cyprus

Cyprus’ policies on migration and their impact on the ethnic division of the island

June 15, 2021 by Rafaella Piyioti

“Refugee Camps in Cyprus” by sarah.ahmadia is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0

Almost 20,000 asylum applications are currently pending in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). According to the Ministry of Interior, asylum seekers on the island now account for 4% of the country’s population. This has an inevitable impact on the ethnic makeup of the island and on the future of the Cyprus Problem negotiations. The RoC has thus far followed a pushbacks policy and installed a razor wire to prevent irregular migration. “Pushbacks” refer to the practice of turning people away without giving them the opportunity to request asylum.. Under International Human Rights Law, however, states must respect the rights of all people moving across borders regardless of their migration status. As a result, the policies followed by the RoC have been in violation of the International Human Rights Law. This article explains the violations by the RoC in its attempt to control irregular migration and what implications this has on the Cyprus Problem.

In March 2020, Cypriot authorities carried out, for the first time, a number of pushbacks of boats carrying mainly Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian asylum seekers who departed from Turkish and Lebanese coastlines. Between March and September 2020, a total of 9 pushbacks were carried out according to Human Rights Watch. These incidents have drawn the attention of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, who called the expulsion of the boats illegal and requested additional investigations on how Cyprus treats asylum seekers currently on the island. Mijatovic wrote a letter to Nicos Nouris, the Minister of Interior of the RoC, calling for a constructive dialogue with Cyprus regarding the treatment of asylum seekers on the island and the illegal pushbacks that have taken place. In the letter, Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Refugee Conventions and notes of the violations that Cyprus has conducted were cited numerous times.

Nouris responded to Mijatovic with a letter that notably did not address any of the legal references to the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Refugee Convention made by Mijatovic.. Nouris’ response instead forefronted only that ‘Cyprus is facing a new trend of irregular arrivals of migrants on the island’, and no justification was given for the pushback policies that followed. In a statement he gave to the Guardian, he said: ‘Cyprus simply has no more space’. In addition, the RoC has accused Turkey of deliberately seeking to create a new migration route in the eastern Mediterranean to alter the demographics of Cyprus. Turkey still does not recognise the RoC, explaining the lack of cooperation between the two countries on the migration issue.

Turkey and the European Council signed an agreement in 2016, to stop irregular migration and monitor the arrival of asylum seekers to EU states. Turkey, however, has been warning that it may send asylum seekers and refugees to the EU despite their previous agreement – a threat that it eventually followed through on in February 2020. As a result, hundreds of asylum seekers and migrants have been arriving on Greek islands and Cyprus from February and March 2020. Cyprus has received hundreds of asylum seekers as a result of Turkey’s policy, but this cannot be used by the RoC as a justification for violating International Law. As stated by UNHCR Cyprus representative, Katja Saha, any pushbacks policy constitutes a violation of International Law and, before any policy response is implemented, the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘asylum seeker’ must be clearly distinguished. Saha has also stated that Cyprus has the legal right to control its borders as long as its policies respect International Law.

The implementation of the pushbacks policy and the refusal by the government to respond to the accusations made by the European Commission for Human Rights, has led to the mobilization of Cypriot humanitarian NGOs against the government. KISA, a Migrant and Refugee Centre, has said that that the living conditions at the refugee camps in Cyprus ‘constitute blatant violations of the Refugee Law’ and that they are ‘extremely dangerous for the health of asylum seekers and public health in general’. KISA has also stated that it has brought legal proceedings against the Cypriot Ministry of Interior before the European Court of Human Rights.

Following the pushbacks’ scandal, the Ministry of Interior of the RoC installed a 11km razor wire along the ‘green line’ to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering the RoC from North Cyprus. According to the Asylum Information Database Report on Cyprus, created by the Cyprus Refugee Council, the wire will not solve the issue of migration because most people enter the RoC directly from the sea and not from border crossings on the island. In addition, it should be noted that many of the people crossing from Northern Cyprus are not illegal migrants as the RoC argues, but people with valid asylum and refugee claims. A group of political activists, known as ‘Os Dame’ (translated as “we’ve had enough”) have cut a piece of the wire and placed it in front of the Ministry of Interior to show their opposition to the government’s new approach to migration. The decision by the RoC to place a wire along the ‘green line’ has led, once again, to the opposition of the European Commission because it violates Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation which states that any change in the policy of the RoC on the crossing of persons should be approved by the Commission before being applied. The European Commission spokesperson, Vivian Loonela, said that the Commission did not receive any notification about the construction of a new fencing from the RoC. In addition, this decision has also been criticised by Cypriot opposition parties for legitimising the division of Cyprus. According to AKEL, the main opposition party, the razor wire is entrenching the ethnic division of the island and it is implying the official acceptance of borders between the RoC and Northern Cyprus.

Despite the opposition within Cyprus and from the European Commission, the President of the RoC, Nicos Anastasiades, has defended the installation of the razor wire along the UN controlled ‘green line’. The ‘green line’ which is also known as the UN Buffer Zone, is not an external border for the EU, although it separates Cyprus into two parts. It is monitored by the UN and, since the RoC entered the EU, the Green Line Regulation was also established setting the terms under which persons and goods can cross the line from the TRNC to the RoC. According to President Anastasiades the wire is a response to Turkey’s strategy on Cyprus, which is to alter Cyprus’ demographics through increased migratory flows. In response to the opposition that this policy has received from many Cypriots, the President said: ‘I am not aware as to how many residents have reacted but if any problems whatsoever are being caused then they will be resolved’. It is worth noting that in addition to the restriction of movement that the wire imposes to migrants and asylum seekers attempting to cross into the RoC, it also restricts access to local farmers who work land near the ‘green line’. The RoC’s spokesman, Kyriakos Koushos, has stated that this policy does not imply any ‘political or other message’ regarding the Cyprus Problem and that it has been made in accordance with Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation. Koushos insisted that the European Union and the UN were informed about the razor wire beforehand, despite the statements of the European Commission claiming the opposite.

The RoC has faced numerous criticisms over the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers on the island. Turkey’s strategy against the island cannot serve as a justification for the human rights violations that the RoC has conducted. The European Union and the UN have criticised Turkey’s treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, but they have nonetheless urged the RoC to stop its current policy of pushbacks. At the same time, the installation of a razor wire along the ‘green line’ has a negative impact on asylum seekers currently on Cyprus, who are unable to cross into the RoC and apply for asylum. The RoC should change its current policy on migration and asylum, stop committing human rights violations and follow the European Convention on Human Rights instead.

Legitimacy Crisis: scandals in the heart of the Cypriot Government

March 30, 2021 by Rafaella Piyioti

By Rafaela Piyoti

A new round of UN-led negotiations on the Cyprus Problem is currently ongoing. Representatives from the UN have already held discussions with the leaders of both communities on the island, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot, as well as with the Prime Ministers of Greece and the United Kingdom. But, as the official government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) is taking part in the peace negotiations, its legitimacy on the island is at stake. This is the result of a series of scandals that have been revealed in the last six months, to which the government has failed to successfully respond.

The first scandal was revealed by Al Jazeera on the 12th of October 2020, wherein they uncovered that the Cypriot government was selling passports to foreigners who had been previously engaged in illegal activities. After this ‘Golden Passports’ scandal emerged, additional accusations were made against the President of the RoC regarding his approach to the Cyprus Problem. Finally, unprecedented police violence was used on the 13th of February 2021 at a protest against corruption and state authoritarianism. These scandals have challenged the current government and with the parliamentary elections taking place next month, a change might be coming. Al Jazeera’s investigation into the Cyprus Investment Programme revealed that a number of senior Cypriot officials, businessmen and lawyers were involved in discussions with convicted criminals regarding ways to acquire Cypriot passports illicitly. As part of the investigation Al Jazeera revealed a video recording and what they referred to as The Cyprus Papers, more than 1000 leaked documents related to the Cyprus Investment Programme. The controversy became known as the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal and it led to the resignation of Demetris Syllouris, the Cypriot parliament speaker, and Christakis Giovani, a Cypriot MP.

In addition, the President of the RoC, Nicos Anastasiadis, was also accused of profiting from the ‘Golden Passports’ with his law firm amongst those mentioned in Al Jazeera’s investigati. However, according to Anastasiadis, he is not currently involved in its operation, it is instead being run by his children. Anastasiadis is additionally alleged to have travelled to the Seychelles with the private jet of a Saudi Arabian prince who has since acquired a Cypriot passport. Andreas Paraschos, the Cypriot journalist who accused Anastasiadis of receiving economic benefits from the scheme was forced to resign from his job. His resignation has been criticised as a violation of freedom of expression, a basic human right for any democratic government. Furthermore, following the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal, the European Commission has opened formal legal action against the RoC to decide whether the Cyprus Investment Programme was lawful or not. According to the European Commission, ‘Golden Passports’ raise concerns over money laundering and corruption which are prohibited in EU member states.

Paraschos’ accusations about the RoC’s President, however, did not stop at the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal. He revealed that Anastasiadis was considering the possibility of a two-state solution to the Cyprus Problem in a conversation he held with Alexis Tsipras, the Greek Prime Minister at the time, in which Paraschos was present. In support of Paraschos’ claims, the Cypriot Archbishop made a public announcement claiming that in a private conversation he had with the President, Anastasiadis claimed that a two-state solution could be favourable for the Cypriot economy which could continue operating programs like the Cyprus Investment Programme. To make things even worse, in an interview with a Cypriot newspaper, the former UN special envoy for the Cyprus Problem, Espen Barth Eide, has also referred to Anastasiadis’ support for a two-state solution. The RoC’s President defended himself by arguing that Eide has always shown a preference to promote Turkish interests and that’s the reason he spreads such ’unfounded fiction’.

As for Paraschos’ and the Archbishop’s claims, Anastasiadis dismissed their claims as gossip and said that his words have been misinterpreted. Nevertheless, following recent developments on the peace negotiations, Anastasiadis sent a letter with his recommendations about the new peace talks to the UN – the letter has not been made public.

The lack of transparency and the refusal of Anastasiadis to state publicly his opinion on the Cyprus Problem has only further angered Cypriots. NGOs and independent journalists on the island describe the current government of the RoC as an authoritarian regime, rather than a democratic government, and they continue to call for Anastasiadis to resign.

To show their opposition to the government, NGOs and non-profit organisations joined forces, and organised a protest- attended by several hundred people, in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, against corruption and state authoritarianism. The covid-19 pandemic and the economic impact of the measures taken by the government to limit the spread of the virus were used as a trigger for the protest, but the more fundamental cause was the dissatisfaction of the people with the government, in light of recent scandals.

According to people who took part, the protest had a peaceful character but once the police got involved to break up the demonstration violence sparked. The police used a water cannon and teargas against the protestors which resulted in several people being injured. One woman was hit by the water cannon and underwent an emergency surgery to save her eyesight. A lawyer who took part in the protest argued this constituted an unprecedented use of police violence on the island. The official statement of the government was that the police were deployed to stop the demonstration as it was violating the rules in relation to Covid-19.

There was no official statement, however, on what the government’s exact orders were and why the police showed such force against the protestors, some of which were families with children. An independent investigation committee has been formed to look into the extreme police violence incident. The organisers of the protest argue that the police brutality is evidence of the oppression that endangers not only the legitimacy of the current government but it is also an attack on democratic values.

The main consequence of these scandals has been a severe damaging of people’s trust in the government of the RoC. Al Jazeera’s investigation uncovered its economic corruption, accusations made by Paraschos revealed President Anastasiadis support of a two-state solution, and unprecedented police brutality made apparent its increasingly desperate attempts to cling onto power. As such, the President of the RoC must either apologise and become more transparent towards the Cypriot citizens, or else resign from his position.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy. She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. She also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys traveling and learning about new cultures in her free time.

The Other ‘Two-States’ solution: Cyprus and its Peace Process

March 17, 2021 by Rafaella Piyioti

By Rafaela Piyoti

Road Block (Roman Robroek/ Urban Photographer)

The island of Cyprus has been divided since the 1974 Turkish Invasion. On one side, there is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which stands unrecognised by any nation-state but Turkey, and on the other, there is the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) which, by contrast, is internationally recognised and occupies a seat in the United Nations General Assembly. Since 1974, the UN has facilitated talks to attempt to reconcile the island’s bifurcation, but the two sides have resisted reconciliation, leading to the current status quo, or what is called, the Cyprus Problem.

Since the partition of the island the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have grown further apart. The UN Peacekeeping force has established a Buffer Zone between the two communities and has been the mediator of all peace negotiations and political developments on the island since. The TRNC declared its independence in 1983 under the presidency of Rauf Denktas, although the UN deemed the declaration illegal. Crossing from the TRNC into the RoC and vice versa was not allowed until 2003, when the first borders opened marking a historic moment for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem.

Amongst solutions to this problem, the most widely discussed proposal is a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Whilst another, and increasingly possible, alternative is the recognition of two states, one that is Greek Cypriot and another that is Turkish Cypriot. So far, the two-states solution has never been discussed in the UN-led peace talks. However, the election of Ersin Tatar, a known hardliner and supporter of a two-states solution, as the President of the TRNC, has marked the first time a political figure has proposed the consideration of the two-states solution as part of the UN-led negotiations.

For 47 years, bi-communal discussions have failed to solve the Cyprus Problem despite the numerous UN calls for the two Cypriot communities to negotiate a solution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom serve as guarantor powers responsible, under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the island. The Declaration of Independence of Cyprus signed in 1960, proposed a federation with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot PM. The Cypriot federation collapsed in 1963, following the first bi-communal tensions in the wake of the islands independence.

Major discussions on the unification of the island and the establishment of a new federation were made between 1989 and 1992 with the Boutros-Ghali Plan, and in 2004 with the Annan Plan. The failure of the plans to lead to the unification of the island is attributed to domestic disagreements between the two Cypriot communities.

The Boutros-Ghali Plan failed, as, according to each sides leaders at the time, there was a lack of ‘confidence-building’ measures between the two communities. When the Annan Plan was proposed by the UN the two Cypriot communities had already grown politically distinct. According the Greek Cypriots, the Annan Plan was an indirect partition of the island as it imposed restrictions on the resettlement of Greek Cypriots in cities under the control of the TRNC. Thus, in a referendum held in the RoC a majority of 75,83% voted against the plan.

In addition to the domestic differences between the two Cypriot Communities, the role of foreign powers was also crucial in the failure to reach a solution. The Greek and Turkish governments, as guarantor powers, have supported the RoC and the TRNC respectively. Greece and the RoC, although closely allied, act as two independent states, maintaining independent foreign policies on the Cyprus Problem and on foreign affairs. Greece, like the UK, does not actively participate in the discussions, other than what is obliged through its role as guarantor power. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot government relies on Turkey in order to form its foreign policies. For Northern Cyprus, Turkey is the main economic contributor and their only foreign ally. Turkey in turn views the TRNC as a geopolitical advantage which gives them access to the Eastern Mediterranean natural resources.

Political disagreements between the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish government have also contributed towards the previous collapse of the peace talks. Recent tensions over the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis and Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the region could potentially have a negative impact on the next round of negotiations as well.

Since the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus, representatives from neither of the two Cypriot Communities have met to discuss the two-states solution. The election of Tatar as the president of the TRNC could mark the first time that the two-states solution will enter official peace negotiations. President Tatar, backed by Turkey, has stated that although he is willing to attend a new round of discussions on the Cyprus Problem, he refuses to discuss any other proposal than the two-states solution – which would entail the official recognition of the TRNC as an independent state. This would inevitably mark a political defeat not only for the Cypriot government but also for Greece and the UN, which have repeatedly called for the unification of the island.

The UN called the two Cypriot governments to a five-party meeting, to discuss the future of Cyprus peace talks. A five-party meeting format will include the presence of the two Cypriot leaders, representative from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom – as the island’s guarantor powers – and the UN as the moderator of the talks. Jane Holl Lute, the UN special envoy, was sent to Cyprus on the 11th of January 2021 to meet the two leaders separately in advance of discussions beginning in February. The Cypriot President, Nicos Anastasiades, welcomed the UN initiative to resume the negotiation process and restated that a bi-communal federation is the most favourable solution to the Cyprus Problem. Tatar, on the other hand, expressed his willingness to participate in the five-party meeting but stated that a federation is no longer a realistic solution for the island. The UN did not make any official statements for either of the meetings, but the next round of negotiations is expected to take place in late February, in New York.

February 2021 will mark the first official negotiations between Ersin Tatar and Nicos Anastasiadis, the Cypriot president, under the supervision of the UN. It is yet unclear whether the two presidents will discuss the two-states solution or if the Greek Cypriot government would veto such a proposal. So far, the official Greek Cypriot stance is against such a solution.

The Cyprus Problem has remained unresolved for 47 years despite the numerous bi-communal talks held by the UN to find a solution. So far, the two Cypriot communities have discussed several variations of a federation that would unify the island. Disagreements between the two Cypriot communities, and the extensive involvement of the Turkish government in the affairs of the TRNC have led to the collapse of all the negotiations that took place since 1974. Greece is a close ally of the RoC but does not have an active role in the negotiation process. Turkey supports the split of the island into two states and has repeatedly called for the international recognition of the TRNC. The newly elected president of the TRNC, Ersin Tatar, has been the first leader of the Turkish Cypriot community who has officially proposed the two-states solution. With the next round of talks taking place in February, the RoC has two options; either to comply with Tatar’s request, meaning a political defeat, or to refuse his proposal, leading, once again, to the collapse of the negotiation process.

Frozen Conflicts: Areas of Limited Sovereignty and Their Future

November 24, 2016 by Kyriakos Michail

By: Michail Kyriakos

Development in Cyprus’ Green Line that divides it in two is frozen along with the conflict.

The idea of “frozen conflicts”, came in the spotlight after the end of Cold War and the subsequent interventions and secession movements from areas of USSR, such as Gagauzia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria [1] in the late 1990’s. Frozen conflicts, however,do not necessarily stay like that (inactive conflicts) but based on political developments they could reignite [2]. Following the Crimean referendum [3] and its annexation by the Russian Federation in 2014 [4], Crimea remains a frozen conflict. Frozen conflicts, are not uncommon but exists even in regions without direct Russian influence, such as North Cyprus. However, most of the cases are former Soviet Union areas with large Russian populations or politico-economic connection with Moscow. The lack of active conflict in these areas, coupled with an absence of a finite peaceful resolution, holds them in a frozen and underdeveloped state due to limited sovereignty and recognition [5]. Alas being in a frozen conflict, means for an area to be in a state of limbo without free access to the global market, no legal entity and no formal recognition by the United Nations and always in dependency with the parent/guardian state. As time goes by and these disputed areas remain unrecognized legal entities, they face structural, politico-economic problems that puts their fate in jeopardy.

These entities, de facto states for the most part, face many internal issues and challenges. For instance, despite the fact that they have created their own governmental institutions, they lack of economic and political independence, especially since they are not universally recognized as states by the international community [6]. Due to the fact that most of these “states” are being controlled or are largely dependent upon their parent states, they are often subjected to playing the role of puppet states. For example, Crimea survives politically and economically under the shadow of Russia while North Cyprus is still dependent upon Turkey’s economic and military support. It is clear that these areas are in dire need of development in order to progress and gain sovereignty within the area. Subsequently, sustaining the status quo without formal recognition or resolving the conflict, results in these states remaining in a vicious cycle of instability and dependence[7].

The status quo of these “states” has become unbearable for the local population, resulting in demonstrations and clashes with the authorities in many circumstances[8]. In many cases there does not seem to be a clear path that these “states” could pursue in order gain recognition and independence. Often, parent countries clamp down on secession movements, as they fear the possibility of a domino effect and the legitimization of these independence processes. In many of these cases, such secessionist movements aim to remove ethnic minorities from a bicommunal or multinational state, either to form a homogenous and self-ruled country or to reunite with their parent state. However, in almost all cases this seems to have backfired.

For instance, in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion, under the pretext of acting as a guarantor power, the demographic character of Cyprus changed when Turkey illegally brought some 40,000 settlers [9]. This in turn, created extreme financial dependence, and until today Turkey contributes a significant amount to the budget of North Cyprus. North Cyprus also needs Turkey to act as its gateway to the global market, in order to export its goods to the world[10]. Penetration of the local economy by the parent state is also evident in the case of Nagorny Karabakh and Russia[11]. However, in this case, the demographics changed when the majority of the population - the Azerbaijanis- started fleeing to nearby Azerbaijan due to continuous conflict. In 150 years’ time, the Armenians became the absolute majority in the area [12]. Nagorny Karabakh also heavily relies on the financial support of the Armenian diaspora [13].

The Northern part of Cyprus, which is being administered by the Turkish-Cypriots under the name Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has been in talks for many years with the Republic of Cyprus, which is largely administered by the Greek-Cypriots, to resolve its status. Attempts for a bi-zonal, bicommunal federation[14] under the auspices of the Special Envoy of the United Nations, have been futile for the past 42 years. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Turkish-Cypriots are left without any other viable options. Several factors, such as the exerted control by Turkey, the arrival of settlers, and lack of recognition from the international community has pushed them repeatedly to resume negotiations in order to be reintegrated into the international system.

The case of North Cyprus is a strong example of what these “states” could face after many years of isolation and one-sided attachment with their parent states. It is also an example of what is possibly their only rational choice, which is pursuing talks through the United Nations or regional organizations such as the European Union, in order to achieve reintegration, stability, and to normalize their relations with the rest of the world. Nevertheless, in order for this to happen, it is necessary for these “states” to detach themselves from their parent states and accept many concessions in the aforementioned negotiations and peace talks. The intensified negotiations in Cyprus have a great chance of success and the local and international factor remain optimistic for a final solution after 42 years of frozen conflict[15][16]. If negotiations do succeed, then perhaps we could see a positive outcome and a good example that should be followed for the rest areas aforementioned that are currently entrapped within frozen conflicts and subsequent economic stagnation.

Kyriakos Michail is a postgraduate student pursuing an MA in Intelligence and International Security. He earned a BA in Political Sciences from the University of Cyprus. Kyriakos’ research interests include EU politics, conflict resolution, radicalization and Middle-Eastern politics. He previously worked as an intern at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and with local NGOs, such as the Cypriot Puzzle in research projects that are relevant to the Cyprus’ problem, such as the demographic changes on the island of Cyprus.

Notes:

[1] John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov & Gerard Toal (2014) Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: a comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55:5, p. 423

[2] The Economist http://www.economist.com/node/12494503

[3] BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26606097

[4] Russian Government Announcement http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

[5] Morar, Filor (2010) The Myth of ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Transcending Illusive Dilemmas, per Concordiam Journal of European Security and Defense Issues, Domestic Security Vol. 1, Number 2, p. 11

[6] Ibid, p. 15

[7] Costas M. Constantinou & Mete Hatay (2010) Cyprus, ethnic conflict and conflicted heritage, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33:9, p. 1602.

[8] http://www.dw.com/en/turkish-cypriot-protests-set-back-turkeys-eu-membership-bid/a-14829513

[9] Heinz Kramer (1997) The Cyprus problem and European security, Survival, 39:3, p. 20

[10] Öner Günçavdi & Suat Küçükç[idot]fç[idot] (2009) Economic Growth Under Embargoes in North Cyprus: An Input‐Output Analysis, Turkish Studies, 10:3, p. 365

[11] Laurence Broers (2015) From “frozen conflict” to enduring rivalry: reassessing the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, Nationalities Papers, 43:4, p. 563

[12] http://www.cria-online.org/2_3.html

[13] http://www.sras.org/nagorno-karabakh

[14] See UN’s Resolution 649 (1990)

[15] https://sapientaeconomics.com/author/newsapie/

[16] http://www.politico.eu/article/cyprus-reunification-peace-nicos-anastasiades-mustafa-akinci/

Image credit: http://www.thetravelingadvisor.com/2012/09/24/contested-space-2/the-green-line-2/

Mastering pretence - A visit to Northern Cyprus

November 12, 2016 by Gerrit Kurtz

Photoessay by: Gerrit Kurtz

It’s half past five in the morning, but the fast food restaurant at the airport is already open. This is not your typical American fast food chain however. It’s called “Burger City” and can be found all over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. To the casual observer, the burgers look strangely familiar. One of our guides during this visit to Northern Cyprus explains why- “’Burger City’ is ‘Burger King’ pretending not to be ‘Burger King.’ It cannot open a restaurant under its own brand in the North because of consumer protests in the South,“ he says. Our guide’s explanation reveals an important feature of Northern Cyprus—the battle of perceptions. Mastering the art of pretence is a national sport in Northern Cyprus.

Trying to be a state

Deception is deeply rooted in Northern Cyprus. The statelet in the Eastern Mediterranean is only recognized by Turkey, which has stationed 42,500 troops in the territory. Ever since the abrogation of the power-sharing arrangement by the Greek Orthodox majority in 1963 and the Turkish military intervention in 1974, Cyprus has been divided.

Peace negotiations have been hampered by the unequal status of the of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus enjoys international legitimacy and full EU membership. The unilateral declaration of a Turkish Cypriot state in Northern Cyprus was an attempt to level the diplomatic playing field. Turkish Cypriots seek to gain politically equal status, even though they only make up about a quarter of the South’s population (313,000 to 1.1 million today).

Caught in limbo

Its unrecognised status has skewed the economy of Turkish Cyprus. Green-yellow mandarins and oranges are examples of the delicious produce grown here. But cargo ships in the ancient port of Famagusta cannot deliver these goods anywhere else except through Turkey because of the international embargo imposed on all Northern Cypriot ports and airports following its unilateral declaration of independence in 1983. Heavy regulations also stifle other means of exporting goods that would otherwise be possible. Meanwhile, uncertainty about property rights of land occupied after the 1974 Turkish intervention deter large foreign investors and hamper local production.

Since exporting agricultural and manufactured goods remains difficult, the economy depends more on its service sector. Driving along the central coast to the city of Girne/Kyrenia (many of the cities were given Turkish names after the Greeks fled), bright neon signs announce one of the mainstays of the North’s shadowy service economy-casinos. Eighteen casinos bring in money from the Turkish mainland, from where the majority of their customers hail.

Other economic activities are less problematic. The Turkish Cypriots have discovered a perhaps unlikely source of profits: higher education. Twelve universities currently attract around 85,000 students, with only about twenty percent from the island itself. The universities are connected to the Turkish higher education system, and are cheaper and easier to get into compared with European ones. Quality inevitably varies, but as The New York Times reported in 2014, for some foreign students, a degree from a Turkish Cypriot university can serve as a springboard for another degree from a western university. With one billion U.S. Dollars, the university sector as a whole contributes a third of Northern Cyprus’ GDP.

A church? A mosque! The Lusignan kings used to be crowned in the majestic St Nicholas church in Famagusta. The Ottomans turned it into a mosque in the 16^th century. Not it is known as Lala Mustafa Pasha Mosque. © Gerrit Kurtz.

First impressions can be deceptive

Things are not always what they seem. This is also evident in the historical architecture of Northern Cyprus. Many powers have conquered Cyprus throughout its history, contributing towards its rich architectural heritage, which can be found in large Gothic churches in Famagusta and Nikosia. Built in the 13th century by the crusading Lusignan (French) that ruled Cyprus at the time, they seem somewhat at odds with their surrounding landscape. Indeed, they are the southern-most examples of brick-stone Gothic churches. However, they are not churches anymore. When the Ottomans conquered the island in 1571, they turned many of the existing places of worship into mosques. Before arriving at the Lala Mustafa Pasha Mosque in Famagusta, one can hear the call to prayer echoing across the square in front of the building.

Yet today, Turkish Cypriots are not very religious; rarely can the mosques in the medieval halls be filled. At a recent evening prayer in Nikosia’s main mosque (that used to be the St Sophia Cathedral), barely thirty people follow the calls of the imam. Across Northern Cyprus, newly built white mosques dot the landscape; smaller ones along the villages, and bigger ones in the cities. These new mosques are a visible sign of the influence of Turkey’s Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which has funded many new mosques in the past fifteen years in Northern Cyprus. They usually remain empty.

The Islamic influence sits uncomfortably with the secular Cypriots, who tend to revere the secularist Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. Dozens of statues, busts, and larger-than-life photos of Atatürk attest not so much to the nationalism of Turkish Cypriots, but to their secular, Kemalist antics. Just another sign that first impressions can be deceptive-the display of a Turkish nationalist leader can actually be a sign of tensions with the Turkish mainland.

The division cuts streets in half, but life continues as if nothing happened. Café at the UN Buffer Zone in Southern Nikosia, Republic of Cyprus. © Gerrit Kurtz.

Perceptions matter

A Western fast food chain pretending to be a non-branded restaurant, an economy built on dubious entertainment and higher education industry, churches turned into mosques, and a building boom of new mosques giving the impression of a very pious society-all are related to the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that pretends to be a state, but lacks international recognition. While the two leaders of the Republic of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus have publicly announced that they want to conclude their current negotiations by the end of this year, observers voiced serious questions whether that was possible and whether reunification is a plausible prospect.

Acting as if the situation was temporary but stable has been the North’s practice since the war in 1974. In the meantime, its society has grown more independent. Identities are a matter of construction, as our Turkish Cypriot guide points out: “Towards Turkey, they are more Cypriot, towards the Greeks they are more Turkish, and towards everyone else they are just Turkish Cypriots.“

Gerrit Kurtz is a PhD Candidate at the War Studies Department, King’s College London. He recently attended the Cyprus Course of the Research School on Peace and Conflict Studies by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), of which he is a member. His publications can be found at http://www.gerritkurtz.net.

cyprus

Footer

Contact

Recent Posts

Tags