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The Libyan Puzzle Piece in Turkey’s Grand Strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean

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by Jack Cross

Joint press conference between President Erdogan and Fayez Al Sarraj, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord, 4th June, 2020

Despite dominating international headlines during the Arab Spring, events in Libya at the time and their consequences today appear to be forgotten. This does not mean, however, that events on the North African coast should be ignored. Indeed, in the context of a civil war, now entering its sixth year since beginning in 2014 , renewed attempts at peace are underway. Alongside the two warring factions are many interested external parties, including Turkey, whose government provides arms and support to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli. The GNA’s opponent is the Benghazi-based, House of Representatives and Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the LNA. But what exactly does Turkey hope to gain in this fragile, embattled and scarred state? I will argue, it is part of a wider narrative of Turkish expansionism across the Eastern Mediterranean and a drive to become the dominant political and economic force in the region.

A recent history of Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Civil War goes back to mid-2019, although their relationship stretches further to the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire under which Libya was a province until 1911-12. This imperial connection places Libya within Turkey’s historical sphere of influence. The current intervention began with Turkey and the GNA agreeing two memorandums of understanding: a military agreement and a maritime deal, signed in November 2019. These guaranteed Ankara’s support, in exchange for revisions of their shared maritime border in the Mediterranean Sea. This was followed up by a vote by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in January of this year, to approve the deployment of military personnel and resources to Libya. The assistance provided by Ankara came in the form of arms, supplies and technical support worth roughly $350 million. Moreover, foreign mercenaries have also been employed and deployed.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya has contributed to a war of words with some of its NATO allies, particularly France, who had been backing the rival Benghazi based government. This has continued despite the fact that the Haftar-led side has little international recognition. However, there have been attempts to reduce foreign influence in the Libyan conflict, including an EU arms embargo, agreed in 2016. This was used to add greater weight to the UN embargo established in 2011. So, what is to be gained here, particularly when the stakes are high enough to spark tensions with major powers? For Turkey, Libya is a key piece of the jigsaw in their ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. In recent years, Turkey as well as Greece and Cyprus, have been increasingly interested in explorative drilling in the Mediterranean, with the potential for huge benefits in exploiting the natural gas deposits beneath the seabed. The Turkish-GNA maritime agreement establishes exclusive economic zones for both Libya and Turkey in the Mediterranean, at the expense of the competing claims made by Greece, Cyprus and others. Already the world has seen mounting tension over this issue, with recent standoffs between the Turkish and Greek navies.

Now, Turkey’s fortunes in the Mediterranean are very clearly tied to those of the GNA in Libya. If the GNA fail to come out as the dominant party in any peace accord, this could put the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement in jeopardy, and President Erdogan’s ambitions along with it. The official line from Ankara makes it clear that they have no intention of abandoning their allies in Libya and there have been widespread suspicions that Turkey has been seeking to breach the arms embargo. In recent days, several Turkish vessels have been boarded by naval personnel, on behalf of the military mission policing the UN and EU embargos. While the Turkish government has denied that there have been attempts to breach any arms embargo, they have stated that their mercenaries are to remain in Libya. This is despite the fact that the initial ceasefire agreement did explicitly call for the removal of foreign military personnel. The danger here is that if Turkey continues these provocative acts, as part of its wider strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, peace talks in Libya may well break down.

So, what consequences do Turkish successes in Libya pose for the wider region? The problem for France, and others opposed to the Turkish policy, is that the Ankara backed side is in a stronger position. At the time of the ceasefire, the GNA had already successfully defended Tripoli from assaults by Haftar and the LNA and retains control of key air bases in the western part of the country. It increasingly appears as if the momentum is behind the GNA, after these recent victories. The current Haftar backers, particularly Russia, have no direct involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean disputes, and are also increasingly friendly with the Erdogan government.  In fact key parts of Turkey’s maritime aims regarding Libya are already accomplished, as the agreement made with the GNA has been registered by the UN as an arrangement made between two legitimate governments. But Ankara must maintain its involvement throughout the peace talks. Turkey has sought to strengthen its position within the peace negotiations, offering $120 billion (USD) worth of reconstruction contracts, on condition that the GNA becomes the dominant force in the post-war government. With this backdrop, it looks likely that Turkey will be heading for further collisions with other actors in the region as talks continue to reach a lasting settlement.

It is unclear yet if Erdogan’s gamble in supporting the GNA has paid off, or what exactly a victory in Libya would mean more broadly for Turkish foreign policy. The threat of sanctions over Turkey’s continued involvement in Libya and provocations in the Mediterranean have appeared to have little effect in deterring the Turkish government. The future remains uncertain and dangerous. The fragile truce in Libya could easily collapse and at that point, Turkish involvement could become greater and even more entrenched. The Libyan piece of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean puzzle has not quite fallen into place yet, it still hangs in the balance. With all the uncertainty and instability there is no telling what the direct consequences will be for the wider region, should Turkey prevail here.

Jack Cross is currently pursuing his MA in the History of War in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His main research interests are on diplomatic history, modern Turkey the Middle East more broadly.

Turkey and Drone Warfare: A Winning Combination for Azerbaijan?

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by Hannah Papachristidis

Death from above: the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 drone going global? (Image credit: DHA via AP)

Azerbaijan’s victory in the recently concluded war with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh can be defined by the former’s extensive military capabilities and its close relationship with Turkey. In particular, the use of Turkish-supplied drones to secure aerial dominance distinctly shaped the conflict in Azerbaijan’s favour. With fighting intensifying in late October and early November, it was feared the conflict would extend into the winter, risking significant humanitarian issues. On the evening of 9 November, however, the conflict abruptly ended with the signing of a peace deal, brokered by Russia. The deal cemented Azerbaijan’s territorial gains and, whilst not including Turkey as a co-signatory, provides significant benefits to it, as Azerbaijan’s critical ally.

The dispute surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, where ninety-five per cent of the population is ethnically Armenian, can be traced to the Armenian Genocide in 1914 and the independent Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) region within Azerbaijan that the Soviet Union created in response to the genocide. As the Soviet Union dissolved, the NKAO sought to formally join Armenia and, in 1991, the region declared independence from Azerbaijan. This led to war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and similarly ended with a Russia-brokered cease-fire in 1994. Under this deal, Nagorno-Karabakh and other surrounding regions fell under Armenian control. The cease-fire was designed to be temporary and Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan however, this status quo has remained in place for 26 years, that is until the events of this year.

Russia’s historic support for Armenia on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh has meant the two countries have remained closely allied since 1994, albeit with Armenia becoming increasingly reliant on its ally – Russia maintains a military base in Armenia and the two countries are part of a multilateral defence agreement. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, sought to balance both Western and Russian influences in the period after 1994 and, only more recently, has the country taken steps to become closer to Moscow. It is not, for example, a party to the same treaty as Armenia.  In recent years, however, Baku has come to see Russia as the key player in efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In a signal towards improved relations, Baku has made significant investments in Russian weapons in recent years. In terms of the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, Azerbaijan has relied on remaining close to its Turkish ally, with whom it shares ethnic, cultural and historical ties.

For Armenia and Azerbaijan, military capabilities are a significant part of national identity. Over the last ten years, both countries have committed a similar proportion of GDP on military expenditure and, as of 2019, both countries rank in the top 10 most militarised countries in the world. Whilst Russia has extensively supplied weapons to both countries since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994, there is a clear asymmetry between the two foes. The value of exports from Russia to Azerbaijan in the period 2009-2019 is over 4.5 times greater than Russian exports to Armenia.

Armenia lacks the cash of its oil-rich adversary in Baku and, therefore, has relied almost entirely on Russia for its arms, provided primarily through Russian credit. Azerbaijan, however, has invested both more significantly in Russian weapons, as well as in other suppliers. When the fighting started in September, therefore, Azerbaijan was far better equipped for war than its adversary.

In Azerbaijan’s efforts to diversify its arms procurement, it has looked to the arms industries of key allies, Turkey and Israel, and it is these weapons which ensured Azerbaijan’s military strength over Armenia. In the year leading up to the outbreak of fighting, exports from Turkey rose six-fold, with sales reaching $77 million in September alone and included drones and rocket launchers. Azerbaijan was also the second-highest receiver of Israeli major conventional weapons between 2015-2019, with Israel providing sixty-one per cent of arms to Baku in the last year.

Of these exports, the weapons which shaped the conflict were, without a doubt, drones and loitering munitions systems. Turkey is a growing drone power, and reports in July suggested Azerbaijan acquired a fleet of Turkish-made armed drones, including the Bayraktar TB2. In addition to these, Israel, also a major drone exporter, has supplied Azerbaijan with the SkyStriker and IAI Harop. These loitering munitions systems, known as ‘suicide drones’ are silent aerial vehicles, capable of long-range, precise strikes, which are built to crash and explode on impact. The Harop was used extensively by Azerbaijan alongside the Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles. According to RUSI, the two systems destroyed more than half of Armenian T72 main battle tanks since the fighting began in September.

In response to the use of Turkish drones in the conflict, Canada suspended exports of drone parts to Turkey after reports by Project Ploughshares showed that Turkish drones were using sensor technology produced by a Canadian subsidiary of the US defence contractor L3Harris. Whilst this move angered Ankara, it did not appear to dissuade Azerbaijan from using Turkish-made drones in their campaign.

As the conflict swung in Azerbaijan’s favour, the violence escalated. In early October, Human Rights Watch documented the repeated use of internationally banned cluster munitions (such as the Israeli-made M095 DPCIM) by Azerbaijan in residential areas of Nagorno-Karabakh. On 28 October, Armenia fired retaliatory Smerch rockets, containing 9N235 submunitions into the city of Barda, Azerbaijan. The use of such explosives to indiscriminately target civilian populations not only goes against the UN treaty on cluster munitions but also violates international humanitarian law. Unconfirmed reports in both Armenian and Azeri media made claims that white phosphorus munitions, another internationally banned substance, had been fired by both sides.

Azerbaijan’s upper hand was secured by the taking of Shusha, the second-largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh. Significant emphasis has been placed on the city, as it gives strategic dominance over the enclave, as well as being of great cultural importance. On the same day, Aliyev received the Turkish Foreign Minister and the National Defence Minister, further signs of the countries’ intimate relationship. There is little doubt that Azerbaijan’s battlefield gains had been guaranteed through Turkish support and weaponry.

Despite its bellicose calls throughout the fighting, it seems like that Turkey will have encouraged Azerbaijan to accept the deal, in part to maintain Turkey’s relationship with Russia. Turkey has complicated relations with Russia given that they support opposing sides in Syria, Yemen and Libya however, they appear to have worked together to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan to the table. For Turkey, the deal promises a corridor across Armenia via Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea, linking Turkey to Central Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a suggestion of Erodgan’s desires to spread his influence deeper into the South Caucasus.

The various involvements of Russia and Turkey in encouraging, fuelling, and ending the conflict reflect the nuances of geopolitical relations in a highly-militarised and volatile region. That the peace deal was drawn-up by Russia, with significant advantages for Turkey, suggests the diminishing influence of the OSCE Minsk Group and the US in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and the extension of Russia and Turkey throughout the region. Whether the Russian-brokered peace will last, however, seems uncertain. The deal consists only of nine points, with no specific details on humanitarian support nor the status of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The Armenians remain angry and it seems likely that Prime Minister Pashinyan will not survive the crisis. Regardless of what happens next, Russia and Turkey have now embedded themselves closely in the dispute.

The conflict, moreover, succeeded in showcasing the power of cheap but efficient drones in challenging traditional ground forces. Azerbaijan’s use of these weapons provided clear evidence of how future battlefields will be transformed by unmanned attack drones and loitering munitions.

Hannah Papachristidis is a project officer at Transparency International Defence & Security, where she manages research outputs for the 2020 Government Defence Integrity Index. Hannah holds an MA in International Affairs from Columbia University and is an Emerging Expert at Forum on the Arms Trade.

 

 

Presidency à la Erdogan: A Perspective on the System of Government and the Future of Turkey

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By Gonenc Uysal:

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[Image by Garyck Arntzen]
Turkey had increasingly staged discussions about the system of government when Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey should have presidency in November 2012[1] (the Turkish system of government is located between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism).[2] Although the system is parliamentarian, the Constitution of 1982 broadened the President’s fundamental executive, legislative and juridical competences in order to give the role to arbitrate the state structure. Furthermore, the constitutional amendments, which were passed in 2007 and required a referendum to elect the President,[3] moved the Turkish system closer to a semi-presidential system. Although advocates of presidentialism base their arguments on the unsuccessful coalition governments of the 1970s and 1990s, parliamentarianism involves mechanisms to overcome deadlocks unlike presidentialism and semi-presidentialism.[4] It can be argued that Turkish democracy can already be further ameliorated with parliamentarism. This article examines Erdogan’s interpretation of the roles of the President and the government in order to present a prospective on future of the Turkish political context.

On 10th August 2014, Erdogan was elected as the President through a national referendum.[5] Although the elections were recognized as adhering to democratic principles, both preceding and subsequent processes should be discussed to demonstrate Erdogan’s interpretation of the President’s power. Erdogan, as the President, is the head of the state with constitutional executive power alongside the Cabinet. Erdogan had already declared that he would use full-competence if he would become the President. He portrayed the Presidential competences as the Constitutional rights despite the fact that ‘having competence does not entail having a right’.[6] Furthermore, Erdogan underlined that the presidential referendum has changed the system and made the Office of Presidency ‘the executive authority’.[7] Thus, it can be argued that he interpreted the President’s power in absolute terms vis-à-vis the executive and signalled that he would attempt to broaden the President’s executive competences, at least through practices if not at the level of the legal structure.

Most significantly, the Supreme Electoral Council declared the official result of the Presidential elections on 15 August 2014[8] and the official result was published in the Official Gazette on 28 August 2014.[9] For more than two weeks between 10th August and 28th August, Turkey had two Presidents: Abdullah Gul and Erdogan. Furthermore, Erdogan had three posts: the President, the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) – despite the fact that the Constitution required the President not to have any political party affiliation. Consequently, Ahmet Davutoglu was permitted to become the Prime Minister on 28th August.[10] Erdogan did not resign from the Office of the Prime Minister during the campaign for the Presidential election based on the Supreme Electoral Council’s decision.[11] Although Erdogan avoided any power vacuum in the executive, it can still be argued that he maintained the political system where he always did have power to rule, even if it meant conflict with the ethos of democracy – having multiple Heads of State, putting pressure on the electorates and breaching the equality of the circumstances of the Presidential candidacy.

Moreover, since the Constitution required the President not to have any political party affiliation, on 21st August, Erdogan declared Davutoglu as their candidate to run as the Chairman of the Party and portrayed the AKP as their party.[12] He attempted to delegitimise the CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) during the AKP’s Congress on 27th August by discrediting their recent political alliances.[13] Both of these events took place when Erdogan held the title of the President. Thus, his attempt to emphasise his belonging to the AKP and discredit two opposition parties can be considered as a conflict with the Constitution as the President is supposed to have an impartial role.

During his Presidential speech on 28th August, Erdogan presented a break between his term of office as the President and the past. He presented his Presidential term as the closure of the old Turkey era and beginning of the new Turkey era. He delegitimised the old Turkey by portraying it as tutelage regime and legitimised the new Turkey by portraying it as the victory of national will and democracy. Erdogan has always portrayed the AKP’s government as the only representative of the national will while denying the existence of the opposition and its place in the same nation. He further portrayed his Presidential position more legitimate than the previous Presidents by emphasising on the people’s vote to elect the President. Thus, besides being the head of the state as the President, he presented his position legitimate enough to act as the head of the executive and the Party.[14]

It can be argued that Erdogan envisions Turkey as the single-party state represented with the AKP’s majority government, the AKP as the state-party under the leadership of ‘one man’,[15] since one man, now as the President, represents the state. Therefore, the new Turkey era is envisioned as the era of the party-state regime under the President’s leadership in order to consolidate the hegemonic project of conservative democracy.[16]

 

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Gonenc Uysal is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where she focuses on the state discourse on secularism and its interaction with civil-military relations in Turkey.

[1] Erdogan: Baskanlik Turk Sistemi Olsun (11 November 2012) CNNTurk, retrieved from: http://www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/11/11/erdogan.baskanlik.turk.sistemi.olsun/684086.0/
[2] Bestas, A. (2014) Yari-Baskanlik Sistemi. Surec Analiz, 9, pp. 25-27.
[3] TBMM (2011) T. C. Anayasasi. Retrieved from: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf
[4] Ozbudun, E. (2012) Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism in Turkey, Policy Brief. Global Turkey in Europe Series, Istanbul.
[5] Cumhurbaskanligi Secimi (10 August 2014) BBC Turkce, retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/140810_canli_cumhurbaskanligi_secim.shtml
[6] Spaak, T. (2005) ‘The Concept of Legal Competence’. The IVR Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law, Stockholm University.
[7] Erdogan’dan Kosk Aciklamalari (16 April 2014) Hurriyet, retrieved from: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26235576.asp
[8] YSK (2014a, 15 August) Yuksek Secim Kurulu Baskanligi Karar No 3719. Retrieved from: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Kararlar/2014-3719.pdf
[9] Yuksek Secim Kurulu Karari, Karar No 3719. Resmi Gazete, 28 August 2014, 29102 Mukerrer.
[10] Bakanlar Kurulu’nun Gorevini Surdurmesine Dair Islem. Resmi Gazete, 29102 Mukerrer 2.
[11] YSK (2014b, 12 July) Yuksek Secim Kurulu Baskanligi Karar No 3237. Retrieved from: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Kararlar/2014-3237.pdf
[12] Erdogan Yeni Basbakani Acikliyor (21 August 2014) Radikal, retrieved from: http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_yeni_basbakani_acikliyor-1208245
[13] AKP (2014) Basbakan Erdogan’in AK Parti 1. Olaganustu Buyuk Kurultayinda Yaptigi Konusma. Retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-1.-olaganustu-buyuk-kurultayinda-yaptigi-konusm/66343#1
[14] Cumhurbaskani Erdogan’dan Tarihi Konusma. (28 August 2014) Takvim, retrieved from: http://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2014/08/28/ve-tarihi-an-geldi-catti
[15] Yasli, F. (2014, 28 August) 28 August 2014: Cumhurbas(ba)kanligi Rejiminin Ilk Gunu. Yurt, retrieved from: http://www.yurtgazetesi.com.tr/28-agustos-2014-cumhurbas-ba-kanligi-rejiminin-ilk-gunu-makale,8704.html
[16] For the AKP’s official discourse on conservative democracy: Akdogan, Y. (2004) AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi. Istanbul: Alfa.