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The First Tech War? Why the Korea-Japan Tensions are about US-China Competition on AI

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by Yeseul Woo

Stand-off? South Korea’s Moon Jae-in and Japan’s Shinzo Abe (Image credit: Kim Kyung-hoon EPA-EFE)

 

The deteriorating relations between the United States, South Korea, and Japan have shaken the security system in Northeast Asia, which hinges on the alliances between the three countries. Observers typically attribute the slump in the relationship between South Korea and Japan to the latter’s removal of South Korea’s favoured “whitelisted” trade partner status, the imposition of export controls on its electronics sector, and South Korea’s August 2019 announcement that Seoul did not wish to renew the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). This is a naïve observation, missing the critical dynamic that is inextricably linked to the South Korea-Japan row–that is, great-power competition in artificial intelligence technology (AI) between the United States and China.

On 30 October and 29 November 2018, South Korea’s Supreme Court ordered Nippon Steel & Sumimoto Metal, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries respectively to compensate South Koreans forced to work in their factories during the Japanese occupation period. The court ruled, that if the Japanese companies refused to oblige, the victims of forced labour could seek local court orders to seize their Korea-based assets.

Over the course of July 2019, then, Japan imposed export controls on three core materials required by South Korean tech companies to manufacture dynamic random-access semiconductors (DRAMS)—an essential part for 5G networks and AI. The export curbs require Japanese firms to seek licenses to export these materials to South Korea. Because Japan is the main producer of the core materials, the new export procedures disrupted supply chains and in so doing South Korea’s ability to manufacture DRAMS. On 2 August 2019, Japan removed South Korea from its whitelist of favoured trade partners, thereby prolonging and formalising the export curbs on these materials.

Although Japan claimed that the export regulations were designed to streamline export procedures in light of national security concerns, observers believed the new measures came in response to the South Korean Supreme Court rulings on South Korean forced labour in Japanese companies during the occupation period and due to the on-going disagreements between Japan and South Korean on the compensation of comfort women. South Korea’s response came later in August 2019. Seoul announced its intention to terminate GSOMIA, reasoning that Japan’s export restrictions had caused a ‘grave’ change in security cooperation. Although South Korea and Japan have since agreed not to let GSOMIA lapse, the issue of whitelist exclusion has not been resolved. The trade row between the two countries is set to worsen when South Korea will act on its Supreme Court rulings by beginning to seize the Korea-based assets of Japanese companies.

But Japan’s export controls resemble the US-China trade war. Semiconductors are vital components of AI and 5G technology, which are used in surveillance technology and missile defence. They are imperative for national security as for instance, AI is used to predict missile flight paths. The crucial link is this: two Korean companies, Samsung and SK Hynix, are the world’s largest and second-largest manufactures of DRAMS respectively, accounting for 72.7% of the global DRAMS market in the fourth quarter of 2019. But South Korean companies also account for a large proportion of Huawei’s DRAMS supply, China’s main producer of 5G and AI technology. Samsung’s recent launch of the Data and Information (DIT) Center, an effort to produce AI semiconductors, suggests that the company has outpaced its competitors.

South Korea’s DRAMS exports to Huawei might be a national security concern for the United States and Japan. By disrupting South Korea’s supply of the materials needed to manufacture DRAMS, Japan might potentially slow down China’s AI progress. Japan’s export restrictions undoubtedly align with US intentions. The Wall Street Journal reported on 17 February 2020 that the US Department of Commerce plans to restrict Chinese access to chip technology by seeking legislation to ‘require chip factories world-wide to get licenses if they plan to produce chips for Huawei.’ Furthermore, the US Department of Commerce plans on tightening export controls on chips to Huawei; license-free sales are only to be permitted where chips are less than ten per cent American-made. The threshold stands at twenty-five per cent at the time of writing. The United States has also pressured allies like Canada and European countries to contain Chinese semiconductor technology, causing a row between President Trump and Prime Minister Johnson after the UK allowed Huawei a limited role in the development of Britain’s 5G network.

In another twist, however, Japan’s decision to limit South Korea’s access to materials needed for its DRAMS production backfired. The export restrictions were a protectionist move – Japan was arguably hoping that its own companies would thrive once again to become the market leaders, which they were until Samsung and SK Hynix gained a competitive edge. But DuPont, a US chemical materials company, subsequently decided to establish a US$ 28-million production facility for extreme ultraviolet rays in Korea, which will ensure Korea’s supply of the key materials needed for the production of semiconductors. Therefore, if Japan is serious about its ambition to gain market share in the semiconductors industry, it should carefully consider its next steps.

In other words, what we may be witnessing with the row between South Korea and Japan is not so much a dispute over compensation of South Korean forced wartime labourers or comfort women during the Japanese occupation period but the onset of the world’s first tech war: competition between the United States and China over supremacy in AI. South Korea has long aligned with the United States in geostrategic terms, but China’s overtaking of the United States as South Korea’s most important trade partner has placed Seoul in an awkward position as the imposition of Japanese export controls—designed to hit one of South Korea’s major industries—has demonstrated.


Yeseul Woo is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and a Developing Scholar at the Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. She has previously served as a journalist for South Korean and U.S. media outlets and as a fellow at the East West Center, at the Pacific Forum and at the Harry S. Truman Institute

Strife Interview – Antonio Moscatello on “Megumi”

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Antonio Moscatello is an Italian journalist who graduated in Japanese language and translated many texts from Japanese. He became a professional journalist in 2001 and worked as foreign correspondent in Tokyo, Iraq, and Budapest. In 2012 he investigated North-Korean kidnappings, which is also the theme of “Megumi”, his latest book. Strife’s Editor Andrea Fischetti met with Mr Moscatello to discuss the issues raised in “Megumi”.

All Enquiries as to this article’s content should be sent to Strife Blog.

 

AF: Let’s start with “Megumi”, who inspired the title of your book. Who is Megumi? What does her case tell us about North-Korean kidnappings?

AM: Megumi Yokota was kidnapped when she was 13 years old, in November 1977, on her way home after school. Everything happened within around 500 meters. For about 20 years her disappearance remained a mystery, until, almost by chance, the truth came up: she was kidnapped and taken to North Korea by agents working for Pyongyang.

Her story became the most emblematic case among the many North Korean kidnappings in Japan, South Korea, and further afield. Moreover, the story of Megumi has yet to come to an end, after more than 40 years.

I believe a remarking characteristic of Megumi’s case is the reason behind her disappearance. This wasn’t a planned operation, like many others conducted by Pyongyang in those years. In fact, Megumi was kidnapped due to her physical appearance, since she looked older than her actual age. This is also an emblematic case of Kim Jong Il’s strategy. At that time, for the North Korean regime there was no difference between normal people and those who held official roles in government and parties: everyone was believed to be an “agent” of a government, be it ally or enemy. For example, when 30 years later five Japanese citizens were returned to Japan after being kidnapped, they were presented as part of an official delegation.

The lack of a difference between normal citizens and government officials in the eyes of North Korea explains a lot about the North-Korean view of power; it also highlights the cohesiveness of the regime and, possibly, of the whole North-Korean society.

 

AF: Megumi is not the only case you analyse in your book. Is there another one you want to tell us about?

AM: There are many stories, and each one could make for a great espionage movie. However, there is one specific case that I wish to mention; one that took place in the United Kingdom, and more precisely in London. In 1983, a young exchange student from Japan, Keiko Arimoto, disappeared. Similarly to Megumi’s case, Keiko’s whereabouts remained unknown for many years, until another Japanese citizen, who was also detained in North Korea following his kidnapping, managed to send a letter saying that Keiko was in that country. This was the starting point of a series of investigations.

The last time she had been seen, Arimoto was at Copenhagen airport. She appeared in pictures together with a man believed to be a North Korean diplomat or spy. Keiko Arimoto has been approached by another young Japanese woman, who appeared to be the wife of a member of the Yodo-go group. This group was made of far left political activists who hijacked a Japanese plane in 1970, taking it to Pyongyang. The group, which was initially headed towards Cuba, remained in North Korea and played a role in at least three kidnappings of young Japanese in Europe (although they deny these accusations). Among these three kidnappings, there was Keiko, brought to North Korea with false promises regarding a job in the import-export field.

 

AF: You have been investigating North Korean kidnappings for years. What have you learned about their modus operandi? What is their purpose, and how do the victims live afterwards, once they are in North Korea?

AM: Each kidnapping was unique and there are many differences among them. I could divide them, focusing on those I have the best knowledge of, in sub-categories with opposing themes: casual targets / specific targets, violence / lies and tricks, couples / singles. The kidnappings that took place in Japan provide good examples of all categories. Spies would intercept people in isolated seaside places, ideally beaches. They would capture the targets, putting them inside of sacks, then running away with rubber boats. From there, they would reach the motherships, which were used to go back to North Korea.

The purposes of these kidnappings are various. Some of them are random, such as Megumi’s, while others had specific targets in mind. This is the case, for example, of a famous film director and an actress, both from South Korea, which were both kidnapped to develop the North-Korean cinema scene. Another instance of kidnappings of specific targets is the case of four young Lebanese women and a Romanian girl. They were kidnapped to become wives of American deserters who were used in national cinematic propaganda.

When it comes to Japanese victims, they were used in a number of different ways. Megumi, for example, was employed as teacher of Japanese language and culture to prepare North-Korean agents, and subsequently was married to a South-Korean who was also possibly a victim of kidnapping. Other Japanese were forced to marry among them, but no clear explanation emerged about this.

Generally, those who were kidnapped enjoyed higher living standards than the average North-Korean when it comes to food and nutrition. Even in the 1990s, when the country experienced a severe shortage of food, the victims of kidnappings that were living in North Korea were given proper food rations, at least compared to those of the North-Korean population. They did not have any external contacts with North-Korean citizens, and only met with those who took care of them, their guards, and government spies.

 

AF: You met with family members of the victims. How do they make sense of these events and what do they think about the Japanese government’s take on the kidnappings?

AM: Their families have been wishing for decades to meet again their dearest ones, and for them it is very hard to make sense of these events. Some of the families developed a radicalised political stance on this theme, which is often part of the rhetoric of right-wing politicians in Japan. Understandably, they have an extremely negative vision of Pyongyang, as they believe it has been hiding the truth for decades.

It is Pyongyang’s silence and lies that make North-Korean kidnappings even more worrying. In fact, there is no clear figure about the number of kidnapped Japanese citizens, which could amount to several hundreds. However, only 17 have been proved by the Japanese government.

Many families who experienced a kidnapping have been criticising the Japanese government. Until 2001, despite the public had been aware of this phenomenon for several years, Japanese governments appeared to negate the existence or understate the gravity of this issue and even preferred realpolitik to a tough line in their talks with Pyongyang. During the second half of the 1990s, Tokyo was supporting the Clinton administration with their efforts to resolve the North-Korean nuclear crisis through dialogue and a normalisation of diplomatic relations. This stance was also due to the economic interests in reaching a dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington and, through that, between Pyongyang and Tokyo.

It was under Junichiro Koizumi’s administration that the Japanese approach to the problem of North-Korean kidnappings began to change. Nowadays, especially thanks to Shinzo Abe, the issue became a priority for Japan. The current Prime Minister has been very concerned with the issue of North-Korean kidnappings, and even wears the blue-ribbon [which is a symbol of support for those who were kidnapped and their families – AF] in many occasions.

However, families, and especially the elderly, remain skeptic about the government: they fear that the destiny of their sons could be subject to realpolitik, and that ultimately they could be exchanged for a solution to the North-Korean crisis.

 

AF: America, Europe, Asia: to different extents and in different contexts, kidnappings have been a reality to deal with in many countries. However, in these cases a sovereign state such as North Korea recognised its involvement in kidnappings operations: should we treat these cases differently from other kidnappings?

AM: These kidnappings are definitely different from those carried by organisations such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. In this case, we are looking at a series of kidnappings that are part of a detailed program planned by a sovereign state. Although we should take into account that, as Kim Jong Il stated when he was still the leader of the country, there had been an excess of zeal among North-Korean officials, there is no doubt that official branches of the North-Korean government planned, and carried out, the kidnappings, organised the imprisonment of those who were kidnapped, and produced false documents regarding the victims.

Terroristic groups usually tend to make their kidnappings public in order to have an economic or ideological return. North-Korean kidnappings have been kept secret and the victims were ultimately used for the regime’s benefit. These kidnappings are more similar to the forced labour that Korea experienced during the colonial period. Pyongyang itself used this example in an attempt to legitimise their kidnappings.

 

AF: Despite the recent North Korean tensions resulted in ballistic missiles flying over Japan, also triggering missile alerts in the country, I argued that Japan’s involvement in the North Korean tensions will remain marginal due to legal, military, and political reasons. So far this has been the case, but many kidnappings are currently unresolved, and cannot be officially attributed to North Korea. What are their implications for Japan-DPRK relations and East Asian Security?

AM: It is hard to say. Japan tried to keep the North-Korean kidnappings issue on the agenda using Abe’s relation with U.S. President Donald Trump as leverage. There were positive results, and Trump cited Megumi in his first speech at the UN, and even met with families of the kidnapped Japanese during his first visit to Japan.

However, Trump’s behaviour is hard to predict and this is especially annoying for Japanese politicians. Trump’s will to meet Kim Jong Un, for example, seemed to worry Abe, who is still determined to keep a tough line on North Korea.

The issue of North-Korean kidnappings may once again be overshadowed by the international need to overcome the North-Korean crisis and denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Nonetheless, this is far from certain: in the past, Pyongyang often simulated an openness to dialogue just to earn precious time and soften international pressure. Trump’s will is also still to be clearly verified, even in the context of South-Korean openness to cooperation.

Furthermore, despite Abe appeared to be determined to achieve a resolution to this issue, it is possible that the kidnappings will eventually end up being bargaining chips in international talks. This would not necessarily be a negative change for the victims’ families, but it could make the situation even more complex or deprioritise its resolution. What happened in the past, unfortunately, doesn’t suggest that the victims of kidnappings will have priority.

 

AF: “Megumi” is currently available in Italian, and I would definitely recommend it to anyone who has an interest in this specific topic, but also International Relations and East Asia in general. At this point I am sure many of our readers would ask the same question: will an English version be available in the future?

AM: The book has been published by Rogiosi in Italy, a small publishing house based in Naples. They recently notified me of their willingness to discuss an English edition, and I am awaiting to see whether this could actually happen. I really wish it could, because the literature on this topic is currently very scarce in the West, and surprisingly in Japan too, where despite the many books published by victims, families, and North-Korean defectors, nothing has been written by an external observer.

 

Image Credit: Antonio Moscatello

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Part II – The view from Tokyo

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By Andrea Fischetti

Pacifist Pro-Article 9 Demonstration in Tokyo, May 2014 (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

Characterised as a peace-loving nation, Japan has earned this favourable international reputation through a combination of its culture and society. Also, the Constitution does not allow the country to possess offensive military capabilities.[1] Nonetheless, it is involved in territorial and political disputes with most of its neighbours, and at times, its foreign policy is perceived as assertive by other regional actors such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Therefore, this article will explore the reasons why a so-called pacifist country such as Japan is involved in so many disputes. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan is situated in a region where history and historical memories still resonate politically, and continue to drive regional actors’ foreign policies, resulting in territorial and diplomatic disputes as well as long-lasting rivalries. In fact, the national perspectives of Japan and its neighbours are inseparable from their past experiences.

The “abnormalcy” concept

Firstly, in order to understand Japan’s perspective, it is necessary to consider the nature of its “abnormalcy”. Realist scholars believed that the phenomenal economic development that Japan experienced during the second half of the 20th century would inevitably result in rising military ambitions. This was seen to be especially true, considering Japan’s imperialistic and militaristic past. However, Japan did not try to translate its economic might into military capabilities, nor did it attempt to challenge the hegemony of other powers. As a consequence, Japan has been considered an “abnormal” country, due to its “pacifist” behaviour.[2]

The idea that Japan is not a “normal” country, has been reinforced by its US-drafted constitution, implemented in the aftermath of the Second World War by American occupying forces. Japan’s Constitution, not only contains a peace clause, but is also considered rare due to its longevity.[3] In other words, Japan may be considered an abnormal country because despite its economic power, it has not tried to develop modern offensive military capabilities; instead, the country has preserved a foreign-drafted pacifist constitution for over seven decades.

Whether it deserves the title of “abnormal” is debatable, as it would imply the existence of some sort of international standard;[4] nonetheless, considering its legal framework, society, and behaviour on the international stage, it is understandable why Japan is considered a pacifist and exceptional country.

Yesterday’s rivalry, today’s dispute

Domestically, Japanese society has been able to overcome its wartime experiences thanks to policies that guaranteed “peace and prosperity”. During the post-war period for example, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida developed the “Yoshida Doctrine”, which included a number of “pacifist” policies that were aimed at preserving peace while focusing the country’s capabilities on achieving economic prosperity.[5]

However, while Japan has been enjoying decades of “peace and prosperity”, the spectre of its behaviour in wartime has remained very much alive among its neighbours. After the war, Korea was divided in two different countries. Not only did this division result in numerous diplomatic and strategic issues, but also, as ‘halved’ parts of a single country, neither ROK, nor the Northern side – the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – have managed to equal Japan’s economic development. This is perhaps unsurprising, considering the long-lasting effects of Korean War, in combination with economic sanctions, and trade restrictions. Furthermore, the diplomatic and strategic issues on the Korean peninsula have been exacerbated by the DPRK nuclear programme, and more specifically the recent missile tests.

Similarly, the PRC has been dealing with its own problems following the Second World War, despite the fact they were on the winning side, unlike Japan. Yet, it did not feel like a victory for Beijing: as numerous social and economic issues affected the country, China had to watch Japan’s remarkable growth and development. While the Land of the Rising Sun was enjoying peace and prosperity, the PRC was dealing with the trouble of overcoming the “century of humiliation”, a period of foreign occupation, territorial losses, and military defeats that took place between the 19th and the 20th century.

Northeast Asian rivalries fuel many disputes: all actors in the region have, to different extents, disputes with their neighbours, and Japan is no exception. What is notable is the vital role that historical memory plays in this volatile regional context. Accordingly, Japan’s involvement in disputes with other regional actors can be very largely be attributed to history.

Following the war, Japanese society welcomed the advent of peace and prosperity, quickly adapting to the new image that Japan projected of itself at international level. The Japanese military was totally discredited, and with the help of US occupation, the country developed anti-militaristic norms.[6] Japan’s national identity of a pacifist country is also demonstrated by public opinion polls on the country’s priorities[7], and the influence that the strong popular support for peace and prosperity has on the policy making process.[8]

As a result, at the dawn of the 21st century, Japan’s domestic memories of war were not forgotten, but were instead relegated to the past. By contrast, wartime memories were still vivid in among the populations of local neighbours including China and Korea. A fact that has been reflected in the Chinese “obsession” for power balance between the United States, Japan, and China[9], or in the long-lasting dispute on the comfort women issue between South Korea and Japan, inciting several diplomatic incidents regarding Japan’s apologies for sexual slavery during the Second World War.

In the case of China, for example, the dispute on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has been emblematic in defining its approach to Japan: China has to show strength, to overcome its past “humiliations”. China sees the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) as an occupant of its territory, namely the ‘Diaoyu Islands’ (considered Chinese according to Beijing’s historical view).

Conversely, Tokyo’s official stance is that ‘the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Island’.[10] Furthermore, as Japan’s military capabilities are intended for self-defence purposes only, what the Chinese consider an aggression, is seen as self-defence in Tokyo, a legitimate “resolute stance” (kizen to shita taido), also considering that the Senkaku Islands (Senkaku-shotō) are controlled by Japan as per the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement. The Japanese perspective on this issue, which does not involve acknowledging a dispute due to the above reasons, only appears to be even more assertive in the eyes of Beijing. This is the essence of the regional security dilemma facing North-east Asia today.

Similarly, Japanese society finds it difficult to justify the ROK’s continued emphasis on the comfort women issue. On the one hand, Japanese occupation and wartimes memories have not been forgotten in South Korea, and they remain a highly debated topic. On the other, having apologised multiple times, and considering itself a pacifist country and a “contributor to peace”[11], Japan sees South Korea’s insistence on this matter as unjustified. Further to social, cultural, and political differences, the divergence in perspective among these countries is also a result of the different kinds of narratives and government-led propaganda they are subject to.[12]

Conclusion

Japan’s national identity is that of a pacifist country, and one who is far more interested in promoting diplomatic relations than remembering historical disputes or rivalries. Despite its geopolitical role in a number of disputes, the country has enjoyed peace and prosperity for many decades, its society identifies itself as pacifist, and its behaviour on the international stage reflects its pacifist values. From alternate perspectives, it could reasonably be argued that its neighbours are generally more prone to fuel disputes, yet Japan’s conviction in its pacifist national identity might also mean it is failing to address these issues properly. In order to fix the conflictual relationship with its neighbours and prepare for future challenges, Tokyo should focus on taking into account its international image from the viewpoint of countries such as China or South Korea.

Andrea (@A_Fischetti) is a MEXT Scholar researching on Japan and East Asian Security at The University of Tokyo. He is also a Series Editor for Strife. Andrea earned his MA in War Studies from King’s College London, following a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies. He was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University, and worked in the House of Commons.

Notes:

[1] Berger, 1998; Katzeinstein, 1996.

[2] Kennedy, 1994; Waltz, 1993; 2000.

[3] Comparative Constitutions Project, 2017; Elkins et al, 2009.

[4] Soeya et al, 2011.

[5] Yoshida and Nara, 2007.

[6] Berger, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996.

[7] Asahi Shimbun, 2012.

[8] NHK, ‘Seiji ishiki getsurei chōsa’, 2007.

[9] Rozman, 1999.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016.

[11] Japan National Security Council, 2013.

[12] Pugliese and Insisa, 2017.

 

Image Source: 

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Proarticle9demo-may2014nearginza.jpg

Bibliography:

Asahi Shimbun (2012) ‘Abe Naikaku Sijiritsu 59%’, Asahi Shimbun, December 2012.

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security. 17(4): 119-50.

Berger, T. U. (1998) ‘Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan’. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Comparative Constitutions Project (2017) Timeline of Constitutions. Available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ [Accessed on 13 August 2017]

Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T. and Melton, J. (2009) ‘The Endurance of National Constitutions’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Japan National Security Council (JNSC) (2013) ‘National Security Strategy’, provisional translation, December 2013.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) ‘Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan’. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Kennedy, P. (1994) ‘Japan: A twenty-first-century power?’ in C. C. Garby and M. Brown Bullock (eds) Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, pp. 193-9.

King, A. and Taylor, B. (2016) ‘Northeast Asia’s New ‘History Spiral’.’ Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–119.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016) Senkaku Islands Q&A. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q1 [accessed on 12 November 2016]

NHK (2007) Seiji Ishiki Getsurei Chōsa (政治意識月例調査) Available at https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/2007.html [Accessed 11 March 2017]

Pugliese, G. and Insisa, A. (2017) ‘Sino-Japanese Power Politcs: Might, Money and Minds’. London, Palgrave.

Rozman, G. (1999) ‘China’s Quest for Great Power Identity’. Orbis, 43,3, 383-402.

Soeya, Y., Tadokoro, M., Welch, D. A. (eds) (2011) ‘Japan as a ‘normal country’? A Nation in Search of its Place in the World’. Toronto, University of Toronto Press.

Waltz, K. N. (1993) ‘The emerging structure of international politics’, International Security 18(2): 44-79.

Waltz, K. N. (2000) ‘Structural realism after the cold war’. International Security 25 (1): 5-41.

Yoshida, S. and Nara, H. (2007) Yoshida Shigeru: Last Himeji Man. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Introduction – One Region, Different Standpoints

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By Andrea Fischetti

 

Northeast Asia is a region of crucial importance, from a strategic and economic point of view.

 

East Asia is home to one fifth of the world’s population, and some of the global economic powerhouses. In particular, the second and third world largest economies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan, are located in Northeast Asia. The region may subsequently be characterised as one of crucial importance for international affairs not only for the size of its economy, but also from a strategic point of view.

In this area, North Korea in particular has been in the limelight during the past year due to its aggressive nuclear program and tests, which resulted in strategic and diplomatic tensions.  This country, however, is not the only cause for disputes in Northeast Asia. The whole region is deeply divided in terms of culture, ideology, and politics, resulting in some cases, in inter-state relations characterised by “hot economics, cold politics”.[1]

Although current tensions in East Asia are considered of increasing importance by the international community, many of the Northeast Asian divisions and rivalries are primarily fuelled by historical roots. Amy King and Brendan Taylor identify a “history spiral”[2] in this region: a competitive approach to “re-remembering”[3] and rewriting history, common to all regional actors. The lack of effective international multilateral organisations is a further reason why this region is “ripe for rivalry”.[4]

Therefore, the purpose of this series is to explore the national perspectives of Northeast Asian countries. Understanding what Pyongyang’s priorities are, how Japan sees itself, what worries China, and where do the differences between Taiwan and China come from, can help to understand regional disputes as well.

In the first article, Ashley Ryan takes us to Pyongyang, where the North Korean thought and perspective on international affairs is unveiled. She analyses the strategic thinking of Kim Jong-un and explains what is the ultimate goal of Pyongyang, arguing that what North Korea has been doing so far is both rational and coherent in strategic terms.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti explains why Japan is a pacifist country, and how Japan’s pacifism affects Tokyo’s approach to disputes with its neighbours such as China and South Korea. According to Fischetti, the post-war period largely shaped culture and society of Northeast Asian countries, and the differences in culture and society now encourage rivalries as countries have different perspectives on the same issues.

In the third article, Dean Chen explores the Taiwan issue and the nature of cross-strait relations, analysing Taiwan’s national perspective. The author argues that Taiwan and China have mismatching identities, which from an ontological security perspective, results in a rivalry characterised by misunderstandings.

Lastly, in the fourth article, Riccardo Cociani analyses the strategic and political challenges that the North Korean tensions pose to Beijing. Adopting a Chinese perspective, he explores China’s approach to tackling these challenges, with an eye to regional security.

This series offers a unique opportunity to explore the ideas and points of view of some of the main regional actors in Northeast Asia. Thanks to Ryan, Fischetti, Cociani, and Chen, these different perspectives come together in one place, and all contribute to further our understanding of Northeast Asian rivalries.

Andrea (@A_Fischetti) is a MEXT scholar and conducts research on Japan’s national identity and East Asian Security at the University of Tokyo. He is also a Series Editor for Strife. He recently earned his MA in War Studies from King’s College London, following a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies. He worked for a year in the House of Commons. A recipient of the JASSO Scholarship (日本学生支援機構), he was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

Notes:

[1] Dreyer, J. T., 2014, pp. 326-341.

[2] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 113

[3] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 112

[4] Friedberg, A. L., 1994, pp. 13-14

Image source:

Here at https://spfusa.org/chairmans-message/flurry-of-east-asia-summits-signals-thawing-of-icy-relations/ 

Bibliography: 

  • Dreyer, J. T. (2014) China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’. Orbis, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 326-341.
  • Friedberg, A. L. (1994) Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5–33
  • King, A. and Taylor, B. (2016) Northeast Asia’s New ‘History Spiral’. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–119.

Japan’s Role in the North Korean crisis will remain a marginal one

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By Andrea Fischetti

A North Korean Hwasong-12 missile, the model fired on August 29th (Credit: KCNA)

 

The latest missile test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 15 was the second in a row to directly involve Japan. The Korean intermediate range missile flew over the land of the rising sun for the second time in two weeks, and these tests undoubtedly pose a new challenge to Japan’s institutional pacifism, reawakening the debate on whether Japan needs to possess offensive military capabilities. However, Japan’s role in the North Korean crisis remains limited, and the country is not likely to become a key actor alongside the U.S. and South Korea in tackling the regime of the Kim dinasty.

In the early morning of August 29, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a ballistic missile: Pyongyang’s fourth test in four days (Held, 2017). The country has tested more than fifteen missiles since February (USPACOM, 2017), and their effectiveness gradually improved, a sign that its current weapons program will not stop until it reaches its goal. North Korea’s ultimate objective, is considered to be a nuclear warhead-topped missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Such a weapon would secure the position of the Kim dynasty, as Pyongyang believes it would deter the U.S. from interfering in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK conducted a further test on September 15, which flew once again over Japanese territories.

The August 29 test was the first to involve a missile going over Japan without being announced or preceded by any warning. The intermediate-range ballistic missile Hwasong-12, known as NK-17, was fired over Japan’s territory, specifically the northern island of Hokkaido. Residents were given a short-notice warning inviting them to take cover, and the missile flew in Japanese airspace for almost  two minutes. The act was condemned by the US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea; while China stated that the North Korean situation had reached a “tipping point”. Pyongyang’s latest missile launch seemed to affect Japan more than any other country, as it passed over Japanese territory.

Nonetheless, the North Korean tensions are far more threatening for other countries than for Japan, and Tokyo’s role in this situation remains only a marginal one compared to that of the U.S. or South Korea. As reporter Kjeld Duits pointed out, since 1998, North Korea’s tests violated Japan’s EEZ and airspace many times, three of which during the last  two months. Pyongyang’s declared  ambition, however, is that of being able to hit U.S. territories. In fact, the NK-17 that travelled over Hokkaido broke up more than 1180 Kilometres from Japan’s mainland, suggesting that the country never was an objective in the first place. The missile’s range has been estimated to be 4000 Kilometres, which potentially makes Guam – and its American military base – a realistic  objective. Furthermore, North Korea has a number of short-range capabilities which can cause significant damage to nearby potential targets such as Seoul in South Korea. Arguably, that is the biggest threat that North Korea poses in the short term, and the reason why the U.S. must be careful in dealing with Pyongyang.

Accordingly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a show of “overwhelming force” (Crabtree and Kemp, 2017) against North Korea, involving the dropping of bombs near the Northern border and joint drills of four South Korean F-15 fighter jets with four American F-35 stealth fighter jets and two B-1B American bombers, while U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “talking is not the answer”.

On the other hand, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe does not have the same freedom of operation. Firstly, although Japan has excellent missile defence systems, taking down high-altitude missiles fired from North Korea to territories beyond Japan – such as Guam – is legally challenging, and it would raise many questions about Japan’s stance on the use of military force for non-defensive purposes. This is due to Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, especially considering that Japan is not the target of the DPRK’s tests. Secondly, and more importantly, even considering the effectiveness of the modern Air Defence System MIM-104F (PAC-3) acquired by Japan, there would be technical challenges in shooting down Pyongyang’s missiles, as the system is designed to counter inbound offensive missiles at lower altitudes, instead of hitting the bottom part of the missile by chasing it at higher altitudes. In other words, for Japan it would be easier to shoot down a missile that is actually targeting Japan rather than one that is only flying over its territories.

Two days after Pyongyang’s test, Japan’s Defence Ministry requested a budget increase for 2018 (Pollmann, 2017) which would include enough funds for further developing its radar system and acquiring weapons capable of shooting down high-altitude missiles. The North Korea tensions, including the launch of a NK-17 over Hokkaido, come at a time when Prime Minister Abe’s approval rating is decreasing. Also, his plan to amend the Japanese Constitution, in particular its Article 9 which prevents Japan from possessing offensive military capabilities, is far from guaranteed to succeed. In order to meet popular demands of a country with strong anti-militaristic norms (Berger 1993; 1998) and which is more concerned with achieving peace and prosperity than security objectives, Abe’s rhetoric has been focusing on Japan’s role as a ‘proactive contributor to peace’. Whether this role involves shooting down North Korean missiles for non-defensive purposes, however, is unclear.

The decision to expand the country’s military budget and potentially have a more proactive role in Northeast Asian security could be partly justified by Pyongyang’s moves, in the eyes of  the Japanese population, due to the perceived threat to Japan’s security. However, while Japan is involved in the North Korean crisis for geopolitical reasons, it is not Pyongyang’s main concern. Similarly, Abe is capitalising on the increasingly frequent North Korean tests to justify the need of stronger military capabilities, but increasing Japan’s involvement in this situation is not his ultimate goal. The challenge that Abe is facing is achieving a balance between rhetoric  and moderate actions compatible with Japan’s current Constitution and the public opinion’s will.

While Japan’s public opinion has a negative view of North Korea, and this missile launch could influence the debate on Constitutional amendments, Japan’s public is ultimately more likely to support pacifist approaches to resolving this issue, and an overemphasis of the North Korean threat could end up being counterproductive for Abe’s goals. Kim Jong-Un’s behaviour seemed unaffected by the rhetoric of the U.S. and South Korea, their shows of force, and the UN sanctions; therefore, even by stepping up as a more central actor in the North Korea tensions, Japan would not be able change this trend.

In conclusion, Japan will keep honouring its alliance with the U.S., a country directly involved in the North Korea tensions. Abe will also attempt to emphasise the threat posed by Pyongyang for justifying his unpopular constitutional amendments. However, due to technical and legal constraints, it is unlikely that Japan’s role in this situation will significantly change in the short term.

Andrea Fischetti (@A_Fischetti) is an MA Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London specialising in East Asian Security and Japan. He recently earned a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies and worked for a year in the House of Commons. Andrea was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University and studied Japanese at SOAS and King’s College London. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

 

Notes: 

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security 17(4): 119-50.

 

Berger, T. U. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

Crabtree, J. and Kemp, T. (2017) ‘South Korean President Moon tells military to toughen up, orders show of ‘overwhelming’ force’. CNBC Defense.

 

Held, A. (2017) ”Restraint’ Appears To Be Over As North Korea Launches Missile Test Again’, NPR. Available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/26/546344429/restraint-appears-to-be-over-as-north-korea-launches-missile-test-again

 

Pollmann, M. (2017) ‘What’s in Japan’s Record 2018 Defense Budget Request?’ The Diplomat.

 

USPACOM (2017) North Korea Policy, US Pacific Command. Available at http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1310112/north-korea-policy/