Libya

North Africa - between security and democracy

September 3, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Umberto Profazio

Photo: Flickr under creative commons license.

Recent security developments in North Africa show how terrorism is gradually spreading in the region. On 20^th August one police officer was killed in a terrorist attack in Sousse, Tunisia, and the very same day a car-bomb exploded near a courthouse and a national security building in Cairo, injuring 29 people. The attack in Egypt was claimed by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, also known as Wilayat al-Sinai (province of Sinai), the local branch of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organisation. Despite that its roots can be tracked to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi succeeded to expand even on the shores of Mediterranean Sea, taking advantage of the faltering security conditions and of the political instability that emerged after the Arab Spring.

IS expanded in particular in Libya, where the political transition after the fall of Gaddafi régime resulted in a stubborn stalemate between the internationally recognised House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli. As a consequence, chaos and instability are the dominant factors in the country today, mainly due to the overwhelming role of different militias and the ongoing struggle between the two governments. The expansion of IS in Libya was a natural consequence: despite the ouster from the stronghold of Derna, where strained relations with the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade led to clashes between these two groups and the subsequent IS evacuation of the city at the beginning of July, the group was able to make further gains. In August IS took control of Sirte, where it gained a foothold in late 2014 and where it enjoys considerable support from Ansar al-Sharia. Sirte, hometown of Gaddafi, also offers IS the opportunity of a collusion with the former régime officers, as much as in Iraq where the strategic alliance between IS and the Ba’athists created a lethal blend.

Failing or failed states like Libya are clearly the main targets of the jihadists. The ongoing clashes between HoR and GNC gave IS the opportunity to expand its control on the territory and to apply the classic rule of divide et impera among different tribes and militias. Furthermore, the complete lack of a national security force in Libya is easing IS operations in the country. Previous governments’ policies to enlist different Libyan militias in the national army resulted counterproductive, making several tribal leaders and paramilitary groups more powerful and less accountable in front of domestic and international justice. As a result, the government in Beida, which is supported by HoR, is asking the help of the international community, in terms of an easing to the arms embargo and a foreign intervention by the Arab League to carry out air attacks against IS positions in the country.

The Libyan case shows the importance of proper security sector reform as a decisive step in the political transition after the Arab Spring. To a less extent, these conditions apply also to other states in the region, where national security forces are already in place. This is the case of Tunisia, where the difficult transition from the dictatorship to a democratic government is currently threatened by security issues. The terrorist attacks at the Bardo museum on 18 March 2015 (19 victims and more than 40 injured) and at the Marhaba Imperial Beach Hotel in Sousse on 26 June (39 victims, mainly British tourists) were apparently lone-wolf operations aimed at affecting Tunisian economy, heavily dependent on the tourism sector. More important are the consequences on a political level: on 25^th July the Tunisian parliament approved a new counter-terrorism law. While the bill includes new and important provisions against the money laundering, human rights groups criticized the law’s broad definition of terrorism and the increasing power of police in suspects’ surveillance and custody, considering them as possible signs of a return to an authoritarian state. Moreover, the extension of the state of emergency for two months from the 3^rd August risks altering the delicate balance of the Tunisian transition. For example, emergency powers have been used to jail thirteen activists for two weeks protesting against unemployment in Gafsa region.

Similar developments occurred in Egypt where President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi signed a controversial counter-terrorism law, which was criticized by journalists and media workers for the limits imposed on the freedom of information. Moreover, on 29^th August three al-Jazeera journalists accused of collusion with the banned Muslim Brotherhood were given a 3-year sentence for spreading false news. While these laws are gradually restricting the political freedom and civil liberties in both countries, it is unlikely that they will seriously affect IS activities, as shown by the attacks on 20^th August. Furthermore, they lay a radicalization risk in both societies, in particular among those already emarginated by the current political developments.

More generally, government decisions in Tunisia and Egypt are reinforcing the simplistic narrative that discriminates between Secularists, often associated with the ancient régime apparatus, and Islamists, frequently equated to terrorists. A more comprehensive solution to this fake dilemma should be to reform and strengthen the security sector and its intelligence apparatus, while respecting human rights and enhancing inclusiveness.[1] This is particularly true for Tunisia, where investigations on terrorist attacks in Bardo and Sousse can be considered controversial. Despite the initial claiming by IS, the Tunisian government blamed the attack in Bardo on the al-Qaeda affiliated Okba Ibn Naafa Brigade.[2] After the attack in Sousse and the enquiries by Metropolitan British police, Tunisian authorities acknowledged that the perpetrators of both attacks were presumably trained in the same camp run by Ansar al-Sharia in Sabratha, Libya, and released 8 people that had been detained since March. These men were part of a cell belonging to the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which also claimed the 20^th August killing of the police officer in Sousse.

The reform of the security sector in transitioning societies is a delicate operation, but it should be preferable than curtailing civil freedom and fundamental rights. This solution is adoptable in Egypt and Tunisia, where effective governments are in place. For Libya options are more restricted: the presence of two rival governments and several militias created the opportunities for the expansion of the IS. While a comprehensive peace deal between the two main Libyan factions is still far from being reached, the possibility of a foreign intervention in the country is gradually increasing.

Umberto Profazio is a PhD researcher in History of International Relations at the University of Rome “Sapienza”, where his thesis focuses on Libya after independence. He is currently an analyst for the NATO Defence College Foundation and author of its Maghreb Strategic Trends. You can follow him on Twitter @profazio.

[1] Réforme and stratégie sécuritaire en Tunisie (International Crisis Group, Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord, N.161, 23 juillet 2015).

[2] Maghreb Strategic Trends (NATO Defense College Foundation, March 2015).

Interview - Dr Carol Bohmer on the Mediterranean migrant crisis

April 21, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook:

An inflatable hard bottom craft carrying some 87 would be immigrant maily from Somalia is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa on June 15, 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0) — An inflatable hard-bottom craft carrying some 87 migrants is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa in June 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0)

On Monday, yet another tragic story broke of a ship sinking off the coast of Libya en route to Europe. This time, however, there were a potential 900 fatalities – if confirmed this would represent the highest number in any single case yet. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) fears that 30,000 sea crossings of this sort could occur in 2015 – likely rife with continuing tragedies. EU Foreign Ministers are currently in Luxembourg discussing the issue and what response may be required to both manage criminal elements of this related to human smuggling, and preventing the increasing number of tragedies.

Strife talked to Dr. Carol Bohmer, Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, about those trying to reach Europe and how to address the current crisis.

***

There seems to be a significant increase in the number of refugees trying to reach Europe from North Africa. Has there simply been more media coverage of this, or are the rates of these incidents significantly increasing?

The number of refugees drowning en route to Europe has increased exponentially over the last couple of years. So far this year, it is estimated that at least 1600 migrants have died, a 30-fold increase over the same period last year. There have been several incidents in the last couple of weeks, the latest one involving an estimated 800 or more deaths. Because of the magnitude of this tragedy, the media coverage has been intense.

Part of the media coverage has to do with the political implications of these disasters. Last October, Mare Nostrum, a programme of search and rescue, credited with saving 100,000 lives last year, was stopped. Several governments, including the British government, decided to end the operation because they believed that it encouraged migrants to flee to Europe. Not providing rescue was supposed to deter these desperate migrants from attempting the journey. These latest events have put the lie to the effectiveness of this deterrence argument.

Where do these refugees come from? What are the demographics?

The refugees come from places where there is war, civil strife and persecution. Not surprisingly, many come from Syria, Eritrea, South Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Others come from countries in the throes of unrest or economic stagnation. It is difficult to get exact numbers when the authorities do not even know how many have drowned, let alone where they came from. There is evidence that most of them are young with a number of children under 18, some as young as 10 or 12. It is unclear how many women are involved. There is also some evidence that as many as one million Syrians and Sub-Saharan Africans are waiting in Libya to cross into Europe.

What is likely to happen to these refugees if they reach Europe?

It should first be said that while many of the migrants are fleeing persecution, some of them are economic migrants looking for a better life. Even those fleeing the war and chaos of the Middle East do not all fit into the narrow framework of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which, with the follow up 1967 Protocol, provides the definition of refugee in the law.

It is very difficult to follow the path of those migrants and asylum seekers who make it to Europe. Many of them spend long periods of time in reception centres, waiting to be processed as refugees. Return to their countries of origin is extremely difficult, for both practical reasons and because of the international legal principle of “non-refoulement,” which forbids the return of someone to their country of origin if they have reason to fear persecution. Those who are granted asylum (and even those who aren’t) can move away from reception centres, to other parts of Italy or other parts of Europe, and no doubt some of them do, though statistics on this are hard to come by. Formal resettlement programmes appear to be rather limited, especially given Italy’s current financial difficulties.

What are some of the broader political implications (positive or negative) for increasing numbers of refugees travelling to Europe?

The increasing numbers of migrants travelling to Europe are grist for the mill for the far right political parties in many EU counties. The potential power of those parties affects the way those currently in power deal with the issue, focusing on punitive measures rather than more measured efforts as solutions. They are therefore more likely to respond, as Philip Hammond did this week, by supporting efforts to catch traffickers, rather than restart Mare Nostrum to prevent the migrants from drowning at sea.

It is possible that these tragedies will spur the EU to promulgate unified policies to deal with the crisis, and also to provide funding to do so. The Italian government, as well as others who receive migrants from the Mediterranean, argue that they are being forced to accept an unfair share of the burden with insufficient financial support from the rest of the EU.

Migration has the benefit of providing young workers in the EU countries that have ageing populations; the disadvantage of this type of irregular, usually unskilled, migration is that it may not provide the type of workers needed. It also has the disadvantage of indicating a lack of control of borders by those in power.

For those departing from conflict areas is there any evidence that these could be former combatants, or what security risks could be posed?

I don’t know of any evidence that some migrants are former combatants, but there is no reason to suppose they are not. The security risks are well known, and involve possible terrorist acts, though it is hard to imagine terrorists resorting to leaky boats as a means of transport to the EU so they can commit acts of terrorism once there.

In your opinion, how should the international community respond to these cases? What steps do you believe could be taken to avoid further tragedies?

The international community should restart Mare Nostrum. It is painfully clear that this deterrence does not work, given that the number of people risking crossing the Mediterranean have increased so markedly since Mare Nostrum was abandoned. It is inhumane not to try to save the lives of those who cross to Europe in a futile attempt to reduce the numbers. The reason that people are coming in increased numbers has to do with the situation in the places they are fleeing. Until the various crises are resolved we can expect migrant numbers to remain high. International efforts to this end could have some effect on the number of refugees who flee.

Given that not all the migrants are refugees but rather those seeking a better life than the barren and economically disastrous one in their places of origin, efforts to improve the economic outlook in those countries would also reduce the incentive for migrants to try to reach Europe.

Going after the traffickers would have some effect, but would not stop the transit of desperate people such as have been risking their lives recently. The desperation is too great and the rewards for the traffickers who are not caught are too high to deter them.

Dr. Carol Bohmer is a Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies, and is a Visiting Associate Professor at Dartmouth College, Hanover NH, USA. She is also the author of numerous books and publications including “The Politics of Invisibility and the Stigmatized Vernacular: The Case of Political Asylum Seekers” with Amy Shuman (forthcoming), and “Rejecting Refugees: Asylum in the US and the UK in the 21st Century”, with Amy Shuman” (2007).

Interview conducted by Joana Cook, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief.

Uncovering the truth about the War on Terror

November 14, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Charlie de Rivaz:

5286621200_9969839eba_o — Photo by El Zod (http://goo.gl/LhAPoa)

At the end of October, buried deep in the middle pages of the newspapers, was a story about the UK Court of Appeal. The Court had ruled that a Libyan man and his wife could sue British officials for their alleged role in the couple’s kidnapping and ‘extraordinary rendition’ to Gaddafi’s Libya back in 2004, where the man was subsequently tortured.

You might wonder how such a case could end up going all the way to the Court of Appeal. Surely we don’t need the country’s second-highest court to tell us that British officials accused of complicity in kidnapping and torture should face justice, provide some kind of redress, or, at the very least, reveal the truth about what happened?

Well, actually we do. Since the start of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ allegations of torture and complicity in torture against UK and US officials have either been swept under the carpet – hidden by anti-terror rhetoric and legislation – or they have been dismissed by officials – chief among them Dick Cheney – who maintain that torture is justified when dealing with terrorists. The truth about torture has been hidden as a matter of policy.

The recent ruling in the Court of Appeal suggests that times are changing. The cloak of impunity may well be slipping from the shoulders of those UK officials who turned a blind eye to the worst excesses of the War on Terror. They may yet have to face up, and pay up, for their wrongdoings. And even more importantly: they may have to reveal the truth about what went on behind closed doors during the War on Terror.

The Belhaj case

The case before the Court of Appeal involved Abdul-Hakim Belhaj and his wife, Fatima Boudchar. Belhaj, an opposition commander during the Libyan armed conflict in 2011, claims that in 2004 UK officials colluded with the CIA and Libyan External Security Organisation (ESO) to abduct him and his wife from China and transfer them, via Malaysia and Thailand, to Libya. Belhaj says that he was about to fly to London to claim asylum when the MI6 tipped off the ESO, and subsequently helped the CIA to arrange his ‘extraordinary rendition’ into the hands of Gaddafi. Once in Libya, Belhaj spent six years in prison and was repeatedly tortured. His wife, who was 4 months pregnant at the time of their abduction, spent the 17-hour journey to Libya hooded and taped to a stretcher. She was released from prison a month before giving birth.[1]

We now know that Belhaj was a pawn in the ‘deal in the desert’ of March 2004, made famous (or infamous) by the photo of Tony Blair and Gaddafi embracing in a tent. Bush and Blair sought to bring Gaddafi in from the diplomatic wilderness in exchange for his giving up chemical weapons and committing to the fight against terrorism. But in the small print were a few less savoury items, among them the promise of the USA to ‘render’ at least four detainees from US to Libyan custody, and for the British to help in one of these transfers: that of Belhaj. These details were not revealed until September 2011, after Human Rights Watch discovered incriminating documents in Tripoli, the Libyan captial.[2] One of these was a letter from Mark Allen, at the time the Director of Counter-Terrorism at MI6, to his counterpart at the ESO, sent just 6 days before Blair arrived in Tripoli for the desert deal:

‘Most importantly, I congratulate you on the safe arrival of [Belhaj]. This was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built up over recent years.’[3]

A year after these documents came to light, Belhaj was trying to get his case heard in the High Court in London. He did not appear to be motivated by the promise of a massive compensation pay-out by the UK government, offering to settle the case in exchange for an apology and £1 each from the main defendants: Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary at the time of Belhaj’s abduction), Mark Allen and the UK government.[4] Belhaj’s apparent motivation was the desire to hear the defendants admit what he believes to be the truth: that UK officials were complicit in his kidnap, imprisonment and torture.[5]

Avoiding responsibility

But the British government knows ingenious ways to avoid taking responsibility. First, they have constructed a parallel system of secret justice, pushing any allegations against them into the world of shadows and darkness. The Justice and Security Act of 2013 extended the system of closed courts and changed the balance of power so that in civil proceedings the government’s national security concerns outweigh the rights and liberties of individuals. Victims of the government’s excesses during the War on Terror who try to sue the government may be denied access to the proceedings of their case, and can only be represented by a security-cleared lawyer. It goes without saying that very few facts – if any at all – about such cases filter through to the light of day.[6]

Second, the government hands over inquiries into the dark side of the UK’s role in the War on Terror to the inept Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). It was the ISC that concluded in a report in 2007 – three years after Belhaj was abducted – that there was ‘no evidence that the UK Agencies were complicit in any “Extraordinary Rendition” operations’.[7] Made up of MPs and peers appointed by the Prime Minister, it was the ISC who in December 2013 were given the task of investigating allegations of British involvement in torture and kidnapping, despite the government’s 2012 pledge to hold a genuinely independent, judge-led inquiry. Last Saturday leading human rights groups announced that they will boycott the investigation.

The third way that the government avoids taking responsibility for its sins is through legal alchemy. In the case of Belhaj they employed their two favourite strategies to attempt to bar the case from even being heard: the principle of state immunity and the ‘Act of State doctrine’.

State immunity is based on the principle that all states are equal and one state cannot sit in judgement on the conduct of another.[8] Of course, in terms of their respect for human rights, all states are obviously not equal: the idea of affording Gaddafi’s Libya the same respect and dignity as, say, Sweden, simply because of its status as a state, is distasteful at best. Yet the law is often not to our taste, and before the law all states are equal.

In the Belhaj case the government argued that in order for the court to establish that the British government was complicit in the rendition and torture of Belhaj, then the court must ‘sit in judgement on the conduct of other states’ – that is, the court must judge the lawfulness of the conduct of China, Malaysia, Thailand and Libya in their own territory. To do that, the government argued, you must make them parties to the case; you must have them sitting in the dock alongside Jack Straw and Mark Allen.[9]

This first attempt at legal skulduggery was unsuccessful. The Judge rejected the government’s argument, saying that you don’t need to bring Libya et al. into the dock just to be able to talk about their actions. State immunity would only become an issue if those states’ rights and interest were ‘obviously affected’ by the case, but in the Belhaj case they wouldn’t be; the only thing affected would be their reputation.

When the state immunity gambit didn’t work, the government turned to their other favourite legal tool: the ‘Act of State doctrine’. This is similar but different to state immunity, and very few people actually understand the relationship. One of those who does is Geoffrey Robertson QC. For him, the main difference between the two principles is this:

Sovereign immunity is a limit on the court’s power imposed by international law and ‘Act of State’ derives from the court’s own nervousness about its competence to decide a foreign political issue.[10]

The government got their way back in December 2013, when the High Court ‘got nervous’ and refused to admit the Belhaj case on the basis of the ‘Act of State’ doctrine. As with state immunity, it was understood that the case called into question the actions of foreign states both on their own territory and outside of their territory, and required the court to judge the lawfulness of those actions. But the court didn’t know by what legal code to judge those actions – British law? International Law? Chinese law? In particular, the British judge didn’t know by what legal code to judge the actions of US officials operating outside of the USA (those CIA officials involved in Belhaj’s abduction and rendition [and even torture] who were hopping from airport to airport and black site to black site).

The judge concluded that an inquiry into the lawfulness of the actions of those US officials would be ‘damaging to the national interest’, since it would allegedly require the detailed examination of intelligence-sharing arrangements between the MI6 and the CIA, thereby putting an unacceptable strain on US-UK relations.[11] The court got nervous and barred the case, and so the government’s dirty secrets remained hidden.

Justice strikes back

The ruling, however, was clearly unsatisfactory. As several NGOs (including Amnesty, REDRESS, the ICJ, Justice and Reprieve) pointed out, torture is a particularly grave violation of human rights, and there is no question about its legal status: it is forbidden. All the countries involved in the case (except Malaysia) are parties to the UN Convention against Torture, and customary international law recognises that in absolutely no context is torture permissible.

The Court of Appeal in their recent judgement accepted this reasoning. They also recognised that if British courts didn’t investigate these issues, no-one would, and that there was a compelling public interest that the allegations be investigated. This is obvious: it is clearly in the interest of the British public to know if the people wielding the power in the country have been kidnapping those they don’t like and flying them off to be tortured.

Importantly, the Court of Appeal decided that the risk of damaging our relationship with the USA was outweighed by the importance of getting to the bottom of what happened to Belhaj and to what extent UK officials were involved:

In this particular context, the risk of displeasing our allies or offending other states, and even the risk of the consequences of varying severity which it is said are likely to follow, cannot justify our declining jurisdiction on grounds of act of state over what is a properly justiciable claim.[12]

The Court of Appeal had the sense to look through the fog of legal trickery conjured up by the government’s lawyers and see the real issue: that this is a case that simply has to be heard – it is too important to be swept under the carpet. Belhaj’s victory at the Court of Appeal suggests that maybe, just maybe, the truth will be heard, and Jack Straw, Mark Allen and the government will have to admit their part in some of the most despicable excesses of the War on Terror.

Reasons to be pessimistic

But we should not celebrate just yet. The truth might still fail to reach the light of day. The government, as I have shown, really do not want the British public and the world at large to discover the full extent of their sins. So they will no doubt appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal and try to get Belhaj’s case dismissed at the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court.

In addition, if the threat from terrorist groups like ISIS continues to consume the British collective imagination, then we might see a growing appetite for the kind of draconian policies that marked the wildest years of the War on Terror. We must ensure this does not happen. Kidnapping and then beheading British and American citizens is unquestionably barbaric, but we should not react to such barbarism by lowering our own standards of morality. ‘An eye for an eye’ has always been a dangerous saying, repeated unthinkingly by those who would justify human rights abuses ‘because the bad guys do it’.

Reasons to be optimistic

There is also cause for optimism. The British public have approached the threat from ISIS in a far more nuanced and critical way than they did the threat from al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/11. And they are now far more sceptical of the motives of politicians when they call for extraordinary measures to tackle terrorism, mainly as a result of the bits of truth that managed to seep through about the excesses of the War on Terror, including Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, Baha Mousa, and the various Wikileaks videos. This scepticism will likely deepen as new reports surface detailing human rights abuses by British and US officials during the War on Terror.

There is also a willingness on the part of some politicians to distance themselves from the methods used during the War on Terror. At the beginning of August US President Barack Obama admitted for the first time that the CIA ‘tortured some folks’. But, again, we should be restrained in our optimism: like the British government, Obama’s administration is not keen on revealing the extent of this torture. The publication of the 6000-page CIA ‘Torture Report’, detailing the organisation’s use of torture during the War on Terror, has been delayed again and again as Obama’s administration looks for ways to redact large chunks of it. Incredibly, Obama put the CIA itself in charge of the redaction process.

The ruling by the Court of Appeal in the Belhaj case is significant. The Court dismissed the government’s attempts to bamboozle it with legal alchemy, and declared unequivocally that the protection of basic human rights outweighs considerations about reputations and ‘special relationships’. Belhaj might yet get his day in court. We must hope that if he does, then the truth will finally be heard. We will learn just how low our government stooped during the War on Terror, and we will learn if they are ready to take responsibility for what they did.

Charlie is an MA student on the Conflict, Security and Development programme at King’s College, London. For three years he worked in Argentina and Colombia as an English teacher and journalist. His main interests include the political economy of war, international human rights law, conflict resolution, and state-failure and state-building. Charlie is currently the Managing Editor of the Strife blog.

NOTES

[1] For a full account of what allegedly happened to Belhaj and Boudchar read paragraphs 8-17 of the Judgement of the Court of Appeal (30/10/2014).
[2] Note that in the documents themselves Belhaj is referred to as Abdullah al-Sadiq. This was the name he used as commander of the now defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).
[3] See para.13 of the Judgement in the Court of Appeal (30/10/2014).
[4] In the Al-Skeini / Baha Mousa case, brought against the UK government by relatives of six Iraqi civilians killed by UK soldiers in 2003, the government paid out £2.83 million to settle the case in 2008.
[5] Another pawn in the ‘deal in the desert’, Sami al-Saad, an anti-Gaddafi dissident abducted and ‘rendered’ from Hong Kong to Libya, preempted Belhaj in suing Jack Straw, Mark Allen & co. In December 2012 he accepted a settlement of £2.2 million from the British government. Importantly, the government said that there had been ‘no admission of liability’, and the truth remained hidden.
[6] For a much more detailed analysis, read this article by Rod Jones published on the OpenDemocracy website.
[7] Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Rendition, July 2007, p. 64
[8] Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 370
[9] This is called ‘indirectly impleading’ a foreign state. A foreign state is indirectly impleaded when it is not named as a party to the tort, yet is required to adopt a position of either having to defend itself and forgo its immunity or have a judgment entered against it, so that it is bound by the judgment.
[10] Robertson (2006), p. 342
[11] Para.150 of the Judgement in the High Court (20/12/2013).
[12] Para.120 of the Judgement in the Court of Appeal (30/10/2014).

Back in the fold? Canada's tentative re-engagement with NATO

May 16, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

Amid the increasing tensions with Russia, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s meeting on 5 May with the head of NATO’s military operations, General Philip Breedlove along with the recent deployment of 6 F-18s to Romania have garnered some Canadian press attention. This represents some of the highest-level contact between the Canadian government and NATO leadership in some time. The question is, does this signal a Canadian re-engagement with NATO?

Since Canada’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, there has been a marked disengagement with the alliance, the hints of which came while Canada was still engaged in Kandahar. The decision to deploy Canadian forces there, motivated by undoubtedly honest intentions, nonetheless placed a heavy strain on a force not really designed for a long-term overseas combat deployment. The challenge of stabilizing southern Afghanistan was underestimated by allies and the casualties among the deployed nations attest to the grim and thankless challenge. With years of blood and treasure spent in southern Afghanistan and trying to muster greater commitment to the operation from NATO Allies, Canadian policymakers had seemed fed up.

After continually hammering allies over burden sharing and finding no relief for their forces in Kandahar, the Canadians faded into NATO’s background, still present, but not nearly as forward-leaning, constructive or vocal as in years past. Beyond Afghanistan and Libya, there was no more Canadian engagement in any other NATO operations, be it Kosovo, counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia or elsewhere. The commitment to the Libya campaign, while not irrelevant, was done without fanfare which can be attributed to Harper’s tight control over diplomatic messaging. While quiet diplomacy can be positive, the lack of recognition in headquarters of Canada’s contribution adds to the perception of its diminishing NATO presence.

When coupled with Canada’s meagre presence in the International Military Staff, it further highlights how it has lost its informal presence around the Brussels headquarters and across the alliance. Moreover, Canada publicly withdrew from NATO’s aerial surveillance platform (Airborne Warning And Control System, AWACS) which it had previously supported. The withdrawal left the programme in limbo and upset its allies. On top of that, the withdrawal from the allied ground surveillance programme was also noticed as both of these happened as the Secretary General was pushing for more shared capabilities in the Alliance.

Undoubtedly, Harper’s move to support NATO against Russia is the right one, but as of yet it doesn’t represent a wholesale re-engagement with the alliance. NATO needed to send a clear message that the annexation of Crimea would evoke a notable transatlantic response and the deployment of US and Canadian assets to Europe helps underscore the alliance’s solidarity, To not respond to NATO requests for assets would have been damaging for the alliance and certainly upset a number of allies, perhaps most importantly the US and the UK. The current government has often accused previous Liberal administrations of offering hollow rhetoric and relying on its peacekeeping and ‘middle power’ traditions without offering concrete contributions. In this circumstance, the Canadian contribution, important as it is, needs to also support a robust diplomatic effort on the part of Canada focused on keeping the Alliance relevant and purposeful.

The deployment of F-18s to Romania and a frigate to support NATO’s Standing Maritime Naval Group in the Mediterranean is significant, but they need to be coupled with a diplomatic effort in NATO headquarters. Though it is unlikely to happen, the Harper government needs to offer some additional leeway to its diplomatic corps in order to let them not only ‘talk up’ Canada’s contribution, but also offer some significant experience and depth of knowledge.

This is an opportunity for Canada to once again exercise a level of leadership and agency in NATO and help shape its character for the year to come. It may not represent a new ‘overarching’ theme to Canadian foreign policy, but it will show allies that not only is it an active contributor to the defence of Europe, it is also proactive in ensuring the future transatlantic relevance of the alliance. As the past decade of foreign policy has demonstrated, it is not enough to wield the stick; speaking softly is also a requirement. The upcoming NATO summit in Wales and a lack of identifiable deliverables places a burden on the shoulders of the member nations to start articulating a vision for a post-Afghanistan phase. While this was previously conceived of as the transition from ‘NATO operational’ to ‘NATO prepared’ these plans, however nebulous they may be, will have required some alteration. Russia will certainly dominate the agenda, but for NATO to lose the capabilities it has developed in Afghanistan would also be tragic. The alliance has worked relatively successfully with militaries from around the world in Afghanistan and built relationships with many more. To see these partnership opportunities wither or disappear after 2014 would diminish the influence of NATO for years to come.

This should also give policymakers in Ottawa some pause and hopefully encourage a more serious contemplation of Canada’s foreign policy, which has been adrift for some time now. With elections next year there will be an opportunity to redefine Canada’s place in the world and encourage a deeper contemplation as to what that means for Canadian influence. Are they content to continue with ad hoc diplomacy or can they define priorities which not only defend and advance Canadian interests but also buttress an increasingly beleaguered Western international order?

_____________________

Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

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