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Understanding the 1965 Indonesian Coup

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By George Loh

Image credit: Kawan Kawan Media

The 12th DMZ International Documentary Film Festival screened Director Fanny Chotimah’s debut film, “You and I”. It features the story of two elderly women, Kaminah and Ksdalini who have grown old since their ordeals following their jail term in 1965 (The film later won the Asian Perspective Award in the same Festival). The decision to feature a documentary outlining the effects of the 1965-1966 period, according to Fanny, was to educate the audience on the continued significance of this period to Indonesian history. Until Fanny’s expose on this issue, this controversial piece of history had been arguably blindsided amongst Indonesian media sources, despite the horrific death tolls and the curious rise of President Suharto, whose role throughout the period will be examined.

Context

Kaminah and Ksdalini were the victims of a failed coup, also termed the “September 30 movement”, which occurred after leftist leaders and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) youth members abducted and killed 6 out of 7 Indonesian generals en route to Halim Air Base. The junior officers argued that they did so to forestall a military coup planned for 5th October, but upon carrying out the killings, they proceeded to seize power in Jakarta in the name of a Revolutionary Council. The movement was very poorly planned, and was quickly stopped, according to official accounts of the story, by General Soeharto who assumed command of the military. Under Soeharto’s control, the soldiers attacked Halim Air Base, where the movement leaders were based. Meanwhile, President Sukarno moved from Halim to Bogor Palace. Soeharto’s swift response sent the coup leaders to flight early on 2nd October, and the coup attempt was over in less than two days. This led to a pogrom (mass riots targeted towards an ethnic/religious group) against the PKI, where mass roundups of PKI members and sympathisers took place. The two women featured in the film are falsely accused of their involvement with the Communists, and the documentary recounts how the sequence of events set in stone the overthrow of the Sukarno regime and the eventual installation of Soeharto into power. This ushered in the famed “New Order” which lasted for decades. More importantly, the subsequent purge of the PKI between 1965-1966 resulted in the deaths of approximately more than 500,000 people (with many more unreported killings).  

The coup took place during a precarious time in Indonesian politics. By 1965, the only significant powers at the centre of Indonesian politics were the President, the PKI and the military. Under Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy,” presidential authority was supreme, but his ailing health meant increasing tussles for power between these three forces. Furthermore, President Sukarno’s increasingly anti-American foreign policy rhetoric, and warm ties with China had also led to American concerns that Indonesia may become a communist state. According to a memo released on 29 September 1965 (one day prior to the coup), the CIA had received intelligence that Indonesia was looking to attain nuclear weapons from China, a significant Communist threat. This accentuated the CIA’s involvement with the September 30 movement, given that they were already involved in previous regional rebellions around Indonesia in 1958. 

Lingering controversies

Today, the motivations behind the 1965 coup remain a mystery, with several different popular interpretations of why the coup came about. The first version, the official version maintained by the Government and taught in Indonesian history textbooks, is that the coup was used by the PKI as an institution to seize state power. Declassified CIA documents have shown that the US Embassy supplied the army with a list of thousands of PKI cadres for targeting following the attack, which made convenient the narrative that the PKI as an institution was responsible, much like their involvement in Madiun in 1949. The second, proposed by the likes of Anderson and McVey, argued that it was an internal army push by junior officers who were disgruntled with the corruption and mismanagement by top military officials (Anderson and McVey, 2009). The third version, according to Crouch, was that the coup was the work of different discontented military officials but that the PKI played a key supporting role (A movement where PKI, Sukarno and Soeharto became entangled.) More recently, the fourth version, according to W.F. Wertheim was that Soeharto and other anti-communist army officials organised the movement through double agents in order to provide a pretext for attacking the PKI and overthrowing Sukarno (Wertheim, 1966). 

As the differing accounts show, there are obvious loopholes in the way the coup materialised. The leftist soldiers and PKI youth members had not kidnapped Soeharto, despite his prominence in the military leadership. Soeharto was also exceptionally quick with his counter-measures and assumption of Army demand. It was these curious loopholes that led Kammen & McGregor to argue that September 30th “was a complex process that lacked a simple schema or linear development.” (Kammen and McGregor, 2012)

Wertheim, meanwhile, argued Soeharto was likely to be in charge of the coup. He had significant implications with the coup leaders, being a friend of both movement’s leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Untung and Colonel Latief. Wertheim highlights that Soeharto was not targeted despite being a key commander of troops in Jakarta and a potential threat to any mutiny or coup attempt.  The movement’s troops did not blockade the Army Strategic Reserve Command’s (KOSTRAD’s) headquarters, although it was not far from their position in front of the palace.   Emotionally, Soeharto had also reacted with “uncanny efficiency in extremely confusing circumstances.”  While most military officials were unsure of what to do, Soeharto seemed to know exactly how to defeat the movement. Finally, the identity of Sjam, who Soeharto claimed was a confidante of PKI leader Aidit, was also suspicious.  Wertheim believes he was a double agent, but it remains to be seen if he was really Aidit’s subordinate, or in charge of the movement to forestall the military coup.

However, even this narrative is difficult to believe. Werthiem’s conjecture makes Soeharto out to be a figure of superhuman genius and foresight. Besides, a plan that involved the removal of top generals would significantly weaken the KOSTRAD, and there is no indication amongst the archival material available that Soeharto had fallen out of favour with his comrades. His goal of crushing the PKI could have been carried out in a more straightforward manner, such as having Untung declare they were working for the PKI. After the coup, the movement leaders did not demand Sukarno appoint Soeharto as Yani’s replacement. While CIA involvement did make it easier for Soeharto to coordinate the process that ultimately resulted in his overthrow of Sukarno, and later the communist killings, the forced confessions of some conspirators cloud narratives that they were not acting on Soeharto’s behalf.

Despite the different accounts available, it is clear that Soeharto was aware of the internal conflict between the PKI and the Army, and that the CIA had supported him in the PKI pogrom that came after. However, the true intentions of the movement leaders remain contested, and continue to cast doubt over the validity of these different accounts put forth. What we also know is that a communist Indonesia, given the state of the Indonesian economy then, as well as deep schisms between it and the majority Muslim groups in the country, was never likely. However, not only did this movement become a pretext for the mutual suspicion and indiscriminate killings of hundreds of thousands of people, it also affected Indonesian life profoundly, with old wounds that have not healed despite the passage of time. 

 

George is a Masters’s student at the Department of Methodology at The London School of Economics (LSE). He received his double bachelors in Political Science and International Relations from The Australian National University, before furthering his studies at the LSE. His interests include examining the phenomenon of democratic backsliding across Southeast Asian states, and the study of the political systems of Southeast Asian states from a comparative perspective. Prior to the commencement of his graduate studies, George held roles in various research capacities, notably an internship stint at Control Risks’ Global Risks Analysis (GRA) team as well as AKE International’s, covering the broader Asia Pacific region.

West Papua, the Pursuit of Merdeka, and Continued Indonesian Oppression

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by Joseph Jarnecki

Protestors wear t-shirts emblazoned with the Morning Star Flag, on which blue signifies faith, white peace, red courage, and the seven stripes represent the seven regions of West Papua. (Image credit: BBC)

Indonesia’s national motto, Unity in Diversity, rings with ironic cruelty for the indigenous population of West Papua.* For Papuans, neither unity nor an acceptance of their diversity has been forthcoming from successive governments in Jakarta. Under Indonesian rule, they have instead faced systematic discrimination from state agencies and violent repression from the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI – “Indonesian National Armed Forces”). Whilst armed resistance by Papuans has been limited since 2005, peaceful protest has not. Large-scale demonstrations occurred in August 2019 across the peninsula while international pressure has continued to mount on Indonesia. In this context, 2020 seemed to offer a chance for change. The onrush of coronavirus, however, has brought such hopes to a screeching halt. As the pandemic tears its way around the globe, international support withers, and Papuans endure a discriminatory and chronically under-supported health care system. In this moment, therefore, it is all the more important to take stock and continue to highlight the story of West Papua.

Formerly part of the Dutch East Indies, West Papua’s decolonisation has played a key role in the Indonesian state-building narrative. Whilst independence was won for the majority of the peninsula in 1949, Dutch New Guinea remained a colonial possession. This did not sit well with President Sukarno’s newly-formed government which, following the ‘successor state principle’, held that all former Dutch pacific colonial territory should naturally be inherited by Indonesia. As such, the protracted diplomatic struggle that the Sukarno Government undertook to “liberate” Dutch New Guinea was, and still is, perceived as foundational to the narrative of a post-colonial Indonesian state.

By 1962, the Netherlands finally bowed to mounting international pressure to reach a resolution and the New York Agreement, arbitrated by the United Nations, was signed. Central to this deal was a guarantee that Papuan natives would have an ‘Act of Free Choice’ before 1969, as to whether they wished to remain part of Indonesia. Eventually occurring in 1969 itself, the plebiscite marks the first major Papuan grievance with the Indonesian Government. Contrary to the agreement’s terms, which gave a vote to ‘all adults, male and female,’ Indonesian authorities ran a ‘collective consultation’ of just 1,025 participants. Those selected were assembled, often at gunpoint, to witness speeches by TNI generals and were then asked to raise their hand if they wished to remain within Indonesia. Unsurprisingly, the vote returned a unanimous result against West Papuan independence.

Following the vote, brutal repression, including acts of torture, rape, forced disappearance, and murder, were pursued by the Suharto Administration to prevent Papuan popular mobilisation. Alongside the brutality, economic policies incentivising the entrance of foreign resource-extraction companies were pursued at the cost of native land rights and traditional lifestyles,  such as subsistence farming. Moreover, those limited economic opportunities offered to West Papuan inhabitants were largely fenced off from native Papuans and were reserved for Indonesian transmigrants, whose influx destabilised the Papuan demographic majority.

With Suharto’s resignation and the subsequent renaissance of Indonesian democracy in 1998, Papuans were optimistic. They expected reduced TNI repression and the possibility of increased local autonomy. Instead, the TNI, who generate much of their own budget from enterprises in the region, has continued to crack down on native Papuans, and successive promises from Jakarta to decentralise power and allow journalists access to the region have come to nothing. A broad picture, therefore, shows four core Papuan grievances: the weight of history, state violence, economic marginalisation, and discrimination.

A snapshot of the protests which broke out in August 2019. Racist abuse against Papuans by other ethnic groups in Indonesia commonly essentialises indigenous Papuans as primitive or animalistic. (Image credit: Time)

All of these contributed to the protests which, beginning on the 15 August 2019 to commemorate the New York Agreement, were exacerbated the next day by the arrest of 43 Papuan students. Accused of damaging an Indonesian flag found outside their residence, the students were barricaded into their building by Islamist and Nationalist groups, who attacked the students physically and verbally. These groups were reportedly shouting ‘Monkeys, get out’ as they attacked. Eventually, the police stormed the building, and mass protests quickly followed across the peninsula.

By the end of the month, The protests escalated to the burning of government buildings in the regional capital of Jayapura, and the symbol of Papuan independence, the Morning Star flag, was raised across the territory.  In response, the Indonesian Government shut down internet access to the region and deployed 6,000 additional security personnel, bolstering the estimated 45,000 already stationed there. These troops then cracked down on protestors, undertaking mass arrests and shooting into crowds of Papuans. The death toll recorded was at least 59. Though protests restarted to a lesser extent a month later, the repressive tactics employed by the TNI were sufficient to quash any sustained popular gatherings.

Alongside direct violence, the Indonesian state relies on two elements in order to sustain its hold on West Papua. First, the compliance and indifference of the domestic and international community. Both the UK and Australian governments support Indonesian sovereignty over the region and domestic party politics avoids the topic, arguably because of the region’s resource wealth—the Freeport gold mine alone represents 1.59% of Indonesia’s GDP. Second, transmigrants settling in West Papua in the 20th century received a land incentive, generally confiscated from Papuans, and benefited from the structural exclusion of natives from settler communities and well-paying jobs. Though land grabs have slowed, Papuans still experience segregation, and the provision of education exclusively through the Indonesian language drives cultural assimilation. These factors go some way to illustrate why Papuans, who made-up 96.09% of West Papua’s population in 1971, are expected to account for only 28.99% by the end of 2020. It is a depressing reality that West Papua is often called ‘the Pacific’s Palestine’. Compared to their East Timorese cousins, Papuans have been unable to secure a legitimate referendum on their future; their resource wealth, coupled with the absence of pressure on the Indonesian Government alongside the distraction of coronavirus, seems to indicate that the status quo will continue.

Whilst the situation for Papuans seems bleak there is nonetheless a significant domestic and international grassroots movement agitating for their right to live in peace. Papuan political leaders like Jacob Rumbiak and Benny Wenda continue their campaigns,  support for West Papuan membership in the Melanesian Spearhead Group is growing, support structures like the West Papua Project at Sydney University are building awareness and tools for Papuan resistance, and the music of groups such as the Lani Singers drives the transnational exposure of Papuan culture. The fight for dignity and the right to self-determination is not lost.

*In this article, the term ‘West Papua’ is used to refer to the Indonesian ruled territory covering the western half of the island of New Guinea. Originally colonised by the Dutch, the region has seen various name changes in the post-colonial period. Most recently, the land was bifurcated by Indonesia in 2003 into the provinces of ‘West Papua’ and ‘Papua’. As such, if making references to these, this article will use the phrases ‘West Papua Province’ and ‘Papua Province’.

Joseph Jarnecki is a MA International Conflict Studies student at King’s College London and the Coordinating Editor for Strife blog. His research interests include the politics of knowledge production, the proceduralisation of democratic accountability, as well as violence and (in)security. He completed his BA in International Relations at King’s. You can follow him @Jarnecki.

Perception and Misperception in the Asia-Pacific

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By: Jaki Nurhasya

The Asia-Pacific region has a lot at stakes in perceiving President Trump’s future policy trajectories

Presidential inauguration speeches in the United States of America matter a lot to the global world. It portrays the way in which the President, as one of the world’s democratic leaders, projects the pathways that it would take on strategic issues. As history illustrates, notable speeches such as Roosevelt’s call upon the US to become a great power in 1905 or Kennedy’s pledge for peace in 1961 became a solid basis for future policy trajectory analysis. Indeed, inauguration speeches offer the world a glimpse on a US leadership’s foreign policy trajectory.

Realizing the importance of the particular momentum, one can assume that hundreds of country representatives rushed to write reports and policy recommendations on President Donald J. Trump’s inauguration speech. Each report and policy advice created will try very hard to dissect and analyze every policy implication the speech may impact on their respective country’s dynamics with the United States. Each report will also have to take into account current international dynamics, be it the uncertain security situation in Syria, European surge of nationalism, or the climate change question, all have their dimension and perception with regards to the US’ current leader’s policy options.

In general, many observers have mentioned President Trump’s inauguration speech as a much more nationalistic and populist policy trajectory, intended to secure US interests first. In Trump’s own word: “From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first, America first”, a notion that America will now not be hiding to declare publicly that it will put its interest first, a rather different approach from the past administration’s international cooperation and global interest goals.

As a region in which the US can be considered as a hegemonic power, the Asia-Pacific region has a lot at stakes in perceiving President Trump’s future policy trajectories. Undeniably, US presence in the region has an impact on tilting the regional balance and puts emerging powers in check. The possibility of a power vacuum in the region has been voiced numerous times, especially with the US’ current shifts in military assets. In lieu with these developments, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his congratulatory message to President Trump iterated the urgency of taking note the increasing severity of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

PM Abe’s message of concern is not without reasoning. In Trump’s words in his speech: “We have defended other nations’ borders while refusing to defend our own.” Aside from its clear reference towards the proposed US-Mexican border enforcement (which may or may not include the US building a massive wall and have the Mexican Government pay for it), the statement can also be interpreted as a clear message toward the US allies’ burden-sharing problem. As Japan and South Korea relies heavily on the US’ security and nuclear umbrella, Trump’s past suggestion of those two countries defending themselves (and even including a nuclear weapon trajectory arming option to be approved by the US) should be a concern given the region’s current dynamic.

The Asia-Pacific region is also a home for emerging world powers, and one of them is even being said will soon take over world leadership responsibilities on several strategic issues. As a Chinese Foreign Ministry senior official recently mentioned, China had no intention of seeking a leadership role, but would not deny its responsibilities once the front-runners stepped back. Arguably, China is already at the current forefront of the global climate change issue. As the new US administration deleted all climate change references from the government’s website, China stepped up its game and allocated resources to improve its status as a power player on climate change issues. As radical as it sounds, this fact shows that policies can radically change even if in a previous time those policies were bolstered as a vital national interest. Arguably, the same is applicable toward security alliances.

There are at least three strategic issues in which the new administration should be taking into account when formulating a new policy framework for Asia-Pacific security.

Firstly, the US alliance has been perceived as one of the cornerstones for the region’s balance of power. A perception that the US will let their most important allies in the region – Japan and South Korea – to be more active in defending itself and develop its military strength will undeniably create rifts in the Asia-Pacific’s current dynamics, especially by taking into account the historical animosity and the webs of border disputes happening between the countries at play.

Secondly, the region’s maritime security dimension has always been perceived as a US strategic interest. A perception that the US will put fewer resources in the region’s maritime security problem will put the dynamics of maritime arms development at risk. The problem is even more worrying; by taking into account current dynamics in the South China Sea problem and China’s ongoing aggressive military expansion maneuvers.

Lastly, regional organizations such as ASEAN rely heavily on U.S. involvement to keep regional powers in check. A perception that the U.S. will be less involved will arguably have an impact on the organization’s cohesion and decision-making process on urgent issues. As has been showed by Manila’s recent maneuvers between superpowers, this is also a crucial dimension of the region needed to be taken care of.

President Trump’s inauguration speech may provide a perception and misperception of risks to the Asia-Pacific’s future security dynamics. As foreign policy is a game of perception and misperception, possibilities of foreign policy hints (such as in the famed series of tweets by the President) will only add to the risk of misperception. Undeniably, time is ticking, and the new US administration will have to race with the possibility of misperception as consequences for Asia Pacific countries.

Jaki Nurhasya is a Master’s candidate in the Science and Security program with the War Studies Department at King’s College London. He is a junior diplomat with the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an FCO 2016/17 Chevening Scholar from Indonesia. The article was originally published in the Jakarta Post. The views expressed are his own.

Image source: http://asean.org/category/asean-statement-communiques/

Pushing back the black flag: The critical importance of southeast Asian security in the fight against ISIL

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By: Lai Ki Cheng*

JAKARTA_GUN_BOMB_ATTACK_ISLAMIC_STATE_ISIS_REUTERS_150116_INDONESIA-BLAST.JPG
Source: The Malaysian Insider

On January 14th 2016, Indonesia experienced its most hard-felt kinetic strike by the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL, also known as the Daesh militancy) in its capital of Jakarta. The city first experienced explosions from Indonesian ISIL militants followed by a series of firearm engagements. Attacks were coordinated to target both dense civilian populations and police posts in the business district of the city and within close vicinity to a United Nations Office, according to a timeline constructed by the Guardian.[1] At the May-2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong revealed the growing importance of monitoring ISIL activities in the region as ‘the threat is no longer over there, it is over here.”[2] He could not be more right. A majority of the region’s population is comprised with those of the Islamic faith and therefore represents a large untapped resource to those supporting and fighting ISIL. Over the last decade, the entire world has witnessed large populations of sympathisers travelling to Syria and Iraq. Since, multiple European and American governments have established countermeasures aimed at interdicting the flow of radicalised Islamists migrating to the Middle East and the exploitation of cyberspace for recruitment and propaganda. Hence, Southeast Asian governments have begun to follow suit, establishing programs to monitor social media, immigration and general counterterrorism activities against ISIL supporters in their own states. Southeast Asia is in the crosshairs, making its national and regional security of paramount importance in the fight against ISIL.

Setting the Stage

The importance of Southeast Asia in deterring ISIL efforts of expansion must be understood. To accomplish this, ISIL-related activity in the region must be identified, namely the countries of Malaysia and Indonesia, who possess high levels of ISIL activity; in comparison to Singapore and the Philippines, who possess lower levels of ISIL activity. Collectively, they form part of the Southeast Asian community that ISIL has recently targeted to gain support for their activities in the Middle East. The following explores each country and examines the varying levels of ISIL activity and the potential causalities.

Malaysia

Over the last decade and since the end of the Second Iraq War, ISIL has been gradually establishing a state – a caliphate – in the Middle East. It has since set its sights on South East Asia, a region full of Muslims and local militias with resentment towards their governments. This was a perceived untapped resource for sympathetic and potentially devote supporters to be recruited to the ISIL cause. Estimated figures of Malaysians who have journeyed to Syria and Iraq to join the jihadist struggle with the Daesh militancy varies from 30 to 150. Those that have returned are spreading and encouraging more Malaysian Muslims to join the group, heightening the level of domestic militancy – 122 people have been detained for possessing a connection to ISIL by 2013.[3] After the attacks in Indonesia, arrests of ISIL suspects have illuminated the intentions to stage an attack in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur.[4]

Over the past ten years, Malaysia has experienced varying levels of civil instability with corruption scandals and large scale protests in Kuala Lumpur – potentially degrading the trust of the Malaysian population in their government. Their actions are also made easier due to roughly 60.4% of the population being of the Islamic faith.[5] There might be additional factors involved, but the argument can be made that the civil strife generated through corruption coupled with the majority Islamic population fundamentally provides ISIL with an easy target for radicalisation through manipulation of information and resentment of authority. This is further evident in the identification of Malaysian uniformed personnel who assisted the transporting of Malaysian citizens overseas to train and fight in the Middle East.[6]

Indonesia

Looking further South and home to the largest Muslim population in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has witnessed a varying rate of ISIL supporters travelling overseas while those on the homeland are imprisoned. The two key areas of ISIL or ISIL-related activities in Indonesia can be identified within prisons and through open campaigning. Prisons, often criticised as ‘schools of crime’, have supplied ISIL activists with an entire populace of militants and other communities with resentment against the government who are also ripe for radicalisation through dissemination of propaganda or direct recruiting.[7] Even within maximum-security penitentiaries, inmates have surprisingly large degrees of communication and access to ISIL literature and translations in addition to being able to announce allegiances that would have gained audience from other detainees and the public.

In addition, Indonesia has seen open recruitment efforts for ISIL in Jakarta, through the organisation of mass gatherings where over 2000 Indonesians have expressed support for the cause. Amongst the multiple pro-ISIL groups in Indonesia, the most vocal campaigns were organised by the Indonesian Islamic entity ‘Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI)’ founded in 2013.[8] The democratic system and earlier ignorance of the Indonesian governmental services did little to stifle the rise of ISIL in the country. The “Achilles heel” of Indonesia would be its multiple militia groups sympathetic towards ISIL and their influence over the locals amongst its rural populations. Groups like the Abu Sayyaf faction (who possesses close ties with al-Qaeda and the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah) have recently pledged allegiance to ISIL. The Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT) – who has pledged allegiance to Santoso (also known as Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi al-Indonesi) – is one of the most active terrorist organisations in Indonesia. According to Chalk, the group fundamentally has become ‘an umbrella movement for militants based in the simmering conflict zones of Poso, Palu and Bima and has been linked to numerous attacks on the police’.[9] The group has also continued to expand the capabilities of ISIL by searching and recruiting individuals with proficiency in information technology to exploit cyber avenues for propaganda and ‘to wage a domestic jihad’.[10]

When discussing the degree of ISIL supporters from Southeast Asia, Indonesian supports formulates a large percentage of them, with over 2,000 Indonesian supporters pledging support to the Daesh militant group. Although accurate numbers might be difficult to obtain, the existing figures does reveal the scale of influence ISIL has exerted over the Indonesian community – mainly the marginalised militia groups targeted by the government.  However, the most critical problems do not reside with those that travel overseas (although still a problem) but rather with those that return and with the potentially radicalised mentality they bring back with them.

Picture1 (1)
Source:The Wall Street Journal (January 16, 2016).

Singapore

Singapore, probably one of the most pluralistic (multinational) and small nations in the region, has also recently experienced the effects of ISIL propaganda. In May 2015, ‘[a] Singaporean youth has been detained under the Internal Security Act [and] another youth was arrested…for further investigations into the extent of his radicalisation’.[11] Later, after the Jakarta incident, ‘[t[wenty-seven male Bangladeshis working in Singapore have been arrested under the [ISA]’ – the first foreigner-centric jihadist cell identified in the country.[12] Since the arrests, Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Yaacob Ibrahim, urged Singaporeans to be more vigilant against radicalised teachings of ideologies and suspicious activities but ‘not discriminate against foreign workers’.[13] As Prime Minister Lee has mentioned, ‘the threat is here’ and Singapore has been very aware of the ISIL threat. Academic institutions such as the ‘Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis’ program from the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University have conducted extensive research into ISIL and other extremist activities in the region – later called upon in a televised 3-part documentary on Channel News Asia.[14] What is unique about Singapore is the sheer plurality of its community and its position on the international stage on financial, medical, defence, intelligence matters, and law enforcement. Singapore even has a religious rehabilitation centre to de-radicalise youths allegedly converted by ISIL – this is the Khadijah Mosque. Perhaps due to its relatively small size, dense population, community cohesion spurring on an inherent defiant sense of patriotism and ethnic harmony has created an ‘almost’ incorruptible environment for ISIL influences to take root. The Singapore model of establishing community centric deradicalisation centres is something that could be adopted by all countries tackling the ISIL threat, not just its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Philippines

ISIL activity in the Philippines has been thought to be as extensive as in Malaysia or Indonesia as there has been clear signs of its intentions to cultivate influence in the country through targeting Muslim majority islands in the south. However, despite evidence about recruitment activities targeting Philippine citizens (even through monetary incentives), there remains limited proof of the successfulness of these efforts. In addition, localised Islamic rebel groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front have also rejected ISIL activities due to its aggressive and violent methods.

Nonetheless, there are militia groups that have aligned themselves with ISIL. Namely the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. These two rebel organisations have operated in the Philippines over the last two decades but have been heavily hindered in terms of expansion and operational abilities to the extent where fracturing of its infrastructure is a growing possibility. Under constant engagement with localised military forces, it is unlikely these organisations would be sustainable vehicles for ISIL activities. However, the problem again is not the local people but those overseas – ‘as an estimated 2.5 million Filipino expatriates live and work in the Middle East’.[15] An argument could also be made that the size of those Islamic rebel organisations is small, and even smaller within the context of the nation’s religious diversity – Filipinos are predominantly Christians. This does not allow ISIL to conduct influence gathering operations in the country. However, due to the number of Filipinos working not just in the Middle East but also in other countries, should ISIL decide to target those communities, what can be achieved is much more terrifying.

“Bundle of Sticks” Security

The analysis of the various ISIL activities in each Southeast Asian nation has illuminated their strategy for the region. Domestically, ISIL or radicalised Islamic activity targets the minorities and outliers of local communities within the countries and specifically within penitentiaries. The successfulness of this strategy is only realised due to the inadequacy of the local government’s penal and prison services. In addition, the corruption that plagues multiple states within the region (i.e. Malaysia, Cambodia) further degrades the state’s ability to deter ISIL efforts and increases the potential for exploitation through monetary incentives. It has also been evident that ISIL is targeting the religious understanding of locals through militia and detained sympathisers, a technique similar to al-Qaeda when collating homegrown terrorists in the United States. In Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia, the impacts of such tactics are significantly more extensive given the religion demographics of the two nations. The most important point here is that ISIL is targeting the marginalised Muslim population within Southeast Asia. Therefore, domestic security must be enhanced to contribute towards a larger framework of a cohesive international security network – collectively striving towards influence interdiction.

Security studies have proposed the strengthening of national migration, citizenship, and counterterrorism programs and legislations. However, these strategies often would come at the price of potentially alienating Muslim minorities through legal injunctions or social unrest amongst other members of the population. What can be done is a collative effort of all the Southeast Asian states to form a standardised set of counter-radicalisation objectives and a multinational organisation perhaps under the jurisdiction of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, deradicalisation institutions/mosques such as the one in Singapore could be established in each nation and in smaller scales to assist domestic efforts to stemming the rise of radicalised Muslims. Like a ‘bundle of sticks’, Southeast Asian nations must work together to generate a strong cohesive network of intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism operations to suppress the threat. ISIL is targeting the region for the number of potential sympathisers it can convert to refill its ranks lost in Iraq and Syria. It is hence more important now to rally together and protect the region from the Black Flag, pushing back the radicalisation and interdicting ISIL’s human resources strategy. Only by choking its supply of manpower, not only with force but also with compassion and deradicalisation programs like that in Singapore, can we successfully counter this insurgency from the Islamic State.

 

Formerly an Officer in the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. He is currently undertaking his MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around proxy warfare strategies in the contemporary security theatre, and more broadly in international security and intelligence sectors. Cheng is currently a Series Editor with Strife.

*The views and opinions represented within this piece does not represent that of the Singapore government or its Ministry of Defence but are only the intellectual analysis of the author.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Safi M. & Weaver, M. ‘Jakarta attacks: Islamic State militants claim responsibility – as it happened’, The Guardian, (January 14, 2016).

[2] Rogin, J. ‘Islamic State is Rapdily Expanding in Southeast Asia’, BloombergView, (May 29, 2015).

[3] Chalk, P. ‘Strategy: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (December 2015).

[4] Ngui, Y. & Fernandez, C. ‘Malaysian Arrests After Jakarta Attack Fuel Fears of Islamic State’s Reach’, The Wall Street Journal, (January 16, 2016).

[5] ‘Malaysia Religion’, GlobalSecurity.org, Available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/religion.htm, Accessed January 25, 2016.

[6] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 11.

[7] Walker, Nigel, “Nozick’s Revenge”, Philosophy, Vol. 70, pp. 581-586, (1995).

[8] Chalk, P. ‘Islamic State goes Global: ISIL Spread in Indonesia’, The National Interests, December 21, 2015.

[9] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 13.

[10] Ibid.

[11] ‘Self-radicalised Singaporean youths – one arrested, one detained under ISA’, Channel News Asia, (May 27, 2015).

[12] Kok, L.M. ’27 radicalised Bangladeshis arrested in Singapore under Internal Security Act: MHA’, The Straits Times, (Jan 21, 2016).

[13] Driscoll, S. ‘ISA arrests: Singaporeans must be more vigilant against radical ideologies: Yaacob Ibrahim’, The Straits Times, (Jan 20, 2016).

[14] RSIS, ‘Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis’, Nanyang Tehcnological University. Available from: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/ctta/#.VrCX8jbPyu4, Accessed February 2, 2016.

[15] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 16