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Strife Series: Colonial Legacies – Seeds of Violence – A Colonial Tale of Undivided Assam and its tryst with Ethnic Conflict

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Achik Matkrik Elite Force (AMEF) members surrender to Police, 22 January 2016. Photo Credit: Vishma Thapa, Licensed under Creative Commons

The strategic importance of the North Eastern states of India could not be disputed during the long stretch of colonial rule in India. Unifying the North East into British India was of absolute political necessity, concerning the relations with what was then known as Burma. The physical geography of North Eastern India, especially states like Assam, is mountainous. The presence of a plethora of tribal groups including the Miris, Mikirs, Lushai, Jaintia and Khamptis made the task of colonial administration very tricky in these spaces of both geographical and political upheavals. The margins of linguistic diversity and cultural practices in this region renders it an exciting place for any form of anthropological excavation. It is still considered a “miniature India,” marking the presence of such diverse ethnic groups. Ethnicity has played a major role in the politics of Assam since colonial times. Therefore, in order to make sense of the post-colonial developments in Assam, one needs to contextualize its colonial roots first. The nature of militarization, the rise of insurgent groups demanding secession, and frequent violent clashes between ethnic groups that we witness now in Assam in the 21st century, all have roots set in its colonial legacy.

The rationale of colonial interest in Assam was purely monetary in nature. The colonization of Assam’s tea estates was the beginning of the larger scheme of division and exploitation. The language policy in the valley was suppressive, making the Bengali community more dominant compared to the “Assamese” in language training. The creation of a new top-down hierarchy of Bengali officials made the landscape of Assam more divided, marking the onset of both social and economic exploitation. One of the most important waves of migration, during the colonial years, was the migration of peasants from East Bengal. This also marked demographic changes in the sub-region, provoking public pressure. The “Line System” was conceived in 1916 in response to these demographic changes in Assam, which made the Assamese-speaking population more susceptible to “otherized” communities. The Line System was an administrative decision of drawing a line between the tribal tracts in the hilly areas and the general districts of Assam. This exercise of boundary drawing set a limit to district jurisdiction and started defining areas of autonomy and areas of control.  The inception of drawing the Inner Line can be narrowed down to the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873. The drawing of administrative lines bifurcated the supposedly “hill tracts” and “plain areas”. The British interest in administering these spaces was twofold. Firstly, for revenue-generating concerns and secondly, the political significance of governing the North East. British interest in tea plantations, and surveying of land for this purpose, forced them to arrive at conflicting standoffs with hill tribes. Under these contexts, the boundaries were drawn to administratively focus on plain areas and keep the hill tracts under autonomy. This colonial mindset precipitated the hardened bifurcation between the hills and the plains.

The larger British political interest in the North Eastern Frontier grew more concrete with French involvement in Burma in the 1890s. And subsequently, the rise of China in South East Tibet. These concerns forced the British to spearhead the “line system” even further, with the creation of buffer states. The politics of boundary-making and autonomy around the hill tracts created consolidated cultural identities and a sense of alienation of the hill tribes in post-colonial India as well. The construction of categories like excluded areas, and backward tracts became a framework of governance even after Independence where identities had grown political wings. The neglect of plain tribes like the Bodo Kacharis and their conflict with the umbrella identity of “Assamese” in post-colonial India, was a breeding ground for the streaks of ethnic violence one witnesses in this region.

Independent Assam was built on the colonial understanding of divisive institutionalism. The constitutional protection of autonomy under the Sixth Schedule was granted to states like Assam, to maintain their own autonomous district councils. This gave considerable autonomy to the hills and frontier tribes of Assam. But the alienation of the plains tribes like the Bodo Kacharis, and their general political neglect, made it a breeding ground for future insurgencies. The very division of hills and plains was a colonial construct, which had little significance in contemporary Assamese Politics. The creation of consolidated racial identities, along with political under-representation—created a cocktail strong enough to spit ethnic fires for decades to come.

Currently, Assam, and North Eastern India more generally, are dominated by large insurgent groups like the Bodoland Liberation Tiger—often clashing with other ethnic groups. These clashes were perpetuated by a series of migrations from neighbouring countries like Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s. This influx of “other”, “foreign”, and “alien” immigrants into the plains of Assam, further inflamed the already delicate situation. With the politicization of “Muslim” immigrants, the conflict soon took on a religious aspect within the wider political context of the 1990s. Ethnic cleansing in villages of the Kamrup District in July 2012 exemplifies the dark side of ethnic strife between Bodos and Bengali Muslims in Assam. Last year on 26th July, we witnessed clashes with the Assam and Mizoram Police forces as well. These examples are important as they draw attention to the history of such inter-state boundary related disputes, which have a colonial legacy. The colonial tendency to draw lines for administrative reasons and revenue sharing concerns has planted infinite seeds of racial alienation. The creation of institutions of autonomy in post-colonial India has ultimately caused more damage than repair.

References:

  • Baruah, S (2001): India Against Itself (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).
  • Baruah, S (2010): Ethnonationalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press)
  • Brass, Paul. (1991). Ethnicity and Nationalism, Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage.
  • Gait, S Ε (2003): A History of Assam (New Delhi: Surjeet Publication)
  • Goswami, Sandhya (2001), “Ethnic Conflict in Assam”, The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol 62, June 2001.
  • Hussain, Monirul. (1992), “Tribal Question in Assam”, Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, May 6.
  • Misra, Udayan. (1989) “ Bodo Stir: Complex Issues, Unattainable Demands”, Economic and Political Weekly. Bombay. May 2.
  • Murshid, Navine (2016) “Assam and the Foreigner Within”, Asian Survey, Vol 56, June 2016.

Feminist Foreign Policy and South Asia: A scuffle between values and change

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Nepalese Battalion received UN Medal.
Photo Credit: United Nations, licensed under Creative Commons.

‘The personal is political.’

The above sentence, coined by Carol Hanisch, encapsulates a simple yet pervasive truth about women and their struggles. Women’s lives in the public domain have for a long time been affected directly by gendered power hierarchies and beliefs. Their participation and inclusion in the public domain are determined by the norms and beliefs laid out in the society. However, this politics of domination and subjugation do not exist only in the public domain but also affect the personal lives of people. Personal spaces and family lives are governed by gendered notions that put men in a higher pedestal than women. The personal and political are intrinsically linked, for one, the values imbibed in the personal also influence the political behaviour of women.

South Asian women, have been historically marginalised and excluded from active participation in the political sphere. In recent times, multiple developmental programs have attempted to decrease the regional gender gap in education, employment and political participation by focusing on women centric development, however, the Global Gender Gap Report 2020, highlights that South Asia has the second largest gender gap among the eight other regions of the world.

The gender gap, visible in the education, social and employment sector, is also reflected in the foreign policy and diplomatic decisions of the countries in the region. Female representation remains scarce in important positions in the international arena. Diplomacy as such is a gender-neutral term that does not differentiate between male and female participants, however, the hierarchies established in these societies makes it a male-dominant field. Without proper representation of female voices remain unheard and neglected in internal and international spaces. Female political agency in most South Asian countries is scarce. Female parliamentarians make up only 13% of parliamentarians in India, 21 % in Bangladesh, and Nepal tops the list with women comprising 33.5 % of the federal parliament. Though these statistics show a considerable improvement from previous years , they are not proportional to the female population living in these countries.

Despite improvement in terms of the political representation of women in various South Asian countries, ground level problems remain which need to be addressed to ensure feminist outlooks are taken into context when making international decisions. Complex patriarchal power structures in these countries limit the participation of women. In Nepal, for example, the 2015 constitution prevents women from providing their child with the right to citizenship. The only parent able to confer Nepalese citizenship is a ‘male’ member of society. This prejudicial notion limits women’s participation in society. Their participation becomes directly linked to a male member of society and they their roles are confined as just daughters and wives This limitation in role also manifests in the political decision-making process in times of war and conflict where a similar binary between the genders is adopted, labelling men as the protectors while women are the objects that are need of protection.

In a similar vein, in India, through protests like that of Shaheen Bagh, political representation and inclusivity has improved , with more women asserting themselves in the public sphere. However, international and diplomatic decision-making persists in excluding women from senior positions. As Khullar highlights, a false hard-soft diplomatic dichotomy has been created where defence, military, power and security are reserved as male domains and diplomatic decision-making surrounding topics of international trafficking, migration, women empowerment and human rights are labelled as soft-domains. An outlook that women rely on emotions and focus on soft-issues is still prevalent in many countries in the region and women ministers are often assigned positions based on the same assumption while diplomatic decision-making remain dominated by male leaders. Therefore, the diplomatic and foreign policy structure that has been monopolised by men does not allow space for feminist voices.

Allowing women more representation not just in internal but also international politics will open up new avenues for countries to make way for a more inclusive society. A feminist foreign policy will ensure that women who are confined to the domestic spheres are also represented in the decision-making process. A feminist foreign policy (FFP) agenda can act as a fresh perspective and opportunity to view war and peace from a different lens. FFP emphasises that gender is not an accidental but an intrinsic part of military, economic and diplomatic relations between nations. It allows countries to develop a holistic outlook towards decision-making in the international security arena by incorporating the voices of women and other marginalised communities.

Women’s issues in many societies are viewed through a cultural lens of culture while issues surrounding men are considered political. These traditional notions bar women from being active participants in the political arena. The responsibility to protect and various international agendas are also used patriarchal tools to advance strategic interests in interventionist wars across the world where men are responsible for the protection of women. In the light of this underrepresentation and exclusion from the mainstream international agenda, the inclusion of women in negotiation tables and their decisions should be taken into consideration. Hearing the voices of people from traditionally underrepresented groups in society will shed light upon the intersectional impact of any decision-making process.

The war-peace dichotomy, a fixture of traditional foreign policy, can be overcome by addressing issues surrounding migration, border policing and increased securitisation through a feminist lens. South Asia has an admirable history in terms of women residing in positions of power with Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal electing female leaders. However, despite such headline progress women in parts of South Asia are still subjected to discriminatory practices and are excluded from social and political participation. Adopting a feminist foreign policy in such a situation will allow countries in South Asia to assert their commitment to gender equality by addressing intersectional issues in both internal and international arena. Commitment towards a feminist foreign policy can also impact the global standing of countries and can help strengthen diplomatic ties.

The failings of Regionalism: SAARC and its struggle to thrive.

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Following the growing tensions between India and Pakistan, the 2014 summit was the last where all member states participated. Photo Credit: President Mahinda Rajapaksa, licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0.

The ongoing COVID crisis has exacerbated the disparity between states whilst also creating a new opportunity for regional cooperation. In South Asia, a region characterized by political disharmony and strategic schism, regionalism, though entrenched, hasn’t been able to prosper as possibilities of further integration and cooperation look uncertain.

Regional cooperation and interaction have become an important feature of the international order. The increasingly globalised and liberalised world that calls for interaction between all states has witnessed a regional reaction with states striving to keep their regional linkages intact. In South Asia, this need for interconnectedness has long been recognised and multiple attempts to create a spirit of pan-Asian cooperation were championed in various conferences like the Asian Relations Conference and Bandung Conference. However, these attempts at cooperation and integration failed as newly independent countries began to prioritise national security and development over regional cooperation. Subsequently, this led to more sub-regional cooperation as this offered a more viable and manageable option for the newly independent states.

The formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, was a regionalist project aimed at promoting cohesion in the South Asian region. With, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Maldives as founding members, and Afghanistan joining in 2007, SAARC was the first of its kind in the region. It was established with the aim of promoting social cohesion, economic and cultural cooperation, as well as encouraging self-reliance, mutual assurance and collaboration within the region.

South Asia is a critical geostrategic area bordered by China, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, with the nations bound together by ‘geographical proximity’ over cultural or economic proximity. Cooperation between the nations in South Asia is vital to ensure holistic development in the region as large disparities remain between states.

However, over recent years, SAARC has been at stalemate and has struggled to make progress as compared with other regional organisations. Owing to a long history of colonialism and disjointed power structures in the area, attempts at region building haven’t yielded positive outcomes. The competing power struggles that emerged after the end of colonialism and the violent cartographies which arbitrarily demarcated nascent states created significant international tensions, with each nation concerned about the expansionism of the others.

One of the many reasons that hinders multilateral cooperation between South Asian nations is that the region is comprised of unequal partners. Identified as one of the poorest, most socially complex and underdeveloped areas in terms of trained human resources the region struggles to maintain cohesion and cooperation. Of the many nations, India has emerged as a prominent power in the region whilst most countries like Nepal still fall under the rubric of “less developed country”. The rise of India as a prominent global power has also exacerbated tensions within the region creating an apprehensive atmosphere about its influence in South Asia.

Furthermore, many of the participating SAARC nations have competing power interests and are deadlocked in geopolitical stalemate. The most prominent nations, India and Pakistan have been in a protracted state of pseudo-conflict over border disputes since their inception. Similarly, there exists a similar border issue with Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as India and Nepal. The cartographic issues coupled with insurgencies and cross-border conflicts often exacerbate the differences between the countries.

Various attempts at regional economic cooperation have also suffered at the behest of different economic policies and power relations between the countries. In 2004, the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement was signed with the aim of establishing a free-trade area amongst the countries by 2016 to facilitate holistic economic development. However, this initiative failed due to the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan. The strategic rivalry between the countries has led to the breakdown of multiple initiatives.

In 2017, India launched a satellite to ensure better communication in the South Asian region and all members of the SAARC welcomed it though Pakistan refrained from taking part in the venture. Events and agreements like these promoting cooperation between regional nations have often been stymied by political manoeuvring leaving little chance for mutually advantageous cooperation.

The increasing anxiety between the states in the region has led to more sub-regional cooperation activities becoming viable options for smaller nations. These have led to the formation of organisations like Bangladesh, Bhutan India Nepal Initiative (BBIN) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) for the coordination of trade and economic agreements. Similarly, as the hegemon in the region, India continues to pursue a strategy of reaching out to broader cooperative organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further its growth strategy, thereby antagonising smaller South Asian regional players who may feel left behind.

Owing to the asymmetric and divided nations left by colonial rule, the South Asian region still struggles to create a cooperative environment in the region. The disintegrated cooperation between the nations coupled with their divergent political interests in the region will only create a stalemate that will disrupt chances of regional development and cooperation. It is essential that all member states work towards tackling their competing political interests and differences to ensure the revival of regionalism in South Asia.

Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations: Islamabad Calling, Will Dhaka Respond?

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Bangladeshi youth commemorate the Bengali freedom fighters of the 1971 war at the National Memorial in Dhaka, on Victory Day, 16 December 2019

By Silvia Tieri

In South Asia, music speaks politics. Among uncountable melodic masterpieces, there is a moving Pakistani ghazal, Woh Humsafar Tha, that goes like this:

Woh humsafar tha magar us sey humnawai na thi…

Adavatein thi, taghaful tha, ranjishein thi magar

Bicharne walay main sab kuch tha, bewafai na thi…

(He/She was my companion (fellow-traveller) but there was no harmony between us…

There were feelings of animosity, indifference, and anguish but

In my departing partner I had found all but unfaithfulness…)

The composition gained new popularity within and beyond the country in 2011 thanks to its indie-style remake that served as a soundtrack for a romantic soap-opera also named “Humsafar” (Hum: together; Safar: journey). However, few among its younger fans will know that this song tells the story of no typical heartbreak. In fact, the two co-journyers who had so much in common yet could not quite stick together – as the lyrics say – are Pakistan and Bangladesh, parting ways five decades ago. The ghazal was written by Naseer Turabi soon after the news of the fall of Dhaka (for Indians: Lt. Gen. Niazi’s surrender to Indian forces; for Bangladeshis: Victory Day) reached West Pakistan on 16 December 1971, leaving him shocked and in tears.

When the great partition of the Indian subcontinent divided Punjab and Bengal in 1947, Bengalis of the East had joined their Western co-religionists into a brave political journey called Pakistan: a homeland for South Asian Muslims, forming a nation separate from the Hindus’. However, while they officially constituted a single nation-state, the two wings of Pakistan (one’s capital was Karachi, the other’s Dhaka) were divided by significant cultural, ethnolinguistic, and socio-economic differences, as well as by more than two thousand kilometres of Indian territory. It could not last. Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib “Bangabandhu”,  father of Bangladeshi nationalism as well as the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the East eventually seceded, militarily supported by India. East and West Pakistan had existed as one for less than twenty-five years. In 1971 they split. It was a massive blow to the Two-Nations Theory that had been Pakistan’s raison d’être.

On paper, Pakistan and Bangladesh have much in common. They are the two Muslim-majority nations of the Indian subcontinent, carved out of British India by means of partition(s). They also both share a complicated relationship and some long borders with South Asian hegemon India, although the Indo-Bangladeshi border is rather porous, while the Indo-Pakistani is the most militarised in the world. Nonetheless, relations between Dhaka and Islamabad, which replaced Karachi as Pakistan’s capital in 1967, have been strained ever since Bangladeshi independence.

Hasina’s perceived closeness to India, as well as her government’s vigorous prosecution of former pro-Pakistani and Islamist forces since the late 2000s, have cast a long shadow on post-1971 bilateral relations. A partial rapprochement had occurred earlier, under the rule of Ziaur Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), traditionally closer to Pakistan. However, Hasina’s Awami League (AL) inherited the independence legacy and in 2008 returned to power, maintaining a solid grasp over it ever since. In 2009 the AL administration created the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a special court in charge of prosecuting war crimes, including genocide, committed by the Pakistani Army and its collaborators during the 1971 war. Because the convicted belong to political forces that are AL’s archenemies, the ICT receives criticism not only for its supposed low judicial standards, but also for being allegedly used to knock out political competition. In Bangladesh, it still counts on considerable popular support.

Bilateral relations between the once humsafars have been almost non-existent in the last decade. The execution of Bangladeshi members of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) in 2013 and 2016, strongly condemned by the Pakistani Parliament, marked their lowest points. In May 2019, it even seemed that the two countries temporarily suspended reciprocal visa issuance. The last high-level official visit of a Bangladeshi head of state to Pakistan dates back to February 2006, when Islamabad received then-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, heiress of husband Ziaur Rahman’s BNP leadership.

Speculations about a possible thaw, however, emerged following a series of gestures initiated by Pakistan in 2019 and continued in 2020. In September 2019, Pakistani Foreign Minister S.M. Qureshi phoned his Bangladeshi counterpart A.K.A. Momen to apprise him on Pakistan’s position over Kashmir after New Delhi revoked of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had granted special status to the disputed region until August 2019.The two talked again in March 2020 regarding the  pandemic. In July 2020, Pakistani High Commissioner I.A. Siddiqui met Momen in Dhaka. Days later Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan paid a courtesy call to Sheikh Hasina, exchanging views on the COVID-19 emergency, Kashmir, and inviting the Prime Minister to visit Islamabad. Khan also expressed commitment to deepen relations. This was reiterated on 3 December 2020, when High Commissioner Siddiqui and Hasina held a courtesy meeting in Dhaka. Additionally, Pakistan expressed its interest in deepening the trade relationship with Bangladesh, especially in terms of partnerships and investments in the textile sector.

These unusual overtures alerted Indian hawks in particular, as they caught India in a turbulent period, dotted by protests and lockdown impositions in Kashmir, border tensions with China, and a general deterioration of relations with regional neighbours. Some consider that Pakistan’s move towards Bangladesh is an attempt to take advantage of the widening vacuum left by New Delhi’s policy towards its eastern neighbour, less attentive in the latest years despite declared intentions to “Look East” and to “Neighbourhood First”. One emerging commonality between Islamabad and Dhaka is their convergence towards China as a key investor, development partner, and defence supplier, proving Bangladesh has other reliable options besides India. While Pakistan remains China’s major ally in South Asia, Dhaka-Beijing relations have been recently upgraded to a “strategic partnership of cooperation” in 2016. 

Overall, Pakistan’s recent openings towards Bangladesh undoubtedly signalled an interest to rekindle an otherwise frosty bilateral relationship. But the critical issues that keep poisoning it have been left untouched. These are rooted in the divergent Pakistani and Bengali nationalisms, and their irreconcilable narratives of the facts of 1971. The AL and most Bangladeshis are determined that Pakistan owes a formal apology for its actions against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, acknowledges neither the accusation of genocide nor the number of victims alleged by Dhaka. Because the matter is so controversial, to establish where history ends and national narratives begin remains a challenging task. Other pending bilateral issues include the status of Bangladesh’s Biharis, the question of asset sharing, as well as the 1974 trilateral agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, of whose violation Bangladesh and Pakistan have accused each other. Meanwhile, to the dismay of Pakistan, the war crime trials have continued in Bangladesh. In 2019, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court resumed hearing appeals of such trials after a three year interruption. In the same year, the ICT emanated 14 new death sentences to former militants of JeI and Razakar Bahini. Also, Bangladesh’s official stance on Kashmir remains non-intervention. Although the notorious abrogation of Article 370 was met with protests in Dhaka, Foreign Minister Momen reiterated that it is an internal issue of India into which Bangladesh will not get involved. 1971 was a bad break-up. Pakistan is now making a move. But Dhaka still wants Islamabad to apologise and make amends, before they can embark on a new journey, together.

Silvia Tieri is a political scientist and ethnographer in training based at King’s India Institute. In 2019 she joined the King’s College London-National University of Singapore Joint PhD Programme. Her doctoral research concerns the politics of linguistic identity in contemporary India and Pakistan. Before joining KCL, she was a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore. She holds a Master’s in International Relations from the University of Pisa (Italy) and a Master’s by Research in South Asian Studies from the National University of Singapore.

Hizbul Mujahideen in Assam: A non-existential threat

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By M.A. Athul, published 17 October 2018

Hizbul Mujahideen militants (Credit Image: Swarajya)

 

Assam, in Northeast India,  has been experienced a long spell of ethnic insurgency since 1979. Yet the state is witnessing a consolidation of peace and stability, (the insurgency related fatalities has fallen from 305 in 2014 to nine in 2018), with ethnic insurgent violence in its last leg. However, the recent arrest of Islamist militants from the state is an indicator that religious militant groups are also trying to find footing in the state, which borders Bangladesh.

three individuals, identified as Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) militants on 14th and 15th September 2018. They were arrested from Hojai, Udali (Nagaon District) and Byrnihat along Assam-Meghalaya border respectively. Reports indicate that the HM operatives were attempting at supplying arms including the AK 47 assault rifles for its operatives in the state.

On 18 September 2018, three more people were arrested for links with the Kashmiri insurgent group, from Hojai District and on  on 23 September 2018, an HM linkman identified as Abhumanyu Chouhan was arrested from Mosoka .

The arrests came soon after a HM militant of Assam origin, identified as Qamar-uz-Zama was arrested by Uttar Pradesh Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) on 13 September 2018 from Kanpur. According to reports, he was planning to conduct attack during Ganesh Chaturthi, a Hindu religious festival. Initial reports of Qamar-uz-Zama joining HM had surfaced on 8 April 2018 after his picture holding an automatic rifle went viral on the social media declaring him having joined Hizbul Mujahideen with the codename “Dr Hurairah”. According to his family, he had gone to the United States of America in 2011, returning in 2014 and going to Bangladesh the same year.

 

Hizbul Mujahideen

HM, which became operational in 1989 in Jammu Kashmir with Pakistani patronage, is one of India’s oldest militant groups. The group was formed as a proxy for Pakistan and a counter weight for another militant group Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was propagating ‘independence’ rather than accession to Pakistan. HM was established by Master Ahsan Dar as its chief. It was formed as a militant wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir. Mohammed Yusuf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin has been heading the organisation since 1990. Although earlier the group has a cadre strength of about 1,500, current estimates point at 400 active militants.

Security forces in J&K have had a significant tactical success against the group in recent times. According to partial data compiled by SATP, From January 2017 to September 2018 at least 74 HM militants have been killed in J&K, with about 29 HM militants being killed in the first eight months of 2017.

 

Back ground of Islamist Groups Operating in Assam

Traditionally, Assam’s insurgency landscape has been dominated by ethnic insurgent groups such as United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA-Independent) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). However, groups such as Muslim United Liberation Army (MULTA) and Bangladesh based Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) have also been operating as Islamist groups in Assam in addition to Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULF), Islamic Liberation Army of Assam and People’s United Liberation Front (PULF). According to the Assam Police, the Islamic terrorist groups started appearing in Assam after the Nellie massacre in 1983.

During the Assam violence in July 2012, the Central Government identified at least 19 Muslim fundamentalist organisations to watch in connection with violence in Assam.

NO Name of Organisation
1 Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA)
2 United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA)
3 Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA)
4 Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF)
5 Muslim Liberation Army (MLA)
6 Muslim Security Force (MSF)
7 Islamic Sevak Sanng (ISS)
8 Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI)
9 Revolutionary Muslim Commandos (RMC)
10 Muslim Tiger Force (MTF)
11 Muslim Liberation Front (MLF)
12 Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MLTA)
13 Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)
14 Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULTA)
15 Islamic National Front (INF)
16 Islamic Revolutionary Front (IRF)
17 United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA)
18 United Islamic Revolutionary Army (UIRA)
19 Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF)

 

Historically, the most active among these groups were the MULTA, and the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF)]. While the former confines its activities to Assam, the latter operates in Manipur as well.

Major global Islamist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and IS are also reportedly targeting the region. Notably, at the time of its formation in September 2014, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) had specifically mentioned Assam as its target, along with Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, IS in its ‘world dominion map’ has covered Assam among other parts of India. However, there is no visible signs of presence of these formations in the state.

 

Recent incidents

The presence of JMB in Assam was exposed after discovery of the Burdwan Module in West Bengal: an accidental blast at Burdwan on 2 October 2014, in which two JMB militants were killed and another was injured. NIA claimed that during the course of investigations, it had been found that operatives of JMB had established their networks in different Districts of Assam, Jharkhand, and West Bengal. According to the NIA Charge sheets, five accused in the case belonged to Assam. The NIA also , JMB operatives ‘were engaged in preparation of bombs, ammunition/arms, maintaining hideouts and organizing terrorist training camps in pursuance of a larger conspiracy to organise terrorist attacks in different parts of India and in Bangladesh’. One of the charge sheeted persons, Lal Mohammed aka Ibrahim, a JMB cadre arrested by Jharkhand Police on 18 April 2015 (the NIA officially arrested him on 27 April 2015), reportedly revealed to interrogators that JMB’s sabotage plans in Assam were to counter Bodo  . Reports indicated that MTFA was formed for the massacre of Muslims in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) in May 2014.

In a significant incident, six JMB militants were arrested in back-to-back operations in Goalpara and Chirang Districts of Assam on 25 September  2015. Earlier on 18 September 2015, a JMB training camp was uncovered at Daukhanagar in Chirang District.

 

Number of Islamist Militants arrested in India’s Northeast Region from 2015 to September 2018

 

Year Militant Groups
2015 JMB MTFA MULTA MLA PULF IM HM NS
  20 19 10 1 1 0 0 6
 
2016 24 6 1 0 0 1 0 0
 
2017 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 2
 
2018 0 0 2 0 0 0 7 2
Total 45 25 18 1 1 1 7 10

(Source : SATP)

 

State Parliamentary Affairs Minister Rockybul Hussain had informed the State Assembly on December 16, 2014, that between January 2001 to November 2014, 130 Islamist extremists, including 106 MULTA militants, 14 Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and 10 JMB militants, were arrested in Assam. He also added that between 1995 to 2014, 626 militants of Harkat-ul-Jihad (HuJI), MULFA, PULF and Islamic Security Force of India (ISFI) were arrested.

Despite the long list of Islamist militant groups present in Assam the fact that there is indicative of the lack of operational capabilities of such groups and the success . Moreover, given that groups such as Bangladesh-based JMB is using the region more as a safe house to escape crack down by the Bangladeshi authorities than as an operational area, likelihood of Islamist groups pulling of a successful attack remains rather remote.  Moreover, with HM coming under pressure in its core area of operations in J&K its ability of expand its area of operation is rather limited. In this light, possibility of more militant groups finding a foot hold in the state is a remote possibility and the detection and arrest of HM cell is unlikely to be a harbinger of a new trend. That being said, arrest of more than 100 religious militants being arrested in the region since 2015 and the fact that Assam has the second largest internet traffic related to Islamic State (IS) (after Jammu Kashmir) is a possible indicator that a segment of population is susceptible to Islamist radical ideology. Although the threat of Islamist militancy has been kept under check by law enforcement agencies, a pro-active effort by authorities to identity and ween away the susceptible population from extremist ideologies is required.

 

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on LinkedIn 

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