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You are here: Home / Archives for South Asia

South Asia

Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations: Islamabad Calling, Will Dhaka Respond?

February 12, 2021 by Strife Staff

Bangladeshi youth commemorate the Bengali freedom fighters of the 1971 war at the National Memorial in Dhaka, on Victory Day, 16 December 2019

By Silvia Tieri

In South Asia, music speaks politics. Among uncountable melodic masterpieces, there is a moving Pakistani ghazal, Woh Humsafar Tha, that goes like this:

Woh humsafar tha magar us sey humnawai na thi…

Adavatein thi, taghaful tha, ranjishein thi magar

Bicharne walay main sab kuch tha, bewafai na thi…

(He/She was my companion (fellow-traveller) but there was no harmony between us…

There were feelings of animosity, indifference, and anguish but

In my departing partner I had found all but unfaithfulness…)

The composition gained new popularity within and beyond the country in 2011 thanks to its indie-style remake that served as a soundtrack for a romantic soap-opera also named “Humsafar” (Hum: together; Safar: journey). However, few among its younger fans will know that this song tells the story of no typical heartbreak. In fact, the two co-journyers who had so much in common yet could not quite stick together – as the lyrics say – are Pakistan and Bangladesh, parting ways five decades ago. The ghazal was written by Naseer Turabi soon after the news of the fall of Dhaka (for Indians: Lt. Gen. Niazi’s surrender to Indian forces; for Bangladeshis: Victory Day) reached West Pakistan on 16 December 1971, leaving him shocked and in tears.

When the great partition of the Indian subcontinent divided Punjab and Bengal in 1947, Bengalis of the East had joined their Western co-religionists into a brave political journey called Pakistan: a homeland for South Asian Muslims, forming a nation separate from the Hindus’. However, while they officially constituted a single nation-state, the two wings of Pakistan (one’s capital was Karachi, the other’s Dhaka) were divided by significant cultural, ethnolinguistic, and socio-economic differences, as well as by more than two thousand kilometres of Indian territory. It could not last. Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib “Bangabandhu”,  father of Bangladeshi nationalism as well as the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the East eventually seceded, militarily supported by India. East and West Pakistan had existed as one for less than twenty-five years. In 1971 they split. It was a massive blow to the Two-Nations Theory that had been Pakistan’s raison d’être.

On paper, Pakistan and Bangladesh have much in common. They are the two Muslim-majority nations of the Indian subcontinent, carved out of British India by means of partition(s). They also both share a complicated relationship and some long borders with South Asian hegemon India, although the Indo-Bangladeshi border is rather porous, while the Indo-Pakistani is the most militarised in the world. Nonetheless, relations between Dhaka and Islamabad, which replaced Karachi as Pakistan’s capital in 1967, have been strained ever since Bangladeshi independence.

Hasina’s perceived closeness to India, as well as her government’s vigorous prosecution of former pro-Pakistani and Islamist forces since the late 2000s, have cast a long shadow on post-1971 bilateral relations. A partial rapprochement had occurred earlier, under the rule of Ziaur Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), traditionally closer to Pakistan. However, Hasina’s Awami League (AL) inherited the independence legacy and in 2008 returned to power, maintaining a solid grasp over it ever since. In 2009 the AL administration created the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a special court in charge of prosecuting war crimes, including genocide, committed by the Pakistani Army and its collaborators during the 1971 war. Because the convicted belong to political forces that are AL’s archenemies, the ICT receives criticism not only for its supposed low judicial standards, but also for being allegedly used to knock out political competition. In Bangladesh, it still counts on considerable popular support.

Bilateral relations between the once humsafars have been almost non-existent in the last decade. The execution of Bangladeshi members of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) in 2013 and 2016, strongly condemned by the Pakistani Parliament, marked their lowest points. In May 2019, it even seemed that the two countries temporarily suspended reciprocal visa issuance. The last high-level official visit of a Bangladeshi head of state to Pakistan dates back to February 2006, when Islamabad received then-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, heiress of husband Ziaur Rahman’s BNP leadership.

Speculations about a possible thaw, however, emerged following a series of gestures initiated by Pakistan in 2019 and continued in 2020. In September 2019, Pakistani Foreign Minister S.M. Qureshi phoned his Bangladeshi counterpart A.K.A. Momen to apprise him on Pakistan’s position over Kashmir after New Delhi revoked of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had granted special status to the disputed region until August 2019.The two talked again in March 2020 regarding the  pandemic. In July 2020, Pakistani High Commissioner I.A. Siddiqui met Momen in Dhaka. Days later Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan paid a courtesy call to Sheikh Hasina, exchanging views on the COVID-19 emergency, Kashmir, and inviting the Prime Minister to visit Islamabad. Khan also expressed commitment to deepen relations. This was reiterated on 3 December 2020, when High Commissioner Siddiqui and Hasina held a courtesy meeting in Dhaka. Additionally, Pakistan expressed its interest in deepening the trade relationship with Bangladesh, especially in terms of partnerships and investments in the textile sector.

These unusual overtures alerted Indian hawks in particular, as they caught India in a turbulent period, dotted by protests and lockdown impositions in Kashmir, border tensions with China, and a general deterioration of relations with regional neighbours. Some consider that Pakistan’s move towards Bangladesh is an attempt to take advantage of the widening vacuum left by New Delhi’s policy towards its eastern neighbour, less attentive in the latest years despite declared intentions to “Look East” and to “Neighbourhood First”. One emerging commonality between Islamabad and Dhaka is their convergence towards China as a key investor, development partner, and defence supplier, proving Bangladesh has other reliable options besides India. While Pakistan remains China’s major ally in South Asia, Dhaka-Beijing relations have been recently upgraded to a “strategic partnership of cooperation” in 2016. 

Overall, Pakistan’s recent openings towards Bangladesh undoubtedly signalled an interest to rekindle an otherwise frosty bilateral relationship. But the critical issues that keep poisoning it have been left untouched. These are rooted in the divergent Pakistani and Bengali nationalisms, and their irreconcilable narratives of the facts of 1971. The AL and most Bangladeshis are determined that Pakistan owes a formal apology for its actions against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, acknowledges neither the accusation of genocide nor the number of victims alleged by Dhaka. Because the matter is so controversial, to establish where history ends and national narratives begin remains a challenging task. Other pending bilateral issues include the status of Bangladesh’s Biharis, the question of asset sharing, as well as the 1974 trilateral agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, of whose violation Bangladesh and Pakistan have accused each other. Meanwhile, to the dismay of Pakistan, the war crime trials have continued in Bangladesh. In 2019, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court resumed hearing appeals of such trials after a three year interruption. In the same year, the ICT emanated 14 new death sentences to former militants of JeI and Razakar Bahini. Also, Bangladesh’s official stance on Kashmir remains non-intervention. Although the notorious abrogation of Article 370 was met with protests in Dhaka, Foreign Minister Momen reiterated that it is an internal issue of India into which Bangladesh will not get involved. 1971 was a bad break-up. Pakistan is now making a move. But Dhaka still wants Islamabad to apologise and make amends, before they can embark on a new journey, together.

Silvia Tieri is a political scientist and ethnographer in training based at King’s India Institute. In 2019 she joined the King’s College London-National University of Singapore Joint PhD Programme. Her doctoral research concerns the politics of linguistic identity in contemporary India and Pakistan. Before joining KCL, she was a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore. She holds a Master’s in International Relations from the University of Pisa (Italy) and a Master’s by Research in South Asian Studies from the National University of Singapore.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: Bangladesh, India, music, Pakistan, South Asia, strategy

Hizbul Mujahideen in Assam: A non-existential threat

October 17, 2018 by Strife Staff

By M.A. Athul, published 17 October 2018

Hizbul Mujahideen militants (Credit Image: Swarajya)

 

Assam, in Northeast India,  has been experienced a long spell of ethnic insurgency since 1979. Yet the state is witnessing a consolidation of peace and stability, (the insurgency related fatalities has fallen from 305 in 2014 to nine in 2018), with ethnic insurgent violence in its last leg. However, the recent arrest of Islamist militants from the state is an indicator that religious militant groups are also trying to find footing in the state, which borders Bangladesh.

three individuals, identified as Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) militants on 14th and 15th September 2018. They were arrested from Hojai, Udali (Nagaon District) and Byrnihat along Assam-Meghalaya border respectively. Reports indicate that the HM operatives were attempting at supplying arms including the AK 47 assault rifles for its operatives in the state.

On 18 September 2018, three more people were arrested for links with the Kashmiri insurgent group, from Hojai District and on  on 23 September 2018, an HM linkman identified as Abhumanyu Chouhan was arrested from Mosoka .

The arrests came soon after a HM militant of Assam origin, identified as Qamar-uz-Zama was arrested by Uttar Pradesh Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) on 13 September 2018 from Kanpur. According to reports, he was planning to conduct attack during Ganesh Chaturthi, a Hindu religious festival. Initial reports of Qamar-uz-Zama joining HM had surfaced on 8 April 2018 after his picture holding an automatic rifle went viral on the social media declaring him having joined Hizbul Mujahideen with the codename “Dr Hurairah”. According to his family, he had gone to the United States of America in 2011, returning in 2014 and going to Bangladesh the same year.

 

Hizbul Mujahideen

HM, which became operational in 1989 in Jammu Kashmir with Pakistani patronage, is one of India’s oldest militant groups. The group was formed as a proxy for Pakistan and a counter weight for another militant group Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was propagating ‘independence’ rather than accession to Pakistan. HM was established by Master Ahsan Dar as its chief. It was formed as a militant wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir. Mohammed Yusuf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin has been heading the organisation since 1990. Although earlier the group has a cadre strength of about 1,500, current estimates point at 400 active militants.

Security forces in J&K have had a significant tactical success against the group in recent times. According to partial data compiled by SATP, From January 2017 to September 2018 at least 74 HM militants have been killed in J&K, with about 29 HM militants being killed in the first eight months of 2017.

 

Back ground of Islamist Groups Operating in Assam

Traditionally, Assam’s insurgency landscape has been dominated by ethnic insurgent groups such as United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA-Independent) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). However, groups such as Muslim United Liberation Army (MULTA) and Bangladesh based Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) have also been operating as Islamist groups in Assam in addition to Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULF), Islamic Liberation Army of Assam and People’s United Liberation Front (PULF). According to the Assam Police, the Islamic terrorist groups started appearing in Assam after the Nellie massacre in 1983.

During the Assam violence in July 2012, the Central Government identified at least 19 Muslim fundamentalist organisations to watch in connection with violence in Assam.

NO Name of Organisation
1 Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA)
2 United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA)
3 Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA)
4 Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF)
5 Muslim Liberation Army (MLA)
6 Muslim Security Force (MSF)
7 Islamic Sevak Sanng (ISS)
8 Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI)
9 Revolutionary Muslim Commandos (RMC)
10 Muslim Tiger Force (MTF)
11 Muslim Liberation Front (MLF)
12 Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MLTA)
13 Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)
14 Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULTA)
15 Islamic National Front (INF)
16 Islamic Revolutionary Front (IRF)
17 United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA)
18 United Islamic Revolutionary Army (UIRA)
19 Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF)

 

Historically, the most active among these groups were the MULTA, and the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF)]. While the former confines its activities to Assam, the latter operates in Manipur as well.

Major global Islamist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and IS are also reportedly targeting the region. Notably, at the time of its formation in September 2014, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) had specifically mentioned Assam as its target, along with Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, IS in its ‘world dominion map’ has covered Assam among other parts of India. However, there is no visible signs of presence of these formations in the state.

 

Recent incidents

The presence of JMB in Assam was exposed after discovery of the Burdwan Module in West Bengal: an accidental blast at Burdwan on 2 October 2014, in which two JMB militants were killed and another was injured. NIA claimed that during the course of investigations, it had been found that operatives of JMB had established their networks in different Districts of Assam, Jharkhand, and West Bengal. According to the NIA Charge sheets, five accused in the case belonged to Assam. The NIA also , JMB operatives ‘were engaged in preparation of bombs, ammunition/arms, maintaining hideouts and organizing terrorist training camps in pursuance of a larger conspiracy to organise terrorist attacks in different parts of India and in Bangladesh’. One of the charge sheeted persons, Lal Mohammed aka Ibrahim, a JMB cadre arrested by Jharkhand Police on 18 April 2015 (the NIA officially arrested him on 27 April 2015), reportedly revealed to interrogators that JMB’s sabotage plans in Assam were to counter Bodo  . Reports indicated that MTFA was formed for the massacre of Muslims in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) in May 2014.

In a significant incident, six JMB militants were arrested in back-to-back operations in Goalpara and Chirang Districts of Assam on 25 September  2015. Earlier on 18 September 2015, a JMB training camp was uncovered at Daukhanagar in Chirang District.

 

Number of Islamist Militants arrested in India’s Northeast Region from 2015 to September 2018

 

Year Militant Groups
2015 JMB MTFA MULTA MLA PULF IM HM NS
  20 19 10 1 1 0 0 6
 
2016 24 6 1 0 0 1 0 0
 
2017 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 2
 
2018 0 0 2 0 0 0 7 2
Total 45 25 18 1 1 1 7 10

(Source : SATP)

 

State Parliamentary Affairs Minister Rockybul Hussain had informed the State Assembly on December 16, 2014, that between January 2001 to November 2014, 130 Islamist extremists, including 106 MULTA militants, 14 Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and 10 JMB militants, were arrested in Assam. He also added that between 1995 to 2014, 626 militants of Harkat-ul-Jihad (HuJI), MULFA, PULF and Islamic Security Force of India (ISFI) were arrested.

Despite the long list of Islamist militant groups present in Assam the fact that there is indicative of the lack of operational capabilities of such groups and the success . Moreover, given that groups such as Bangladesh-based JMB is using the region more as a safe house to escape crack down by the Bangladeshi authorities than as an operational area, likelihood of Islamist groups pulling of a successful attack remains rather remote.  Moreover, with HM coming under pressure in its core area of operations in J&K its ability of expand its area of operation is rather limited. In this light, possibility of more militant groups finding a foot hold in the state is a remote possibility and the detection and arrest of HM cell is unlikely to be a harbinger of a new trend. That being said, arrest of more than 100 religious militants being arrested in the region since 2015 and the fact that Assam has the second largest internet traffic related to Islamic State (IS) (after Jammu Kashmir) is a possible indicator that a segment of population is susceptible to Islamist radical ideology. Although the threat of Islamist militancy has been kept under check by law enforcement agencies, a pro-active effort by authorities to identity and ween away the susceptible population from extremist ideologies is required.

 


Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on LinkedIn 


Image Source: https://swarajyamag.com/politics/hizbuls-foray-into-north-east-at-pakistans-behest-triggers-alarm

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Counterinsurgecy, counterterrorism, India, South Asia

Strife Series on Counterterrorism and Human Rights, Part III – Silencing political dissent through counterterrorism measures in Bangladesh

January 23, 2017 by Strife Staff

By: Athul Menath

Bangladeshi Police returning from raids

Islamist violence has been increasing in Bangladesh since 2013 after secular and atheist bloggers or minorities including Hindus and Shiites have been targeted by Al-Qaeda on the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) and neo-JMB, another radical Islamist group with an ideological affinity towards the Islamic State (IS). While the consensus among security analysts is that the violence stems from a radical jihadi nature, the secular Awami League government primarily blamed its bitter political rivals, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) for the violence, cracking down on these opposition parties and using the violence to push for greater censorship.

Politicisation of law enforcement agencies

Ambiguities inherent in the definition of ‘terrorism’ has led to the broad use of counterterrorism tools to target the political opposition and general dissent. With its far-reaching scope, the Anti-Terrorism Act offers a legal basis to trial any dissenting voices who allegedly threaten the ‘solidarity of Bangladesh’. Compounding this problem is the politicisation of law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh. With both the BNP and Awami League relying on law enforcement agencies to strengthen their position, agencies are widely perceived to be politicised and inept. A majority of senior and mid-level positions are occupied by officers who have demonstrated their allegiance to the incumbent political party. In this light, the investigating capacity of security agencies is likely to be limited, and personal rewards for confessions of suspects might incentivize the use of blackmail or even torture.

Internet and media censorship

The government has also used the specter of terrorism to clamp down on internet freedom and the freedom of expression. In November 2015, citing militant threats, the government of Bangladesh temporarily blocked popular messaging services such as Viber and Tango. In a more drastic measure, Facebook was made inaccessible for 22 days until 10 December 2015. Moreover, the government approved a new digital security law that permitted law agencies to imprison any individual for spreading negative propaganda against former Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – the first PM of independent Bangladesh – on the internet. The law called for 14-year prison sentences for cybercrimes including cyber-attacks on government infrastructure. Bangladesh’s current cyber law – the Information and Communication Technology Act under which anyone publishing material ‘hurting religious beliefs or offending the state’ – has been used to target journalists, civil society groups and human rights organisations. When confronted with questions of proportionality, the Information Minister of Bangladesh Hasanul Haq stated that the ‘right flow’ of information was needed to stop the rise of militancy and propaganda. Earlier, the 2014 National Broadcast Policy approved the establishment of an ‘independent commission’ to oversee the content of electronic media in Bangladesh. under this, a Broadcast Commission will be set up that will prohibit independent news content that might tarnish the image of law enforcement agencies as well as the army. This effectively renders the government effective and final arbiter of media output.

A history of abusing power to silence dissent

In 2016, the government issued a large-scale crackdown on alleged militants during which nearly 15,000 individuals were arrested. However, only 194 were confirmed to be militants linked to radical Islamist groups and reports indicate that members of the political opposition party BNP had been maliciously targeted. Disappearances and unlawful detentions of political activists have become routine in Bangladesh. They constitute a violation of due process and are a complete distortion of the country’s official counterterrorism legislation. According to human rights organisations, the interaction between law enforcement agencies and treatment of suspects are also puzzling. Over the first nine months of 2016, 150 people were killed during confrontations or during custody, and 95 journalists were reportedly tortured.

However, abusing power and targeting dissent is unfortunately not new in Bangladesh’s volatile political system. When BNP was in power in 2002, it launched ‘Operation Clean Heart’ to counter proliferating crime. The operation resulted in the extrajudicial killing of at least 60 people, wounded about 3,000, and led to the arrest of more than 5,000. The then opposition Awami League claimed BNP had used the opportunity to target the political opposition rather than criminals.

Today, the actions of the International War Crimes Tribunal (ICT), which was set up in 2009 to investigate the war crimes committed during the 1971 war, is resulting in bereavement and polarization in Bangladeshi society. Until now, the tribunal has indicted more than 57 individuals mainly from political rival parties such as JeI, and executed high-profile leaders such as its former vice president, chief financier or Secretary General. Although the executed individuals were likely to have committed involved human rights violations during the 1971 war, the perception that the ICT is a tool in the hands of the government to target its political opposition, particularly the senior leadership in order to weaken the opposition institutionally has let to wide-spread grievance amongst political activists. Moreover, such crackdowns have decreased the operating space for legitimate political opposition and increased radicalism and militant recruitment. Given that many political activists have been put in overcrowded prisons, there is a large possibility of them coming in contact imprisoned militants who are actively recruiting within jails.

Polarisation facilitates radicalisation

Bangladesh has witnessed at least a dozen coups since its independence in 1971. Compounding this problem is the zero-sum political rivalry between BNP and Awami League. Given historical political volatilities, the primary aim of any government in Bangladesh remains to secure its position and maintain its stay in power and to delegitimize or destroy any dissenting voices. The effect of such drastic measures on actual national security remains questionable. While the anti-militancy raids have resulted in a relaxation of attacks in and around population centers, the respite is likely to be temporary. Although terrorist groups are likely to have dispersed to peripheral Bangladesh due to the crackdown, dangers of further radicalization and recruitment in their ranks will only be made easier should the government continue to abuse its position and further polarize Bangladeshi society.


Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is on counterterrorism policies in South Asia and the rule of law. Follow him on Twitter @loner/56.


Image Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/world/asia/bangladesh-police-kill-9-militants-in-gun-battle.html

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Bangladesh, feature, South Asia, Strife series

Strife Series on Grand Strategy, Part III: What a Trump victory means for South Asia

December 18, 2016 by Strife Staff

By Jonata Anicetti

The Indian PM Narendra Narendra Modi, USA President-elect Donald Trump, and Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif. Much less attention has been given to how Trump would deal with a nuclear South Asia.
The Indian PM Narendra Narendra Modi, USA President-elect Donald Trump, and Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif. Much less attention has been given to how Trump would deal with a nuclear South Asia.

In the past few weeks, much has been said about how U.S. Grand Strategy could change with respect to Europe, the Middle East, Russia, and China now that Donald Trump will become the next U.S. President in January 2017. Much less attention has been given to how Trump would deal with a nuclear South Asia. From the few statements on the region the President-elect has pronounced during and after his election campaign, it seems that the U.S. will favor India, rather than Pakistan, as an important ally to balance China. And yet, while Trump’s offer to mediate between the two South Asian rivals to promote stability in the region is detached from current U.S. policy, it could actually be a valuable and unexpected asset for Islamabad.

Since President Bill Clinton, the importance of India to the White House has been growing with every administration. In the 1990s, faced with an increasingly powerful and assertive China in the Asia-Pacific, Washington started to look at India as its natural ally to contain Beijing. Thus, when in 1999, nuclear rivals India and Pakistan went to war in Kargil, President Clinton pressured Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw his troops from India-controlled areas. The same script was repeated in late 2001 when, following a dreadful attack on the Indian Parliament by a Pakistan-based terrorist group, India initiated its largest military mobilization against Pakistan that pushed both countries to the brink of war. Like his predecessor, President George W. Bush pressured Pakistan to step back.

In 2000, writing in Foreign Affairs the then US Secretary of State-in-waiting Condoleezza Rice observed, “there is a strong tendency conceptually to link India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one”. The Bush administration understood that improving bilateral relations with India would help enhance its ability to counter China’s rising power in Asia. In 2006, Bush and India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, which allowed India to receive civilian nuclear assistance without being a member of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (TBT).

The U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement came into force in 2008, during the last year of the Bush presidency. As Barack Obama stepped into the Oval Office in 2009, he confirmed his support to the agreement and declared India to be an indispensable U.S. partner. Moreover, visiting the Indian Parliament in 2015, he reiterated the U.S.’ support of India’s candidacy for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. While U.S.-India relations under Obama improved, conversely, relations between the U.S. and Pakistan reached a new low. In 2011, the U.S. secretly went ahead with a military plan using the U.S. Special Forces to kill Osama bin Laden  in Abbottabad without the knowledge of Pakistani authorities. Although this constituted a violation of sovereignty under international law, it signalled that the U.S. did not trust the Pakistani government with sensitive information; incidentally, Osama bin Laden was killed next to Pakistan Military Academy. Further, funding cuts by the Congress towards Pakistan followed, and the hundreds of Pakistani civilians that have been killed by American counterterrorism drone strikes in the “Af-Pak” theatre of operations did not help boost confidence between the two Cold War allies.

Bilateral affairs continue to be strained between the U.S. and Pakistan; the Obama administration maintained silence on the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. This further ruffled feathers in Pakistan and reinforced U.S. sympathy towards the Indian cause. In fact, in both 1999 (Kargil War) and 2001-2002 (Twin Peak Crisis), Pakistan exploited fears of a nuclear escalation in South Asia to draw the U.S. in as a third-party to help extract concessions from India. Pakistan’s strategy nevertheless backfired, and without a third-party support, a conventionally stronger India is unlikely to accept Pakistan’s terms. Trump’s offer to mediate between the two countries has been warmly welcomed by Pakistan but understandably less so by India.

However, it is undeniable that the U.S. and India will continue to strengthen bilateral relations. During the presidential campaign, Trump remarked that if elected, India and the U.S. “will become even better friends, in fact…we are going to be best friends”. By contrast, Trump admitted to Pakistan being “the most dangerous country in the world”. While many believe that Trump will sober up his campaign rhetoric and forget many of his most controversial and outrageous ideas, statements such as “India’s check of Pakistan” and his strong statements regarding restricting  Muslims from certain countries to enter the U.S. certainly bodes ill for Islamabad. Nonetheless, Trump’s delusions of leadership and confidence in his own ability as a negotiator could be an unexpected gift to Islamabad which will seek to make sure Kashmir is high on the agenda of the next American President. As of now, in a recent phone call, Sharif got Trump to say that he “would love to visit Pakistan“. The last American President who visited Pakistan was Bush in 2006.


Jonata Anicetti holds a M.A. in Intelligence & International Security (KCL) and one in International Relations and European Studies (Cesare Alfieri).


Image credit: http://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/pakistan-media-donald-trump-us-president-nawaz-sharif-india-narendra-modi-government/443652/

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Donald Trump, feature, South Asia

Strife Series on Grand Strategy, Introduction: Whither Grand Strategy?

December 9, 2016 by Strife Staff

By: John A. Pennell

war-board-games
Grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power

In light of recent Western political developments—“Brexit,” Trump’s U.S. electoral victory, rise of populist and/or far-right movements across Europe—coupled with an assertive China, a resurgent Russia, bolder actions from Iran and North Korea, continued terrorist threats from ISIS and its affiliates, and an ongoing refugee crisis emanating from Africa and the Middle East, a number of experts have sounded the alarm regarding the implications of these developments for the cultural, economic, political, and security arrangements that have shaped the post-Second World War order and the role of “grand strategy” in the emerging world (dis-?)order.[1]

This series explores the impact of such trends on grand strategy in the specific country and regional contexts that include the U.S., Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Mexico. Before offering a summary of the pieces in the series, we should first take a step back and define what we mean by “grand strategy.”

According to British strategist Liddell Hart, grand strategy is the ‘policy which guides the conduct of war’ and its role is to ‘co-ordinate and direct all of the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.’[2] In other words, grand strategy incorporates all instruments of national power—the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—into the conduct of war and maintenance of peace.

With the exception of combatting terrorist organizations, the countries and regions reviewed in this series are generally not at war with any other state.[3] Thus, for the purposes of this series, we will refer to grand strategy in terms of its role in guiding states in their pursuit of political (including foreign policy) objectives rather than strictly military objectives.

Most authors in this Strife series explore how a new Trump administration’s grand strategy or policy priorities may affect a particular country or region, while one author considers how the strategic culture in Mexico has failed to adapt to the evolving global order.

First, Brian Babb focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the incoming Trump administration. He argues that the new White House leadership would use an “America-first” foreign policy based on transactional deal-making. The implications, Babb claims, are that the U.S. would prioritize stability over the promotion of liberal values (e.g., democracy, human rights), be more willing to work with certain authoritarian regimes (e.g., Russia and Syria) and be less inclined to support security arrangements (e.g., NATO) or economic partnerships without a clear material benefit to the U.S.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti examines the implications of a potential U.S. withdrawal from or a decreased presence in East Asia. He argues that the U.S.’ maintenance of security arrangements with its allies—Japan and South Korea—is critical during a time of increased territorial disputes between powers in the region, a nuclear North Korea, and Chinese aspirations for regional hegemony. Without a significant U.S. military presence in the region, Fischetti fears the long-standing East Asian security architecture would collapse resulting in U.S. partners falling into Beijing’s orbit.

In the third article, Jonata Anicetti explores how the new U.S. administration would deal with the South Asian nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. On the one hand, Anicetti describes Washington’s improving relations with India since the Clinton administration as part of an effort to counter China’s rise within Asia, and on the other hand, its deteriorating relations with Pakistan over the past several years. Nevertheless, in Anicetti’s view, President-elect Trump’s recent overtures to Pakistan offer hope that relations with Pakistan could potentially improve and lead to greater stability in South Asia.

Tony Manganello considers how the incoming Trump administration would view the U.S.’ security partnerships in Africa in the fourth article of the series. He argues that the U.S.’ ‘small footprint‘ approach to addressing key issues (e.g., counter-terrorism) across the African continent has been highly effective, in no small part due to the time-intensive cultivation of cooperative relationships with African governments and security forces. Taking a unilateral approach to fighting terrorism, including the use of conventional forces, Manganello warns, would not only undermine these relationships but likely prove to be unsuccessful.

The fifth piece in the series, authored by Alexis Herrera, takes a different approach. Herrera, rather than focusing on potential U.S. strategy towards Mexico, examines instead the grand strategy and strategic culture of Mexico as a “middle power.” In his view, Mexico’s strategic culture is found lacking due to an inability to prepare for the long run and a misunderstanding of the evolving global order. Examples of this include Mexico’s continued faith in the North American integration process and economic benefits of NAFTA, despite surging headwinds against those processes dating back to the 2008 recession amplified with recent political developments in the U.S. and elsewhere.

The pieces in this series offer important perspectives regarding the effects of potential shifts within the emerging global order on some select country- and regional contexts. While a number of the trends described in these pieces may raise significant concerns over global stability and the future of the so-called liberal world order, it is important to emphasize that many of these trends have yet to fully take shape. Thus, their potential impacts, positive or negative, are still open to debate. It is also necessary to remind ourselves that there’s often a significant gap between campaign rhetoric and actual policy formulation; key elections in France, Germany, and elsewhere have yet to take place; the conditions under which “Brexit” moves forward are still underway; and so forth. Still, the rising tide of populism and right-wing movements across the West, along with emerging powers who pose a challenge to the liberal international order, indicate the potential for significant change moving forward. To reiterate, this order is still evolving. Our current assumptions will very likely need adjustments as the economic, social, and political trends described earlier reach their conclusion.

Disclaimer: Please note that the views expressed in this document reflect the personal opinions of the author and are entirely the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the United States Government. USAID is not responsible for the accuracy of any information supplied herein.


John A. Pennell is a Series Editor of StrifeBlog and a PhD candidate in the Defence Studies Department (DSD) within the School of Security Studies at King’s College London. Mr. Pennell is a Career Member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, currently serving in Kyiv, Ukraine. His prior assignments have included Afghanistan, East Africa, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. Mr. Pennell has an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National Defense University/National War College (Washington, DC), an M.A. in Political Science from American University (Washington, DC), and a B.A. in Politics from The Catholic University of America (Washington, DC). You can follow him on Twitter @jpennell1970


Notes:

[1] Ian Buruma. November 29, 2016. “The End of the Anglo-American Order.” The New York Times Magazine. (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/magazine/the-end-of-the-anglo-american-order.html); The Economist.“Trump’s World: The New Nationalism.” November 19, 2016. (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710249-his-call-put-america-first-donald-trump-latest-recruit-dangerous?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/trumpsworldthenewnationalism); Peter Feaver. November 29, 2016. “A Grand Strategy Challenge Awaits Trump.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/a-grand-strategy-challenge-awaits-trump/); Mike J. Mazarr. October 5, 2016. “The World Has Passed the Old Grand Strategies By.” War On the Rocks. (http://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-world-has-passed-the-old-grand-strategies-by/); David Rothkopf. November 29, 2016. “Hitting the Reset Button on the International Order.” Foreign Policy. (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/29/hitting-the-reset-button-on-international-order/).

[2] B.H. Liddell Hart. Strategy. Second Revised Edition. New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967. (accessed from http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html)

[3] Although the U.S. and its allies are actively fighting the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), I do not consider ISIL a state in the traditional sense. Rather, I consider it a terrorist organization.


Feature Image Credit: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/topics/war-military-strategy

In-article Image credit: http://img2.rnkr-static.com/list_img_v2/19293/1839293/full/war-board-games.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Africa, East Asia, feature, Grand Strategy, Mexico, South Asia, Strife series, USA

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