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Mastering pretence – A visit to Northern Cyprus

November 12, 2016 by Gerrit Kurtz

Photoessay by: Gerrit Kurtz

It’s half past five in the morning, but the fast food restaurant at the airport is already open. This is not your typical American fast food chain however. It’s called “Burger City” and can be found all over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. To the casual observer, the burgers look strangely familiar. One of our guides during this visit to Northern Cyprus explains why– “’Burger City’ is ‘Burger King’ pretending not to be ‘Burger King.’ It cannot open a restaurant under its own brand in the North because of consumer protests in the South,“ he says. Our guide’s explanation reveals an important feature of Northern Cyprus—the   battle of perceptions. Mastering the art of pretence is a national sport in Northern Cyprus.

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Burger City outlet in Northern Nikosia. © Gerrit Kurtz.

Trying to be a state

Deception is deeply rooted in Northern Cyprus. The statelet in the Eastern Mediterranean is only recognized by Turkey, which has stationed 42,500 troops in the territory. Ever since the abrogation of the power-sharing arrangement by the Greek Orthodox majority in 1963 and the Turkish military intervention in 1974, Cyprus has been divided.

Peace negotiations have been hampered by the unequal status of the of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus enjoys international legitimacy and full EU membership. The unilateral declaration of a Turkish Cypriot state in Northern Cyprus was an attempt to level the diplomatic playing field. Turkish Cypriots seek to gain politically equal status, even though they only make up about a quarter of the South’s population (313,000 to 1.1 million today).

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Cargo ships at the ancient port of Famagusta only have one (legal) destination: Turkey. © Gerrit Kurtz.

Caught in limbo

Its unrecognised status has skewed the economy of Turkish Cyprus. Green-yellow mandarins and oranges are examples of the delicious produce grown here. But cargo ships in the ancient port of Famagusta cannot deliver these goods anywhere else except through Turkey because of the international embargo imposed on all Northern Cypriot ports and airports following its unilateral declaration of independence in 1983. Heavy regulations also stifle other means  of exporting goods that  would otherwise be possible. Meanwhile, uncertainty about property rights of land occupied after the 1974 Turkish intervention deter large foreign investors and hamper local production.

Since exporting agricultural and manufactured goods remains difficult, the economy depends more on its service sector. Driving along the central coast to the city of Girne/Kyrenia (many of the cities were given Turkish names after the Greeks fled), bright neon signs announce one of the mainstays of the North’s shadowy service economy–casinos. Eighteen casinos bring in money from the Turkish mainland, from where the majority of their customers hail.

Other economic activities are less problematic. The Turkish Cypriots have discovered a perhaps unlikely source of profits: higher education. Twelve universities currently attract around 85,000 students, with only about twenty percent from the island itself. The universities are connected to the Turkish higher education system, and are cheaper and easier to get into compared with European ones. Quality inevitably varies, but as The New York Times reported in 2014, for some foreign students, a degree from a Turkish Cypriot university can serve as a springboard for another degree from a western university. With one billion U.S. Dollars, the university sector as a whole contributes a third of Northern Cyprus’ GDP.

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A church? A mosque! The Lusignan kings used to be crowned in the majestic St Nicholas church in Famagusta. The Ottomans turned it into a mosque in the 16th century. Not it is known as Lala Mustafa Pasha Mosque. © Gerrit Kurtz.

 First impressions can be deceptive

Things are not always what they seem. This is also evident in the historical architecture of Northern Cyprus. Many powers have conquered Cyprus throughout its history, contributing towards its rich architectural heritage, which can be found in large Gothic churches in Famagusta and Nikosia. Built in the 13th century by the crusading Lusignan (French) that ruled Cyprus at the time, they seem somewhat at odds with their surrounding landscape. Indeed, they are the southern-most examples of brick-stone Gothic churches. However, they are not churches anymore. When the Ottomans conquered the island in 1571, they turned many of the existing places of worship into mosques. Before arriving at the Lala Mustafa Pasha Mosque in Famagusta, one can hear the call to prayer echoing across the square in front of the building.

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A Turkish-funded mosque in Northern Cyprus. © Gerrit Kurtz.

Yet today, Turkish Cypriots are not very religious; rarely can the mosques in the medieval halls be filled. At a recent evening prayer in Nikosia’s main mosque (that used to be the St Sophia Cathedral), barely thirty people follow the calls of the imam. Across Northern Cyprus, newly built white mosques dot the landscape; smaller ones along the villages, and bigger ones in the cities. These new mosques are a visible sign of the influence of Turkey’s Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which has funded many new mosques in the past fifteen years in Northern Cyprus. They usually remain empty.

The Islamic influence sits uncomfortably with the secular Cypriots, who tend to revere the secularist Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. Dozens of statues, busts, and larger-than-life photos of Atatürk attest not so much to the nationalism of Turkish Cypriots, but to their secular, Kemalist antics. Just another sign that first impressions can be deceptive–the display of a Turkish nationalist leader can actually be a sign of tensions with the Turkish mainland.

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The division cuts streets in half, but life continues as if nothing happened. Café at the UN Buffer Zone in Southern Nikosia, Republic of Cyprus. © Gerrit Kurtz.

Perceptions matter

A Western fast food chain pretending to be a non-branded restaurant, an economy built on  dubious entertainment and higher education industry, churches turned into mosques, and a building boom of new mosques giving the impression of a very pious society–all are related to the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that pretends to be a state, but lacks international recognition. While the two leaders of the Republic of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus have publicly announced that they want to conclude their current negotiations by the end of this year, observers voiced serious questions whether that was possible and whether reunification is a plausible prospect.

Acting as if the situation was temporary but stable has been the North’s practice since the war in 1974. In the meantime, its society has grown more independent. Identities are a matter of construction, as our Turkish Cypriot guide points out: “Towards Turkey, they are more Cypriot, towards the Greeks they are more Turkish, and towards everyone else they are just Turkish Cypriots.“

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A bright future? Street in the old town of Northern Nikosia. © Gerrit Kurtz


Gerrit Kurtz is a PhD Candidate at the War Studies Department, King’s College London. He recently attended the Cyprus Course of the Research School on Peace and Conflict Studies by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), of which he is a member. His publications can be found at http://www.gerritkurtz.net. 


 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: cyprus, recent

Cybersecurity in Practice (Part II): Cybersecurity of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles

November 9, 2016 by Arthur Laudrain

By: Arthur Laudrain

Thales' Stratobus - autonomous stratospheric platform between a drone and a satellite
Thales’ Stratobus – autonomous stratospheric platform between a drone and a satellite

The resilience of aerial and space platforms are not the first issue that oomes to mind when cybersecurity is generally discussed. Yet, they increasingly constitute the backbone of our societies, both in the civilian and military worlds.[1] We will address two categories of aerospace platforms: unmanned or otherwise increasingly autonomous vehicles,[2] and geosynchronous objects, such as satellites.

Satellites: a too-often forgotten critical infrastructure

If satellites are not significant components within our mass-communications infrastructure,[3] they are crucial when it comes to meteorology, GPS navigation, high-resolution mapping or outer space surveillance. Satellites are also important for military-specific purposes such as the dissemination of encrypted command and control or espionage. They are, as a consequence, high-value targets through the eyes of cyber-attackers.

If a vulnerability was to be discovered on a geosynchronous object,  it is both technically difficult and expensive to fix or upgrade the hardware. In other words, they are rarely future-proof, especially when it comes to cybersecurity.[4] Thus, the resilience of satellite systems during cyber-attacks is highly dependent on their security by design. This explains why the old GPS satellite constellation of the United States is much less secure than its recent European counterpart Galileo.[5]

Fixing the satellite’s software is significantly easier, since it can potentially be achieved through remote firmware and software updates. However, enabling such a feature raises the challenge of controlling remote access to the core of the system.[6]

The case of military drones and increasingly autonomous weapon systems

Contrary to civilian technologies, one could think that military assets are designed first with security in mind. Yet, cases of either military drones or their supporting infrastructures being hacked are numerous.[7]

For both remotely piloted and autonomous vehicles or missiles, the risks related to cyber threats can be classified as disruption of the system’s availability, compromised confidentiality of sensitive data, and attack on the physical integrity of the system.

Basically, attacks can take on different forms depending on the purpose in which they seek to achieve. Those on availability will attempt to jam or otherwise disrupt communications or control of the vehicle. Attackers seeking to breach the confidentiality of the system will look for vulnerabilities that would allow them to steal or manipulate the data exchanged or stored on the platform. Attacks on the physical integrity of the vehicle usually involve hijacking attempts, which involves actually taking control of its navigation commands. This could be for the purpose of using it as a weapon, or stealing the vehicle for retro-engineering, as it was done by the Iranians when they allegedly jammed the navigation system of a United States RQ-170 drone on December 4th, 2011.[8]

Finally, the internal system of drones can also be targeted with the aim of using the vehicle as a proxy to gain access to its supporting communication ecosystem. Once the attackers gain access,  they can continue their attack by using a remote malware injection to further disrupt or compromise ground command and control stations. Perhaps this was what happened at the Creech Air Force Base in Nevada in 2011, when their ground command and control computers were infected by a persistent key-logger which may have compromised classified information.[9]

Emerging technologies and platforms

Mirroring the diversity and ingenuity of the threats faced, security answers will increasingly be a mix of hardware and software solutions, designed from their inception to work together. Among them, three stand out: ground-breaking encryption technology, new C4-ISR (Communication, Command, Control, Computer for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) platforms, and artificial intelligence.

Firstly, we are witnessing the rise of new game-changing technologies in the field of encryption and secure communications. One of them, the quantum satellite, is becoming a reality after decades of research. In a few words, it consists of two special onboard lasers that share the quantum property of entanglement, which makes the satellite and the communication flow it handles eavesdrop-proof.[10] The first of its kind, Micius, was launched by China in August 2016.[11] Another example is block-chain technology, which brings the promise of unspoofable virtual signatures and identities, among many other things.

Second, new C4-ISR vehicles are currently in development, namely pseudolites. They are aerial or space platforms with a limited lifeespan ranging from a few days up to five years, and they are aimed at complementing drones and satellites in tasks such as intelligence gathering and dissemination. They can take the forms of large high-altitude solar drones or space zeppelins and are referred as Very High Altitude Long Endurance (VHALE) vehicles.[12] The rise of their development, especially in the US (VULTURE programme) and the EU (Thales’ Stratobus), reflects the need among the armed forces to obtain more persistent yet versatile ISR platforms. Their advantage lies not only in terms of pure technological or tactical superiority. Cybersecurity wise, they can be easily and rapidly fixed or upgraded with new hardware.

Third, the progress of artificial intelligence and deeplearning techniques continues to empower traditional cybersecurity solutions. The cyber-aware sentinel is a combined software-hardware solution deployed both onboard the vehicle and the ground station dedicated to the detection of and protection against cyber-attacks. It is able, amongst other things, to analyse the consistency and integrity of data and navigation orders and to detect unusual or illogical behaviours.[13]

Regardless of the platform or operational sector, cybersecurity is as much a matter of policy and organisational management than it is a technical issue.


2LT(R) Arthur Laudrain graduated from the University of Montreal, CA, with a BSc in international studies in 2015, after attending the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) at Seoul National University, ROK, in 2014. In 2014, he volunteered with the United Nations. He is currently at the end of his curriculum as an MA candidate in International Peace and Security at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London in UK.


Notes:

[1]Rosenzweig (2016), Lawfare

[2]Which includes manely UAVs, but also munition-based platforms such as ballistic missiles.

[3]Valerie C. Coffey (2014), « Sea Change: The Challenges Facing Submarine Optical Communications », Optics & Photonics News, p.31.

[4]David Livingstone and Patricia Lewis (2016), “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity ?”, Chatham House Research paper.

[5]Ibid.

[6]UK HM Governement (2014), “National Space Security Policy”, UKSA/13/1292, p.2.

[7] http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-‘palestinian-idol’-that-hacked-into-israel’s-drones

[8]Greg Jaffe and Thomas Erdbrink (2011), « Iran says it downed U.S. stealth drone; Pentagon acknowledges aircraft downing », The Washington Post

[9]Unless it came from a simple USB stick, which would be a bit embarassing to admit for USAF. See Brian Prince (2011), “Mysterious Keylogger Infects U.S. UAV Fleet”. Security Week.

[10]Robert Young (2016), « China’s quantum satellite could make data breaches a thing of the past ». Phys.org.

[11]Unclassified briefing by an analyst of the NVAD, the Netherlands’ security services, at Rotterdam, in August 2016.

[12]Joseph Henrotin (2016).

[13]Barry M. Horowitz and D. Scott Lucero (2016), « System-Aware Cyber Security: A Systems Engineering Approach for Enhancing Cyber Security », Insight Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2. p.39-42.

Image Credit: Thales Alenia Space – Photo presented by Jean-Philippe Chessel during a conference talk on 2016-03-01 available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stratobus_artiste.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Cybersecurity, recent, Strife series

Cybersecurity in Practice (Introduction): Outside the Mainstream

October 31, 2016 by Cheng Lai Ki

By: Cheng Lai Ki

‘In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not.’ – Anonymous (not the hacktivist group)
‘In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not.’
– Anonymous (not the hacktivist group)

Over the last century, human experiences have progressively benefited from continuously advancing information technology (IT) systems. Within civilian domains, advanced IT services have facilitated the globalized sharing of commercial and financial information critical to the prosperity of private conglomerates. Within governmental domains, IT enabled technologies have supported the distribution and transference of essential diplomatic intelligence critical in the function of national security and international relationships. Collectively, the nexus of civilian and governmental IT systems forms a new spatial environment known as ‘cyberspace’.[1] Like other dimensions of Land, Sea, Air, and Space; cyberspace has progressively been recognized as a new domain of warfare, conflict and thus securitization.[2]

As global commercial and military dependencies on advanced IT systems increase, humankind has witnessed the rise of several new high-function sensory and reconnaissance platforms (i.e. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) that are critically dependent effective IT systems interacting with geosynchronous space-based platforms (i.e. Satellites). As such, cybersecurity has become the centrepiece of security sector discussions within both commercial and state domains. Nations and non-state actors are accumulating cyberspace enabled tactics and strategies for offensive and defensive operations.  Guided by these broad considerations, most contemporary literature regarding cybersecurity often focus on the technical elements of computer network exploitations (CNEs), the implications for national level topics (i.e. Political Security; Economic Stability) and technical advisories.[3]

While it is important to understand the technical and national security implications, it is also equally important to understand the vulnerabilities and security implications in more specified sectors, such as maritime security as well. These areas remain relatively under-researched and receive minimal media coverage. This four-part series attempts to illuminate and provide insight into these areas within the cybersecurity studies by drawing upon the knowledge of practitioners and academics from cybersecurity and military sectors. This Strife Series analyses these topics from a practitioner’s perspective. What does the cyber landscape mean to them – does it differ from security-scholars? What concerns and issues are faced by practitioners from the various (i.e. commercial; security) sectors? The objective of this article is to illuminate the reality of cybersecurity considerations beyond the theoretical and provide readers with an insight into its practice.

First in the series is Marcelo Malagutti who is the founder and former Projects Director from Fóton Informática, a Brazilian software company specializing in banking automation. Marcelo will kick off the series by presenting ‘software power’ as a complement and alternative to the processing power of supercomputers. Utilizing various practical examples, Marcelo illuminates the software-hardware relationship and the vitality of effective software platforms running on clusters of ‘commodity hardware’ in processing large amounts of information.

Secondly, we have Arthur Laudrain from the French Military who will be exploring cyber-related vulnerabilities of unmanned remote-control and autonomous platforms. The article explores the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of drones and other aerospace platforms. He specifically relates his discoveries to C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Cyber for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) platforms and the ever evolving landscape of cyber-augmented platforms utilized by intelligence and military organizations.

The third author in the series is Cheng Lai Ki who will be examining the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of maritime platforms, ranging from seafaring vessels (i.e. Naval Frigates; Cargo Freighters) to oceanic installations (i.e. Oil Rigs). The globalized maritime sector is critical to state expansion, global economies, and national naval capabilities.[4] Here, he specifically explores how navigational systems could be exploited by attackers and the ramifications for maritime operations.

The fourth article is written by Nicolas Castellon, a cybersecurity specialist with the CGI Group who will be discussing the importance of understanding and developing a comprehensive crisis-management infrastructure for cyber incidents. As commercial and national infrastructures are progressively brought online, we need to cultivate effective and rapidly deployable teams for scenarios where entire computerised systems are compromised. As a practitioner himself, Nicolas’ article provides an incredible insight into the operational sides of cybersecurity within the commercial world today.

The fifth article, also contributed by Cheng Lai Ki, concludes the series by examining and outlining the current cybersecurity landscape within professional sectors. In this final article, he aims to firstly addresses emerging threats that are simultaneously affecting the government, commercial and civilian sectors. Subsequently, he will reveal emerging security development trends currently being developed by various companies within the cybersecurity sector utilizinging information gathered from his experiences at the IP Expo Europe 2016[5].

According to Jason Healey, the future of cyberspace ‘is a jump ball, undecided, and it may be more sensitive to state-sponsored technological disruptions than many governments currently understand’.[6] Equipped with new cyber-enabled tools, criminals, militaries and grand-spymasters are potentially able to exploit computer network vulnerabilities in an unrestrained fashion. This could lead to systematic disruptions within critical national infrastructures or obstruct kinetic operations that could have disastrous implications on our physical security. Therein lies the importance to understand practical aspects of cybersecurity outside the general technical and generalized cybersecurity narratives.

 


About the Author:

Cheng is a graduate from the MA Intelligence and International Security program at King’s College London, his Master’s thesis examined the characteristics and trends defining China’s emerging cybersecurity and cyberwarfare capabilities. He was a finalist at the 2016 Cyber 9/12 Student Challenge in Geneva, contributed to other security journals such as IHSJane’s Intelligence Review and was a Former Managing Editor (Blog) at Strife.


Notes:

[1] Byrant, R. ‘What kind of space is Cyberspace’, Minerva – An Internet Journal of Philisophy, 5, (2001); 138 – 155.

[2] Even, S. & Siman-Tov, D. Cyber Warfare: Concepts and Strategic Trends, (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies), May 2012.

[3] Anderson, R. J. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, (2nd Eds.), (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley), 2008.

[4] Dutta, S. ‘Securing the Sea Frontier: China’s Pursuit of Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea’, Strategic Analysis, 29(2), 2015 pp. 269 – 294.

[5] The IP Expo Europe 2016 was an event held in at the London Expo Centre near Greenwich (LDN) that featured multiple tech companies within the areas of Cybersecurity, DevOps and InfoSec. Although fundamentally a sales environment, the event hosted several discussions and keynote speeches by experts within the sector and thus providing valuable insight into the workings of the cybersecurity industry today.

[6] Healey, J. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012, (Vienna:VA, Cyber Conflict Studies Association), 2013; ISNB-10: 0-9893274-0-X; pp. 11.

Image Credit: https://i.vimeocdn.com/video/540928465_1280x720.jpg (Accessed 28 October 2016)

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Cybersecurity, recent, Strife series

Donald Trump and the Perils of Modern Masculinity

October 13, 2016 by Harris Kuemmerle

By: Harris Kuemmerle

 

The recent release of comments made by Donald Trump in 2005 brought to light what many people have known for a number of years; that Donald Trump has a problem with women. In these comments his misogyny was laid bare and evident, and millions of people have been rightly appalled and disgusted in its wake. For those who may be unaware, this latest scandal to hit the Trump campaign erupted late last week when a video was released showing Mr. Trump making a number of comments about women which ran from the nauseating, to the genuinely illegal. One comment in particular, has been seized upon as particularly reprehensible. Where in Mr. Trump states that when you are a star you can do anything, including, ‘Grab them [women] by the pussy [vagina]. You can do anything.’.

While these comments are clearly reprehensible and have garnered a rare apology from Mr. Trump, attempts have also been made to spin these comments in a lighter tone. In the days following the release, it was stated and repeated by numerous figures in the media and politics that these comments amounted to nothing more than ‘locker room talk’, or more generally the kind of meaningless banter men often discuss with each other. Conversely, others claim that his comments are nothing more than the glorification of violent assault. Regardless, it is right to condemn these comments and point out that the vast majority of men discuss sex and relationships amongst themselves as a vital part of male friendships and without ever condoning or bragging about assault or abuse. However, it would also be naïve, to suggest that Donald Trump does not represent to some degree the current zeitgeist of American society at large.

We exist in a society where young boys are conditioned from birth to feel that to be a man means to be aggressive, unemotional, and even violent in the pursuit of individual gain. Terminology such as conquest, or score as a way to describe male sexual exploits speaks volumes. Likewise, anyone who falls outside of these neat categories is ostracised, especially gay and lesbian people. While characteristics such as compassion, empathy, and vulnerability are perceived as feminine and admonished. We see the consequences of this all around us from domestic abuse, to the epidemic of rape and sexual assault where almost one in five women in the United States will be raped during their lifetime, especially on university campuses. We see it in the pay and opportunity gap, disproportionate representation in politics, the economy, and science, and yes we also see it in the rise of Donald Trump. Indeed, the real scandal of Donald Trump’s comments is not in what he said, but in that his words present a disturbingly accurate reflection of American society. A society where men have both a perceived and very real feeling of structural, social, and sexual ownership and superiority over women; and that successful men have earned the right to act as they please.

The uncomfortable truth is that it’s not just that Donald Trump has a problem with women. It is that our society as a whole has a problem with women and gender asymmetry. Donald Trump, in all his sexism, misogyny, bigotry, and locker room talk, is a reflection and caricature of the patrilineal society in which he was brought up. However, in his campaign he also has the effect of both propagating contemporary sexism and in promoting the idea of a less equal society. His rhetoric and campaigning make it clear that he represents an attempt to not just ‘make America great again’, but to make the American male great again (and by extension American society) by returning it to its classical binary gendered form; and pushing back against the many accomplishments of so many female and male feminist and LGBTQ activists in recent decades. This is the real danger of a Donald Trump presidency. The potential to undo decades’ worth of work on a range of issues from race relations to economic equality. However, the risk to gender and sexual equality and the vindication of a section of American society which seeks to turn back the clock to an imagined time and place when men were men, and girls were girls, is particularly worrisome.

However, fixing sexism is not just about defeating Donald Trump. The root cause of sexism in our society must be understood as being partly a product of a rigid and binary gender dynamic which values aggression over empathy, which prioritises men over women, and violence over cooperation. These are not just women’s issues, or secondary issues for another day, these are human issues which affect us all; right now and in the foreseeable future. From the numerous and incalculable consequences for women, to homophobia and transphobia, to the significantly higher rates of suicide and mental health issues in men as opposed to women, to the clear link between female empowerment and long-term development success; the consequences of our current concept of gender in society are very real and very destructive.

Now more than ever this discussion is needed. To not just admonish Donald Trump as a pariah, but to understand the society and the gendered norms that created him. It is up to all of us to push back against all forms of bigotry. However, it is especially up to men of all backgrounds, classes, orientations, and gender identities to stand up to sexism and objectification in all its forms by calling it out at every opportunity and chastising those who engage in it both privately and in public. It is only by doing so that we can hope to prevent sexism and misogyny and help ensure a better future for both our daughters and our sons.

 

 

Harris is a PhD candidate in both the War Studies and Geography departments at King’s College London, as well as the Editor-in-Chief of Strife. He received a BSc in International Relations from Plymouth University and an MSc in Asian Politics from SOAS, University of London which focused on the Indo-Bangladeshi Ganges River dispute. His main areas of interest include; hydropolitics, human and state environmental security, climate change, environmental extremism, centre-state relations, and transboundary disputes. With additional interests in gender dynamics, interactive entertainment, and the role of science in society. His main region of focus is South Asia with additional expertise on the US, UK, and Europe. A native of the US, he has been based in the UK since 2008. You can follow him on Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

 

Notes:

Image Credit: https://static.pexels.com/photos/48566/pexels-photo-48566.jpeg 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: American Culture, Donald Trump, Gender, Masculinity, recent, Sexual Assault

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