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Cyprus’ policies on migration and their impact on the ethnic division of the island

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“Refugee Camps in Cyprus” by sarah.ahmadia is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0

Almost 20,000 asylum applications are currently pending in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). According to the Ministry of Interior, asylum seekers on the island now account for 4% of the country’s population. This has an inevitable impact on the ethnic makeup of the island and on the future of the Cyprus Problem negotiations. The RoC has thus far followed a pushbacks policy and installed a razor wire to prevent irregular migration. “Pushbacks” refer to the practice of turning people away without giving them the opportunity to request asylum.. Under International Human Rights Law, however, states must respect the rights of all people moving across borders regardless of their migration status. As a result, the policies followed by the RoC have been in violation of the International Human Rights Law. This article explains the violations by the RoC in its attempt to control irregular migration and what implications this has on the Cyprus Problem.

In March 2020, Cypriot authorities carried out, for the first time, a number of pushbacks of boats carrying mainly Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian asylum seekers who departed from Turkish and Lebanese coastlines. Between March and September 2020, a total of 9 pushbacks were carried out according to Human Rights Watch. These incidents have drawn the attention of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, who called the expulsion of the boats illegal and requested additional investigations on how Cyprus treats asylum seekers currently on the island. Mijatovic wrote a letter to Nicos Nouris, the Minister of Interior of the RoC, calling for a constructive dialogue with Cyprus regarding the treatment of asylum seekers on the island and the illegal pushbacks that have taken place. In the letter, Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Refugee Conventions and notes of the violations that Cyprus has conducted were cited numerous times.

Nouris responded to Mijatovic with a letter that notably did not address any of the legal references to the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Refugee Convention made by Mijatovic.. Nouris’ response instead forefronted only that ‘Cyprus is facing a new trend of irregular arrivals of migrants on the island’, and no justification was given for the pushback policies that followed. In a statement he gave to the Guardian, he said: ‘Cyprus simply has no more space’. In addition, the RoC has accused Turkey of deliberately seeking to create a new migration route in the eastern Mediterranean to alter the demographics of Cyprus. Turkey still does not recognise the RoC, explaining the lack of cooperation between the two countries on the migration issue.

Turkey and the European Council signed an agreement in 2016, to stop irregular migration and monitor the arrival of asylum seekers to EU states. Turkey, however, has been warning that it may send asylum seekers and refugees to the EU despite their previous agreement – a threat that it eventually followed through on in February 2020. As a result, hundreds of asylum seekers and migrants have been arriving on Greek islands and Cyprus from February and March 2020. Cyprus has received hundreds of asylum seekers as a result of Turkey’s policy, but this cannot be used by the RoC as a justification for violating International Law. As stated by UNHCR Cyprus representative, Katja Saha, any pushbacks policy constitutes a violation of International Law and, before any policy response is implemented, the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘asylum seeker’ must be clearly distinguished. Saha has also stated that Cyprus has the legal right to control its borders as long as its policies respect International Law.

The implementation of the pushbacks policy and the refusal by the government to respond to the accusations made by the European Commission for Human Rights, has led to the mobilization of Cypriot humanitarian NGOs against the government. KISA, a Migrant and Refugee Centre, has said that that the living conditions at the refugee camps in Cyprus ‘constitute blatant violations of the Refugee Law’ and that they are ‘extremely dangerous for the health of asylum seekers and public health in general’. KISA has also stated that it has brought legal proceedings against the Cypriot Ministry of Interior before the European Court of Human Rights.

Following the pushbacks’ scandal, the Ministry of Interior of the RoC installed a 11km razor wire along the ‘green line’ to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering the RoC from North Cyprus. According to the Asylum Information Database Report on Cyprus, created by the Cyprus Refugee Council, the wire will not solve the issue of migration because most people enter the RoC directly from the sea and not from border crossings on the island. In addition, it should be noted that many of the people crossing from Northern Cyprus are not illegal migrants as the RoC argues, but people with valid asylum and refugee claims. A group of political activists, known as ‘Os Dame’ (translated as “we’ve had enough”) have cut a piece of the wire and placed it in front of the Ministry of Interior to show their opposition to the government’s new approach to migration. The decision by the RoC to place a wire along the ‘green line’ has led, once again, to the opposition of the European Commission because it violates Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation which states that any change in the policy of the RoC on the crossing of persons should be approved by the Commission before being applied. The European Commission spokesperson, Vivian Loonela, said that the Commission did not receive any notification about the construction of a new fencing from the RoC. In addition, this decision has also been criticised by Cypriot opposition parties for legitimising the division of Cyprus. According to AKEL, the main opposition party, the razor wire is entrenching the ethnic division of the island and it is implying the official acceptance of borders between the RoC and Northern Cyprus.

Despite the opposition within Cyprus and from the European Commission, the President of the RoC, Nicos Anastasiades, has defended the installation of the razor wire along the UN controlled ‘green line’. The ‘green line’ which is also known as the UN Buffer Zone, is not an external border for the EU, although it separates Cyprus into two parts. It is monitored by the UN and, since the RoC entered the EU, the Green Line Regulation was also established setting the terms under which persons and goods can cross the line from the TRNC to the RoC. According to President Anastasiades the wire is a response to Turkey’s strategy on Cyprus, which is to alter Cyprus’ demographics through increased migratory flows. In response to the opposition that this policy has received from many Cypriots, the President said: ‘I am not aware as to how many residents have reacted but if any problems whatsoever are being caused then they will be resolved’. It is worth noting that in addition to the restriction of movement that the wire imposes to migrants and asylum seekers attempting to cross into the RoC, it also restricts access to local farmers who work land near the ‘green line’. The RoC’s spokesman, Kyriakos Koushos, has stated that this policy does not imply any ‘political or other message’ regarding the Cyprus Problem and that it has been made in accordance with Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation. Koushos insisted that the European Union and the UN were informed about the razor wire beforehand, despite the statements of the European Commission claiming the opposite.

The RoC has faced numerous criticisms over the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers on the island. Turkey’s strategy against the island cannot serve as a justification for the human rights violations that the RoC has conducted. The European Union and the UN have criticised Turkey’s treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, but they have nonetheless urged the RoC to stop its current policy of pushbacks. At the same time, the installation of a razor wire along the ‘green line’ has a negative impact on asylum seekers currently on Cyprus, who are unable to cross into the RoC and apply for asylum. The RoC should change its current policy on migration and asylum, stop committing human rights violations and follow the European Convention on Human Rights instead.

Reforming China’s Refoulement Policy towards North Korea

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By: Davis Florick

Korean refugees traveling through China towards Southeast Asia and freedom

The Chinese government’s policy concerning North Korean refugees represents a serious blight on human security and welfare. Through its ‘refoulement programme’, Beijing has expressed its willingness to send North Korean refugees back to Pyongyang. However, there are five key reasons as to why Xi Jinping’s administration should reconsider this policy.

Firstly, evidence suggests that those refugees who are returned to North Korea by Beijing face imprisonment or even death. Since refoulement was first implemented in 1998, tens of thousands of North Koreans have been forcibly repatriated. Unfortunately for these refugees, political crimes are considered by Pyongyang as a far more grave offence than common criminal acts. Considering the fact that it is a political crime to leave North Korea and the manner in which North Korea treats those who are forcibly repatriated, China’s decision to deport refugees back to North Korea would condemn these individuals to unspeakable suffering and even death. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea has often highlighted the use of persecution, torture, and indefinite detainment of such individuals. In particular, those refugees who have made contact with external parties such as religious or foreign aid groups are sometimes executed as well. Among the worst atrocities that take place, infanticide is committed against children of mixed races and forced abortions are imposed on women carrying fetuses of mixed races. Many of these children are of Chinese heritage, yet Beijing’s insensitiveness to such an underlying current of racism in Pyongyang’s policy is surprising.

Second, many North Korean refugees are simply traveling through China to their intended destination of South Korea. Although the precise number of North Korean refugees living in China is unclear, analysts have expressed a widespread belief that most refugees use China as a gateway to South Korea or other parts of the world. While such refugees may initially seek to work in China, strict immigration laws motivate them to seek employment and refuge elsewhere. Other factors that deter North Korean refugees from remaining in China include the language barrier and poor economic conditions in China’s northeastern provinces of Jilin and Liaoning, where most of them reside. The lack of employment and a steady income have placed many refugees at risk of sexual exploitation and destitution. Due to a lack of options, many are coerced to accept low-wage jobs as farm laborers, household servants, or manufacturing labour. Subsequently, the low cost of North Korean labour results in further tensions among locals who are infuriated with an increased competition for employment. It is probably in China’s best interests to assist these refugees in reaching South Korea, which has expressed a willingness to accept them.

Third, potential security concerns and negative publicity stemming from incidents involving North Korean security personnel and foreign missionaries could be eliminated if refugees were better managed by the government. From an internal security perspective, the movement of North Korean refugees, security agents, foreign aid workers, and various other parties create a politically unstable environment in China. As it stands today, a significant number of undocumented migrants travel from the northeast of China to the Yunnan province in the southwest before making their way to other countries in Southeast Asia. On one hand, North Korean security personnel cooperate with China to capture their fellow countrymen and scuttle them back to the North. On the other hand, some foreign missionaries and other non-governmental organizations operating in China actively help refugees to escape. Such competing interests lend themselves to volatility and potential confrontations. It would make sense for Beijing to dodge this bullet by allowing these refugees to move to their desired destinations.

Fourth, Beijing has an obligation to assist these individuals as a signatory of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Recently, Beijing has obtained an elevated role as a global leader, particularly in terms of economic power and political prowess. As Xi Jinping’s administration accentuates China’s new role within the international system, abiding by human rights commitments would help Beijing establish a positive public image. However, it has largely overlooked its responsibilities pertaining to North Korean refugees. Given its own internal human security challenges with the Uighurs and the presence of political dissidents, providing North Korean refugees safe passage to Seoul seems like a strategic and politically viable solution for Chinese officials.

Finally, by aiding North Korean refugees, Beijing can subtly remind Pyongyang of their asymmetric relationship. North Korea is heavily dependent on trade with China, allowing Beijing to enjoy an asymmetric advantage in the relationship. For instance, China accounted for over 85% of North Korean trade as of 2014. By assisting refugees, the Xi Administration can remind Kim Jong-Un of his vulnerabilities. In fact, Xi Jinping’s government could go against Pyongyang’s wishes by abandoning the refoulement policy if only to demonstrate China’s superiority over the bilateral relationship.

Among the foreign relations challenges confronting Chinese officials today, refoulement is one that can easily be addressed without adversely impacting Beijing in a substantial manner. As Beijing continues its efforts to curb domestic volatility, this is one of the few areas where it can gain a victory on a human rights issue with minimal domestic drawbacks. By reforming its policy on North Korean refugees, China could improve relations with South Korea during this tense period while demonstrating a more responsible approach to human rights in the international community. At a time when Pyongyang seems willing to discard the impact its actions are having on Beijing’s prestige, this measure would remind North Korea of Beijing’s power asymmetry. Any response that North Korea can muster would likely come at the cost of Kim Jong-Un’s economic reforms designed to make his country stronger. The refoulement reform is thus a politically sound strategy for Chinese leaders.

Davis Florick is a strategic policy analyst for the United States Department of Defense, a 2016 WSD-Handa Non-resident Fellow with the Pacific Forum, and a Junior Fellow with the Human Security Centre. He earned a Master’s degree in East-West Studies from Creighton University and specializes in North Korean strategic and human security issues.

Image credit: http://www.libertyinnorthkorea.org/rescue-refugees/

The incommensurable loss of the little drowned boy, Aylan Kurdi

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By: Ana Flamind

I hope humanity finds a cure for visas

Photo: “I hope humanity finds a cure for visas.” Published with the permission of the author

This article seeks to explore the particular affectivity provoked by the publication on 3 September 2015, of the picture of a little drowned boy in Bodrum, Turkey.

Why does the image of this little boy seem to provoke a stronger affectivity, one of shame most particularly, prompting us to scream “that’s it, this is really too much!” when other recent pictures seem to have triggered a remediable guilt (for example recent pictures juxtaposing tourists and refugees on the beaches of Turkey, Greece, etc.)? This stronger affectivity could very well be the result of a cumulative effect, of our hearts growing more pained with each and every story we read and picture we see, of the incremental realisation of what tragic fate awaits refugees, of reading headlines calling the recent displacement of people “the worst refugee crisis since World War II.’’ But it could also be that this specific picture does something, undoes us, as Judith Butler would put it, in a specific way.

Butler’s essay “Precarious life”, in the book of the same title, explores the Levinasian ethic of the face to interrogate the link between representation and humanisation.[1] Butler cautions us that the link is not as straightforward as one might think. A picture seeking to humanise should vocalise grief or agony, a sense of the precariousness of life.[2] Yet giving a face to some tragic event does not necessarily require the seeing of a face, which at times comes to symbolise dehumanisation, such as the picture of Osama bin Laden, Butler reminds us. The face that humanises “will be that for which no words really work; the face (that) seems to be a kind of sound, the sound of language evacuating its sense.”[3] This face “is not explicitly a human face” and can be any bodily parts that “are said to cry, to sob and to scream.”[4] The little drowned boy lies face down in the sand, his back prompting us to respond, yet already prefiguring a response lacking the possibility of uttering sense, a response akin to the sound of grief. Butler writes:

“To respond to the face, to understanding its meaning, means to be awake to what is precarious in another life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself. This cannot be an awakeness, to use his words (Levinas), to my own life, and then an extrapolation from an understanding of my own precariousness to an understanding of another’s precarious life. It has to be an understanding of the precariousness of the Other.”[5]

Furthermore, for Levinas, the injunction of the face, testifying to the Other’s vulnerability, provokes in us a struggle between “the temptation to kill and the call to peace, the You shall not kill.”[6] For Butler, this struggle is foundational of ethics:

“If the Other, the Other’s face, which after all carries the meaning of this precariousness, at once tempts me with murder and prohibits me from acting upon it, then the face operates to produce a struggle for me, and establishes this struggle at the heart of ethics. (…) The face makes various utterances at once: it bespeaks an agony, an injurability, at the same time that it bespeaks a divine prohibition against killing.”[7]

Paradoxically, the picture hurts us by keeping grief outside of the frame. Unlike other pictures depicting the absurd barbarity of children losing their lives in and to horrible conditions, with parents seen holding dead and/or wounded bodies, their faces contorted by pain, hopelessness and anger the little drowned boy is seen in his utter vulnerability, as the unaccompanied body of a three-years old who has no one left to protect him or grieve his disappearance. We do not expect little boys and girls to be left alone, unprotected. We cannot accept little boys and girls to be dead alone, either. This picture thus speaks of what is left outside of the frame, of the innumerable and unfathomable decisions parents face when they put their children’s fate into the hands of smugglers and board a flimsy boat with dim hopes of survival. The picture also speaks of the parents’ probable death, the death of those who could most feel the incommensurable loss of three-years old Aylan Kurdi.[8] For if we want to mourn his death, and the death of all refugees seeking to reach our European shores, we need to hear those who have known them and loved them, attempt to speak of their bereavement, of their incommensurable loss. The picture of three-years old Aylan Kurdi, of the man standing next to him, and, in equal measure, of the photographer who has witnessed the bareness of the little boy’s body, commands us to question why his parents cannot be there to mourn him; it compels us to apprehend the precariousness of life itself.

This, for me, speaks of a different kind of pain sweeping away the foundations of our being: That in acknowledging the vulnerability of Aylan’s dead body, we are forced to face our shared precariousness, our interdependence, if we are to ‘overcome’ the vulnerability that always already puts our fate into the hands of others. The picture of 3-year old Aylan Kurdi, the little drowned boy, establishes the ground of our ethical struggle in plain sight: that of a choice between the fear for our own survival or the disavowal of more suffering. It is now our duty to testify of the incommensurability of Aylan’s life and to the bereavement left by his death. This pain must be seen.

Ana Flamind just completed reading for a MA in International Conflict Studies at King’s College London. Her main interest lies in critical IR and security scholarship.

[1] Butler, Judith; “Precarious life” in Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence (London: Verso, 2004), p 128 – 151.

[2] Rephrased from ibid, p. 141

[3] Ibid p. 135

[4] Ibid p. 133

[5] Ibid p. 134

[6] Emmanuel Levinas as cited by Butler, ibid p. 134

[7] Ibid p.135

[8] The little boy’s father did survive but his older brother and mother did not. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/drowned-syrian-toddler-sparking-global-outrage-named-aylan-kurdi-1671698816

Interview - Dr Carol Bohmer on the Mediterranean migrant crisis

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By Joana Cook:

An inflatable hard bottom craft carrying some 87 would be immigrant maily from Somalia is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa on June 15, 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0)
An inflatable hard-bottom craft carrying some 87 migrants is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa in June 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0)

On Monday, yet another tragic story broke of a ship sinking off the coast of Libya en route to Europe. This time, however, there were a potential 900 fatalities – if confirmed this would represent the highest number in any single case yet. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) fears that 30,000 sea crossings of this sort could occur in 2015 – likely rife with continuing tragedies. EU Foreign Ministers are currently in Luxembourg discussing the issue and what response may be required to both manage criminal elements of this related to human smuggling, and preventing the increasing number of tragedies.

Strife talked to Dr. Carol Bohmer, Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, about those trying to reach Europe and how to address the current crisis.

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There seems to be a significant increase in the number of refugees trying to reach Europe from North Africa. Has there simply been more media coverage of this, or are the rates of these incidents significantly increasing?

The number of refugees drowning en route to Europe has increased exponentially over the last couple of years. So far this year, it is estimated that at least 1600 migrants have died, a 30-fold increase over the same period last year. There have been several incidents in the last couple of weeks, the latest one involving an estimated 800 or more deaths. Because of the magnitude of this tragedy, the media coverage has been intense.

Part of the media coverage has to do with the political implications of these disasters. Last October, Mare Nostrum, a programme of search and rescue, credited with saving 100,000 lives last year, was stopped. Several governments, including the British government, decided to end the operation because they believed that it encouraged migrants to flee to Europe. Not providing rescue was supposed to deter these desperate migrants from attempting the journey. These latest events have put the lie to the effectiveness of this deterrence argument.

Where do these refugees come from? What are the demographics?

The refugees come from places where there is war, civil strife and persecution. Not surprisingly, many come from Syria, Eritrea, South Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Others come from countries in the throes of unrest or economic stagnation. It is difficult to get exact numbers when the authorities do not even know how many have drowned, let alone where they came from. There is evidence that most of them are young with a number of children under 18, some as young as 10 or 12. It is unclear how many women are involved. There is also some evidence that as many as one million Syrians and Sub-Saharan Africans are waiting in Libya to cross into Europe.

What is likely to happen to these refugees if they reach Europe?

It should first be said that while many of the migrants are fleeing persecution, some of them are economic migrants looking for a better life. Even those fleeing the war and chaos of the Middle East do not all fit into the narrow framework of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which, with the follow up 1967 Protocol, provides the definition of refugee in the law.

It is very difficult to follow the path of those migrants and asylum seekers who make it to Europe. Many of them spend long periods of time in reception centres, waiting to be processed as refugees. Return to their countries of origin is extremely difficult, for both practical reasons and because of the international legal principle of “non-refoulement,” which forbids the return of someone to their country of origin if they have reason to fear persecution. Those who are granted asylum (and even those who aren’t) can move away from reception centres, to other parts of Italy or other parts of Europe, and no doubt some of them do, though statistics on this are hard to come by. Formal resettlement programmes appear to be rather limited, especially given Italy’s current financial difficulties.

What are some of the broader political implications (positive or negative) for increasing numbers of refugees travelling to Europe?

The increasing numbers of migrants travelling to Europe are grist for the mill for the far right political parties in many EU counties. The potential power of those parties affects the way those currently in power deal with the issue, focusing on punitive measures rather than more measured efforts as solutions. They are therefore more likely to respond, as Philip Hammond did this week, by supporting efforts to catch traffickers, rather than restart Mare Nostrum to prevent the migrants from drowning at sea.

It is possible that these tragedies will spur the EU to promulgate unified policies to deal with the crisis, and also to provide funding to do so. The Italian government, as well as others who receive migrants from the Mediterranean, argue that they are being forced to accept an unfair share of the burden with insufficient financial support from the rest of the EU.

Migration has the benefit of providing young workers in the EU countries that have ageing populations; the disadvantage of this type of irregular, usually unskilled, migration is that it may not provide the type of workers needed. It also has the disadvantage of indicating a lack of control of borders by those in power.

For those departing from conflict areas is there any evidence that these could be former combatants, or what security risks could be posed?

I don’t know of any evidence that some migrants are former combatants, but there is no reason to suppose they are not. The security risks are well known, and involve possible terrorist acts, though it is hard to imagine terrorists resorting to leaky boats as a means of transport to the EU so they can commit acts of terrorism once there.

In your opinion, how should the international community respond to these cases? What steps do you believe could be taken to avoid further tragedies?

The international community should restart Mare Nostrum. It is painfully clear that this deterrence does not work, given that the number of people risking crossing the Mediterranean have increased so markedly since Mare Nostrum was abandoned. It is inhumane not to try to save the lives of those who cross to Europe in a futile attempt to reduce the numbers. The reason that people are coming in increased numbers has to do with the situation in the places they are fleeing. Until the various crises are resolved we can expect migrant numbers to remain high. International efforts to this end could have some effect on the number of refugees who flee.

Given that not all the migrants are refugees but rather those seeking a better life than the barren and economically disastrous one in their places of origin, efforts to improve the economic outlook in those countries would also reduce the incentive for migrants to try to reach Europe.

Going after the traffickers would have some effect, but would not stop the transit of desperate people such as have been risking their lives recently. The desperation is too great and the rewards for the traffickers who are not caught are too high to deter them.

Dr. Carol Bohmer is a Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies, and is a Visiting Associate Professor at Dartmouth College, Hanover NH, USA. She is also the author of numerous books and publications including “The Politics of Invisibility and the Stigmatized Vernacular: The Case of Political Asylum Seekers” with Amy Shuman (forthcoming), and “Rejecting Refugees: Asylum in the US and the UK in the 21st Century”, with Amy Shuman” (2007).

Interview conducted by Joana Cook, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief.

South Sudan peace talks need to return home

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By Josephine Chandiru Drama:

Sudan picture

South Sudan gained independence on 9th July 2011 after decades of armed struggle with the Sudanese government. On 15th December 2013, fighting that began as a political dispute between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar broke out and turned into ethnic violence. On 23rd January, 2014, a ceasefire agreement was reached after three weeks of talks in Ethiopia. Just a month after signing the cease-fire, fighting resumed in the major towns of Malakal and Bentiu. Within the 4 months of conflict, several people are believed to have been killed; over 870,000 others have fled their homes, 145,000 of them to neighbouring countries and 75,000 to UN Mission bases in South Sudan. Peace talks hosted by Ethiopia with support from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are staggeringly going on with periods of recess.

Peace talks are interactions expected to respond to conflicts. The response demands for mutual bilateral bargains to reach an amicable agreement between the warring parties and restore normality in the conflict zone and its neighbours. The loud call for peace talks by various conflicting factions, regional bodies, the international community and people of good will stems from the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians from unnecessary harm.

When parties agree to build a consensus for peace talks, the venue is an important factor that will determine the outcome of a negotiation. Venue determines who participates and who does not. When citizens attend to the affairs of their country, they get their concerns included in the agenda of the negotiations, and influence public support for them. It allows them to closely monitor the implementation of the outcomes and commit to long-term peace process.

Apart from South Africa, Kenya and a handful of other African countries that have hosted their own peace talks, the majority have held these in a foreign country. Some agreements reached during these periods have been adhered to, several others have not. Well aware that foreign states offer neutral, quiet and peaceful grounds for peace talks, there is a complete disconnect with what happens on the ground. It limits participation of other stakeholders who have a say in the matter. It further complicates consultations since on many occasions, the leaders of the warring factions are busy fighting on the ground, and the representatives need to reach them. Foreign countries seem to be comfort zones, displaying traits of people on holiday, luxury and laxity are part and parcel of their commitments. This makes them easily forget the plight of those they have gone to represent.

The South Sudan peace talks taking place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia can take place in any other state in the country that is relatively peaceful. Of the 10 states in South Sudan, the conflict is visible in 4 states. Thus the conflict taking place in selected parts of the country offers an opportunity to community leaders in the safe states to mobilise their people to lay down their arms as a call for peace and giving feedback to their warring allies. After all, the people have trust and belief in their community leaders. This way the same objective of negotiating peace could also be reached. Dialogues with the people as opposed to military interventions improve political power negotiations with political commitments.

If round table talks to broker peace were initiated in countries affected by and going through conflict, in this case South Sudan, the ordinary citizens would participate, the negotiators would become messengers of the people, costs of hotels and other facilities would be minimal. There would be immense pressure on warring parties by the citizens to find a solution plus other demands from the people, the brokers and representatives of both parties would be in position to feel what it means to be in the scene of conflict, thereby reaching durable peace agreements and also enforcing them. This would make negotiations achieve more. The venue also prepares a fertile ground for lasting political settlements through holding of dialogues between parties.

Historically, ethnic, religious and women’s groups have been excluded from offering negotiated efforts to conflict resolution despite being experts in mediation among their communities and homes. Furthermore, if peace talks are brokered in places that are thousands of kilometres away, how can we utilize the capabilities of such people?

Citizens can be a driving force to achieve a desired goal if conditions such as proximity to venues of peace talks and an open platform are set to allow citizen participation in whichever form. For instance, during the Liberia peace talks in neighbouring Ghana, women were a driving force through their pressure groups. At one point, those in negotiations demanded the doors of the building where the talks were taking place to be shut. The women then surrounded the building and refused to let the delegates leave until a settlement was made. This placed increased pressure on the negotiating parties to reach a decision. Such groups and many others who have non-violent capabilities should be encouraged to offer their free time and service to end violence against the people and participate in the state building processes.

Addressing the grievances of those who are excluded from the peace process is an incomplete process. People who are affected by conditions that are uncalled for should be allowed to tell their stories and name their perpetrators. Meeting of minds as opposed to meeting of weapons should be a strategy employed to resolve issues. This is the road map to achieve sustainable peace. This can only be viable when devolution of such agendas is brought to the people as soon as they materialize.

The way forward is for “Peace grounds with zero violence” to be established in South Sudan, deliberately used for peaceful negotiations, civic engagement and sanctioned by every leader to respect such grounds that are meant for discussions. They are to be violence free zones that accord the respect of all citizens to the exclusion of no other.

The neutral role of the external mediators during peace talks cannot be understated. In such a case, it takes great courage and sacrifice to volunteer their lives and that of their family to accept to broker peace in situations where negotiations take place in a conflict zone. The government on its part should be able to offer a secure ground to ensure deliberate safety of the external actors.

IGAD, the East African regional bloc spearheading the South Sudan peace talks should consider the said option so as to encourage full participation and monitoring of the implementation of the agreements. This would also minimize costs on their part and keep their presence in South Sudan longer ensuring conscious implementation and hold accountable those who fault their own agreements.

The dangers caused by armed conflicts cannot be endured forever thus an end to violence should be a priority. Conflict causes civilians to become homeless and thus displaced. With no shelters, dry seasons may prove manageable for some, but during the rainy season, with children and mothers forced to live under trees not knowing when their plight will end, a further motivation for peace talks to return home is established. Negotiators should be able to see the plight of those that they are negotiating for. The creation of an opportunity to re-build relations between citizens and their governments can only be achieved by opening spaces that are accessible to the citizens. This helps leaders rebuild confidence amongst the population and attract those in the diaspora to return, and external actors to faithfully contribute to positive state building and peace building. It ensures leaders exchange influence with the citizens. It makes people negotiate what is best for them, as the leaders cannot do it alone. The population also further owns negotiations held at home. Outcomes established in home countries end up building institutions that are internal as opposed to external. Let us give a chance for peace talks to return home.

 

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Josephine is a woman fellow at the African Leadership Centre at Kings College London, UK. She has worked with STEWARD women’s organization and facilitated dialogues between security operatives and media houses, as well as community dialogues for Payam (District) authorities, traditional chiefs, police, religious, youth and women leaders in various parts of South Sudan.