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You are here: Home / Archives for rafaella piyoti

rafaella piyoti

Cyprus’ policies on migration and their impact on the ethnic division of the island

June 15, 2021 by Rafaella Piyioti

“Refugee Camps in Cyprus” by sarah.ahmadia is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0

Almost 20,000 asylum applications are currently pending in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). According to the Ministry of Interior, asylum seekers on the island now account for 4% of the country’s population. This has an inevitable impact on the ethnic makeup of the island and on the future of the Cyprus Problem negotiations. The RoC has thus far followed a pushbacks policy and installed a razor wire to prevent irregular migration.  “Pushbacks” refer to the practice of turning people away without giving them the opportunity to request asylum.. Under International Human Rights Law, however, states must respect the rights of all people moving across borders regardless of their migration status. As a result, the policies followed by the RoC have been in violation of the International Human Rights Law. This article explains the violations by the RoC in its attempt to control irregular migration and what implications this has on the Cyprus Problem.

In March 2020, Cypriot authorities carried out, for the first time, a number of pushbacks of boats carrying mainly Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian asylum seekers who departed from Turkish and Lebanese coastlines. Between March and September 2020, a total of 9 pushbacks were carried out according to Human Rights Watch. These incidents have drawn the attention of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, who called the expulsion of the boats illegal and requested additional investigations on how Cyprus treats asylum seekers currently on the island.  Mijatovic wrote a letter to Nicos Nouris, the Minister of Interior of the RoC, calling for a constructive dialogue with Cyprus regarding the treatment of asylum seekers on the island and the illegal pushbacks that have taken place. In the letter, Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Refugee Conventions and notes of the violations that Cyprus has conducted were cited numerous times.

Nouris responded to Mijatovic with a letter that notably did not address any of the legal references to the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Refugee Convention made by Mijatovic..  Nouris’ response instead forefronted only that ‘Cyprus is facing a new trend of irregular arrivals of migrants on the island’, and no justification was given for the pushback policies that followed. In a statement he gave to the Guardian, he said: ‘Cyprus simply has no more space’. In addition, the RoC has accused Turkey of deliberately seeking to create a new migration route in the eastern Mediterranean to alter the demographics of Cyprus. Turkey still does not recognise the RoC, explaining the lack of cooperation between the two countries on the migration issue.

Turkey and the European Council signed an agreement in 2016, to stop irregular migration and monitor the arrival of asylum seekers to EU states. Turkey, however, has been warning that it may send asylum seekers and refugees to the EU despite their previous agreement – a threat that it eventually followed through on in February 2020. As a result, hundreds of asylum seekers and migrants have been arriving on Greek islands and Cyprus from February and March 2020. Cyprus has received hundreds of asylum seekers as a result of Turkey’s policy, but this cannot be used by the RoC as a justification for violating International Law. As stated by UNHCR Cyprus representative, Katja Saha, any pushbacks policy constitutes a violation of International Law and, before any policy response is implemented, the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘asylum seeker’ must be clearly distinguished. Saha has also stated that Cyprus has the legal right to control its borders as long as its policies respect International Law.

The implementation of the pushbacks policy and the refusal by the government to respond to the accusations made by the European Commission for Human Rights, has led to the mobilization of Cypriot humanitarian NGOs against the government. KISA, a Migrant and Refugee Centre, has said that that the living conditions at the refugee camps in Cyprus ‘constitute blatant violations of the Refugee Law’ and that they are ‘extremely dangerous for the health of asylum seekers and public health in general’. KISA has also stated that it has brought legal proceedings against the Cypriot Ministry of Interior before the European Court of Human Rights.

Following the pushbacks’ scandal, the Ministry of Interior of the RoC installed a 11km razor wire along the ‘green line’ to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering the RoC from North Cyprus. According to the Asylum Information Database Report on Cyprus, created by the Cyprus Refugee Council, the wire will not solve the issue of migration because most people enter the RoC directly from the sea and not from border crossings on the island. In addition, it should be noted that many of the people crossing from Northern Cyprus are not illegal migrants as the RoC argues, but people with valid asylum and refugee claims. A group of political activists, known as ‘Os Dame’ (translated as “we’ve had enough”) have cut a piece of the wire and placed it in front of the Ministry of Interior to show their opposition to the government’s new approach to migration. The decision by the RoC to place a wire along the ‘green line’ has led, once again, to the opposition of the European Commission because it violates Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation which states that any change in the policy of the RoC on the crossing of persons should be approved by the Commission before being applied. The European Commission spokesperson, Vivian Loonela, said that the Commission did not receive any notification about the construction of a new fencing from the RoC. In addition, this decision has also been criticised by Cypriot opposition parties for legitimising the division of Cyprus. According to AKEL, the main opposition party, the razor wire is entrenching the ethnic division of the island and it is implying the official acceptance of borders between the RoC and Northern Cyprus.

Despite the opposition within Cyprus and from the European Commission, the President of the RoC, Nicos Anastasiades, has defended the installation of the razor wire along the UN controlled ‘green line’. The ‘green line’ which is also known as the UN Buffer Zone, is not an external border for the EU, although it separates Cyprus into two parts. It is monitored by the UN and, since the RoC entered the EU, the Green Line Regulation was also established setting the terms under which persons and goods can cross the line from the TRNC to the RoC.  According to President Anastasiades the wire is a response to Turkey’s strategy on Cyprus, which is to alter Cyprus’ demographics through increased migratory flows. In response to the opposition that this policy has received from many Cypriots, the President said: ‘I am not aware as to how many residents have reacted but if any problems whatsoever are being caused then they will be resolved’. It is worth noting that in addition to the restriction of movement that the wire imposes to migrants and asylum seekers attempting to cross into the RoC, it also restricts access to local farmers who work land near the ‘green line’. The RoC’s spokesman, Kyriakos Koushos, has stated that this policy does not imply any ‘political or other message’ regarding the Cyprus Problem and that it has been made in accordance with Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation. Koushos insisted that the European Union and the UN were informed about the razor wire beforehand, despite the statements of the European Commission claiming the opposite.

The RoC has faced numerous criticisms over the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers on the island. Turkey’s strategy against the island cannot serve as a justification for the human rights violations that the RoC has conducted. The European Union and the UN have criticised Turkey’s treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, but they have nonetheless urged the RoC to stop its current policy of pushbacks. At the same time, the installation of a razor wire along the ‘green line’ has a negative impact on asylum seekers currently on Cyprus, who are unable to cross into the RoC and apply for asylum. The RoC should change its current policy on migration and asylum, stop committing human rights violations and follow the European Convention on Human Rights instead.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: cyprus, immigration, Migration, rafaella piyoti, refugee

Libya strikes historic ceasefire but prospects for peace remain limited

January 27, 2021 by Rafaella Piyioti

by Rafaella Piyioti

Libya Map with Flag Pin. Source: iStockPhoto

At present, Libya’s two governments, each with their own parliament and central bank system, are competing for power. The situation is further complicated by the overlapping and intersecting involvement of regional and international actors. On the 23 October 2020 an UN-mediated ceasefire was signed to establish the foundations for peace in the country. This agreement is the result of a series of UN-led talks between Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, leader of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and General Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA). To ensure a successful peace settlement in Libya, the disarmament of domestic militia organisations and the withdrawal of foreign forces is of paramount importance. Moreover, to understand the complexities of the civil war in Libya and the fragility of the UN ceasefire agreement, it is essential to focus on the role of foreign actors in Libya.

Since the toppling of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, civil war has raged across Libya. While the Colonel’s pan-Arabist leanings granted the country strong regional influence, his financing of terrorism led to frequent confrontations with the West. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya entered a new era of instability and insecurity. From this General Haftar has emerged as a self-proclaimed new Libyan leader, aiming to establish his own military rule over the nation with the support of various regional and international actors.  The UN, in a bid to establish stable civilian governance and prevent domestic militias from gaining control of the country, instead supported the formation the GNA in 2016.

Failing thus far to unify Libya, the GNA has only managed to establish its authority in Tripoli and has been engaged in long-term fighting with Haftar’s LNA. Libyan domestic militias are divided between those who support the GNA and those who support Haftar. Haftar promised his supporters military control of the country based on the Egyptian model of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his campaign against political Islam has led many regional actors to form alliances with him. Egypt, the UAE and Israel provided political support and funding to Haftar, in an attempt to prevent radical Islamist groups from gaining control of Libya and advancing their regional influence.

In the past year, the conflict between the GNA and the LNA has intensified, piquing when Haftar’s troops invaded Tripoli on the 4th April 2019. Since then, foreign actors have played an increasingly decisive role in how events have unfolded.

In January 2020, Turkey signed an agreement with the GNA to provide military support and send mercenaries to al-Sarraj’s army. Turkey’s alliance with the GNA is an extension of its current foreign policy, to advance its regional influence, using a politically pro-Islam rhetoric. Al -Sarraj, is accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation known for its Pan-Islam ideology, that calls for the unity of all Muslims worldwide, and its alliance with Turkey. Erdogan’s support to the GNA led Israel, Egypt and the UAE to increase their support to General Haftar to counter the rise of political Islam.

Russia, although one of the ‘Permanent Five’ members on the UN Security Council, supports Haftar’s LNA, offering military aid in an attempt to advance its own geopolitical influence in the region. Post-Soviet Russia has struggled to establish itself as a recognised global power and Libya’s strategic position offers Russia options for both naval and air bases which could support its activities in the region. Haftar’s troops, establishing a number of defence contracts with Russia, have also served as an economic boon. Nonetheless, following the escalation of violence in Libya, President Putin has joined the German Chancellor Merkel and the British Prime Minister Johnson, in calling the two Libyan leaders to negotiate a ceasefire agreement.

France, another member of the ‘Permanent Five’, has also supported Haftar, though this has not always been the case, with its overarching foreign policy on Libya being more ambiguous. While initially a neutral actor, Turkey’s involvement in Libya pushed France towards Haftar’s LNA as the two countries are experiencing increased tensions over their conflicted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Macron’s opposition to radical Islam, is yet another contributing factor in France’s alliance with Haftar, who has established an anti-Islamist political campaign in Libya to counter the rise of Islamist militias.

In the absence of a holistic European Union policy towards Libya, France pledged an alliance with Haftar, joined by Greece and Cyprus.  This is mainly due to their political dispute with Turkey on the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis. Other EU states have formed their own policies on Libya.  Italy has long established historic and strategic interests in Libya and is one of the only EU member states that supports the GNA over the LNA. Not only does Italy depend on Libyan hydrocarbons, but it has also reached a deal with the GNA to cooperate in countering illegal migration and human trafficking. Libya thus serves as an opportunity for Italy to maintain its interests and advance its own influence in the region.

Following a year of intensive fighting Haftar and al-Sarraj signed an UN-initiated ceasefire agreement on the 23 October 2020. The ceasefire, welcomed by the UN and the EU, is an important step towards the re-establishing peace in Libya. The UK and Germany offered to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which has set a timeline of three months for the disarmament of domestic militias and for foreign actors to withdraw from Libya. Yet, there remains a feeling of mistrust between al-Sarraj and Haftar which could undermine the prospect of a long-lasting peace. The three months’ timeframe is almost over, and the LNA has already accused Turkey of continuing its presence in Libya. For peace and stability, it is necessary that foreign actors, whether regional or international, follow the rules of the ceasefire agreement and withdraw their troops from Libya.

The UN, as the body traditionally at the forefront of global conflict mediation, should therefore lead efforts to ensure that all parties are following the ceasefire rules. Still, even if Turkey exits Libya, important challenges will remain. A tenuous peace and real political unity are two completely different things. As long as the ideological and political differences between the GNA’s policy of promoting political Islam, and the LNA’s anti-Islamist campaign remain unaddressed, political unity cannot be achieved.

While the UN ceasefire agreement is an important step towards lasting peace, without the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to the pursuit of regional interests through Libya, the conflict will inevitably continue. A ceasefire shows that there is a willingness, or at least a possibility, for peace. What remains now is for the GNA and LNA to be given the space and impetus to seize the opportunity for a lasting peace.


Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy.

She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking.

Rafaela is a Staff Writer at Strife.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Africa, Fayez al-Sarraj, Gaddafi, General Khalifa Haftar, GNA, Government of National Accord, Libya, Libyan National Army, rafaella piyoti, United Nations

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