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You are here: Home / Archives for applied history

applied history

Modernity and the Long Peace: Has the World Seen a Decline in War?

April 2, 2021 by Gideon Jones

By Gideon Jones

Pieter Bruegel the Elder, ‘The Triumph of Death’ (c. 1562)

Has the world become more peaceful?

One would think that such a question would be easily answered. On an intuitive level, many people in the West would feel that this is the case: to them, war is something that exists in far distant places and is seen only on high-resolution screens. It’s absence has become so pronounced that some have claimed we are living in a Long Peace, the period from the end of the Second World War until today that has seen a fall in the frequency of major wars, and has led to a period of unparalleled human prosperity.  However, this answer, and the preceding question is seductively simple, and when investigated, a far more complicated image begins to emerge. 

The argument that the world has become more peaceful (and less violent in general) was perhaps most famously made by Steven Pinker. Pinker’s 2011 book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, made a celebratory case about modernity, that in spite of the horrors of the 20th Century, war and violence in human society have been on a decline that has been ongoing over centuries. And there is plenty of data to back up this claim. Just a cursory glance at ‘The Visual History of Decreasing War and Violence’ highlights reductions in our rates of violent death, whether related to murder or the lethality of war. For example Western Europe was thought to have a violent death rate at around 2% of the entire population in the 17th Century, whilst between 1900-1960, the violent death rate in Europe and North America lay at 1%.It is not without cause that Pinker feels confident in proclaiming that ‘we may be living in one of the most peaceful eras in our species’ existence’. 

The reasons for this apparent decline are manifold, but Pinker’s central claim is that humanity has gradually been able to gain greater control over our inner demons. The classic view of human nature is that Humanity has and always will be prone to violence, and that since war is an expression of that violent tendency, it is here to stay. He claims human nature itself, while containing the potential for violence and cruelty, isn’t static, but is itself influenced by the environment, and that the systems and institutions of modernity (be it participative democracy or free market capitalism) promote less violent and more cooperative behaviour. When humanity developed means to trade peacefully with one another and developed ways of managing relations without recourse to war, more cooperative behaviours were selected for, as opposed to violent ones.  Furthermore, Pinker claims that it’s our reason that lies at the basis of much of this change, and that ‘just as our species has applied its cognitive powers to ward off the scourges of pestilence and famine, so it can apply them to manage the scourge of war’. Though war and our impulses to wage it may never be eradicated, there may be reason to believe that we may be slowly turning a new leaf. 

This decline of war thesis is a celebration of modernity. Though we are frequently inundated with the problems of the world in our news media, those proposing this thesis reassure us, showing us that we have in fact progressed, and we have modernity to thank.

However, while the narrative of the decline in war and violence is as attractive as it is persuasive, it only represents half of the argument. Others have argued that such progress is an illusion, and that the idea that we have morally advanced is little more than wishful thinking. 

Bear F. Braumoeller, a statistician and political scientist, argues that the idea that the data shows a decline in violence is questionable at best. In his book, Only the Dead, Braumoeller firstly disagrees with the thesis that war between states has become less frequent. He argues that when one looks rate of conflict initiation in the Cold War- during the so called Long Peace– we see ‘one of the most warlike periods of the last 200 years outside the two world wars’. Though a ‘hot’ war between the USA and the USSR thankfully never broke out, that did not mean that violent conflicts were not fought elsewhere.

What about the claim that war has become less deadly? Once again, it depends on how the data is interpreted. Though there is an observable decline in the death rate per 100,000, this may as much be a product of the fact that our societies are larger. The anthropologists Dean Falk and Charles Hildebolt argued in a paper that though a higher ratio of any given society will tend to die in conflict the smaller the society is, ‘the actual number of war deaths increases with growing population sizes’. If human societies had gotten more peaceful as time had gone on, this relationship should not exist. 

This is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to criticising the statistical basis of the Long Peace thesis. To Nassim Taleb and Pasquale Cirillo, the greatest weakness of the decline of war theory not just a chronic underestimation of deaths from violent conflict, but also looking at the mean whilst ignoring low probability, high impact events like a world war. 

When this is taken into mind, the peace that the world has experienced from the end of the Second World War (between the great powers at least) begins to look very different. Though there have been times and places in history where peace did for the most part exist- be it Augustus’ Pax Romana or the Congress System in Europe where major conflicts were prevented and relations were managed- they inevitably ended in major conflict.  The difference between then and now is of course our technology, with 14,000 nuclear weapons existing today, which are more powerful than the ones which existed in the Cold War. The point here is to suggest that an armed conflict between the world’s major powers, whilst unlikely, is by no means impossible, and such a war would undoubtedly be one of extreme death and violence. To quote Taleb and Cirillo, it is nonsensical ‘to say that violence has dropped but maybe not the risk of tail events’– in that case, the Long Peace is not evidence of humanity’s newfound pacifism, but is instead merely an interlude between one great conflict and the next. 

So why does this debate matter? 

On New Year’s Eve 2019, it looked as if 2020 was going to be the same as any other year. Yet it wasn’t. Instead, the world faced a global pandemic- a supposedly low probability, yet high impact event. And we were not ready for it.

Whether one agrees with the idea that war is declining is one thing, but it should not be a cause for complacency and self-congratulation. If peace is to remain, there must be an understanding of its fragility. We should not let grand narratives of our moral progress lull us into a false sense of security; by ignoring the violence of today we open the doors to the violence of tomorrow.

 

Gideon Jones is a MA student in Terrorism, Security & Society at the War Studies Department, King’s College London, and completed his BA in History at the University of Warwick. Coming from Northern Ireland, he has been brought up in a country scarred by the issues of terrorism, conflict, sectarianism, and extremist ideology. Through this experience, he has been given valuable insight into how the legacies of such problems can continue to divide a society decades after the fighting has stopped, and how the issues left unresolved can threaten to upend a fragile peace. Gideon is a Staff Writer at Strife.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: applied history, foresight, peace, prediction, theory

Korean Reunification (II): what does Pyongyang really think?

March 5, 2021 by Carlotta Rinaudo

By Carlotta Rinaudo

The Joint Security Area, a section of the DMZ destined to diplomatic relations. It’s also the only place where North and South Korean soldiers are standing face-to-face. (Image credit: Flickr)

When asked her opinion about Korean reunification, North Korean waitress Song Jin A replied that the North and South are one blood, and that Korean compatriots should all live together, ‘cuddled in Kim Jong-un’s arms.’

Such proclamations are regular fixtures of comments made to foreign journalists on the streets of Pyongyang, where citizens repeatedly emphasize their longing for reunification, often referring to Koreans south of the 38th parallel as “brothers and sisters.” Similarly, the political elites of both countries continue to publicly advocate for the integration of the two Koreas.

Despite these declared desires, reunification nonetheless remains seemingly impossible. On each side, a plethora of factors seem to complicate reconciliation, and currently both parties face domestic contexts that render ambitions of reunification untenable. As I have argued previously, the South Korean elite is preoccupied with the hypothetical unions’ economic costs, the issue of demilitarizing and denuclearizing the North, and what place the Kim family and its officials should have in a unified Korea. Face-to-face with these obstacles, elite actors within North Korea also have their own concerns about unification. And it is to these which I will now turn. 

It should first be noted that North Korea would enter the union as a weaker partner, which would reduce its ability to influence the decision-making process. For this reason, North Korean elite officials fear that reunification will be to their social, economic, and political disadvantage: they fear the intrusion of the United States in Korean affairs, the suppression of the North Korean ideology, and of losing their personal authority.

North Korean leaders depict Japan and the US as the imperialist forces responsible for the division of the Korean Peninsula. Their rhetoric maintains, not entirely without basis, that the US transformed South Korea into a colony governed by a puppet regime. Indeed, since the Cold War era South Korea has undergone an Americanization process that saw the country adopting an American style democracy while embracing many of the American ways of living, and allowing a strong American military presence on its soil. 

Although over recent years the Kim regime has displayed some tolerance towards the American presence in the South, Kim Jong-un has continued to request these troops be significantly reduced. As a precondition of reunification, North Korean officials may demand US forces be expelled from the Korean Peninsula, or request their re-organization and reduction. The US is unlikely to support such deal, as its South Korean bases offer a key strategic point in countering perceived Chinese threats in the South China Sea.
Consequently, South Korea’s government, for whom the US is a main military ally, may also oppose the proposals.

As discussed in my previous article, in 2017 South Korea’s per capita GDP was twenty-five times larger than that of North Korea. This prompts North Korean leaders to fear that, should reunification occur, the South may economically overshadow the North, threatening the survival of the North Korean ideology. To avoid this scenario, in 1980 former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung said that the North and the South should instead unify under a form of confederation, branded the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo –  where the word Koryo recalls the ancient Koryo Kingdom under which the whole Korea was unified until 1392. The Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo is a “one country, two systems” model, much like what China and Hong Kong used to be. It consists of a unified nation that maintains two separate systems of government, allowing the coexistence of different ideologies: the Juche Socialism of the North, and the Capitalist system of the South. To ensure such coexistence, there would be a supreme national assembly with the same number of representatives from both sides. An equal share of representation would avoid a “big fish eats small fish” scenario, reducing the risk of the North Korean ideology being swallowed by a stronger South Korean counterpart.

The North Korean elite benefits from a hereditary class system known as Songbun, which divides people into three main social classes: the core, the wavering, and the hostile. The families that have been loyal to the Kim dynasty represent the core class, a ruling cadre that includes high-ranking military officials, senior bureaucrats, businessmen and diplomats. They enjoy material affluence and enjoy a system where they regularly accept bribes from the rest of the population in exchange of favors. This elite is afraid that, should reunification occur, their privileges might be taken away or, even worse, that they might be punished for their complicity in the Kim regime. 

As such, these elites may attempt to sabotage any unification process that threatens their power. Northern military generals might mount an insurgency against a unification government before the military units are disarmed and disbanded, or else they could organize clandestinely using underground stores of weapons.

This scenario has happened before. When American forces invaded Iraq, many members of the Ba’ath party lost their privileges. They therefore organized an insurgency of former regime allies, which would eventually pave the way for the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq. Consequently, North Korean elites are unlikely to collaborate in the reunification process unless they are assured that their advantageous social position won’t be undermined.

Nonetheless, a significant part of the elite is increasingly unhappy with Kim Jong-un. North Korea’s state-controlled economy has proved largely unable to raise the living standards of its population, and the country is currently crippled by countless economic sanctions which banned the export of North Korean coal, iron ore and textiles, a major source of revenue for Pyongyang. In a speech to the Workers Party Congress in January 2021, Kim Jong-un surprisingly admitted that his efforts to rebuild the economy have failed. Should a new North Korean leader take over, he or she could be one of those entrepreneurs who operate outside of the inefficient North Korean economy. In this scenario, such leadership could push North Korea towards a China-like reformation period, as happened under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. This would partially open North Korea to a market-based economy, thus beginning to bridge the ideological gap between North and South and perhaps facilitating a reunification process.

In sum, many factors stand in the way of a Korean reconciliation. On one side, the elites of Pyongyang are unlikely to support the reunification process unless certain conditions are met: American forces are expelled or reduced from the Peninsula, the North Korean ideology is preserved, and they can maintain their socioeconomic privileges. On the other side, South Korean leaders are unlikely to accept a US withdrawal from the Peninsula, while also questioning the role of the North Korean elites under a unified Korea. 

However, it should be noted that predicting the conditions of a national unification is no easy task, especially when it involves tracing social forces within a state system as opaque as North Korea. 

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: applied history, elite politics, korean unification, North Korea

Korean unification: what can Seoul learn from Berlin?

February 8, 2021 by Carlotta Rinaudo

By Carlotta Rinaudo

Image Credit: Flickr

“If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one place after another”, President Harry S. Truman, 1950. 

As Truman spoke, North Korean forces were crossing the 38th parallel thereby invading the South, American troops were poised to intervene, and the Korean Peninsula was on the brink of becoming a first battleground of the nascent Cold War. Thus, in 1950 the Korean War began, and it has yet to conclude. While an armistice was agreed in 1953, no official peace treaty was ever signed, and the two Koreas have been divided by a demilitarized zone (DMZ) for almost 70 years. In this time their peoples have known very different lives and their societies have concurrently diverged, so that now, the peninsula is both governmentally and societally bifurcated.  

North of the parallel we find a country pursuing its own variant of “Juche” Socialism, an ideology that promotes state control and economic self-reliance. However, Juche Socialism, in practice, has produced a very different reality. State control has transformed North Korea into a family-run kleptocracy, and the idea of economic self-reliance has instead made North Korea largely dependent on foreign aid. North Korean people have resorted to informal economics in order to survive, with women manufacturing goods in their homes and selling them in black markets. Furthermore, North Korea embraced the doctrine of “asymmetric escalation”, which sees the Kim family amassing stockpiles of nuclear weapons in order to protect their rule from exogenous pressure, including invasion and regime change. In contrast, South of the parallel, there is a highly-productive capitalist and democratic society, which has boomed into the 11th largest economy of the world, and is widely-known for its Samsung products, K-pop music, and pop-art lights.

Despite these drastic differences, the political elites of both countries advocate for the integration of the two Koreas. In 1972, President Kim Il Sung formulated the Three Charters of National Reunification, and The Arch of Reunification was erected in Pyongyang in 2001. In South Korea, a Ministry of Unification was established in 1969, with President Moon Jae-in pledging to achieve a reunification of the Korean Peninsula by 2045. Therefore, if unification is a possibility, what would be the implications? 

The article aims to evaluate costs and benefits of a hypothetical reunification of the Korean Peninsula, assessing the case from a South Korean perspective. In a follow-up article, the same question will be tackled from a North Korean perspective.

The current situation on the Korean Peninsula can be compared to that of Germany during the Cold War: today’s North Korea and yesterday’s East Germany share a communist regime and an inefficient planned economy, while their counterparts adopted a democratic government and a market-based economy. Therefore, the German unification can provide valuable insights into the issues that the two countries would face should the Koreas become one again. It is exactly for this purpose that the German-Korean consultative body on unification issues was formed in 2010. What are, then, the implications at an economic, military, political and social level, if we draw from this German experience?

Many South Koreans fear that the process would simply be too expensive, with Seoul having to carry the burden.
In 2017, South Korea’s per capita GDP was $29,743, while North Korea’s was $1,214, the former being twenty-five times bigger than the latter. It would doubtless be a long process for the two to converge. Similarly, today the Eastern part of Germany still lags behind its Western counterpart, with salaries being only 84% of those in the West, and Germans often migrating from East to West as most of the major companies are headquartered there. Today German citizens still pay the so-called “Soli”, a controversial solidarity tax that is invested by the German government to fill the gap between West and East.

Despite these concerns, experts suggest that long-term economic benefits of a Korean unification will outweigh its costs, just as it has in Germany, first of all by creating a single market of 75 million people. North Korean citizens would be liberated from starvation and malnutrition, while South Korea would benefit from a significant injection of cheap labor in the economic system, but also from a huge amount of natural resources like coal, iron ore, and rare earth materials, which abounds in the Northern half of the Peninsula. 

At a geo-economic level, North Korea’s geographical position has always isolated South Korea from import and exports via land. With a united Korean Peninsula, this would no longer be the case: Seoul could finally connect with the rest of the world via rail, with goods being shipped from Busan to Europe, whilst also integrating Pyongyang in global supply chains. Meanwhile, it could enable the construction of pipelines that transport natural gas from Russia to Seoul.

Nonetheless, the denuclearisation and demilitarisation of North Korea still pose a challenge. 
East Germany was a base for Soviet nuclear weapons, but it did not have arsenals of its own. Similarly, at the point of unification, the 175,000 soldiers of the East German Soviet National People’s Army either left the army, or simply joined the military force of West Germany by swapping their uniforms. 

In terms of military capabilities, North Korea is a different case. It has an army of 1,2 million, a stockpile of various missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and more than 60 nuclear warheads. It is one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, and the question of how to deal with it still remains largely unanswered. 

In addition, how to ensure that the political elites that violated the rights of the North Korean people will be held accountable? What will happen to the Kim family? How to build a future where the North Korean people are equally represented in the government and other spheres? Germany still has a long way to go in this sense: while some “Eastern Germans” have become top political leaders, such as Chancellor Angela Merkel and former President Joachim Gauck, very few of the business leaders of big German companies were born on the Eastern side of the Berlin wall.

Finally, integration will come with social consequences. 

Although the injection of cheap labor might be advantageous to big companies, it could also reduce the salaries of South Korean workers, or even replace them, generating further discontent among a society that, like the Japanese one, already suffers from a high level of old-age poverty. 

In addition, North Koreans might struggle to fit in the capitalist world of South Korea. 

Thae Yong-ho, one of the most famous North Korean defectors, once declared that for North Koreans in the South “the first difficulty (…) is that they don’t know how to choose”, because “in North Korea there is no opportunity to choose.”

After a period of timid and cordial relations, tensions between North and South Korea recently escalated again, with North Korea blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office and executing a South Korean official last September.

Although a Korean unification often appears like an impossibility, the issue should nonetheless remain open to discussion and the search for new solutions, especially regarding economic balance, North Korea’s huge military capabilities, the Kim family, and the integration of North Korean citizens.

Unification is a process, not an end-state: in Germany it has not concluded yet – in the Korean Peninsula, it might take even longer.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: applied history, Asia, Deterrence, history, Korea, strategy

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