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Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Introduction – One Region, Different Standpoints

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By Andrea Fischetti

 

Northeast Asia is a region of crucial importance, from a strategic and economic point of view.

 

East Asia is home to one fifth of the world’s population, and some of the global economic powerhouses. In particular, the second and third world largest economies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan, are located in Northeast Asia. The region may subsequently be characterised as one of crucial importance for international affairs not only for the size of its economy, but also from a strategic point of view.

In this area, North Korea in particular has been in the limelight during the past year due to its aggressive nuclear program and tests, which resulted in strategic and diplomatic tensions. This country, however, is not the only cause for disputes in Northeast Asia. The whole region is deeply divided in terms of culture, ideology, and politics, resulting in some cases, in inter-state relations characterised by “hot economics, cold politics”.[1]

Although current tensions in East Asia are considered of increasing importance by the international community, many of the Northeast Asian divisions and rivalries are primarily fuelled by historical roots. Amy King and Brendan Taylor identify a “history spiral”[2] in this region: a competitive approach to “re-remembering”[3] and rewriting history, common to all regional actors. The lack of effective international multilateral organisations is a further reason why this region is “ripe for rivalry”.[4]

Therefore, the purpose of this series is to explore the national perspectives of Northeast Asian countries. Understanding what Pyongyang’s priorities are, how Japan sees itself, what worries China, and where do the differences between Taiwan and China come from, can help to understand regional disputes as well.

In the first article, Ashley Ryan takes us to Pyongyang, where the North Korean thought and perspective on international affairs is unveiled. She analyses the strategic thinking of Kim Jong-un and explains what is the ultimate goal of Pyongyang, arguing that what North Korea has been doing so far is both rational and coherent in strategic terms.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti explains why Japan is a pacifist country, and how Japan’s pacifism affects Tokyo’s approach to disputes with its neighbours such as China and South Korea. According to Fischetti, the post-war period largely shaped culture and society of Northeast Asian countries, and the differences in culture and society now encourage rivalries as countries have different perspectives on the same issues.

In the third article, Dean Chen explores the Taiwan issue and the nature of cross-strait relations, analysing Taiwan’s national perspective. The author argues that Taiwan and China have mismatching identities, which from an ontological security perspective, results in a rivalry characterised by misunderstandings.

Lastly, in the fourth article, Riccardo Cociani analyses the strategic and political challenges that the North Korean tensions pose to Beijing. Adopting a Chinese perspective, he explores China’s approach to tackling these challenges, with an eye to regional security.

This series offers a unique opportunity to explore the ideas and points of view of some of the main regional actors in Northeast Asia. Thanks to Ryan, Fischetti, Cociani, and Chen, these different perspectives come together in one place, and all contribute to further our understanding of Northeast Asian rivalries.

Andrea (@A_Fischetti) is a MEXT scholar and conducts research on Japan’s national identity and East Asian Security at the University of Tokyo. He is also a Series Editor for Strife. He recently earned his MA in War Studies from King’s College London, following a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies. He worked for a year in the House of Commons. A recipient of the JASSO Scholarship (日本学生支援機構), he was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

Notes:

[1] Dreyer, J. T., 2014, pp. 326-341.

[2] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 113

[3] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 112

[4] Friedberg, A. L., 1994, pp. 13-14

Image source:

Here at https://spfusa.org/chairmans-message/flurry-of-east-asia-summits-signals-thawing-of-icy-relations/

Bibliography:

  • Dreyer, J. T. (2014) China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’. Orbis, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 326-341.
  • Friedberg, A. L. (1994) Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5–33
  • King, A. and Taylor, B. (2016) Northeast Asia’s New ‘History Spiral’. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–119.

Japan’s Role in the North Korean crisis will remain a marginal one

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By Andrea Fischetti

A North Korean Hwasong-12 missile, the model fired on August 29th (Credit: KCNA)

 

The latest missile test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 15 was the second in a row to directly involve Japan. The Korean intermediate range missile flew over the land of the rising sun for the second time in two weeks, and these tests undoubtedly pose a new challenge to Japan’s institutional pacifism, reawakening the debate on whether Japan needs to possess offensive military capabilities. However, Japan’s role in the North Korean crisis remains limited, and the country is not likely to become a key actor alongside the U.S. and South Korea in tackling the regime of the Kim dinasty.

In the early morning of August 29, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a ballistic missile: Pyongyang’s fourth test in four days (Held, 2017). The country has tested more than fifteen missiles since February (USPACOM, 2017), and their effectiveness gradually improved, a sign that its current weapons program will not stop until it reaches its goal. North Korea’s ultimate objective, is considered to be a nuclear warhead-topped missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Such a weapon would secure the position of the Kim dynasty, as Pyongyang believes it would deter the U.S. from interfering in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK conducted a further test on September 15, which flew once again over Japanese territories.

The August 29 test was the first to involve a missile going over Japan without being announced or preceded by any warning. The intermediate-range ballistic missile Hwasong-12, known as NK-17, was fired over Japan’s territory, specifically the northern island of Hokkaido. Residents were given a short-notice warning inviting them to take cover, and the missile flew in Japanese airspace for almost two minutes. The act was condemned by the US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea; while China stated that the North Korean situation had reached a “tipping point”. Pyongyang’s latest missile launch seemed to affect Japan more than any other country, as it passed over Japanese territory.

Nonetheless, the North Korean tensions are far more threatening for other countries than for Japan, and Tokyo’s role in this situation remains only a marginal one compared to that of the U.S. or South Korea. As reporter Kjeld Duits pointed out, since 1998, North Korea’s tests violated Japan’s EEZ and airspace many times, three of which during the last two months. Pyongyang’s declared ambition, however, is that of being able to hit U.S. territories. In fact, the NK-17 that travelled over Hokkaido broke up more than 1180 Kilometres from Japan’s mainland, suggesting that the country never was an objective in the first place. The missile’s range has been estimated to be 4000 Kilometres, which potentially makes Guam – and its American military base – a realistic objective. Furthermore, North Korea has a number of short-range capabilities which can cause significant damage to nearby potential targets such as Seoul in South Korea. Arguably, that is the biggest threat that North Korea poses in the short term, and the reason why the U.S. must be careful in dealing with Pyongyang.

Accordingly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a show of “overwhelming force” (Crabtree and Kemp, 2017) against North Korea, involving the dropping of bombs near the Northern border and joint drills of four South Korean F-15 fighter jets with four American F-35 stealth fighter jets and two B-1B American bombers, while U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “talking is not the answer”.

On the other hand, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe does not have the same freedom of operation. Firstly, although Japan has excellent missile defence systems, taking down high-altitude missiles fired from North Korea to territories beyond Japan – such as Guam – is legally challenging, and it would raise many questions about Japan’s stance on the use of military force for non-defensive purposes. This is due to Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, especially considering that Japan is not the target of the DPRK’s tests. Secondly, and more importantly, even considering the effectiveness of the modern Air Defence System MIM-104F (PAC-3) acquired by Japan, there would be technical challenges in shooting down Pyongyang’s missiles, as the system is designed to counter inbound offensive missiles at lower altitudes, instead of hitting the bottom part of the missile by chasing it at higher altitudes. In other words, for Japan it would be easier to shoot down a missile that is actually targeting Japan rather than one that is only flying over its territories.

Two days after Pyongyang’s test, Japan’s Defence Ministry requested a budget increase for 2018 (Pollmann, 2017) which would include enough funds for further developing its radar system and acquiring weapons capable of shooting down high-altitude missiles. The North Korea tensions, including the launch of a NK-17 over Hokkaido, come at a time when Prime Minister Abe’s approval rating is decreasing. Also, his plan to amend the Japanese Constitution, in particular its Article 9 which prevents Japan from possessing offensive military capabilities, is far from guaranteed to succeed. In order to meet popular demands of a country with strong anti-militaristic norms (Berger 1993; 1998) and which is more concerned with achieving peace and prosperity than security objectives, Abe’s rhetoric has been focusing on Japan’s role as a ‘proactive contributor to peace’. Whether this role involves shooting down North Korean missiles for non-defensive purposes, however, is unclear.

The decision to expand the country’s military budget and potentially have a more proactive role in Northeast Asian security could be partly justified by Pyongyang’s moves, in the eyes of the Japanese population, due to the perceived threat to Japan’s security. However, while Japan is involved in the North Korean crisis for geopolitical reasons, it is not Pyongyang’s main concern. Similarly, Abe is capitalising on the increasingly frequent North Korean tests to justify the need of stronger military capabilities, but increasing Japan’s involvement in this situation is not his ultimate goal. The challenge that Abe is facing is achieving a balance between rhetoric and moderate actions compatible with Japan’s current Constitution and the public opinion’s will.

While Japan’s public opinion has a negative view of North Korea, and this missile launch could influence the debate on Constitutional amendments, Japan’s public is ultimately more likely to support pacifist approaches to resolving this issue, and an overemphasis of the North Korean threat could end up being counterproductive for Abe’s goals. Kim Jong-Un’s behaviour seemed unaffected by the rhetoric of the U.S. and South Korea, their shows of force, and the UN sanctions; therefore, even by stepping up as a more central actor in the North Korea tensions, Japan would not be able change this trend.

In conclusion, Japan will keep honouring its alliance with the U.S., a country directly involved in the North Korea tensions. Abe will also attempt to emphasise the threat posed by Pyongyang for justifying his unpopular constitutional amendments. However, due to technical and legal constraints, it is unlikely that Japan’s role in this situation will significantly change in the short term.

Andrea Fischetti (@A_Fischetti) is an MA Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London specialising in East Asian Security and Japan. He recently earned a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies and worked for a year in the House of Commons. Andrea was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University and studied Japanese at SOAS and King’s College London. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

 

Notes:

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security 17(4): 119-50.

 

Berger, T. U. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

Crabtree, J. and Kemp, T. (2017) ‘South Korean President Moon tells military to toughen up, orders show of ‘overwhelming’ force’. CNBC Defense.

 

Held, A. (2017) ”Restraint’ Appears To Be Over As North Korea Launches Missile Test Again’, NPR. Available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/26/546344429/restraint-appears-to-be-over-as-north-korea-launches-missile-test-again

 

Pollmann, M. (2017) ‘What’s in Japan’s Record 2018 Defense Budget Request?’ The Diplomat.

 

USPACOM (2017) North Korea Policy, US Pacific Command. Available at http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1310112/north-korea-policy/

Strife Feature - Cautious waters in an Asian Century: Militarization in the South China Sea in 2017

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By: Douglas Gray

The contesting claims of the South China Sea.

As stakeholders and policy makers work on predictions of the direction the Trump Administration’s foreign policy will take, uncertainty regarding Washington’s moves in the Asia-Pacific has mounted. Overtures from the new administration regarding a $54bn increase in the Pentagon’s military budget next year, a ten percent rise to ‘ensure America wins its future wars’, have made allies and adversaries alike uncertain of Washington’s next step. In relation to the South China Sea, signalling from the Trump Administration appears to be indicating a more hawkish and militaristic stance on the dispute, in line with chief strategist Steve Bannon’s public beliefs that war between the two powers is inevitable. However, a militaristic response is short sighted in such a complicated geopolitical contest. By placing the South China Sea disputes in the context of the wider China-US geopolitical contest, this article will identify the shortcomings of solving the disputes with a military-first response. Beijing’s strategy recognises that as China’s sphere of influence grows – enhanced by economic and diplomatic might in the region – it will be possible to recoup relations with regional states after a fundamental status quo change in the South China Sea has occurred. So if Washington hopes to combat Beijing’s adventurism it must effectively bolster and extend its own sphere of influence in turn.

Representing a crucial waypoint in the Indo-Pacific region, the South China Sea is bordered by Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. The seemingly marginal sea contains a rich and heavily exploited fishing ground as well as significant oil and gas reserves. And it is not just natural resources that make the South China Sea valuable; Japan, South Korea, and other non-littoral states rely heavily on maritime trade and energy flow through the disputed waters. It is the significance of this major shipping lane, the overlapping sovereignty claims to the Sea’s reefs and increasingly hard-line policies in enforcing such claims that have continuously brought the South China Sea to the fore in regional geopolitics. Maritime disputes in the region focus primarily on the major reefs and rocks scattered across the contested waters, including the Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Spratly Islands, and, perhaps most importantly, the Scarborough Shoal. Being subject to a series of overlapping claims by states, the different reefs and their surrounding waters are the centre of a persistent set of legal and territorial disputes, with the largest claim being China’s nine-dash line.

The contemporary disputes are rooted in these early stages of gradual status-quo change over successive decades, with the reinforcement of claims now exacerbating tensions. [1] Beijing’s tactics in the region have been described as the “slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change,” a tactic Robert Haddick coined ‘salami slicing.’ The gradual acquisition of reefs and features within the South China Sea enabled an increased presence, and a consolidation of territorial claims has been enabled by artificial reef extensions throughout the South China Sea. [2] Extensive infrastructure-building has allowed Beijing to move towards a fundamental shift in the status-quo of the region in their favour, allowing for dominance of the all-important sea lanes and the natural resources below them. The building of airbases and military infrastructure at an unprecedented pace, including reinforcement with surface-to-air missile sites, has changed the nature of the disputes, which have taken on a much more overtly strategic tone. The infrastructural investments, coupled with rapidly accelerating procurements by the Chinese Navy (18 new ships were commissioned in 2016), speaks to a militarisation of the region that is unprecedented in the post-WWII era.

Land reclamation by Beijing on Fiery Cross Reef. Top: August 14, 2014. Below: June 3, 2016.

Legally, the international laws governing the disputes are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), established as a framework to balance the interest of both coastal and seafaring states. [3] This legal framework drew significant attention on July 12th 2016 when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled overwhelmingly against Beijing in a legal contest brought on by Manila. In assessing whether or not Beijing had breached its obligations under UNCLOS, the court not only stated that China’s nine-dash line claim had no legal basis but also presented a damning indictment of Beijing’s behaviour throughout the proceedings. However, perhaps unsurprisingly to international law sceptics, the court’s ruling has seemingly had no effect on the current state of the disputes due to the lack of an accompanying enforcement mechanism.

While the United States is in a comparably weak position to challenge the lack of conformity to international laws and norms in Beijing’s island claims, given that it is the only major power not to have ratified UNCLOS, it has cited the violation of ‘customary international law’ in its efforts to counter what it views as Chinese expansionism. Since 2015 Washington has conducted four freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through the contested waters to challenge Chinese claims, along with diplomatic efforts. In October 2015, the USS Lassen exercised innocent passage by patrolling within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-controlled Subi Reef. Later on, in January and May 2016 respectively, the USS Curtis Wilbur and the USS William P. Lawrence conducted FONOPs near Triton Island and Fiery Cross Reef – both of which were heavily condemned by Beijing. Most recently, the USS Decatur undertook a FONOP near the Paracel Islands in October 2016, in what was declared to be the first iteration of a ‘more regular operations tempo’ to come.

And it would seem that the tempo has in fact increased. The arrival of a US carrier strike group to the South China Sea on February 18th, including the Nimitz-class USS Carl Vinson and an escorting destroyer, the USS Wayne E. Meyer, represents a significant step up in US military presence in the region. While the carrier has been en route since before Trump’s entry to the oval office, having previously been in Guam and the Philippine Sea, the illustration of power has concerned pundits amid rhetoric that has come from the new administration. Recent comments by US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis during his visit to Tokyo appeared to largely reassert the policy status quo toward the region set by the Obama Administration. Mattis’ public comments that the issue is ‘best solved by diplomats’ were welcomed by Beijing. In private, Mattis has reportedly stated that ‘America would no longer be that tolerant of China’s behaviour in the South China Sea,’ pledging to take a more aggressive stance and increase patrols. The comments reflect a US administration seeking to take a hard line on the issue, consistent with earlier remarks by now-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at his confirmation hearing, who implied that the US would attempt to blockade China’s access to islands – a contentious claim later moderated by clarifying that this would only apply ‘if a contingency occurs.’

The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transits the Philippine Sea. The Carl Vinson Strike Group is on a regularly scheduled western Pacific deployment as part of the U.S. Pacific Feet-led initiative to extend the command and control functions of U.S. 3rd Fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 3rd Class Kurtis A. Hatcher/Released)

It is based on comments such as these that a continuation down the path of militarisation of the region has been widely tipped as the Trump Administration now articulates its foreign policy. Proponents of a more hawkish stance on the issue are pushing for the Trump Administration to execute a military rebalance to Asia in a more steadfast way than the previous Obama Administration. They argue that the US should look to impose a strategic risk on Beijing’s belligerence in order to reassert dominance. However, while deterring expansionism is necessary, a focus on militarisation is informed by a short-sighted viewpoint of Beijing’s strategy in the region.

As South-east Asian states seek to hedge between the two major powers, cautiously attempting to push Beijing and Washington towards cooperation rather than confrontation, Washington’s hopes of alignment against excessive Chinese claims have been dashed. ASEAN’s continuous claims of unity and harmony are often fragile and hollow. It has adopted a muted line in the wake of the UNCLOS ruling last year, choosing not to speak up about the issue. In a region finding itself increasingly reliant on China’s economic power, individual states’ interests, as well as those of the community as a whole, are shifting. Beijing’s strategy is based on economic leverage and the belief that the region is naturally inclined to fall within its sphere of influence. While assertiveness in the South China Sea has exacerbated disputes with its neighbours, trade dependencies and carefully managed diplomacy have prevented the long-term costs frequently affiliated with such adventurism. The lacklustre reaction to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the territorial disputes is a direct result of Chinese influence and concerns from regional stakeholders regarding the economic and political repercussions of pursuing action on the ruling.

At present, Beijing’s extensive infrastructural investments have not been militarised beyond defensive measures. While the islands have the capacity to host fighter and bomber squadrons, missiles or PLAN vessels, no such militarized actions have yet been taken. Beijing’s stance remains that Xi Jinping’s 2015 promise not to militarise the region has been upheld – and while satellite imagery provides ample evidence to dispute this, the stall in further escalation from Beijing puts American responses on the back foot. The ultimate symbol of this strategy’s success perhaps came last year, during the last FONOP by Washington in October. Chinese state media was able to achieve a significant diplomatic coup by labelling the United States as the belligerents of the South China Sea, a move only made possible by effectively bringing Manila ‘into the fold’, with President Duterte having been in Beijing at the time for conciliatory talks. Former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once urged China to become a responsible stakeholder in the region – but perhaps Beijing being viewed as a responsible stakeholder and provider of economic wellbeing is the biggest threat to US interests.

Xi Jinping in Davos, January 2017

So if the Trump Administration is to counter Beijing’s adventurism in the South China Sea, a strategy beyond simplistic militarisation of the dispute must be employed. As the American liberal world order is increasingly challenged on the global stage, including Moscow’s actions in Crimea and Beijing’s rejection of the PCA ruling, measures to strengthen it must likewise be maintained. The establishment of the post-WWII, US-centric alliance systems in Europe and Asia, along with the World Bank, IMF and GAT, placed policy makers in Washington in an unprecedented leadership position. While having the biggest economy and an unparalleled military are important for superiority on the world stage, the continuity of American primacy over the last three decades has been built upon a bastion of institutional leadership, both economic and political – something that should not be forgotten. While Washington has had to contribute a disproportionate amount to these institutions and alliances, it is not because policy makers were duped, but because they recognised that the benefits of leadership outweighed the costs. The Bretton Woods system and subsequent dominance of world trade were not fashioned out of altruism, but as a way of advancing the interests of the United States via systemic leadership.

After the Trump administration abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement – the economic centrepiece of Obama’s rebalance to Asia - without a replacement, doubts were been raised in Asia about the future credibility of US leadership in the region. While the TPP has been a contentious issue, the rationale underpinning the agreement represented an extension of the post-WWII American rules-based order strategy that has underpinned its pre-eminence for decades. Furthermore, Beijing is currently advancing its own institutions that challenge the US leadership - such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In this context, active retrenchment from international institutions carries enormous costs to Washington. Xi Jinping’s portrayal of Beijing as an alternative leader of globalisation at Davos in January has been widely touted as the seizing of an opportunity to place China in a position to adopt a mantle of leadership as the US recedes. And in Southeast Asia, the formation of the aforementioned Beijing-centred institutions provides the framework for the assumption of economic and trade leadership throughout the region. China is already an indispensable trading partner in most of the Asia-Pacific region and is rapidly placing itself at the heart of a new set of institutions to provide the foundation for extending a sphere of influence which is in parts already there.

So if the new administration in Washington hopes to combat Beijing’s adventurism in the South China Sea, it must recognise both Beijing’s wider strategy and the structural factors of America’s own pre-eminence before intensifying a militaristic response. The absence of war that has been sustained in the Western Pacific over the last four decades has been fundamental to the political stabilisation and economic development of the region – and it is in no state’s interests for this to end. A return to the competitive cat-and-mouse military confrontations of the Cold War era is fundamentally short-sighted and fails to recognise the wider geopolitical contest between Beijing and Washington. So as Beijing seeks to extend its sphere of influence and deter continued American pre-eminence in the region, the Trump administration must bolster its structural influence, otherwise, Washington will increasingly find itself disadvantaged.

So how can the Trump Administration undertake this task? Most importantly, it must be appreciated that the expansion of US access to Asian economies amid the much touted Asian-century was not only about economic leverage, but also about consolidating a US sphere of leadership and influence which has staggered as China grows. While the military must play an important part within a reinforcement of US interests in the region, it should be harnessed to further reinforce structural leadership. For instance, a return to discussions to establish an Indo-Pacific Quad, a hypothetical military alliance United States, India, Japan, and Australia, could both reinforce influence and establish a US-centric institution with the authority to weather Chinese claims of American belligerence. Likewise, active engagement with ASEAN states, both individually and collectively, must be maintained, in order to ensure the US presence in the region is continually recognised. In order to counter Beijing’s economic weight, an alternative to the TPP must be sought, otherwise Chinese will increasingly harness the ability to rewrite the US rules of trade in the region. Beijing’s strategy is based on an appreciation that its own sphere of influence is growing with time, so in order to counter this, the Trump Administration must reassure the region as a whole that they are there to stay.

Douglas Gray is a Masters student at Kings College London in the War Studies Department, studying Intelligence and International Security. Previously, he completed his honours degree at Victoria University Wellington in New Zealand, majoring in international relations and political science. His special research interests are information warfare, intelligence sharing and competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Endnotes

[1] The current round of tensions were sparked after a tense standoff between Beijing and Manila over the Scarborough Shoal in 2008; eventually leading to Beijing’s de facto control of the outcrop in 2012. Later, in 2014, another standoff occurred between Beijing and Hanoi over drilling operations by a Chinese state-owned oil company 17 nautical miles from Triton Island, eventually leading to the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam.

[2] While Beijing is notably not the only state reclaiming land in the South China Sea, with similar activities being undertaken by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, they have certainly done so further and faster than any others.

[3] Ratified by nearly all coastal states in the disputes, UNCLOS establishes an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within 200 nautical miles of coastal waters while also guaranteeing passage rights for naval vessels through these zones.

Image 1 source: https://qz.com/763161/it-is-time-to-rename-the-south-china-sea/

Image 2&3 source: https://amti.csis.org/fiery-cross-reef/

Image 5 source: https://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/BN-RO104_0109da_GR_20170109164947.jpg

 

Strife Series on Grand Strategy, Part II: Is Trump saying “Sayonara” to U.S. Grand Strategy in East Asia?

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By Andrea Fischetti

This photo illustration shows extra editions of Japanese newspapers reporting the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election in Tokyo on November 9, 2016. AFP PHOTO / TORU YAMANAKA
This photo illustration shows extra editions of Japanese newspapers reporting the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election in Tokyo on November 9, 2016. AFP Photo / Toru Yamanaka

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s statements on foreign policy often contradict both his own past statements and those of his national security advisers. However, one thing has remained consistent over time, and that is Trump’s view of East Asia. Accordingly, the new Republican administration will likely call for decreased U.S. involvement in East Asia and a revision of its alliances in the region—this will be a major change in U.S. grand strategy. In the past few years, the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” has focused on rebalancing within the East Asian region - engaging with emerging powers, bolstering already established partnerships, and supporting regional institutions as a means of demonstrating American capability to project power on a global scale [1].

Maintaining a regional presence in East Asia is particularly important due to security arrangements with U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea, the high concentration of rising economies, territorial disputes, a nuclear North Korea, and the growing threat of Chinese aspirations to establish regional hegemony. U.S. interests and credibility are at stake in the region, and should the opportunity arise, China will likely challenge a weaker (or withdrawn) America, giving rise to potential flashpoints. Already, the sovereignty of American allies is being challenged owing to territorial disputes. One of America’s closest post-war allies - Japan - has been involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China in the East China sea and is increasing military activities in the South China Sea as well. In fact, Japan and other American allies in the region have adopted a proactive behaviour in recent years, taking advantage of the limited “window of opportunity” in the last decade, when U.S. military supremacy in the region remained unmatched by China’s naval capabilities[2]. This behaviour involved smaller actors advancing territorial claims in the South China Sea and other neighbours reinforcing already established national positions such as the Japanese nationalisation of the Japan-administrated Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. However, this window is rapidly closing and previous measures like the U.S.-led Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia suffer from a potential lack of continuity and encouragement by the American government. Therefore, it will become increasingly difficult for U.S. allies to be assertive in responding to China’s moves.

Foregoing the American grand strategy in Asia

Domestic economic challenges, coupled with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have left the United States with a national debt of almost US$ 20 trillion. As an immediate consequence, U.S. military spending will reduce by US$ 500 billion over the next few years[3]. However, East Asian politics is ripe for hegemonic and revisionist tendencies. Given China’s assertive behaviour and increasing maritime aggression, U.S. involvement could arguably get more expensive over time. Despite such costs, the U.S. would undoubtedly benefit from preserving an American naval presence in East Asia. In the event of conflict breaking out, an American naval presence would provide a vital regional base that could reduce response time and stem operational inefficiency among the allies. As U.S. Naval War College Professor Toshi Yoshihara states: “a shrinking fleet will nullify our attempts to pivot to Asia”. Furthermore, retrenching from the current American grand strategy would significantly diminish U.S. influence in the region. Scholars argue that retrenchment would also undermine the current peaceful order created by U.S. hegemony[4].

However, Trump has been very clear about the future of U.S. grand strategy in East Asia. As he has reiterated, America will come first in any case and national and domestic interests will be prioritized. The impact of such an approach will be widely felt in the region and particularly so for Japan. Hillary Clinton was the first Secretary of State to reassure Japan about the Senkaku Islands, stating that they are covered by article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, U.S. obligations could change with a Trump administration. In Trump’s words: “They [Japan] are going to have to defend themselves with whatever they are going to have. We, right now, defend Japan. . . Japan pays us a small fraction of the cost, a very small fraction. . . We’re talking about billions of dollars. . . Our country is stone cold broken. . . So whenever I talk about Japan I say, if they don’t make us whole, they are going to have to defend themselves. . . It’s up to them. . . You have to be prepared to walk from a deal. . .They have been ripping us off for a long time”[5].

We cannot yet predict what American grand strategy in Asia will look like under Trump. If he chooses to compromise U.S. alliances in East Asia and underestimate the importance of the region from a security perspective, the power hierarchy in the area will be shaken and the current political order would be greatly altered. The uncertainty surrounding U.S. leadership could also destabilise regional power structures. At present, the ‘hub and spokes’ or ‘San Francisco’ system of alliances[6] established by the U.S. continues to define the East Asian security architecture. Nevertheless, with a possible U.S. retrenchment under Trump, multilateral alliances may be formed, and some countries may fall into Beijing’s orbit. Therefore, the American “power-play” strategy will be challenged by either multilateralism or an increasingly influential China. It will be up to Donald Trump and his advisers to assess whether this will fall within America’s national interest.

Andrea Fischetti (@A_Fischetti ) is an MA Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London specialising in East Asian Security and Japan. He recently earned a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies and worked for a year in the House of Commons. He was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University and studied Japanese at SOAS and King’s College London.

Notes:

[1] Parameswaran, P. 2014. Explaining US Strategic Partnerships is the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, Developments and Prospects. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs; August 2014, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p. 262.

[2] Pugliese, G. 2016. Japan 2015: Confronting East Asia’s Geopolitical Game of Go. Asia Maior 2015, Vol. XXVI, M. Torri and N. Mocci eds., The Chinese-American Race for Hegemony in Asia, Roma: Viella, 2016: 93-132.

[3] Drezner, Daniel W. “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).” International Security 38, no. 1 (Summer 2013): 52-79

[4] Brooks, S., Ikenberry, G. J. and Wohlforth, W. C. 2012. Don’t Come Home America: The Case against Retrenchement. International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13). Pp. 7-51.

[5] Diamond, J. and Jokuza, E. 2016. Trump and Japan’s Abe meet for ‘very candid discussion’ in New York. Video interview of Donald Trump. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/17/politics/abe-trump-japan-meeting/index.html?sr=twCNN111816abe-trump-japan-meeting1135AMStoryLink&linkId=31305792

[6] Cha, V. D. 2010. Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia. International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 158-196

Image Credit: Japan Times, available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/n-analysis-z-20161110.jpg

Strife Series on Grand Strategy, Introduction: Whither Grand Strategy?

by

By: John A. Pennell

war-board-games
Grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power

In light of recent Western political developments—“Brexit,” Trump’s U.S. electoral victory, rise of populist and/or far-right movements across Europe—coupled with an assertive China, a resurgent Russia, bolder actions from Iran and North Korea, continued terrorist threats from ISIS and its affiliates, and an ongoing refugee crisis emanating from Africa and the Middle East, a number of experts have sounded the alarm regarding the implications of these developments for the cultural, economic, political, and security arrangements that have shaped the post-Second World War order and the role of “grand strategy” in the emerging world (dis-?)order.[1]

This series explores the impact of such trends on grand strategy in the specific country and regional contexts that include the U.S., Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Mexico. Before offering a summary of the pieces in the series, we should first take a step back and define what we mean by “grand strategy.”

According to British strategist Liddell Hart, grand strategy is the ‘policy which guides the conduct of war’ and its role is to ‘co-ordinate and direct all of the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.’[2] In other words, grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power—the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—into the conduct of war and maintenance of peace.

With the exception of combatting terrorist organizations, the countries and regions reviewed in this series are generally not at war with any other state.[3] Thus, for the purposes of this series, we will refer to grand strategy in terms of its role in guiding states in their pursuit of political (including foreign policy) objectives rather than strictly military objectives.

Most authors in this Strife series explore how a new Trump administration’s grand strategy or policy priorities may affect a particular country or region, while one author considers how the strategic culture in Mexico has failed to adapt to the evolving global order.

First, Brian Babb focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the incoming Trump administration. He argues that the new White House leadership would use an “America-first” foreign policy based on transactional deal-making. The implications, Babb claims, are that the U.S. would prioritize stability over the promotion of liberal values (e.g., democracy, human rights), be more willing to work with certain authoritarian regimes (e.g., Russia and Syria) and be less inclined to support security arrangements (e.g., NATO) or economic partnerships without a clear material benefit to the U.S.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti examines the implications of a potential U.S. withdrawal from or a decreased presence in East Asia. He argues that the U.S.’ maintenance of security arrangements with its allies—Japan and South Korea—is critical during a time of increased territorial disputes between powers in the region, a nuclear North Korea, and Chinese aspirations for regional hegemony. Without a significant U.S. military presence in the region, Fischetti fears the long-standing East Asian security architecture would collapse resulting in U.S. partners falling into Beijing’s orbit.

In the third article, Jonata Anicetti explores how the new U.S. administration would deal with the South Asian nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. On the one hand, Anicetti describes Washington’s improving relations with India since the Clinton administration as part of an effort to counter China’s rise within Asia, and on the other hand, its deteriorating relations with Pakistan over the past several years. Nevertheless, in Anicetti’s view, President-elect Trump’s recent overtures to Pakistan offer hope that relations with Pakistan could potentially improve and lead to greater stability in South Asia.

Tony Manganello considers how the incoming Trump administration would view the U.S.’ security partnerships in Africa in the fourth article of the series. He argues that the U.S.’ ‘small footprint‘ approach to addressing key issues (e.g., counter-terrorism) across the African continent has been highly effective, in no small part due to the time-intensive cultivation of cooperative relationships with African governments and security forces. Taking a unilateral approach to fighting terrorism, including the use of conventional forces, Manganello warns, would not only undermine these relationships but likely prove to be unsuccessful.

The fifth piece in the series, authored by Alexis Herrera, takes a different approach. Herrera, rather than focusing on potential U.S. strategy towards Mexico, examines instead the grand strategy and strategic culture of Mexico as a “middle power.” In his view, Mexico’s strategic culture is found lacking due to an inability to prepare for the long run and a misunderstanding of the evolving global order. Examples of this include Mexico’s continued faith in the North American integration process and economic benefits of NAFTA, despite surging headwinds against those processes dating back to the 2008 recession amplified with recent political developments in the U.S. and elsewhere.

The pieces in this series offer important perspectives regarding the effects of potential shifts within the emerging global order on some select country- and regional contexts. While a number of the trends described in these pieces may raise significant concerns over global stability and the future of the so-called liberal world order, it is important to emphasize that many of these trends have yet to fully take shape. Thus, their potential impacts, positive or negative, are still open to debate. It is also necessary to remind ourselves that there’s often a significant gap between campaign rhetoric and actual policy formulation; key elections in France, Germany, and elsewhere have yet to take place; the conditions under which “Brexit” moves forward are still underway; and so forth. Still, the rising tide of populism and right-wing movements across the West, along with emerging powers who pose a challenge to the liberal international order, indicate the potential for significant change moving forward. To reiterate, this order is still evolving. Our current assumptions will very likely need adjustments as the economic, social, and political trends described earlier reach their conclusion.

Disclaimer: Please note that the views expressed in this document reflect the personal opinions of the author and are entirely the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the United States Government. USAID is not responsible for the accuracy of any information supplied herein.

John A. Pennell is a Series Editor of StrifeBlog and a PhD candidate in the Defence Studies Department (DSD) within the School of Security Studies at King’s College London. Mr. Pennell is a Career Member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, currently serving in Kyiv, Ukraine. His prior assignments have included Afghanistan, East Africa, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. Mr. Pennell has an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National Defense University/National War College (Washington, DC), an M.A. in Political Science from American University (Washington, DC), and a B.A. in Politics from The Catholic University of America (Washington, DC). You can follow him on Twitter @jpennell1970

Notes:

[1] Ian Buruma. November 29, 2016. “The End of the Anglo-American Order.” The New York Times Magazine. (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/magazine/the-end-of-the-anglo-american-order.html); The Economist.“Trump’s World: The New Nationalism.” November 19, 2016. (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710249-his-call-put-america-first-donald-trump-latest-recruit-dangerous?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/trumpsworldthenewnationalism); Peter Feaver. November 29, 2016. “A Grand Strategy Challenge Awaits Trump.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/a-grand-strategy-challenge-awaits-trump/); Mike J. Mazarr. October 5, 2016. “The World Has Passed the Old Grand Strategies By.” War On the Rocks. (http://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-world-has-passed-the-old-grand-strategies-by/); David Rothkopf. November 29, 2016. “Hitting the Reset Button on the International Order.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/hitting-the-reset-button-on-international-order/).

[2] B.H. Liddell Hart. Strategy. Second Revised Edition. New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967. (accessed from http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html)

[3] Although the U.S. and its allies are actively fighting the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), I do not consider ISIL a state in the traditional sense. Rather, I consider it a terrorist organization.

Feature Image Credit: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/topics/war-military-strategy

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