Turkey

Many Problems with Neighbours: The Ankara Attack and the Fragility of the Erdoğan Era

October 21, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Jackson Webster

On October 10th 2015, two suicide bombings shook Ankara, the Turkish capital, killing almost 100 Turks and wounding hundreds more. As if the death toll was not tragic enough, the victims of the explosions were peace demonstrators. The march in Ankara last Saturday was protesting the current government’s refusal to accept the offer of a three-week ceasefire by the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK), proposed by the Kurdish leadership in light of the impending snap elections scheduled to be held on the 1st of November. The snap elections were announced by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August after his Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party or AKP)—which saw its majority become a plurality in last June’s general elections— failed to form a coalition with opposition parties. Since the bombing, the Erdoğan government has imposed a “media blackout”, denying the Turkish press the ability to investigate the bombing further. Ignoring this government directive, the Turkish paper Cumhuriyet (Republic) has since published claims that the perpetrators crossed into Turkey from Syria at the border town of Kilis, just north of the Syrian city of Aleppo, which is currently embroiled in a bloody three-way struggle between rebel militias, government forces, and ISIS. To add to the controversy, as of October 17th, Cumhuriyet —a popular and frequently anti-government Turkish-language newspaper— published an article claiming to have found evidence that Turkish security services had been wire-tapping the suspected bombers, yet were surprisingly unable to stop the attack. The validity of these claims could not be confirmed by additional sources at the time of the article’s publication.

The first Cumhuriyet report neither supports nor attacks the unofficial government stance, articulated by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, which claims that the PKK and ISIS were “likely in cooperation” and were jointly responsible for the October 10th bombings. Despite the ludicrous nature of this accusation, one can see the reasoning for the government looking to curate this highly improbable narrative. Turkey is currently waging an air campaign against the PKK in Anatolia, the Kurdish Peshmerga in Syria and Iraq, and the Islamic State. Thus, it follows that the Erdoğan government would want to use the bombing to rally support behind further military action against both the PKK and ISIS.

The bombing in Ankara comes during a delicate period in Turkish politics, due to both the AKP’s uneasiness with its lost majority status and the extremely volatile nature of opposition groups, both inside and outside parliament. The most notable opposition parties, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party or CHP) and Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party or MHP), were not able to reach an agreement with the AKP over the creation of a cabinet following the June general elections. This failure of government-formation was attributed by Foreign Policy’s John Hannah to the AKP, which allegedly was dogmatic and unwavering in negotiations with opposition parties to the point where the Nationalist Party leader Devlet Bahçeli refused to meet with Prime Minister Davutoğlu immediately following the bombings. In addition, the Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party or HDP) has accused the government of negligence, criticising the Turkish intelligence services for not being able to prevent the attack, with some members even going so far as to hint at intentional government ignorance of a terrorist attack which conveniently targeted activists protesting government policy.

What both the political antagonism and the bombings themselves articulate and exacerbate is the truly tenuous nature of Turkish security, the questionable state of its democracy, and the lack of logical continuity in recent foreign policy. The bombing itself calls into question whether the vast and expensive Turkish internal security apparatus is truly able to protect its citizenry and state. The Turkish people elected the AKP on promises of safety, yet the recent frequency of attacks within Turkey has shown how Ankara’s long and sometimes porous border with Syria presents serious security challenges. Additionally, the government’s media blackout following the bombing, going so far as to keep mourning family members away from the blast sight, is indicative of the state of the free press in Turkey today. Indeed, as the investigation continues, how the government will respond to further reports from Cumhuriyet and other papers that may be critical of its handling of the recent crisis will be an excellent indicator of how an AKP majority would conduct itself should the Turkish people choose Erdoğan’s party in the coming snap elections.

The ruling AKP’s failure to see the interconnectedness of the crises it has faced in its neighbourhood has lost touch with the sound policy which saved the Turkish nation-state from dissolution following the First World War, and future administrations in Ankara would do well to learn from the secular, populist, and calculated examples of their twentieth-century predecessors. Turkey’s foreign policy over the last decade —the brain-child of current Prime Minister and then-Foreign Minister Davutoğlu—has been coined “zero problems with neighbours”. The original idea of the policy was essentially to pursue close ties with all countries in Turkey’s region. This task has proved difficult considering that, since the policy’s inception, Syria has erupted into civil-war-turned-proxy-war, Iran and Saudi Arabia have grown more belligerent, Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered under a conservative government in Jerusalem, and Russia has annexed Ukrainian territory. Simultaneously forming energy ties with the Russian government against the will of a distinctly pro-European and anti-Russian population has cost the Erdoğan government support both domestically and in Brussels. The policy of non-intervention in the Peshmerga’s struggle for Kobanê and subsequent delays in allowing for coalition access to Turkish airfields soured NATO opinions towards Turkey, just as Ankara was filing an Article IV declaration (formal request for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council). NATO’s discontent with Turkish policy regarding Syria can arguably be seen in the withdrawal of Patriot missiles from Turkey first by Germany and the Netherlands, and last week by the United States. Though the relevance to last week’s bombings in Ankara is debatable, Turkish policies of attempting to play too many sides in harshly divisive conflicts such as Syria and Ukraine could find Ankara frighteningly alone should violence between the government, PKK, and the potential spillover of the fight against IS and other groups in Syria escalate beyond the control of Turkish security forces.

Modern Turkey, a NATO member-state and traditionally stable regional power, currently faces existential threats to the state’s ability to govern both from within and without. The dire nature of these threats originates not from opposition groups, but from the ruling party figure head and strongman Erdoğan’s policy and rhetoric. Turkey’s advantageous geopolitical position as a bridge between the European and Muslim worlds has been squandered by a series of policy miscalculations. Equally, NATO members, preoccupied for most of 2014 by Russian actions in the Baltic and Ukraine, are beginning to direct their attention southward to Asia Minor and the Levant. Ankara’s geographical privilege has been wasted on a policy seeking to solidify support within its homogeneous core voter-base while forgetting that it presides over a multicultural, and multi-ethnic society. A heterogeneous population can add vibrancy to open democracies, but such diverse electorates are the bane of repressive states. Future Turkish governments, regardless of the party from which they originate, will have to face the above myriad of diverse threats. The security of the Turkish nation-state as we know it cannot be taken for granted in light of current instability. Ultimately, the Ankara bombing is one more variable to enter into the calculations of Turkish grand strategy, yet another sign of the instability both in and around Anatolia. Perhaps Turkey, much like the Ottoman Empire of old, cannot be ruled: it must be administered.

Update: Since the initial writing of this article, a Turkish court has lifted the “media blackout” on coverage of the attacks and investigations into those responsible, despite the ban being ignored by more critical newspapers like Cumhuriyet. Additionally, the first suspect has been named: Yunus Emre Alagöz, a young man from the southeast of Turkey who’s brother Şeyh carried out a similar suicide attack in Suruç this July. Both brothers had allegedly discussed sympathies with the Islamic State in Syria in online exchanges.

Jackson Webster, a Los Angeles native, is in the final year of an International Relations degree at the King’s College London Department of War Studies. He is the President of the KCL United Nations Association and is a content editor for Dialogue Magazine.

Turkey in the Midst of the Syrian Crisis: Security, Democracy and Secularism

September 16, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Gonenc Uysal:

After years of civil war in Syria, that has caused more than 210,000 – mostly civilian – deaths, the international community has recently been shaken by videos of war crimes undertaken by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These have included beheadings and mass executions, sexual slavery, child soldiers and destruction of cultural heritage. Despite this, Turkey has not changed its rigid position against Bashar Assad, maintaining the doctrine of strategic depth outlined by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu. Moreover, the significant majority of international commentators, including scholars and journalists, continue to argue that Syrian rebel groups, particularly Islamists, have tried to reconcile liberal democracy with Islamism/political Islam.

Alongside the rise of radical political Islam in the Middle East, including in Turkey, there has been an apparent decline in support for the secularist principles that have long acted as the foundation of the Turkish state. This article argues that secularism should be reconfirmed as the founding principle of Turkey. This must be done in order to maintain the security of its democracy.

The tension between religion and secularism cannot be reduced to politico-cultural relativism, since secularism dictates the nature and boundaries of sovereignty, and thus the relationship between the state and its citizens as well as the relationship among citizens. Political Islam considers the spiritual sphere as sacred and grants sovereignty to divine rule. It also divides society into two antagonistic groups – believers and unbelievers – and claims the legitimacy of the former over the latter. Therefore, political Islam should be considered as a project which foresees the reconstruction of both state and society in accordance with the dictates of religion.

In various countries political Islam has been portrayed as being compatible with liberal democracy.[1] The result of this position is to veil class inequalities and the exploitation of the capitalist system, as well as the deepening dependence of national economies under the global capitalist system.[2] Such reconciliation between political Islam and liberal democracy is fundamentally in contradiction with the principle of equality of human beings,[3] and it has overruled any secular criticism that could overcome deficiencies of capitalism at the global, regional and domestic levels.

In the international sphere, Turkey served as a balance between the monopolist Western capital and the rising Gulf capital. Although the former remained cautious, it was still in alliance with the latter, for instance, by supporting Syrian rebel groups under the CIA long before the plan on training and equipping Syrian rebels took shape. However, in the face of ISIL’s war crimes and radicalisation among parts of the Western population, the West began to search for a way to legitimise the possibility of future cooperation with regional actors, such as Iran.

While a significant chunk of the international community began to discuss whether Assad could be a necessary evil, it also began to blame Turkey for encouraging ISIL by supplying military equipment and training, and medical care, and for fighting against the PYD (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat –Democratic Union Party), which has an organic relationship with the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane –Kurdistan Workers’ Party). As long as the possibility of changing power dynamics between Iran and the Gulf capital has existed, the sympathy of the international community toward the PYD has risen. Consequently, in order to regain its image as a Western ally and a bulwark against radical political Islam in the eyes of international and domestic public opinion, Turkey has let the USA use Incirlik air base close to the Syrian border, and called NATO for a meeting on the basis of the Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey further agreed with the USA on an ISIL-free buffer-zone consisting of Syrian rebels, including a majority of the moderate Islamists.

However, since Turkey also contributed to the training and equipping of Syrian rebels, it still faces the possibility of the inadvertent radicalisation of Islamists,[4] similar to the case of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Any government’s tacit consent and arguably support for the so-called moderate Islamists would contribute to the deterioration of fundamental human rights and freedoms both in Turkey and in the Middle Eastern region. Therefore, Turkey urgently needs to reformulate its foreign policy and respond to the Syrian crisis in accordance with the principle of secularism.

In the domestic sphere, although the AKP government had already passed the controversial omnibus domestic security bill in April 2015, the latest terrorist attack against socialist activists in Suruc in July 2015 could not be prevented. On the contrary, whereas the police used disproportionate use of force against labour demonstrations on 1^st May 2015 and the LGBT parade in June 2015, the police did not intervene in the Caliphate Parade, which called for the application of sharia in Turkey and which was organised by Hizbut Tahrir in June 2015.

In July 2015, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation against left-oriented pro-Kurdish HDP for allegedly supporting PKK’s terrorism, and President Erdogan declared that ‘the peace process’ was terminated. Beginning in August, the armed conflict between the PKK and the constabulary forces has begun to escalate with the loss of tens of civilians and combatants, and practices of martial law have been implemented in particular towns in south-eastern Turkey.

In the meantime, protests against the PKK’s terrorism turned into acts of vandalism against the opposing political parties and newspapers while shouting takbir (‘Allah is the greatest’). Although Davutoglu assured that the interim election government would prevent fratricide, he did not publicly discuss what the peace process exactly consisted of and why it was terminated, and he failed to delegitimise the political use of religion. Indeed, neither the AKP government nor the political opposition were criticised for their inability and unwillingness to prevent the political use of religion, and thus the rise of political Islam, by underestimating the importance of secularism.

In the face of the rise of radical political Islam and conflicts alongside ethnic and sectarian cleavages in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries of the global capitalist system, Turkey should understand the importance of secularism for addressing security issues and preserving fundamental human rights and freedoms. Marx once said that the critique of religion was ‘the prerequisite of every critique’, necessary to dismantle social domination.[5]

Any ideological movement which calls for the superiority of religion over the worldly sphere cannot be reconciled with democratic principles, particularly fundamental human rights and freedoms, since it aims to politically use religion as a tool for power.

In the era of neoliberalism security issues, as well as both authoritarian political regimes and deficiencies of liberal democracy, can be overcome through a political agenda which accepts the primacy of secularism. Since Turkey remains a semi-peripheral country within the framework of the Bretton Woods system,[6] and since Turkey has a majority Muslim population, the quest for secularism is urgent. Only through secularism can Turkey solve its domestic security issues and respond to its regional security issues.

Gonenc Uysal is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where she focuses on the state discourse on secularism and its interaction with civil-military relations in Turkey.

NOTES

[1] For the relationship between periphery/semi-periphery countries and the global capitalist system: Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976); Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007)

[2] For the relationship between political Islam and capitalism: Samir Amin, Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion, and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism. (R. Moore and J. Membrez, Trans.) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009)

[3] For the paradoxical relationship between liberal democracy and capitalism: Ellen M. Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For neoliberalism: David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

[4] For a comprehensive summary on rebel groups in Syria: Fehim Tastekin, “Egit-Donat: Bir Batak Hikaye Daha”, Radikal, October 10, 2014, accessed http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/fehim_tastekin/egit_donat_bir_batak_hikaye_daha-1217979

[5] Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. (A. Jolin and J. O’Malley, Trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.131

[6] For the semi-peripheral place of Turkey in the global capitalist system: Nesecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, The Ravages of Neo-Liberalism: Economy, Society and Gender in Turkey. Eds. (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2002)

Presidency à la Erdogan: A Perspective on the System of Government and the Future of Turkey

September 25, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Gonenc Uysal:

turkish_flag_wallpaper_by_magnaen-d38ewl8 — [Image by Garyck Arntzen]

Turkey had increasingly staged discussions about the system of government when Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey should have presidency in November 2012[1] (the Turkish system of government is located between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism).[2] Although the system is parliamentarian, the Constitution of 1982 broadened the President’s fundamental executive, legislative and juridical competences in order to give the role to arbitrate the state structure. Furthermore, the constitutional amendments, which were passed in 2007 and required a referendum to elect the President,[3] moved the Turkish system closer to a semi-presidential system. Although advocates of presidentialism base their arguments on the unsuccessful coalition governments of the 1970s and 1990s, parliamentarianism involves mechanisms to overcome deadlocks unlike presidentialism and semi-presidentialism.[4] It can be argued that Turkish democracy can already be further ameliorated with parliamentarism. This article examines Erdogan’s interpretation of the roles of the President and the government in order to present a prospective on future of the Turkish political context.

On 10^th August 2014, Erdogan was elected as the President through a national referendum.[5] Although the elections were recognized as adhering to democratic principles, both preceding and subsequent processes should be discussed to demonstrate Erdogan’s interpretation of the President’s power. Erdogan, as the President, is the head of the state with constitutional executive power alongside the Cabinet. Erdogan had already declared that he would use full-competence if he would become the President. He portrayed the Presidential competences as the Constitutional rights despite the fact that ‘having competence does not entail having a right’.[6] Furthermore, Erdogan underlined that the presidential referendum has changed the system and made the Office of Presidency ‘the executive authority’.[7] Thus, it can be argued that he interpreted the President’s power in absolute terms vis-à-vis the executive and signalled that he would attempt to broaden the President’s executive competences, at least through practices if not at the level of the legal structure.

Most significantly, the Supreme Electoral Council declared the official result of the Presidential elections on 15 August 2014[8] and the official result was published in the Official Gazette on 28 August 2014.[9] For more than two weeks between 10^th August and 28^th August, Turkey had two Presidents: Abdullah Gul and Erdogan. Furthermore, Erdogan had three posts: the President, the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) – despite the fact that the Constitution required the President not to have any political party affiliation. Consequently, Ahmet Davutoglu was permitted to become the Prime Minister on 28^th August.[10] Erdogan did not resign from the Office of the Prime Minister during the campaign for the Presidential election based on the Supreme Electoral Council’s decision.[11] Although Erdogan avoided any power vacuum in the executive, it can still be argued that he maintained the political system where he always did have power to rule, even if it meant conflict with the ethos of democracy – having multiple Heads of State, putting pressure on the electorates and breaching the equality of the circumstances of the Presidential candidacy.

Moreover, since the Constitution required the President not to have any political party affiliation, on 21^st August, Erdogan declared Davutoglu as their candidate to run as the Chairman of the Party and portrayed the AKP as their party.[12] He attempted to delegitimise the CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) during the AKP’s Congress on 27^th August by discrediting their recent political alliances.[13] Both of these events took place when Erdogan held the title of the President. Thus, his attempt to emphasise his belonging to the AKP and discredit two opposition parties can be considered as a conflict with the Constitution as the President is supposed to have an impartial role.

During his Presidential speech on 28^th August, Erdogan presented a break between his term of office as the President and the past. He presented his Presidential term as the closure of the old Turkey era and beginning of the new Turkey era. He delegitimised the old Turkey by portraying it as tutelage regime and legitimised the new Turkey by portraying it as the victory of national will and democracy. Erdogan has always portrayed the AKP’s government as the only representative of the national will while denying the existence of the opposition and its place in the same nation. He further portrayed his Presidential position more legitimate than the previous Presidents by emphasising on the people’s vote to elect the President. Thus, besides being the head of the state as the President, he presented his position legitimate enough to act as the head of the executive and the Party.[14]

It can be argued that Erdogan envisions Turkey as the single-party state represented with the AKP’s majority government, the AKP as the state-party under the leadership of ‘one man’,[15] since one man, now as the President, represents the state. Therefore, the new Turkey era is envisioned as the era of the party-state regime under the President’s leadership in order to consolidate the hegemonic project of conservative democracy.[16]

_______________________

Gonenc Uysal is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where she focuses on the state discourse on secularism and its interaction with civil-military relations in Turkey.

[1] Erdogan: Baskanlik Turk Sistemi Olsun (11 November 2012) CNNTurk, retrieved from: http://www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/11/11/erdogan.baskanlik.turk.sistemi.olsun/684086.0/
[2] Bestas, A. (2014) Yari-Baskanlik Sistemi. Surec Analiz, 9, pp. 25-27.
[3] TBMM (2011) T. C. Anayasasi. Retrieved from: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf
[4] Ozbudun, E. (2012) Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism in Turkey, Policy Brief. Global Turkey in Europe Series, Istanbul.
[5] Cumhurbaskanligi Secimi (10 August 2014) BBC Turkce, retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/140810_canli_cumhurbaskanligi_secim.shtml
[6] Spaak, T. (2005) ‘The Concept of Legal Competence’. The IVR Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law, Stockholm University.
[7] Erdogan’dan Kosk Aciklamalari (16 April 2014) Hurriyet, retrieved from: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26235576.asp
[8] YSK (2014a, 15 August) Yuksek Secim Kurulu Baskanligi Karar No 3719. Retrieved from: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Kararlar/2014-3719.pdf
[9] Yuksek Secim Kurulu Karari, Karar No 3719. Resmi Gazete, 28 August 2014, 29102 Mukerrer.
[10] Bakanlar Kurulu’nun Gorevini Surdurmesine Dair Islem. Resmi Gazete, 29102 Mukerrer 2.
[11] YSK (2014b, 12 July) Yuksek Secim Kurulu Baskanligi Karar No 3237. Retrieved from: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Kararlar/2014-3237.pdf
[12] Erdogan Yeni Basbakani Acikliyor (21 August 2014) Radikal, retrieved from: http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_yeni_basbakani_acikliyor-1208245
[13] AKP (2014) Basbakan Erdogan’in AK Parti 1. Olaganustu Buyuk Kurultayinda Yaptigi Konusma. Retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-1.-olaganustu-buyuk-kurultayinda-yaptigi-konusm/66343#1
[14] Cumhurbaskani Erdogan’dan Tarihi Konusma. (28 August 2014) Takvim, retrieved from: http://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2014/08/28/ve-tarihi-an-geldi-catti
[15] Yasli, F. (2014, 28 August) 28 August 2014: Cumhurbas(ba)kanligi Rejiminin Ilk Gunu. Yurt, retrieved from: http://www.yurtgazetesi.com.tr/28-agustos-2014-cumhurbas-ba-kanligi-rejiminin-ilk-gunu-makale,8704.html
[16] For the AKP’s official discourse on conservative democracy: Akdogan, Y. (2004) AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi. Istanbul: Alfa.

From the Gezi Parki protests to the Democratisation Package

December 10, 2013 by Strife Staff

by Gonenc Uysal

Protestsers vs. police forces. Istnbul. Events of June 15, 2013. — Protesters vs. police forces, Istanbul, 15 June 2013
(photo by Mstyslav Chernov)

It has been just over six months since the start of Gezi Parki protests on 30^th May. Amnesty International constantly reported widespread and systematic abusive force and called on police to desist. Amnesty also published a report on the Gezi Parki protests which documented the casualties and the most serious injuries:

In Ankara, Ethem Sarisuluk was shot in the head by a police officer on 1 June and died of his injuries on 14 June. A police officer was indicted on the least serious charges possible – causing death by exceeding the limits of legitimate defence without intent. As the trial continues, Sarisuluk’s family and potential witnesses are still being harassed. In Eskisehir, Ali Ismail Korkmaz was severely beaten and died of his injuries on 10 July. CCTV evidence of the beating was destroyed but four police officers and four civilians are due to stand trial for causing his death. In Hatay, witnesses reported that Abdullah Comert was hit in the head by a tear gas canister fired at close range by a police officer on 3 June and died of his injuries on the following day. Other injuries and human rights violations included plastic bullets aimed at heads and upper bodies, sexual assault and beating, using chemical irritants in the water cannon supply tanks, and the use of live ammunition. In Adana, Mustafa Sari, a police officer, fell down while he was interfering in protests and died. The AKP circles stated that he was pushed by protestors but this accusation was denied by Sari’s family circles. According to Turk Tabipleri Birligi (Turkish Medical Association), 7,832 people in total were injured.

The protests seemed to fade away as summer passed; then widely staged protests resumed in Turkey in early September. Due to spatial constraints, prolongations of Gezi Park protests cannot be detailed. However, for further information, it is important to look at some protests such as ODTU (METU) student protests, Hatay protests and protests against HES project in the Black Sea region. Demonstrations during the trials for those who died during the Gezi Parki protests such as Sarisuluk davasi, or against the decisions of Ergenekon trials, Alevis’ protests and the Yatagan workers’ protests, are also telling.

But what has changed since Gezi Parki?

On 30 September, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) introduced a ‘democratisation package’ which addressed the following issues:

Article 42 of the Constitution that accepts Turkish as the mother tongue, however, which allows teaching of different languages under other laws. The liberation of the teaching of native languages (including Kurdish) would be regulated with Law No 5580 which would allow teaching of Kurdish language in private schools.
The abolition of the Turkish Penalty Law Article 222, which punished the usage of the letters W, Q, X with from 2 to 6 months of imprisonment. These letters are used for Kurdish alphabet -and are not used in the Turkish alphabet.
Veiling which was prohibited with the public mandate published in 1982 would be allowed in the public sphere except in the military, police and judiciary
The Mor Gabriel Church would be granted the status and returned to Assyrian community. However, there is no further regulation about the return of properties that were transferred to third persons
Three alternatives to the electoral threshold were proposed: Firstly, the single member district which divides Turkey into 550 electoral regions will cancel this threshold; secondly, the re-drawing of the constituency which will be represented with three to five MPs; and finally, maintaining the present d’hondt method system with a 10% barrier
Treasury aid for parties that exceed 3% barrier
Return of names of towns which aim at to change Tunceli with Dersim, Aydinlar with Tillo and Guroymak with Norsin
Crimes of hatred and discriminatory laws are regulated
Introduction of cultural institute and language courses for Roman Communities
Protection of private life and lifestyle
Allowance of political propaganda in different languages
Regulations on the right to assemble and protest
Abolition of the Turkish school oath
Nevsehir University will be renamed as Haci Bektas Veli University whose name is very significant for Alevis. However, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag is working on Alevis demands and needs, and it is foreseen that this work will be put on the agenda later.

Prime Minister Erdogan stated that the package represented the democratic level that Turkey has now reached. He underlined that ‘the state no longer imposed any identity or interfered with ethnicity, faith and thoughts, but the state now was determined to keep humans alive to keep the state alive’. He also added that ‘the government did not exert authority in the public sphere that turned the public spaces into hell against citizens who did not act according the government’s definition of correctness’. Deputy PM Bulent Arinc stated that polls showed ‘75% of the population found the package satisfactory’. Arinc also underlined that this was ‘a continuing process’ and the AKP could do more in the future.

It should be noted that the package includes positive democratic reforms. However, especially in social media, Gezi Parki protesters demonstrated their dissatisfaction. This package did not satisfy some sectors of Kurdish population since the BDP stated that ‘the package did not respond to the abolition of electoral barrier’, or the ‘right of equal representation and local parliaments that would secure autonomy’. Moreover, the package amends the regulations on freedom of assembly to extend the protests for an extra hour if permission for the protest is granted in the first place. Additionally, the issue of the Special Authority Courts, that arguably had common features with the State Security Courts that were abolished in 2004, was not addressed. Similarly, long detention periods and no amnesty to political prisoners including political activists, journalists and MPs who were involved in the Gezi Parki, protests were ignored. Concerns about the Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law or the Law on Police Duties and Powers were also not responded to. Moreover, it is not clear how hate speech will be regulated: the amendment must not become a legal platform to punish criticisms which will greatly impede on freedom of speech. The most controversial example would be Fazil Say, the high-profile Turkish pianist’s trial over his social media messages about Islam. On the other hand, there was also no mention of hate speech and crimes against the LBGT community members.

Although the minority religious group Alevis’ concerns were stated to be addressed in the future, the package did indeed say nothing about Alevi community’s rights and freedoms such as spaces of prayer (Cemevi), rejection of the emphasis of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) on Sunni Islam, and so forth. The government undertook the construction of a joint Mosque-Space of prayer (Cami-Cemevi) centre to represent their close ties. However, this was rejected by large sections of the Alevis population on the basis on the state’s hidden agenda to supervise the Alevi community. At the same time, the government launched a project to abolish Alevi foundations and establish Izzettin Dogan’s Cem Vakfi as the only Alevi foundation. It should be noted that Dogan was also the member of the committee appointed by the government to visit regions of Turkey and note demands of civil-society organisations to create the democracy package. However some members of the same committee later accused the government on the basis that they were ‘used’ and ‘the package did not represent the larger segments of society’.

Currently, the Turkish political arena has been staging a debate about Erdogan’s statements on ‘university student girls and boys staying together’ (sharing a flat –mixed-sex student houses). Erdogan stated that ‘this is contrary to our conservative structure’ and also added that ‘he gave directive to governors, they would do what is required for regulation’. The next day, the Governor of Adana declared that Erdogan’s speech was indeed understood as a directive and they would do what is required. The CHP underlined the fundamental rights and freedoms of students and asked that the content of the directive, content of regulation, control over students who are already over the age of 18, problems about meetings of girls and boys, and particularly the content of ‘conservative democratic structure’ be clarified.

The biggest question remains: What is the AKP’s understanding of democracy? On one hand, the government prepares a democratic package that would secure rights and freedoms in the public sphere, on the other, the government interferes and re-draws society’s private life by mistreating them on the axis of morality.

The AKP’s interpretations are indeed hidden in its discourse of ‘conservative democracy’ which represents the AKP’s hegemonic ideology with Islamist references. When the founding members of the AKP, namely Abdullah Gul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Bulent Arinc established the Party, they stated that they changed the ‘shirt’ of National View Movement (Milli Gorus) which had an arguably clearer Islamist agenda. Therefore, they formulated ‘conservative democracy’ where their religion does not impede on their politicking. Indeed, AKP always followed the secular separation of religion from the state affairs to achieve their economic policies.

However, while separating state and religion, Turkish secularism places religion under the state’s control. This enables the AKP to re-shape the boundaries of the public and private sphere. Although amendments such as the lift on headscarves are indeed democratic reforms, the AKP has long been using the discourse of ‘our veiled sisters’ to create a binary opposition between ‘us’ versus ‘them’. The AKP’s infringements upon the private life-styles are simply an extension of creating appropriate citizens. Regarding the material gains, the democracy package guides the local elections by representing the AKP as a democracy-builder. The 50% of votes that the AKP received in the 2011 elections urged Prime Minister Erdogan to construct the electoral game on the image of 50% AKP-voters versus 50% other. He understood the Gezi Parki protests as a threat to his authoritative image instead of an opportunity for a further democratisation. Therefore, Erdogan’s speeches deepen the polarisation in society and aim to guarantee ‘conservative’ votes.

In democracies, legislation remains a symbolic act. Having sometimes associated itself with the Ottoman tradition, the AKP should have learnt better from the controversial consequences of the Tanzimat (Gulhane Rescript of 1839) era and its idea of top-down reform through legislation including predominantly through the Constitution. On the contrary, consolidation of democracy can be secured through internalising its underlying ethos.

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Gonenc Uysal is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where she focuses on discourses of the interaction of secularism and Islamism and how these interact with civil-military relations in Turkey.

Unrest in Turkey: from ‘3 or 5 trees’ to ‘democracy’

June 5, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Gonenc Uysal

Recently, the Municipal Government of Istanbul decided to rebuild the Taksim Military Barracks (Topcu Kislasi) in Taksim as either a shopping mall or a hotel. This project involves building over much of Gezi Parki, in Taksim. However, Mayor of Istanbul Topbas and AKP (Justice and Development Party) officials including PM Erdogan denied any damage to trees, stating they would ‘dislocate and plant’ trees elsewhere. Protesters including young people, civil rights activists and environmentalists started to flock to the park after the beginning of demolition and construction on 29th May. When asked about the protest, Mayor Topbas declared PM Erdogan would make the final decision, but the latter refused to review the project.

This is not the first time this year that Taksim square has been at the centre of protests. On 1st May 2013 workers’ unions were denied the right to march into the square -arguing that potholes prevented a safe demonstration. Taksim holds vast symbolic importance in Turkey’s recent Republican history. On that occasion, police reacted with heavy-handed crowd control methods including gas rounds and water cannon, resulting in several wounded.

The present protests have seen unprecedented and disproportionate use of force by police –including burning down tents of civilian protesters, tear gas bombs, and water cannon. Undeterred and rallied through social media such as Twitter the number of protesters swelled to tens of thousands turning up on Saturday 31 May. Protests quickly spread to other big cities including Ankara, Izmir, Eskisehir, Adana, Antalya, Trabzon, Gaziantep and Balikesir, Hatay and Tunceli. Simultaneous protests were also organised in cities abroad such as London, Brussels, Berlin, Amsterdam, the USA such as New York, Chicago.

This protest, unlike many in Turkey’s politically fractious past, includes protesters from different sectors of society. There are elderly and young, men and women, secular and veiled, Turkish, Kurdish, or other ethnic, Muslim, non-Muslim, Sunnis, Alevis, leftists, rightists, Revolutionary Muslims, anarchists, Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, environmentalists, conservatives, non-party partisans, LBGT rights activists. Some, who would not descend to what are becoming street battles with 7ft high barricades of cobble stones, make noise with cooking pots in their balconies. Additionally, on Monday the KESK union federation (with 240,000 members) has begun a two-day strike in support of the protests, accusing the government of ‘state terror’, as has the Istanbul branch of EGITIM-SEN. The level of individuality, and claims of citizen’s rights in these protests is highlighted by criticism of the main opposition parties, CHP (Republican People’s Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) for their inability and unwillingness to provide a concerted opposition or take action in parliament. On the other side of the spectrum, protesters have been unable to appeal to wider working class concerns, which makes participation of working groups unlikely, unless the growing protest movement is able to speak to dire economic, social and political concerns of workers.

Although demands and concerns are far from coordinated and comprehensively supported, a brief summary of the main ones seems necessary. For further reference, see at the end of the article for a list of sources and websites to follow the demands and developments.

-the reversal of plans for Gezi Park;

-the reversal of the decision to demolish the historic Emek Sinemasi (cinema) in Istiklal, Beyoglu, and Ataturk Kultur Merkezi (Ataturk Cultural Centre) in Taksim, Beyoglu.

-revision of the Constitution by the AKP government –the AKP government launched an amendment to change the first three articles of the constitution (which define the fundamental principles of the Republic), and to introduce a presidential system;

-opposition to the government’s Syrian policy, which they contend is bringing instability to the South of the country -with instances such as Reyhanli;

-reversal of policies restricting alcohol consumption

-concern about state control of the media

-widespread arrest, imprisonment and trial of opposition military leaders, journalists and intellectuals, activists since 2007 –symbolised by detention in Silivri prison.

-concern about rapid privatisation programmes and the role of private firm in rural areas

-accusations of corruption at executive government and judicial level;

-recent changes in the education system promoted without consultation and despite educators’ concerns;

-concerns about mistreatment of minority entities like Kurds, Alevis and others (see for instance the Uludere incident). The naming of the proposed third bridge over the Bosphorus as ‘Yavuz Sultan Selim’ –Selim the First (responsible for a massacre of Alevi in the 16th century) has become a symbol of this issue

-concerns about domestic and public, physical and verbal violence against women and LBGT

-call for PM Erdogan to resign

-wider environmental concerns

Evidently, it is no longer the issue of the park that is drawing such disparate groups together; the protests have now escalated with a rising number of diverse and, so far, uncoordinated demands. The park, however, is still the only issue that commands broad consensus, with requests to cancel the demolition of the park and the construction of the Ottoman-style barracks, accountability over recent police excesses in Istanbul and the right to protest. As of the time of writing protests continue, with hundreds camping out in city centres. Disproportionate use of force police has continued, with one casualty confirmed as of Tuesday afternoon.

PM Erdogan has notoriously criticised Syrian President Assad for his use of force against opponents and ignoring democratic demands. On the other hand, Turkish protesters are not spoken of in the same light, instead being labelled by government sources and the PM as ‘marginal’, ‘plunderers’, ‘drunks’ and agents of the Republican Party out to destabilise the country. Furthermore, he highlights that his leadership is supported by the 50% of the country that voted for him in the last election. On 3rd June Erdogan left for a scheduled visit to Morocco and today 4th, the Deputy Prime Minister Arinc has declared that the original protests against the redevelopment of the park were ‘just and legitimate’ and offered talks with the protesters on the subject of the park. He offered a very qualified apology to protesters victims of police excesses adding ‘I do not think we need to apologise to those who create destruction of public property in the streets and who try to prevent the freedom of the people in the streets.’

Another major issue has been the role of the mainstream national and independent media including NTV and even CNNTurk (the Turkish franchisee of CNN) have not been covering the protests except for the reverberations events have had on stock market valuations. This silence, notoriously including cooking shows and documentaries about penguins being aired during the protests, has revealed the extent to which the government is able to control major state and independent media outlets, provoking protests against the media. Smaller outlets such as Halk TV, Ulusal Kanal and T24 have been reporting on the protests, as well as foreign media including the BBC, CNN, Reuters, Al Jazeera, AP, AFP and others.

Considering the partial abstention of mainstream media from the events, not unlike events in North Africa and the Middle East in the last two years, observers following events are left with snippets of information from social media and online depositories of photographs and video. The evidence so far points to widespread abuse by police forces including thousands of arbitrary arrests, beatings of protesters, excessive use of tear and other crowd dispersing gas agents, and serious injuries caused by the widespread use of rubber bullets, water cannon.

Amnesty in Turkey have published a report (3rd June) detailing round numbers for injured protestors on the basis of hospital data. In Istanbul, at least 1500 people received treatment during demonstrations. In Ankara, at least 424 people received treatment in hospitals; in Izmir, 420 people received treatment in last two days. Amnesty in Turkey calls for an immediate end to abusive use of force against demonstrators. It states that the use of tear gas and water cannons is not acceptable during peaceful demonstrations. It also calls for authorities to launch impartial and independent investigations into the policing of demonstrators. It also indicated that lessons should be for the future policing of demonstrations.

This is the biggest public protest since Cumhuriyet Mitingleri (Republic Protests) in 2007 against the candidacy of politicians from Milli Gorus –a predecessor of AKP. During these protests, many marched to ‘protect Republican values’ especially secularism. Although today’s protests include all Republicans, it goes beyond to include above-mentioned various groups.

It would not be accurate to describe these protests as a ‘Turkish Spring’. For a start, Turkey is already a democracy. On the contrary, I read the protests as a claiming its right to practice democracy beyond the ballot box and in protest form. A variety of dissatisfaction with the AKP government is certainly the key to these protests, and it is clear that the PM is unwilling to address or be seen to address this dissatisfactions, as many have read his persistence in continuing his scheduled trip to Morocco and the much-belated offer by Deputy PM Arinc to have a dialogue about the park.

Finally, I wish to highlight a crucial point that I feel is at the core of the non-park aspects of the protests: democracy is a right and principle that extends beyond the ballot box and includes freedom of expression and protest as well as demanding accountability from government. Peaceful protests, freedom of speech and government accountability are constitutional principles in Turkey; these protesters are actualising their claim to these rights.

Turkey

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