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Libya strikes historic ceasefire but prospects for peace remain limited

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by Rafaella Piyioti

Libya Map with Flag Pin. Source: iStockPhoto

At present, Libya’s two governments, each with their own parliament and central bank system, are competing for power. The situation is further complicated by the overlapping and intersecting involvement of regional and international actors. On the 23 October 2020 an UN-mediated ceasefire was signed to establish the foundations for peace in the country. This agreement is the result of a series of UN-led talks between Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, leader of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and General Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA). To ensure a successful peace settlement in Libya, the disarmament of domestic militia organisations and the withdrawal of foreign forces is of paramount importance. Moreover, to understand the complexities of the civil war in Libya and the fragility of the UN ceasefire agreement, it is essential to focus on the role of foreign actors in Libya.

Since the toppling of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, civil war has raged across Libya. While the Colonel’s pan-Arabist leanings granted the country strong regional influence, his financing of terrorism led to frequent confrontations with the West. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya entered a new era of instability and insecurity. From this General Haftar has emerged as a self-proclaimed new Libyan leader, aiming to establish his own military rule over the nation with the support of various regional and international actors.  The UN, in a bid to establish stable civilian governance and prevent domestic militias from gaining control of the country, instead supported the formation the GNA in 2016.

Failing thus far to unify Libya, the GNA has only managed to establish its authority in Tripoli and has been engaged in long-term fighting with Haftar’s LNA. Libyan domestic militias are divided between those who support the GNA and those who support Haftar. Haftar promised his supporters military control of the country based on the Egyptian model of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his campaign against political Islam has led many regional actors to form alliances with him. Egypt, the UAE and Israel provided political support and funding to Haftar, in an attempt to prevent radical Islamist groups from gaining control of Libya and advancing their regional influence.

In the past year, the conflict between the GNA and the LNA has intensified, piquing when Haftar’s troops invaded Tripoli on the 4th April 2019. Since then, foreign actors have played an increasingly decisive role in how events have unfolded.

In January 2020, Turkey signed an agreement with the GNA to provide military support and send mercenaries to al-Sarraj’s army. Turkey’s alliance with the GNA is an extension of its current foreign policy, to advance its regional influence, using a politically pro-Islam rhetoric. Al -Sarraj, is accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation known for its Pan-Islam ideology, that calls for the unity of all Muslims worldwide, and its alliance with Turkey. Erdogan’s support to the GNA led Israel, Egypt and the UAE to increase their support to General Haftar to counter the rise of political Islam.

Russia, although one of the ‘Permanent Five’ members on the UN Security Council, supports Haftar’s LNA, offering military aid in an attempt to advance its own geopolitical influence in the region. Post-Soviet Russia has struggled to establish itself as a recognised global power and Libya’s strategic position offers Russia options for both naval and air bases which could support its activities in the region. Haftar’s troops, establishing a number of defence contracts with Russia, have also served as an economic boon. Nonetheless, following the escalation of violence in Libya, President Putin has joined the German Chancellor Merkel and the British Prime Minister Johnson, in calling the two Libyan leaders to negotiate a ceasefire agreement.

France, another member of the ‘Permanent Five’, has also supported Haftar, though this has not always been the case, with its overarching foreign policy on Libya being more ambiguous. While initially a neutral actor, Turkey’s involvement in Libya pushed France towards Haftar’s LNA as the two countries are experiencing increased tensions over their conflicted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Macron’s opposition to radical Islam, is yet another contributing factor in France’s alliance with Haftar, who has established an anti-Islamist political campaign in Libya to counter the rise of Islamist militias.

In the absence of a holistic European Union policy towards Libya, France pledged an alliance with Haftar, joined by Greece and Cyprus.  This is mainly due to their political dispute with Turkey on the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis. Other EU states have formed their own policies on Libya.  Italy has long established historic and strategic interests in Libya and is one of the only EU member states that supports the GNA over the LNA. Not only does Italy depend on Libyan hydrocarbons, but it has also reached a deal with the GNA to cooperate in countering illegal migration and human trafficking. Libya thus serves as an opportunity for Italy to maintain its interests and advance its own influence in the region.

Following a year of intensive fighting Haftar and al-Sarraj signed an UN-initiated ceasefire agreement on the 23 October 2020. The ceasefire, welcomed by the UN and the EU, is an important step towards the re-establishing peace in Libya. The UK and Germany offered to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which has set a timeline of three months for the disarmament of domestic militias and for foreign actors to withdraw from Libya. Yet, there remains a feeling of mistrust between al-Sarraj and Haftar which could undermine the prospect of a long-lasting peace. The three months’ timeframe is almost over, and the LNA has already accused Turkey of continuing its presence in Libya. For peace and stability, it is necessary that foreign actors, whether regional or international, follow the rules of the ceasefire agreement and withdraw their troops from Libya.

The UN, as the body traditionally at the forefront of global conflict mediation, should therefore lead efforts to ensure that all parties are following the ceasefire rules. Still, even if Turkey exits Libya, important challenges will remain. A tenuous peace and real political unity are two completely different things. As long as the ideological and political differences between the GNA’s policy of promoting political Islam, and the LNA’s anti-Islamist campaign remain unaddressed, political unity cannot be achieved.

While the UN ceasefire agreement is an important step towards lasting peace, without the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to the pursuit of regional interests through Libya, the conflict will inevitably continue. A ceasefire shows that there is a willingness, or at least a possibility, for peace. What remains now is for the GNA and LNA to be given the space and impetus to seize the opportunity for a lasting peace.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy.

She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking.

Rafaela is a Staff Writer at Strife.

The Libyan Puzzle Piece in Turkey’s Grand Strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean

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by Jack Cross

Joint press conference between President Erdogan and Fayez Al Sarraj, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord, 4th June, 2020

Despite dominating international headlines during the Arab Spring, events in Libya at the time and their consequences today appear to be forgotten. This does not mean, however, that events on the North African coast should be ignored. Indeed, in the context of a civil war, now entering its sixth year since beginning in 2014 , renewed attempts at peace are underway. Alongside the two warring factions are many interested external parties, including Turkey, whose government provides arms and support to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli. The GNA’s opponent is the Benghazi-based, House of Representatives and Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the LNA. But what exactly does Turkey hope to gain in this fragile, embattled and scarred state? I will argue, it is part of a wider narrative of Turkish expansionism across the Eastern Mediterranean and a drive to become the dominant political and economic force in the region.

A recent history of Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Civil War goes back to mid-2019, although their relationship stretches further to the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire under which Libya was a province until 1911-12. This imperial connection places Libya within Turkey’s historical sphere of influence. The current intervention began with Turkey and the GNA agreeing two memorandums of understanding: a military agreement and a maritime deal, signed in November 2019. These guaranteed Ankara’s support, in exchange for revisions of their shared maritime border in the Mediterranean Sea. This was followed up by a vote by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in January of this year, to approve the deployment of military personnel and resources to Libya. The assistance provided by Ankara came in the form of arms, supplies and technical support worth roughly $350 million. Moreover, foreign mercenaries have also been employed and deployed.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya has contributed to a war of words with some of its NATO allies, particularly France, who had been backing the rival Benghazi based government. This has continued despite the fact that the Haftar-led side has little international recognition. However, there have been attempts to reduce foreign influence in the Libyan conflict, including an EU arms embargo, agreed in 2016. This was used to add greater weight to the UN embargo established in 2011. So, what is to be gained here, particularly when the stakes are high enough to spark tensions with major powers? For Turkey, Libya is a key piece of the jigsaw in their ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. In recent years, Turkey as well as Greece and Cyprus, have been increasingly interested in explorative drilling in the Mediterranean, with the potential for huge benefits in exploiting the natural gas deposits beneath the seabed. The Turkish-GNA maritime agreement establishes exclusive economic zones for both Libya and Turkey in the Mediterranean, at the expense of the competing claims made by Greece, Cyprus and others. Already the world has seen mounting tension over this issue, with recent standoffs between the Turkish and Greek navies.

Now, Turkey’s fortunes in the Mediterranean are very clearly tied to those of the GNA in Libya. If the GNA fail to come out as the dominant party in any peace accord, this could put the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement in jeopardy, and President Erdogan’s ambitions along with it. The official line from Ankara makes it clear that they have no intention of abandoning their allies in Libya and there have been widespread suspicions that Turkey has been seeking to breach the arms embargo. In recent days, several Turkish vessels have been boarded by naval personnel, on behalf of the military mission policing the UN and EU embargos. While the Turkish government has denied that there have been attempts to breach any arms embargo, they have stated that their mercenaries are to remain in Libya. This is despite the fact that the initial ceasefire agreement did explicitly call for the removal of foreign military personnel. The danger here is that if Turkey continues these provocative acts, as part of its wider strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, peace talks in Libya may well break down.

So, what consequences do Turkish successes in Libya pose for the wider region? The problem for France, and others opposed to the Turkish policy, is that the Ankara backed side is in a stronger position. At the time of the ceasefire, the GNA had already successfully defended Tripoli from assaults by Haftar and the LNA and retains control of key air bases in the western part of the country. It increasingly appears as if the momentum is behind the GNA, after these recent victories. The current Haftar backers, particularly Russia, have no direct involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean disputes, and are also increasingly friendly with the Erdogan government.  In fact key parts of Turkey’s maritime aims regarding Libya are already accomplished, as the agreement made with the GNA has been registered by the UN as an arrangement made between two legitimate governments. But Ankara must maintain its involvement throughout the peace talks. Turkey has sought to strengthen its position within the peace negotiations, offering $120 billion (USD) worth of reconstruction contracts, on condition that the GNA becomes the dominant force in the post-war government. With this backdrop, it looks likely that Turkey will be heading for further collisions with other actors in the region as talks continue to reach a lasting settlement.

It is unclear yet if Erdogan’s gamble in supporting the GNA has paid off, or what exactly a victory in Libya would mean more broadly for Turkish foreign policy. The threat of sanctions over Turkey’s continued involvement in Libya and provocations in the Mediterranean have appeared to have little effect in deterring the Turkish government. The future remains uncertain and dangerous. The fragile truce in Libya could easily collapse and at that point, Turkish involvement could become greater and even more entrenched. The Libyan piece of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean puzzle has not quite fallen into place yet, it still hangs in the balance. With all the uncertainty and instability there is no telling what the direct consequences will be for the wider region, should Turkey prevail here.

Jack Cross is currently pursuing his MA in the History of War in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His main research interests are on diplomatic history, modern Turkey the Middle East more broadly.

Feature – The Nuclear Dimension: Pathways of Proliferation and Failings in Qadhafi’s Libya

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by Leonardo Palma

Colonel Muhammar al-Qadhafi, Leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya from 1969 until 2011 (Image credit: Wikimedia)

The Libyan nuclear weapons program started in the 1970s and lasted for thirty years. The acquisition of nuclear capabilities was sustained by the country’s oil wealth and by December 2003, Libya “had succeeded in procuring from abroad most of the technical pieces of the nuclear-weapon jigsaw”.[1] Colonel Muʿammar al-Qhadafi, however, never got the Bomb, proving that money and the black market are not enough to go nuclear militarily.[2] In March 2003, a few weeks before the Iraq War, Musa Kusa, then head of the Libyan Foreign Intelligence (Mukhabarat al-Jamahiriya), contacted the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to start talks aimed at dismantling the program in return for removing sanctions. After having examined the key drivers behind the program and how Libya proliferated, this post will assess the scale of the threat that the Libyan nuclear programme posed to the international system and how and why a potentially successful project failed.

The Colonel’s Nuclear Ambitions: Deterrence, Security, and Prestige

Libya’s position regarding the nuclear issue was characterised by ambiguity and duplicity from the start. In July 1968, the Kingdom of Libya signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but it was not ratified until years later, in May 1975; and only because of pressure from the Soviet Union. Qadhafi’s statements against the production of nuclear weapons were oftentimes disavowed by fierce appeal to the desirability of an “Arab bomb” to deter Israel.

Qadhafi’s key drivers for a military nuclear program were: security, deterrence, and prestige. Initially, deterrence from outside intervention relied primarily on the building of a conventional apparatus and the targeted neutralisation of dissidents abroad. The outcome was counterproductive: the Colonel spent billions accumulating the greatest arsenal of Africa but it remained almost useless due to the lack of skilled manpower. Meanwhile, the killing of people abroad and financial support for terrorism made him a public enemy for the West.[3] Furthermore, political and economic support for the Palestinians put the Colonel in the crosshairs of Israel as well.

Consequently, the parallel non-conventional weapons programme assumed over time a more relevant role as security insurance for regime survival, but it also triggered a race against the clock since Tel Aviv had already demonstrated its willingness to use preemptive strikes. Indeed, the 1981 bombing of Saddam Hussein’s Osiraq reactor, as well as the 1985 attack against the PLO headquarters outside Tunis, had a great impact on Qadhafi’s mind.[4] Following the US strike on Tripoli one year later, the regime became seriously concerned that a similar attack could occur in the future and decided to speed up the military nuclear programme.[5]

Security for regime survival and deterrence against Israel and the West matched the Colonel’s eagerness for the spotlight and desire to bolster his image and prestige in the Middle East, seeking to promote himself as the defender of the Arab masses in the face of Israel. Therefore, going nuclear militarily was perceived also as a means towards this end. To sum things up, security insurance for regime survival, deterrence against Israel and the West, and personal prestige were the main drivers of Libya’s nuclear programme.

Pathways of Proliferation: From International Assistance to the A.Q. Khan network

Nuclear proliferation in Libya came through three different periods of research and supply, running from the early 1970s to late 2003. The first period, from 1970 to 1981, encompasses Libya’s efforts to build a civilian program but also to start a parallel nuclear military procurement. Broadly speaking, these attempts were slowed down by a general respect for non-proliferation in relation to Libya, and that was due more to the mistrust of the main suppliers towards Qadhafi, rather than to a sincere adhesion to the NPT regime by the Libyan leader.[6]

The failure to get tactical nuclear weapons in 1970 from Beijing proved to the regime that an “off-the-shelf” weapons procurement was unlikely to succeed. Therefore, Libya decided to seek assistance for a civilian programme and to secretly divert that technology for military purposes, starting a simultaneously multi-track procurement. In so doing, the regime approached Argentina, Egypt, the US, India, and France.[7] Paris halted the acquisition both of a nuclear power reactor and of twenty calutrons, while New Delhi soon stopped cooperating due to growing concerns about Qadhafi’s ties with Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan. [8]

These failures pushed Libya towards the Soviet Union and from the mid-1970s, Moscow became the main source of nuclear assistance to the Colonel.[9] The Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF) became the centre both of peaceful research and illegal uranium conversion experiments. At the same time, the regime sought to procure a stockpile of uranium but the absence of exploitable deposits prompted it to seek external sources. Some have speculated that the invasion of the Aouzou Strip in 1973 was partly related also to the hope of seizing uranium deposits.[10] According to the IAEA, in the end, Libya did succeed in acquiring yellowcake (a type of uranium concentrate powder) from Niger between 1978 and 1981.[11]

The second period lasted from 1981 to the mid-1990s, and it was characterised by attempts to acquire the fissile material required for weapons based on both plutonium and uranium enrichment. The plutonium route came to nothing. Experiments conducted at Tajura allowed the regime to separate a very small amount of plutonium.[12] The regime then pressed the Soviets for the building of a light-water reactor in Sirte. The deal never went beyond the development stage, apparently because of proliferation concerns influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev’s new foreign policy.[13]

Dissatisfied with Moscow, and worried by the safety of the Soviet-reactors after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, Qadhafi sought assistance in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, while initiating discussions with Belgonucleaire, a Belgian company specialised in reprocessing nuclear materials. The talks were halted under US pressure.[14] Despite these setbacks, Libya kept looking for fissile materials. The regime started to seek Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCF) “no later than 1981” but no uranium hexafluoride (UF6) was ever produced.[15] Moreover, between 1983 and 1989, Libya held experiments to acquire experience in the dissolution and purification of yellowcake. In short, in this period Libya violated every single article of the NPT Safeguards Agreement but achieved very little in terms of becoming a nuclear power.

The third period, from 1995 to 2003, saw the rebirth of the program, especially in the enrichment field, thanks to the A.Q. Khan network.[16] Libya contacted Khan for the first time in 1997 and acquired from his syndicate centrifuges, UF6, and nuclear weapon designs. Contacts started in 1997 with a series of meetings in Istanbul between Libyan intelligence, Khan himself and his associate, Abu Tahir.[17] Further meetings were held in Dubai and Casablanca between 1998 and 2002. Those locations reflected the transnational nature of the network and its complexities since it involved nuclear specialists, middlemen, and unaware supplier companies.[18] Countries with weak export-controls such as Malaysia and UAE became the terminal for shipments to Libya and other countries such as Iran and North Korea. Sensitive components were assembled thanks to dual-use materials exported from Europe.[19] Shipments to Libya were specifically made possible thanks to a Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering (ScoPE).[20]

Not only did Qadhafi buy centrifuge-related technology from A.Q. Khan, Libya also received gas handling and heat-treating materials, mass spectrometers, and perhaps even unemployed nuclear scientists from South-Africa.[21] The network sold to Libya two types of centrifuges as well: L-1 and L-2. The former incorporates aluminum rotors while the latter includes maraging steel rotors. Both designs were probably stolen by Khan while he was working for the URENCO consortium. In addition, the procurement included systems for process gas feeding as well as frequency converters for a total amount of more than 20 complete L-1 centrifuges.[22]

By April 2002, several machine cascades were either set up or ready for installation. However, two “demonstration models” sent by Khan were not in workable conditions.[23] Despite all the expenses, by the late 1990s and early 2000s Libya had still failed to produce UF6. In time, they would ask the Khan network to procure some, providing Libya with 1.7 tons of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU, enriched to around 1% U235) and some natural and depleted uranium. These contacts also came with designs and blueprints relating to nuclear weapons manufacturing. However, the projects came from an old 1960s-era Chinese design and one drawing was even missing a key part.[24]

Explaining the Failures and Assessing the Threat

When Musa Kusa contacted British SIS in mid-March 2003, Libya had by now procured most of the technology needed for a weapon but, despite the efforts and millions of dollars spent, Qadhafi had not stockpiled a single nuclear warhead. No threshold had been reached. In her work on the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear programs, scholar Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer noticed that in 1991 Saddam Hussein was on the threshold of a breakthrough towards the bomb. Then came the Gulf War and everything halted. But Iraq did better than Libya anyway, even if the Colonel had more money, more time, and access to the black market.

Hegghamer argues that in both cases what prevented the two from getting the bomb was a lack of “prioritization” and “State-capacity,” or the professionalism of this state apparatus.[25] Both Saddam and Qadhafi weakened their states to maximise their personal hold on power. In so doing, the strongmen endangered their respective countries’ ability to launch, plan, and micromanage some complex technical projects such as a military nuclear program. However, they went about weakening Iraq and Libya in different ways: Saddam created a bloated state with competing agencies, leaders, wrapped in paranoia, emulating Stalin’s Soviet Union; Qadhafi almost dismantled the State entirely, only the informal dimension of power worked. Consequently, Saddam had a bigger toolbox to fix his WMD program.[26]

The Tajura Nuclear Research Facility Centre (TNRF) in Tripoli, Libya (Image Credit: Global Security)

In Libya, any kind of success was a remote prospect. Every initiative fell apart because of the lack of organisational resources. When Colonel Qadhafi launched his Cultural Revolution in 1973, the nuclear and chemical weapons programs were shielded from the Revolutionary Committees. However, the program still suffered indirect consequences as well. Moreover, fearing dissents and radicalisation, the regime did not train enough engineers or physicists. The whole program suffered a lack of continuity and poor management, as well as the absence of a high-tech industry and an associated education system.

While the regime spent billions on procurement, it failed in finding Libyans qualified to assemble the nuclear-puzzle. According to the IAEA inspectors, only a handful of them was specialised in nuclear-related matters.[27] The lack of organisational resources was compounded by a general respect for non-proliferation towards Libya and by the constraining effect of UN sanctions after the Lockerbie bombing. By the late 1990s, the A.Q. Khan network appeared as the only route available, and it was indeed pivotal for the program but it showed that access to technology does not equate to building-capacity.[28]

How far, then, was Libya from building the bomb in 2003? Saif al-Islam, Qadhafi’s son, declared in 2009 that they believed that they were just five years away from getting the bomb. Instead, they were far away.[29] While it was not impossible for the regime to go nuclear militarily in the future, it was highly improbable. However, back in 2003, the threat-assessment of the Libyan nuclear program was radically different, matching with that of Saif, because it was influenced by the ongoing dynamics of the international system at the time.

After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s foreign policy overlapped with national security and countering proliferation became one of the main goals of the Global War on Terror. On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Qadhafi’s offer to dismantle his program was perceived both as a political opportunity to bolster the US administration and as an effort coherent with the broader strategy of the White House of countering the spread of WMD. Consequently, one may argue that the threat-assessment of the Libyan program ended up reflecting the context of the post-9/11 altered perception. A mix of political opportunism and sincere security concerns were the mirror through which both the British and the US looked at Libya.

In summary, the history of Qadhafi’s nuclear program proves that money, dual-use materials procurement and black-market are not enough to get the bomb. Without a top-priority programme led by the government and handled by highly-specialised scientists, acquiring all the pieces of the nuclear puzzle can result in a dead-end. Furthermore, it proves that threat-assessment of a nuclear program is easily and dangerously altered by the general dynamics of the international system (even those which are not immediately related to WMD) and to the approach and perceptions that policy-makers have regarding nuclear proliferation and international security at a given time.

[1] Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation. Stepping Back from the Brink (Routledge, 2017), p. 25.

[2] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2016).

[3] Derek Lutterbeck, “Arming Libya. Transfers of Conventional Weapons”, in Contemporary Security Policy, 30:3, 2009, pp. 505-528.

[4] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak. Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks”, in International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, pp. 101-132.

[5] Ronald Neumann, Senate Testimony on US Policy Toward Libya, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 2000. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67394/pdf/CHRG-106shrg67394.pdf

[6] “Libya Has Trouble Building the Most Deadly Weapons”, in The Risk Report, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Vol. 1, No. 10, December 1995, pp. 1-4.

[7] Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (Routledge, 2016), p. 68; “Annex 8: Nuclear Infrastructures of Argentina and Brazil”, in Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Policies, Issue 2, 2001, http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/digest_2_2001.html.

[8] Ibidem, p.68, Cooley, Op. Cit., pp. 232-233. See also: Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb. The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 98–99; Technology Transfer to the Middle East, US Congress, September 1984, OTA-1 SC-173, p. 380, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html, p. 397. On the Libyan–French deal: Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 63–65.; Technology Transfer to the Middle East, US Congress, September 1984, OTA-1 SC-173, p. 380, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html, p. 397.

[9] Bowen, Ibidem, pp. 29-30.

[10] Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Authority, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp; Project Number LIB/3/004, Nuclear Raw Materials.

[11] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by Director General, IAEA, May 20, 2004. https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf.

[12] IAEA Report, May 2004, Op. Cit., p. 6.

[13] K.D. Kapur, Soviet Nuclear Non- Proliferation Diplomacy and the Third World (Konark Publishers, 1993), p. 148. See also: “Soviets Draw Back from Helping Libyan Program”, in Nuclear Engineering International, December 1987, p. 27.

[14] OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, Op. Cit., p. 380; MacLachlan and Knapik, Belgium and Libya, p. 5, quoted in: Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 33.

[15] IAEA Report, Implementation of the NPT, Op. Cit., p. 4. See also: “Japanese Parts Used in Libya’s Nuke Program,” in Herald Ashi, March 13, 2004. Quoted in: Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 34.

[16] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford University Press, 2006).

[17] Royal Malaysia Police, “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Program”, February 20, 2004, http://www.rmp.gov.my/rmp03/040220scomi_eng.htm.

[18] Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 37.

[19] Anwar Iqbal, “Khan Network Supplied N-Parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia”, in Financial Times, June 10, 2004. See also: James Doyle, Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Non-proliferation. Achieving Security with Technology and Policy (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008).

[20] Andrew Koch, “The Nuclear Network: Confession of a Proliferator”, in Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 24, 2004.

[21] IAEA Report, Implementation of NPT, Op. Cit., Annex 1, p. 6; Stephen Fidler, and Mark Huband, “Turks and South Africans Helped Libya’s Secret Nuclear Project”, in Financial Times, June 10, 2004.

[22] David Albright, and Corey Hinderstein, “Libya’s Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered”, in Institute for Science and International Security, March 1, 2004, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya.

[23] David Albright, International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counter-proliferation Initiative, Statement before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, June 23, 2004. http://www.senate.gov/∼govtaff/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=185&WitnessID=673.

[24] IAEA Report, Op. Cit., p. 3. See also: Andrew Koch, “The Nuclear Network. Chinese Warhead Drawings Among Libyan Documents”, in Los Angeles Times, February 16, 2004.

[25] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons”, Seminar at Woodrow Wilson Centre, September 15, 2017.

[26] Braut-Hegghammer, Ibidem.

[27] Richard Stone, “Agencies Plan Exchange With Libya’s Former Weaponeers”, in Science, Vol. 308, No. 5719, April 8, 2005, pp. 185-186.

[28] Chairman Hon. Laurence H. Silberman, and Hon. Charles S. Robb, Report to the President of the United States, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, March 31, 2005, pp. 259-260. See: Federation of American Scientists (FAS), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf .

[29] Braut-Hegghammer interview with Saif al-Islam. Quoted in: W. Wilson Centre Seminar, September 2017.

Leonardo Palma attended the Military Academy of Modena and holds a B.A. in Political Science and a M.A. in International Relations from Roma Tre University. He has been visiting research student at King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Twitter: @HadrianPAelius.

Libya’s civil war & the importance of strategic sequencing

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By: Robert Andrea

Secretary_Kerry_Sits_With_Italian_Foreign_Minister_Gentiloni_and_UN_Special_Representative_for_Libya_Kobler_at_the_Italian_Foreign_Ministry_in_Rome_(23090680244)
US Secretary of State John Kerry at a 2015 meeting for the future of Libya in Rome. Source: Wikimedia

One of the most overlooked aspects in strategic deliberations is that of sequencing. It is much more common for the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of a policy to receive the lion’s share of analysis. Despite this, the order in which the segments of a strategy are implemented can often be just as important. And while this may not always be the case, the cost of not giving due consideration to sequence can be painfully high. The ongoing Libyan Civil War provides a contemporary case study into how important sequencing can end up being in the pursuit of strategic interests.

Concerning Libya

In the immediate term, Western states appear to see (based on the different types of policy approaches on the table) two broadly defined interests in Libya. One is resolving the civil war that has been ongoing since 2014. The second is counterterrorism, primarily with regard to the increasing presence in Libya of the so-called Islamic State, but also of groups like the AQ-linked Ansar al-Sharia.

In terms of the civil war, the international community (particularly the United States and European Union) is committed to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict via the UN-led peace process. Dealing with the counterterrorism issue, on the other hand, will almost definitely involve a more kinetic approach.

Without the proper sequencing of these respective policies, however, neither issue will be solved effectively. Worse still, the situation on the ground would likely deteriorate significantly if the major actors fail to appreciate this.

Civil war

Following the overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi by NATO-backed rebels in 2011, Libya has struggled to rebuild effective state institutions, culminating in another civil war in 2014. This current conflict has essentially been fought between two rival entities – both claiming to be the legitimate government of Libya – each with their respective loyalists.

On one hand, there is the General National Congress. Often referred to as the Tripoli government or the Libya Dawn Coalition, the General National Congress (GNC) is comprised largely of Islamist militias and political blocs including the Justice and Construction party – considered by some to be the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The GNC and its allied militias are backed by Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan.

The rival of the GNC is the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, alternatively known as the Council of Deputies or the Tobruk government. Comprised of supposedly secular-leaning opponents of the Islamist-dominated GNC, the House of Representatives (HoR) is internationally recognized as the legitimate elected government of Libya. The HoR also maintains the loyalty of General Khalifa Haftar and his loyalists in the Libyan National Army.

In an effort to end hostilities, a U.N.-led diplomatic effort has produced a roadmap towards reconciliation.

In January of this year, a Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced, which, it is hoped, will unite the warring factions. For security reasons, the GNA (led by chairman and prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj) was not able to enter Libya until 30 March of this year, when he landed in Tripoli. In a somewhat surprising move, the Tripoli-based GNC announced shortly thereafter that it would remove itself from power in favor of the U.N.-backed unity government.

As of yet, the HoR has not ratified the agreement, as certain clauses would call for Haftar to step down as their army chief.

New place. Same threat. Same policy.

Taking advantage of the chaos during the civil war, the Islamic State has managed to establish a major foothold in Libya. This presence includes, but is not limited to, control of the coastal city Sirte. Increasingly concerned about these developments, Western states have been mulling more direct military options to combat the growing jihadist threat in Libya.

Earlier this year, a U.S. airstrike against an Islamic State camp in Sabratha, western Libya, killed around 50 people, including Noureddine Chouchane. Chouchane is thought to have been a key player in the two attacks last year targeting a museum and a beach resort in Tunisia. The attacks have been claimed by the Islamic State. However, this was a fairly isolated operation and there has yet to be a sustained Western airstrike programme conducted in Libya.

In terms of ground forces, part of the agreement that led to the GNA includes plans for an Italian-led multinational force of 6,000 troops to be deployed to Libya. It is still unclear what part of that force will be specifically devoted to counterterrorist operations and, for now, it is still a theoretical force. There doesn’t appear to be any reports of conventional Western troops actually in Libya currently, though multiple reports do place U.S., U.K., and French special operations forces in the country.

The foregoing reveals nothing to suggest that the counterterrorism programme in Libya will consist of anything tactically different than the ones implemented (mostly by the United States) in places like Yemen, Syria, or Somalia: Drone/airstrikes as well as occasional direct action raids by special operations forces (SOF). As we have learned time and time again though, airstrikes and SOF operations alone are usually insufficient in countering jihadist insurgencies. In the absence of a sizeable deployment of conventional Western troops, partnership with local ground forces would additionally be required to make these airstrike/SOF programmes effective.

If examined purely at a tactical level, the disparate nature of the two policies (conflict resolution and counterterrorism) would theoretically allow them to be pursued concurrently. That would be a very serious mistake – doing so would essentially ignore sequencing considerations and would likely end in catastrophe.

Enter the role of sequencing

It is critical to the long term effectiveness of both the political solution to the civil war and the West’s counterterrorism programme in Libya that the diplomatic portion of the strategy be conducted first. Only after the civil war has ended and the Libyan factions reach a modicum of unity, should counterterrorist operations against the Islamic State and other groups begin.

Without reaching a settlement to the civil war first, there will not be a single unified Libyan state to serve as a local military partner to foreign-led counterterrorism efforts. Rather, the prevailing status of a martially factionalized Libya would be the environment in which these counterterrorism operations would have to take place. In such a situation, the West would probably be forced to pick a side in the domestic conflict to act as its partner. This would undoubtedly result in an even more protracted civil war. Only now, it would be a civil war in which Western forces might find themselves as a target.

In the event of such a scenario, it’s more than likely that the Western powers would choose to side with the HoR and, specifically, Haftar over the GNC. For one, the HoR and Haftar are favoured by close partners of the West in the Middle East, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the Libyan National Army, under the command of Haftar, has proven to be the most capable fighting force in the country and has already shown a willingness to fight the Islamic State.

However, Haftar is also predisposed to fighting Islamists in general. This includes the Islamist-dominated GNC, which he labels (in its entirety) as terrorists. A foreign intervention siding with their chief rival would almost assuredly incense and seriously threaten the GNC.

Not only would this be a death blow to the diplomatic efforts towards national reconciliation, it would also seriously hamper counterterrorism operations. If they were to feel threatened by an HoR backed with Western military support, it is more than conceivable that some of the more hardline elements in the GNC might make common cause with the very jihadist organisations being targeted. This should not be viewed as a hypothetical. Certain GNC-aligned elements already cooperate from time to time with these jihadist groups.

Take the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council as an example. The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) is one of the primary elements fighting Haftar’s forces in the east and has often allied with the GNC. Comprised of multiple Islamist militias, the BRSC is led by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). Both ASL, the group behind the 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, and the BRSC at large have periodically cooperated with the Islamic State against Haftar’s forces.

This places the GNC only one degree of separation away from the Islamic State. This is not to say that in the event of a foreign counterterrorism intervention that the GNC would swear the bay’ah to the caliphate en masse. It is entirely plausible however, that at least some of these forces decide to enhance their level of cooperation with the Islamic State if they were to perceive the West’s backing of their arch rival, Haftar, as a threat.

Such a strategic blunder would leave foreign counterterrorism forces facing an already capable enemy, but now potentially reinforced with thousands of new fighters.

If the aforementioned scenario were to occur, the chances for a political settlement to the Libyan Civil War would evaporate almost instantly and the jihadist threat that Libya already poses to the West (particularly to Europe) would increase drastically. Or, to put it succinctly: It would be an unmitigated strategic failure for the West.

To their credit, both the Western states and the U.N.-supported unity government are trying their best to properly sequence their strategies in Libya. Italy, who will be leading the eventual international troop deployment, has said it will refuse to lead the operation until the GNA is ratified by all parties and the Libyan military command structure is clarified. Even more recently, the GNA itself called on all military factions to hold off on any military operation against Sirte until a unified military structure is established.

So it would seem that, for now, the policymakers handling the Libya file in the West are aware of the importance of taking sequence into account.

Conclusion

All of this is not to say that utilising proper sequencing will guarantee success in Libya. The road ahead contains a veritable minefield of challenges to reaching some semblance of stability. In such a complicated political and security landscape, there is nothing to say that the peace process and/or counterterrorism operations in Libya might not face serious challenges in the future. That said, while sequencing might not be the most stimulating aspect of policy analysis, as we see in the case of the Libyan Civil War, failure to fully appreciate its necessity could lead to disastrous consequences.

 

 

Robert Andrea is an incoming MA student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

The Libya Complex: From International Interference to Impotence

by

By: Laura Hawkes

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Source: The New York Times (February 19, 2016)

When attempting to formulate an effective international response to conflicts the crucial question looms: what comes first, diplomacy or eliminating an insurgency? In the context of Libya, this inevitable question has haunted the international community, causing stalled reactions rendering their positions weak. In the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan revolution which saw the removal of a forty-two year long authoritarian regime under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the U.S. and other powers have been reluctant to intervene in Libyan political or security affairs.

However, on February 19th 2016, in a delayed attempt to combat the Islamic State (IS) insurgency in Libya, U.S. warplanes targeted an IS compound near the western coastal city of Sabrata. The airstrike killed at least forty-one suspected IS fighters. This included the intended target, Noureddine Chouchane, a Tunisian national, believed to be responsible for the two fatal attacks against foreigners in Tunisia last year. The Pentagon’s Press Secretary Peter Cook announced with optimism:

‘Destruction of the camp and Chouchane’s removal will eliminate an experienced facilitator and is expected to have an immediate impact on ISIL’s ability to facilitate its activities in Libya, including recruiting new ISIL members, establishing bases in Libya, and potentially planning external attacks on U.S. interest in the region.’[1]

However, the effect on relations with local ground actors in Libya, as well as the potential impact this strike would have on the protracted Libyan diplomatic process were not accounted for.  The February 19th strike restored relative global faith in the U.S.’s military power, yet it also added fuel to the already bipolar sentiment amongst Libyans with respect to foreign involvement. Libya’s internationally recognised government, the House of Representatives (HoR) condemned the U.S. for failing to coordinate with Libyan authorities in advance of the strike, labelling it ‘a clear and flagrant violation of [the] sovereignty of the Libyan state.[2] This is also not the first example of U.S. military action against IS in Libya as they targeted the extremist group’s alleged leader, Wissam Najm Abd Zayd Al-Zubaydi, also known by his nom de guerre, Abu Nabil, in the south-eastern city of Derna on November 13th 2015. In June 2014, a US airstrike against a compound in close proximity to Ajdabiya killed at least seven Al-Qaeda affiliated militants, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar who is of Algerian citizenship. Belmokhtar has a history of membership in several prominent jihadi groups and was also reportedly a former senior figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[3] It is now, more than ever, abundantly clear that if the US or any other country or international entity attempts aerial or ground campaigns in Libya, it will serve to further antagonize the country’s already vulnerable political and security situation.

The IS Threat

The American and European powers, however, cannot simply turn a blind eye to IS expansion in North Africa and hope it will disappear on its own. In order to establish an effective counterinsurgency strategy, it is imperative that the threat IS presence in North Africa poses to the international community be understood through a pragmatic lens. Firstly, to group IS in Libya with their counterparts in the Levant is an understandable, yet costly mistake. The geopolitical threat posed by IS affiliated militants in Libya is unique due to the strategic location of the country as the gateway to Europe and Africa. IS’s stronghold in Sirte lies just 348 miles southeast of Malta, and over the past year a massive influx of migrants fleeing Libya have arrived on European shores raising fears amongst regional governments, Intel agencies and the general public that IS members may be amongst those escaping persecution.[4] This concern is largely fuelled by the chaos and lack of security in Libya, which has resulted in a void with respect to coastal and border security. IS’s foothold in Libya also allows the easy transition of arms and foreign fighters to and from affiliate groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.[5] Additionally, unlike in Syria and Iraq, there are no obstacles preventing reinforcements and new recruits from reaching IS in Libya.

Furthermore, the rapid expansion of IS in Libya is less a result of their strong military capabilities, and rather due to the organizations ability to exploit the security vacuum in civil war conflict zones. The modus operandi of the organization is division of its enemies. This potent tool has solidified the group’s position against opposing and fractured militias on both sides of the political spectrum in Libya. A unified response from Libyan actors should be essential begin to mitigate the threat, as a key difference between the situation in Syria and Iraq, compared to Libya is that the former have one political leader. Unfortunately, at the moment Libya has no central regime to work with or against, and UN initiatives to create a single unity government have thus far been unsuccessful due to split support from rival factions.[6]

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Source: USA Today

International Approaches in Libya

Considering the alarming rate of IS expansion in the Libya, and given its geostrategic significance, it is puzzling that no unified domestic or foreign initiatives have been formed to combat the insurgency. Given the international community’s relative inaction towards IS in Syria and Iraq, their hesitance towards Libya comes as no real surprise. The hope and optimism of the Arab spring that swept across the Middle East in 2011 has been replaced by fear and frustration. A relatively cohesive push to oust Colonel Gaddafi, which unified Libyans during the revolution, has since produced a fractured Libyan society. A dire power struggle has ensued as historic tribal tensions, militia fighting and political differences have been resurrected and amplified. The international community must tread carefully not to upset the fragile peace process whilst also eradicating IS presence in Libya and other areas of the Middle East. Adding to this challenge for the international community is the fact that at present, many Libyans on the ground as well as in both rival governments seem to regard western intervention as a bigger enemy than IS and would rather leave them to expand than unify to combat them. In this regard, the ‘War on Terror’ and its subsequent encroachment by Bush have engrained in Arab psyche an anti-western military stance.

In the absence of widespread ground support, international responses can be split into two fields: either clandestine social initiatives or overt military force. The former approach suggests foreign powers could seek to exploit IS’s social weaknesses. First, unlike most conventional insurgencies, IS shows little concern for ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ and instead opts for strict punishments in accordance with their hard-line interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia). Moreover, a more nuanced and covert approach could be the best means for fracturing IS from within. Since the U.S. airstrike last week various reports have emerged claiming the surge in numbers of new IS members, which US intelligence sources state is approximately 5,000, has created divisions within the group.[7] According to the Washington Post, “Three Libyans who said they had joined the Islamic State group told AP that they see most of the new recruits as lacking skills and as opportunists, looking to gain property and money confiscated from IS opponents in Sirte.”[8] This could mark a positive step in the internal erosion of IS, as until now the group’s cohesion has given them a stark advantage over its splintered opponents. Exemplified by militia groups affiliated with the Tripoli based General National Congress and the eastern internationally recognised government, the HoR have routinely experienced internal divisions causing disruptions and resulting in staggered responses to political and security developments.

The second approach advocates for a stronger emphasis on combating IS presence immediately, and turning to political dialogue at a later date. The reverse approach has thus far produced neither a unity government nor a stronger security apparatus. It seems western powers are still struggling to devise a suitable strategy in light of a series of failed efforts during the past fifteen years. Intervention is regarded as interfering, yet inaction allows insurgency to blossom. An attempted top-down diplomatic resolution cannot be representative of Libyan society as a whole or even stabilize a temporary unity government incorporating the most powerful militias and politicians. To deal with the expansion of IS in North Africa, the international community’s response needs to be ‘enemy-centric’ and target the foremost and imminent threat of IS. Only then can the political process resume.

 

 

Laura Hawkes is a Libyan political and security analyst, who is currently pursuing her MA in Terrorism, Security and Society from King’s College London. Hawkes is also a research intern at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence based in London, where she focuses on foreign fighters.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] ‘Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Libya Airstrike’, U.S. Department of Defense, (February 19, 2016)

[2] ‘Recognised Libya govt condemns US strike on jihadists’, Yahoo News, (February 20, 2016)

[3] ‘Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Top Islamist ‘killed’ in US strike’, BBC News, (June 14, 2015)

[4] Dearden, L. ‘Isis plans to use immigrant boats from Libya to cause terror in Europe and close shipping routes’, The Independent, (February 18, 2015)

[5] Charbonneau, ‘Arms from Libya could reach Boko Haram, al Qaeda: U.N.’, Reuters, (January 26, 2012)

[6] Murray, R. ‘Libya: A tale of two governments’, Al Jazeera, (April 04, 2015)

[7] El Amrani, I. ‘How Much of Libya Does the Islamic State Control?’, Foreign Policy, (February 18, 2016)

[8] Musa, R. & Keath, L. ‘Libya becoming new front in fight against Islamic State’, Washington Post, (February 20, 2016)