet platforms in an attempt to cooperate in fighting ISIS propaganda online. The US government has, upon a number of occasions, asked the private sector for assistance, most recently enlisting Facebook, Instagram and Twitter to assist in the fight against terrorism. The French government has also contacted the US companies for support in removing online propaganda material, following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, while the UK Parliament had previously put blame on internet platforms, claiming that they are instrumental in spreading terrorist ideology. Far from a synchronized effort to find a common strategy to combat terrorism online, it oftentimes looks like a desperate cry for help from some governments, when they realise that what goes on online is strongly linked to national security threats. And this picture is further twisted by the complexity of the international law system, where tech companies are left with the decision of balancing out questions of freedom of expression, censorship and the difference between dissemination and promotion of online propaganda.

Using Big Data to draw patterns

What if one could turn one of the mightiest ISIS weapons into a liability? What if, by using big data analytics, one can look into the huge amount of content provided by ISIS-related websites, traditional media and social media accounts, to be able to draw relevant patterns? This may already be underway in highly classified intelligence programmes, where advanced algorithms may be used to track and determine potential terrorist activity. For example, in domestic law-enforcement domains, this is a model already being explored in some parts of the United States. By making use of mathematical and analytical techniques, police authorities are able to determine patterns that could lead to predicting criminal activity.

Apply that same technique for counter-terrorism and the value of big data analytics increases substantially. Having the technical ability to follow the data patterns, the footprints and the online records, looking into location, travel, profiles and messages of potential terrorists is a gold mine for national security authorities. It is easy to estimate that advanced big data analytics will outpace the computational ability of ISIS users to fake their identity and hide their location, as there are already a significant number of failings, even when instructed to hide their GPS location. There are situations where ISIS buildings and hotspots have been targeted by Western military forces, after users had accidentally pinpointed their location on social media. Ultimately, there is very little ISIS propagandists can do to completely hide online, if the organisation’s aim is to use the internet to spread the ideology, promote the mission and recruit new fighters.

As a general rule, recent research shows that social media analytics can be used for creating detailed profiles of potential terrorists and then looking for places where a high percentage of the local population matches the profile. Although this would seem a pretty straightforward approach, it has been shown that looking into the motivations and backgrounds of confirmed terrorists doesn’t necessarily lead to one single profile. However, sketching using big data analytics can define some widely-valid characteristics. For instance, ISIS recruits tend to be predominantly young and male and the ones originating in the EU and the US tend to come from a middle class background, with a high level of education. Drawing patterns out of huge amounts of available data has, however, obvious downsides, as it would only be a perfect profiling system if both the data and the algorithm were perfect. Therefore, privacy concerns are ultimately justified and any such governmental initiatives should duly take them into account.

Existing Big Data analytics projects

A massive data mining project by Qatar Computing Research Institute in Doha looked at social media data to figure out the origins of support for the Islamic State. Over a three month period, scientists looked into more than three million tweets, highlighting common patterns and attributes between pro and anti-ISIS messages. The algorithm was successful in “guessing” the sentiment in 87% of the cases, which is amazingly high for any big data project.

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) – the high-tech research arm of the U.S. intelligence community – is also focusing several programmes on using big data analytics to tackle some of the challenges ISIS has created online. For instance, they are currently focusing efforts on a facial recognition programme, based on imagery collected from available sources, be they high resolution cameras, or mobile phones, and even devices with less reliable resolution or lighting. Of course, the process is proving to be a difficult one, especially when algorithms are in charge of creating one face and recognising it from imagery in various angles, with varying lighting and quality.

Aside from its facial recognition programme, IARPA is also focusing on analytics results based on online video searching, through its code-named Aladdin programme. This implies designing new big data search methods for video content, that does not simply target tag words or user-generated content, but scans the video itself for elements that can describe what the movie is about. While terrorists may be clever enough not to tag videos where, for instance, they explain how to make explosives in view of a potential terrorist attack, their videos would be easily inspected and tracked down if a search method non-reliant on tags would be developed. Thus, while YouTube has been doing a great job in taking down such content almost in real time and while ISIS has moved these activities to the dark web to be less visible and thus less searchable, these movie samples may provide very valuable insight to national security experts, using advanced big data analytics to extract information from video material.

Moreover, the bigger the data, the better the big data analytics will be. Shared information for national security purposes has been something friendly governments have been focused on doing ever since 9/11. The precision and quality of information coming out of a big data project will always rely on the amount of data analysed, thus making it obviously necessary that countries cooperate in exchanging the information they have. The Dfuze system, for instance, is a database that allows such information exchange across multiple countries. National security experts can use the platform to access large amount of data shared by various actors and thus draw possible trends and patterns that can assist with prevention and preparation in view of potential terrorist attacks. There are already 40 countries using this product, which is an indication that such big data application can be very powerful tool in terrorism prevention and control.

Conclusion

This is not to say that big data, alone, can prevent terrorist attacks. Lone wolves will always be a difficult category to track, hunt and make sense of. This is to say, however, that big data can have a very significant input in creating and tracking the kind of patterns needed for effective intelligence gathering. It can also have a very important part to play in prediction, especially when it comes to planned, organised and coordinated terror attacks. Significant human reasoning and expertise will have to be attached to this, to distinguishing between real attacks and online bluff, between facts and intentionally deceptive mass-upload of messages. But that is the case for any intelligence method – human reasoning will continue to be at the centre of decision-making. And while it will always be the case that intelligence failures will be blamed for terrorist attacks – and hence also the failure of the people involved and the tools used – we simply don’t know how many terror plots have already been foiled and how many anti-ISIS military operations have already been successful with input from big data analytics.

 

 

Sabina Maria Ciofu is a first year MPhil/PhD candidate in Defence Studies, at King’s College London, where she explores the relationship between big data and US foreign policy. She is also a policy advisor in the European Parliament, working on digital economy, foreign affairs and trade issues. Sabina holds a BA in Classics from Cambridge and a MA in War Studies from King’s College London. @SabinaCiofu

IDPs in Iraq and the progress of the Islamic State: An interview with Hebatalla Taha (IISS)

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By: Jack Curran-Persell

The UN estimates there are now over 3 million Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq with that figure only set to rise further. http://www.geo.tv/article-167331-Displaced-top-2-million-as-winter-hits-northern-Iraq
The UN estimates there are now over 3 million Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq with that figure only set to rise further. http://www.geo.tv/article-167331-Displaced-top-2-million-as-winter-hits-northern-Iraq

Hebatalla Taha is a Research Analyst for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London where she focuses on the Middle-East and North Africa.

Jack Curran-Persell: Earlier this month, you wrote a very interesting article for IISS on the situation for IDPs in Iraq. With the UN estimating over 3 million Iraqis have been displaced, could you explain what the current situation is like for these people?

Hebatalla Taha: Conditions for IDPs in Iraq have been dire. In the article, I focused on how ISIS in particular limits the movement of civilians in areas under its control, but there are actually various armed groups and actors across Iraq that make any movement across the country quite difficult. This is especially the case for IDPs in Anbar province, who represent 40% of displaced people in Iraq. Many head to Baghdad, which has one of the highest IDP populations alongside Anbar, but some are unable to enter and remain trapped in Anbar province. In Anbar there is humanitarian presence due to the high security risks, which restricts assistance to IDPs there. Other IDPs from provinces such as Diyala or Salah al-Din tend to go to Kurdish areas and Kirkuk.

According to the International Organisation for Migration, 70% of IDPs are living in private settings, such as homes that they are renting, with families, or hotels; 19% are in ad-hoc buildings, and another 8% in camps.

Funding for Iraqi IDPs is also becoming an issue. The UN’s 2015 appeal for Iraq is still 90% underfunded, and because of this, it has had to shut down, or scale back, various programmes assisting IDPs. Such conditions are related to the decision by many displaced people to flee the country altogether, whether to Europe or elsewhere, seeing no prospects for improvement.

What is the attitude of the Baghdad government, ISIS, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to those fleeing conflict in Iraq?

Regarding the attitudes towards IDPs, the government is worried about ISIS-linked infiltrators within refugee groups–especially in Baghdad which tends to have the highest number of monthly fatalities due to frequent bombings, many of which claimed by ISIS. Therefore the Baghdad government has implemented heavy restrictions and background checks, and the process often requires a long wait and sponsors. The Bzeibiz bridge between Anbar and Baghdad is mostly closed, according to UNOCHA, and only people who require medical treatment are actually allowed to cross into Baghdad.

The KRG is similar in that it is worried about ISIS operatives launching attacks in its territories, but it also cites economic reasons. The KRG says it is cash-strapped and doesn’t have the resources to deal with the influx of refugees. The situation is exacerbated by the KRG’s own rivalry with the Baghdad government; it feels that Baghdad is not sharing the burden. The political dynamics between the KRG and Baghdad are also affecting ‘contested’ areas such as Kirkuk, where the Kurds fear ‘Arabisation’ by IDPs and both sides are suspicious of one another’s actions in Kirkuk.

ISIS has tried to prevent people from leaving the territory under its control, placing explosives around cities, confiscating identity cards, and executing people who are caught trying to flee. Its bureaucracy has allowed people to leave in the past but under particular conditions, such as leaving their families hostage, giving up their homes, or paying large sums of money. ISIS is using the plight of the displaced people as a recruitment tactic. It uses images of Sunni IDPs struggling to enter Baghdad in its audio-visual material with the message, lamenting their inability to enter various provinces, including their own capital. It tries to depict itself as the only actor defending Sunnis and therefore they should to their homes in areas under ISIS control, or even volunteer to join the group.”

So Sunni people fleeing undermines ISIS’s image of a cohesive Islamic state-building project?

Very much so. And you can see this in recent propaganda videos directed at refugees leaving Iraq. A recent video urged refugees to join the ‘caliphate’, rather than fleeing to what it regards as a xenophobic Europe. Indeed, the fact that many people are fleeing ISIS contradicts the image of itself as a coherent state which it has been trying to project. Having people to govern over is essential for ISIS’s vision.

You mention at the end of your article that fleeing has become increasingly difficult because of a crackdown on internal resistance groups. How effective have groups such as the Mosul Brigade been and what types of resistance have they been putting up?

Information on resistance groups in Mosul is difficult to obtain and verify; this is the case with most of the information coming out of Mosul in general. That is why is it’s difficult to assess the impact or magnitude of such an internal resistance, or to speculate as to whether it is an organised resistance movement, Some claim they are coordinating with the Iraqi security forces and the coalition, but others appear to be individuals reacting to the violence perpetrated by ISIS or settling scores with ISIS fighters.

My guess would be that it is a combination of both. One of the main indicators that there is significant internal resistance in Mosul is that ISIS has actually instigated these heavy crackdowns in Mosul, executing hundreds of people (some sources have cited figures as high as 2,000). The make-up of those who have been executed is also telling: most are linked to the Iraqi security forces, who are thought to have been behind many of the attacks against ISIS fighters.

It has been exactly a year since the first UK airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. How effective have these US-led air strikes in Iraq and Syria been?

The airstrikes on their own do not have a decisive effect, but combined with ground operations, they have assisted Kurdish groups in regaining significant swathes of territory in northern Iraq and restricting expansion by ISIS. In the operation against Tikrit in March 2015, for example, which was led by the Hashed al-Shabi militia, the belated airstrikes by the US-led coalition were in fact key in expelling ISIS from the city. The airstrikes have not been as effective in Syria, aside from assisting Kurdish groups in the north, such as the well-known battle for Kobani. This is linked to the more complicated dynamics of the Syrian crisis: there is a lot more happening than just ISIS.

What do you make of the recent Russian military commitment to Syria in order to support Assad supposedly against ISIS?

It is a disturbing development especially since the conflict contains many actors beyond Bashar al-Assad and ISIS, and, as you were suggesting, the first airstrikes didn’t target ISIS, but rather, rebel groups.

Tragically, I think this will most likely only enable the war to drag on longer, with severe humanitarian effects—ones that we already witnessing and that will not simply go away.

Away from Iraq and Syria, how much progress are ISIS making in areas such as Libya or Yemen?

In Yemen, ISIS-linked groups that have slowly emerged throughout the past year appear to be making progress in the chaos of the current war. A recent report from a journalist based in Aden noted that ISIS seem to be more organised than Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and has been successful in directing some of Al-Qaeda’s recruits and infiltrating its support bases. This is important because it suggests that the situation is changing. Earlier, ISIS-linked groups (which usually call themselves ‘Wilayet Sanaa’ or ‘Wilayet Aden’ or others based on the province) did not seem to be as organised as AQAP and were unable to challenge it. Most of the attacks by ISIS-linked groups in Yemen have been against the Houthi or Shia mosques in Sanaa, although there have been other smaller-scale incidents elsewhere, such as in the south.

In Libya, ISIS-linked groups are one of many groups vying for control, including various jihadi organisations and Islamist groups. ISIS-linked operatives have taken advantage of the chaotic war to establish a presence there and create a ‘jihadi front’ in North Africa—to which many foreign fighters have fled. It is important to emphasise that although the group has expanded due to foreign fighters, it has failed to gain many recruits from within Libya. So overall, within Libya’s military and political context, ISIS remains quite marginal.

In Egypt, the situation is different because there is a functioning state and a functioning army, but the ISIS-linked group, Wilayet Sinai in North Sinai has posed a serious threat, and its capacity has continued to grow, despite escalating crackdowns by the army.

While many of these groups have adopted tactics used by ISIS, such as beheadings, they don’t merely reflect an expansion by ISIS into these territories. Both sides effectively benefit from this partnership. ISIS can give the impression that it is unstoppable, undefeatable, and is everywhere. Its local affiliates – predominantly opportunistic groups – gain notoriety by leveraging ISIS’s name, which helps them win over recruits and possibly get funding or weapons. This is also discernible in who the ISIS-linked groups view as the main adversary in each of the different contexts, i.e. the army in North Sinai in Egypt, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Libya Dawn coalition in Libya.

In your opinion, how does a state like Libya which is effectively a failed state benefit groups like ISIS?

Armed groups such as ISIS thrive in that atmosphere of a political and security vacuum, and their emergence is fundamentally linked to the state of war. This state of war provides obvious logistical advantages, such as the ability to smuggle foreign fighters into the country, and the lack of a functioning security apparatus enables them to organise, expand, etc., but they also benefit from the political reasons that lead to the descent into a failed state. ISIS-affiliated groups, as I mentioned, are not created by ISIS, but are informed by the political crises governing each of the countries.

Thank you.

Jack Curran-Persell is currently completing an MA in Conflict, Security, and Development within the War Studies Department at King’s College London.