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You are here: Home / Archives for Arab Spring

Arab Spring

International Women’s Day: The impact of conflict on parity

March 8, 2016 by Joana Cook

Author’s note: Much of the reference to Yemen was drawn from the recent publication: “Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges”[1] (2015).  

By: Joana Cook

DSC_2464
Source: National Yemen

Today marks the 2016 International Women’s Day, where the year’s theme “Pledge for Parity” promotes areas extending from helping women and girls achieve their ambitions, calling for gender-balanced leadership, and encouraging respect and value of difference.

It is perhaps fitting then to highlight what was for many a key struggle to achieve parity. Five years have now passed since the 2011 Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The protests were largely driven by populations seeking an end to corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, who demanded dignity, equality and justice in their societies. Women and youth were foremost amidst these, participating in protests in Libya and Tunisia, occupying Tahrir Square in Egypt, and challenging the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (amongst others).

While countries such as Tunisia have been able to emerge from these protests with fragile, transitional democratic governments, others such as Syria and Libya have descended into states of chaos, destabilizing the surrounding region and creating vacuums currently filled by groups such as the so-called ‘Islamic State’. Yemen, perhaps the most overlooked of these Arab Spring participants, deserves special recognition for the roles that women were able to carve for themselves in the early days of the Arab Spring, and the gains they were able to advance. Yemen too, perhaps highlights what is most at stake for the parity of women with the failure to solidify these ambitions.

Yemen was always going to be a challenging country to advance parity. Yemen is currently ranked on the UN Human Development Index as 160 out of 188. It’s gender equality rating is the worst in the world – the World Economic Forum’s Gender Equality Index places Yemen 142 of 142 countries. Prior to 2011, Yemen only featured a single woman in parliament and three in the Shura council. Despite these long-standing poor rankings however, women such as Tawakal Karman and others from diverse backgrounds initiated and led protests across the country which eventually led to the transition of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Karman later won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts and brought attention to the significant efforts of many other brave and dedicated women across the country.

The subsequent National Dialogue Conference (NDC) contained nine working groups that addressed key transitional issues such as military and security, development and transitional justice. While an imperfect process, the NDC was deemed a success by many around the world, and significantly 27% of participants in the conference were women. The outcomes of the NDC were forwarded to the constitutional drafting committee and a draft constitution was completed in January 2015. This constitution, which had not yet been ratified, was extraordinary in the advances it guaranteed for women.

The draft constitution highlighted the representation and support of women in areas ranging from leadership and participation in political bodies, to supporting their roles in the security sector (police, military and intelligence) and ensured the State would “eliminate negative cultural and social norms that demean the dignity of women” (Article 57). Article 76 went so far as to state, “To give effect to the principle of equal citizenship, the State shall enact legislation and take measures, to achieve effective political participation for women to ensure access to at least 30% in various authorities and bodies.” While the substance of such articles needed to be further articulated, and the constitution was set to be debated prior to ratification, the leaps and bounds inherent to the protections and promotions of women in this document were incredible.

However, due to a number of avoidable factors and failures,[2] this transition was interrupted and the situation for women has never been more dire. The constitution in its current format also seems unlikely to move forward and the very status of the state is currently in question. In March 2015, Operation Decisive Storm began in an effort to stop Houthi rebels from seizing power in the country has in many respects shattered the country – the War in Yemen has now stretched almost a year and the country is on the brink of the abyss. 21 million of the countries 24 million now need some form of humanitarian aid and over 3,000 have been killed, many in coalition air strikes (though this figure is expected to be much higher). Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the so-called Islamic State continue to make advances in the country, and have historically installed harsh interpretations of sharia law over the populations they control, including severe restrictions on the rights of women.

Furthermore, displaced populations face significant challenges, and women in particular face an increased risk of sexual assault and abuse (even within their families, as public pressures grow and manifest themselves in the private sphere, increases in domestic violence often occur). There has also been a noticeable increase in the number of child brides amongst fleeing populations, with families unable to care for their children. Education, employment and other key activities to ensuring the advancement of women in the country is attainable have been interrupted or ceased all together. Perhaps most critically, negotiations to end the conflict have reflected a notable absence of women, particularly from the government side. In essence, it appears as though the significant opportunities that once appeared for women in Yemen have all but vanished.

As highlighted by the case of Yemen, it is clear that women in these societies have been integral to significant social, economic, cultural and political achievements before and during the Arab Spring. It is also clear that for many of them, advances to their rights and aspirations to parity have never been at such risk.

This International Women’s Day, it is perhaps worthwhile then to remember then that while parity in general is as worthy a focus as any, such considerations must be reflected in the very fabric of conflict mediation, resolution and reconstruction that will be required in places such as Yemen, Syria and Libya.

Joana Cook is a PhD Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her PhD analyzes the roles of women in counterterrorism practices post-9/11. Her broader academic interests revolve around extremism and terrorism, with a focus on Canada, the US, UK and Middle East. She is also a researcher for the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS).  You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook.

Notes:

[1] Joana Cook, ed. “Our Main Concern Is Security”: Women’s Political Participation, Engagement in the Security Sector, and Public Safety in Yemen, Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges (Gerlach Publishing, 2015).

[2] For a good background on this, see: Adam Baron, “Civil War in Yemen: Imminent and Avoidable,” in Policy Memo, ed. European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) (23 March 2015).

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: al-Qaeda, Arab Spring, International Women's Day 2016, IS, Yemen

The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred

August 11, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Samar Batrawi:

Jihad caravan1

Montasser AlDe’emeh and Pieter Stockmans, De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat [The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred], Tielt, Belgium: Uitgeverij Lannoo, 2015. 19,99 (e-book). Pages: 518. ISBN: 9789401427708

‘I was born and raised in Antwerp. A year and a half ago I left to go to Syria. I have not for a single second regretted burning my bridges in Belgium. You may analyse me, how I have become what I am now. But I am not returning to Belgium. In this area I am the third highest military commander of Jabhat al-Nusra. Today I celebrate the birth of my daughter. I am happy!’ [1]

We will never fully comprehend extremism in Europe and the Middle East without an appreciation of the interplay between the intimate life stories of those involved and the bigger geopolitical picture.[2] This is the main premise behind ‘De Jihadkaravaan’ (The Jihad Caravan), in which the personal stories of Dutch-speaking foreign fighters from the Netherlands and Belgium are combined with accounts of the developments in their European home countries and the countries on which the jihadist struggle often focuses, such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine.

The book engages with the ideas, hopes, and fears of the people involved in the struggles in the Middle East. It is not a strictly academic book, but this is precisely where its value lies as it helps us comprehend the human narratives behind the statistics and the headlines, and therefore helps us make sense of that vague yet incredibly relevant word that we hear so much in relation to radicalisation: ‘identity’. It approaches homegrown radicalisation in the West as a societal problem, and it calls upon everybody to become engaged in the resolution of this issue. The book is largely narrated through the eyes of Montasser AlDe’emeh, a Palestinian-Belgian who decided to travel to Syria to get to know the stories of his fellow countrymen who had decided to leave their old lives behind.

This review is aimed at making the main ideas of this book more accessible for those that do not speak Dutch, as this book not only offers an insight into the Dutch and Belgian foreign fighter issue, but it may also carry important insights for other European countries from which foreign fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq in the past years.

Narratives of Displacement and Oppression

‘Belgium has pushed us away with its hypocritical laws. Muslim women could not attend school without removing their headscarf. You decided how we had to live. We chose not to sell out our religion.’[3]

There are currently approximately 200-250 Dutch and 440 Belgian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Belgian nationals form the largest per capita number of foreign fighters from Western Europe (of the 11.2 million total population) and the Netherlands comes in sixth (with a total population of 16.8 million).[4] To put these numbers in perspective: with a population of 64.1 million, the United Kingdom has around 500-600 foreign fighters in the region, putting it three places below the Netherlands per capita.

Though the Netherlands and Belgium are societies that differ on a number of levels, the linguistic connection between the Dutch-speaking foreign fighters from both countries has fostered an intimate connection between them. For example, the group Sharia4Holland – a radical Salafist group that was active in the Netherlands from 2010 onwards and from which several members have travelled to Syria[5] – is in fact an offshoot of the Belgian Sharia4Belgium. Belgian fighters that travelled to Syria in 2012 and 2013 have been linked to this group.[6]

Some of the Dutch and Belgian people Montasser meets in Syria are former members of these networks.[7] Those following the Dutch and Belgian fighters are familiar with this alleged connection, though it should be made clear that it is ideological rather than organisational in nature. It is doubtful that Sharia4Holland and Sharia4Belgium have played an active role in the recruitment and the arrangement of travelling to Syria.[8]

As Montasser explains, Sharia4Belgium’s and Sharia4Holland’s aim and success has been creating an awareness of a certain notion of Muslim identity among their followers.[9] This, in turn, has proven to be fertile soil for further radicalisation and incentives to action. This complicates the attempts of government and security agencies to tackle the flow of foreign fighters from their countries to Syria and Iraq, as the more straightforward method of targeting active recruiters would be an insufficient – if not largely misguided – policy in this case.

Radicalisation processes and the choice to become a foreign fighter may more often than not occur at a closed-off individual level, perhaps (but not necessarily) preceded by direct contact with an organisation such as Sharia4Holland or Sharia4Belgium. And as more and more stories have emerged of Dutch and Belgian fighters in Syria and Iraq, it has become clear that often the most evident connection to ‘networks’ in their home country and Syria is either through ideological sympathy or through friend or family connections. What seems to be key in understanding the foreign fighter contingent may therefore not be these official networks, but rather some notion of identity and belonging.

The centrality of identity is obviously manifested in the ideological and political aims of European jihadists abroad, but this book gives us a valuable insight into another component of the identity of Dutch and Belgian fighters: their intimate connection through their shared Dutch language, which they speak amongst each other. Interestingly, even though they have made it to the land that they believe will allow them to escape European oppression and free their equally oppressed Middle Eastern brothers, they speak in the language of their home countries of Belgium and the Netherlands. They refer to their world in Syria as a ‘mini Europe’.[10] The identity of these people is not merely a religious one, but it is also one of having felt out of place in – yet inevitably having been shaped by – a European context. The stories of these people may teach us more than we think about the societies from which they emerge, as they are not purely a product of Islam but also of their Dutch and Belgian experiences.

Conclusion

The Jihad Caravan concludes with a number of recommendations for us all – not merely for the policy world – as the authors view the issue of foreign fighters as a global issue which can only be addressed with everybody’s involvement. They make two particularly important recommendations:[11]

First, they make a call for people to support the Arab Spring, and to pierce through the false choice between peace and security in the Middle East. This entails recognising that the old model of international support for local dictators in the name of stability has failed, as it was part of the reason why a new form of global terror (Salafi-jihadism) has emerged. Though this implies that the Arab Spring is a uniform movement rather than – what I would argue – more of a chain of interlinked yet distinct popular uprisings, what the authors mean by their call for ‘support of the Arab Spring’ is in fact an international backing of genuine change as demanded by the people in the Middle East, unhindered by an obsession with security and stability in the region.

The observation that Salafi-jihadism emerged because of internationally backed local dictators is the subject of many studies, and questionable simply because the rise of secular Arab dictators happened in conjunction with a number of different historical developments which may have triggered the rise of Salafi-jihadism. It is therefore difficult to strictly isolate the chain of events that led to this form of global terror, but it is true that Salafi-jihadism is new in the sense that it is a phenomenon of the past few decades, though its ideological influences date back to the early days of Islam.

Moreover, and in my opinion incredibly important, is the call to stop focusing solely on Islamic State horror stories in reports about the developments in Syria and Iraq, but to also focus on the terror that largely feeds Islamic State support: that of the Assad regime which has killed around 50 civilians for each one that the Islamic State has killed to date. The Islamic State is a terrifying entity, but death and suffering at the hands of non-jihadists must not be forgotten.

The second recommendation made in the book is to create a better foundation for European Islam to flourish. The underlying thought is that homegrown Muslim extremism in Europe cannot be solved without giving new life to a European Islam. Muslim communities in Europe have suffered immensely from the radicalising and polarising effects that the rise of the Islamic State has had in the global debate on Islam, which has compounded much of the exclusion and discrimination they were already feeling. This essentially brings us back to questions of displacement and oppression – precisely those issues that are at the heart of the foreign fighter issue.

Though this book ends on a political tone, which not everybody will appreciate, the least we can take from this account is what it tells us about the deeply human nature of what we so distantly call – as I do above – ‘the foreign fighter issue’. It also reminds us of the substantial human grievances that inspire these low-level recruits, as well as the undeniable human suffering that they cause on their path to fulfilment.


Samar Batrawi is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has worked for the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in London, and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Follow her at @SamarBatrawi

NOTES

[1] Quote from a Belgian foreign fighter interviewed in AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 159

[2] AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 12

[3] Quote from a Belgian woman in Syria interviewed in AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 161

[4] Neumann, P.R. (January 2015), Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s, ICSR Insight (http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/)

[5] De Volkskrant (23 May 2013), ‘Nederlander Vast in Marokko om Ronselen voor Syrie’ (http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-burgeroorlog-in-syrie/nederlander-vast-in-marokko-om-ronselen-voor-syrie~a3447299/)

[6] De Volkskrant (24 April 2013), Sharia4Holland Speelt Rol bij Jihad-reizen (http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/sharia4holland-speelt-rol-bij-jihad-reizen~a3430968/)

[7] AlDe’emeh, M. & Stockmans, P. (2015), De Jihadkaravaan: Reis naar de Wortels van de Haat (The Jihad Caravan: a Journey to the Roots of Hatred), Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, p. 128

[8] Ibid. p. 143

[9] Ibid. pp. 136-141

[10] Ibid. p. 129

[11] Ibid. pp. 461-503

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Arab Spring, assad, Belgium, Holland, jihad, radicalisation, Syria, terrorism

The triumph of secularism in Tunisia and the democratic challenges ahead

November 13, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Beatrice Tesconi:

Photo: Gwenael Piaser http://goo.gl/rhG0HR
Photo: Gwenael Piaser http://goo.gl/rhG0HR

Against the backdrop of dispiriting headlines about the rise of Islamism in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’, recent political developments in Tunisia have been hailed as a beacon of hope for a region wracked by extremism and civil war.

On Sunday October 26, Tunisia held its second parliamentary elections since the ousting of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. Securing 85 of the 217 seats in parliament, the main secular party Nidaa Tounes swept aside the once dominant Islamist party of Ennahda.[1]

Hailed as a regional success story and an “important milestone in Tunisia’s historic political transition” by US President Obama, the triumph of laïcité in Tunisia has gained the praise of governments worldwide.[2]

Bravo Tunisia. Well done.

Once again, this small olive-eyed North African country has set itself as an example to its Arab neighbours and restored some of the credibility behind the revolutionary aspirations of the Arab uprisings. The apparent triumph of secularism in Tunisia has also challenged the widely held perception that the Arab uprisings served as a mere gateway to Islamic fundamentalism. A season of change seems to be underway. Perhaps we can still talk about a genuine ‘Arab Spring’.

But we should not be too hasty in declaring Tunisia’s transition to democracy an unbridled success. Free and fair elections are only one of the indicators of democracy. The long queues of Tunisians outside polling stations and the flood of pictures on social networks of voters’ ink-stained fingers are in stark contrast to an allegedly growing disillusionment with democracy as a system of government. In a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre, 59% of the Tunisian public expressed its preference for a “leader with a strong hand” over a democratic government, up from the 37% of two years ago.[3] In this context, the familiar faces of Ben Ali-era politicians in the ranks of Nidaa Tounes raises the question of whether the electoral results reflect the genuine democratic aspirations of the Tunisian people, or a form of nostalgia for the certainty of authoritarianism.

Since the fall of Ben Ali many of the practices of the ancien regime have been revived. This is particularly evident in the context of the security forces’ attempt to re-establish the impunity they enjoyed under Ali. The death of Mohamed Ali Snoussi in October of this year seems to suggest that police brutality has become prevalent once again. Human Rights Watch launched an investigation into the case based on serious allegations that police officers tortured and abused Snoussi in broad daylight.[4] But the arbitrary arrests of journalists, bloggers and activists on account of the peaceful exercise of their freedom of expression are also reminiscent of the old regime’s tactics. That was the case for the politically motivated arrest of the revolutionary blogger and human rights activist Azyz Amami in May 2014 . After openly criticising the police, Amami was arrested on trumped-up charges of drug possession under the provisions of the infamous Law 52, a legal penal code tool often used to silence dissenting voices under Ben Ali’s regime.[5]

The deteriorating security situation in the country has played into the ‘anti-Islamist’ rhetoric used by the main secular party to garner support in the elections. But if the country is to avoid slipping back into authoritarianism, Nidaa Tounes must restrict the powers of the security forces and reorient the party’s focus towards the socio-economic issues that originally sparked the 2011 uprisings. These problems remain unresolved: Tunisians have seen their economy worsen, inequalities persist and frustrations mount since Ben Ali fled the country.

A waning economy combined with high unemployment rates amongst college graduates is ripping apart the hopes of the Tunisian youth and creating the perfect audience for jihadist propaganda. So far, more than 3,000 Tunisians have allegedly travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the fight of the Islamic State (IS), making Tunisia the world’s biggest exporter of jihadist fighters.[6] In the radical alternative preached by groups like IS, Tunisia’s disillusioned and marginalised youth find the economic security and the political recognition they are denied back home.

One of the biggest challenges for Nidaa Tounes will be forming a government. Despite winning the most votes in the elections, the party still fell short of an outright majority to govern and must therefore enter the fraught process of forging a coalition. The decisions Nidaa Tounes will take in the next few weeks will act as a litmus test for the party’s commitment to inclusive politics and democratic governance. The anti-Islamist rhetoric seems to suggest that the secularists will be reluctant to engage in any form of political dialogue with the defeated Ennahda party. But closing the door on what is still the second-largest party in parliament would jeopardize the new government’s ability to make the structural reforms the country desperately needs. If excluded from government, Ennahda will not shy away from mobilising its strong support base to oppose any reform measures introduced by a Nidaa Tounes-led coalition. A weak and divided government under threat of further social unrest seems unlikely to be able to effectively tackle the socio-economic issues plaguing the country.

Reconciling the Islamist and secular political forces in the government will therefore have to be a priority for the new government. Although the elections’ results have been framed in terms of a mere referendum on Islamism, they should be interpreted as an opportunity to form the national unity government necessary for the country’s stability. An inclusive and unified government will also be essential in helping to restore some faith in the institution of the state and eventually dampen the jihadist appeal. However, this can only be achieved if Tunisia’s vibrant youth is incorporated into the political process. Only a government that truly represents the Tunisian people will be able to tackle the country’s social and economic problems. If Nidaa Tounes succeeds in forming such a government, then we can genuinely start talking about a successful transition to democracy in Tunisia.

Despite the challenging path ahead, Tunisia has already proved itself to be a powerful catalyst for change in the region. The recent political developments suggest that Tunisia has the capacity to lead such a positive change again, shattering once and for all those popular misconceptions that portray Arab constituencies and democratic governments as two worlds too far apart.

 


 

Beatrice studied Politics and International Relations at the University of York, and is currently undertaking an MA in International Peace and Security at King’s College, London. Her research interests are in the field of radicalisation, International Human Rights Law and the Middle East and North Africa Region.

 

NOTES

[1] “Tunisia elction results: Nida Tunis wins most seats, sidelining Islamists”, TheGuardian, October 30, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/tunisia-election-results-nida-tunis-wins-most-seats-sidelining-islamists
[2] “Tunisia counts votes after historic poll”, Aljazeera, October 26, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/tunisia-counts-votes-after-historic-poll-20141026192241951958.html.
[3] “Tunisian Confidence in Democracy Wanes”, Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, October 15, 2014 http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/15/tunisian-confidence-in-democracy-wanes/.
[4] “Tunisia: Suspicious Death in Custody”, Human Rights Watch, October 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/13/tunisia-suspicious-death-custody-0
[5] Amna Guellali, “Tunisia:The human cost of the drug law”, Human Rights Watch News, May 19, 2014 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/19/tunisia-human-cost-drug-law
[6] David D. Kirkpatrick, “New Freedoms in Tunisia Drive Support for ISIS”, The New York Times, October 21, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world/africa/new-freedoms-in-tunisia-drive-support-for-isis.html.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Arab Spring, democracy, Secularism, Tunisia

‘It’s the brotherhood, stupid.’ Values and the Arab Spring

March 27, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Jill S. Russell:

I attended last week a very interesting panel discussion on the Arab Spring [1], its meanings and the response it deserves. A theme that was shared across the panel was that the West [2] owed the movement its support because the latter was promoting the values held to be sacred by the former.

Before going any further, I have to confess here that I am an unrepentant Kennanist and have a hard time letting go of his standard that interest and not values (or the morals which sustain them) must drive foreign policy. His summary of the essential problem for such a policy framework assays the fullness of the issue, and I think it a wise explication of the flaws and  worth quoting here at length:

But at the heart of [a foreign policy based on morality] would lie the effort to distinguish at all times between the true substance and the mere appearance of moral behaviour. In an age when a number of influences…all tend to exalt the image over the essential reality to which that image is taken to relate, in such an age there is a real danger that we may lose altogether our ability to distinguish between the real and the unreal, and, in doing so, lose both the credibility of true moral behaviour and the great force such behaviour is, admittedly, capable of exerting. To do this would be foolish, unnecessary and self-defeating. There may have been times when the United States could afford such frivolity. This present age, unfortunately, is not one of them. [3]

Functionally I cannot argue with his formula that values abroad do not necessarily serve the responsibilities of the government in either domestic or foreign policy. Nor can I ignore the ghastly spectre of how such a basis for foreign policy could be horribly perverted. But I am willing for the sake of argument to live briefly in a world where Kennan might be wrong. [4]

Even in that world, I am troubled that the values of the Arab Spring on the ground, and in the swelling centres of grass-roots power, do not match my own. As it is a question of my support, not of the movement’s legitimacy, my values matter.

As the beacon of this piece, let us first consider the Muslim Brotherhood and its rise and – has it fallen or is this just ‘rise interrupted’? – in Egypt. How can you expect me to believe this group shares my values? From the outset the name excludes me. Insofar as they accept women, that role has been marginalised by the imposition of restraints based in the recourse to a traditional culture which define a woman’s role in public life. Even as women are even now on the front lines of the political struggle against the military junta [5], one worries (expects) that this sacrifice will be forgotten in the case of victory. Seriously, Egypt has been past such strictures upon women for decades. So whose culture is this? And if the Muslim Brotherhood is in fact the legitimate heir to Egyptian political culture it becomes extremely difficult to argue that my values are represented.

Moving abroad from Egypt, I worry even more that the conflict in Syria has been terminally overtaken by fundamentalists [6], and that should they oust Assad the future for women in Syria will be unpleasant. The status quo ante was brutal, but as far as women are concerned what could come next might be even worse, with political, legal, and social repression a distinct possibility. This would be the same perversion as in Egypt, where the service of women in the struggle will not translate to real power in the aftermath. I am reminded of the similar bait and switch played upon the African slaves who served honorably in the American War for Independence -8 years a soldier and a slave came well before 12 years a slave.

Finally, what of the initial Tunisian protest that has been enshrined as the spark of this movement? What of the revelations that the fateful act, the offending slap that is said to have driven Mohamed Buazzizi to self immolation in protest, never occurred that day in Tunisia? What if it was not a rejection of tyranny but a man angry at a woman in a position of authority, the police officer Fedia Hamdi? [7] If the latter were true, then what would this change in its origins mean for the terms of this revolution? What if the heart of the rebellion is really aimed at secular norms and not corruption? It is certainly the case that the rise of the Taliban was in part the result of their reversal of corrupt practices in governance. But that was only a small part of what they sought to ‘reform’. Nevertheless, and quite importantly, even as this information on the event has been in the public domain for nearly three years, the apocryphal slap remains in the legend. An indictment of the former system’s corruption does not require this detail, so why does it figure so prominently in the retelling still?

And so, as I sat in the audience, one of only a handful of women, and part of an even smaller group that eschewed a head scarf, I felt distinctly odd. I am not unused to the predominance of men in my professional life. Nor am I unfamiliar with men who think I should not be there. I do not begrudge them their dislike of me. But in the West, the accepted value is that legal sanction based on gender is not an option. The Arab world, across its broad political and religious spectrum, does not fully hold to this belief. And it is important, if the question is whether to support the Arab Spring on the matter of values, to recognize that these are also our values, and they are what make ‘democracy’ something more than tyranny by vote.

Looking only at this one issue it becomes clear that selling the Arab Spring on a perversion of Western values merely for the sake of gaining the latter’s support will not, in the end, serve the cause. Attracting the West on the basis of interest – mutual interest – is the approach that will best serve both sides. That it has been defined as crass, and demonized as selfish, is unfortunate and serves no ultimate purpose.

 

Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently a doctoral candidate at King’s College London, researching military history. 

______________

Notes

[1] I had a long discussion with colleagues as to the validity or usefulness of the collection of these many events under a single banner. I absolutely take their point that events on the ground in each theatre must be addressed singly, specifically and uniquely. And while I am likely in agreement that no single name could describe the individual events well, it is certainly the case that there now exists, in the world’s consciousness, an idea, an event, known as ‘the Arab Spring’. It could aptly be considered as the foreign policy/diplomatic international face of the movement. It packages the ideals, broad message and news to the world.
[2] And here we have more problems with mass or meta categories. The matter of what constituted “the West” arose, and for the purposes of that evening’s discussion the understanding was that it was meant to denote the states of the EU, North America, and the Anglophone Pacific.
[3] George Kenann, ‘Morality and Policy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Winter, 1985), pp. 205-218.
[4] At the worst extremes of the moral spectrum I am happy to ignore Kennan completely. I am not a monster.
[5] Enas Hamed, ‘Egypt’s ‘Muslim Sisterhood’ moves from social work to politics‘, AL Monitor, 20 November 2013; Bulletin of the Oppression of Women, “Muslim Brotherhood” Category . Also worth a view, Mona Eltahawy’s appearance on Al Jazeera’s program, ‘Head to Head: Do Arab Men Hate Women?‘
[6] Let us be clear, I am no fan of Christian fundamentalism. This is not about Islam or Muslims, it is about extremism.
[7] Elizabeth Day, ‘The Slap That Sparked a Revolution’, The Observer, 15 May 2011.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Arab Spring, democracy, Egypt, extremism, foreign policy, Muslim Brotherhood, Syria, Tunisia, us, women

Spontaneity and consciousness in the Arab Spring

January 12, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Leo Graham-Dullaert

We have been handed a cartoon of the Arab Spring. Despite the enormous advances
in the technical quality of reporting from areas of conflict, humans have not kept pace
with the machines. Even some of our best broadcasters have fallen prey to some of
our most basic human flaws; at best – laziness, at worst – prejudice. The cartoon we
have received is one of innocent well-meaning rebels fighting evil, faceless regimes.
Rubbish? Let me try and persuade you.

In trying to be a good student of the social sciences I want to be balanced, I want to
understand the dynamics of the conflicts for which we have received such consistent,
24/7, high-definition, battle-embedded footage. On the one hand I feel that I might
have achieved a quasi-cosy relationship with the Syrian rebel forces (witness the
undeniably enthralling coverage by French photojournalist Mani on Channel 4 News)
and an enduring rapport with the Libyan freedom-fighters. Meanwhile, I remain on
decidedly frosty, inhospitable terms with their establishment-propping counterparts. I
don’t really want to dash into polemic soap-box barracking over the bias in Western
media, but I would like some balance and some insight into this faceless “other side”.
I am fairly sure Bashar Al-Assad is not patrolling the streets alone, nor was Gaddafi
likely to be found harrying the frontlines in Misrata without support.

However, rather than simply complaining about the one-sided nature of the press
coverage, I wanted instead to make one specific complaint. The rise of Leninism
sparked a fierce debate between its followers and the Economists (along with
the Mensheviks and others) regarding the spontaneity and consciousness of the
revolutionary organisation. In essence, the latter believed that a revolution must arise
spontaneously (with certain economic conditions aligning), while the former believed
political consciousness must be led by the Party (i.e. the intellectuals, and funnily
enough perhaps Lenin himself) and that the workers themselves could not achieve
such political consciousness alone. And so it is along these lines that I feel I have
been presented with a certain caricature of the Arab Spring:

In the UN-peacekeepers’-blue corner we have the freedom fighting rebels, imbibed
with organically-grown, grassroots consciousness of their worthy cause. While in the
Stalinist-red corner we have the regime-backing sheep meekly led by a vicious elite;
this group of faceless foot soldiers being incapable of attaining any form of “self”
consciousness.

Perhaps there is some truth to this dichotomy, but I cannot believe it to be so vividly
black and white, or indeed blue and red. In any case, why are we so desperate to
create such a dichotomy? Are we saying that the public cannot handle a conflict that
does not feature a nice clean delineation between good guys and baddies? Heroes and
villains? Cowboys and Indians (I won’t speculate too much further on that one)? At
best we, or the press, are saying exactly that. At worst, perhaps these dichotomies
serve a more political purpose. Moreover the hypocrisy within these divisions of good
and evil is difficult to ignore. We have celebrated the rebellion within these far-flung
societies and demonised the regimes who seek to quell them. Yet on our own doorstep
we instantly branded our own Summer of Discontent in London last year as the
mindless actions of criminal youth. It seems to me a desperate state of affairs when
some of the most balanced analysis comes from a musician (even if he is an artistic
genius).

And so I ask a question familiar to this very debate – what is to be done? A
fairer representation of the seismic events we have witnessed would consider the
hitherto neglected deeper workings of each group of belligerents with which we
are concerned. Have these uprisings been truly spontaneous in their nature, or
has someone, somewhere, learned-of-Lenin, covertly imbued a certain political
consciousness? Equally, is there no element of self-conscious support for the various
regimes?

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Arab Spring, Consciousness, Facts, Leo Graham-Dullaert, Media, Spontaneity

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