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Turkey and Drone Warfare: A Winning Combination for Azerbaijan?

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by Hannah Papachristidis

Death from above: the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 drone going global? (Image credit: DHA via AP)

Azerbaijan’s victory in the recently concluded war with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh can be defined by the former’s extensive military capabilities and its close relationship with Turkey. In particular, the use of Turkish-supplied drones to secure aerial dominance distinctly shaped the conflict in Azerbaijan’s favour. With fighting intensifying in late October and early November, it was feared the conflict would extend into the winter, risking significant humanitarian issues. On the evening of 9 November, however, the conflict abruptly ended with the signing of a peace deal, brokered by Russia. The deal cemented Azerbaijan’s territorial gains and, whilst not including Turkey as a co-signatory, provides significant benefits to it, as Azerbaijan’s critical ally.

The dispute surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, where ninety-five per cent of the population is ethnically Armenian, can be traced to the Armenian Genocide in 1914 and the independent Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) region within Azerbaijan that the Soviet Union created in response to the genocide. As the Soviet Union dissolved, the NKAO sought to formally join Armenia and, in 1991, the region declared independence from Azerbaijan. This led to war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and similarly ended with a Russia-brokered cease-fire in 1994. Under this deal, Nagorno-Karabakh and other surrounding regions fell under Armenian control. The cease-fire was designed to be temporary and Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan however, this status quo has remained in place for 26 years, that is until the events of this year.

Russia’s historic support for Armenia on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh has meant the two countries have remained closely allied since 1994, albeit with Armenia becoming increasingly reliant on its ally – Russia maintains a military base in Armenia and the two countries are part of a multilateral defence agreement. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, sought to balance both Western and Russian influences in the period after 1994 and, only more recently, has the country taken steps to become closer to Moscow. It is not, for example, a party to the same treaty as Armenia.  In recent years, however, Baku has come to see Russia as the key player in efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In a signal towards improved relations, Baku has made significant investments in Russian weapons in recent years. In terms of the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, Azerbaijan has relied on remaining close to its Turkish ally, with whom it shares ethnic, cultural and historical ties.

For Armenia and Azerbaijan, military capabilities are a significant part of national identity. Over the last ten years, both countries have committed a similar proportion of GDP on military expenditure and, as of 2019, both countries rank in the top 10 most militarised countries in the world. Whilst Russia has extensively supplied weapons to both countries since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994, there is a clear asymmetry between the two foes. The value of exports from Russia to Azerbaijan in the period 2009-2019 is over 4.5 times greater than Russian exports to Armenia.

Armenia lacks the cash of its oil-rich adversary in Baku and, therefore, has relied almost entirely on Russia for its arms, provided primarily through Russian credit. Azerbaijan, however, has invested both more significantly in Russian weapons, as well as in other suppliers. When the fighting started in September, therefore, Azerbaijan was far better equipped for war than its adversary.

In Azerbaijan’s efforts to diversify its arms procurement, it has looked to the arms industries of key allies, Turkey and Israel, and it is these weapons which ensured Azerbaijan’s military strength over Armenia. In the year leading up to the outbreak of fighting, exports from Turkey rose six-fold, with sales reaching $77 million in September alone and included drones and rocket launchers. Azerbaijan was also the second-highest receiver of Israeli major conventional weapons between 2015-2019, with Israel providing sixty-one per cent of arms to Baku in the last year.

Of these exports, the weapons which shaped the conflict were, without a doubt, drones and loitering munitions systems. Turkey is a growing drone power, and reports in July suggested Azerbaijan acquired a fleet of Turkish-made armed drones, including the Bayraktar TB2. In addition to these, Israel, also a major drone exporter, has supplied Azerbaijan with the SkyStriker and IAI Harop. These loitering munitions systems, known as ‘suicide drones’ are silent aerial vehicles, capable of long-range, precise strikes, which are built to crash and explode on impact. The Harop was used extensively by Azerbaijan alongside the Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles. According to RUSI, the two systems destroyed more than half of Armenian T72 main battle tanks since the fighting began in September.

In response to the use of Turkish drones in the conflict, Canada suspended exports of drone parts to Turkey after reports by Project Ploughshares showed that Turkish drones were using sensor technology produced by a Canadian subsidiary of the US defence contractor L3Harris. Whilst this move angered Ankara, it did not appear to dissuade Azerbaijan from using Turkish-made drones in their campaign.

As the conflict swung in Azerbaijan’s favour, the violence escalated. In early October, Human Rights Watch documented the repeated use of internationally banned cluster munitions (such as the Israeli-made M095 DPCIM) by Azerbaijan in residential areas of Nagorno-Karabakh. On 28 October, Armenia fired retaliatory Smerch rockets, containing 9N235 submunitions into the city of Barda, Azerbaijan. The use of such explosives to indiscriminately target civilian populations not only goes against the UN treaty on cluster munitions but also violates international humanitarian law. Unconfirmed reports in both Armenian and Azeri media made claims that white phosphorus munitions, another internationally banned substance, had been fired by both sides.

Azerbaijan’s upper hand was secured by the taking of Shusha, the second-largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh. Significant emphasis has been placed on the city, as it gives strategic dominance over the enclave, as well as being of great cultural importance. On the same day, Aliyev received the Turkish Foreign Minister and the National Defence Minister, further signs of the countries’ intimate relationship. There is little doubt that Azerbaijan’s battlefield gains had been guaranteed through Turkish support and weaponry.

Despite its bellicose calls throughout the fighting, it seems like that Turkey will have encouraged Azerbaijan to accept the deal, in part to maintain Turkey’s relationship with Russia. Turkey has complicated relations with Russia given that they support opposing sides in Syria, Yemen and Libya however, they appear to have worked together to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan to the table. For Turkey, the deal promises a corridor across Armenia via Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea, linking Turkey to Central Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a suggestion of Erodgan’s desires to spread his influence deeper into the South Caucasus.

The various involvements of Russia and Turkey in encouraging, fuelling, and ending the conflict reflect the nuances of geopolitical relations in a highly-militarised and volatile region. That the peace deal was drawn-up by Russia, with significant advantages for Turkey, suggests the diminishing influence of the OSCE Minsk Group and the US in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and the extension of Russia and Turkey throughout the region. Whether the Russian-brokered peace will last, however, seems uncertain. The deal consists only of nine points, with no specific details on humanitarian support nor the status of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The Armenians remain angry and it seems likely that Prime Minister Pashinyan will not survive the crisis. Regardless of what happens next, Russia and Turkey have now embedded themselves closely in the dispute.

The conflict, moreover, succeeded in showcasing the power of cheap but efficient drones in challenging traditional ground forces. Azerbaijan’s use of these weapons provided clear evidence of how future battlefields will be transformed by unmanned attack drones and loitering munitions.

Hannah Papachristidis is a project officer at Transparency International Defence & Security, where she manages research outputs for the 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index. Hannah holds an MA in International Affairs from Columbia University and is an Emerging Expert at Forum on the Arms Trade.

 

 

Strife Series on Counter-Terrorism in Modern Warfare (Part I) – The Importance of Labels: A Social Psychology Approach to Counterterrorism Policies

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by Lucía Ruiz Vila

Fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) during their retreat from Turkey into Northern Iraq (Image credit: Firat News Agency/AP)

 

Terrorism is constituted through discourse. Understanding that process of construction can provide important insights for policy and practice. This piece will first address how a group’s identity determines the way in which the narrative on terrorism is constructed and how that identity impacts the possible policies in response. The second part is a case study of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), in which two actors, in this case: Turkey and the EU, both label this group as ‘terrorist’ but differ in their counterterrorism policies towards it. This divergence is to do with their respective construction and understanding of terrorism, which are radically opposed. Ultimately, this group identity can be considered as the premise for constructing terrorism through language. By analysing the process behind labelling a group as terrorists, the type of counterterrorism policies available to each actor can be better understood.

Social Psychology, Discourse, and Terrorism  

This essay will particularly explore how social behaviour is determined by discourse. Social psychology is concerned with how individual behaviour is affected by social behaviour. Within the field, social psychologists link language with terrorism by arguing that the latter is a ‘naming-making practice,’ which implies that instead of focusing on the terrorists’ motivations, they look at people’s perceptions of those. Therefore, terrorism is a ‘socially constructed’ term, as what the terrorists think of themselves becomes less relevant than what ‘we make of the terrorists.’

It is important to remark that not everyone has equal power to construct this discourse. Bathia refers to the ‘politics of naming’ to explain how influential actors are the ones who impose their perception of reality on others. This imposition on the way in which we refer to reality will develop into the construction of ‘common knowledge,’ that is shared understandings of the reality which ultimately fence in the possibilities for policymakers to step out of that narrative.

Group Identity  

Discourse on terrorism is constituted by referencing, developing, or reassuring the identity of the group that is affected by terrorism. This essay suggests three guiding questions that reveal how this process is made:

  • Who is the ‘Other’?
  • Can we engage in a conversation with the Other’s claims?
  • Does an attack by the ‘Other’ threaten our identity?

Answering the first question allows an understanding of how a group builds its own identity by attributing undesirable characteristics to the opposite ‘Other.’ In the case of a terrorist attack against a specific group, their identity might be reinforced through negation, arguing that no one from the in-group could engage in such violent action. This notion of members of the inner group denying the possibility of ever being like the ‘Other’ resonates with Foucault’s explanation of group belonging and language. The French philosopher argued that groups distance themselves from others who they deem inferior by labelling them as ‘mad.’ Once this perception is built, and sanity is on the side of the group, the use of language will reinforce that perception.

If the ‘Other’ has been constructed as immoral, it is harder for individuals to engage with them in a conversation to try to understand their reasons, as they fear falling into a trap of ‘humanising‘ what is by nature ‘evil.’ In this case, this is even more difficult if the reasons behind a terrorist attack are blurred by media and politicians. For instance, in the United States after 11 September 2001, media and politicians referred to terrorism by reinforcing its irrationality and extremism, which portrayed them as an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue. If there is a sense of fear among the population, the practice of othering will become more acute, and the conditions for belonging to the in-group will be more restrained. This is how, to answer the third question, a group will determine if the terrorist attack impacts the core of their identity. This was also the case with the previous example of the post-9/11 USA, as American media spread a sense of fear through a victimising discourse accusing “the other” of threatening their values as a nation.

Limitations on Policies 

The limits on the possible policies in reaction to terrorism will mainly answer two questions:

  • Is this threat inevitably recurring? Or is it an extraordinary event?
  • Are we willing to do whatever it takes to respond to the threat?

If by answering the first question, the group identifies the threat as extraordinary, this will give rise to the ‘politics of exception’ which will allow for the government to have unchecked power in order to answer to the terrorist threat. Media can add to this narrative by fuelling a sense of urgency and fear that encourages governments to take measures that may be considered non-democratic to tackle the issue. Another reason why constructing the nature of the threat is important is because it will determine which departments of government will respond. For instance, because the US portrayed al-Qaeda as a military target, its response inevitably involved the Army and the Department of State; if it had been constructed as a criminal act, it would have been confronted by the police.

Furthermore, this differentiation will determine what type of limitations, if any, that group will set for its policies on terrorism. If the threat is seen as extraordinary, there will be a risk of forsaking civil liberties in exchange for the state to guarantee security. This state of exceptionality can also lead to an erosion of public morality, which will make terrorists seem undeserving of human rights. Nevertheless, perceiving the treat as exceptional does not mean that the group will be willing to set no restrictions on their possible policies in response. This was the case of Spain who decided not to extradite to the US an al-Qaeda cell found after 9/11, as they feared that the terrorists would be sentenced to the death penalty, which under the EU legislation would have been illegal.

Adaptability is also a very important part of the policy limitations on terrorism, as what is framed as extraordinary in a first instance, might become normalised over time. This was the case when the UK labelled migration as a security issue. This label became part of its counterterrorism narrative after 9/11. At present, the government understands migration as a matter of security because it may give rise to social tensions, but not because it is related to terrorism. This shift of perception promoted new democratic channels to tackle the issue instead of justifying political decisions on an overly extended threat or state of exceptionally. In conclusion, by understanding how group identity impacts the construction of terrorism through discourse, important insight can be gained on the types and limitations of counterterrorism policies available to different actors.

Case Study: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist group

The case of the PKK in Turkey is a prime example that shows how terrorism is constructed through language and discourse. It demonstrates how two actors, Turkey and the EU, who labelled the PKK as a terrorist group have radically opposed policies, due to their in-group identity, and how they construct the nature of the terrorist group. The Kurds have historically been suppressed by the Turkish state, unable to exercise their right to autonomous government or cultural expression of any kind. In the 1970s, the PKK was founded to defend the Kurds within Turkey, and in 1984 they began engaging in violent action against the government to reclaim their rights as an ethnic group.

The Turkish authorities referred to those Turks who were part of the PKK as ‘children’ who needed to come to their senses and leave their terrorist lifestyle behind. Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was often referred to by the media as a ‘baby-killer’ whose followers were ‘uncivilized.’ The Turkish government for many years tried to capture the Kurdish leader, who thanks to the Greek authorities’ support, managed to escape Turkey. It was finally in 1999 when the Turkish state captured him. Offended by Greece’s attitude towards Öcalan, the Turkish president demanded that the EU added Greece to the list of countries that supported terrorism.

Leaving aside already existing tensions between Turkey and Greece, the reason why the latter was not seen as being complicit in terrorism was that the West did not perceive the PKK as a terrorist organization per se. At that time, Western media referred to the PKK as an ‘outlawed group’, a ‘rebel group’, or one conducting ‘guerrilla war’. Even the EU itself referred to the Kurds’ cause as a minority struggle and questioned the terrorist narrative around them. Unconcerned about Western opinion, the Turkish judiciary sentenced Öcalan to the death penalty, which caused demonstrations throughout Europe in support of the Kurdish cause. The European Union was clear in its response: if Turkey were to execute Öcalan, the country will never be considered to join the European Union.

Conclusion

Building on the case study, there are two clear processes of othering. On the one hand, the Turkish state identifies the Other as the Kurds, who are subsequently labelled as terrorists. According to Turkish anti-terror legislation, terrorism is an act that threatens the territorial unity of the state, and even non-violent propaganda against said unity is considered terrorism. As it has been mentioned, the Kurds were referred to as infantile and uncivilised, which made them an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue, and which ultimately threatened Turkish identity.

On the other hand, at the time Öcalan was captured, the EU did not have a terrorist list until after the 9/11 attacks and did not consider the PKK as terrorists. The decision not to give the terrorist label to the PKK was very significant for the EU’s identity, as they chose to ‘other’ the Turkish government instead of the Kurds. Turkey had long been a point of debate in determining the limits of Europe as a political unit, as the EU characterised itself as a ‘rational’ actor unlike those beyond its borders, as Isin argues. Ultimately, it was the death sentence of Öcalan which set the limits of Europe’s identity.

Interestingly, in 2002, there was a turning point for the PKK terrorist debate. Turkey overturned Öcalan’s death penalty sentence and changed it to life imprisonment, while the EU added the PKK to its terrorism list. The EU’s decision was highly controversial since the PKK had not engaged in violent action since 1999 and also because the procedure for adding the PKK to the list had not been transparent. It was later condemned by the European Court of First Instance. To this day, Turkey is unlikely to join the European Union, and the PKK remains in the EU list of terrorist organisations.

Although both the EU and Turkey now recognise the PKK as the Other and labels them as terrorists, their approaches to the issue and their policies vary. The EU is concerned with preventing terrorism in the first place, which makes them interested in learning about the root causes of terrorism. Following this rationale, they invited in February of 2020 representatives of the PKK to join a European Parliament Session. Yet, because for Turkey there is no possible dialogue with terrorism, Turkish media was outraged by the meeting.

Lucía Ruiz Vila graduated with honours in International Relations from the University of Deusto in Spain and afterwards studied a year abroad in the University of Richmond in the United States. Following this, Lucía completed a MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London where she researched transitional justice, counterinsurgency campaigns, DDR and SSR, peacekeeping missions, and women’s role in security. You can connect with her via LinkedIn. 

Conscription Reform and the Future of Military Manpower in Turkey

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By Onur Kara

12 February 2019

A Turkish soldiers stands guard in Anıtkabir, Ankara.(Photo credit: Wojciech Olkusnik)

 

The military draft is making headlines again following several decades in decline. France seeks to re-introduce the national service and several gulf Arab states went ahead with implementing conscription despite their relatively small populations. Even Tunisia, known for maintaining a modest army, had a debate about making the military more attractive to its youth.

Turkish security bureaucracy, however, spent a good portion of 2018 working on a paid conscription exemption — a one-off payment of 15,000 Turkish Liras (roughly £2000 at the time of writing), for which people born before 1994 are eligible. This ‘exemption’ allows the reduction of military service to 21 days of mostly symbolic training instead of a 6-month minimum. The response was overwhelming; over 600,000 people applied by the time the government closed applications in November 2018. It also revealed that the Turkish military has a severe recruitment problem which remained under the radar, highlighting the strenuous interaction between politicians and the army.

Military service is a politically sensitive topic in Turkey. Military service exemptions were a talking point for many political figures before the July 2018 elections, while one analyst argued that the paid exemption supporters constituted the best organised lobby group in the country. They are very visible with their Twitter campaigns, supported by a dedicated association which attracts a wide following, constituting a large pool of voters with a very clear demand in mind.

Electoral politics, however, cover only one part of a larger story. Turkey’s defence and security establishment has been undergoing substantial change after the failed coup attempt in 2016, and the defence doctrine is not exempt from it. The manpower policy in particular is due to change, which feeds the second largest land army in NATO and one the strongest in its region. In a topic where available literature is a thin and anecdotal evidence is the norm, the issue of military service buyouts provides some insight.

Turkey’s conscription model is universal. It is not possible to opt for civilian service, or opt out due to religious or family reasons. Conscientious objection is not recognised, which often means a long legal struggle for objectors. The only practical way of total exemption is (apart from dropping the citizenship altogether) a medical discharge. All other methods result in deferrals, which does not remove the obligation and there is no cut-off point where the state stops tracking one’s military service status.

The key issue is that the manpower policy of the military no longer corresponds to the needs of the nation. Prime Minister Yıldırım announced that 5.5 million people still carried the military obligation in 2018, which denotes all men of the military age who still need to go through their military service. He also stated that the required force level of the army was 350,000. In a country of 80 million people with a large youth population, it means processing a very high amount of young men every year. The bureaucracy of enlistment and discharging previous cohorts alone causes several months’ gap between one’s application to enlist and the start of the actual service. So, 600,000 applications for the November 2018 exemption suddenly clogged the system, causing the government to announce a mobilisation-demobilisation schedule stretching to January 2020.

In June 2018, President Erdogan announced a commitment to a more professional and high-tech military as the paid exemption was being launched. The structure of the military has already changed considerably in the last years; the army no longer uses conscripts in most combat units, and the Gendarmerie declared that it will stop enlisting conscripted troops altogether after 2019. The Gendarmerie alone employs around 120,000 drafted personnel, which presents a substantial challenge on its own. Hence, a conscript today is unlikely to see combat, and the military experience remains limited to support roles.

How further professionalisation will be achieved, however, is still in question. The government is unlikely to abolish the military service altogether. Political cost of such a step is very high in an environment where nationalism is on the rise, and the armed forces itself could disagree. Stopgap measures in the past also proved themselves to be problematic: there were several cases in the 2000s where the army pushed for further professionalisation, especially for enlisted men ad NCOs. These were much less successful than anticipated and the armed forces usually could not recruit as many candidates as they wanted.

As a result, the military service became increasingly filled with variations and exceptions: differences between university graduates and non-diploma holders, special rules for dual-citizenship holders and Turks living abroad, and so on. The practice of paid exemptions contributes to this pattern while not finding a solution to the underlying structural issues. It also raises moral questions since those with the wherewithal end up not serving.

The armed forces themselves are aware of these problems. Hulusi Akar, the Minister of National Defence, recently made a statement declaring that the military service is to be reformed — which will unify the currently fractured system into a single training program where educational attainment and employment status will not make a difference. Such a reform would help alleviate the sense of injustice coming from the current system; however, it also requires the coordination of several government ministries.

Any concrete proposals for military service reform will become clearer after the local elections scheduled for March 2019. The manpower policy of the Turkish army is evolving as the society changes and the security policy evolves towards favouring a different kind of force structure. The end result is likely to be a form of compromise between the civilians and the military, which hopefully won’t be the worst of both worlds.

Onur Kara is a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow him on Twitter @on_kara. 

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turkish_soldier.jpg

Turkey’s Growing Military Influence

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By Gorkem Dirik & Selcuk Aydin

Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 (Credit Image: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

 

 

Turkey views itself increasingly compelled to generate new strategies in foreign and security policy by combining both soft and hard power instruments because of the changing dynamics during the post-Arab Spring period. While Turkey was seen as a role model during the Arab Spring for neighboring countries that were in transition from autocratic to democratic forms of governance, this model lost its appeal due to violent toppling of democratically elected regimes as well as the escalation of conflicts in the wider Middle East. For instance, Turkey lost its political and economic ties in Egypt after the coup d’état in 2013. The Syrian civil war bears economic, social and security implications for Turkey. Hence, in order to preserve its political and economic power in the region in the wake of hostile developments around the country, Turkey began to search for other mechanisms to wield its influence. As a result, Turkey has found itself launching military bases in Qatar and Somalia and military intervention in Syria.

 

Military Journey of Turkey

Turkey was established by Kemalist military cadres who conducted top-down modernist reforms and threatened the civilian governments by coup d’états that encountered strong opposition from the social and political movements throughout Turkish political history.

Several events played a significant role in decreasing the power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in domestic politics during the Justice and Development Party era since 2002. Such factors include the EU negotiation process during the first decade of 2000, the Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer cases respectively in 2008 and 2010 as well as the failed coup attempt on 15th July 2016 committed by the FETO (Gülenists). The consolidation of civilian politics against the TAF establishment during the Justice and Development Party era enabled the civilian government to use hard power as a diplomatic instrument. Consequently, there TAF were once identified as the determinant of Turkish Foreign Policy,  however they have undergone a drastic transformation and they have now turned into the instrument of Turkey’s Foreign policy.

As Turkey entered a new era of foreign policy implementation, this reflected upon the country’s efforts to diversify its options in this matter. For instance, Turkey established new embassies in twelve countries across the African continent to bolster economic relations. Most significantly, this change in foreign policy has positively resulted in a spill-over effect from economic to political and then security fields of relations and impacts.

Historical experiences have also played a key role in empowering the defence industry in guaranteeing the security of the country. In 1974, for instance, when Turkey conducted military operations in Cyprus, the country faced an arms embargo by the US. Ankara was also prohibited from purchasing some specific arms from its NATO allies in its fight against the PKK in the 1990s.

Along with these historical experiences, the conflict in Syria and Iraq accelerated the urgency of empowering the defence industry. Having realized this, Turkey chose to nationalise its defence industry and proceeded with the diversification of its security alliance. As part of this process, Ankara has become cautious on its relations with NATO, whilst signing the S-400 missile agreement with Russia.  Turkey also took a leading role in the Syrian peace process alongside Russia and Iran. These advancements in its defence industry allowed the country to undergo a transition from an absolute weapon-importer state to a weapon-exporter state. One illustration is this shift comes with an arms sell to Pakistan  selling arms to Pakistan.

 

Turkey’s Military Expansion

By investing in its defence industry and expanding its network of military bases, Turkey aims to become a more active player in the Middle East, Africa, and Caucasus.

This is evident when looking at the Turkish incursion in Syria, which became a showcase for Ankara to evaluate its military capacity. President Tayyip Erdogan understood the necessity of using military power as a foreign policy instrument in the Syrian war, with the statement “We are not war-lovers, but we are not far from war either” in 2012.  In this regard, the Turkish military deterrence has visibly altered the security dynamics in Syria against the ISIS and PKK affiliated groups since the beginning of Euphrates Shield Operation in 2016. As the efforts via soft power means to form a safe-zone in Northern Syria had proven fruitless, Turkey felt obligated to take the necessary steps to create a zone of influence. In addition to this, the recent Turkish-Russian-Iranian tripartite cooperation has indeed aimed to decrease conflict in Syria with agreeing on the four de-escalation zones. Thus, this underlined the prominence of Turkey’s military deterrence capabilities and its growth as a regional power.

As part of Turkey’s new strategy, Turkey has established military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Iraq, and it is expected that the number of Turkish soldiers serving in the oversea military bases will surpass 60,000 by 2022.  Moreover, Turkish military activities are not only limited to military bases. Additionally, the TAF train and equip the armies of allied countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

In Somalia, Turkey has opened dockyards, built international airports and numerous hospitals, and established a military base on 30 September 2017. With more than 10,000 soldiers serving, Turkey`s main role is to train and equip the Somali forces in their fight against terrorist groups such as Al-Shaabab. Furthermore, the Turkish military presence has been improving Somalia`s ability to secure its coastline, particularly against pirates that threaten the maritime trade route.

The sharing of common interests, especially in the foreign policy arena, has brought Qatar and Turkey together. This led Ankara to establish another military base in Qatar at the request of the Qatari government in October 2015. With 3,000 troops deployed in the Tariq bin-Ziyad military base, Turkey has further strengthened its position in the Gulf and altered the regional status quo. For instance, during the Gulf crisis, Turkey has played a key role in dissuading the GCC’s (Gulf Cooperation Council) decision to isolate and castigate Qatar for its rapprochement with Turkey, thereby underlining how the latter has increasingly shifted regional power dynamics in its favor.

Furthermore, Turkey`s security cooperation with Azerbaijan has allowed both countries holding periodic joint military exercises to evaluate the Azerbaijani Army’s potential. Turkey also assists in the modernization of Azerbaijani military education by trying to bring it in line with NATO standards. As a result, Azerbaijani military officers participate with Turkey`s peacekeeping missions abroad, for instance, in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ultimately, Turkish military capability has been further solidified via an unofficial agreement between Turkish and Azerbaijani officials on `Casus Foederis`, which signifies that an attack against one country is an attack against both.

 

In conclusion, Turkey has accelerated its military activity in the Middle East in an attempt to alter the regional balance of power in its favor. Apart from Qatar and Somalia, Turkish military bases as well as its deterrence capabilities can be observed in Northern Cyprus and Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, Ankara provides military training as well as equipping to the military of key Central Asian countries, which also enables increased Turkish influence in this region. Moreover, Turkey`s recent incursion into northern Syria has also illustrated technological advances in its defense industry. Taking all of these developments into consideration, it can be said that Turkey has transformed itself into a crucial player whose influence impacts not only the Middle East but also farther afield, stretching from the Caucasus to Sub-Saharan Africa.

 

Gorkem Dirik

Gorkem is an Assistant Researcher at TRT World Research Centre. He previously worked at Turkish Embassies in Malta and Barcelona, Spain which enabled him to observe the inner dealings of diplomacy. Before he moved back to Turkey he carried out his studies in languages and diplomacy in Kaliningrad (Russia), Malta, Belgrade (Serbia), Barcelona (Spain), Buenos Aires (Argentina), London (United Kingdom), and Almaty (Kazakhstan). He holds a Master of Science in Conflict Studies and Nationalism from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Besides Turkish, he is fluent in English, Russian, Serbian, Croatian, Spanish and Portuguese for which he holds certificates from reputable universities that he can speak them all on a diplomatic level. His book on Turkish foreign policy, titled Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st century – A Comparative Study: Turkey between East and West was published in 2012 by the University of Malta. Moreover, his dissertation on the Ukrainian Crisis, “The Role of Nationalism in the De-Facto Dissolution of Ukraine” has been awarded as the best dissertation of the year by the LSE. His research and specialisation area is Russian and Turkish foreign policies and their implications on the Balkans and the Central Asia.

 

Selcuk Aydin

Selcuk is a Researcher at the TRT World Research Centre, and a PhD Candidate, Defence Studies, School of Security Studies, King’s College London. He has conducted projects and published articles, book chapters and opinions on Turkey’s history, Turkish diaspora in the UK, Kurdish Studies and Middle East. His research interests are colonialism, Middle Eastern politics and history, Islamic and Kurdish movements, diaspora, institutional, and security studies. Selçuk holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, a Master’s Degree in Political Economy of the Middle East from King’s College London. His PhD thesis’ title is “Post-Ottoman States and Kurdish Movements: A Comparatively Analysis of Single Party Regime in Turkey (1923-1945), British Mandate Regime in Iraq (1920-1932) and French Mandate Regime in Syria (1923-1946).”

 

Image Source: https://qz.com/1093011/turkey-opens-its-largest-overseas-military-base-in-somalia-to-train-somali-soldiers/ 

Reforming the Republic of Turkey: Erdoğan’s Power Project

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By Kyle R.Brady

erdoganAfter the military-led July 2016 coup attempt failed to overthrow Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2016, a counter-coup effort was initiated by Erdogan to remove any alleged co-conspirators from power. At the time, Erdoğan’s retaliation was expected but the initial response was still overblown, with structurally damaging and problematic consequences to both civil society and the international theatre. In the months following, Erdoğan has undertaken a massive effort that appears to target any enemies – real, perceived, or invented – who stand in opposition to his goals to reform the country. In a continued state of emergency, with expanded national security powers, and with more than 125,000 Turks already removed or suspended from their positions within the military or government, the counter-coup cleanup has clearly exceeded external expectations as the country moves toward autocracy.

Additionally, the formal restructuring of the Republic of Turkey and its government has begun, as the legislature has proposed substantial constitutional reforms that would empower the Presidency and, therefore, Erdoğan. As this is in line with the other Turkish power restructurings in the latter half of 2016, it seems abundantly clear that Erdoğan will not cease his Turkish reformation until fully empowered as its leader. Moreover, this threat-inspired reform will continue to exploit fear and shadowy enemies as the violent attacks on the civilian population – regularly attributed to the Kurds and ISIS — continue.

The consequences of this threat-inspired reform seem to be extraordinarily wide-ranging. The primary and most fundamental casualty derives from the attack on Turkey’s political structure, no longer democratic: the Republic now seems to be authoritarian, if not a burgeoning autocracy. As this reform and conversion process continues, Turkey’s hope for membership in the European Union declines in tandem. Further, the Turkish people will suffer politically, ideologically, and perhaps even theologically, as any autocracy does not tolerate dissent, opposing political views, or alternative belief systems — this intolerance was initiated with the purges.

In light of the birth of a New Cold War, of significant concern to the wider world may be the budding relationship between Turkey and Russia, as they grow closer in their ties, stronger in their coordination, streamlined in their interests, and more similar in their state behaviors [1]. As a NATO member state and a long-term ally of the United States, Turkey’s drift toward authoritarianism, autocracy, and anti-Western sensibilities present a substantial problem to Western leaders in terms of alliances, reliability, and trustworthiness. Moreover, the difficulties presented by the apparent failure of a non-Western, non-European democracy cannot be overstated, as it very clearly presents a counterargument for attempts to bring democracy to the region.

As these purges and authoritarian trends continue, the overall distance between Turkey’s democratic past and authoritarian present remains to be seen.  Whether Turkey maintains its NATO membership, EU candidacy, and Western ally status, the country will remain an important regional power with an essential role in the dual interests of the present:  a resurgent Russia and regional counter-terrorism efforts.  In the meantime, however, Erdoğan will grow both his positioning and power, while freedom, liberty, and peace will continue to suffer within the borders of his state.

Kyle R. Brady (@KyleBradyOnline) is a security-oriented academic with a primary interest in contextualizing security concerns, which he currently explores as a postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies. He also holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University with foci on terrorism, public administration, and emergency management, and a Bachelors in Political Science from San Jose State University with interests in international relations and political theory.  You can find Kyle’s work at http://docs.kyle-brady.com, http://blog.kyle-brady.com, or email him at kyle.brady@kcl.ac.uk.

Notes:

[1] Hennigan, W.J., and Brian Bennett. “Russia, Turkey Expand Military Operations in Syria during Trump’s Transition to Power.” Los Angeles Times, 17 November 2016, available at http://lat.ms/2h4hgW6. Also see MacFarquhar, Neil. “Warming Relations in Person, Putin and Erdogan Revive Pipeline Deal.” New York Times, 10 October 2016, available at http://nyti.ms/2h32NZb, and Fraser, Suzan, and Dominique Soguel. “UN Expert Says Torture Appeared Widespread after Turkey Coup.” Washington Post, 2 December 2016 available at http://wapo.st/2i7vXDU

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