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Greco-Turkish Relations: Two Centuries of Constant Competition

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Greek painting of the Battle of Velestino during the Greco-Turkish War, 1897 – Public Domain

There are few fraught relationships of international politics that are purely recent phenomena. There is almost always a deeper, historical basis for the hostility experienced between two states. The poor relations between Greece and Turkey are not simply the product of recent competition over natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, but rather the latest chapter in two centuries of animosity. The 21st of March of this year marks the bicentennial of the Greek declaration of independence and the beginning of its bloody war of liberation against the Ottoman Empire, the historical predecessor of the modern Turkish state. In the years since Greek victory in this war, there have been six conflicts [1] in which Greece and Turkey have been enemies, with numerous crises and war scares in between. With the current Turkish government displaying neo-Ottoman characteristics, history is being brought to the forefront of their foreign policy. In order to understand the current animosity between Greece and Turkey, it is vitally important to look at the history of their relationship and the constant competition between the two states.

From the moment that Greek independence was confirmed in the London Protocol and Treaty of Constantinople, relations between the new kingdom and the Ottomans would be defined by tension and competition. Despite its small size, the new Greek state considered itself a successor state to the Byzantine Empire and therefore a direct rival to the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, Greece sought to create a ‘greater’ kingdom, uniting the ethnic Greek population. This was pursued through various claims to Ottoman territory, initially with failed interventions against the Ottomans such as in the Crimean War (1853-56). However, their greatest successes came between 1912 and 1921, during the final demise of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the modern Turkish state. Through success in the First Balkan War (1912-13), the Kingdom of Greece roughly doubled in size, entirely at the expense of the Ottomans. Greece would also go on to fight against the Ottomans during the First World War and the new Turkish state during their own war of independence. The latter of these conflicts, saw a large scale population exchange as well as atrocities committed by both sides against ethnic Greeks and Turks. Given the brutality of this conflict, relations between Greece and the new republican Turkish state began with deeply held feelings of distrust and an instinct to compete rather than co-operate. In the last two hundred years, Greece and Turkey have only fought on the same side of a conflict one, the Second Balkan War (1913). This was as co-belligerents not as allies and while both states are today part of the NATO alliance, this has not produced a new era of Greco-Turkish cooperation.

While the current Greek state may not have any Byzantine aspirations, throughout the past two centuries the Hellenic kingdom and subsequent republic has sought to replace the Ottoman-Turks as the dominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The key to achieving this dominance would be through naval power, controlling the routes from the Mediterranean to the Aegean.

Both Greece and the then Ottoman Empire considered themselves seafaring states, the former with a large number of islands to defend and the latter with a long, vulnerable coastline in Anatolia. During both the Greco-Turkish War (1897) and the First Balkan War (1912-13), Greece enjoyed its greatest successes against the Ottomans through the deployment of superior naval force. A powerful Greece at sea is therefore an understandable anxiety for the Turkish state as policymakers are all too aware of the historic difficulty there has been in defending the Anatolian coast. The current naval arms race between Greece and Turkey, with both sides expanding their surface and sub-surface capabilities, will only exacerbate these strategic concerns.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, successive Greek governments sought to expand their territory further into the Mediterranean and the Aegean. This was first seen through the peaceful transfer of the Ionian Islands from Britain in 1864, followed by aggressive expansion through several conflicts including the Balkan Wars and the First World War. The end of the Second World War saw the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands from Italy, bringing Greek territory even closer to the Turkish coast, now only twenty-five miles away. While Turkey does not dispute Greece’s holdings in the Aegean, the current tension is a new variation of the historic competition for control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The current dispute over access to natural gas in Eastern Mediterranean demonstrates the continued relevance of the historic themes that have characterised Greco-Turkish relations. While the competition over these resources also includes Egypt, Israel and Cyprus, at its heart it is a dispute between Athens and Ankara. The possibility of access to new mineral wealth is a hugely important opportunity for any state, especially two that have suffered recent economic woes. While it is Turkey that have taken the far more aggressive approach, with extensive exploration and deployment of naval assets, the Greeks have shown their willingness to engage in brinkmanship.

In the eyes of the governments of Greece and Turkey, in order to profit from these new resources, the other state must backdown. There is to be no mutual benefit, no cooperation. Whichever state gains access to these new natural gas deposits will be able to establish a vast zone of economic control over the Eastern Mediterranean, effectively achieving the long desired maritime dominance in the region. To some Turkish analysists, the current dispute is being viewed as another opportunity for Turkey to reverse some of the losses from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This is through the establishment of a ‘blue homeland’, with a clear zone of Turkish maritime control in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, a neo-Ottoman vision endorsed by Erdogan which would help to redress some of the losses to Greece and Cyprus in the post-independence era.

The Ottoman Empire may have collapsed ninety-nine years ago but the legacy of its demise is still alive and well in modern Greco-Turkish relations. Whether it be in the continued disputes over the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus or the competing claims over the natural resources of the Mediterranean, it is the most recent chapter in a two-hundred-year-old relationship defined by tension and rivalry. Too often analysts treat current diplomatic problems as purely modern phenomena, ignoring the historical trajectory within which they sit. This does not mean that crises suddenly become resolvable when policymakers understand their historical origins, but in the case of Greece and Turkey it means that one can appreciate that this goes far deeper than merely a tug of war over natural gas deposits. Nonetheless, we should not be wedded to historical determinism when looking at modern international relations. The tension which has dominated Greco-Turkish relations demonstrates that any lasting solution must be a compromise which can satisfy some, but not all, of each side’s aims. As long as both opt for a winner takes all approach, the hostility of centuries past will continue to define the present.

[1] Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The Coming Arms Race in the Eastern Mediterranean’ Royal United Services Institute (July 2021)

[2] Wars in which Greece and Turkey/Ottomans were on opposing sides: Crimean War, Greco-Turkish War, First Balkan War, First World War, Turkish War of Independence, Turkish Invasion of Cyprus

[3] Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (Penguin, 2012)

[4] Vasileios Th. Meichanetsidis, ‘The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, 1913–1923: A Comprehensive Overview’ Genocide Studies International, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2015)

[5] Peter Kincaid Jensen, ‘The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-22’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (November 1979)

[6] Vassilis K. Fouskas, ‘Uncomfortable Questions: Cyprus, October 1973-August 1974’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 2005)

[7] Galip Dalay, ‘Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Charting a way out of the current deadlock’ Brookings Institute (January 2021)

[8] Patrick Wintour, ‘How a rush for Mediterranean gas threatens to push Greece and Turkey into war’ The Guardian (September 2020)

Turkey is Winning the War of the Narrative

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Photo Credit: Toetoe, licensed with CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

When it comes to strategic messaging, Turkey has been a glutton for punishment in recent years by seemingly fuelling crises as much as trying to spin them. In 2017, the Turkish government announced it would purchase Russia’s S400 missile defence system, which caused significant tension with the US and other NATO members. Tensions with Greece and Cyprus following Turkey’s gas exploration in the East Mediterranean have led to a ‘historic low point’ in relations between Turkey and the European Union.

At first glance the antagonising of supranational organisations to which Turkey is (NATO) or aspires to be (EU) a member seems counter-intuitive. But this overlooks the fact that the EU and US are no longer the target audience for their strategic communications. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is looking to position Turkey as a ‘model for the Muslim world’. This article will demonstrate how Turkey is reaching out to Muslims in the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and Central Asia, combining soft and hard power to form their strategic narrative.[i]

Media and the arts illuminate Turkey’s focus and success in pan-Islamic messaging. Turkish television dramas (dizi) have had a particularly powerful effect in Pakistan. Dizi have seen a global rise in popularity recently: between 2004 and 2017, their export value grew from $10,000 to $350 million. Turkish dramas have seen significant investment from hedge funds in the last few years, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has launched cash incentives for film productions in Turkey, which points to a clear understanding at a government level of their power to influence audiences abroad. The investment has paid off - Turkish is now the most watched non-English language in the world. 55 million people in Pakistan watched the finale of the Turkish drama Forbidden Love, and Pakistan makes up 25% of the global audience on YouTube for Resurrection Ertugrul, a series about a Turkic warrior who was the father of the founder of the Ottoman Empire. Audiences watch Ertugrul battle a variety of enemies – Christian crusaders and Byzantines being recurring characters.[ii] Erdogan has said of the show ‘until the lions start writing their own stories, the hunters will always be the heroes’[iii] – a reverse engineering of the idea that history is written by the victors. Whoever writes (or broadcasts) history, is by default, the victor.

This classic storytelling trope of goodies and baddies, with the Christians as the baddies, was inadvertently reinforced by the West’s reaction to the new Turkish law reinstating the Haghia Sophia as a mosque. This should not have come as a surprise to Western commentators, as Erdogan had already declared this to be his intention, yet emotive reactions to the ruling emerged from the Greek press, the Pope, and France’s Foreign Affairs minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, among others. These expressions were disproportionate to UNESCO’s own muted response (after all, there are plenty of other UNESCO Heritage Sites that are also mosques). Combined, they expressed a perceived offence against Christianity, rather than to the cultural value of the Haghia Sophia, and this in turn had had the effect of reinforcing Erdogan’s strategic narrative (also expressed in Resurrection Ertugrul) of a religious and ideological dichotomy between Christian Europe and the Muslim ‘East’, placing the Haghia Sophia and Turkey at the centre of that ideological (and geographical) battle.

The Gulf region was the largest international consumer of Turkish dizi – until 2017, when the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman pulled all dizi from MBC Group, the Middle East’s largest media conglomerate – a significant blow to Turkey’s cultural exports. [iv] But far from a banana republic, Turkey’s cultural exports are diverse and competitive - this is well-demonstrated by Turkey’s appeal for ‘halal tourism’. In 2017, Turkey became ‘the world’s third most popular destination for halal travellers’,[v] and dominates the all-inclusive beach holiday sector. Recent reports suggest that the Gulf states may be seeking to normalise relations once more - perhaps willing to overlook Turkey’s assertive behaviour in order to cement the coalition against Iran.

Turkey faces significant competition for influence against Russia and China in the Balkans.[vi] This region used to comprise some of the key heartlands of the Ottoman Empire, and remained important right up to the early Republic of Turkey. In the first parliaments of the Republic, more than 50% of MPs in the National Assembly came from the Balkans.[vii] While the popularity of dizi is an important factor in Turkish influence in the region, investment in schools and supporting migration to Turkey from the Balkans are policies that have resonated even more powerfully. ‘Ordinary Balkan people…realised there was a leader in Turkey who could hear their voices’.[viii] During the Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan, the President of Serbia said he was considering buying Turkish-made armed drones – a sign that Turkish soft power has reaped hard power rewards.

The Nagorno-Karabakh war has also been a key turning point in Turkish influence in Central Asia. Michael Tanchum’s analysis points out that countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, already inclined towards Turkey by their common Turkic language, now also share a trade corridor thanks to Azerbaijan’s victory. To celebrate the Azerbaijani recapture of Shusha, Turkey announced that it would host its version of Eurovision, Turkvision, in the historic city. This soft power signal was reinforced by various defence agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Turkish influence in Africa is also growing, particularly in Sudan. Turkish aid to Sudan exceeds that given by the United Nations,[ix] and 2017 Turkey was granted part of the former Ottoman port of Suakin, in order to rebuild it as a tourist destination as well as a possible military port. This would support Turkey’s $50 million military training base in Somalia, as well as their current military presence in Libya.

Turning to the domestic front, Turkey’s internal policies reinforce its message to other Muslim nations. Turkey has shown itself to be a safe haven for Muslims the world over, taking in 3.6 million Syrian refugees as well as thousands of Uighur refugees. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has allocated up to $14 million to Islamic schools and youth organisations between 2017 and 2018, with the aim of creating a new generation of religiously grounded Turkish youth.[x] The budget of the Diyanet, Turkey’s religious authority that oversees the country’s 85,000 mosques, has quadrupled during President Erdogan’s tenure.[xi]

This strategy is so much more than neo-Ottomanism. It is an exercise in influence, not empire. Strategic communications is a holistic study, and all these communicative acts weave together to form Turkey’s clear narrative, a narrative that is ostensibly effective with its target audience in the Muslim world.

[i] Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin use strategic narratives as a tool to understand and measure the impact of soft power strategy. Soft power resources may be designed or structured to fit an existing or developing narrative, which helps to explain a state’s actions according to a communicative structure. Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin. “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power.” Media, War & Conflict 7, no. 1 (April 2014): 70–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696.

[ii] Bhutto, Fatima. New Kings of the World: Dispatches from Bollywood, Dizi, and K-Pop. Columbia Global Reports: New York [2017], p139.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Izzet Pinto, founder of dizi distribution company Global Agency, estimated a loss of $500 million from the MBC decision – but this would affect the overall business only by about 15%, due to additional uptake of dizi in Latin America. Bhutto, Fatima. New Kings of the World: Dispatches from Bollywood, Dizi, and K-Pop. Columbia Global Reports: New York [2017], p158.

[v] Smith, Hannah Lucinda. Erdogan Rising. William Collins: London [2019], pp74-5.

[vi] Erdi Ozturk, Ahmet. “Ahmet Erdi Ozturk on Turkey’s cultural, political and religious footprint in the Balkans”. Turkey Book Talk #139 [Podcast], 13th April 2021. See also Aydintasbas, Asli. “From Myth to Reality: How to Understand Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans”. European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 13th March 2019. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from_myth_to_reality_how_to_understand_turkeys_role_in_the_western_balkans/

[vii] Erdi Ozturk, Ahmet. “Ahmet Erdi Ozturk on Turkey’s cultural, political and religious footprint in the Balkans”. Turkey Book Talk #139 [Podcast], 13th April 2021. See also Zurcher, Erik-Jan. Turkey: A Modern History. Bloosmbury: I.B. Tauris. 2017.

[viii] Erdi Ozturk, Ahmet. “Ahmet Erdi Ozturk on Turkey’s cultural, political and religious footprint in the Balkans”. Turkey Book Talk #139 [Podcast], 13th April 2021.

[ix] Bhutto, Fatima. New Kings of the World: Dispatches from Bollywood, Dizi, and K-Pop. Columbia Global Reports: New York [2017], p137.

[x] Yabanci, Bilge. “Work for the Nation, Obey the State, Praise the Ummah: Turkey’s Government-oriented Youth Organisations in Cultivating a New Nation”. Taylor and Francis Online, published 17th October 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1676536. This can be seen as a move by the state to challenge the influence of Gulenist schools, which have been blamed for promoting anti-government sentiment and contributing to the 2016 coup. As Yabanci outlines in her paper, the Turkish youth has historically been instrumental in pushing reform in Turkish politics.

[xi] Turkey with Simon Reeve. “Taurus Mountains to Istanbul”. BBC Two, first broadcast 2nd April 2017, 46:35. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b08ll1wy/turkey-with-simon-reeve-series-1-2-taurus-mountains-to-istanbul

 

Lebanon’s case in the Turkish quest for regional leadership

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By Pierre-Axel Thüring

Photo source: CNN Arabic, 2020

There is little debate about Turkish president Recep Tayiip Erdogan’s ambition to become a key regional player. In partnership with Qatar, Turkey has entered a number of unstable areas in a difficult search for regional leadership. If Turkish foreign policy in Syria and Libya is frequently discussed, what about Lebanon? Lebanon has always been the prey of former controlling powers (Turkey and France), invaders (Israel and Syria) and regional rivalries (Saudi Arabia and Iran). The point of this article is to state that, although still moderate, several factors illustrate the growing interest of Turkey in the Land of Cedars, notably in the North.

Different resentments and biases make it difficult to form a clear and honest assessment of the degree of the Turkish influence today. According to Vice President Fuat Oktay, Ankara has no secret agenda in Lebanon: neither interest in natural resources, nor colonial legacy. The Turks are officially leading a win-win policy in order to promote peace and stability in the region. This policy is based on a ‘common ground’ inherited from the Ottoman Empire, while being quite ironically opposed by Fuat Oktay to a “mindset of colonialism” pursued by certain countries such as France. A contrary discourse can be found in several Western or anti-Erdogan media, accusing the Turkish leader of seeking more weight at the grassroots level. President Erdogan is criticized for trying to galvanize crowds in conservative Muslim areas, especially in the North in Tripoli and in the Akkar. Moreover, several rumours are circulating. Turkey is said to be supplying arms to loyalists in northern Lebanon and bringing cash to finance mobilisations. Faced with these two discourses, what about the facts?

Turkish action in Lebanon is first of all community based. On one hand, it calls for Sunni Muslim solidarity. Investments are mainly in Sunni Muslim areas and Ankara largely publicises its support for Palestinian refugees, notably those in Lebanese camps. On the other, it relies on groups of Turkmen and Turkish origin. In 2010, Erdogan came to visit Turkmen communities in the Akkar. The authorities even claimed to offer Turkish nationality to any Lebanese with Turkish or Turkmen roots, with a number of naturalizations estimated at 9600 until 2019.

Ankara and Beirut have also developed cooperation in several fields. Turkey is economically active to the point that it is one of Lebanon main trading partners. Several contracts make it a privileged interlocutor concerning energies such as electricity. Lebanon thus offers outlets for national production. It represents a major strategic interest in the context of economic crisis and regional rivalry in gas exploitation. Turkish presence is also a military one through its participation since 2006 in the UN mission on the border with Israel. Nevertheless, the Turks are better known in Lebanon for their humanitarian and cultural support. Indeed, since 2014, a whole development program has been developed through the state-run Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). The agency has distinguished itself by the creation of a hospital in Sidon and more recently by the assistance provided following the explosion in the Port of Beirut. Through the creation of schools and cultural centres, through financing the restoration of Ottoman monuments in Tripoli and through series and films, Turkey is gradually developing its cultural influence in Lebanon.

Finally, the Turkish political clout is relatively moderate and works primarily on personal relationships. Although the government is said to have relations with the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood party, there is no real proof of this. On the contrary, Ankara seems to be more open to dialogue with the widest possible political spectrum, though focusing mostly on Sunni politicians. This includes Faisal Karami, Najib Mikati and Ashraf Rifi. Ties are particularly notable between the families of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and President Erdogan, as well as between the head of the Turkish intelligence agency Hakan Fidan and the head of the Lebanese ‘General Security Directorate’ Abbas Ibrahim.

This multi-faceted influence, growing although limited, generates many national and regional reactions.

The most virulent is surely that of the Armenian community. In June 2020, an ethnic Armenian host called Erdogan on TV ‘an obnoxious Ottoman’, causing a demonstration in front of the TV station’s offices as well as many insults on the social networks, mainly from Arabs with Turkish origins. If the Ottoman legacy necessarily affects the vision of Syriacs and Armenian Christians on Turkey, it also has an impact on those remembering the massacres of Arab nationalists by the Ottomans in Beirut and Damascus in 1915 and 1916.

European reactions to Turkish foreign policy in Lebanon are to be seen in the context of great rivalry in Eastern Mediterranean. The explosion at the Port of Beirut has led to a verbal joust between France and Turkey. Visiting Beirut, French President Emmanuel Macron insisted on avoiding Lebanon ending up ‘in the hands of the vileness of the regional powers’. It is surely no coincidence that, in early December, the French, German and American ambassadors jointly organized a visit to Tripoli. Nevertheless, for internal reasons, the Turkish president lately seems more open to burying the hatchet with France and the European Union. It remains to be seen how long this posture will last, and its consequences for Lebanon.

The Sunnite position is enshrined in the competition for leadership in the region. With the flow of Palestinian and then Syrian migrants, the Sunnis have seen their political weight increase in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries initially presented themselves as the great patrons of this community. However, due to the economic and social quagmire and the growing Iranian hold, the Saudis have slightly disengaged. The fear of the Lebanese Sunni political elite for a disinterest could lead them to turn more to Ankara. Interestingly, this might not be seen in a bad light by Riyad and Abu Dhabi, since the latest moves on the international scene have shown a rapprochement between the Gulf countries and Qatar, and therefore Turkey.

Last but not least, the perception of Hezbollah is unsure. If some criticisms emerge in Lebanon towards Hezbollah as responsible for the sanitary and economic crisis, but also for the explosion of the Port, the ‘Party of God’ remains a central player in Lebanese political life. It leaves little room for a political vacuum. What’s more, after clashes between the Turks and Hezbollah in Syria, Ankara lost the support it previously earned among Hezbollah supporters by having harsh words about Israel. According to Fadi Assaf, founder of Middle East Strategic Perspectives, the Shia group sees the rise of Turkish clout from a good eye only if it competes and even breaks the Saudi/Egypt/UAE power in Lebanon. On the contrary, a smart cooperation of influence between them could try to compete Hezbollah.

To conclude, without fantasizing about it, the Turkish weight in Lebanon is growing in very diverse spheres, in particular in Northern Lebanon. Due to the instability of the country, this policy may represent a risk if it becomes more pronounced. Nevertheless, the redefinition of the Turkish role in Lebanon relies both on the Lebanese national context (Lebanon is not Syria or Libya) and on international developments, in particular the new US foreign policy.

 

Pierre-Axel Thüring is a MA student in International Peace & Security at the War Studies Department. Having studied in Lebanon and Jordan, his research interests are particularly focused on the MENA region. He is currently writing his dissertation on the Turkish intervention in the Syrian Civil War.

Power Game in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Implications for the U.S.

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By Sena Namlu

(The Abraham Lincoln and John C. Stennis carrier strike groups are conducting carrier strike force operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeremiah Bartelt/U.S.)

“Each of the carriers operating in the Mediterranean as this time represent 100,000 tons of international diplomacy,” – Jon Huntsman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia

Sitting at the junction of three continents and main international trade routes, the Mediterranean Sea has been of capital importance for both littoral states and international powers. The name of Mediterranean itself, originating from the Latin term (mediues terra) and meaning “the sea in the middle of the earth,” illustrates its significant place in international affairs. While for regional powers, such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea determines their national security and prosperity, it equally has strategic implications for states outside of the basin with regards to furthering influence over different regions and connection with other parts of the world.

The United States has been engaged in the region since the 19th century. America’s involvement reached its apogee during the Cold War; a time when two superpowers vied for control over the Mediterranean region, encompassing an immense maritime zone between the Straits of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. The Mediterranean Sea has witnessed many examples of coercive naval diplomacy, historically known as Gunboat Diplomacy, which involves the application of naval forces to compel or deter a state. By the end of the Cold War, the United States had achieved unity in the Mediterranean, for the first time since ancient Rome, through bilateral and multilateral political arrangements; transforming the Sea into an almost a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lake or a Mare Nostrum for the Alliance.

The emerging threats and complex regional challenges of the post-Cold War era brought renewed attention to the Mediterranean and forced states to engage in the region, notwithstanding the United States’ gradual retreatment. The American policy of withdrawal was initiated with the Obama Administration, but was taken further in the Trump era. Rising regional and international powers are eager to fill this expanding void left in America’s wake, seeking to gain as much control as they can in such a promising maritime area.

Russia, which has historically had strong incentives to access the warm watersof the Mediterranean, has successfully exploited the long-lasting conflicts in the Mediterranean as well as the current power gap, leading to the establishment of a permanent presence through heavy investments in the Syrian Port of Tarsus, where now it has both an air base and naval facility.

China has adopted a relatively peaceful method of further its influence in the Mediterranean through weaponization of its global supply chain. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the Mediterranean is a crucial part, led to the country investing in the high-tech industries of Europe such as aerospace and artificial intelligence, and connecting said ventures through an immense supply chain comprised of many Mediterranean ports in which Chinese state-owned companies have significant holdings. Following the acquisitions of ports in several coastal states such as Italy, Malta and Greece, Chinese state firms now have significant influence in one-tenth of all European port capacity. Beijing is orchestrating every instrument at its disposal, including political, economic, and security creating a symphony in the words of Chinese Foreign Minister, in order to expand Chinese influence and presence around the world. One of the major concerns is of the possibility that China may not hesitate to use its civilian port facilities to the military end as it has done so in the past. Furthermore, Beijing’s previous experience of dispatching one of its most impressive-looking warships, the 689-foot-long amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan to Syria” to participate in Russian coercive diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, makes the menace even greater for Europe and the United States.

Turkish claims based on the Blue Homeland doctrine and enforced through the dispatch of the seismic research vessel Oruç Reis raised the unresolved issues in the Mediterranean relating to maritime delimitation and jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the country with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Turkey regards drilling activities on the continental shelf as its fundamental right and disregards any solution that “confines Turkey to the shores.” Turkish foreign policy objectives relate the region directly to national security, rights, and interests. Additionally, Turkey’s perception of being left out in the Eastern Mediterranean based on the regional cooperation efforts excluding Turkey such as EastMed Gas Forum aggravates the tension and induces Ankara to resort more to coercive naval diplomacy. The successful outcome of natural gas reserve exploration in the Black Sea also strengthened Turkey’s commitment towards drilling operations in the Mediterranean.

Countries opposed to Turkey’s actions in the region gathered around France, whose expectations for further political and military supports towards the European Union and NATO remain unmet, have agreed on seeking regional cooperation. France that has been the most vocal European power in opposing Turkey’s regional claims so far, backed by Greece and Cyprus with joint military drilling operations and deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Eastern Mediterranean. France’s President, Emmanuel Macron seems quite determined to resist resurgent Turkish moves in the Mediterranean and has closed the ranks with its regional partners at all costs as being lacked of concrete support from the European Union and NATO members in its battling with Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkey similarly seeks to strengthen its hand through bilateral arrangements with another regional actor. Ankara signed two memoranda of understanding with Libya’s United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), one of which regulates maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea in line with the Turkish claims and the other envisaging further security and military cooperation. These agreements are followed by a similar deal between Greece and Egypt.

In pursuit of the Greece-Egypt deal, Prime Minister of Greece Mitsotakis and the President of Egypt Sisi reflected their expectation of more decisive U.S. involvement in the region under a Biden Administration. Nevertheless, given the other prominent challenges facing America such as extreme domestic polarization and the rising Chinese threat in the Pacific region, it is hard to predict whether the election of “Joe Bidenopoulos”, as he introduced himself to a group of Greek Americans will result in a rotation of American attention towards the region and to what extent this shift will change the course in the Mediterranean. Biden will likely give more weight to international organizations, beginning with enhancement of the EU and NATO’s downsized role in the region. However, geopolitical challenges require further engagements. Besides Russia’s permanent return to the area, China’s rapprochement with America’s most important strategic partner in the region, Israel puts American regional and international interests at higher risk. Similarly, Huawei’s expansion based on the Digital Silk Road Initiative accordingly to ports-buying strategy raise the caveat of filching data from NATO allies and friends in the region.

There is little doubt that the President-elect Biden will find himself in the middle of various complex and entrenched issues related to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea once he takes the oval office. It is clear that defusing tensions, restoring once-existing U.S. and NATO’s influence, and countering the rise of Russia and China as the alternative strategic partners for the region will occupy the top of the lists of American policies in the area. Any help and support provided by the regional partners will be beneficial for the United States. Although the hard task of gathering regional NATO allies France, Greece and Turkey, around a table has become more challenging than it has been before, Biden Administration can bring a breath of fresh air in relations and create incentives for each party to bolster dialogue. Depending on the new American leader’s ability to manage sensitive and tangled regional relations and find a common ground among highly divided and determined actors, it will soon be seen whether this glimmer of hope may blaze out or rapidly fade away.

 

Sena Namlu is a youth and women’s right activist. She has actively partaken in social profit organizations working on particularly girls and youth empowerment — their inclusion in policy-making, conflict resolution, and peace-building processes, and initiated social projects. She is a board member of YCDC, the representative institution of Youth 20 in Turkey, and attended the Y20 Summit in Argentina and G(irls)20 Summit in Japan as Turkey’s delegate. She is also a fellow of the Women in Conflict 1325 Fellowship Programme. After graduation, she worked within Doctors of World Turkey Office as a Grant Officer. Sena is currently a graduate student in the Intelligence and International Security MA Program at the War Studies Department of KCL. Her research interests include processes of foreign policy-making, providing and analyzing information for decision-makers, as well as the role of women and non-governmental actors in conflict resolution and peace-building.

The Libyan Puzzle Piece in Turkey’s Grand Strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean

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by Jack Cross

Joint press conference between President Erdogan and Fayez Al Sarraj, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord, 4th June, 2020

Despite dominating international headlines during the Arab Spring, events in Libya at the time and their consequences today appear to be forgotten. This does not mean, however, that events on the North African coast should be ignored. Indeed, in the context of a civil war, now entering its sixth year since beginning in 2014 , renewed attempts at peace are underway. Alongside the two warring factions are many interested external parties, including Turkey, whose government provides arms and support to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli. The GNA’s opponent is the Benghazi-based, House of Representatives and Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the LNA. But what exactly does Turkey hope to gain in this fragile, embattled and scarred state? I will argue, it is part of a wider narrative of Turkish expansionism across the Eastern Mediterranean and a drive to become the dominant political and economic force in the region.

A recent history of Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Civil War goes back to mid-2019, although their relationship stretches further to the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire under which Libya was a province until 1911-12. This imperial connection places Libya within Turkey’s historical sphere of influence. The current intervention began with Turkey and the GNA agreeing two memorandums of understanding: a military agreement and a maritime deal, signed in November 2019. These guaranteed Ankara’s support, in exchange for revisions of their shared maritime border in the Mediterranean Sea. This was followed up by a vote by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in January of this year, to approve the deployment of military personnel and resources to Libya. The assistance provided by Ankara came in the form of arms, supplies and technical support worth roughly $350 million. Moreover, foreign mercenaries have also been employed and deployed.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya has contributed to a war of words with some of its NATO allies, particularly France, who had been backing the rival Benghazi based government. This has continued despite the fact that the Haftar-led side has little international recognition. However, there have been attempts to reduce foreign influence in the Libyan conflict, including an EU arms embargo, agreed in 2016. This was used to add greater weight to the UN embargo established in 2011. So, what is to be gained here, particularly when the stakes are high enough to spark tensions with major powers? For Turkey, Libya is a key piece of the jigsaw in their ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. In recent years, Turkey as well as Greece and Cyprus, have been increasingly interested in explorative drilling in the Mediterranean, with the potential for huge benefits in exploiting the natural gas deposits beneath the seabed. The Turkish-GNA maritime agreement establishes exclusive economic zones for both Libya and Turkey in the Mediterranean, at the expense of the competing claims made by Greece, Cyprus and others. Already the world has seen mounting tension over this issue, with recent standoffs between the Turkish and Greek navies.

Now, Turkey’s fortunes in the Mediterranean are very clearly tied to those of the GNA in Libya. If the GNA fail to come out as the dominant party in any peace accord, this could put the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement in jeopardy, and President Erdogan’s ambitions along with it. The official line from Ankara makes it clear that they have no intention of abandoning their allies in Libya and there have been widespread suspicions that Turkey has been seeking to breach the arms embargo. In recent days, several Turkish vessels have been boarded by naval personnel, on behalf of the military mission policing the UN and EU embargos. While the Turkish government has denied that there have been attempts to breach any arms embargo, they have stated that their mercenaries are to remain in Libya. This is despite the fact that the initial ceasefire agreement did explicitly call for the removal of foreign military personnel. The danger here is that if Turkey continues these provocative acts, as part of its wider strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, peace talks in Libya may well break down.

So, what consequences do Turkish successes in Libya pose for the wider region? The problem for France, and others opposed to the Turkish policy, is that the Ankara backed side is in a stronger position. At the time of the ceasefire, the GNA had already successfully defended Tripoli from assaults by Haftar and the LNA and retains control of key air bases in the western part of the country. It increasingly appears as if the momentum is behind the GNA, after these recent victories. The current Haftar backers, particularly Russia, have no direct involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean disputes, and are also increasingly friendly with the Erdogan government. In fact key parts of Turkey’s maritime aims regarding Libya are already accomplished, as the agreement made with the GNA has been registered by the UN as an arrangement made between two legitimate governments. But Ankara must maintain its involvement throughout the peace talks. Turkey has sought to strengthen its position within the peace negotiations, offering $120 billion (USD) worth of reconstruction contracts, on condition that the GNA becomes the dominant force in the post-war government. With this backdrop, it looks likely that Turkey will be heading for further collisions with other actors in the region as talks continue to reach a lasting settlement.

It is unclear yet if Erdogan’s gamble in supporting the GNA has paid off, or what exactly a victory in Libya would mean more broadly for Turkish foreign policy. The threat of sanctions over Turkey’s continued involvement in Libya and provocations in the Mediterranean have appeared to have little effect in deterring the Turkish government. The future remains uncertain and dangerous. The fragile truce in Libya could easily collapse and at that point, Turkish involvement could become greater and even more entrenched. The Libyan piece of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean puzzle has not quite fallen into place yet, it still hangs in the balance. With all the uncertainty and instability there is no telling what the direct consequences will be for the wider region, should Turkey prevail here.

Jack Cross is currently pursuing his MA in the History of War in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His main research interests are on diplomatic history, modern Turkey the Middle East more broadly.