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The Other ‘Two-States’ solution: Cyprus and its Peace Process

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By Rafaela Piyoti

Road Block (Roman Robroek/ Urban Photographer)

The island of Cyprus has been divided since the 1974 Turkish Invasion. On one side, there is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which stands unrecognised by any nation-state but Turkey, and on the other, there is the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) which, by contrast, is internationally recognised and occupies a seat in the United Nations General Assembly. Since 1974, the UN has facilitated talks to attempt to reconcile the island’s bifurcation, but the two sides have resisted reconciliation, leading to the current status quo, or what is called, the Cyprus Problem. 

Since the partition of the island the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have grown further apart. The UN Peacekeeping force has established a Buffer Zone between the two communities and has been the mediator of all peace negotiations and political developments on the island since. The TRNC declared its independence in 1983 under the presidency of Rauf Denktas, although the UN deemed the declaration illegal. Crossing from the TRNC into the RoC and vice versa was not allowed until 2003, when the first borders opened marking a historic moment for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. 

Amongst solutions to this problem, the most widely discussed proposal is a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Whilst another, and increasingly possible, alternative is the recognition of two states, one that is Greek Cypriot and another that is Turkish Cypriot. So far, the two-states solution has never been discussed in the UN-led peace talks. However, the election of Ersin Tatar, a known hardliner and supporter of a two-states solution, as the President of the TRNC, has marked the first time a political figure has proposed the consideration of the two-states solution as part of the UN-led negotiations. 

For  47 years, bi-communal discussions have failed to solve the Cyprus Problem despite the numerous UN calls for the two Cypriot communities to negotiate a solution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom serve as guarantor powers responsible, under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the island. The Declaration of Independence of Cyprus signed in 1960, proposed a federation with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot PM. The Cypriot federation collapsed in 1963, following the first bi-communal tensions in the wake of the islands independence. 

Major discussions on the unification of the island and the establishment of a new federation were made between 1989 and 1992 with the Boutros-Ghali Plan, and in 2004 with the Annan Plan. The failure of the plans to lead to the unification of the island is attributed to domestic disagreements between the two Cypriot communities. 

The Boutros-Ghali Plan failed, as, according to each sides leaders at the time, there was a lack of ‘confidence-building’ measures between the two communities. When the Annan Plan was proposed by the UN the two Cypriot communities had already grown politically distinct. According the Greek Cypriots, the Annan Plan was an indirect partition of the island as it imposed restrictions on the resettlement of Greek Cypriots in cities under the control of the TRNC. Thus, in a referendum held in the RoC a majority of 75,83% voted against the plan. 

In addition to the domestic differences between the two Cypriot Communities, the role of foreign powers was also crucial in the failure to reach a solution. The Greek and Turkish governments, as guarantor powers, have supported the RoC and the TRNC respectively. Greece and the RoC, although closely allied, act as two independent states, maintaining independent foreign policies on the Cyprus Problem and on foreign affairs. Greece, like the UK, does not actively participate in the discussions, other than what is obliged through its role as guarantor power. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot government relies on Turkey in order to form its foreign policies. For Northern Cyprus, Turkey is the main economic contributor and their only foreign ally. Turkey in turn views the TRNC as a geopolitical advantage which gives them access to the Eastern Mediterranean natural resources.  

Political disagreements between the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish government have also contributed towards the previous collapse of the peace talks. Recent tensions over the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis and Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the region could potentially have a negative impact on the next round of negotiations as well. 

Since the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus, representatives from neither of the two Cypriot Communities have met to discuss the two-states solution. The election of Tatar as the president of the TRNC could mark the first time that the two-states solution will enter official peace negotiations.  President Tatar, backed by Turkey, has stated that although he is willing to attend a new round of discussions on the Cyprus Problem, he refuses to discuss any other proposal than the two-states solution – which  would entail the official recognition of the TRNC as an independent state. This would inevitably mark a political defeat not only for the Cypriot government but also for Greece and the UN, which have repeatedly called for the unification of the island. 

The UN called the two Cypriot governments to a five-party meeting, to discuss the future of Cyprus peace talks. A five-party meeting format will include the presence of the two Cypriot leaders, representative from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom – as the island’s guarantor powers – and the UN as the moderator of the talks. Jane Holl Lute, the UN special envoy, was sent to Cyprus on the 11th of January 2021 to meet the two leaders separately in advance of discussions beginning in February. The Cypriot President, Nicos Anastasiades, welcomed the UN initiative to resume the negotiation process and restated that a bi-communal federation is the most favourable solution to the Cyprus Problem. Tatar, on the other hand, expressed his willingness to participate in the five-party meeting but stated that a federation is no longer a realistic solution for the island. The UN did not make any official statements for either of the meetings, but the next round of negotiations is expected to take place in late February, in New York. 

February 2021 will mark the first official negotiations between Ersin Tatar and Nicos Anastasiadis, the Cypriot president, under the supervision of the UN. It is yet unclear whether the two presidents will discuss the two-states solution or if the Greek Cypriot government would veto such a proposal. So far, the official Greek Cypriot stance is against such a solution. 

The Cyprus Problem has remained unresolved for 47 years despite the numerous bi-communal talks held by the UN to find a solution. So far, the two Cypriot communities have discussed several variations of a federation that would unify the island. Disagreements between the two Cypriot communities, and the extensive involvement of the Turkish government in the affairs of the TRNC have led to the collapse of all the negotiations that took place since 1974. Greece is a close ally of the RoC but does not have an active role in the negotiation process. Turkey supports the split of the island into two states and has repeatedly called for the international recognition of the TRNC. The newly elected president of the TRNC, Ersin Tatar, has been the first leader of the Turkish Cypriot community who has officially proposed the two-states solution. With the next round of talks taking place in February, the RoC has two options; either to comply with Tatar’s request, meaning a political defeat, or to refuse his proposal, leading, once again, to the collapse of the negotiation process. 

 

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy. She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. She also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys traveling and learning about new cultures in her free time.

A Glimmer of Hope for Burma’s Peace Process?

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By Anna Plunkett

As two new parties sign Burma’s National Ceasefire Agreement, are we witnessing a new stage in Burma’s peace process? (Credit Image: Xinhua/U Aung)

 

On February 13, 2018, the number of signatories on Burma’s National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) grew from eight to ten with the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) officially joining at a ceremony held in the state capital Naypyidaw. Peace and reconciliation have been the primary focuses of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) since its landslide victory in the 2015 election. The cornerstone policy has been the NCA, which was established under President Thein Sein’s government and aims to negotiate between the government and the numerous Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) throughout Burma. Despite multiple peace conferences since 2015, the addition of two new signatories to the NCA in February has been the first tangible development in Burma’s peace process under the new NLD-led government. So, is this development the breath of life the beleaguered peace agreement has needed – or has it simply masked the larger problems within Burma’s peace process?

Either way, it has brought a glimmer of hope to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s peace and reconciliation aspirations that have not only been her primary objective since 2015 but a lifelong cause. Best known for her years under house arrest, Daw Suu is internationally recognised as a symbol of non-violent struggle against oppression. However, since taking office in early 2016 she and the NLD have struggled to make any progress on this central objective despite inclusive peace conferences with a variety of armed actors. Thus, the signing of two new armed groups to the NCA is the first substantial and official development within a highly-coveted peace process.

The NCA itself was developed under the leadership of President Thein Sein, Burma’s first civilian leader, elected in 2011. A former general, President Thein Sein brought mass political and economic reforms to Burma – among them the NCA. The National Ceasefire Agreement aimed to bring peace to Burma and unify multitude bilateral ceasefires that have been previously established around the country. Although it failed to meet its national aspirations, eight of the fifteen invited groups signed the agreement in October 2015.  This progress was marred with criticism after the main active armed opposition groups remained among the groups unwilling to sign the NCA.

This challenge to peace remains – Burma’s strongest opposition groups continue to oppose rather than negotiate with the government. Since 2011, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is actively engaged in combat with the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army). This war continues, mostly forgotten in the wake of the Rohingya crisis in the south of the country, which has seen the mass forced migration of almost 700,000 civilians into Bangladesh among claims of horrendous and systematic crimes against humanity. These crises within Burma’s borderlands highlight not only obstacles to the NCA but to Burma’s transition from war to peace.

The signing of two more groups to the NCA, the first substantial development since the original signing in late 2015, should be a cause for celebration. It represents long awaited progress in a war of almost seventy years. At the signing ceremony, Daw Suu confirmed the government’s commitment to fostering peace with the ten or so EAOs yet to sign the NCA.  Nevertheless, the central concern remains the same – the largest EAOs still refuse to sign and conflict continues to plague many communities within the borderlands. There is no doubt that steps towards a more comprehensive NCA represent not only success for the peace process but for the NLD government, struggling to live up to citizen’s expectations as it is.

As things stand, these successes are more superficial than lasting. Less than one month on, cracks are beginning to show in this newly reconfigured ceasefire. At the end of February, a skirmish was reported between the NMSP and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Ye Township of Mon State. Although fighting between the two groups is known to occur over land disputes, their newly forged alliance through the NCA provides a disconcerting backdrop to the escalation. This point is perhaps underlined by the Mon leadership’s refusal to give up their arms despite signing the NCA last month. A commitment to the peace process has been made, but the trust in it to work has yet to be forged.

Mistrust continues to undermine further agreements with non-members of the NCA. The Karenni National People’s Party (KNPP) has stated that it will delay its decision on whether to sign the ceasefire agreement until it can be established if the Tatmadaw were responsible for the deaths of three party members and a civilian. Although the Tatmadaw launched an investigation, the KNPP leadership remains unsure of its validity given the nature of the incident.

These proceedings demonstrate the fragility and complex environment in which the government attempts to forge nationwide peace and reconciliation. The signing of the NMSP and LDU has been a major step forward and may provide some momentum to what has been a beleaguered peace process. However, major obstacles to the NLD’s central objective persist. Fighting within the country continues between ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw, the Rohingya Crisis has taken on new proportions with villages now flattened within Rakhine State, and general mistrust of the army throughout the country remains high. Until the government can resolve some of these long-term underlying mistrust issues between the actors involved, it is unlikely that the peace process can be anything but tenuous.

 

Anna is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She received her BA in Politics and Economics from the University of York, before receiving a scholarship to continue her studies at York with an MA in Post-War Recovery. She was the recipient of the Guido Galli Award for her MA dissertation. Her primary interests include conflict and democracy at the sub-national level, understanding how transitions are implemented at the local level.  You can follow her on Twitter @AnnaBPlunkett

Image Source 

Banner: http://home.bt.com/news/world-news/two-rebel-groups-join-burmese-government-peace-process-11364250153132 

Image 1: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1089677.shtml

The ‘Third Intifada’ in historical perspective: the resurgence of the cross-generational Palestinian struggle?

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By: Aurelie Buytaert

Palestinian boy wears a Hamas headband during an anti-Israel rally, in the central Gaza Strip, Oct. 23, 2015. (photo by REUTERS/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa)
Palestinian boy wears a Hamas headband during an anti-Israel rally, in the central Gaza Strip, Oct. 23, 2015. (photo by REUTERS/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa)

Word of a Third Intifada is spreading in Israel, the Palestinian territories and in medias around the world – relayed by some, denied by others. Politicians and activists have focused regional and global attention on the conflict through this term as it resonates in history, and easily started eclipsing other discourses on the evolution of the conflict. On October 20, Ban-Ki Moon traveled to Jerusalem and spoke of the urgent need of restoring ‘a political horizon’ for the future. For the UN Secretary General, only there resides the hope ‘to overcome today’s despair’. Is the use of the term Intifada useful in analysing the present situation and what is its discursive impact on the hopes for a political horizon? Deconstructing what the label ‘intifada’ has come to convey, this article will argue that comparing today’s surge with the last intifada can expose the continuity in the underlying causes of violence, but that the differences in the agency and leadership today are too important to refer to the violence as an Intifada. Weighing these observations, it will assess if the use of the word intifada today speaks of political hope or only prolongs Palestinian despair.

Intifada’s historical meaning

December 1987. The word Intifada, originating in the Arabic root ‘shake’, ‘shake something’, or yet ‘break free’, is first applied to the Palestinian struggle. Developing through this first uprising, Palestinian remembrance and the Second Intifada, the term’s resonance in Palestine and the world is comparable to few others. It positions itself between Low Intensity Warfare and Ghandi-like civil disobedience,[i] and emerged out of the evolution of the 1987 Intifada, from a largely unarmed rebellion, to an increasingly lethal and armed insurgency in the 2000s. One of the fundamental idea of the Intifada is that of a ‘window of opportunity’,[ii] enabled by young generations of Palestinians; a vehicle for the social reproduction of the principles of Palestinian nationhood, whose (re)occurrence bridges political gaps between generations by bringing young actors to the forefront of Palestinian politics[iii]. Its identification as political warfare through national remembrance endows the term with the power to make martyrs out of individuals and shape a political message out of personal indignation. The rise of suicide Intifada participants, especially in 2000, gave the word an even more powerful resonance in linking the personal to the political by reinforcing the religious dimension of ‘[transforming] potentially senseless death into a redemptive self-sacrifice for the nation’[iv]. 

Learning from the past: the cross-generational causes of violence

At first glance, one could view the current wave of violence as the start of an Intifada, as it is mirroring the events at the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. Both surges in violence have been triggered by the perception that Israel had altered the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram el-Sharif. In 2000 it was the heavily policed visit to the Temple Mount by the then right-wing opposition leader Ariel Sharon that unleashed a wave of Palestinian upheaval. Today, rumours that the Israeli government desires to alter the status quo arrangement by allowing Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount have inflamed tensions and spurred the current wave of violence, so much so that Israeli Prime Minister had to accept the American backed initiative of installing surveillance cameras to refute the incendiary claim and prove that his government is in fact committed to preserving the status quo arrangement.

But as with the analysis of the underlying causes of the al-Aqsa Intifada[v], understanding the current wave of violence necessitates looking beyond the inflamed rhetoric surrounding Jerusalem’s holy sites, and understanding the deep-rooted issues that have compelled some Palestinians to turn to violence. In 2000 for instance, the most widely acknowledged cause of the uprising was the failure of the Camp David talks[vi], themselves crumbling due to the PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat’s unwillingness to accept Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s politically courageous offers of a territorial compromise. The failure of Camp David should not be considered in a political vacuum though; the Palestinian frustration, ingrained in national and religious sentiments of ownership of Sites in Jerusalem, in the enduring issue of the right of return, poor economic opportunities and in a lack of faith in the peace process, were underpinning high Palestinian politics and laying the grounds for mass uproar[vii]. This retrospective analysis should enlighten the analysis one can make of the grounds for shaking off today, as these Palestinian concerns and frustrations have, rather than been addressed, worsened: in 2013, polls showed that 47% of Palestinians thought a peace agreement would never be reached, 63% thought the right of return was a precondition for peace and unemployment in Gaza was deemed the Global worst in 2015.

The analogy between 2000 and 2015 leads to a two-fold conclusion. First, it highlights the importance of maintaining and monitoring the status quo over the Temple Mount/Haram el-Sharif, as tensions over this Site is a recurrent trigger of violence. But secondly, and most importantly, the analogy displays the intrinsic insufficiency, in preventing the resurgence of violence, of maintaining peace at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites in absence of a genuine peace process. Putting up surveillance cameras on Temple Mount and building additional walls to keep “terrorists” in check will by no means suffice to decrease the underlying causes of violence.  

Learning from the past: the evolution of agency and leadership in the violence

Causes of violence in 2015 may reflect those of 2000 but for so much, the insurgency is neither carried out by the same actors, nor directed with the same political purposefulness and organization. During the Second Intifada, the violence spread from the al-Aqsa compound in Jerusalem to the West Bank and Gaza, with a relative degree of organization and the cooperation of the Palestinian Security Forces. Today, acts of violence are carried out by individuals throughout the occupied territories and newly so, in high proportion, from Arab-Israeli (Israeli of Palestinian descent) living in East Jerusalem. These actors, holding Israeli ID Card and falling outside the Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction, have for the most part not experienced the al-Aqsa Intifada. The Palestinian Security Forces have neither participated in sparking the insurgency, nor have they joined it. Hence, while the Al-Aqsa Intifada started with a large, collective protest and soon held a clear, organized and national political message calling for change in Israeli policy, the lone knife-attackers that have occupied so much of the scene of this year’s violence have acted in isolation and without so much of a specific collective political message on Israeli policies –rather a desperate, suicidal statement of indignation.

But the most profound difference between the last Intifada and the present surge in violence might reside, not in the identity and mind-set of insurgents, but in the associated issue of the declining control of the Palestinian leadership –be they Fatah, Hamas or the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). In 2000, the uprising was, as many argue, galvanized by Arafat and channeled by the PLO to obtain a better bargaining position in the negotiation process [viii]. Today, it is questionable as to which leader, between Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh or the PLO’s Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, if any, is able to exert control on the violence. An aggravating circumstance to the political rivalry in Palestine is indeed the fact that no elections have been held in almost a decade.  Thus far, most of the perpetrators of violence have declared Abbas and the PLO ‘irrelevant’, and few have a distinct allegiance to Hamas. Some commentators point to personal and desperate acts of violence, not to a political and organized Intifada. This historically new kind of Palestinian insurgency, experienced neither in 1987 nor 2000, will likely be of a more volatile nature, becoming a non-negotiable, and even less controllable surge of violence, which would provoke an even more brutal Israeli response.

The use of the word “Intifada” today

The use of the word “intifada” to describe the current situation reflects for the mot part two attitudes: wishful thinking on the part of some elements of the Palestinian society and sympathizers to the Palestinian cause – as the term cloaks the lack of leadership and profound change of the agency’s mind-set – or sensationalism on part of commentators willing to utilize it as a buzz word.  Both may aim to convey hope rather than portray despair, but mislead the debate in the mystification of the past rather than using the latter to enlighten the analysis of the realities of 2015.

Looking back on the past exposes that the complexity of the causes of Palestinian indignation renders it either hypocritical or delusional to attempt to solve them if not holistically – that is, by addressing Palestinian concerns much beyond the Holy Sites’ status quo. In this, the Intifada analogy is useful. But if history is to be put to good use, one must admit that today’s acts of violence are not part of a single pattern of uprising, crossing Palestinian generations and communities. The present lack of responsible leadership and the changes in agency of these violence makes of today’s “martyrs” and protesters, rather than brothers in arms in a cross-generational and purposeful Intifada, powerless voices, accessories to the political impasse. As hope for a peace process is already mired in right-wing Israeli politics and in the Palestinian leadership’s shortcomings, observers and parties to the conflict should refrain from loading the present violence with misused historical constructs. Far from creating a ‘window of opportunity’, this only leads the debate towards more inflammatory rhetoric and further away from the much needed hope to create a new political horizon.

[i] Ron Schleifer, Psychological Warfare in the Intifada (UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2006) p.48

[ii] John Collins, Occupied by Memory (New York: NYU Press, 2004) p. I

[iii] Ron Schleifer, Psychological Warfare in the Intifada (UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2006) p.17

[iv] Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 140

[v] Aaron Bregman, Israel’s wars: a history since 1947 (London: Routeledge, 2002), p.207

[vi] Noam Chomsky, Middle East Illusions (U.S: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003

[vii] Jacob Shamir, Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada (USA: Indiana University Press, 2010) p. 61-62

[viii] Benny Morris, Righteous Victims (New York: Vintage Books, 2001) p. 662

Aurelie Buytaert, a Belgian national and Geneva native, is completing her final year of undergraduate studies at King’s War Studies Department, reading International Relations and specializing in the EU ‘s external action. She is European editor at the KCL Politics Society’s Dialogue and has worked with international and national refugee NGOs in both Switzerland and the UK.

Netanyahu, just the man we need

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By Gianmarco Morassutti Vitale:

Photo: Wikipedia
Photo: Wikipedia

This is the last of a three-piece series analysing outcomes and impacts of the recent Israeli election. Last week Eddo Bar considered what impact Netanyahu’s re-election would have on Israeli security, and Jill Russell examined the potential consequences for US-Israeli relations.

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Last Wednesday, Isaac Herzog, leader of the centre–left Zionist Union, conceded defeat to Benjamin Netanyahu after his party was allotted 24 seats in the Knesset – the Israeli parliament – to the Likud’s 30. In a similar fashion to the 1996 elections against Shimon Peres and the Labor party, Netanyahu’s Likud trailed behind the opposition in opinion polls but managed to secure the elections with a victory that he described as “against all odds”.

That same day, the Likud party announced that it was looking to form a coalition government with the Jewish Home party, Yisrael Beitenu, the United Torah Party, the ultra-orthodox Shas, and the centrist Kulanu.

Beyond the Likud’s victory, what really caused media uproar was Netanyahu’s declaration on Tuesday that he rejected the possibility of a Palestinian state, ultimately destroying the possibility of a two-state solution and deepening schisms in the US-Israeli relationship.

However, in order to galvanise the peace process and change decision-making in Israel, it is necessary to raise the cost of the occupation. In order to create constructive change, it is necessary to place Israel on a collision course with everyone else. Since long-standing support from the US and international partners have been critical to maintaining the status quo, a re-evaluation of the peace process might lead to a new direction and initiative. For this, Netanyahu is just the man we need; he is a polarising figure on the international stage, and his re-election will compel allies and partners to re-assess their policy towards Israel.

It is no secret that the relationship between the United States and Israel, or more specifically, with the Bibisitter himself, has been colder than it had been in the past. Netanyahu’s most recent visit to Washington DC, where he appeared before Congress to speak against an emerging nuclear deal with Iran, galvanised certain elements of the Republican party but placed him in the doghouse for the Obama administration. Netanyahu was accused of trying to bolster his election support and provide the Republican-dominated Congress with the backing to oppose the executive’s negotiations with Iran. Perhaps the decision to invite Netanyahu was motivated more by anti-Obama sentiment than an anti-Iran / pro-Israel sentiment.

Netanyahu’s outright opposition to a Palestinian state marks a decisive break from US interests in the region. Republican and Democrat administration in the past decades have implicitly desired the establishment of a Palestinian state, despite the US’s continuous support of Israel in the UN. The Prime Minister’s declaration has therefore raised some serious concerns in the current administration. According to Josh Earnest, the press secretary to the Obama administration, the US is ‘deeply concerned about rhetoric that seeks to marginalize Arab-Israeli citizens’. He also added that the administration would ‘have to reassess our options going forward’. There have in fact been warnings that the US might withdraw its political support for Israel within the UN. However, military support and the security relationship will continue to be sacrosanct.

Many have dismissed Netanyahu’s abandonment of prior commitments as mere election rhetoric aimed at consolidating right-wing votes during the elections, and they aren’t wrong. According to a report from Haaretz by Or Kashti, while the Zionist Union fared better in the larger and wealthier cities, Likud won the majority of middle- and lower-class towns (64 of 77) and the support of West Bank settlements. On Thursday, two days after his electoral victory, Netanyahu had already begun to backtrack on his statements. He explained that he wasn’t divorcing the peace process but that ‘what has changed is the reality’. He said that the reality on the ground marked what was achievable and what wasn’t. ‘To make it achievable, then you have to have real negotiations with people who are committed to peace’.

For Dimi Reider, an Israeli journalist and researcher at the European Council on Foreign Affairs, Benjamin Netanyahu needs to maintain the mirage perception of a two-state solution as it allows Israel to pursue and implement a de facto, rather than de jure, one-state reality. According to certain officials, Netanyahu has previously talked about the two-state solution as lip service to coalition partners but tended to focus policy arguments on the dangerous presence of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza. He has also categorically refused to address a binational state solution, preferring an ‘Israel-only’ supervision of future demilitarisation in the West Bank[1].

Regardless of Benjamin Netanyahu’s backtracking and attempts to clarify his statements, the White House has reaffirm its commitments to the two-state solution. Mr Earnest clarified that Netanyhu’s statement did have consequences, one of which was demonstrating that he wasn’t truly committed to the peace process and that consequently the administration would have to reassess its options and ‘re-evaluate our thinking’.

And this is why Netanyahu is – inadvertently – perfect for the long-term prospects of the peace process.

When the election results came out and it became clear that Netanyahu had won, social media platforms rang out with all sorts of disappointment and many echoed the fear that a two-state solution was finally buried. But the victory of Likud and Benjamin Netanyahu is actually a positive outcome because it is likely to harden the desire within the US and other international actors for a new process and mobilise the effort needed for it to be constructive.

Netenyahu’s divisive rhetoric during the elections and the abandonment of prior commitments for the sake of votes has demonstrated that Netanyahu is the worst kind of opportunist. This, alongside his continuous flip-flop between the possibility of negotiating a two-state solution and the categorical refusal to withdraw from the West Bank, demonstrates that Netanyahu is not a trustworthy partner and the US should refrain from being his enabler. Senators Dianne Feinstein and Richard Durbin stated that Netanyahu has sacrificed a ‘deep and well-established cooperation’ for partisan points that would have lasting repercussions.

Netanyahu’s persona carries an important phenomenon: polarization, and it is this ability that, as Gideon Levy – a writer for Haaretz – stated, will ‘lead the United States to adopt harsh measures against Israel, for the man whom the world long ago grew sick of’[2].

In irregular warfare insurgent or guerrilla movements often aim at polarizing the populace, who are regarded as the critical battleground, rather than the conventional battlefield. Polarising the populace typically results in the heightened mobilisation of people and a more clear distinction of who is on whose side. In other words, polarisation shifts perceptions so that the world stops being viewed as many different shades of gray and becomes a world of black and white or “us versus them”. Netanyahu embodies this polarisation factor.

Netanyahu has come to embody the very concept of Israeli intransigence, the expansion of settlements, and the violation of Palestinian rights.

As interactions between Israelis and Palestinians has diminished and the costs of maintaining the occupied territories hasn’t risen, Israel has become comfortable with the status quo. For any kind of effective change it is necessary to alter the trajectory. If Isaac Herzog had been elected, the illusory perception of change might have lessened international pressure on Israel. A new government would have sought to reopen previously failed channels and peace negotiations would have begun without any real progress. Stagnation would be the inevitable product of a united right-wing opposition in the Knesset.

Despite being snubbed by the Obama administration, Israel continues to have deep contacts within Congress. Netanyahu’s government will probably try to ride out the division with the Obama administration until the next US presidential is elected in 2016, but if the current administration begins to act on its re-evaluations, as Earnest stated, it could spell real trouble for Netanyahu. Even if he does try to ride it out, pressure on Israel is bound to increase.

In fact, under Netanyahu’s leadership, the ‘BDS’ or ‘boycott, divestment and sanctions’ campaign against Israel by the international community has thrived. Millions of dollars have been divested from Israeli Banks and companies like SodaStream that operated in the West Bank.

Netanyahu continues to heighten tensions between allies and polarise the international community. The opposition of his government to any constructive change will mobilise international pressure and possibly the future of an entirely new peace process.

And that’s why I, for one, am glad that the Bibisitter is back.

Gianmarco Morassutti Vitale is an MA student in War Studies at King’s College London.  His holds a BA in Arabic and Politics from the University of Leeds. He spent a year in Egypt during the revolution 2011 and has a particular interest in the Middle East, especially Lebanon, Hezbollah and Israel.