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Canada Needs to Rethink Foreign Policy: Peacekeeping isn’t the Answer

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By: Zachary Wolfraim

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/Canadian_Army_Brig._Gen._Dave_Corbould,_center_left,_the_deputy_commanding_general_of_Coalition_Effects_and_Transitions,_Combined_Joint_Task_Force_101,_Regional_Command_East,_talks_with_an_Afghan_National_Army_130523-A-XM609-063.jpg
Brigadier General Dave Corbould meets with Afghan National Army personnel.

The election of Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party on 19 October marks the end of a decade of Prime Minister Harper’s dominance in Ottawa. After a grueling 78-day campaign, voters convincingly rejected the Harper government and put a majority Liberal government in place for the first time in 15 years. This campaign has largely been a referendum on Harper’s leadership and one of the areas that has evinced the most visceral reaction from his opponents has been in foreign policy.

Both the left-wing Liberal and NDP parties, when discussing foreign policy, were more than willing to (rightly) point to Canada’s diminishing role in the world. Prime Minister Harper and his supporters have been quick to state that their foreign policy has been more forceful in defending Canadian interests internationally and has intentionally steered away from previous government’s ‘fence-sitting’ and moral equivocation. Nonetheless, it is hard to dispute that on the foreign policy file, while Canada has remained an active member of the international community, its diplomatic initiatives have been wanting.

In discussing foreign policy, both Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau and NDP leader Thomas Mulcair stated that Canada needs to reprioritize peacekeeping as a vital component. This is a mistake. The mythological Pearsonian peacekeeping tradition to which they are referring, died with the Cold War. Trying to apply its tenets to the current international environment would invariably fail. That said, this presents an interesting opportunity for whoever forms the next government to start thinking seriously about foreign policy.

The current international environment is, to put it lightly, a mess. With a retrenched United States, rising China, revanchist Russia, and a refugee crisis in Europe spurred by instability through the Middle East it is hard to see where exactly a peacekeeping force would offer added value. A military commitment to NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe and participation in coalition operations in Iraq and Syria give Canada international visibility, however, this doesn’t necessarily translate into influence. Utilising hard power as the key means to promote Canada’s interests and values internationally is neither sustainable nor feasible.

While Canada’s military has had over a decade as the go-to tool by which to implement Canadian foreign policy aims, it requires significant investment and strengthening. A long decade of action in Afghanistan combined with a high tempo of operations means that the military needs revitalisation. Similarly, a reinvigoration of the diplomatic service and a re-examination of Canada’s foreign aid programs would offer a more robust and holistic approach to foreign policy priorities. This is an opportunity by which Canada can not only rebuild its diplomatic reflexes but also seriously re-engage with the international forums such as the UN and NATO which act as force multipliers. Indeed, there is a risk for Canada that as a comparatively small country (population-wise), it can have difficulty making its voice heard amidst the international chaos. Offering a constructive presence in these forums is a way by which Canada builds international influence and enables it to punch above its weight.

In doing so, this makes Canada’s opinion consequential again. One of the key criticisms of Harper’s foreign policy was that it represented bullhorn diplomacy – this is our position, take it or leave it. Supporters of this style of foreign policy suggest that this means Canada gets taken seriously, but in reality, it generally means that Canada is left shouting from the margins. Treating diplomacy like any other type of negotiation is a misjudgment at best, particularly given that the consequences of failing to negotiate effectively can be catastrophic. Moreover, by throwing the military at every major international security issue, it automatically escalates both Canada’s commitment by risking Canadian lives and military assets in a way that diplomatic initiatives tend not to, but also raises the likelihood of deeper military involvement.

Invoking a role as international peacekeeper has become the solution of choice for countries that want to remain internationally engaged while limiting their investment in the military. The UK is already going down this route as Minister of Defence Michael Fallon indicated recently, he intends to commit the UK’s stretched defense capabilities to future peacekeeping missions. However, this should not be seen as a sustainable avenue to pursue a foreign policy agenda in the current international environment, particularly given that there is currently very little peace to keep. Unless a commitment to peacekeeping is coupled with a commitment to streamline the UN’s capabilities and also has the support of other Security Council members, it is unlikely to offer a serious method by which to assert security policy.

Ultimately, it needs to be remembered that in many ways, the international system is pay-to-play and underinvestment usually reaps diminished influence. Canada’s incoming Liberal government will need to do more than re-hash ‘traditional’ foreign policy roles but instead decide what Canada’s international priorities are going to be and how it will achieve them over the next four years. It will be a serious undertaking to recalibrate Canadian foreign policy after years of neglecting both military and diplomatic capabilities, particularly while also tackling the ambitious domestic agenda that the Liberal party articulated during the campaign. Given that it has been a decade since Canada’s last foreign policy review it may be time to revisit what its key foreign policy priorities should be heading forward.

Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him at @Zachwol.

A tale of two elections: UK, Canada and lacklustre foreign policy

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By Zachary Wolfraim:

David Cameron in conversation with US President Barack Obama and Canadian PM Stephen Harper, 25 June 2010. Crown copyright (CC 2.0).
David Cameron in conversation with US President Barack Obama and Canadian PM Stephen Harper, 25 June 2010. Crown copyright (CC 2.0)

A Conservative Prime Minister is fighting against a left-wing opponent about which the electorate has continued doubts. At the same time this Prime Minister is faced with challenges from within his own party: attempting to prevent the right-wing elements from pulling away from the moderate image he has sought to project. Despite weathering what seems to be the worst of the 2008 financial crisis, he continues to face the repercussions of the crisis alongside Russian aggression, instability in the Middle East and broader socioeconomic issues such as rising economic inequality, all the while faced with US leadership that has adopted a relatively passive foreign policy.

The above description fits Conservative Prime Ministers on both sides of the Atlantic. Both David Cameron in the UK and Stephen Harper in Canada are fighting to retain control of Parliament and their position in it. In both countries the governments have made significant attempts to shrink the role of the state and, in Canada’s case, an effort to redefine its national worldview. The result of these elections could see a departure from the ‘austerity’ leadership that has characterised both countries since the 2008 financial crisis. This would alter the dynamics of the transatlantic sphere and, vitally, each country’s relationship with the USA.

While many of the specifics vary, both men are faced by restless electorates who are increasingly willing to examine alternative options, be they as extreme as Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party or, in Canada, as mainstream as Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party. Either way, the political landscape seems likely to shift.

In terms of the UK election’s international dynamics it seems clear that regardless of who wins, addressing British voters’ apprehension towards immigration from the EU is a chief concern. Should the UK’s relationship with the EU chill further, it will have serious consequences: the US has voiced a clear preference for the UK to stay in the EU. The impending US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could alter the dynamics of the way in which US businesses view the utility of the UK as a European entry point, particularly if Britain were shut out of this agreement by leaving the EU. The US leadership desires a stable Eurozone, but it also wants a close ally with influence in the heart of Brussels.

On the Canadian side, it remains hard to discern the various parties’ stances on foreign policy, but if trends continue as they have under the Harper government, Canada’s international voice and standing will continue to diminish. Both Harper and Cameron have stepped back from seeking to lead on foreign policy initiatives and seem content to follow the US’ reluctant leadership, as they did in tackling ISIS/L and Russia.

Pressures at the US domestic level, including budgetary restraints, an intransigent Republican presence in Congress, and a lack of overarching strategic vision, are to blame for a relatively diminished American role in international affairs. During this time, Canada-US relations can best be described as transactional and tepid, due in no small part to the mismatched personalities and ideologies of Stephen Harper and Barack Obama.

Conversely, while the US-UK relationship has been positive under Cameron, the possibility of a European referendum or another Scottish referendum means that the UK is no longer the predictable pillar of support for US relations with Europe. Moreover, neither Harper nor Cameron have been very proactive with their foreign policy initiatives meaning that foreign policy leadership is left in the hands of a passive US administration seeking to ‘lead from behind’, the consequences of which have become apparent as crises continue throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe.

So both Canada and the UK under their Conservative leaders have stepped back from taking the lead in global affairs at a time when the US has also stepped back. This has been a mistake. There are no other countries as capable of putting constructive pressure on the US leadership as Canada and the UK. The ‘special relationship’ between these three north Atlantic members of the anglosphere has been invoked time and again to justify support for military actions under US leadership, such as Iraq in 2003 (and at present), Libya in 2011 and Afghanistan in 2001. Given the current state of international affairs, a British or Canadian leader with a clearer foreign policy vision could constructively influence US foreign policy towards certain strategic ends.

Indeed, in this election cycle the main UK parties have scarcely gone into depth on foreign policy and, while in Canada the election is not slated until later this year, opposition parties have focused largely on domestic issues.

Whoever ends up in 10 Downing Street or 24 Sussex Drive needs to be ready to be more proactive on issues of foreign policy. Both countries claim a ‘special relationship’ with the US; however, thus far neither Canada nor the UK has used this to substantially exercise influence in the Obama White House. This is symptomatic of a failure of foreign policy vision on the part of both Conservative leaders.

Whoever is elected this year will need to think critically about the nature of their relationship with the USA. By doing so, they will have an opportunity to help shape the nature of future US foreign policy initiatives. If they fail to do so, they risk leaving themselves at the mercy of international events and, ultimately, to be swept along with whatever future actions the US administration undertakes.

Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

Back in the fold? Canada's tentative re-engagement with NATO

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By Zachary Wolfraim:

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Amid the increasing tensions with Russia, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s meeting on 5 May with the head of NATO’s military operations, General Philip Breedlove along with the recent deployment of 6 F-18s to Romania have garnered some Canadian press attention. This represents some of the highest-level contact between the Canadian government and NATO leadership in some time. The question is, does this signal a Canadian re-engagement with NATO?

Since Canada’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, there has been a marked disengagement with the alliance, the hints of which came while Canada was still engaged in Kandahar. The decision to deploy Canadian forces there, motivated by undoubtedly honest intentions, nonetheless placed a heavy strain on a force not really designed for a long-term overseas combat deployment. The challenge of stabilizing southern Afghanistan was underestimated by allies and the casualties among the deployed nations attest to the grim and thankless challenge. With years of blood and treasure spent in southern Afghanistan and trying to muster greater commitment to the operation from NATO Allies, Canadian policymakers had seemed fed up.

After continually hammering allies over burden sharing and finding no relief for their forces in Kandahar, the Canadians faded into NATO’s background, still present, but not nearly as forward-leaning, constructive or vocal as in years past. Beyond Afghanistan and Libya, there was no more Canadian engagement in any other NATO operations, be it Kosovo, counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia or elsewhere. The commitment to the Libya campaign, while not irrelevant, was done without fanfare which can be attributed to Harper’s tight control over diplomatic messaging. While quiet diplomacy can be positive, the lack of recognition in headquarters of Canada’s contribution adds to the perception of its diminishing NATO presence.

When coupled with Canada’s meagre presence in the International Military Staff, it further highlights how it has lost its informal presence around the Brussels headquarters and across the alliance. Moreover, Canada publicly withdrew from NATO’s aerial surveillance platform (Airborne Warning And Control System, AWACS) which it had previously supported. The withdrawal left the programme in limbo and upset its allies. On top of that, the withdrawal from the allied ground surveillance programme was also noticed as both of these happened as the Secretary General was pushing for more shared capabilities in the Alliance.

Undoubtedly, Harper’s move to support NATO against Russia is the right one, but as of yet it doesn’t represent a wholesale re-engagement with the alliance. NATO needed to send a clear message that the annexation of Crimea would evoke a notable transatlantic response and the deployment of US and Canadian assets to Europe helps underscore the alliance’s solidarity, To not respond to NATO requests for assets would have been damaging for the alliance and certainly upset a number of allies, perhaps most importantly the US and the UK. The current government has often accused previous Liberal administrations of offering hollow rhetoric and relying on its peacekeeping and ‘middle power’ traditions without offering concrete contributions. In this circumstance, the Canadian contribution, important as it is, needs to also support a robust diplomatic effort on the part of Canada focused on keeping the Alliance relevant and purposeful.

The deployment of F-18s to Romania and a frigate to support NATO’s Standing Maritime Naval Group in the Mediterranean is significant, but they need to be coupled with a diplomatic effort in NATO headquarters. Though it is unlikely to happen, the Harper government needs to offer some additional leeway to its diplomatic corps in order to let them not only ‘talk up’ Canada’s contribution, but also offer some significant experience and depth of knowledge.

This is an opportunity for Canada to once again exercise a level of leadership and agency in NATO and help shape its character for the year to come. It may not represent a new ‘overarching’ theme to Canadian foreign policy, but it will show allies that not only is it an active contributor to the defence of Europe, it is also proactive in ensuring the future transatlantic relevance of the alliance. As the past decade of foreign policy has demonstrated, it is not enough to wield the stick; speaking softly is also a requirement. The upcoming NATO summit in Wales and a lack of identifiable deliverables places a burden on the shoulders of the member nations to start articulating a vision for a post-Afghanistan phase. While this was previously conceived of as the transition from ‘NATO operational’ to ‘NATO prepared’ these plans, however nebulous they may be, will have required some alteration. Russia will certainly dominate the agenda, but for NATO to lose the capabilities it has developed in Afghanistan would also be tragic. The alliance has worked relatively successfully with militaries from around the world in Afghanistan and built relationships with many more. To see these partnership opportunities wither or disappear after 2014 would diminish the influence of NATO for years to come.

This should also give policymakers in Ottawa some pause and hopefully encourage a more serious contemplation of Canada’s foreign policy, which has been adrift for some time now. With elections next year there will be an opportunity to redefine Canada’s place in the world and encourage a deeper contemplation as to what that means for Canadian influence. Are they content to continue with ad hoc diplomacy or can they define priorities which not only defend and advance Canadian interests but also buttress an increasingly beleaguered Western international order?

 

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Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.