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The Paris terror attacks and their geopolitical implications

November 16, 2015 by Deborah Asseraf

By: Deborah Asseraf

US Marines and French Gendarmie inspect weapons as part of a 2014 training exercise. US Marines and French Gendarmerie exercise
US Marines and French Gendarmie inspect weapons as part of a training exercise. Source: Wikimedia.

Six coordinated terror attacks, involving seven terrorists took place in East Paris and near the Stade de France at Saint Denis on the evening of Friday, November 13. In Saint Denis, three terrorists blew themselves up near the stadium, while supporters inside attended a friendly France – Germany football match. Among the five attacks in East Paris, one was a suicide bombing, at the Boulevard Voltaire, and four others were shootings. This included the Bataclan concert hall hostage crisis, during which as soon as police launched the assault the four attackers detonated the bombs they were carrying. At least 132 people were killed and 350 wounded.

Islamic State responsibility

Islamic State claimed responsibility soon after in a statement that defined the attacks as the ‘first of the storm’. Indeed, France is likely to be a primary target for the terrorist group. For example, a video released in September 2014 attributed to Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, known as an ISIS spokesperson, instructed followers around the world to kill citizens of the countries involved in the coalition: ‘If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be.’

Using the same rhetoric in another video released in October 2014, a French ISIS militant warned France that ‘as many bombs you dropped in Iraq and Sham [Syria], you will have as many murders, as many killings, like our brother Mohammed Merah did. You are afraid of one brother, there will be thousands and thousands in the future’. The call for attacks in France has become a key element of ISIS propaganda directed towards French potential recruits.

France is a main pool of recruitment for Islamic State. Among the 30,000 ISIS ‘soldiers’ in Syria and Iraq, most are foreign fighters, and in 2014 about 1,200 were said to be French. According to a 2015 report by a French Senate investigation committee dedicated to countering jihadist networks in France and Europe, 1500 French citizens who fled to Syria have been identified by the intelligence services. Accurate policy responses to handle the cases of those who return to France are yet to be found. The antiterrorism bill passed on November 13, 2014 modifies statutory law regulating the entry of foreigners but does not tackle the issue of French fighters coming back from Syria. The first article of the bill only allows authorities to prevent a suspected ‘jihadi candidate’ from going abroad.

At present, the intelligence administration has registered 4,000 people in ‘fiches S’, administrative memos compiling information about persons who are known for their ‘Islamic radicalization’ on French territory. One of the Bataclan terrorists, Omar Ismaïl Mostefaï was registered in a ‘fiche S’ for ‘radicalization’.

Internal responses to the crisis: a national emergency plan

President François Hollande, who was rushed out of the Saint Denis stadium as soon as the explosions were heard, immediately addressed the Nation that night. He called for an emergency ministerial meeting and announced two measures. President Hollande first declared a state of emergency, and second announced the closing of French borders. If these domestic responses to the crisis are mainly consensual in France, the issue of external action in Syria remains the subject of fierce debate.

The state of emergency is an exceptional legal situation in which French State authorities are allowed to take special action outside of the framework of ordinary law. Prefects (state representatives in regions) are allowed to impose bans on traffic, curfews, large gatherings, and allow searches and raids without warrants. The state of emergency is based on a 1955 law, passed in response Algerian National Liberation Front terror attacks in 1954. It was first used three times during the Algerian War of Independence. A state of emergency was last declared in 2005 on the occasion of the large-scale riots in the Parisian suburbs. In 2015, the state of emergency is not only applied at the local level, but to the entire national territory. It allows for the cancellation of cultural events, gatherings, the closure of public monuments and museums, and increased levels of security and surveillance. Accordingly, 1,500 soldiers were deployed in the capital and nearly as many police officers. In order to implement efficient border controls, customs staff were reinforced.

As part of the state of emergency, 168 antiterrorist raids took place on Sunday, November 15 and overnight into Monday, November 16, in the homes of potential terrorists registered in a ‘fiche S’ and 23 people were arrested. The raids were conducted in Bobigny (Northern Paris), Toulouse, Grenoble, Strasbourg, Lille-Roubaix, Marseille and Lyon, where a rocket launcher was discovered. In Villefranche-sur-Saône, close to Lyon, heavy weaponry was found, including a Kalashnikov assault riffle, a rocket launcher, pistols, and bullets. Aside from the current investigation that led to identify French and Belgian terrorist cells, raids current searches aim to dismantling other networks. Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve stated: ‘It is just the beginning’.

External response: is France at war?

In an official address on November 14, President Hollande stated that: ‘What happened yesterday in Paris and in Saint Denis close to the Stade de France was an act of war. Faced with war, the country has to take appropriate decisions. An act of war that was committed by a terrorist army, Daesh, a jihadist army against France, against the values we defend throughout the world, against who we are, a free country that speaks to the whole world’. The use of the expression ‘act of war’ is a crucial step for France. It suggests the terrorist attacks carried out on French territory have external belligerent outcomes. Designating ISIS as an ‘army’ seems very delicate considering the situation on the ground. Islamic State may have its own institutions, control territory, and a population, but it is not recognized as a state on the international scene. Hence, ISIS is not in control of a regular army but rather comprises a various range of actors from former Saddam Hussein officials to jihadist terror groups including the former Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Declaring war against ‘the Caliphate’ is no less than declaring a war against terror. If the very term resembles G. W. Bush’s rhetoric, it can also be feared that such a war is already lost. Regarding the fact that terrorists carrying out such so-called ‘acts of war’ are French citizens, it seems impossible to consider ISIS as a defined enemy in the form of an army.

It is not clear whether President Hollande is really declaring war based on a use of international law. At the moment the French and US-led coalition against ISIS launched in 2014 includes Western countries (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands) as well as Arab and Middle-Eastern countries (Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Turkey, United Arab Emirates). Nevertheless, the coalition intervention, consisting of airstrikes as well as arming and training support to the Kurds is completely informal. Western action could hardly be an UN-backed intervention, as a unanimity vote at the Security Council, would be likely impossible considering Russia’s pro-Assad agenda.

Nonetheless, the use of the term ‘act of war’ by President Hollande could be a way to legitimize an intervention under NATO provisions. Indeed, the 1949 Washington Treaty (article 5) states: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’

Moreover, in 1999 NATO members recognized acts of terror as armed attacks that possibly bound allies to collective defence: ‘Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism’.

As an act of war opens the legal possibility for a use of force under international law, France could call for its NATO allies to support and retaliate against ISIS and escalate the conflict. However, legitimizing war against ISIS through international law might also lead the nations involved to acknowledge that the earlier coalition was illegal. On the night of November 15, ten French fighter jets dropped twenty bombs in their biggest raid in Syria so far. They targeted Islamic State’s strongholds in Raqqa in coordination with US forces.

A strong response

While French intentions regarding the coalition against ISIS are not completely clear, it seems very unlikely that troops would ever be dispatched to the ground. However, the latest attacks will no doubt affect French foreign policy, and an escalation in airstrikes with support of the coalition may be occurring, as President Hollande vowed a ‘merciless response’ to ISIS. In order to strengthen French air force in Irak and Syria, the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier will leave Toulon for the Persian Gulf on November 18. It will carry eighteen Rafale and eight Super Étendard aircrafts, and join the six Rafale and six Mirage already based in Jordan.

Yet, relevant internal solutions must be found within France. The primary threat to French security is domestic. The country’s immediate enemies are to be fought on French territory. Internal policies dedicated to tackling, preventing, and understanding radicalisation are now essential in averting future attacks.

Deborah Asseraf is a graduate student at Sciences Po, Paris, specializing in the field of public policy and law. A research student in History at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS Paris) she is interested in international relations and politics.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Bataclan, Belgium, France, French, Hollande, ISIS, Paris, Syria, terrorism

The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred

August 11, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Samar Batrawi:

Jihad caravan1

Montasser AlDe’emeh and Pieter Stockmans, De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat [The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred], Tielt, Belgium: Uitgeverij Lannoo, 2015. 19,99 (e-book). Pages: 518. ISBN: 9789401427708

‘I was born and raised in Antwerp. A year and a half ago I left to go to Syria. I have not for a single second regretted burning my bridges in Belgium. You may analyse me, how I have become what I am now. But I am not returning to Belgium. In this area I am the third highest military commander of Jabhat al-Nusra. Today I celebrate the birth of my daughter. I am happy!’ [1]

We will never fully comprehend extremism in Europe and the Middle East without an appreciation of the interplay between the intimate life stories of those involved and the bigger geopolitical picture.[2] This is the main premise behind ‘De Jihadkaravaan’ (The Jihad Caravan), in which the personal stories of Dutch-speaking foreign fighters from the Netherlands and Belgium are combined with accounts of the developments in their European home countries and the countries on which the jihadist struggle often focuses, such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine.

The book engages with the ideas, hopes, and fears of the people involved in the struggles in the Middle East. It is not a strictly academic book, but this is precisely where its value lies as it helps us comprehend the human narratives behind the statistics and the headlines, and therefore helps us make sense of that vague yet incredibly relevant word that we hear so much in relation to radicalisation: ‘identity’. It approaches homegrown radicalisation in the West as a societal problem, and it calls upon everybody to become engaged in the resolution of this issue. The book is largely narrated through the eyes of Montasser AlDe’emeh, a Palestinian-Belgian who decided to travel to Syria to get to know the stories of his fellow countrymen who had decided to leave their old lives behind.

This review is aimed at making the main ideas of this book more accessible for those that do not speak Dutch, as this book not only offers an insight into the Dutch and Belgian foreign fighter issue, but it may also carry important insights for other European countries from which foreign fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq in the past years.

Narratives of Displacement and Oppression

‘Belgium has pushed us away with its hypocritical laws. Muslim women could not attend school without removing their headscarf. You decided how we had to live. We chose not to sell out our religion.’[3]

There are currently approximately 200-250 Dutch and 440 Belgian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Belgian nationals form the largest per capita number of foreign fighters from Western Europe (of the 11.2 million total population) and the Netherlands comes in sixth (with a total population of 16.8 million).[4] To put these numbers in perspective: with a population of 64.1 million, the United Kingdom has around 500-600 foreign fighters in the region, putting it three places below the Netherlands per capita.

Though the Netherlands and Belgium are societies that differ on a number of levels, the linguistic connection between the Dutch-speaking foreign fighters from both countries has fostered an intimate connection between them. For example, the group Sharia4Holland – a radical Salafist group that was active in the Netherlands from 2010 onwards and from which several members have travelled to Syria[5] – is in fact an offshoot of the Belgian Sharia4Belgium. Belgian fighters that travelled to Syria in 2012 and 2013 have been linked to this group.[6]

Some of the Dutch and Belgian people Montasser meets in Syria are former members of these networks.[7] Those following the Dutch and Belgian fighters are familiar with this alleged connection, though it should be made clear that it is ideological rather than organisational in nature. It is doubtful that Sharia4Holland and Sharia4Belgium have played an active role in the recruitment and the arrangement of travelling to Syria.[8]

As Montasser explains, Sharia4Belgium’s and Sharia4Holland’s aim and success has been creating an awareness of a certain notion of Muslim identity among their followers.[9] This, in turn, has proven to be fertile soil for further radicalisation and incentives to action. This complicates the attempts of government and security agencies to tackle the flow of foreign fighters from their countries to Syria and Iraq, as the more straightforward method of targeting active recruiters would be an insufficient – if not largely misguided – policy in this case.

Radicalisation processes and the choice to become a foreign fighter may more often than not occur at a closed-off individual level, perhaps (but not necessarily) preceded by direct contact with an organisation such as Sharia4Holland or Sharia4Belgium. And as more and more stories have emerged of Dutch and Belgian fighters in Syria and Iraq, it has become clear that often the most evident connection to ‘networks’ in their home country and Syria is either through ideological sympathy or through friend or family connections. What seems to be key in understanding the foreign fighter contingent may therefore not be these official networks, but rather some notion of identity and belonging.

The centrality of identity is obviously manifested in the ideological and political aims of European jihadists abroad, but this book gives us a valuable insight into another component of the identity of Dutch and Belgian fighters: their intimate connection through their shared Dutch language, which they speak amongst each other. Interestingly, even though they have made it to the land that they believe will allow them to escape European oppression and free their equally oppressed Middle Eastern brothers, they speak in the language of their home countries of Belgium and the Netherlands. They refer to their world in Syria as a ‘mini Europe’.[10] The identity of these people is not merely a religious one, but it is also one of having felt out of place in – yet inevitably having been shaped by – a European context. The stories of these people may teach us more than we think about the societies from which they emerge, as they are not purely a product of Islam but also of their Dutch and Belgian experiences.

Conclusion

The Jihad Caravan concludes with a number of recommendations for us all – not merely for the policy world – as the authors view the issue of foreign fighters as a global issue which can only be addressed with everybody’s involvement. They make two particularly important recommendations:[11]

First, they make a call for people to support the Arab Spring, and to pierce through the false choice between peace and security in the Middle East. This entails recognising that the old model of international support for local dictators in the name of stability has failed, as it was part of the reason why a new form of global terror (Salafi-jihadism) has emerged. Though this implies that the Arab Spring is a uniform movement rather than – what I would argue – more of a chain of interlinked yet distinct popular uprisings, what the authors mean by their call for ‘support of the Arab Spring’ is in fact an international backing of genuine change as demanded by the people in the Middle East, unhindered by an obsession with security and stability in the region.

The observation that Salafi-jihadism emerged because of internationally backed local dictators is the subject of many studies, and questionable simply because the rise of secular Arab dictators happened in conjunction with a number of different historical developments which may have triggered the rise of Salafi-jihadism. It is therefore difficult to strictly isolate the chain of events that led to this form of global terror, but it is true that Salafi-jihadism is new in the sense that it is a phenomenon of the past few decades, though its ideological influences date back to the early days of Islam.

Moreover, and in my opinion incredibly important, is the call to stop focusing solely on Islamic State horror stories in reports about the developments in Syria and Iraq, but to also focus on the terror that largely feeds Islamic State support: that of the Assad regime which has killed around 50 civilians for each one that the Islamic State has killed to date. The Islamic State is a terrifying entity, but death and suffering at the hands of non-jihadists must not be forgotten.

The second recommendation made in the book is to create a better foundation for European Islam to flourish. The underlying thought is that homegrown Muslim extremism in Europe cannot be solved without giving new life to a European Islam. Muslim communities in Europe have suffered immensely from the radicalising and polarising effects that the rise of the Islamic State has had in the global debate on Islam, which has compounded much of the exclusion and discrimination they were already feeling. This essentially brings us back to questions of displacement and oppression – precisely those issues that are at the heart of the foreign fighter issue.

Though this book ends on a political tone, which not everybody will appreciate, the least we can take from this account is what it tells us about the deeply human nature of what we so distantly call – as I do above – ‘the foreign fighter issue’. It also reminds us of the substantial human grievances that inspire these low-level recruits, as well as the undeniable human suffering that they cause on their path to fulfilment.


Samar Batrawi is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has worked for the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in London, and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Follow her at @SamarBatrawi

NOTES

[1] Quote from a Belgian foreign fighter interviewed in AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 159

[2] AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 12

[3] Quote from a Belgian woman in Syria interviewed in AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 161

[4] Neumann, P.R. (January 2015), Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s, ICSR Insight (http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/)

[5] De Volkskrant (23 May 2013), ‘Nederlander Vast in Marokko om Ronselen voor Syrie’ (http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-burgeroorlog-in-syrie/nederlander-vast-in-marokko-om-ronselen-voor-syrie~a3447299/)

[6] De Volkskrant (24 April 2013), Sharia4Holland Speelt Rol bij Jihad-reizen (http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/sharia4holland-speelt-rol-bij-jihad-reizen~a3430968/)

[7] AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 128

[8] Ibid. p. 143

[9] Ibid. pp. 136-141

[10] Ibid. p. 129

[11] Ibid. pp. 461-503

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Arab Spring, assad, Belgium, Holland, jihad, radicalisation, Syria, terrorism

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