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You are here: Home / Archives for South China sea

South China sea

Tactical Instability on the South China Sea and Sino-American Decoupling

October 30, 2018 by Axel Dessein

By Axel Dessein
30 October 2018

The USS Decatur finds itself seconds from disaster during an unsafe encounter with a Chinese destroyer in September 2018. (Image Credit: US Navy)

In late September 2018, a Chinese Luyang-class destroyer nearly collided with the American destroyer U.S.S. Decatur during a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea. These operations are essentially aimed at signalling a commitment to keeping the sea lanes open, the near-collision demonstrates that such commitments are to be upheld. Following the unsafe encounter at sea, several commentators pointed out that this atypical event may be a reflection of the broader deterioration in relations between the two countries. Indeed, we may now be witnessing the effects of the trade war spilling over into the military and security domain. This shift in behaviour is a crucial development, as the Trump Administration seems to have declared a new Cold War on China.

Winning Control

At the strategic level, China’s acquisitions in the South China Sea are its answer to the First and Second Island Chains, which caused the country’s claustrophobic vision of its surrounding seascape. Indeed, while the American interpretation of these island chains was aimed at keeping the country in, China itself views this enduring element of the region’s geostrategic outlook as benchmarks for its naval ambitions, as Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow demonstrate.

In the 1970s, China took control of the Paracel Islands and their surrounding waters after a military standoff with the Vietnamese Navy. It is on those islands that China eventually established Sansha City, the administrative basis for control over the “Three Sands:” the Paracels (or Xisha, West Sand), the Spratlys (or Nansha, South Sand), and the Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (commonly grouped under the name Zhongsha, Central Sand).

Undoubtedly, heaps of sand abound. Satellite imagery reveals that since 2014, China has engaged in massive land reclamation and construction activities on many of the islands and submerged features. This island-building enterprise is a clear expression of the intent to establish a military foothold in the region, thereby securing relative control of the sea. If for instance, one draws a line between the different island groups, a triangle becomes visible within the Nine-Dash Line, a series of dashes that trace China’s maritime demarcation line.

The Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlüe xue), an informative study released by the Chinese Academy of Military Science is especially enlightening as to what these advancements mean for China. According to the study, China’s strategic thinking is increasingly looking towards the South China Sea to attain a form of effective control (youxiao kongzhi) over the area to establish a forward-deployed position (qianyan fangwei) away from the mainland. However, it remains unclear what exactly China is claiming: the sea itself or the many features within the Nine-Dash Line.

This ambiguity fits perfectly within the nature of the country’s approach towards asserting its claims. In fact, China seems to be moving within the so-called grey zone, a form of strategy “at the low end of the conflict spectrum in which […] military coercion is occurring to alter the status quo,” according to James J. Wirtz. Whether conflict in the grey zone is an entirely new domain is of course an interesting debate, as Toshi Yoshihara demonstrated an earlier variation of such behaviour in his appraisal of the Paracel Sea Battle between China and Vietnam. Whatever the answer may be, such short-of-war behaviour has clearly demonstrated its effectiveness time and again.

Manning the Great Wall at Sea

Ambiguity and non-military coercion appear to be essential elements in China’s toolbox for the South China Sea. Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson have written extensively on this topic. Most importantly, one has to recognise that there are essentially three Chinese sea forces: the grey-hulled navy, the white-hulled coast guard and its fishermen. Aptly called a maritime militia, these fishing boats are the vanguard involved in promoting and defending China’s sovereignty at sea. That is not to say, however, that China has come up with a recipe for success.

The 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff demonstrates the fallibility of Chinese strategy. Special attention can be drawn to the Philippines which in 2013 filed a case against China’s territorial claims at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. After a ruling in favour of the Philippines that thereby denied the Chinese claims, China rejected the validity of the PCA and insisted on resolving the disputes bilaterally. In this instance, China failed to win control, and the shoal remains a major source of tension between the two countries.

The South China Sea is sometimes referred to as “Asia’s powder keg” because of its precarious position between China and several ASEAN states. (Image Credit: Global Security, CSIS, DW)

Other attempts have been made to quell China’s expansionist activities in the South China Sea. After sixteen years of negotiations China and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recently made some progress on drafting the framework of a proposed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which is a slow albeit necessary process. However, the conflict is not limited to Asia. Because of the growing economic and political relationship between China and countries like Greece, the European Union has come short of wording a clear statement on the issue. Here, we see attempts at preserving international law in a key trading region like the South China Sea increasingly being trumped by other economic interests.

One commentator suggests that the Scarborough Shoal standoff reveals much about China’s intent. The country demonstrated non-military assertiveness with the aim of becoming a great power at sea (haiyang qiangguo). Another commentator sees an analogy between China’s sea power endeavours and those of the German navy under Admiral Tirpitz. Broader historical parallels are also drawn with the Anglo-German conflict of the nineteenth century. However, while the clash between the world’s most powerful states is primarily about their desire for great-power status, diverging ideologies are shaping how this conflict plays out. Here, Alfred W. McCoy writes: “Treat the South China Sea as central, not peripheral, and the Cold War not as bounded by a specific ideological conflict but as the midpoint in a century-long clash of empires.” Today, the empires in question are of course, China and the U.S.

A Relationship Adrift

Amid growing trade tensions, the countries put a halt to their Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (D&SD). The U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis also skipped China during his October 2018 trip to Asia, but did meet with his Chinese counterpart in Singapore. In light of such events, it is but a small surprise that Chinese academics and political groups are discussing a “decoupling” (tuogou), a process which describes a potential rupture in the economic and security relationships between China and the U.S. The risks associated with such an unravelling of the ties between China and the U.S. are manifold, with increased tactical instability demonstrated by the recent near-collision as an example.

Strategic competition with China is back on the American agenda. As a result, the two giants are increasingly stepping on each other’s toes. In this scenario, the destroyer’s sortie could indeed be a display of greater confidence and boldness on the Chinese part, showcasing a broader shift in the relationship. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that an article by a think tank affiliated with China’s State Council still urges restraint in face of “long-term strategic competition” with the United States. While it is unclear how long such moderation will last, our understanding of the Chinese decision-making process clearly suffers from large information gaps. Simply talking about a new Cold War will not be the answer, learning from Chinese words and actions will be.


Axel Dessein is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. His research focuses on the implications of China’s rise on the current world order. Axel completed his BA and MA in Oriental Languages and Cultures at Ghent University. You can follow him on Twitter @AxelDessein.


Banner image source: https://www.stripes.com/news/photos-show-how-close-chinese-warship-came-to-colliding-with-us-navy-destroyer-1.550153

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: America, Axel Dessein, China, China Maritime Strategy, feature, New Cold War, South China sea, strategy, Tactics

The South China Sea: Understanding the Dragon’s Appetite for Islands

August 1, 2017 by Sarah Choong Ee Mei

By Sarah Choong Ee Mei

According to an ancient Chinese war treatise, as described in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.’’ [1] Despite the fact that the South China Sea island disputes are one of the biggest potential flashpoints for conflict in recent times, little attempt has been made to understand the rationale behind the actions of the biggest claimant state – China.

Of the six states involved in the dispute, namely Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam — China is the only state claiming nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea – a region engulfing the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal [2]. China does so based on historical claims and by referring to the ‘Nine-Dash Line’, which is a U-shaped demarcation line first asserted by the Republic of China back in 1947 [3]. Significantly, the ‘Nine-Dash Line’ goes against the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, Article 57, which states that a country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. Nevertheless, China’s assertion of its claims has intensified with the alarming transformation of seven reefs (Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef) into artificial islands, complete with airstrips and anti-air defence capabilities to conduct Chinese military operations.

China’s ‘Nine-Dash Line’, representing its claim of most of the South China Sea

Swimming in Contested Waters 

Given that most of the islands are uninhabitable and often submerged during high tides, one cannot help but wonder: why is the South China Sea so highly contested? Firstly, the region is rich in oil. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 11 billion barrels of oil reserves can be found in the South China Sea. However, Chinese calculations place estimates much higher at 130 billion barrels of oil, making the South China Sea the most oil-rich region in the world, ranking second to Saudi Arabia [4]. Regardless of whether Chinese calculations are accurate, the belief in the region’s resource potential helps partly explain China’s aggression.

Secondly, the South China Sea is one of the most important trade routes in the world with US$5.3 trillion worth of international trade passing through its waters every year, accounting for more than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage. These waters are also of particular importance for China as more than 80% of its oil imports arrive from the Middle East via the South China Sea.

Thirdly, beyond material incentives, there are historical and cultural reasons that need to be accounted for. Until its encounter with European powers in the 19th century, China had long regarded itself as the centre of the world – the Middle Kingdom. This mentality, coupled with the legacy of the tributary system and its character as a civilization-state, heavily influences China’s foreign relations in the region and in the world today [5]. In fact, it is worth noting that the Mandarin word for modern day China is zhong guo (中国), defined in English as the Middle Kingdom.

Beginning with the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220AD), China administered a tributary system where neighbouring states showed deference to China by embarking on tribute missions to give gifts and to verbally acknowledge the superiority of the Chinese emperor [6]. In exchange, these nations were bestowed with gifts and opportunities to trade with China. For the Han dynasty, the tributary system was also a means to bribe China’s enemies with treasure and trade in order to avoid fighting protracted border wars. Furthermore, China reached the zenith of its naval glory during the Ming Dynasty with Admiral Zheng He’s seven voyages, sailing across the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and beyond [7]. During this time, China was a powerful state and reached a peak of naval technology that was unsurpassed in the world.

However, after centuries of dominance in Asia, the Middle Kingdom began to crumble during a 100-year period known as the ‘Century of Humiliation’ — dating from 1839 to 1949. During this time, China suffered at the hands of foreign powers, faced humiliating defeats, ceded territories, and was often forced to sign unequal treaties or bu ping deng tiao yue (不平等条约). For instance, the Treaty of Nanking during the Opium Wars resulted in Hong Kong being ceded to Britain in 1842, while the Treaty of Shimonoseki led to Taiwan being ceded to Japan in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese Wars [8]. These shameful events in China’s eyes, coupled with the burning of the Summer Palace by British and French troops in 1860, adversely affected China’s perception of itself and its view of foreign powers.

The Rise of Communist China & The Politics of Humiliation

Following the ‘Century of Humiliation’, China’s foreign policy has increasingly reflected a desire to dispel the shameful events of the past and to return  to a position in which China would once again be at the centre of the East Asian order. The Chinese Dream or zhong guo meng (中国梦), as articulated by President Xi Jinping in late 2012, envisions reclaiming national pride. While China has witnessed the return of Hong Kong and Macau to its fold, the prominence of Taiwan as a lost territory marshals a longing to bring together a ‘Greater China’ where the country is finally united and restored [9]. Similarly, it is possible that China’s aggression in the South China Sea is a manifestation of this belief – to reclaim lost territories back to China.

Further, China’s foreign relations might also be directed at reviving a neo-Confucian world order based on the tributary system [10]. Economic strategies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013, seem poised at drawing neighbouring states back into China’s sphere of influence in a manner resembling the ancient tributary system. Additionally, akin to the bestowing of gifts by the Han Emperor to quell conflict with tributary states, China’s investment projects seem aimed at purchasing the silence of economically troubled Southeast Asian states over their claims of the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Lastly, China’s militarization in the South China Sea needs to be understood from a historical and cultural standpoint. After 100 years of unequal treaties and shame, it comes as no surprise that a rising China now seeks to restore itself to the glory that was once imperial China. The ‘return of the dragon’ signals a demand for recognition from its neighbours and from the international community — China is hungry for power and hungry for islands.


Sarah Choong (sarah.choong@kcl.ac.uk) is pursuing her MA International Relations at King’s College London. She is the recipient of the Top 5 Best Delegate Award at the ASEAN Youth Summit 2012 in Jakarta, Indonesia. She will also be working as an intern at the International Organization for Migration, UN’s Migration Agency in Geneva beginning August 2017.


Notes

[1] Giles, Lionel. 2001. Sun Tzu on the Art of War. IndyPublish.com.

[2] Scott, Shirley V. 2016. “China’s Nine-Dash Line, International Law, and the Monroe Doctrine Analogy.” China Information 30 (3): 296–311.

[3] Zou, Keyuan. 1999. “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands.” The International Journal of Marine and Costal Law 14 (1): 27–55.

[4] Kaplan, Robert. 2014. Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. New York: Random House.

[5] Jacques, Martin. 2012. When China Rules the World. 2nd ed. London: Penguin Group.

[6] Roy, Denny. 2013. Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security. New York: Columbia University Press.

[7] Wilson, Andrew. 2009. “The Maritime Transformation of Ming China.” In China Goes to Sea, edited by Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, 238–87. China Maritime Studies Institute and The Naval Institute Press.

[8] Gray, Jack. 2002. Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press.

[9] Harding, Harry. 1993. “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations and Reservations.” The China Quarterly 136 (December). Cambridge University Press.

[10] Callahan, William A. 2012. “Sino-Speak : Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of History.” The Journal of Asian Studies 71 (1): 33–55.


Image Sources

Image 1: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/31/commentary/world-commentary/south-china-sea-disputes-test-chinas-peaceful-rise/#.WVK8jGgrJPY

Image 2: http://www.southchinasea.org/files/2014/09/China-claims-a-big-backyard.png

 Feature image: Andy Wong / Associated Press 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: China, feature, Hong Kong, nine dash line, South China sea, Taiwan

Strife Feature – Cautious waters in an Asian Century: Militarization in the South China Sea in 2017

April 6, 2017 by Douglas Gray

By: Douglas Gray

The contesting claims of the South China Sea.

As stakeholders and policy makers work on predictions of the direction the Trump Administration’s foreign policy will take, uncertainty regarding Washington’s moves in the Asia-Pacific has mounted. Overtures from the new administration regarding a $54bn increase in the Pentagon’s military budget next year, a ten percent rise to ‘ensure America wins its future wars’, have made allies and adversaries alike uncertain of Washington’s next step. In relation to the South China Sea, signalling from the Trump Administration appears to be indicating a more hawkish and militaristic stance on the dispute, in line with chief strategist Steve Bannon’s public beliefs that war between the two powers is inevitable. However, a militaristic response is short sighted in such a complicated geopolitical contest. By placing the South China Sea disputes in the context of the wider China-US geopolitical contest, this article will identify the shortcomings of solving the disputes with a military-first response. Beijing’s strategy recognises that as China’s sphere of influence grows – enhanced by economic and diplomatic might in the region – it will be possible to recoup relations with regional states after a fundamental status quo change in the South China Sea has occurred. So if Washington hopes to combat Beijing’s adventurism it must effectively bolster and extend its own sphere of influence in turn.

Representing a crucial waypoint in the Indo-Pacific region, the South China Sea is bordered by Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. The seemingly marginal sea contains a rich and heavily exploited fishing ground as well as significant oil and gas reserves. And it is not just natural resources that make the South China Sea valuable; Japan, South Korea, and other non-littoral states rely heavily on maritime trade and energy flow through the disputed waters. It is the significance of this major shipping lane, the overlapping sovereignty claims to the Sea’s reefs and increasingly hard-line policies in enforcing such claims that have continuously brought the South China Sea to the fore in regional geopolitics. Maritime disputes in the region focus primarily on the major reefs and rocks scattered across the contested waters, including the Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Spratly Islands, and, perhaps most importantly, the Scarborough Shoal. Being subject to a series of overlapping claims by states, the different reefs and their surrounding waters are the centre of a persistent set of legal and territorial disputes, with the largest claim being China’s nine-dash line.

The contemporary disputes are rooted in these early stages of gradual status-quo change over successive decades, with the reinforcement of claims now exacerbating tensions. [1] Beijing’s tactics in the region have been described as the “slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change,” a tactic Robert Haddick coined ‘salami slicing.’ The gradual acquisition of reefs and features within the South China Sea enabled an increased presence, and a consolidation of territorial claims has been enabled by artificial reef extensions throughout the South China Sea. [2] Extensive infrastructure-building has allowed Beijing to move towards a fundamental shift in the status-quo of the region in their favour, allowing for dominance of the all-important sea lanes and the natural resources below them. The building of airbases and military infrastructure at an unprecedented pace, including reinforcement with surface-to-air missile sites, has changed the nature of the disputes, which have taken on a much more overtly strategic tone. The infrastructural investments, coupled with rapidly accelerating procurements by the Chinese Navy (18 new ships were commissioned in 2016), speaks to a militarisation of the region that is unprecedented in the post-WWII era.

Land reclamation by Beijing on Fiery Cross Reef. Top: August 14, 2014. Below:  June 3, 2016.

Legally, the international laws governing the disputes are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), established as a framework to balance the interest of both coastal and seafaring states. [3] This legal framework drew significant attention on July 12th 2016 when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled overwhelmingly against Beijing in a legal contest brought on by Manila. In assessing whether or not Beijing had breached its obligations under UNCLOS, the court not only stated that China’s nine-dash line claim had no legal basis but also presented a damning indictment of Beijing’s behaviour throughout the proceedings. However, perhaps unsurprisingly to international law sceptics, the court’s ruling has seemingly had no effect on the current state of the disputes due to the lack of an accompanying enforcement mechanism.

While the United States is in a comparably weak position to challenge the lack of conformity to international laws and norms in Beijing’s island claims, given that it is the only major power not to have ratified UNCLOS, it has cited the violation of ‘customary international law’ in its efforts to counter what it views as Chinese expansionism. Since 2015 Washington has conducted four freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through the contested waters to challenge Chinese claims, along with diplomatic efforts. In October 2015, the USS Lassen exercised innocent passage by patrolling within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-controlled Subi Reef. Later on, in January and May 2016 respectively, the USS Curtis Wilbur and the USS William P. Lawrence conducted FONOPs near Triton Island and Fiery Cross Reef – both of which were heavily condemned by Beijing. Most recently, the USS Decatur undertook a FONOP near the Paracel Islands in October 2016, in what was declared to be the first iteration of a ‘more regular operations tempo’ to come.

And it would seem that the tempo has in fact increased. The arrival of a US carrier strike group to the South China Sea on February 18th, including the Nimitz-class USS Carl Vinson and an escorting destroyer, the USS Wayne E. Meyer, represents a significant step up in US military presence in the region. While the carrier has been en route since before Trump’s entry to the oval office, having previously been in Guam and the Philippine Sea, the illustration of power has concerned pundits amid rhetoric that has come from the new administration. Recent comments by US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis during his visit to Tokyo appeared to largely reassert the policy status quo toward the region set by the Obama Administration. Mattis’ public comments that the issue is ‘best solved by diplomats’ were welcomed by Beijing. In private, Mattis has reportedly stated that ‘America would no longer be that tolerant of China’s behaviour in the South China Sea,’ pledging to take a more aggressive stance and increase patrols. The comments reflect a US administration seeking to take a hard line on the issue, consistent with earlier remarks by now-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at his confirmation hearing, who implied that the US would attempt to blockade China’s access to islands – a contentious claim later moderated by clarifying that this would only apply ‘if a contingency occurs.’

The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transits the Philippine Sea. The Carl Vinson Strike Group is on a regularly scheduled western Pacific deployment as part of the U.S. Pacific Feet-led initiative to extend the command and control functions of U.S. 3rd Fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 3rd Class Kurtis A. Hatcher/Released)

It is based on comments such as these that a continuation down the path of militarisation of the region has been widely tipped as the Trump Administration now articulates its foreign policy. Proponents of a more hawkish stance on the issue are pushing for the Trump Administration to execute a military rebalance to Asia in a more steadfast way than the previous Obama Administration. They argue that the US should look to impose a strategic risk on Beijing’s belligerence in order to reassert dominance. However, while deterring expansionism is necessary, a focus on militarisation is informed by a short-sighted viewpoint of Beijing’s strategy in the region.

As South-east Asian states seek to hedge between the two major powers, cautiously attempting to push Beijing and Washington towards cooperation rather than confrontation, Washington’s hopes of alignment against excessive Chinese claims have been dashed. ASEAN’s continuous claims of unity and harmony are often fragile and hollow.  It has adopted a muted line in the wake of the UNCLOS ruling last year, choosing not to speak up about the issue. In a region finding itself increasingly reliant on China’s economic power, individual states’ interests, as well as those of the community as a whole, are shifting. Beijing’s strategy is based on economic leverage and the belief that the region is naturally inclined to fall within its sphere of influence. While assertiveness in the South China Sea has exacerbated disputes with its neighbours, trade dependencies and carefully managed diplomacy have prevented the long-term costs frequently affiliated with such adventurism. The lacklustre reaction to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the territorial disputes is a direct result of Chinese influence and concerns from regional stakeholders regarding the economic and political repercussions of pursuing action on the ruling.

At present, Beijing’s extensive infrastructural investments have not been militarised beyond defensive measures. While the islands have the capacity to host fighter and bomber squadrons, missiles or PLAN vessels, no such militarized actions have yet been taken. Beijing’s stance remains that Xi Jinping’s 2015 promise not to militarise the region has been upheld – and while satellite imagery provides ample evidence to dispute this, the stall in further escalation from Beijing puts American responses on the back foot. The ultimate symbol of this strategy’s success perhaps came last year, during the last FONOP by Washington in October. Chinese state media was able to achieve a significant diplomatic coup by labelling the United States as the belligerents of the South China Sea, a move only made possible by effectively bringing Manila ‘into the fold’, with President Duterte having been in Beijing at the time for conciliatory talks. Former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once urged China to become a responsible stakeholder in the region – but perhaps Beijing being viewed as a responsible stakeholder and provider of economic wellbeing is the biggest threat to US interests.

Xi Jinping in Davos, January 2017

So if the Trump Administration is to counter Beijing’s adventurism in the South China Sea, a strategy beyond simplistic militarisation of the dispute must be employed. As the American liberal world order is increasingly challenged on the global stage, including Moscow’s actions in Crimea and Beijing’s rejection of the PCA ruling, measures to strengthen it must likewise be maintained. The establishment of the post-WWII, US-centric alliance systems in Europe and Asia, along with the World Bank, IMF and GAT, placed policy makers in Washington in an unprecedented leadership position. While having the biggest economy and an unparalleled military are important for superiority on the world stage, the continuity of American primacy over the last three decades has been built upon a bastion of institutional leadership, both economic and political – something that should not be forgotten. While Washington has had to contribute a disproportionate amount to these institutions and alliances, it is not because policy makers were duped, but because they recognised that the benefits of leadership outweighed the costs. The Bretton Woods system and subsequent dominance of world trade were not fashioned out of altruism, but as a way of advancing the interests of the United States via systemic leadership.

After the Trump administration abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement – the economic centrepiece of Obama’s rebalance to Asia – without a replacement, doubts were been raised in Asia about the future credibility of US leadership in the region. While the TPP has been a contentious issue, the rationale underpinning the agreement represented an extension of the post-WWII American rules-based order strategy that has underpinned its pre-eminence for decades. Furthermore, Beijing is currently advancing its own institutions that challenge the US leadership – such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In this context, active retrenchment from international institutions carries enormous costs to Washington. Xi Jinping’s portrayal of Beijing as an alternative leader of globalisation at Davos in January has been widely touted as the seizing of an opportunity to place China in a position to adopt a mantle of leadership as the US recedes. And in Southeast Asia, the formation of the aforementioned Beijing-centred institutions provides the framework for the assumption of economic and trade leadership throughout the region. China is already an indispensable trading partner in most of the Asia-Pacific region and is rapidly placing itself at the heart of a new set of institutions to provide the foundation for extending a sphere of influence which is in parts already there.

So if the new administration in Washington hopes to combat Beijing’s adventurism in the South China Sea, it must recognise both Beijing’s wider strategy and the structural factors of America’s own pre-eminence before intensifying a militaristic response. The absence of war that has been sustained in the Western Pacific over the last four decades has been fundamental to the political stabilisation and economic development of the region – and it is in no state’s interests for this to end. A return to the competitive cat-and-mouse military confrontations of the Cold War era is fundamentally short-sighted and fails to recognise the wider geopolitical contest between Beijing and Washington. So as Beijing seeks to extend its sphere of influence and deter continued American pre-eminence in the region, the Trump administration must bolster its structural influence, otherwise, Washington will increasingly find itself disadvantaged.

So how can the Trump Administration undertake this task? Most importantly, it must be appreciated that the expansion of US access to Asian economies amid the much touted Asian-century was not only about economic leverage, but also about consolidating a US sphere of leadership and influence which has staggered as China grows. While the military must play an important part within a reinforcement of US interests in the region, it should be harnessed to further reinforce structural leadership. For instance, a return to discussions to establish an Indo-Pacific Quad, a hypothetical military alliance United States, India, Japan, and Australia, could both reinforce influence and establish a US-centric institution with the authority to weather Chinese claims of American belligerence. Likewise, active engagement with ASEAN states, both individually and collectively, must be maintained, in order to ensure the US presence in the region is continually recognised. In order to counter Beijing’s economic weight, an alternative to the TPP must be sought, otherwise Chinese will increasingly harness the ability to rewrite the US rules of trade in the region. Beijing’s strategy is based on an appreciation that its own sphere of influence is growing with time, so in order to counter this, the Trump Administration must reassure the region as a whole that they are there to stay.


Douglas Gray is a Masters student at Kings College London in the War Studies Department, studying Intelligence and International Security. Previously, he completed his honours degree at Victoria University Wellington in New Zealand, majoring in international relations and political science. His special research interests are information warfare, intelligence sharing and competition in the Indo-Pacific.


Endnotes

[1] The current round of tensions were sparked after a tense standoff between Beijing and Manila over the Scarborough Shoal in 2008; eventually leading to Beijing’s de facto control of the outcrop in 2012. Later, in 2014, another standoff occurred between Beijing and Hanoi over drilling operations by a Chinese state-owned oil company 17 nautical miles from Triton Island, eventually leading to the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam.

[2] While Beijing is notably not the only state reclaiming land in the South China Sea, with similar activities being undertaken by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, they have certainly done so further and faster than any others.

[3] Ratified by nearly all coastal states in the disputes, UNCLOS establishes an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within 200 nautical miles of coastal waters while also guaranteeing passage rights for naval vessels through these zones.


Image 1 source: https://qz.com/763161/it-is-time-to-rename-the-south-china-sea/

Image 2&3 source: https://amti.csis.org/fiery-cross-reef/

Image 5 source: https://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/BN-RO104_0109da_GR_20170109164947.jpg

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Asia-Pacific, East Asia, feature, featured, ma, Militarisation, South China sea, Strife Feature

The Little Blue Men: China’s Maritime Proxy-Warfare Strategy

September 9, 2016 by Cheng Lai Ki

By: Cheng Lai Ki

28-3351721-2101-2

Maritime tensions in the East Asia region are undoubtedly a hallmark event of the early twenty-first century, as well as of the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a regional superpower in the East. Concurrent to existing tensions between Japan, Korea and the PRC over islands in the East China Sea (i.e. Senkaku), the emerging Eastern power has also begun to expand into the South China Sea – claiming its historical sovereignty. Coined as the ‘Little Blue Men’, China has increased the deployment of its Maritime Militia into the disputed waters within South-East Asia (SEAsia) over the past six months. This proxy-warfare strategy is similar to President Valdimir Putin’s ‘Little-Green-Men’ strategy of deploying civilian militia forces to support Russian operations during the Ukrainian Crisis.[1] China’s military and naval expansion in the region has not slowed, especially with the integration of the Type 053 Frigate into its Coast Guard Force in around June 2016.[2] While it remains relatively easy to track the progression of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and its new assets/platforms, tracking its Maritime Militia has proven somewhat more elusive.

The ‘Little Blue Men’ are China’s Maritime Militia formed of civilian fishermen and seafaring merchants. According to an article from Defense One, the PRC’s ‘Little Blue Men’ were ‘Chinese merchant and fishing vessels [behaving] in sharp contrast to China’s navy ships, “crossing the [USS Lassen’s] bow and manoeuvring around the [navy] destroyer even as they kept their distance”’.[3] Articles 27 and 28 in Section 3 of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) have established the immunity and relevant protective laws of civilian/commercial vessels conducting passage through ‘sovereign waters’. This issue has been under consistent debate after China’s disregard  for the Court of Arbitration’s ruling on 12 July 2016 about China’s sovereignty of the South China Sea. The ruling effectively denounced most of China’s maritime activity in the region as non-innocent passage in an Economic Free Zone belonging to the surrounding SEAsian countries. The PRC has since vowed to disregard the ruling and continued to conduct operations and increased presence within the contested waters.

China’s use of the Maritime Militia is not a new strategy. It existed after the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1920s and its solidification as China’s main political power in the 1960s. According to Erikson and Kennedy, the first recorded implementation of maritime militia can be linked to its island seizure campaigns during the 1950s – namely, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1955-96).[4] That PLAN has continued with this proxy-warfare strategy is evident from the 2012 seizure of the Scarborough Shoals from the Philippines and the 2014 repelling of Vietnamese vessels from a Chinese oil-platform located near the contested Paracel Islands.[5] The PLAN Maritime Militia has been defined by the commanders from the Zhongshan garrison as ‘an irreplaceable mass armed organization not released from production and a component of China’s ocean defence armed forces [that enjoys] low sensitivity and great leeway in maritime rights protection actions.’[6] In a 2014 Official PLA Publication, it described its Maritime Militia as ‘穿上迷彩是合格战士,脱下迷彩是守法渔民’; which can be translated into ‘a soldier when wearing camouflage, complying fishermen when not’. Such hybrid strategies can also be identified in Western civilizations, as with the historical use of privateers by the East India Trading Company to protect merchant vessels traveling the high-seas.[7] Despite this maritime proxy-warfare being a historically entrenched strategy, it has to be modernized to adapt to contemporary laws and operational platforms. What are the modern military strategic roots of China’s ‘Little Blue Men’? Outside of regional presence, what other objectives can an efficient militia support?

 

2013 Science of Military Strategy & Thousand Grains of Sand

The roots of China’s modern Maritime Militia strategy can be most recently traced back to the 2013 Science and Military Strategy publication and the concept of Forward Defence of its strategic space.[8] The concept essentially emphasises the need to shift possible contention locations away from China’s geographical (inclusive of coastal) territory and into its peripheral regions. By expanding its defendable dominion, China effectively increases the distances between itself and potential adversaries. This enforcement of forward defence can be further confirmed through the fortifications (i.e. runways and radar towers) made on the artificial islands in the disputed maritime regions in SEAsia. Yet, how does this apply to their Little Blue Men?

To realize their Forward Defence strategy within its maritime domain, China utilises its largest asset: its people. Chairman Mao once characterised the contentions China faces (and will face) as a ‘People’s War’; where everyone is equally confronted by the same threat, and hence arises the need for collective resistance.[9] As such, the notion of unity is an essential concept identifiable in leadership discussion across multiple topics as argued by Martin Jacques in a 2010 TEDTalk. This unity is essentially the concept of nationalism (or national pride), as stated in the 2014 official publication of China’s Maritime Militia, mentioned above. Adapting this to the PLAN’s Maritime Militia strategy, the 2013 Science of Military Strategy publication essentially suggests utilizing China’s grandiose civilian population to its advantage. This reflects another strategy known as Thousand Grains of Sand, where power can be obtained through exploiting the volume of the citizen population for intelligence and warfare purposes.[10] To skeptical security scholars, this deployment of civilians onto the frontline and exploitation of their attack immunity resembles a ‘human shield’. Evidence of this strategy is evident from incidents where detained fishing vessels were ‘rammed’ clear (and allowed to escape) by the larger Type-053 Frigates of the Chinese Coast Guard (essentially warships) escorts. This allows the PRC to project military presence in the maritime domain under the guise of protective escorts.

china-map
Fig 1. China’s Maritime Forward Defence Area The red line on the map indicates the general area of China’s maritime forward defence activities. It can be argued that this line essentially forms another ‘Great-Wall’ to defend its empire. Hence, the notion of forward defence but through regulated naval patrols, Maritime Militias (basically a human-shield) and artificial outposts.

Outside of Power & Control

Outside of establishing presence and control in the contested maritime region, an efficient militia can also provide significant human intelligence (HUMINT) support – as defined by Michael Herman’s HUMINT Pyramid.[11] The PLAN’s Little Blue Men are civilians nonetheless and are able to travel inconspicuously throughout several maritime regions. Although illegal, the identity of seafaring vessels is dependent on what flag they fly during their passage. In addition, when coupled with China’s extensive HUMINT infrastructure of embedded civilian spies, the Little Blue Men can easily become a means of payload delivery and asset deployment for the PLAN and other Chinese agencies. Of course, while these concepts remain , we should not deny the possibilities of such strategies – especially with China’s increasing recognition of Cross-Domain Warfare.[12] China recognises the need to defend its maritime peripherals to ensure a more inclusive security environment, especially after its geographical command reform in 2015 (See Fig 1).

In summary, China’s Little Blue Men strategy supports a greater concept of strategic space expansion through forward defence. Guided by Mao’s concept of all Chinese conflicts requiring national resistance, it is of no surprise that the CCP would be expanding its militia programs – something reflected in its HUMINT programs and even cyberspace according to Sheldon and MacReynolds.[13] Understanding that militaristic behaviour would significantly undermine the image projected by Xi Jinping’s administration, the party has turned to its massive civilian population. It is without a doubt that the objective of China’s ‘Little Blue Men’ is to support its strategic space expansion without projecting a direct military presence in the region. The employment of militia forces is a revitalization of its older strategies of creating a sort of maritime wall capable of intelligence gathering, early-warning and forward defense.

 

 

 

Cheng served as an Amour Officer and Training Instructor at the Armour Training Institute (ATI) in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and now possesses reservist status. Currently undertaking his MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s College London, his research revolves around security considerations within the Asia-Pacific Region and more specifically around areas of Cybersecurity, Maritime Security and Intelligence Studies. His Graduate thesis explores the characteristics and trends defining China’s emerging Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare capabilities. He participated in the April 2016 9/12 Cyber Student Challenge in Geneva and has been published in IHS Janes’s Intelligence Review in May 2016. You can follow him on Twitter @LK_Cheng

 

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Herman, M. Intelligence and Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996.

[2] Qiu, M. ‘Chinese Military Strategy: Cross-Domain Concepts in the 2013 Edition’, Cross-Domain Deterrence Working Paper, (La Jolla, CA), September 2015.

[3] See Sheldon, R. & McReynolds, J. ‘Civil-Military Integration and Cybersecurity’, in Lindsay, J.R., Cheung T.M. & Reveron, (eds.) D.S. China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy and Politics in the Digital Domain, (New York: Oxford University Press), Apr 2015; for more information about China’s Cyber-Militias.

[4] “Little Green Men” a primer on Modern Unconventional Russian Warfare, Ukraine 2013 – 2014, (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command), 2015.

[5] Lin, J. & Singer, P.W. ‘China arms up with a new warship’, PopularScience, (Jun 01 2016); [Online].

[6] Watson, B. ‘The D Brief: U.S. to China: No harm, no foul in the South China Sea’, DefenceOne, (Nov 3 2015); [Online], Available from: http://www.defenseone.com/news/2015/11/the-d-brief-november-03-2015/123349/?oref=search_Little%20Blue%20Men, (Accessed Sept 1 2016).

[7] Erickson, A.S. ‘Revelations on China’s Maritime Modernization’, TheDiplomat, (Apr 16, 2016); [Online], Available from: http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/revelations-on-chinas-maritime-modernization/ (Accessed Sept 1 2016).

[8]Erickson, A.S. & Kennedy, C.M. ‘China’s Maritime Militia: What is it and how to deal with it’, Foreign Affairs, (Jun 23 2016), [Online]

[9]曾鹏翔, 傳志刚, 连荣华 [Zeng Pengxiang, Chuan Zhigang, Lian Ronghua], “科学构建海上民兵管控体系” [Scientifically Build a Maritime Militia Management System], National Defense, No. 12 (2014), pp. 68-70; as cited in Erikson A.S. & Kennedy C.M. China’s Maritime Militia, (Arlingotn, VA: Centre for Naval Analysis), 2016, pp. 1

[10] Cheng, LK. ‘Private Contractors, Governments and Security by Proxy: An analysis of contemporary challenges, governmental developments and international impacts of private military and security companies’, Dissertation: University of Leicester, (2015).

[11] Xiaosong, S. (eds), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], (Beijing, CN: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2013), 104.

[12] Cho, T.K. ‘Mao’s War of Resistance: Framework for China’s Grand Strategy’, Parameters, (2011); 6 – 18.

[13] Dunnigan, J. ‘China’s Thousand Grains of Sand’, Strategy Page: Dirty Little Secrets, (Jul 21 2005),

Image Source: http://files.balancer.ru/forums/attaches/2014/01/28-3351721-2101-2.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Active Defense, China, China Maritime Strategy, feature, intelligence, Little Blue Men, proxy, South China sea, UNCLOS

How Japan can deter China’s increasing maritime activity

May 13, 2016 by Gen Kawasaki

By: Gen Kawasaki

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Minami Kojima (foreground), Kita Kojima (middle right) and Uotsuri (background) are the disputed islands in the East China Sea, called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. Source: Washington Times

The 21st century has seen China and Japan drift towards treacherously ‘warmer’ waters. The two countries have failed, over and over, to settle historical matters and territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With a shifting balance of maritime power, their geostrategic calculations in the East and South China Sea cannot be overlooked.

Given the amalgamation of events in the region, could Tokyo implement a strategy of deterrence in the disputed waters due to Beijing’s increasing ventures?

As China currently occupies seven artificial features in the South China – fortified with three fully operational airstrips and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs),[1] Japan could implement a strategy of deterrence whilst increasing maritime interoperability with its regional allies. Since March 2016, Tokyo has become more proactive within the regional security framework by increasing both multilateral naval exercises and arms exports to bolster maritime security and capacity of regional allies. [2]

In the future, China should expect an uptick in United States military presence in the southern waters, with Japan becoming more willing to participate in Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and other maritime operations – as demonstrated during their last Iron Fist exercise, where they conducted mock amphibious landings. [3] Tokyo should also strengthen their interoperability with regional allies in order to deter China from deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their little ‘bastion’ they have created in the Paracels and the Spratlys. [4] The most progressive and rational response Japan can take in the South China Sea is to deepen a three-way strategic alliance between Australia and the U.S. aimed to deter and ‘contain’ China by assuring presence during peacetime and superiority during conflict. Indeed, all three countries employ or have plans to employ a number of common weapon platforms and systems such as the F-35 fighter,[5] [6] anti-submarine helicopters and the Aegis Combat System, facilitating the opportunity to work together and develop common operating concepts, tactics and doctrine. [7] Increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sharing would also help deter Chinese submarine excursions and naval activities.

Deterrence can also be applied in the East China Sea with the lingering Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The Senkaku are prime maritime real estate, and Tokyo’s decision to refrain from deploying permanent troops on them, combined with Beijing’s increasing ventures, may erode Japan’s geostrategic position in the years to come. Two hypothetical scenarios illustrating how a deployment of permanent military troops would be an effective deterrence against Chinese land proclamations can be employed.

The first scenario is that China could invade the island with conventional troops to prompt negotiations on her terms and dare Japan to be the first to resort to lethal force to reclaim them. The second scenario is that Beijing could use ‘civilian activists,’ amongst which there could be undercover Special Forces, to occupy the island (contingencies can vary from a group of students planting a flag on the island or ‘researchers’ setting up a camp to conduct marine studies). The scenarios can be further developed into airborne incursions where the troops/civilians can be inserted by helicopters or other aircraft. This being said, although one can physically block boats without sinking them, the only way to prevent the passage of an aircraft is to shoot it down. [8] Should the Japanese Coast Guard use lethal force to try and retake the islands or prevent the aircraft from landing, Japan would be forced into a position of aggressor – something that any actor in the South China Sea should avoid at all costs.

Without troops on the islands, an invasion could be seen as ratcheting up tensions. With troops on the Senkakus, invasion would mean starting a war, in which the Chinese would be depicted as the aggressors. [9] These examples highlight that for Japan, it would be wise to station permanent troops on the Senkakus in order to deter any possible land proclamation and to maintain the current status quo. Indeed, democracies traditionally avoid being the first ones to shoot, and Tokyo’s move would make China less likely to use force if it implicates drawing first blood and undeniably appearing as the aggressor.

China’s ‘cabbage’ strategy, [10] as seen in the South China Sea, aims at letting the regional and international level acclimatize to the newly established status quo – that of artificially built islands. If we were to apply this to the East China Sea, a sluggish and indecisive response from Tokyo upon the capturing of an undefended Senkakus could possibly lead, over the long term, to Beijing’s control of the islands as the new status quo. If Japan were to retake the islands, they could be depicted as the aggressors who are breaking the status quo.

However, Japan’s choice to deter may be seen by China as an act of aggression. China could react against this in a disproportionate manner, from antagonistic rhetorical campaigns, to economic sanctions, or even potentially to a physical attack. In order to avoid such misunderstandings, Tokyo should make its utmost priority to remain transparent and responsive towards Beijing about their strategic moves in this naval chess game[11]. This strategy of deterrence should go hand-in-hand with increased diplomatic talks between China, Japan and the US. Perhaps the establishment of a Beijing-Tokyo hotline would relieve tensions and bring the countries closer, whilst reducing the scope for miscalculation and misunderstandings. However, the preliminary challenge is to reach an agreement to firstly meet.

 

 

Gen Kawasaki is a second year undergraduate at King’s College London. He was the researcher and coordinator for the 2016 King’s College London Crisis Simulation that replicated tensions in the South China Sea.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Reuters, Staff Report. “‘Chinese missiles’ in South China Sea seen as escalation of tensions.” Japan News, February 16, 2016. Accessed May 07, 2016. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/17/asia-pacific/china-deployed-advanced-sams-disputed-isle-fox-news/#.Vy36zYQrKUk

[2] Tetsuro Kosaka.  “China’s island-building in the South China Sea is ruffling feathers worldwide.” Nikkei Asian Review, April 21, 2016. Accessed April 22, 2016. http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160421-AFTERSHOCKS/Politics-Economy/China-s-island-building-in-the-South-China-Sea-is-ruffling-feathers-worldwide

[3] Defense Media Activity, Department of Defense. “Exercise Iron Fist 2016: Amphibious Operations.” Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) video 01:45, March 3, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2016. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/452702/exercise-iron-fist-2016-amphibious-operations#.VyH80PkrKUk

[4] Tetsuro Kosaka. “China’s island-building in the South China Sea is ruffling feathers worldwide.” Nikkei Asian Review, April 21, 2016. Accessed April 22, 2016.  http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160421-AFTERSHOCKS/Politics-Economy/China-s-island-building-in-the-South-China-Sea-is-ruffling-feathers-worldwide

[5] “Joint Strike Fighters: Government to spend $12 billion on 58 more next-generation F-35s” ABC News, April 23 2014. Accessed May 7, 2016. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236

[6] Chris Cooper, Sachiko Sakamaki and Gopal Ratnam. “Lockheed Martin wins Japan Order for 42 F-35 Fighter Planes.” Bloomberg, December 20, 2011. Accessed May 7, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-20/lockheed-martin-wins-japan-jet-fighter-contract-over-boeing-eurofighter

[7] Andrew Shearer. “One way forward in the South China Sea.” Nikkei Asian Review, April 5, 2016. Accessed April 23, 2016. http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Andrew-Shearer-One-way-forward-in-the-South-China-Sea

[8] Alex Calvo. “Why Japan should put boots on the ground on the Senkaku Islands.” Strife Blog, May 25, 2015. Accessed April 22, 2016. https://strifeblog.org/2015/05/25/why-japan-should-put-boots-on-the-ground-on-the-senkaku-islands/

[9] Alex Calvo. “Why Japan should put boots on the ground on the Senkaku Islands.” Strife Blog, May 25, 2015. Accessed April 22, 2016. https://strifeblog.org/2015/05/25/why-japan-should-put-boots-on-the-ground-on-the-senkaku-islands/

[10] Harry Kazianis. “China’s Expanding Cabbage Strategy.” The Diplomat, October 29, 2013. Accessed May 7, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-expanding-cabbage-strategy/

[11] Riccardo Cociani. “Is War with China inevitable?” The Telegraph, April 18, 2016. Accessed April 19, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/18/is-war-with-china-inevitable/

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: China, Diaoyu, Japan, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, PLA-N, Senkaku, South China sea

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