• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Home
  • About
    • Editorial Staff
      • Bryan Strawser, Editor in Chief, Strife
      • Dr Anna B. Plunkett, Founder, Women in Writing
      • Strife Journal Editors
      • Strife Blog Editors
      • Strife Communications Team
      • Senior Editors
      • Series Editors
      • Copy Editors
      • Strife Writing Fellows
      • Commissioning Editors
      • War Studies @ 60 Project Team
      • Web Team
    • Publication Ethics
    • Open Access Statement
  • Archive
  • Series
  • Strife Journal
  • Contact us
  • Submit to Strife!

Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

  • Announcements
  • Articles
  • Book Reviews
  • Call for Papers
  • Features
  • Interviews
You are here: Home / Archives for peace

peace

Modernity and the Long Peace: Has the World Seen a Decline in War?

April 2, 2021 by Gideon Jones

By Gideon Jones

Pieter Bruegel the Elder, ‘The Triumph of Death’ (c. 1562)

Has the world become more peaceful?

One would think that such a question would be easily answered. On an intuitive level, many people in the West would feel that this is the case: to them, war is something that exists in far distant places and is seen only on high-resolution screens. It’s absence has become so pronounced that some have claimed we are living in a Long Peace, the period from the end of the Second World War until today that has seen a fall in the frequency of major wars, and has led to a period of unparalleled human prosperity. However, this answer, and the preceding question is seductively simple, and when investigated, a far more complicated image begins to emerge.

The argument that the world has become more peaceful (and less violent in general) was perhaps most famously made by Steven Pinker. Pinker’s 2011 book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, made a celebratory case about modernity, that in spite of the horrors of the 20th Century, war and violence in human society have been on a decline that has been ongoing over centuries. And there is plenty of data to back up this claim. Just a cursory glance at ‘The Visual History of Decreasing War and Violence’ highlights reductions in our rates of violent death, whether related to murder or the lethality of war. For example Western Europe was thought to have a violent death rate at around 2% of the entire population in the 17th Century, whilst between 1900-1960, the violent death rate in Europe and North America lay at 1%.It is not without cause that Pinker feels confident in proclaiming that ‘we may be living in one of the most peaceful eras in our species’ existence’.

The reasons for this apparent decline are manifold, but Pinker’s central claim is that humanity has gradually been able to gain greater control over our inner demons. The classic view of human nature is that Humanity has and always will be prone to violence, and that since war is an expression of that violent tendency, it is here to stay. He claims human nature itself, while containing the potential for violence and cruelty, isn’t static, but is itself influenced by the environment, and that the systems and institutions of modernity (be it participative democracy or free market capitalism) promote less violent and more cooperative behaviour. When humanity developed means to trade peacefully with one another and developed ways of managing relations without recourse to war, more cooperative behaviours were selected for, as opposed to violent ones. Furthermore, Pinker claims that it’s our reason that lies at the basis of much of this change, and that ‘just as our species has applied its cognitive powers to ward off the scourges of pestilence and famine, so it can apply them to manage the scourge of war’. Though war and our impulses to wage it may never be eradicated, there may be reason to believe that we may be slowly turning a new leaf.

This decline of war thesis is a celebration of modernity. Though we are frequently inundated with the problems of the world in our news media, those proposing this thesis reassure us, showing us that we have in fact progressed, and we have modernity to thank.

However, while the narrative of the decline in war and violence is as attractive as it is persuasive, it only represents half of the argument. Others have argued that such progress is an illusion, and that the idea that we have morally advanced is little more than wishful thinking.

Bear F. Braumoeller, a statistician and political scientist, argues that the idea that the data shows a decline in violence is questionable at best. In his book, Only the Dead, Braumoeller firstly disagrees with the thesis that war between states has become less frequent. He argues that when one looks rate of conflict initiation in the Cold War- during the so called Long Peace- we see ‘one of the most warlike periods of the last 200 years outside the two world wars’. Though a ‘hot’ war between the USA and the USSR thankfully never broke out, that did not mean that violent conflicts were not fought elsewhere.

What about the claim that war has become less deadly? Once again, it depends on how the data is interpreted. Though there is an observable decline in the death rate per 100,000, this may as much be a product of the fact that our societies are larger. The anthropologists Dean Falk and Charles Hildebolt argued in a paper that though a higher ratio of any given society will tend to die in conflict the smaller the society is, ‘the actual number of war deaths increases with growing population sizes’. If human societies had gotten more peaceful as time had gone on, this relationship should not exist.

This is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to criticising the statistical basis of the Long Peace thesis. To Nassim Taleb and Pasquale Cirillo, the greatest weakness of the decline of war theory not just a chronic underestimation of deaths from violent conflict, but also looking at the mean whilst ignoring low probability, high impact events like a world war.

When this is taken into mind, the peace that the world has experienced from the end of the Second World War (between the great powers at least) begins to look very different. Though there have been times and places in history where peace did for the most part exist- be it Augustus’ Pax Romana or the Congress System in Europe where major conflicts were prevented and relations were managed- they inevitably ended in major conflict. The difference between then and now is of course our technology, with 14,000 nuclear weapons existing today, which are more powerful than the ones which existed in the Cold War. The point here is to suggest that an armed conflict between the world’s major powers, whilst unlikely, is by no means impossible, and such a war would undoubtedly be one of extreme death and violence. To quote Taleb and Cirillo, it is nonsensical ‘to say that violence has dropped but maybe not the risk of tail events’- in that case, the Long Peace is not evidence of humanity’s newfound pacifism, but is instead merely an interlude between one great conflict and the next.

So why does this debate matter?

On New Year’s Eve 2019, it looked as if 2020 was going to be the same as any other year. Yet it wasn’t. Instead, the world faced a global pandemic- a supposedly low probability, yet high impact event. And we were not ready for it.

Whether one agrees with the idea that war is declining is one thing, but it should not be a cause for complacency and self-congratulation. If peace is to remain, there must be an understanding of its fragility. We should not let grand narratives of our moral progress lull us into a false sense of security; by ignoring the violence of today we open the doors to the violence of tomorrow.

 

Gideon Jones is a MA student in Terrorism, Security & Society at the War Studies Department, King’s College London, and completed his BA in History at the University of Warwick. Coming from Northern Ireland, he has been brought up in a country scarred by the issues of terrorism, conflict, sectarianism, and extremist ideology. Through this experience, he has been given valuable insight into how the legacies of such problems can continue to divide a society decades after the fighting has stopped, and how the issues left unresolved can threaten to upend a fragile peace. Gideon is a Staff Writer at Strife.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: applied history, foresight, peace, prediction, theory

Can the Abraham Accords Encourage the Denuclearisation of Israel?

October 28, 2020 by Aleix Nadal Campos

by Aleix Nadal Campos

From left to right, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, the Prime Minister of Israel, the President of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the United Arab Emirates sign the Abraham Accords at the White House (Image credit: Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead).

The Arab states have laid two pathways for Israel to normalise its diplomatic ties with them. The first is through the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which establishes that Arab states will only recognise Israel once a peace settlement with Palestine has been achieved. The second, and less noticed one, is through the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East’s (WMDFZME) initiative, whereby the Arab states and Iran have implicitly acknowledged that Israel could gain their formal recognition once the latter has dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Yet, the agenda of the Arab states and Iran in regard to the Zone initiative is presumably incompatible with Israel’s, whose single objective is to establish diplomatic relations with regional states. In this vein, by offering diplomatic normalisation with two Gulf countries without any stipulation that binds Israel to clear disarmament commitments, the Abraham Accords have undermined the few instruments that Arab states and Iran had at their disposal to entice Israel into foregoing its nuclear capabilities.

The Abraham Accords

Israel’s (unrecognized) nuclear arsenal serves to ultimately safeguard the country from self-perceived existential threats and quantitative asymmetries vis-à-vis other regional states. These asymmetries, however, could soon be diminished. On 15 September 2020, U.S. President Donald J. Trump hosted a ceremony at the White House where the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain forged official bilateral diplomatic ties with Israel. Immediately following this, the three Middle Eastern countries issued a joint declaration of principles that has been since dubbed as the Abraham Accords. Statements by US and Israeli officials suggest that other regional countries may soon follow in Bahrain’s and UAE’s footsteps, giving Israel the official recognition it has always sought. Because Israel has justified its nuclear arsenal on the basis of a threat of an all-out war against them, one could surmise that the Abraham Accords could become a watershed moment for the eventual de-nuclearisation of Israel and the region as a whole. Unfortunately, diplomatic and security-related factors emerging from the Accords will further deter Israel from acquiescing to join a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

The history of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

To dismantle Israel’s nuclear monopoly and shrink its strategic superiority, Arab countries and Iran have long advocated for the de-nuclearisation of the Middle East. In 1974, Iran and Egypt submitted a joint proposal to the United Nations General Assembly to create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZME) that would forbid the development, testing, possession, acquisition, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons in the region. Since 1980, annual resolutions from the UN General Assembly endorsing the proposal were approved unanimously until 2018, including by Israel, demonstrating that even the latter supports the initiative. The scope of the prospective treaty was subsequently broadened to include all weapons of mass destruction following a proposal by the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1990.

Whilst several dialogues have taken place since the initiative’s inception, through both official channels and backchannel diplomacy, progress has been notably absent, at least until recently. In November 2019, a conference under the United Nations’ auspices was held where all Arab states and Iran, as well as extra-regional countries, participated to discuss the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME). Henceforth, the November Conference is expected to be held annually until an agreement on the Zone is secured. Citing that the conference represented an attempt by the Arab states and Iran to impose a diplomatic process without prior consultation, Israel declined to participate in the first edition and is not expected to attend the second one, partly withering away the momentum generated by the new multilateral process. If this opt-out continues, the credibility of the entire process could be put into question, for the dismantlement of Israel’s nuclear capabilities remains the chief target of the initiative.

In essence, the persistent lack of progress and Israel’s non-involvement in the Conference reflects the fact that the ultimate objectives of Arab countries and Iran are diametrically opposed to those of Israel. For the former countries, the Zone is an instrument to dismantle Israel’s nuclear arsenal and erode the military edge that Israel enjoys over other regional countries. For the latter, any framework to negotiate a WMDFZ in the Middle East is desirable to the extent that Israel can use the process itself to normalise diplomatic relations with regional countries. These conflicting objectives have translated into a sort of chicken-and-egg dilemma about the sequencing between ‘regional peace’ and ‘disarmament’. In particular, Israel has adopted a security-based approach whereby disarmament should only occur in a context where regional peace has been previously reached. Conversely, Arab countries and Iran contend that disarmament itself creates regional peace and as such Israel should proceed with dismantling its nuclear arsenal if it ever wants peace in the region.

The question that remains, then, is whether the Abraham Accords can encourage Israel to re-engage with the Zone initiative and participate in the yearly conferences until its de-nuclearization is agreed upon.

The Abraham Accords and the de-nuclearization of Israel

In addition to the UAE’s and Bahrain’s failure to extract disarmament commitments from Israel, which undermines the ‘disarmament first’ approach taken by Middle Eastern countries, there are two security-related factors emanating from the Abraham Accords that thwart the efforts to establish the Zone. First, the Accords are an extension of the increasing bilateral cooperation that has taken place for the past few years between Israel and some of the Gulf countries in the security field. This cooperation has been largely motivated by their shared interest to contain the emergence of Iran as a determined geopolitical player and by their hostility towards the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). By formalising this anti-Iran coalition, the deal may then contribute to exacerbating inter-state polarisation in the Persian Gulf, potentially encouraging Iran to resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In turn, the escalation of tensions could strengthen Israel’s self-perceived legitimacy to have a nuclear deterrent as the country considers Iran as its largest security threat. Thus, in Iran, Israel would have the perfect alibi to not seriously engage with the Zone initiative.

Second, reports that the US would reward the UAE’s normalisation agreement with Israel by allowing it to purchase the F-35 fighter further dwindles the prospects of a WMDFZME. Such a sweetener would not be unprecedented in the context of a US Administration brokering a peace deal between Israel and an Arab country. Indeed, the US delivered significant military assistance to both Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994, respectively, when they signed their peace treaties with the Jewish state. If the UAE was to receive this military payoff, however, Israel’s qualitative military edge over Middle Eastern countries that the US has long been committed to would be compromised, albeit only partially.

Other Arab countries could then interpret that peace with Israel in exchange for US military assistance would be the new gold standard and subsequently demand analogous conditions, contributing to the erosion of Israel’s conventional military superiority in the region. In such a scenario, it would be hard to envisage Israel being more willing to take progressive steps towards nuclear disarmament when nuclear superiority would constitute the ultimate strategy to offset this potentially new military reality. In fact, some Israeli officials have already aired their concerns that an arsenal of the F-35 fighter jet in the hands of an alternative leadership cadre in the UAE that is less keen on building bridges with Israel would constitute a security threat.

Conclusion

The Abraham Accords might usher in a new era in the Middle East where regional peace is progressively achieved. Accordingly, they could result in the configuration of novel security conditions that are more conducive to Israel’s nuclear disarmament. Seen in this light, the Accords could be positively assessed in terms of its contribution to nuclear disarmament. In fact, it is not implausible to assume that Israel could participate in upcoming editions of the November Conference as a gesture of goodwill towards the Arab states, for its participation would not entail any binding commitments with respect to its nuclear posture. Nevertheless, despite their positive potential, the Accords may have entrenched a series of incentives that undercut the (already) dim prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East in the foreseeable future.


Aleix Nadal Campos received his MA in European Studies: International Relations and European Politics from Maastricht University. He is currently an EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium intern at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. In the course of his internship, he has published a paper on the policy options that the European Union can adopt to streamline the prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. You can find him on Twitter @AleixNadal.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Abraham, Abraham Accords, Alexis, Atom, Campos, free zone, Israel, Middle East, nuclear, nuclearisation, peace, WMD

Out of Balance: A Review of Women’s Rights in Myanmar

May 27, 2019 by Anna Plunkett

by Anna Plunkett

27 May 2019

Women Factory Workers Strike (The Myanmar Times, 2011)

Myanmar is a country that has sprung to global attention in the last few years, its seemingly self-led non-violent transition towards democracy was soon tarnished by the systematic ethnic cleansing of the country’s Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. At the epicentre of these storms has been Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, nicknamed ‘the Lady’. The now State Counsellor had been the global symbol of modern non-violent, pro-democracy struggles from behind the bars of her house arrest. After her release in 2012 she won a landslide election to join the legislature as an MP for the National League of Democracy, a taste of the victory she would achieve three years later in the 2015 election. She soon achieved notice within Myanmar for her preference for traditional dress inspiring a resurgence in this simple but elegant style. However, since taking office she has failed to maintain this saint-like status, losing support both domestically and abroad. Her fall from moral status symbol to a pariah of the diplomatic circles she was once the darling of provides a stark snapshot into the complexities facing women throughout Myanmar. Women in Myanmar are often portrayed as exotic and beautiful, with striking images of long-necked tribes and thanaka painted faces used throughout the tourist industry. Yet their access to many leadership positions and even basic rights are fraught with much darker struggles.

Daw Suu was the symbol and leader of the pro-democracy struggle in Myanmar[1] since her arrival in the country in 1987. She gave inspiring speeches from outside the central hospital where she cared for her sick mother, the original reason for her return to the country after settling down with husband Michael Aris in Oxford. Since then, her face has been plastered on street signs, posters, postcards and matchboxes across Myanmar and internationally, despite domestic bans.[2] In the wake of her rise within the political arena, and in response to the continuing conflicts within Myanmar’s borderlands, a plethora of women’s organisations jumped into existence.[3] Today, almost all ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) have dedicated women’s organisations or arms focused on the promotion of women’s rights, human rights and economic and social welfare. These groups, which have been fighting along almost all of Myanmar’s borderlands for autonomy from the state have been active since before Myanmar achieved independence. The presence of such wars have isolated the communities in these regions from access to state services and international norms, something these women’s groups and branches focus on attempting to provide to the communities under EAO rule. The mobilisation of women is not unique to the borderlands, with women’s rights groups forming within the capital and across the central zones. The power of these new women’s groups was seen during the women led factory strikes in 2015 and 2011 over worker protections within Chinese owned garment factories. Women have the capacity and are willing to mobilise around key issues that impact their lifestyles and livelihoods.

Women Fighters in Kachin (Adriene Ohanseian)

However, this organisation and activism is not fully mirrored in the positive progress of women’s rights within this transitioning state. Over the past four years a network of women’s organisations have organised “16 days of activism” to promote basic protections for women within Myanmar and advocate against domestic and other forms of violent abuse against women. An event that struggled to get official state approval in its first year, but has since gained standing with the Pa’O Ethnic Affairs Minister speaking at the event in 2018. The necessity of this activism became clear to one trainer when working within the local communities, by the end of a three-day training programme on domestic abuse almost all participants had identified and spoken about examples of physical or psychological abuse they had personally experienced.[4] Women’s rights continue to sit within a state of almost abject neglect, with the few ongoing state interventions failing to make the changes that are increasingly being demanded from below.

Another noted how domestic abuse was viewed as a “natural” part of relationships between men and women within many rural communities, this normalisation was attributed to the legacy of violence from the conflict within the borderlands and lack of education within many communities.[5]

The continuing war across Myanmar’s borderlands is compounding the struggle for women’s rights and equal opportunity. Multiple reports have identified rape as a weapon of war utilised by both the military and the EAOs.[6] More women are beginning to come forward, to seek justice and support, however services are stretched trying to provide adequate assistance within a justice system biased against victims. The justice system remains tied to the military dominated government, with cases often taking too much time and becoming so expensive that communities seek redress through alternative, often informal means. Many villages continue to rely upon village headmen or financial redress packages to provide justice over those of offered by the official justice mechanisms.

Despite this, the women of Myanmar are far from just victims within this uneven landscape. Women’s organisations continue to report and advocate on crimes and inequalities, even in the face of growing oppression from the state. In many of the conflict zones women act as the primary household earners, with men away at war or seriously injured by it. Where direct conflict has ended the persistent drugs epidemic in the borderlands, many women face being the sole providers for partners and sons with addictions. Women also play a critical and active role within Myanmar’s ethnic armed organisations, including roles as fighters within women’s units. Women continue to be active within their communities and fight to be heard and included.

Women’s activism within Myanmar’s conflict zones – both within the conflict effort and as primary earners – has materialised due to a belief that women pose less of a threat and are therefore less likely to be arrested. This belief has resulted in women taking on responsibilities traditionally reserved for men, such as village headmen. During the conflict in Karen State, the number of female village heads has surged, as the role became less desirable due to concerns over the violence such leaders face when interacting with the state:

“Village heads … are usually women, because men cannot survive the repeated beatings and punishments by the soldiers [whereas women are beaten and tortured somewhat less often]. Therefore, nobody wants to be a village head throughout the whole region.” Female Village Head

Yet once this danger has passed, women have found themselves removed from these roles in power and leadership. They are blocked from these key leadership positions which increase in desirability as the immediate threat has reduced with the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement in 2015.

Women Representation in the Peace Process (USAID)

Women have fulfilled a breadth of roles within Myanmar’s war efforts, from fighters to negotiators and mediators to service providers and village heads. Yet as wars within the borderlands begin to reduce so have the roles open to women. Despite the opening of the national dialogues for peace, and the government more broadly under the National League for Democracy, women are failing to achieve representation. A recent report released by USAID highlighted the underrepresentation of women within the peace process, with many fulfilling technical roles within the peace process but unable to engage with policies under negotiation. Meanwhile women continue to be victims within Myanmar’s war zones and at home. Despite their organisation and promotion of their plights, reforms to make domestic abuse illegal have stalled in parliament.

Women may be visible within the political arena in Myanmar, and their roles may be varied, but they still lack access to basic rights and this is proving a chokehold not only for them, but for Myanmar’s development overall. Progress is beginning to develop but it is slow and proving to be increasingly ineffective in the wake of increasing demands for women’s rights, participation and activism. Though the state may be slow to respond there is no doubt about the veracity of womens activism in Myanmar, which if the state could harness could prove to be force of will needed to establish change.


Anna is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She received her BA in Politics and Economics from the University of York, before receiving a scholarship to continue her studies at York with an MA in Post-War Recovery. She was the recipient of the Guido Galli Award for her MA dissertation. Her primary interests include conflict and democracy at the sub-national level, understanding how minor conflicts impact democratic realisation within quasi-post conflict states. Her main area of focus is Burma’s ethnic borderlands and ongoing conflicts within the region. She has previously worked as a human rights researcher focusing on military impunity in Burma and has conducted work on evaluating Bosnia’s post-war recovery twenty years after the Dayton Peace Accords. You can follow her on Twitter @AnnaBPlunkett.


[1] Then Burma, the military SPDC government changed the name in 1989 though Burma was still widely used until the transfer to a civilian government in 2011

[2] This has been reported by ex-political prisoners who were arrested simply for having images of “The Lady” after the 8888 uprising.

[3] For example, see Women’s League of Burma, GEN and WON – all womens networks with large member organisations based on womens rights.

[4] Insight from field interview with women’s rights trainers, conducted by Author in 2018

[5] Testimonies given as part of research on Myanmar’s democratisation process as part of the author’s PhD research. Testimonies were collected by the author on multiple research trips between 2018-2019.

[6] See reports by Karen Human Rights Group and Kachin Women’s Association Thailand respectively: https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/suffering-silence-sexual-violence-against-women-southeast-myanmar-december-2018 https://kachinwomen.com/reports/

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Anna Plunkett, Myanmar, peace, Rakhine, Rights, Rohingya, women, Women's rights

Poetry and reconciliation: The poet’s quest for peace

June 27, 2016 by Alexandria Reid and Sasha Dugdale

By: Alexandria Reid with Sasha Dugdale

Sasha Dugdale, Poet and Translator. Source: Academica Rossica.

Poetry, especially in traditional oral form, has the power to connect boundaries and disciplines. Literary critic Paul Fussell makes a powerful case that by forcing the reader to confront ‘actual and terrible moral challenges’ the genre earns itself a special reputation for timelessness and emotional reverence. [1] War poetry is often a staple ingredient in history and English curriculums for schools across the world, and many who claim not to enjoy poetry make an exception for war poetry. As a deeply personal experience, poetry captures people across time and space. These exceptional qualities may allow for poetry to become a potent tool in conflict resolution.

Poetry offers an insight into the emotional experience of violence and conflict potentially beyond that found in academia. As Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov notes, academically identifying the drivers of conflict amidst political elites does not necessarily promote a stable or long lasting peace. [3] Missing from the equation is the importance of community reconciliation as a process and an outcome of durable peacemaking. ‘Reconciliation’, Bar-Tal and Bennick note, ‘involves modifying motivations, beliefs, and attitudes of the majority, and such activities promote establishing or renewing relations within a group.’ [2] Poetry offers itself as a way of building confidence and understanding between groups at a grassroots level.

It is possible to envisage that the vocabulary and social discussion poetry stimulates might become an important element of the reconciliation process between communities. This idea is not novel. Long ago, Walt Whitman’s American Civil War poem entitled ‘Reconciliation’ exposed the self-serving myth that the enemy is ‘the evil other’, and not in fact ‘a man divine as myself’:


Word over all, beautiful as the sky!
Beautiful that war, and all its deeds of carnage, must in time
be utterly lost;
That the hands of the sisters Death and Night, incessantly
softly
wash again, and ever again, this soil’d world:
… For my enemy is dead — a man divine as myself is dead;
I look where he lies, white-faced and still, in the coffin — I draw near;
I bend down, and touch lightly with my lips the white face in
the coffin.

Walt Whitman, 1867 [4]

Employing the theme of reconciliation, and seeking a way to incorporate poetry into contemporary discussions about conflict, last weekend, internationally renowned poets gathered in London for an interfaith discussion and series of readings on the theme of ‘The Poet’s Quest for Peace’. The event saw Kurdish poet and refugee Choman Hardi, Israeli poet Agi Mishol, and T.S. Eliot prize-winning poet George Szirtes asking the important question: How might poetry contribute to peace processes?

Strife spoke briefly with Sasha Dugdale, editor of Modern Poetry in Translation, on some of these themes. Sasha was short-listed earlier this month for the Forward Prize for Best Single Poem of 2016 with her poem Joy:

Alexandria Reid: Who are the audiences for your poetry? Does your poetry about conflict ever reach the victims, or the stakeholders in these conflicts?

Sasha Dugdale: I write in response to friends’ experiences of conflicts (mostly Russians and Ukrainians) and my own experience of translating their conflict-related work, so my experience of conflict is second-hand. I wouldn’t dream of presuming to show the victims or stakeholders, as I am mostly at one removed and it would feel presumptuous. Also it is usually at an oblique angle to the events it describes.

AR: One of the panels on the day asked the question ‘How might poetry contribute to peace processes?’ Could you tell Strife your thoughts on this:

SD: I can’t honestly see how poetry contributes to peace processes, which are usually careful minute calculations of diplomacy with all emotion carefully stripped out. But poetry can remind us of the pity of war as no other genre can, so perhaps its useful role is played out before the tanks roll in.

AR: What are some of the challenges of writing about violence and conflict through poetry as a medium?

SD: I don’t seek to write about conflict and violence, I write about what is moving and agitating me. But there are distinct risks: when some poets are living through war, genocide and desperate times, to write about their experience from the position of someone who lives in safety and stability can seem presumptuous to the point of immorality. I wouldn’t say I wrote poetry of witness, because I wouldn’t claim to have felt or witnessed their experiences ‘on my pulse’ however I can write what naturally and properly arises from my own meditations on war and conflict and my own experiences of working with the scarred.

 


The Poet’s Quest for Peace was an LJS event, curated by Naomi Jaffa [former Director of The Poetry Trust/Aldeburgh Poetry Festival] and organised by Harriett Goldenberg and Sue Bolsom.

Sasha Dugdale is a Sussex-born poet, playwright and translator specialising in both classic and contemporary Russian drama and poetry. She has worked for the British Council in Russia and set up the Russian New Writing Project with the Royal Court Theatre in London. Since 2012 she has been editor of Modern Poetry in Translation (co-founded in 1965 by Ted Hughes and Daniel Weissbort) and to date she has published three poetry collections – most recently Red House (2011). Twitter: @SashaDugdale.

Alexandria Reid is a recent graduate of War Studies at King’s College London and recipient of the Sir Michael Howard Excellence Award and Best Undergraduate Award. Alex currently works for Strife as a Social Media Coordinator, and as a research assistant for Dr. John Bew. In September she will begin her Master’s education as a Conflict, Security and Development student at KCL. Twitter: @AlexHREID.

 

Notes:

[1] Fussell in Featherstone, Simon (1995), ‘War Poetry: An Introductory Reader’ (Routledge), p.1

[2] Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov (2004), From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (Oxford University Press)

[3] Bar-Tal, Daniel, Bennink, Gemma (2004), ‘The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process’, in Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (Oxford University Press), pp.11-39

[4] Whitman, Walt (1867), ‘Reconciliation’, Bartleby Bibliographic Record, accessed 24/06/2016, http://www.bartleby.com/142/137.html

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Alexandria Reid, Forward Prize, LJS, peace, poetry, reconciliation, Sasha Dugdale

Boko Haram in Cameroon: A timely wakeup call?

August 22, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Awah Leonide Azah:

Boko Haram and Cameroon

Cameroon, Central Africa’s largest economy, has over the years gained a reputation for being a relatively peaceful and stable country in an increasingly insecure region. Conflicts and violent extremism have plagued Cameroon’s neighbors, especially in light of recent conflicts in Mali, Chad, and Central African Republic, as well as of terrorist attacks in northern Nigeria. Cameroon’s relative peace and stability has meant that it has attracted less attention than its neighbours in international and regional security debates. However, the militant group Boko Haram seems determined to alter this situation as they have recently stepped up cross-border attacks into the northern region of Cameroon, unleashing terror on the local population and turning the area into a combat zone. Cameroon’s response to the crisis seems to follow the narrative that frames it as an external problem with little mention of any other solution to the crises besides military intervention.

The recent Boko Haram attacks on Cameroon require further national and international scrutiny as this situation, if not properly tackled, may have profound implications on peace and security in Cameroon and the wider region.

Boko Haram, the Islamist militant group that has for year’s sown terror throughout Nigeria’s north-eastern region has in the past weeks stepped up cross-border attacks into northern Cameroon. The group which gained international notoriety after abducting more than 200 schoolgirls from Chibok in northern Nigeria in April 2014, now seeks to gain a foothold in Cameroon’s poor rural north and has stepped up cross-border attacks into the region. The most recent attack took place in the village of Zigague in remote northern Cameroon on 6 August in which eleven people were killed including two soldiers.[1] This attack came on the heels of a 27 July attack on the residence of Cameroon’s vice Prime Minister Amadou Ali during which three people were killed and his wife and sister in law abducted.[2] The level of brutality and the targeted nature of these latest assaults clearly indicate to the Cameroonian authorities the scale of the problem Boko Haram poses to the country and the entire region. This episode has been a wakeup call to the Cameroonian authorities to step up regional co-operation with its neighbours and to become more pro-active in the fight against Boko Haram.

However, Cameroon’s response to the Boko Haram crisis seems to follow the narrative that frames it as an external issue, ie. not Cameroon’s problem. Cameroon’s minister of information Isa Tchiroma stated in an interview on 27 July that Cameroon was a ‘collateral victim’ of aggression that is unfortunately spilling over.[3] Granted, the Boko Haram menace began in Northern Nigeria, but the Islamist group has gained root in the wider Sahel region that spans into Northern Cameroon and Niger. With Cameroon playing the victim and regarding the Boko Haram menace as an external crisis, the authorities miss the valid lesson to be drawn from this episode – that the current level of peace and stability in Cameroon is more or less relative, and not absolute. The Islamist group is only tapping into pre-existing grievances driven by governance failures, corruption and non-accountability already present in the country. These grievances could be seen for example in the 2008 transport strike, which was sparked by the increase in fuel prices but ended up degenerating into urban violence nationwide as a result of Cameroonian’s frustration and exasperation with the regime.[4] Cameroonian’s will largely acknowledge the existence of a range of social conflicts present within the country but the narrative at the macro level still remains that Cameroon is a haven of peace and stability. There seems to be a gross disconnect between state security and human security.

It is absolutely essential for the authorities to ask valid questions and seek long-term solutions to this crisis. The Boko Haram menace may just be a manifestation of more profound threats to peace and security in Cameroon. The vulnerability of Cameroon’s northern region to violent extremism is due to the region’s long history of neglect, marginalization, poverty and social exclusion. It is for this reason that the militant group Boko Haram has been able to penetrate these communities and radicalise, recruit and train young people whom it is now using to perpetrate terror in their own communities. The ease with which the perpetrators of the most recent attacks moved within the town of Kolofata and the precision with which they attacked the homes of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Sultan reinforce the belief amongst eye witnesses that some Cameroonians were in their ranks.[5]

It is worth noting that, Boko Haram’s attacks in Cameroon’s northern region date back as far as 2012 when raids and abductions were recorded in Fotokol, Makary and Kousseri Dabanga, but cited as ‘isolated incidents’. The Cameroonian authorities treated the crises as an external problem which ought to be handled by those directly concerned such as Nigeria; ‘Our main challenge is safeguarding our borders so that we don’t import the Boko Haram problem’, stated an official in charge of economic and socio-cultural affairs at the Far North governor’s office.[6] While Cameroon treated these as an external problem, its Nigerian counterpart’s response to the crises was, and still largely remains, military, while the political will to do more than that appears entirely lacking.[7]

With the recent wave of attacks in Northern Cameroon, the response of the Cameroonian authorities seemingly mirrors that of Nigeria. In reaction to the recent mounting violence, Cameroon’s President Paul Biya fired two high-ranking military officials who were responsible for security in the region and sent his army chief to the north of the country to beef up security. Approximately 3,000 soldiers have been deployed to the north, including troops of the elite Rapid Intervention Battalion.[8] This military response is commendable as the authorities need to ensure that an iron curtain of resistance is put up to counter any further attacks by Boko Haram.

However, as can be reflected from the Nigerian experience, a military solution alone will only provide brief pauses to the crisis. As Issa Tchiroma, the Cameroonian Minister of Communication, noted during his recent interview with Voice of America, the battle against Boko Haram is asymmetrical because no one is quite certain who the members of Boko Haram are, as they have infiltrated the community. Able to move quite freely, these groups are unlikely to ever be completely suppressed militarily, unless, in addition to military efforts, the government wins local hearts and minds by implementing fundamental political reforms to address the many grievances that are at the base of this continued violence.

The recent attacks on Cameroon are not only a tragedy in themselves, but a timely reminder of the need to access the security situation of the country. Fighting Boko Haram is a long-term endeavour that requires not only military force but a robust effort to nurture the resilience of communities through measures that promote economic development and social cohesion. Also, given the porous nature of the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, and the level of cross border interaction which takes place between the borderland communities, there is need to step up regional cooperation through harmonized security laws. All stakeholders in Cameroon, including the government, civil society and local authorities should use this as a wakeup call to focus on a human security approach which focuses on an integrated framework appropriate to address this conflict.
____________________

Awah Leonide is a legal scholar and a research assistant at the African Leadership Center in Nairobi, Kenya. Her research interests amongst others include the France-Africa relationship and its impact on security and development in francophone Africa. You can follow her on Twitter @ AwahLeonide

 

NOTES

[1] Cameroon Radio and Television News, ‘Situation dans l’Extrême-Nord: Paul Biya rassure’ Source PRC 2 August 2014. http://www.crtv.cm/cont/nouvelles/nouvelles_sola_fr.php?idField=13580&table=nouvelles&sub=national
[2] Cameroon Radio and Television News, ‘Des assaillants lourdement armés attaquent la localité de Kolofata.’ 27 July 2014. http://www.crtv.cm/cont/nouvelles/nouvelles_sola_fr.php?idField=13580&table=nouvelles&sub=national
[3] Peter Clottery, ‘Cameroon Reviewing Military Strategy after Boko Haram Attacks’. Voice of America, 27 July 2014. http://www.voafanti.com/gate/big5/www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1966165.html
[4] International Crisis Group, ‘Cameroon: The dangers of a fracturing regime’. Africa Report,161, Brussels, 24 June 2010. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/cameroon/161%20CAMEROON%20dangers%20of%20a%20fracturing%20regime%20ENGLISH.pdf
[5] BBC News, ‘Boko Haram’ abducts Cameroon Politician’s wife’. 27 July 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28509530
[6] IRIN, ‘Cameroon takes steps against Boko Haram’. 27 December 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/99396/cameroon-takes-steps-against-boko-haram
[7] International Crises Group, ‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram insurgency’. African Report, 216, Brussels, 3 April 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.aspx
[8] Reuters, ‘Cameroon fires two army officers after Boko Haram raids’. 29 July 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-nigeria-violence-cameroon-idUSKBN0FY26E20140729

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Boko Haram, Cameroon, peace, security

  • Go to page 1
  • Go to page 2
  • Go to Next Page »

Footer

Contact

The Strife Blog & Journal

King’s College London
Department of War Studies
Strand Campus
London
WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

[email protected]

 

Recent Posts

  • The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: a distorted reality
  • Russia’s 2021 State Duma Elections: A sham vote but with signs pointing to possible future change
  • Feminist Foreign Policy and South Asia: A scuffle between values and change
  • Communications positions available at Strife
  • Editor Positions available at Strife

Tags

Afghanistan Africa Brexit China Climate Change conflict counterterrorism COVID-19 Cybersecurity Cyber Security Diplomacy Donald Trump drones Elections EU feature foreign policy France India intelligence Iran Iraq ISIL ISIS Israel ma NATO North Korea nuclear Pakistan Politics Russia security strategy Strife series Syria terrorism Turkey UK Ukraine United States us USA women Yemen

Licensed under Creative Commons (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives) | Proudly powered by Wordpress & the Genesis Framework