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International Women’s Day: The impact of conflict on parity

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Author’s note: Much of the reference to Yemen was drawn from the recent publication: “Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges”[1] (2015).

By: Joana Cook

DSC_2464
Source: National Yemen

Today marks the 2016 International Women’s Day, where the year’s theme “Pledge for Parity” promotes areas extending from helping women and girls achieve their ambitions, calling for gender-balanced leadership, and encouraging respect and value of difference.

It is perhaps fitting then to highlight what was for many a key struggle to achieve parity. Five years have now passed since the 2011 Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The protests were largely driven by populations seeking an end to corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, who demanded dignity, equality and justice in their societies. Women and youth were foremost amidst these, participating in protests in Libya and Tunisia, occupying Tahrir Square in Egypt, and challenging the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (amongst others).

While countries such as Tunisia have been able to emerge from these protests with fragile, transitional democratic governments, others such as Syria and Libya have descended into states of chaos, destabilizing the surrounding region and creating vacuums currently filled by groups such as the so-called ‘Islamic State’. Yemen, perhaps the most overlooked of these Arab Spring participants, deserves special recognition for the roles that women were able to carve for themselves in the early days of the Arab Spring, and the gains they were able to advance. Yemen too, perhaps highlights what is most at stake for the parity of women with the failure to solidify these ambitions.

Yemen was always going to be a challenging country to advance parity. Yemen is currently ranked on the UN Human Development Index as 160 out of 188. It’s gender equality rating is the worst in the world – the World Economic Forum’s Gender Equality Index places Yemen 142 of 142 countries. Prior to 2011, Yemen only featured a single woman in parliament and three in the Shura council. Despite these long-standing poor rankings however, women such as Tawakal Karman and others from diverse backgrounds initiated and led protests across the country which eventually led to the transition of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Karman later won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts and brought attention to the significant efforts of many other brave and dedicated women across the country.

The subsequent National Dialogue Conference (NDC) contained nine working groups that addressed key transitional issues such as military and security, development and transitional justice. While an imperfect process, the NDC was deemed a success by many around the world, and significantly 27% of participants in the conference were women. The outcomes of the NDC were forwarded to the constitutional drafting committee and a draft constitution was completed in January 2015. This constitution, which had not yet been ratified, was extraordinary in the advances it guaranteed for women.

The draft constitution highlighted the representation and support of women in areas ranging from leadership and participation in political bodies, to supporting their roles in the security sector (police, military and intelligence) and ensured the State would “eliminate negative cultural and social norms that demean the dignity of women” (Article 57). Article 76 went so far as to state, “To give effect to the principle of equal citizenship, the State shall enact legislation and take measures, to achieve effective political participation for women to ensure access to at least 30% in various authorities and bodies.” While the substance of such articles needed to be further articulated, and the constitution was set to be debated prior to ratification, the leaps and bounds inherent to the protections and promotions of women in this document were incredible.

However, due to a number of avoidable factors and failures,[2] this transition was interrupted and the situation for women has never been more dire. The constitution in its current format also seems unlikely to move forward and the very status of the state is currently in question. In March 2015, Operation Decisive Storm began in an effort to stop Houthi rebels from seizing power in the country has in many respects shattered the country - the War in Yemen has now stretched almost a year and the country is on the brink of the abyss. 21 million of the countries 24 million now need some form of humanitarian aid and over 3,000 have been killed, many in coalition air strikes (though this figure is expected to be much higher). Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the so-called Islamic State continue to make advances in the country, and have historically installed harsh interpretations of sharia law over the populations they control, including severe restrictions on the rights of women.

Furthermore, displaced populations face significant challenges, and women in particular face an increased risk of sexual assault and abuse (even within their families, as public pressures grow and manifest themselves in the private sphere, increases in domestic violence often occur). There has also been a noticeable increase in the number of child brides amongst fleeing populations, with families unable to care for their children. Education, employment and other key activities to ensuring the advancement of women in the country is attainable have been interrupted or ceased all together. Perhaps most critically, negotiations to end the conflict have reflected a notable absence of women, particularly from the government side. In essence, it appears as though the significant opportunities that once appeared for women in Yemen have all but vanished.

As highlighted by the case of Yemen, it is clear that women in these societies have been integral to significant social, economic, cultural and political achievements before and during the Arab Spring. It is also clear that for many of them, advances to their rights and aspirations to parity have never been at such risk.

This International Women’s Day, it is perhaps worthwhile then to remember then that while parity in general is as worthy a focus as any, such considerations must be reflected in the very fabric of conflict mediation, resolution and reconstruction that will be required in places such as Yemen, Syria and Libya.

Joana Cook is a PhD Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her PhD analyzes the roles of women in counterterrorism practices post-9/11. Her broader academic interests revolve around extremism and terrorism, with a focus on Canada, the US, UK and Middle East. She is also a researcher for the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook.

Notes:

[1] Joana Cook, ed. “Our Main Concern Is Security”: Women’s Political Participation, Engagement in the Security Sector, and Public Safety in Yemen, Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges (Gerlach Publishing, 2015).

[2] For a good background on this, see: Adam Baron, “Civil War in Yemen: Imminent and Avoidable,” in Policy Memo, ed. European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) (23 March 2015).

The Libya Complex: From International Interference to Impotence

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By: Laura Hawkes

Source: The New York Times (February 19, 2016)

When attempting to formulate an effective international response to conflicts the crucial question looms: what comes first, diplomacy or eliminating an insurgency? In the context of Libya, this inevitable question has haunted the international community, causing stalled reactions rendering their positions weak. In the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan revolution which saw the removal of a forty-two year long authoritarian regime under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the U.S. and other powers have been reluctant to intervene in Libyan political or security affairs.

However, on February 19th 2016, in a delayed attempt to combat the Islamic State (IS) insurgency in Libya, U.S. warplanes targeted an IS compound near the western coastal city of Sabrata. The airstrike killed at least forty-one suspected IS fighters. This included the intended target, Noureddine Chouchane, a Tunisian national, believed to be responsible for the two fatal attacks against foreigners in Tunisia last year. The Pentagon’s Press Secretary Peter Cook announced with optimism:

‘Destruction of the camp and Chouchane’s removal will eliminate an experienced facilitator and is expected to have an immediate impact on ISIL’s ability to facilitate its activities in Libya, including recruiting new ISIL members, establishing bases in Libya, and potentially planning external attacks on U.S. interest in the region.’[1]

However, the effect on relations with local ground actors in Libya, as well as the potential impact this strike would have on the protracted Libyan diplomatic process were not accounted for. The February 19th strike restored relative global faith in the U.S.’s military power, yet it also added fuel to the already bipolar sentiment amongst Libyans with respect to foreign involvement. Libya’s internationally recognised government, the House of Representatives (HoR) condemned the U.S. for failing to coordinate with Libyan authorities in advance of the strike, labelling it ‘a clear and flagrant violation of [the] sovereignty of the Libyan state.[2] This is also not the first example of U.S. military action against IS in Libya as they targeted the extremist group’s alleged leader, Wissam Najm Abd Zayd Al-Zubaydi, also known by his nom de guerre, Abu Nabil, in the south-eastern city of Derna on November 13th 2015. In June 2014, a US airstrike against a compound in close proximity to Ajdabiya killed at least seven Al-Qaeda affiliated militants, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar who is of Algerian citizenship. Belmokhtar has a history of membership in several prominent jihadi groups and was also reportedly a former senior figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[3] It is now, more than ever, abundantly clear that if the US or any other country or international entity attempts aerial or ground campaigns in Libya, it will serve to further antagonize the country’s already vulnerable political and security situation.

The IS Threat

The American and European powers, however, cannot simply turn a blind eye to IS expansion in North Africa and hope it will disappear on its own. In order to establish an effective counterinsurgency strategy, it is imperative that the threat IS presence in North Africa poses to the international community be understood through a pragmatic lens. Firstly, to group IS in Libya with their counterparts in the Levant is an understandable, yet costly mistake. The geopolitical threat posed by IS affiliated militants in Libya is unique due to the strategic location of the country as the gateway to Europe and Africa. IS’s stronghold in Sirte lies just 348 miles southeast of Malta, and over the past year a massive influx of migrants fleeing Libya have arrived on European shores raising fears amongst regional governments, Intel agencies and the general public that IS members may be amongst those escaping persecution.[4] This concern is largely fuelled by the chaos and lack of security in Libya, which has resulted in a void with respect to coastal and border security. IS’s foothold in Libya also allows the easy transition of arms and foreign fighters to and from affiliate groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.[5] Additionally, unlike in Syria and Iraq, there are no obstacles preventing reinforcements and new recruits from reaching IS in Libya.

Furthermore, the rapid expansion of IS in Libya is less a result of their strong military capabilities, and rather due to the organizations ability to exploit the security vacuum in civil war conflict zones. The modus operandi of the organization is division of its enemies. This potent tool has solidified the group’s position against opposing and fractured militias on both sides of the political spectrum in Libya. A unified response from Libyan actors should be essential begin to mitigate the threat, as a key difference between the situation in Syria and Iraq, compared to Libya is that the former have one political leader. Unfortunately, at the moment Libya has no central regime to work with or against, and UN initiatives to create a single unity government have thus far been unsuccessful due to split support from rival factions.[6]

Source: USA Today

International Approaches in Libya

Considering the alarming rate of IS expansion in the Libya, and given its geostrategic significance, it is puzzling that no unified domestic or foreign initiatives have been formed to combat the insurgency. Given the international community’s relative inaction towards IS in Syria and Iraq, their hesitance towards Libya comes as no real surprise. The hope and optimism of the Arab spring that swept across the Middle East in 2011 has been replaced by fear and frustration. A relatively cohesive push to oust Colonel Gaddafi, which unified Libyans during the revolution, has since produced a fractured Libyan society. A dire power struggle has ensued as historic tribal tensions, militia fighting and political differences have been resurrected and amplified. The international community must tread carefully not to upset the fragile peace process whilst also eradicating IS presence in Libya and other areas of the Middle East. Adding to this challenge for the international community is the fact that at present, many Libyans on the ground as well as in both rival governments seem to regard western intervention as a bigger enemy than IS and would rather leave them to expand than unify to combat them. In this regard, the ‘War on Terror’ and its subsequent encroachment by Bush have engrained in Arab psyche an anti-western military stance.

In the absence of widespread ground support, international responses can be split into two fields: either clandestine social initiatives or overt military force. The former approach suggests foreign powers could seek to exploit IS’s social weaknesses. First, unlike most conventional insurgencies, IS shows little concern for ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ and instead opts for strict punishments in accordance with their hard-line interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia). Moreover, a more nuanced and covert approach could be the best means for fracturing IS from within. Since the U.S. airstrike last week various reports have emerged claiming the surge in numbers of new IS members, which US intelligence sources state is approximately 5,000, has created divisions within the group.[7] According to the Washington Post, “Three Libyans who said they had joined the Islamic State group told AP that they see most of the new recruits as lacking skills and as opportunists, looking to gain property and money confiscated from IS opponents in Sirte.”[8] This could mark a positive step in the internal erosion of IS, as until now the group’s cohesion has given them a stark advantage over its splintered opponents. Exemplified by militia groups affiliated with the Tripoli based General National Congress and the eastern internationally recognised government, the HoR have routinely experienced internal divisions causing disruptions and resulting in staggered responses to political and security developments.

The second approach advocates for a stronger emphasis on combating IS presence immediately, and turning to political dialogue at a later date. The reverse approach has thus far produced neither a unity government nor a stronger security apparatus. It seems western powers are still struggling to devise a suitable strategy in light of a series of failed efforts during the past fifteen years. Intervention is regarded as interfering, yet inaction allows insurgency to blossom. An attempted top-down diplomatic resolution cannot be representative of Libyan society as a whole or even stabilize a temporary unity government incorporating the most powerful militias and politicians. To deal with the expansion of IS in North Africa, the international community’s response needs to be ‘enemy-centric’ and target the foremost and imminent threat of IS. Only then can the political process resume.

 

 

Laura Hawkes is a Libyan political and security analyst, who is currently pursuing her MA in Terrorism, Security and Society from King’s College London. Hawkes is also a research intern at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence based in London, where she focuses on foreign fighters.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] ‘Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Libya Airstrike’, U.S. Department of Defense, (February 19, 2016)

[2] ‘Recognised Libya govt condemns US strike on jihadists’, Yahoo News, (February 20, 2016)

[3] ‘Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Top Islamist ‘killed’ in US strike’, BBC News, (June 14, 2015)

[4] Dearden, L. ‘Isis plans to use immigrant boats from Libya to cause terror in Europe and close shipping routes’, The Independent, (February 18, 2015)

[5] Charbonneau, ‘Arms from Libya could reach Boko Haram, al Qaeda: U.N.’, Reuters, (January 26, 2012)

[6] Murray, R. ‘Libya: A tale of two governments’, Al Jazeera, (April 04, 2015)

[7] El Amrani, I. ‘How Much of Libya Does the Islamic State Control?’, Foreign Policy, (February 18, 2016)

[8] Musa, R. & Keath, L. ‘Libya becoming new front in fight against Islamic State’, Washington Post, (February 20, 2016)

 

 

 

Pushing back the black flag: The critical importance of southeast Asian security in the fight against ISIL

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By: Lai Ki Cheng*

JAKARTA_GUN_BOMB_ATTACK_ISLAMIC_STATE_ISIS_REUTERS_150116_INDONESIA-BLAST.JPG
Source: The Malaysian Insider

On January 14th 2016, Indonesia experienced its most hard-felt kinetic strike by the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL, also known as the Daesh militancy) in its capital of Jakarta. The city first experienced explosions from Indonesian ISIL militants followed by a series of firearm engagements. Attacks were coordinated to target both dense civilian populations and police posts in the business district of the city and within close vicinity to a United Nations Office, according to a timeline constructed by the Guardian.[1] At the May-2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong revealed the growing importance of monitoring ISIL activities in the region as ‘the threat is no longer over there, it is over here.”[2] He could not be more right. A majority of the region’s population is comprised with those of the Islamic faith and therefore represents a large untapped resource to those supporting and fighting ISIL. Over the last decade, the entire world has witnessed large populations of sympathisers travelling to Syria and Iraq. Since, multiple European and American governments have established countermeasures aimed at interdicting the flow of radicalised Islamists migrating to the Middle East and the exploitation of cyberspace for recruitment and propaganda. Hence, Southeast Asian governments have begun to follow suit, establishing programs to monitor social media, immigration and general counterterrorism activities against ISIL supporters in their own states. Southeast Asia is in the crosshairs, making its national and regional security of paramount importance in the fight against ISIL.

Setting the Stage

The importance of Southeast Asia in deterring ISIL efforts of expansion must be understood. To accomplish this, ISIL-related activity in the region must be identified, namely the countries of Malaysia and Indonesia, who possess high levels of ISIL activity; in comparison to Singapore and the Philippines, who possess lower levels of ISIL activity. Collectively, they form part of the Southeast Asian community that ISIL has recently targeted to gain support for their activities in the Middle East. The following explores each country and examines the varying levels of ISIL activity and the potential causalities.

Malaysia

Over the last decade and since the end of the Second Iraq War, ISIL has been gradually establishing a state – a caliphate – in the Middle East. It has since set its sights on South East Asia, a region full of Muslims and local militias with resentment towards their governments. This was a perceived untapped resource for sympathetic and potentially devote supporters to be recruited to the ISIL cause. Estimated figures of Malaysians who have journeyed to Syria and Iraq to join the jihadist struggle with the Daesh militancy varies from 30 to 150. Those that have returned are spreading and encouraging more Malaysian Muslims to join the group, heightening the level of domestic militancy – 122 people have been detained for possessing a connection to ISIL by 2013.[3] After the attacks in Indonesia, arrests of ISIL suspects have illuminated the intentions to stage an attack in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur.[4]

Over the past ten years, Malaysia has experienced varying levels of civil instability with corruption scandals and large scale protests in Kuala Lumpur – potentially degrading the trust of the Malaysian population in their government. Their actions are also made easier due to roughly 60.4% of the population being of the Islamic faith.[5] There might be additional factors involved, but the argument can be made that the civil strife generated through corruption coupled with the majority Islamic population fundamentally provides ISIL with an easy target for radicalisation through manipulation of information and resentment of authority. This is further evident in the identification of Malaysian uniformed personnel who assisted the transporting of Malaysian citizens overseas to train and fight in the Middle East.[6]

Indonesia

Looking further South and home to the largest Muslim population in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has witnessed a varying rate of ISIL supporters travelling overseas while those on the homeland are imprisoned. The two key areas of ISIL or ISIL-related activities in Indonesia can be identified within prisons and through open campaigning. Prisons, often criticised as ‘schools of crime’, have supplied ISIL activists with an entire populace of militants and other communities with resentment against the government who are also ripe for radicalisation through dissemination of propaganda or direct recruiting.[7] Even within maximum-security penitentiaries, inmates have surprisingly large degrees of communication and access to ISIL literature and translations in addition to being able to announce allegiances that would have gained audience from other detainees and the public.

In addition, Indonesia has seen open recruitment efforts for ISIL in Jakarta, through the organisation of mass gatherings where over 2000 Indonesians have expressed support for the cause. Amongst the multiple pro-ISIL groups in Indonesia, the most vocal campaigns were organised by the Indonesian Islamic entity ‘Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI)’ founded in 2013.[8] The democratic system and earlier ignorance of the Indonesian governmental services did little to stifle the rise of ISIL in the country. The “Achilles heel” of Indonesia would be its multiple militia groups sympathetic towards ISIL and their influence over the locals amongst its rural populations. Groups like the Abu Sayyaf faction (who possesses close ties with al-Qaeda and the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah) have recently pledged allegiance to ISIL. The Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT) – who has pledged allegiance to Santoso (also known as Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi al-Indonesi) – is one of the most active terrorist organisations in Indonesia. According to Chalk, the group fundamentally has become ‘an umbrella movement for militants based in the simmering conflict zones of Poso, Palu and Bima and has been linked to numerous attacks on the police’.[9] The group has also continued to expand the capabilities of ISIL by searching and recruiting individuals with proficiency in information technology to exploit cyber avenues for propaganda and ‘to wage a domestic jihad’.[10]

When discussing the degree of ISIL supporters from Southeast Asia, Indonesian supports formulates a large percentage of them, with over 2,000 Indonesian supporters pledging support to the Daesh militant group. Although accurate numbers might be difficult to obtain, the existing figures does reveal the scale of influence ISIL has exerted over the Indonesian community – mainly the marginalised militia groups targeted by the government. However, the most critical problems do not reside with those that travel overseas (although still a problem) but rather with those that return and with the potentially radicalised mentality they bring back with them.

Picture1 (1)
Source:The Wall Street Journal (January 16, 2016).

Singapore

Singapore, probably one of the most pluralistic (multinational) and small nations in the region, has also recently experienced the effects of ISIL propaganda. In May 2015, ‘[a] Singaporean youth has been detained under the Internal Security Act [and] another youth was arrested…for further investigations into the extent of his radicalisation’.[11] Later, after the Jakarta incident, ‘[t[wenty-seven male Bangladeshis working in Singapore have been arrested under the [ISA]’ – the first foreigner-centric jihadist cell identified in the country.[12] Since the arrests, Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Yaacob Ibrahim, urged Singaporeans to be more vigilant against radicalised teachings of ideologies and suspicious activities but ‘not discriminate against foreign workers’.[13] As Prime Minister Lee has mentioned, ‘the threat is here’ and Singapore has been very aware of the ISIL threat. Academic institutions such as the ‘Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis’ program from the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University have conducted extensive research into ISIL and other extremist activities in the region – later called upon in a televised 3-part documentary on Channel News Asia.[14] What is unique about Singapore is the sheer plurality of its community and its position on the international stage on financial, medical, defence, intelligence matters, and law enforcement. Singapore even has a religious rehabilitation centre to de-radicalise youths allegedly converted by ISIL – this is the Khadijah Mosque. Perhaps due to its relatively small size, dense population, community cohesion spurring on an inherent defiant sense of patriotism and ethnic harmony has created an ‘almost’ incorruptible environment for ISIL influences to take root. The Singapore model of establishing community centric deradicalisation centres is something that could be adopted by all countries tackling the ISIL threat, not just its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Philippines

ISIL activity in the Philippines has been thought to be as extensive as in Malaysia or Indonesia as there has been clear signs of its intentions to cultivate influence in the country through targeting Muslim majority islands in the south. However, despite evidence about recruitment activities targeting Philippine citizens (even through monetary incentives), there remains limited proof of the successfulness of these efforts. In addition, localised Islamic rebel groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front have also rejected ISIL activities due to its aggressive and violent methods.

Nonetheless, there are militia groups that have aligned themselves with ISIL. Namely the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. These two rebel organisations have operated in the Philippines over the last two decades but have been heavily hindered in terms of expansion and operational abilities to the extent where fracturing of its infrastructure is a growing possibility. Under constant engagement with localised military forces, it is unlikely these organisations would be sustainable vehicles for ISIL activities. However, the problem again is not the local people but those overseas – ‘as an estimated 2.5 million Filipino expatriates live and work in the Middle East’.[15] An argument could also be made that the size of those Islamic rebel organisations is small, and even smaller within the context of the nation’s religious diversity – Filipinos are predominantly Christians. This does not allow ISIL to conduct influence gathering operations in the country. However, due to the number of Filipinos working not just in the Middle East but also in other countries, should ISIL decide to target those communities, what can be achieved is much more terrifying.

“Bundle of Sticks” Security

The analysis of the various ISIL activities in each Southeast Asian nation has illuminated their strategy for the region. Domestically, ISIL or radicalised Islamic activity targets the minorities and outliers of local communities within the countries and specifically within penitentiaries. The successfulness of this strategy is only realised due to the inadequacy of the local government’s penal and prison services. In addition, the corruption that plagues multiple states within the region (i.e. Malaysia, Cambodia) further degrades the state’s ability to deter ISIL efforts and increases the potential for exploitation through monetary incentives. It has also been evident that ISIL is targeting the religious understanding of locals through militia and detained sympathisers, a technique similar to al-Qaeda when collating homegrown terrorists in the United States. In Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia, the impacts of such tactics are significantly more extensive given the religion demographics of the two nations. The most important point here is that ISIL is targeting the marginalised Muslim population within Southeast Asia. Therefore, domestic security must be enhanced to contribute towards a larger framework of a cohesive international security network – collectively striving towards influence interdiction.

Security studies have proposed the strengthening of national migration, citizenship, and counterterrorism programs and legislations. However, these strategies often would come at the price of potentially alienating Muslim minorities through legal injunctions or social unrest amongst other members of the population. What can be done is a collative effort of all the Southeast Asian states to form a standardised set of counter-radicalisation objectives and a multinational organisation perhaps under the jurisdiction of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, deradicalisation institutions/mosques such as the one in Singapore could be established in each nation and in smaller scales to assist domestic efforts to stemming the rise of radicalised Muslims. Like a ‘bundle of sticks’, Southeast Asian nations must work together to generate a strong cohesive network of intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism operations to suppress the threat. ISIL is targeting the region for the number of potential sympathisers it can convert to refill its ranks lost in Iraq and Syria. It is hence more important now to rally together and protect the region from the Black Flag, pushing back the radicalisation and interdicting ISIL’s human resources strategy. Only by choking its supply of manpower, not only with force but also with compassion and deradicalisation programs like that in Singapore, can we successfully counter this insurgency from the Islamic State.

 

Formerly an Officer in the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. He is currently undertaking his MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around proxy warfare strategies in the contemporary security theatre, and more broadly in international security and intelligence sectors. Cheng is currently a Series Editor with Strife.

*The views and opinions represented within this piece does not represent that of the Singapore government or its Ministry of Defence but are only the intellectual analysis of the author.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Safi M. & Weaver, M. ‘Jakarta attacks: Islamic State militants claim responsibility – as it happened’, The Guardian, (January 14, 2016).

[2] Rogin, J. ‘Islamic State is Rapdily Expanding in Southeast Asia’, BloombergView, (May 29, 2015).

[3] Chalk, P. ‘Strategy: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (December 2015).

[4] Ngui, Y. & Fernandez, C. ‘Malaysian Arrests After Jakarta Attack Fuel Fears of Islamic State’s Reach’, The Wall Street Journal, (January 16, 2016).

[5] ‘Malaysia Religion’, GlobalSecurity.org, Available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/religion.htm, Accessed January 25, 2016.

[6] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 11.

[7] Walker, Nigel, “Nozick’s Revenge”, Philosophy, Vol. 70, pp. 581-586, (1995).

[8] Chalk, P. ‘Islamic State goes Global: ISIL Spread in Indonesia’, The National Interests, December 21, 2015.

[9] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 13.

[10] Ibid.

[11] ‘Self-radicalised Singaporean youths – one arrested, one detained under ISA’, Channel News Asia, (May 27, 2015).

[12] Kok, L.M. ’27 radicalised Bangladeshis arrested in Singapore under Internal Security Act: MHA’, The Straits Times, (Jan 21, 2016).

[13] Driscoll, S. ‘ISA arrests: Singaporeans must be more vigilant against radical ideologies: Yaacob Ibrahim’, The Straits Times, (Jan 20, 2016).

[14] RSIS, ‘Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis’, Nanyang Tehcnological University. Available from: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/ctta/#.VrCX8jbPyu4, Accessed February 2, 2016.

[15] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 16

Finding context in the chaos of the Islamic State

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By: Aaron Noonan

Weiss, Michael D and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts., 2015. Pages: 288. £10.99 (paperback). ISBN-10: 1941393578

In a defiant interview with The Sunday Telegraph in October 2011, just as the Syrian uprising was beginning to transition to civil war, President Bashar al-Assad declared: ‘Any problem in Syria will burn the whole region. If the plan is to divide Syria, that is to divide the whole region.’ [1] This was a cautionary piece of advice to the West not to intervene against his regime, as it battles the ‘terrorists’ that it proclaims to have sparked the uprising. The problem however, is that Assad’s regime wasn’t fighting the terrorists - it was nurturing them.

That is according to ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, by Michael D. Weiss and Hassan Hassan. Weiss is a journalist who has reported from inside Syria for publications such as The Daily Beast, while Hassan Hassan is a Syrian analyst who has written for The National newspaper and now works with Chatham House. The book seeks to place ISIS (now termed the Islamic State or IS) within the broader context of the Middle Eastern strife over the past two decades. Despite taking the world by surprise with its lightning advance through Mosul in northern Iraq in June 2014, IS has existed in various incarnations for well over a decade.

Meticulously researched and using original interviews conducted by the authors with extremists and military officials, the book traces IS’ origins from the radicalisation of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Jordan in the 1980s. His turbulent alliance with Osama bin Laden in the early 2000s spawned IS’ predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI’s takfir ideology, which saw the group actively target Shia muslims during the Iraq War, became a point of contention between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden, as core al-Qaeda feared alienating the Muslim population. Their fears turned to reality, when AQI were beaten back by the US-sponsored tribal militias, the Sons of Iraq, during the Surge in 2007. The book is adept in analysing the various forces that have allowed IS to perpetuate since its early Zarqawist days. In addition, the book seeks to explain how IS is no longer merely a terrorist organisation, but rather a brutal proto-state thriving on chaos and war. The authors are perhaps at their best however when accounting for Iraqi Baathist influence within IS, and when examining the Assad regime’s complicity in allowing the organisation to exist in northern Syria.

The fall of Saddam in 2003 saw the disintegration of the Baath Party in Iraq, though by that time many of those former regime elements, under the influence of the Faith Campaign, had become more Salafist than Baathist. [2] The authors note that many members of Saddam’s regime now hold key positions in IS. [3] From the ashes of decades-long Sunni minority rule came a Shia political resurgence in Iraq, under the guidance of US occupation, which in turn inspired al-Zarqawi’s all out sectarian war against Shia Iraq. The authors make clear that US nurturing of Shia politicians in Iraq through the ‘de-Baathification’ programme, which left many former regime employees ostracised and unemployable, certainly played a role in exacerbating tensions. [4]

The section of the book perhaps most important to understanding the Assad regime’s position in the Syrian Civil War today, is the one addressing the regime’s relationship with AQI member Abu Ghadiyah. The Assad government actively facilitated the crossing of foreign fighters from the Syrian border at Deir Ezzor into Iraq, oftentimes through ‘rat lines’ maintained by Abu Ghadiyah. Despite the international community’s awareness that Syria was aiding Ghadiyah’s activities, Assad refused to put an end to it. It took a cross-border raid into Syria by US Forces in 2008 to finally eliminate Ghadiyah. [5] The authors expertly draw attention to an often overlooked aspect of the Assad regime that continues to affect the civil war today: its state sponsorship of AQI, IS’ predecessor. [6] Indeed, the authors suggest that the Assad regime is at the very least allowing IS to exist unfettered in northern and eastern Syria, despite the regime’s insistence that it is ‘fighting terrorists’ within its borders. [7]

Assad effectively sought to design his own binary narrative of the civil war, spreading the notion that it is his government versus the terrorists, a ploy used to avert the prospect of Western intervention. According to the authors, Assad allowed IS to make strong gains in Syria in order to present himself as the last line of defence against jihadists. [8] This is a bold claim to make, but one that is backed up by well-researched sources and interviews, including with radicalisation expert Shiraz Maher, the radicalisation expert at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London, who argues that Assadist forces actively sought to incite a Sunni uprising through state-sanctioned sectarian violence. [9]

ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror is a book that at its core seeks to contextualize IS within the broader confines of recent Middle Eastern history. Whilst the seemingly unexpected advance of ISIS across northern Iraq in the first half of 2014 propelled the terrorist organization onto the international stage, the book argues that IS is just another incarnation of a decades old group. The need to cover a wide spectrum of aspects pertaining to IS leads the book to adopt a broad analytical focus which, at times, is disadvantageous to particular topics. Notably, its chapters on life within IS and its ability to draw in foreign fighters through internet recruitment are sparse. However, the authors are most skilled at tracing the group’s murky origins and explaining how both the Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War allowed IS to flourish. In drawing attention to the indisputable link between the Assad regime and its sponsorship of Sunni terrorism, the authors do a great service to our understanding of how the Syrian Civil War is playing out. Assad may have warned that ‘any problem in Syria will burn the whole region,’ [10] but as Shiraz Maher points out, it is Assad himself who ‘set the Sunni Muslim world on fire.’ [11]

Aaron Noonan is currently undertaking an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’. His interests include Middle Eastern sectarianism, terrorism, and CBRN weaponry. He can be found on Twitter @custerdome, or on his blog Louder than Bombs.

Bibliography

[1] Gilligan, Andrew. 2011. “Assad: challenge Syria at your peril.” The Telegraph, October 29. Accessed October 7, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/ 8857898/Assad-challenge-Syria-at-your-peril.html.

[2] Weiss, Michael D., and Hassan Hassan. 2015. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York:

Regan Arts, p. 23

[3] Ibid., p. 124

[4] Ibid., p. 26

[5] Ibid., p. 108

[6] Ibid., p. 102

[7] Ibid., p. 147

[8] Ibid., p. 219

[9] Ibid., p. 135

[10] Gilligan, “Assad.”

[11] Weiss and Hassan, “ISIS”, p. 135

Revisiting the ‘Islamic Reformation’: Why Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s approach will not work

by

By Samar Batrawi and Bradley Lineker:

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now. New York, USA: Harper Collins., 2015. Pages: 288. $14.99 (hardback). ISBN: 9780062333957

Recent discourse on Islamic radicalisation and extremism has placed increased emphasis on the role of violence supposedly inherent within Islamic scripture. Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s recent book Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation can be seen as a continuation of this modality of thought. Contrary to claims that the ideas and methods of groups like the Islamic State or Boko Haram are ‘un-Islamic’,

Hirsi Ali argues that Islamic scripture itself contains the core justification for radical action, rather than a wider plurality of explanations that other commentators have emphasised. [i] Consequently, in the book, Hirsi Ali puts forward the conditions by which she thinks an ‘Islamic Reformation’ should occur. This review will critically evaluate her diagnosis of radicalisation and violence as stemming directly from Islamic scripture, while situating her work within the wider discourse on radicalisation, violence and Islam.

The Five Points of Hirsi Ali’s Islamic Reformation

The core part of Hirsi Ali’s argument consists of the identification of five theological principles that should be the subject of an Islamic Reformation. The first is ‘Muhammad’s semi-divine and infallible status along with the literalist reading of the Qur’an, particularly those parts that were revealed in Medina.’[ii] The second principle is ‘[t]he investment in life after death instead of life before death’[iii], which Hirsi Ali strongly associates with violent jihad.

The third principle focuses on Islamic jurisprudence, Sharia, which she approaches from two different directions. On the one hand, she argues that Sharia problematically institutionalises legal norms found within the religious texts, which were designed as part of the initial political project of the Prophet Muhammad amid the rapid expansion of the original Caliphate. On the other hand, these norms are depicted as building into an informal process of social censorship and self-regulation. Thus, Hirsi Ali particularly notes how concepts like honour reinforce power dynamics, which are built to ensure compliance with specific norms. This taps into Hirsi Ali’s fourth point of reform: ‘[t]he practice of empowering individuals to enforce Islamic law by commanding right and forbidding wrong.’[iv]

Finally, in her fifth area of needed reform, Hirsi Ali addresses ‘[t]he imperative to wage jihad, or holy war’[v], an area that perhaps represents the culmination of the preceding four principles, which she unconstructively says must simply be ‘take[n] … off the table’[vi].

Scripture Alone is an Insufficient Explanation

The core thematic argument that suffuses Hirsi Ali’s book is that Islamic scripture is the root problem in the Islamic world; a process which finds expression in the repression of women and religio-ethnic minorities, social conservatism, radicalisation and religious violence.

This is a problematic position since, as William McCants argues, scripture is a constant feature of the history of Islam, and yet radicalisation and violence are not. Scripture itself informs the basic framework which a variety of diffuse Islamic groups around the world use to order their respective worlds. Though Islamic scripture may build into a general explanation, on its own it is not sufficient to account for modern extremism in the way that Hirsi Ali contends. Contextual factors, like socio-economic grievances, and – possibly even more important according to Shiraz Maher – the search for identity and belonging .

Hirsi Ali argues that Islam’s preoccupation with the afterlife inevitably leads to violence and other negative outcomes. However, investing one’s life for the purposes of life after death is itself a positive constant in many strands of moderate and conservative strand of religions, including Islam. Indeed, life before death is not, as Hirsi Ali insists, meaningless to Muslims; it is regulated by cultural-religious norms that are often institutionalised, and cannot be logically developed into ready-made extremism.

This is also the case with her fourth principle of reform, ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’, which may be unique in view of its comprehensiveness within modern Islam, yet it is undeniable that most religions have been constructed along these lines. Hirsi Ali’s emphasis on Islamic scripture and jurisprudence, at the expense of more fluid contextual variables, threatens to not only overlook much of the complexity that underpins the desirability of rigid structures of social control, but also to relegate this social model as a type of barbarianism that is somehow unique to Islam.

Islam against the West

Bearing this in mind, Hirsi Ali’s arguments on scripture are themselves – much like the book in general – situated within a wider Western intellectual trend that, as Edward Said famously argued, approaches Islam from a position of ‘dominance[,] … confrontation [and] cultural antipathy’.[vii] The analogy that Hirsi Ali uses throughout the book, the comparison between West and East in the Cold War – itself recently used, for example, by UK Prime Minister David Cameron in response to the Tunisia attacks in July 2015[viii] – are symptomatic of Said’s general diagnosis.

There are two consequences of this position: the Islamic Reformation is framed as a zero-sum ‘war of ideas’[ix], between a newly reformulated East and West; and the liberal capitalism of which Hirsi Ali speaks is presented as a superior Western commodity which Muslims can only humbly aspire to one day import. This intellectual structure permeates many of the book’s examples, which are in fact an accumulation of sensationalist, out-of-context events that – owing to their diversity – are difficult to generalise into broader narratives.

The book also falls down in respect to its lack of engagement with Salafism in any meaningful way – despite it being the broad ideological inspiration for many of the groups that Hirsi Ali assesses. For example, she claims that ‘[t]he IS agenda is in some respects not so different from that of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Saudi Wahhabist teachings; it is just that their methods are more exposed.’[x]

Yet these groups cannot be reduced to points on a scale that only measures brutality, as both doctrine and method have been acknowledged to differ substantially among Salafists. For example, on the one hand, Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups have often operated within existing (un-Islamic) political systems – such as Hamas’ participation in the Palestinian elections in 2006. On the other hand, IS deems these systems as heretical and illegitimate, and aims to dismantle and replace them. As has been noted elsewhere, [xi] attitudes towards political participation reflect just one of many ongoing intra-Salafist debates[xii]; a complexity that is swept aside by Hirsi Ali’s narrow focus upon the primacy of Islamic scripture and simplistic logical pathway to extremism that this supposedly engenders.

As noted above, this intellectual trend regarding Islam is not new, but seems to be intricately linked to the process that Edward Said once described in his book ‘Covering Islam’. Said’s observations help describe the deeper historical problems within Western understandings of Islam. Perhaps Said’s most important lesson is one the West still has not learned more than 30 years after he wrote it, and which is painfully embedded in Hirsi Ali’s liberal capitalist case for an ‘Islamic Reformation’: that the Islamic World is defined negatively as that with which the West is radically at odds, and this tension establishes a framework limiting knowledge of Islam.’[xiii] Hirsi Ali’s book is undoubtedly situated within the most radical fringes of this paradigm, as her approach expresses deep cultural antipathy towards the Islamic world.

Conclusion

Ultimately, then, Hirsi Ali’s attempt to demarcate an ‘Islamic Reformation’ has merely vocalised a troubled Western conception of Islam that will do little to actually germinate the process that she is ostensibly trying to create.

This dichotomy itself is found in her choice of the first part of her title – ‘Heretic’ – and her project – of developing the principles for an ‘Islamic Reformation’ – the former involves polarisation, whilst the latter infers a process of amelioration. This depiction of Islam in zero-sum terms – much like Bernard Lewis in his essay ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, which would inspire Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’, between the civilising liberal-capitalist ‘West’ and the barbarous traditional ‘East’ – threatens to over-simplify and divide discourse and opinion on Islam in terms reminiscent to the fear and mistrust of the Cold War. While, for example, the literal and uncritical enforcement of the Sharia system of jurisprudence – itself clearly designed for past social structures – is indeed problematic for human rights discourse in the modern age, polarisation and division will never be the solution to untying this particular Gordian knot.

Moreover, simply escaping Islam, as Hirsi Ali advocates for those ‘trapped between their conscience and the commands of Muhammad’[xiv], is also neither practical nor desired for many Muslims.

These issues are part of the wider debate – touched on briefly in this piece – of the West’s relationship with Islam, and, in the face of Hirsi Ali’s book, it is clearer than ever that more people, other than just self-proclaimed ‘heretics’, need to be involved in this discussion to avoid the monopolisation of the ‘Muslim voice’ in the West.

Samar Batrawi is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she studies Salafism in Lebanon. She has worked for the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in London, and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Follow her at @SamarBatrawi.

Bradley Lineker is currently a fully-funded ESRC doctoral candidate in the War Studies Department, King’s College London. He has extensive experience working as a consulting research analyst with the UN and the private sector on contexts like Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia and Syria. Follow him @BradleyLineker.

NOTES

[i] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p. 22

[ii] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p. 24

[iii] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p. 24

[iv] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p. 24

[v] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p. 24

[vi] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p. 206

[vii] Said, E. (1981), Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (London: Vintage Books), p. xvii

[viii] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/11138344/David-Cameron-Fight-against-Islamic-extremism-is-like-World-Wars.html

[ix] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p.220

[x] Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), pp. 163-164

[xi] See Hegghammer (2009), Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism, in Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst & Co), pp.258-262

[xii] For an excellent collection of perspectives on global Salafism and the different intra-Salafi debates, see Meijer, R. (ed.) (2009), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurts & Co)

[xiii] Said, E. (1981), Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (London: Vintage Books), p. 163

[xiv] Hirsi Ali maintains that she believes that leaving Islam as she did is still the best choice for Muslims ‘who feel trapped between their conscience and the commands of Muhammad’, Hirsi Ali, A. (2015), Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: HarperCollins), p. 51